How the Self-Transcendent Emotion of Awe

Affects Cooperation, Distributional Preferences

and Stability in Measurement of the Five Factor

Model of Personality Traits

Caleb Lo

School of Economics and Finance

QUT Business School

Queensland University of Technology

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of

Master of Philosophy (Economics)

2019

Declaration of AuthorshipThe content of this thesis is the original work of the author. The work has not been

previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher

education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no

material previously published or written by another person except where due refer-

ence is made.

Name: Caleb Lo

Date: 3rd September, 2019

Signature: QUT Verified Signature

AcknowledgementsFirst of all I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Uwe Dulleck and Dr.

Stephen Whyte. Without your inspirations, support and guidance, this thesis would

be impossible. I would like to thank Anthony and Alice for their help, in particular

with coding. I would also like to thank Martin and Laura for all the chats we had and

ideas you provided. To everyone else in the School of Economics and Finance, Aimee,

Azhar, Ben, Jeremy, Naomi, Richard, Ryan, Poli, thank you for all the coffees, chats

and laughter we had together. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my

family for your love and support during this research journey. To my parents, Martin

and Karen, I never thank you enough for having raised me over all these years.

AbstractThe emotion of awe has attracted research interest in the past decade on its particular

ability of changing people behaviour. Recent studies have found that experience of

awe leads to a sense of “small self”, and therefore leads to increased prosociality, This

research aims to further investigate awe’s impact on different aspects, including coop-

eration, distributional preferences and stability in measurement of personality traits.

Through a laboratory experiment and exposing participants in a natural awe environ-

ment, this study found that individuals exposed to awe exhibited higher cooperation

level in the public goods game, and increase in their measurement of agreeableness.

Understanding that agreeableness predicts prosociality and cooperation, findings in

this study established an indirect theoretical link between awe and prosociality/ co-

operation.

Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Literature Review 6

2.1 Introduction to cooperative behaviour and shared intentionality . . . 6

2.2 Prosocial behaviour and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3 Relational consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.4 The emotion of awe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.4.1 Self-transcendence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.4.2 Individual differences in experiences of awe . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.5 Somatic Marker Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.6 Stability of the Big Five Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.7 Factors affecting Public Goods Game Contribution . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.8 Distributional preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.9 Gender difference in Behavioural and Experimental Research . . . . . 26

2.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3 Methodology and Design 29

3.1 The experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.2.1 Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.2.2 Emotion labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.2.3 Appraisal endorsement for target experience . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.2.4 Next hour activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.2.5 Equality Equivalence Test (EET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.2.6 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.2.7 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.2.8 Public Goods Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

4 Results and Discussion 35

4.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4.2 Awe and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

4.3 Awe and Distributional Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.4 Awe and the Stability in the measurement of the Five Factor Model of

Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4.4.1 OLS Estimation on Measurement of Personality Traits Stability 51

4.4.2 Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Two-sample t-test on Measure-

ment of Personality Trait Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4.4.3 Components of Agreeableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4.4.4 Further Analysis on Stability in the measurement of Agreeable-

ness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

4.4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4.5 Moderating effect of agreeableness on cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.6 General Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

5 Conclusion 63

A Experiment screenshots i

B Experiment instructions xvii

B.1 Task A instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

B.2 Task C instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii

C Other tests xxi

D Experimental treatment xxv

References xxviii

List of Figures

4.1 Contribution in the Public Goods Game. (N=126) . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4.2 Frequency of the (x,y) scores. (N=117) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

A.1 Welcome page. Participants were to enter their participant label into

the box above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

A.2 Welcome Page. The experimenter presented participants with a brief

introduction. This screen captures no data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

A.3 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the first screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

A.4 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the second screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

A.5 FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the third screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

A.6 Demographic questions. This is the first screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions such

as age, gender, education, marital status, field of study and whether

English is their first language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

A.7 Demographic questions. This is the second screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions

regarding their ethnic and religious background. . . . . . . . . . . . vi

A.8 Demographic questions. This is the third screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions

about their devoutness to religion, interest in politics, political views,

next hour activites as in Shiota et al. (2007), life satisfaction, health

and comments on the experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

A.9 Emotional labels (as in Shiota et al., 2007). After the target experience,

participants were asked to describe their emotional state according to

the emotional labels on a scale of 0-100. Two examples of the emotional

labels are shown above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

A.10 Instructions for Task A. This screen is to inform participants that Task

A is about to start. The instructions for Task A were read aloud by

the experimenter. Participants also received a physical copy of the

instructions when they reach this screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

A.11 Contribution page for Task A. Participants were to choose their con-

tribution to the joint project on this page. The top of this page shows

participants the round they are in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

A.12 Results page. This page shows participants the details of all the con-

tributions in the group, as well as the participants earnings for the

round. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

A.13 Question on the reasoning behind their decisions. Participants were

asked this question about the reasons behind their choice of contribu-

tion to the joint project, after round 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

A.14 Appraisal endorsement for target experience (as in Shiota et al., 2007).

Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they remembered

having several appraisals of the target experience, on a scale of 0-100. xi

A.15 Question on whether the target experience affected their decision to

contribute. Participants in the main treatment were asked this ques-

tion, whether they felt the target experience affecting their decisions

on how much to contribute in the PGG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

A.16 Question on participants previous visits to the Gibson Room. Partic-

ipants in the main treatment were asked this question, as familiarity

may reduce the level of awe during the experience. Participants were

to complete the FFM questionnaire the second time after this question. xii

A.17 Task B instructions. After the second FFM questionnaire (post-treatment),

the instructions for Task B were shown to participants. Participants

were told by the experimenter that Task B involves ten decisions of

splitting money between you (the participant) and another participant. xii

A.18 Decision Task for Task B. This is the decision task from Kerschbamer

(2015), with earnings adjusted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

A.19 Task C instructions. This screen is to inform participants that Task

C is about to start. The instructions for Task C were read aloud by

the experimenter. Participants also received a physical copy of the

instructions when they reach this screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

A.20 Decision screen for Task C. Participants start collecting boxes by press-

ing the Start button and they can press Stop anytime. Every second

before the Stop button a box will be marked by a tick symbol, indi-

cating that the box is collected. Participants press the Solve button to

locate the bomb after pressing Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

A.21 Results screen for Task C. Participants were informed their earnings

for Task C, including the number of boxes collected and whether the

bomb is located in one of the boxes they collected. . . . . . . . . . . . xvi

A.22 Payment screen. This is the final screen of the experiment. Partici-

pants were informed the details of their earnings from the experiment,

including the selected rounds for payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi

Chapter 1

Introduction

“The beauty of the trees,

the softness of the air,

the fragrance of the grass,

speaks to me.

The summit of the mountain,

the thunder of the sky,

speaks to me.

The faintness of the stars,

the trail of the sun,

the strength of fire,

and the life that never goes away,

they speak to me.

And my heart soars.”

Chief Dan George

Sunsets, starry skies, mountains, oceans, waterfalls, childbirth, - transformative, un-

forgettable once-in-a-lifetime experiences, bring an immense sense of wonder, fascina-

tion, and joy. How do these experiences impact, and transform individuals? If these

experiences are beneficial to ourselves, how do these experiences benefit the rest of

the society, including those who did not experience it? If so, does it have collective

implications, where people feel part of a greater community, by making decisions that

are beneficial to others, not just beneficial to themselves?

Awe is an emotional response to perceptually vast stimuli that overwhelms and chal-

lenges frames of reference. Awe is by no means a new concept, as historic reference

1

of awe can be found in religion, sociology and philosophy. Keltner and Haidt (2003)

define the important properties of awe as vastness and accommodation, laying a solid

theoretical foundation for later studies and leading to a resurgence in the research

on awe. The five essential elements - threat, beauty, ability, virtue and supernatural

causality distinguish awe from other positive emotions such as admiration (Keltner

& Haidt, 2003). Combining the solitary nature of experience and a seemingly contra-

dictory unifying power, awe is neither an other-oriented emotion, nor a self-oriented

emotion, but a stimulus-oriented emotion, which is different to other positive emo-

tions such as gratitude (Prade & Saroglou, 2015). The mechanism behind the social

function of awe is different to other positive emotions, and requiring further explo-

ration.

