how unique are current times? · further over the next decade even with moderate slowdown in coming...
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Global Growth and Crises in Historical PerspectiveNovember, 2010
How Unique are Current Times?
Presented byBart van Ark, Chief Economist
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Angus Maddison (1926-2010). This presentation is dedicated to Angus Maddison, who was a lifelong scholar in the measurement of long-term economic growth in the world economy, After several decades at
the OECD, Maddison became an economics professor at the University of Groningen (The Netherlands), where he developed a broadly based research program on the sources of growth and development. The most important part of this program was the development of historical measures of GDP and per capita income growth and comparative levels of economic performance. The full set of numbers
Maddison published in Historical Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP 1-2008 AD is available online from his homepage (www.ggdc.net/ maddison). The Conference Board is proud to have inherited one small part of this monumental enterprise in the form of the output and productivity estimates since 1950 that appear in the Total Economy Database (www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase)
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The current shift in global production may be unprecedented
Projections for 2011-2020 suggest faster global GDP growth than 2000-2010 (or even 2000-2008), and not much below 1950-1973
Slow investment, low demand, persistent unemployment, and structural weaknesses will prevent acceleration of growth in advanced economies
Emerging economies will raise their contribution to global growth further over the next decade even with moderate slowdown in coming decade
The shift in global output from 60% (advanced) – 40% (emerging) in 2000 to 40% (advanced) – 60% (emerging) is largest in history
Is a change in “economic leadership” imminent and what can we learn from the past?
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Agenda
1. Projections of global GDP growth 2011-2020: methods and ranges
2. How unique are current times?
3. A change in economic leadership?
4. The downside risks and upside potential in the next decade
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The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2011-2020
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The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2011-20
Short term (2011) based on The Conference Board Leading Economic Indexes
Medium term (2011-2015) based on measures of output gaps, trends in unemployment and capacity utilization
Long term (2011-2020) based on projections of working age population, assumptions on total factor production and related trends in capital growth.
All informed by evidence from business outlooks and assessment of political-institutional issues that may impact on growth
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-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
U.S. (Sep '10)
Euro area (Sep '10)
U.K. (Aug '10)
Germany (Aug '10)
Japan (Aug '10)
6-month percent change (annual rate)
The Conference Board Leading Economic Indexes®Japan(right side)
6-month percent change (annual rate)
Source: The Conference Board
The Conference Board Leading Economic Indexes® signal slower, but positive, short-term growth in advanced economies
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-32
-28
-24
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
China
Korea
Mexico
6-month percent change (annual rate)
The Conference Board Leading Economic Indexes®
Aug '10
Source: The Conference Board
The short-term growth prospects for emerging economies are mixed
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high speed
slow speed
medium speed
medium speed
slow speed
Multi-speed growth disparities in 2010 continue into 2011
2010
2011
Projected GDP growth
Source: The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2011-2020, preliminary estimates
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The closing of the output gap will take time, even if the potential output level itself falls
Sources: CBO, IMF, The Conference Board
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Output gap betweenactual and potential GDP
Percent of potential GDP Projections
Euro 15
U.S.