Pioneering studies of the social function of awe have only emerged a few years ago,

when researchers such as Piff et al. (2015), Prade and Saroglou (2015) and Stellar

et al. (2017) examined the relationship between awe and prosocial behaviour. Piff

et al. (2015) propose that the sense of diminished self brought by awe experiences

will lead to greater prosociality, while Prade and Saroglou (2015) look particularly

into the effect of awe on helping behaviour. However, these studies were limited by

the simple priming methods they employed in their elicitation of awe. The social

function of awe needs to be explored and tested in different dimensions, using differ-

ent methodologies. Having a well-established link between awe and prosociality also

has important implications for the study of cooperation. A problem for this study

concerns the distinction between prosociality and cooperation. Chapter 2 will detail

the parallels between prosociality and cooperation, in the basis of which this study

expects a positive impact of awe on cooperation.

Key Research Question 1. How does the emotion of awe affect cooperation in

economic experiments?

Following from Key Research Question 1 and past findings on the social function

of awe, it would be interesting to further explore the effect of awe on different types

of social preferences.

Key Research Question 2. How does the emotion of awe affect distributional

preferences in economic experiments?

2

In addition, this study aims to investigate the effect of an awe experience on in-

dividual personality. Understanding that behaviours manifest from one’s personality

traits, it would be interesting to study the stability of personality traits with the

impact of awe (Ajzen, 1987).

Key Research Question 3. To what extent does the emotion of awe affect per-

sonality reporting?

Current literature has divergent views with respect to the stability of personality

traits. More traditional theory argues that personality change is intrinsic and is

therefore relatively stable throughout adulthood, even in the case of a significant life

event (eg. McCrae and Costa, 1999), but more recent studies found that environ-

ment has an impact on the stability of personality traits (eg. Bleidorn et al., 2009;

Hopwood et al., 2011).

To address Key Research Questions 1, 2 and 3, this study examines the relation-

ship between the emotion of awe, cooperation and distributional preferences as well

as the stability in the measurement of the five factor personality traits using a lab-

oratory experiment. Participants in the experiment experienced the emotion of awe

through exposure to a natural environment setting - a balcony with panoramic views.

This study used a 16-round public goods game as a measurement of cooperation,

the Equality Equivalence Test (EET) by Kerschbamer (2015) as a measurement of

distributional preferences, and collected data of the participants’ five factor model of

personality traits before and after the target experience as a measurement of person-

ality traits stability.

This study found that controlling for other factors, participants in the Walk/Awe

treatment group exhibited higher contributions in the public goods game, in other

words, higher levels of cooperation than those who were not exposed to the emotion

of awe. The awe experience also impacted participants’ prosocial preferences, shown

by their x-scores in the EET. A significantly positive treatment effect was also found

on trait stability in the measurement of agreeableness. In other words, participants

in the Walk/Awe treatment group had a positive change in agreeableness compared

to participants in the other treatments. Given the fairly well-established positive re-

lationship between agreeableness and prosociality/cooperation in the literature (eg.

3

Habashi, Graziano & Hoover, 2016; Caprara, Alessandri, Giunta, Panerai & Eisen-

berg, 2009; Volk, Thoni & Ruigrok, 2011; Carlo, Okun, Knight & de Guzman, 2005;

Kagel & McGee, 2014; Koole et al., 2001), this establishes an indirect theoretical link

between awe and prosociality/cooperation: awe experiences increase agreeableness,

and a greater level of agreeableness increases prosociality and cooperation.

Our study contributes to the current literature in three ways. Firstly, by adding

different dimensions into the social function of awe, our results strengthen the the-

oretical understanding of awe. Using the natural environment and the public goods

game as tools confirmed that exposure to awe experiences leads to better coopera-

tion. The results of this study add to the well-established small self hypothesis of

Piff et al. (2015), by establishing an indirect relationship between awe and prosocial-

ity/cooperation through the personality trait of agreeableness. The theoretical link

between awe and prosocial behaviour/cooperation is further bolstered by showing

that exposure to awe experiences lead to an increase in agreeableness, which in turn

leads to higher prosociality and cooperation.

Secondly, by using a setting in the natural environment to induce awe, our study

contributes to the methodology of awe studies. This can overcome the challenge of

stimulating the awe experience in a confined experimental environment. Moreover,

the sufficiency and pureness of awe elicited in an experimental setting has been lim-

ited, although methodologies with highly controlled stimuli such as recalling a past

experience and visual imagery (eg. Piff et al., 2015; Prade & Saroglou, 2015) were

able to demonstrate the relationship between awe and prosocial behaviour. Utilising

panoramic views in a natural setting is worth considering for future research as a

natural stimulus, which more closely approximate a real life awe experience.

Lastly, this study of awe and the change in personality traits contributes to both

strands of the literature, proposing a connection between the two. Previous research

on the emotion of awe has not looked into any possible impacts awe experiences have

on stability in the measurement of personality traits. On the other hand, existing

literature show the change in personality traits over years, or periods in life, but few

have considered the change after a shock event, in a short period of time (within a

single day). Our study showed that in the event of an experience that forces adjust-

ment of the mental schema, it is possible for the measurement of personality traits

4

to be unstable. Future studies might consider how experiences affect the stability in

the measurement of personality traits over short periods of time.

5

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Before investigating further into the behavioural implications of awe, it is important

to understand various underlying concepts. This chapter will provide a summary of

the literature surrounding the topics of awe, transcendence and emotions. We will

also provide literature background to Key Research Questions 1, 2 & 3, including

cooperative behaviour, the public goods game, distributional preferences and the

stability of the five factor model of personality traits.

2.1 Introduction to cooperative behaviour and shared

intentionality

Humans are fundamentally isolated. We are born alone and will die alone (Gergen,

2009). However, we live in groups, and rely on groups. Homo sapiens are an unusually

cooperative species - we are all social and at least minimally cooperative (Sussman

& Cloninger, 2011). In fact, cooperative and altruistic behaviours are the glue that

underpins the ability for primates and humans to live in groups. There are competing

explanations of the cooperative behaviour of human beings. One explanation argues

for group selection, where the groups that cooperate outperform selfish groups. An-

other position is Tomasello’s theory of shared intentionality. Shared intentionality

refers to the collaborative interactions of sharing psychological states with one an-

other (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). It could be a shared goal or a shared action.

Tomasello’s perspective is based on the assumption that young, human infants’ abil-

ity to share interest and attention are much better than that of our nearest primate

relatives, chimpanzees. For example, humans are able to communicate in a unique

way, based on some shared common ground (attentional frame). Also, humans’ in-

6

tentions are different to those of chimpanzees. Chimpanzees engage in cooperative

communication as an individualistic means of manipulating others, while for humans

we share experience or even helpful information. In addition, humans may collabo-

rate just for the sake of collaborating, where chimpanzees do not. Chimpanzees are

much more individualistic, even in learning. Humans would engage in demonstrat-

ing and imitative learning, in other words, copying others actions. Humans seem to

have the ability to see the collaborative structure of this interactive learning. These

different examples of sharing psychological states is what Tomasello argued to be the

foundation of human interactions, including social behaviours.

2.2 Prosocial behaviour and Cooperation

The term prosocial behaviour broadly refers to behaviours that benefit others. Coop-

eration refers to the action of two or more individuals helping one another to reach the

same end, but at a cost to the individual (Hinde & Groebel, 1991). Both prosociality

and cooperation belong to the general category of positive social behaviour, and they

both increase others’ positive outcomes (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982). However, the na-

ture of interdependence, and the underlying motivations are two key distinguishing

factors . The like nature generally defines prosocial behaviour by its unilateral depen-

dence in contrast to the mutual dependence of cooperation . However, Schwartz and

Howard (1982) argue that mutual dependence is central to both, and that the differ-

ence is instead in the nature of the jointly determined costs and benefits. Unlike the

general view of prosocial behaviour that the costs are borne by the helper and the ben-

efits are gained by the receiver, Schwartz and Howard’s (1982) model proposes that

both parties gain rewards and incur costs from their decisions. The helper incurs ma-

terial or social costs, but potentially gains psychological, social or material rewards.

The receiver gains material rewards, but potentially incurs social or psychological

costs. In the case of prosocial behaviour where the costs and benefits of both parties

are dependent on the other parties’ decisions, this mutual dependency is similar to

cooperative behaviour. Cooperative behaviour implies that a person’s decision will

affect others, and others decision will affect that person. Whether or not the interests

of the person and other parties are correspondent (or aligned), cooperation simply

means acting in a way that maximises both the person and the other parties’ interests.

Rewards, on the other hand, play an important role in any interdependence situation.

7

Theories generally classify the intention of a social act into exocentric (external re-

wards) motivation or endocentric motivation (no external reinforcement) (Karylowski,

1982). Yet, largely influenced by game theory, most theories of cooperation, have

focused on the external, situational structure instead of the internal, motivational

structure (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982). Psychologists such as Kelley and Thibaut (1978)

reinterpreted interdependence, showing that it is not formed by the external structure

but the individual perception of the situation, the subjective evaluation of outcome.

If in fact the internal structure, is what constitutes interdependence, then the psy-

chological analysis of cooperation and prosocial behaviour are identical. Although

the prosocial behaviour and cooperation cannot be integrated directly, Derlega and

Grzelak (1982) argue there is a huge overlap in the research domain of the two, and

difference in theoretical approach will gradually converge.

2.3 Relational consciousness

Hay and Nye (1998) introduced the idea of relational consciousness in their book The

Spirit of the Child. The term relational consciousness broadly refers to the awareness

of our interrelationship with other beings, including people, the environment and also

God for religious believers. It is made popular by Hay and Nye’s study into the

spirituality of children in the 1990s. There are three central themes: Awareness of

here and now, Awareness of value, and Awareness of mystery. It is an experiential

awareness, and a feeling of the sensitivity of the connection between all creatures, not

merely from an intellectual level. Contrasting to Western individualism, relational

consciousness stresses that a person’s primary identity is from their relationship with

other beings. There are four key relationships: Self and God, Self and people, Self

and World, and Self and Self. In particular, self and people is about interpersonal

relations, and self and world is about the sensitivity of beauty and nature. ‘Worldly’

possessions are relatively less important under this concept, and supernatural, spir-

itual or nonmaterial realities are all important as a part of our knowledge. In fact,

different people have different contexts for their relational consciousness (Hay & Nye,

1998). To many, relating to the natural world is a common context - they experience

wonder and meaning in connecting with the world. Hay (2000) believes that rela-

tional consciousness is a biologically inbuilt aspect which underlies every altruistic

behaviour. When the psychological distance between the self and reality is shortened

or disappears, they realise they are an inextricable part of the manifold reality (Hay

& Nye, 1998). This sense of shared humanity, a perception of self at one with all

8

mankind, can help explain prosocial behaviour and cooperation, as relational con-

sciousness by definition is always concerned with self-transcendence.

2.4 The emotion of awe

Early examples of awe can be found in sociology, philosophy, and religious texts. Ref-

erences of awe can be found in many religious texts, for example in the Bible:

“When Jacob awoke from his sleep, he thought, Surely the Lord is in this place, and

I was not aware of it. He was afraid and said, How awesome is this place! This is

none other than the house of God; this is the gate of heaven. (Genesis 18:16-17, New

International Version)

In sociology, Emile Durkheim (1972) brought into attention the impact of power-

ful emotions on political, social and religious movements. He proposed two classes of

emotions by their social effects, the first, such as love, fear and respect binds individ-

uals together. The second is collective sentiments that possess transformative powers

and bind individuals with social entities, closely resembling awe:

“Following the collectivity, the individual forgets himself for the common end and

his conduct is directed by reference to a standard outside himself.” (Durkheim, 1972,

p.228, as cited in Keltner & Haidt, 2003).

An important record of awe in philosophy is Irish philosopher Edmund Burke’s defini-

tion of the sublime, an aesthetic experience similar to awe. In his book A Philosophical

Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Burke proposed

two key properties to the sublime - power and obscurity. He also suggested thun-

derstorm, art, symphony as stimuli, bringing a wider perspective into the aesthetic

emotion.

More recent studies on awe have emerged around 2000, and the study by Keltner

and Haidt (2003) well defines it. Keltner and Haidt (2003) describes awe as the

emotion a lower status individual feels towards a more powerful other. They stated

that perceptual vastness and a need for accommodation are two central themes and

conditions for a state of awe. Perceptual vastness refers to the encounter of some-

thing tremendous in size, number, scope, complexity, power, ability, social bearing, or

9

greater than one’s frame of reference in general (Rudd, Vohs & Aaker, 2012; Stellar et

al., 2018). Without perception of vastness the emotion becomes admiration instead

of awe. Accommodation, on the other hand, is the Piagetian process of adjusting

mental structures which could not otherwise assimilate this new experience (Keltner

& Haidt, 2003). Awe challenges our mental structures as we fail to make sense of the

experience. Stellar et al. (2018, p.260) defines the need for accommodation as the

process by which a person revises his or her mental schemas or creates a new one to

account for the deviation between the stimuli and one’s current understanding of the

world. If one fails to understand and satisfy the need for accommodation, the awe

experience can be terrifying. Contrarily, the awe experience can be enlightening if one

is successful in satisfying the need for accommodation. The two are interconnected to

expand one’s usual frame of reference, stimulating new mental models (Rudd et al.,

2012; Shiota et al., 2007). Lazarus (1991) describes awe as ambiguous as it can either

be positive or negative. An awe experience floods consciousness rapidly but it can be

‘switched off’ by diverting attention (Konecni, 2005). Awe usually also includes the

factor of unexpectedness, or surprise (Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018). Frijda (1986)

believes this sense of wonder is a passive, receptive mode of attention in the presence

of something unexpected. It involves a sense of suspense, interesting, and pleasing

degree of risk (Konecni, 2005). However, the individual’s existential security cannot

be threatened. In that moment one is overwhelmed but is still safe.

Awe has certain distinctive features in different aspects. People in experience of

awe involves pulling their lips apart, dropping their jaws and stretching their mouths

(Campos et al., 2013). Shiota, Campos and Keltner (2006) also found facial displays

of slightly raised inner eyebrows, upper lid raise, and raised head and eyes. Physically,

goosebumps are commonly observed (Maruskin, Thrash & Elliot, 2012). Vocal dis-

plays is another aspect to distinguish awe from other emotions, where Simon-Thomas

et al. (2009) discovered vocal bursts unique to awe.

Experiences of awe also brings various psychological and epistemological consequences

or benefits. Griskevicius, Shiota and Neufeld’s (2010) study revealed that awe in-

creases people’s ability to systematically process information-rich stimuli (Zhang &

Keltner, 2016). Berger and Milkman (2010) tested and proved the virality of videos

involving high arousal of awe based on the assumption that awe stimulates curiosity

and interest. Saroglou, Buxant and Tilquin (2008) and Valdesolo and Graham (2014)

10

found that participants primed with awe were more likely to endorse spiritual and su-

pernatural beliefs. In addition, they show greater spiritual eagerness, shown by their

desire to visit a spiritual destination rather than a hedonistic one (Van Cappellen

& Saroglou, 2012). More recently, Chirico et al. (2018) showed that awe enhances

creative thinking. Awe expands mental frames, and enables people to find new con-

nections among objects and ideas.