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Required growth to close output gap in U.S. by 2015 is between 3.5 and 4%
Sources: BEA, CBO, The Conference Board
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Real GDP growth
Potential output growth
Required growth to close output gap
TCB GDP forecast
Percent Projections
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In Europe “required” growth until 2015 is much less due to lower potential output growth rate
Sources: BEA, CBO, The Conference Board
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Real GDP growth
Potential output growth
Required growth to close output gap
TCB GDP forecast
Percent Projections
EU-15
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Advanced economies will show weakness in employment and productivity growth
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010;
*Preliminary estimates of The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2011-2020
* * **
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Investment remains the main driver in emerging economies but total factor productivity will need to play key role
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010
* * * *
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Sources: 1820-2000: Maddison (2007); 2000-2020 The Conference Board
The 2000-2020 period may become the second fastest growth period in recent history
1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000 2000-2020 Western Europe 1.7 2.1 1.2 4.8 2.3 1.3United States 4.2 3.9 2.8 3.9 3.1 1.9Other Advanced 1.0 2.8 2.5 7.5 3.6 2.1 China -0.4 0.6 0.0 4.9 6.8 9.9India 0.4 1.0 0.2 3.5 5.1 8.1Developing Asia 0.9 2.1 1.9 4.6 4.7 5.3Latin America 1.2 3.5 3.4 5.4 3.0 3.6Middle East 0.8 1.4 2.6 7.4 3.4 4.9Africa 0.7 1.3 2.6 4.4 2.9 5.2Eastern Europe 1.4 2.3 0.9 4.9 1.0 3.4Russia and CIS 1.6 2.4 2.1 4.8 -0.6 4.0 World 0.9 2.1 1.8 4.9 3.1 4.0Today's Advanced 1.9 2.6 2.0 4.9 2.9 1.8Today's Emerging 0.4 1.6 1.6 5.0 3.4 6.4
Growth rate of real GDP, 1820-2020
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2020*
Shares of world GDP
US EU-15 Other advanced China India Russia and CIS Other emerging
The world economy looks set for a large shift in global distribution of output
*Preliminary estimates of The Conference Board Global Economic Outlook 2011-2020
2000 2010
23
23
16
8
4
4
23
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010
18
18
1416
5
4
2415
13
11
24
8
8
21
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Differences with Maddison’s projections to 2030 (Maddison, 2007)
Maddison’s 2003-2030 projection for world GDP growth was 3.2% (2.1% for “rich” and 4.1% for “rest”), about 0.8%-point lower than our estimate from 2000-2020.
OECD revised Maddison estimates upward to 3.5% global growth (1.8% for “rich” and 4.5% for “rest”)
Maddison has a larger GDP share for China (17% of world GDP level in 1990$ vs. 11% in 2005$) and bigger growth deceleration (5% vs. 8.5% growth) and India (6% vs. 8% growth).
It may be reasonable to assume slower growth after 2030, maybe by 0.5%, because of declining catch-up opportunities for emerging economies.
Substantial downside risks to our global outlook may have been partly incorporated in Maddison’s estimates
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How unique are current times?
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Sources: Maddison (2007), The Conference Board
The 2000s have seen a larger output share in global output from today’s emerging economies
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
28,000
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 2000 2008
GDP
Billion dollars at 1990 price level (using PPP)
Today’ s Advanced1.Western Europe2.North America and Advanced Pacific3.Advanced East Asia
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
Today’ s Emerging1.China2.India3.Eastern Europe and Russia4.Other emerging
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Sources: Maddison (2007), The Conference Board
Until 1820, what are today’s emerging economies, had by far the largest share in the global economy
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1 1000 1500 1820
GDP
Billion dollars at 1990 price level (using PPP)
Today’ s Advanced1.Western Europe2.North America and Advanced Pacific3.Advanced East Asia
Today’ s Emerging1.China2.India3.Eastern Europe and Russia4.Other emerging
1
23
1
2
3
4
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* 2000-2050 makes conservative assumptions that there will be no further shifts in global output shares after 2020Sources: Maddison (2007), The Conference Board
Period 2000-2020 shows unprecedented change in output shares across major global regions
Alternative measures of changes in global output shares
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A change in economic leadership?
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Colin Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 1940
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What is economic leadership and how does it arise?
Economic leadership has two faces (Rostas, 1985):
The relative primacy of a country in commercializing a new technology and establishing a dominant position in a major sector.
The assumption of responsibility for the successful operation of the world economy as a whole
Economic leadership arises from “intensive growth”:
Population growth, more specifically: a rising share of the working age population
A sustainable mix of investment and productivity growth
A pioneering role in technological and institutional innovation
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Why did the West arise?