In addition to being a stimulus-oriented emotion, from another perspective, awe is a

collective emotion which brings about certain cognitive and behavioural tendencies

and transformation of the self, which binds the individual with broader social enti-

ties and engage in collective action (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Piff et al., 2015). In

the state of awe, individuals develop stronger interest and connectedness with the

world around them. In other words, greater relational consciousness, and less focus

on their self-interest and personal goals (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Zhang & Keltner,

2016; Stellar et al., 2018; Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018). In that moment, people

forget momentarily their individual identity, the thoughts that were occupying their

mind, where they are and what they are doing afterwards (Stegemoeller, Quinn &

Graupmann, 2016). The emotion of awe draws attention away from one-self unlike

many other emotions, and shifts attention towards the needs and concerns of others

(Piff et al., 2015; Stellar et al., 2017). Awe could lead to lower ego defensiveness

and even a shift in one’s self-concept (Stellar et al., 2018). Although awe stimuli

like natural wonders, panoramic views, music and art are asocial in nature, expe-

rience of awe also brings along the drive to treat others better. It could then lead

to prosocial outcomes, such as increased sharing, assistance and generosity (Shiota

et al., 2007; Piff et al., 2015; Stellar et al., 2018). Piff et al.’s (2015) study found

that awe arouses prosocial tendencies. Individuals who experienced awe were found

to be more generous in a dictator game, and also exhibit greater ethicality and de-

creased entitlement. Prade and Saroglou (2015) found the induction of awe leads to

increased helpfulness and generosity in daily settings. In Stellar et al.’s (2018) study,

they found that the diminished self led by awe brings greater humility. The trait of

honesty-humility can then lead to higher cooperation in economic games in Hilbig and

Zettler’s (2009) study. Rudd et al. (2012) found that awe expands time perception

and reduces impatience. People are also more willing to volunteer their time help-

ing others and they even get a momentary boost in life satisfaction. Following the

proven linkage between awe and prosociality, Yang et al. (2015) hypothesized that the

sense of small self can reduce aggression. Although the casual relationship through

11

small self to reduced aggression has not been proven, Yang et al. (2015) nonetheless

had shown that awe has a mediating effect on aggression. Another study by Koh,

Tong and Yuen (2019) found that awe has a buffering effect towards possession loss.

The recent research on awe raises the question of how to elicit awe, and eliciting an

adequate amount of awe in experimental settings. Keltner and Haidt (2003) listed

five criteria that could lead to awe: beauty, ability, virtue, threat and supernatural

ability. Stellar et al. (2017) believes the largest category of awe elicitor to be other

focused appraisals, which relates to the physical and psychological actions of others.

Shiota et al. (2007) find that feeling awe towards another person enhances group co-

hesion through devotion and commitment to the leader and group, and also through

creating feelings of interconnectedness and common humanity. The second largest

category following would be nature. Shiota et al. (2007) believe that nature scenes

brings a feeling of smallness to an individual. In nature, people feel connected to the

surrounding world, forget their day-to-day concerns and they would wish to prolong

and memorise the experience.

The first approach to inducing awe in laboratory settings is personal narratives. Sh-

iota et al. (2007), Rudd et al. (2012) and Piff et al. (2015) all employed a priming

method to elicit awe by asking participants to recall a personal experience of awe,

either verbal or written. However, the biggest problem with priming is the emotional

intensity when recalled compared to the original experience, especially with awe being

a complex emotional state. The second approach is using visual imagery of images

and videos: for example, the use of videos, images of waterfalls, animals and even

astronauts in space in Rudd et al. (2012), Van Cappellen and Saroglou (2012) and

Piff et al.’s (2015) studies. The clear advantage of this method is the standardised

and highly controlled stimuli, however, the intensity of the emotions induced is still

under question. The third method is to situate participants in natural awe-inspiring

environments. Examples include Shiota et al. (2007) asking participants to look at a

full-sized replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton for a minute, and Piff et al. (2015)

asking participants to stare at a grove of tall eucalyptus trees for a minute. This

method avoids the above limitations, but it is necessary to control for any possible

factors of influence. A more recent step forward is Chirico et al.’s (2017) use of im-

mersive videos using Virtual Reality (VR). The use of VR brings greater intensity,

further reaching the expectancy violating nature of awe. It also allows experimenters

to test different subcomponents of awe. However, this methodology is still in its pre-

liminary phase and needs further empirical testing. Overall, the ongoing challenge of

12

eliciting awe in experimental settings is finding a stimulus that generates a sufficient

intensity and a pure measure of awe.

2.4.1 Self-transcendence

A concept closely related to awe is self-transcendence (also known as spiritual tran-

scendence). Not only are these two emotions’ definition and theoretical construct

similar, their research findings are also similar (Landis et al., 2009). Piedmont (1999,

p.4) describes spiritual transcendence as “The capacity of individuals to stand outside

their immediate sense of time and place to view life from a larger, more objective per-

spective”. Transcendence is also a fundamental capacity of a person, and this innate

motivation drives and directs our decision-making. According to Deikman (1982,

p.21), transcendent experiences takes one momentarily into a mystical consciousness

which “involves a different perspective on time, causality, and self - a different real-

ity, considered from our ordinary point of view”. Similar to awe, self-transcendence

involves a subjective experience of self loss and dissolution of the body sense (Yaden

et al., 2017). It involves two subcomponents, annihilation and relation. During self-

transcendent experiences (STEs), the sense of self could disappear. It leads to a

reduction of self-centredness and selfish motivations. The experience may also bring

an increase in the sense of interpersonal connectedness. From the transcendent per-

spective, an individual discovers fundamental unity between beings, with a feeling

of greater bonding with others (Piedmont, 1999). They realise the synchronicity to

life, leading to a sense of commitment to others. According to Yaden et al. (2017),

the enhanced sense of social connection occurs via two major mechanisms. Firstly,

neuropeptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin, together with alterations to parasym-

pathetic activity and vagal tone, increase the level of self-other overlap. Second, STEs

may increase social-cognitive processes. Interpersonal connection is potentially en-

hanced through perceived similarity, leading to increased prosociality and possibly

societal well-being. Transcendent experiences can also lead to enhanced psychologi-

cal functioning and integration and manifestation of the world (Waldron, 1999).

Past studies have looked at self-transcendence from different perspectives. The two

major definitions of self-transcendence are by Reed (1991, 2003) and Tornstam (1996,

1997). According to Reed (2003), self-transcendence is the “ability to expand self-

boundaries intrapersonally (toward greater awareness of one’s philosophy, values, and

dreams), interpersonally (to relate to others and one’s environment), temporally (to

13

integrate one’s past and future in a way that has meaning for the present), and

transpersonally (to connect with dimensions beyond the typically discernible world)”

(2003, p. 147). Although Reed’s definition has been evolving since 1991, his main

idea is that self-transcendence influences a person’s relationship with self, others,

the outside environment and unseen cosmic forces. Meanwhile, Tornstam’s (1996)

perspective draws similarities with Reed’s theory. He describes self-transcendence

as “a shift in metaperspective, from a midlife materialistic and rational vision to a

more cosmic and transcendent one, accompanied by an increase in life satisfaction”

(p.38). Earlier studies such as Frankl (1966), who referred to self-transcendence as a

prioritization of other people over self-focus, and Erikson (1982), who described self-

transcendence as a non-egocentric understanding of the world, have laid the forefront

foundation of the study of self-transcendence. Considering behaviour philosophies

such as patriotism, altruism and secular humanism, all of them can be viewed as al-

ternative expressions, or outlets of our innate motivation of transcendence (Piedmont,

1999). They all require individuals to sacrifice their personal benefits for the greater

benefit of the society. The reason behind these appeals unquestionably relates to our

intrinsic motivation of searching for deeper sense of meaning and motivation.

In fact, Maslow (1969) over the years has recognised self-transcendence as a part

of Maslow’s hierarchy, beyond self-actualisation. He defines it as “seeks to further a

cause beyond the self and to experience a communion beyond the boundaries of the

self through peak experience”, and he calls this special cognitive activity as “being-

cognition”. He argues that a developed and fortunate human being seeks to go

beyond self-actualization and looks for benefits beyond the pure personal. Through

mystical/transpersonal experiences, or engaging in services to others, a person iden-

tifies with something greater than the self. Differences between self-actualization and

self-transcendence, as Maslow explains, is that the former is self-oriented and the

latter is others-oriented. Self-actualization is the working to actualize one’s potential,

whereas self-transcendence puts aside personal needs to help others, or with reasons

outside the personal self. Decades later, Maslow (1993) found that not only self-

actualizing, fortunate beings can transcend, but in fact people who has not reached

the self-actualization stage can also transcend. He said that many individuals have

transcendent experiences regardless of their position on the hierarchy: self-actualizing

individuals may or may not have peak/transcendent experiences, and individuals who

have peak/transcendent experiences may or may not be self-actualizing.

14

This humanistic and transpersonal approach to psychology was developed from the

1960s, and Abraham Maslow was one of the pioneers in this field. He addressed the

importance of peak experiences in various papers and lectures in the 1950s and 1960s,

which include for example mystical experiences, aesthetic experiences, and emotional

experiences involving nature. Over the years, spiritual transcendence and the field

of transpersonal psychology have been largely ignored by conventional psychology

(Frankl, 1966). Transcendence, however, is an integral part of our ability to cre-

ate meaning which has an important impact on societal well-being. Pargament and

Mahoney (2005) found that spirituality affects mental health, drug and alcohol use,

marital functioning, parenting, stress, as well as morbidity and mortality. Comparing

to other strivings, spiritual strivings were found to be more highly correlated with

measures of well-being in Emmons et al.’s (1998) study. Psychologists found that

those with a positive perception of an external agency report higher levels of personal

well-being (Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992; Pargament, Smith, Koenig & Perez, 1998;

Pollner, 1989). In comparison, those with a more negative or punitive views of the

external agency report greater psychological distress (Pargament et al., 1998; Schwab

& Petersen, 1990). Spirituality is also a cultural fact. According to Pargament (1999,

p.12), spirituality is defined as a search for the sacred. It is centred around perception

of the sacred, and covers different approaches of spiritual expressions. The search for

the sacred is a common desire across different countries, cultures and ethnic back-

grounds. It is a highly individualized process of discovering, conserving, and rediscov-

ering. It should be noted that this process is not without risks, and some fail in the

search. Yet, for many people, the search gives them better understandings of them-

selves, better relationships with others, and a greater feeling of interconnectedness.

It is also important to note the differences between transcendence and religiousness.

Piedmont (1999) believes that the scope of transcendence is larger than religiousness,

including a broader domain of motivations. Some fundamental elements of transcen-

dence includes connectedness, universality, prayer fulfillment, tolerance of paradoxes,

non-judgementality, existentiality and gratefulness. For example, universality is re-

ferred to as the unitive nature of life, and prayer fulfillment is the feelings of joy and

contentment that result from personal encounters with a transcendent reality (p.5).

In addition, Piedmont states that self-transcendence is a personal journey searching

for larger sacredness, where religiousness has a more social approach.

The question then extends to when this journey of searching for the sacred starts.

In many different studies including Coles (1990), children are found to be spiritual

15

pilgrims. Although Goldman (1964), for example, questioned children’s ability to

comprehend religious abstractions, social scientists have found many cases of children

seeking the divine (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005). There are different explanations

for children spirituality. Some suggests that it is innate and genetic - children are

born with this desire, or the perception of external agency is embedded in a child’s in-

trapsychic capacity (Bouchard et al., 1990; Rizzuto, 1979). Some argue that spiritual

desire comes from challenges in life where human limitations are exposed (Pargament,

1997). Others such as Kaufman (1981) highlight the role social context plays as the

child grows. It is important to note that the search for the sacred is an unending

process in a person’s life (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005).

An important issue regarding transcendence is the lack of a comprehensive, orga-

nized paradigm, resulting in a conceptual disarray in the field. Apart from Maslow’s

inclusion of transcendence into his hierarchy of needs, Piedmont (1999) proposed that

spiritual transcendence is the sixth factor of human personality, extending from the

Five Factor Model (FFM). Although there are parallels between transcendence and

the personality domains of extraversion, openness and agreeableness, the theoretical

construct of transcendence also contains solitude, simplicity and structure. In short,

the above domains embody some qualities of transcendence. There lacks a separate

measure of transcendence, and thus supports the case for transcendence to be an

individual domain of personality. Piedmont points out that having transcendence as

the sixth personality factor helps us understand why people seek transcendence, and

how we interact with ourselves and other beings.

2.4.2 Individual differences in experiences of awe

Known as an aesthetic emotion, the emotion of awe is closely connected to amaze-

ment, elevation, fascination, and wonder (Silvia, Fayn, Nusbaum & Beaty, 2015).

However, different individuals have different tendencies in enjoying these aesthetic

experiences. One possible explanation for the heterogeneity in awe-proneness is the

difference in personality traits, and psychologists such as Silvia et al. (2015) inves-

tigated into whether individual differences in the Five Factor Model of Personality

(FFM) accounts for any difference in awe-proneness. One factor in particular, Open-

ness to Experience, draws similarities with the emotion of awe in construct. Added

to the FFM by Costa and McCrae (1980), it is the least understood and most dis-

puted personality factor of the five, involving scholarly debates over the past decades

16

regarding its construct. Commonly deemed as an intrapsychic dimension, McCrae

(1994) proposed that Openness to Experience has a broad construct that includes re-

ceptivity to many varieties of experience and a permeable structure of consciousness.

Openness also implies welcoming of new input, which could be sensory, cognitive or

affective. Open people are often curious, independent thinkers who are sensitive to

aesthetics (McCrae & Costa, 1997). In fact, Silvia et al. (2015) proposed Openness

to Experience as an aesthetic trait. Instead of being passive receivers of new experi-

ences, they are characterised by an active pursuit of novelty, which Canaday (1980,

p.5) describes as a quest to “clarify, intensify, or otherwise enlarge our experience”.

Open individuals are also likely to be reflective and thoughtful about the experience.

Unsurprisingly, Silvia et al. (2015) found that Openness to Experience has the

strongest positive correlation with awe-proneness. People who score high in this fac-

tor experience a wider range and complexity of emotions, feelings and thoughts, and

tend to be more creative (McCrae & Costa, 1997; Terracciano, McCrae, Hagemann

& Costa, 2003; Kaufman, 2013; Nettle, 2009; Swami & Furnham, 2014). Those who

are lower in this factor experience a narrower, simpler range of emotions, and tend to

be more factual, practical and down-to-earth. Other possible hallmarks of openness

include tolerance of ambiguity, emotional ambivalence, and perceptual synathesia,

potentially leading to a greater capacity for absorption. McCrae & Costa (1997)

also finds that open individuals have more artistic and investigative interests, often

shown by their appreciation of arts, and they tend to make more mid-career shifts.

It therefore implies that those who are higher on the particular factor of openness to

experience are more likely to experience aesthetic emotions, including awe.

The other important factor affecting awe-proneness is religion. Awe has an essen-

tial role in religious and spiritual experiences, and many early records of awe were

found in religious texts, such as the Mahabarata in the Hindu Itihasa and the Bible,

where the characters experience an encounter with a greater power (Keltner & Haidt,

2003). This strong, overwhelming sensory experience not only lead to confusion and

amazement, it also led to a transformation. Closely related with concepts such as

spirituality and transcendence, it is reasonable to assume some level of relationship

between religion and awe. For example, Van Cappellen and Saroglou (2011) found

that induction of awe endorses spirituality for religious individuals, and Valdesolo

and Graham’s (2014) study which found that induction of awe endorses supernatural

17

control and belief in God. Zhang and Keltner (2016) suggests that awe activate reli-

gious feelings, spiritual desire, and a belief in supernatural forms. However, contrary

to the stereotypical belief that non-religious individuals are less awe-prone, recent

studies such as Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) suggest that atheists also seek and value

experiences of awe and wonder. Findings by Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) shows

that although the notion of a transcendent entity is rejected by most atheists, they

embrace the use of spirituality in psychological and experiential contexts. Overall,

there is little consensus in the literature on whether religious individuals are more

prone to experiencing awe.

2.5 Somatic Marker Hypothesis

Most neo-classical economic theories largely neglects the role emotions play on decision-

making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Decision-making was traditionally viewed as a

cognitive process, one of choosing the best actions to maximise utility through eval-

uating the consequences of each action (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The economic

assumption of rational maximisation expects individuals, knowing the possible out-

comes, to make rational decisions that are logical and consistent. In the 1960s,

critiques of the traditional decision theory focused on the people’s cognitive errors

and the heuristics that are involved. However, in recent decades, research began

to question whether emotional processes, aside from cognitive processes, guide deci-

sion making. A famous example from neuroscience and psychology is the Somatic

Marker Hypothesis (SMH), introduced by Damasio (1994) in his book Descartes’ Er-

ror (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000). Damasio proposed that decision-making

processes are affected by marker signals, brought by emotions and feelings, providing

a neuroanatomical and cognitive framework of emotions’ impact on decision-making

(Bechara, 2004). According to Damasio (1994), somatic markers are instances of

feelings generated from secondary emotions, and are bodily states that correspond

to emotional reactions to different possible courses of action. On a conscious level,

somatic states would mark outcomes of responses as positive or negative, where sub-

sequent decisions of avoidance or pursuit are based on. Through learning, emotions

and feelings are connected to predict future outcomes of certain options or scenarios.