Human capacity to transform forces of nature through rational investigation and systematic experimentation, including rise of universities and the mass use of printing and publishing;
The fostering of entrepreneurship, especially in urban trading centers (Bruges, Venice, etc.);
Reforms of marriage, inheritance, and kinship arrangements to support individualism, accumulation and nation state building
The emergence of a multipolar nation-state system that supported trade, competition, and intellectual exchange.
A gradual evolution of these forces to establish European economic leadership (Maddison-Pomeranz debate)
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
1000-1500 1500-1820 1820-1950 1950-2000 2000-2020
U.S.
Western Europe
China
India
Percent
Population growth rates
Sources: Maddison (2007), The Conference Board
During periods of intensive growth, population rises…
Maddison estimates
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Sources: Maddison (2007), The Conference Board
…in conjunction with a rise in per capita income
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1000-1500 1500-1820 1820-1950 1950-2000 2000-2020
U.S.
Western Europe
China
India
Percent
GDP per capita, annual growth ratesMaddison estimates
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How does economic leadership erode?
Preconditions for the relative decline of leading world economic powers (Kindleberger, 1996)
Financialization of the economy – and erosion of manufacturing base
Overindebtedness (see also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008)
Currency debasement
Overdependence of energy
Political corruption and rent seeking
Loss of technological leadership
A falling share in working age population and skill erosion
In other words: “extensive growth”
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The risks during the next decade
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The downside risk for the global outlook is with emerging economies
Inflationary pressures in emerging markets will be high and drive nominal currency appreciation to effectuate rebalancing
Domestic consumption growth, including services, may dominate trade and investment and slow economic growth
Financial instability risks are high given the large global flows of capital into the immature capital markets of emerging economies
The transition from Investment to productivity as primary driver of growth is more difficult at innovation frontier
The demographic burden of a decline working age population may come too early, in particular for China
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50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
China
India
Advancedcountries
Emergingex. China and India
Working age of populationas a percent of total population
Percent IDB projections
China’s demographics will peak this decade, but other emerging markets will continue to see improvements
Sources: The Census Bureau (IDB), The Conference Board
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-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
-1,500
-1,200
-900
-600
-300
0
300
600
900
1,200
1,500
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
65+ population 40-64 Population15-39 Population 0-14 Population15-39 Growth Rate (RHS) 40-64 Growth Rate (RHS)65+ growth rate (RHS) 0-14 growth rate (RHS)
Working age population (millions)Working age population (millions)
In China aging population and shrinking workforce will add to inflationary pressures longer term
Sources: UN Population Division, World population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, The Conference Board
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The “upgrade” of human capital will be one of the biggest challenges for emerging economies
Emerging economies
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010
Advanced economies Percentage of labor force by skill level
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The upside potential for advanced economies is to reignite an innovation cycle and to realign with the financial cycle
Supply of debt and equity
1980’s
Recovery / restructuring of banking sector; and moderate increase in
loans
1990’s
Raid growth related to ICT/ solid increase
in debt + equity / ratio
2000’s
Slowdown idue to
saturation; finance
chases less productive
activity;
Shortage of supply over demand pushing up returns; how long and how large the returns will be depends on the shape of this gap
Excess supply of capital over demand; by how much depends on many factors
Demand for finance related to investment and innovation
Financial cycle
S-shaped innovation cycle/phase (Kondratieff)
Case for 1970s-2000s
1970’s
Slow growth & weak finance from retained earning and
equity
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The current slow-growth period in the U.S. may have its origins in the prerecession slowdown
Note: Trends were estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter.Sources: BEA, The Conference Board
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annual percent change from preceding quarter
Real GDPCurrentpre-2010 annual revision pre-2009 comprehensive revision
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How much can history tell us about the future?
Topline macro GDP growth estimates can either overstate or understate the dynamics of structural change.
Positive and negative shocks can change the course of action, but mostly play out very, very gradually.
In short term downside risks for emerging economies are large, especially in Asia.
What is nature of economic leadership with average income far below former leaders?
What does greater interconnectivity of the global economy mean for convergence process?