These somatic states are generated by the neural machinery, which we were born

with, in response to stimuli. During education and socialisation, our brains connects

certain stimuli with certain somatic states, creating somatic markers that we use for

rational decision-making based on secondary emotions. This hypothesis also argues

18

for the importance and potential benefits of emotions in decision-making.

The hypothesis is originated from Bechara et al.’s (1994) study into patients with

a frontal lobe damage, especially to the Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC).

The original experiment compares the skin conductance responses (SCRs, which in

this case is used as an index of the activation of somatic states) between patients

with frontal damage and normal individuals, in a setting where they view a set of

projected slides (Damasio, 1994). Most of the slides are banal, but every once in a

while there would be a disturbing slide. They found that normal individuals gener-

ated SCRs when the disturbing pictures are shown, but not the bland pictures. On

the other hand, patients with a frontal lobe damage did not generate any SCRs to any

pictures throughout the entire set of pictures. Although those patients are attentive

in the entire experiment and possess factual knowledge, Damasio (1994) believes and

suggests that they failed to produce a somatic state, and that is the reason they failed

to feel the disturbance from the pictures.

Extending from this experiment, Damasio and colleagues sought to discover whether

and how this lack of somatic markers affect decision making, through the Iowa Gam-

bling Task (IGT). The task requires participants to choose between four decks of

cards. Each deck contains cards of reward or punishment. Some decks will contain

more reward than punishment, hence the good deck’, and some decks will contain

more punishment than reward, hence the bad deck’. The majority of normal, healthy

participants were able to choose the good decks’ over the course of the game, however,

participants with a damaged VM were found to be incapable of avoiding the decks

that lead to serious monetary losses - they tend to cling to the bad decks’. In other

words, they are unable to learn from their mistakes, bringing negative consequences

(Bechara et al., 1994). Their behaviour in the IGT resembles their behaviour in real-

life. Although these patients have normal intellect and normal results in standard

neuropsychological tests, damage in their VMPC impairs their decision-making on

both personal and social level. In other words, abnormalities in their emotions and

feelings, in particular their failure in registering losses, damage their decision-making

abilities.

Maia and McClelland (2004) carried out a replication of Bechara et al.’s (1994) study,

suggesting different interpretations and raising several questions regarding the SMH.

Firstly, Maia and McClelland suggest that VMPC patients’ performance in the IGT

19

could be due to an inability to reverse a learned contingency (Bechara et al., 2005).

They found that a vast majority of participants who behaved advantageously also

possess conscious, reportable knowledge of the advantageous strategy, which they ar-

gue provides sufficient basis for their decisions. Therefore Maia and McClelland do

not believe Bechara et al.’s (1994) claim of nonconscious biases that guide behaviour

before conscious knowledge does. Maia and McClelland also questioned Bechara et

al.’s (1994) claim that anticipatory SCRs reflect somatic markers. They believe that

the higher SCRs correspond to the higher variance in the bad decks, but not neces-

sarily to the negative outcomes, or negative somatic states. Bechara et al. (2005)

disagree with the above arguments, stating that the important notion of the SMH

is to address the possible physiological processes between knowledge and behaviour,

and to highlight the role of emotions, whereas consciousness is relatively less impor-

tant. Although the SMH is frequently under question, by bridging the mechanisms

of conditioning and cognition, the pioneering hypothesis still provides great insights

into the understanding of decision-making and reasoning processes.

2.6 Stability of the Big Five Personality Traits

In recent years, personality has attracted more attention in economics. Economists

view it as a type of non-cognitive skill, and it affects the economic decisions individ-

uals make and therefore the outcomes (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2012). Past literature

has mixed debates regarding the stability of personality traits, and whether person-

ality development is mainly driven by exogenous or endogenous factors. The original

Five Factor Theory by McCrae and Costa (1999) suggests that personality traits are

essentially temperaments - they remain stable in adulthood and are unaffected by the

external environment. The Five Factor theory states that traits are shaped by bio-

logical (intrinsic) maturation- they develop through childhood, mature at adulthood,

and are thenceforth stable. It implies that genetic factors are the major determinants

of personality development, not external environments or experiences (eg. McCrae

and Costa, 1999). Costa et al. (2000) argues that changes in personality traits are

subtle, whether it is led by an intrinsic process or various environmental factors. Per-

sonality remains largely resilient even in the case of a life event, regardless positive or

negative. Most empirical studies into the economic returns of personality also make

the same assumption.

However, in the case that personality traits are not in fact stable over time, results

20

can be biased. Many longitudinal studies showed that personality traits change in

mean-levels throughout the entire lifetime (eg. Haan, Millsap, & Hartka, 1986; Hel-

son & Moane, 1987; Helson & Wink, 1992; Roberts, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2001; Robins,

Fraley, Roberts, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Contrary to McCrae and Costa’s (1999) the-

ory, some studies found that the change in personality traits also occurs in middle

and old age (Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002; Helson & Kwan, 2000; Srivastava, John,

Gosling, & Potter, 2003).

There are models that look at the role of other factors in the development of person-

ality traits. For example, Zelli and Dodge’s (1999) model looks at the role of envi-

ronment and proposes that personality consistency comes within social roles, through

a person’s interactions with the social environment. A similar set of developmental

model such as Levinson’s (1978) highlights the interplays between the traits and con-

texts of life. The model emphasises the building of life structures, which represents

the relationship between self-driven goals and societal and age-graded roles. Another

model by Baltes (1997) and Baltes, Lindenberger and Staudinger (1998) focuses on

adaptation. Taking a life span development approach, it proposes that we humans

are open systems, and we demonstrate both continuity and change in personality

across the whole of our lifetime. More recently, Roberts and Caspi (2003) introduced

a similar alternative to Baltes’s (1997) approach, stressing the importance of identity

processes in explaining the continuity and change in personality. This theory states

that as we get older, we become more capable at interacting with the environment

in ways that lead to consistency of personality. To put differently, development of a

person’s identity is clearer and strengthened with age, thus explaining the increasing

continuity of traits. In addition, commitments to social institutions, such as work and

family, which provide a sense of identity, facilitates psychological maturity. Recent

studies such as Bleidorn et al. (2009) and Hopwood et al. (2011) have found both

genetic and environmental influences on the stability of personality. According to

Roberts, Wood and Caspi (2008), people have different preferences and perceptions

regarding their environments. Individuals also change environments to suit their per-

sonalities. This model of person-environment transactions focuses on the impacts of

social roles, normative changes and major life events (Specht, Egloff & Schmukle,

2011).

The concept of personality change is multifaceted. There are two main measures

of change in the literature, mean-level change and rank-order changes. Mean-level

21

stability is also known as normative or absolute change, representing shifts of groups

of people to higher or lower values over time on a specific trait (Specht et al., 2011).

Rank-order stability, also known as differential stability, is the degree of consistency

in the rank ordering of individuals over time on a given trait (Hopwood et al., 2011).

To put differently, it is whether groups of people maintain their relative placement

over time. There are studies that look for the developmental course of personality

perceptions, for example, Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2011) showed that personality is

relatively stable across a 4 year period for working-age adults. Numerous studies have

looked into whether major life events and experiences change personality traits, but

the results are mixed. For example, Bleidorn, Hopwood and Lucas (2018) and Specht

et al. (2011) support the claim, but Costa et al. (2000) and Sutin et al. (2010) rejects

it.

2.7 Factors affecting Public Goods Game Contri-

bution

The public goods game is a widely used experiment exploring cooperation in eco-

nomics. There are many other factors affecting the level of cooperation in this social

dilemma game, and it is important to consider these factors when designing the exper-

iment and carrying out analyses. The first group of factors is individual differences.

Differences in social motives exist, where people can be categorised into types of indi-

vidualistic, competitive and cooperative (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). Cooperators

often consider from the viewpoint of the group, while individualists think more ego-

centrically, from the standpoint of their individual rationality. Differences in social

motives not only associate with different choice behaviour, but also relate to different

perceptions of rationality and intelligence (Kopelman, Weber & Messick, 2002). Cul-

ture also plays a part in this context, where people from individualistic cultures tend

to be more task-oriented, fixated on their personal goals, whereas people from collec-

tivist cultures tend to cooperate with those in their in-group, but compete with those

perceived as their out-group. However, the influence of culture on social motives is

complex, for example, Garling’s (1999) study found that not all cultural values have

a direct relationship with social motives. For gender, although its impact in social

dilemma games has not been widely studied, it could impact cooperation as male and

female differ in understanding, reacting and responding to actions, resources, group

interactions and discussions (Stockard et al., 1988; Cadsby & Maynes, 1998; Sell et

22

al., 1993). Van Lange et al. (1997) found a weak but reliable relationship, where the

percentage of prosocials is higher in female than in male, and the percentage of pros-

elves is higher among males. Yet, the findings by different public goods games studies

showed mixed results: the effect of gender on cooperation is likely to be unpredictable

and weak. The impact of religiosity and ethnicity on public goods experiments have

also been studied. Religion has long been believed by social scientists as a key factor

of determining behaviour and outcomes. However, studies such as Anderson, Mellor

and Milyo (2010) found little correlation between religious affiliation and contribu-

tions in the public goods game. Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, has a negative

impact on public goods provision, and this finding is largely accepted in the literature

(Banerjee et al., 2005). However, the overall empirical results on social heterogene-

ity’s impact on cooperation is mixed. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson’s (2002) study

and Cardenas’s (2000) field study finds that economic heterogeneity inhibits cooper-

ation, but a general consensus in the field is still lacking.

The second group of factors is the decision structure of the task. Literature shows

that the monetary payoff structure of the task, including rewards and punishments,

affects individuals’ decisions. While Gachter and Fehr (1999) took a step forward and

studied the effect of social rewards, they found the effect social approval has on con-

tribution in collective actions to be insignificant, in a situation where the participants

are strangers to one another. However, if group identity is created, forming weak so-

cial ties and reducing social distance, it may act as a “lubricant” for social exchange

and thus reduce free-riding. On the other hand, uncertainty makes cooperation more

difficult in most cases. Young (1994) argues that uncertainty strengthens coalitions,

other studies such as Iida (1993) argues that uncertainty weakens coalitions, while

Burger and Kolstad (2009) found no effect on coalition size. However, most studies

such as Burger and Kolstad (2009) found that uncertainty hinders cooperation, and

in environmental contexts, uncertainty impedes the emergence and sustainment of a

common resource (Agrawal, 2002; McCay, 2002).

The third group of factors is the social structure of the task. Firstly, the finding that

groups with the same individuals, interacting repeatedly, have higher tendencies to

cooperate than groups that are shuffled every round is fairly well-established (Keser &

van Winden, 2000). This ties into the previous conclusion regarding social distances.

Apart from that, power and status, group size and communication are all possible

factors in social dilemma settings. Mannix (1993) argues that power imbalances in

23

groups will cause group members to focus on protecting their self-interests rather

than mutual gains, and even form coalitions. Members of these groups are also likely

to retaliate and behave competitively. In relation to leadership and administration in

commons-related decisions, Wit and Wilke’s (1990) study explored the role of who,

and to whom, were the rewards and punishment presented. For the undergraduate

participants, whether the rewards or punishments were presented by the government

or by their parent companies, they found no differences between the effectiveness of

the two. Whereas for the managers, rewards presented by their parent companies

were effective, and those presented by the government were counterproductive. The

results from this study raise the question regarding the source of rewards and sanc-

tions and their impact on potential decision-makers. In addition, small groups are

usually more cooperative than larger groups. Kerr (1989) offered an explanation that

small groups have higher self-efficacy than larger groups: smaller groups were found

to be higher in self and collective efficacy than larger groups when the provision point

is low. Allison et al. (1992) suggest that small groups often divide resources more

equally. Yet, Isaac et al.’s (1994) findings contradicted this proposition, where Issac

and his colleagues found that groups of 40 and 100 provided the public good more

efficiently than groups of 4 and 10. While this violates the standard game theoretical

model, Ledyard’s (1993) alternative approach serves as another possible explanation,

proposing that individuals obtain satisfaction (a warm glow) from being a part of a

cooperative group. For communication, its positive effects on cooperation are widely

confirmed in the literature. Bohnet (1999) found that not only two-way communica-

tion, but one-way communication is sufficient to enhance cooperation. However, the

underlying reasoning of communication’s effect on cooperation is still under debate.

Both attempts to the answer to that discussion creates group identity and fosters com-

mitments to cooperate were proven insufficient by Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994)

and Bouas and Komorita (1996). The form of communication also makes a difference,

where Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) study on emails versus face-to-face commu-

nication found no differences in simple tasks, but in more complex tasks, face-to-face

communication leads to greater cooperation. It provides implications for researchers

regarding the choice of communication medium in the provision of common resources.

The fourth set of factors is perceptual factors, for example, framing. Kahneman

and Tversky’s (1979) famous Prospect Theory states that the description of the out-

come as a gain or a loss can affect people’s decisions, as people have different risk

attitudes towards gains and losses. Describing the task as a Business Transaction

24

Study instead of social exchange, as found by Batson and Moran (1999), also changes

people’s cooperative behaviour. Van Dijk and Wilke (2000) suggests that even simply

describing the choices as taking, keeping, leaving or giving changes people’s other-

regarding preferences and therefore the decisions they make (Kopelman, Weber &

Messick, 2002).

Some additional factors such as other-regarding behaviour can also play a role in

affecting people’s cooperative behaviour. Reciprocity and social history, for example,

is an important consideration for many individuals (Kopelman, Weber & Messick,

2002). People evaluate others’ behaviour before making their decisions: if they be-

have cooperatively, then so will I.

2.8 Distributional preferences

The neo-classical economics assumption is that agents’ decisions are entirely driven

by selfish motives. However, psychologists and economists have realised that this

assumption does not reflect the reality of micro-level decision-making. In reality,

many agents take into account of other agent’s payoff in their decision-making. Re-

sultantly, researchers proposed models of other-regarding preferences, for example,

unselfish and altruistic behaviour (Becker, 1974; Andreoni & Miller, 2002), where a

decision maker’s utility increases as the payoff of others increases, efficiency loving

and surplus maximising (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), where the decision maker looks

to maximise the sum of payoffs, inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Bolton &

Ockenfels, 2000), difference aversion (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007)

or egalitarian (Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2008), where fairness motives play a

part, or oppositely equality aversion (Hennig-Schmidt, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002;

Fershtman et al., 2012), maximin (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), Rawlsian (Charness

& Rabin, 2002) or Leontief preferences (Andreoni & Miller, 2002), maximising the

minimal payoff in the group, spiteful (Levine, 1998), competitive (Charness & Rabin,

2002) or status seeking (Duesenberry, 1949), where an agent’s utility decreases as

the payoff of others increases, envious (Bolton, 1991; Kirchsteiger, 1994; Mui, 1995),

which is similar to a spiteful agent, but an envious agent’s utlity is unaffected by the

payoff of agents. However, there is little agreement in the literature on the list of

distributional preferences, and these models require strong structural assumptions.

Nevertheless, the behavioural implications of distributional preferences are proven in

different aspects of decision making. such as donation (Derin-Gure & Uler, 2010;

25

Kamas & Preston, 2015), bargaining (Bolton, 1991; De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008),

voting (Hochtl, Sausgruber & Tyran, 2012; Paetzel, Sausgruber & Traub, 2014; Fis-

man, Jakiela & Kariv, 2015), public goods contributions (Offerman, Sonnemans &

Schram, 1996), competitive behavior (Balafoutas, Kerschbamer & Sutter, 2012), bid-

ding in auctions (Flynn, Kah, & Kerschbamer, 2016; Bartling, Gesche, & Netzer,

2017), provision in credence goods (Kerschbamer, Sutter & Dulleck, 2017).

2.9 Gender difference in Behavioural and Experi-

mental Research

Males and females are fundamentally different in their biological and social roles. The

biological theory explains the gender differences in personality traits by the difference

in hormones, and genetic predispositions. Social psychology theory focuses on the

difference in social roles (eg. Eagly 1987). For example, males are often expected to

be the initiator in mate choice settings, and therefore should exhibit higher levels of

aggression and assertiveness (Trivers, 1972; Buss, 2008). Females, on the other hand,

carry the role of raising offsprings, and are therefore assumed to be more agreeable

and emotionally involved. Such a disproportionate opportunity cost in reproduc-

tion also suggests key differences in both preference and choice in decision settings.

Behavioural economics research has shown as such with females exhibiting greater

preference for resource acquisition (Whyte & Torgler, 2017; Whyte et al., 2018) and

more risk averse personality traits that reflect cooperative behaviours (Whyte & Tor-

gler, 2016; Whyte et al., 2016; Whyte et al., 2017). A further example is Feingold’s

(1994) artefact model which argues the role of sociocultural factors, for example gen-

der stereotypes, therefore some traits are viewed by a particular gender to be more

(or less) desirable. Certainly males and females have been shown to favour different

personality traits at different life reproductive stages (Whyte et al., 2019). Such fun-

damental sex differences lead to the question of how much males and females differ

psychologically in terms of traits, and how this impacts their decision process.

Understanding the psychological differences provide implications on the difference

in their behaviour. Weisberg, DeYoung and Hirsh (2011) found females to be higher

in agreeableness, extraversion and neuroticism, while Schmitt, Realo, Voracek and

Allik (2008) found females to be higher in agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraver-

sion and neuroticism across nations. Over the years females were found to be higher

26

on agreeableness, inferring higher tendency of altruistic behaviour, cooperation, em-

pathy and kindness (Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001). Females were also found to

score consistently higher on neuroticism, which relates to anxiety, depression, anger,

self-consciousness, and emotional lability (Weisberg et al., 2011; Costa et al., 2001).

However for anger, a facet under neuroticism, females do not always score higher

than males (Costa et al., 2001). For the different facets of extraversion, males tend

to score higher on assertiveness and excitement seeking, while females tend to score

higher on warmth, gregariousness, and positive emotions (Feingold, 1994; Costa et

al., 2001). The overall results of gender differences on the domain of extraversion

is mixed. Conscientiousness on the other hand reflects ones self-discipline and orga-

nization, but no significant gender differences have been found (Costa et al., 2001).

Openness to experience relates to imagination, creativity, intellectual curiosity, and

appreciation of esthetic experiences, and while males often scored higher on the ideas

facet, and females scored higher on the esthetics and feelings facet, no significantly

gender difference is found at the domain level of the trait (Weisberg et al., 2011;

Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001).

Gender difference in social roles and personality traits suggest gender differences

are also intertwined in social behaviour. The stereotypical view perceives males as

more selfish and females as more selfless. The sociocultural view considers social

roles, biological differences, or gender hierarchy as the important determinants of so-

cial behaviour. Similar to the above arguments for personality traits, the social roles

rather assume females to be more caring, friendly, and less selfish, while males are

assumed to be more independent and dominant (Eagly, 2009). These gender assump-

tions and stereotypes penetrate into one’s self-concept and thus affect their social

behaviour. The evolutionary perspective looks at the processes of natural and sexual

selection and its impact on sex-differentiated adaptations, and how evolved disposi-

tions affects decision making (Schmitt et al., 2008). These adaptations (or survival

skills) play an important role in attracting sexual partners. For instance, according

to Wood and Eagly (2002), males search for large packaged resources while females

search for low-variance resources, through hunting and gathering respectively. As a

consequence, males and females evolve to possess different psychological adaptation

in order to perform and complete these sex-differentiated tasks. However, studies

over the years in the context of economic games have reported mixed results. Earlier

studies by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) in prisoner dilemma games found mixed

results. More recent studies surround public goods games and ultimatum/dictator

27

experiments. In public goods experiments, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) and Seguino et

al. (1996) found that females contributed significantly higher amounts to the public

good, while Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Sell and Wilson (1991) and Sell et al.

(1993) found the opposite. On the other hand, the studies by Cadsby and Maynes

(1998) and Sell (1997) yielded mixed results. In ultimatum bargaining experiments,

neither Sohnick (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (2001) found significant difference

between the mean offers by males and female. However, Solnick (2001) found higher

rejection rates of offers made by females than males, while Eckel and Grossman (2001)

found higher rejection rates of offers made by males than females. In dictator games,

Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found significantly

higher donation by females, while Bolton and Katok (1995) results were not signif-

icant in their restrictive experimental design (participants could only choose to give

zero or half of the sum). The inconsistency in the results between studies can be

possibly explained by the differences in methodology and experimental design, where

the payoff structure plays a role. However in experiments that involve exposure to

risk, no systematic gender differences was observed. In experiments without exposure

to risk, females were found to be more others-oriented.

2.10 Summary

The above chapter provided a brief summary of the literature relevant to answering

the three Key Research Questions. The social function of awe is widely agreed upon,

and more of its psychological benefits and implications on well-being are continuing

to be discovered. Although recent studies began to establish the relationship be-

tween awe and prosociality, the theoretical link between the two needs to be further

strengthened. In addition, a theoretical gap exists with no previous studies looking

into whether external stimuli cause sudden changes in personality traits. This chap-

ter also covered several factors that needs to be given careful consideration to when

designing a public goods experiment. Further discussion regarding the experimental

setup and design will be detailed in the next chapter.

28

Chapter 3

Methodology and Design

3.1 The experiment

126 participants were recruited via the QUT ORSEE system (Greiner, 2015) to take

part in the experiment. There were 9 sessions of the experiment in total, including 3

sessions of the Walk/Awe treatment (N=42), 3 sessions of the Walk/No Awe treat-

ment (N=42), and 3 sessions of the baseline treatment (N=42). Participants were

from various different study areas. Each participant only participated in one of the

treatment conditions. The experiment took place in the BEST (Behavioural Eco-

nomics, Society and Technology) lab of Queensland University of Technology, from

21 September 2018 to 25 February 2019. There are 20 widely separated computer

terminals in the laboratory. oTree was the experimental software used in the study

(Chen, Schonger & Wickens, 2016).

After signing and returning the informed consent form, participants were asked to

fill in some survey questions. It includes a Big Five Personality Test and some demo-

graphic questions. Upon completion of the pre-treatment questionnaire, the experi-

menter went for a walk with the participants. The Walk/Awe treatment included a

walk to a balcony on the tenth floor (Gibson Room), with panoramic views of the

Brisbane city and the Brisbane river (see Appendix D). The Walk/No Awe treatment

included a walk to the university library and back, in between buildings, without any

spectacular views. Walks in both the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatment took

approximately 8 minutes. Participants were told that they can do whatever they wish

during the walk. After the walk, participants were asked to complete an emotional

scale of current feelings and emotional states as in Shiota et al. (2007), but from 0

to 100. The baseline treatment did not include a walk and participants were to fill in

29

the emotional scale immediately after completing the demographic questionnaire.

The experiment consisted of three main tasks. Before each task, the instructions were

distributed to each participant, displayed on the computer screen and read aloud by

the experimenter. Task A is a standard public goods game for 16 rounds. Partic-

ipants were allocated into random groups of 3. Each participant is endowed with

100 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) at the start of every round, and they can

choose to contribute ci ∈ [0,100] to a joint project in each round. Total contribution in

the group for the round will be multiplied by a factor of 1.5, and split evenly among

all three participants in the group. Participants payoff for the round equals their

earnings from the joint project, plus the amount they did not contribute. The payoff

function for subject i in each round is as follows: πi = 100− ci + 0.5n∑

j=1

cj, where 100

is the endowment at the start of each round, c is the contribution to the joint project

by subject i, andn∑

j=1

cj is the total contribution to the project in a group. One round

was randomly selected as their payment for the task. During round 8, participants

were asked the reason behind their decisions on how much to contribute to the project.

After Task A, participants were asked a set of questions about appraisals during

the target experience. They were then to fill in another Big Five Personality Test

(which was identical to the one before).

Task B consisted of ten decisions tasks from the Equality Equivalence Test (EET) by

Kerschbamer (2015). It was an independent task. A participant’s decision did not

affect other participants’ payoffs. One of ten decisions was randomly chosen as their

payment for Task B.

Task C was the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin (2013).

For each box collected, participants earn 2 ECUs if none of their boxes contains a

bomb. The number of boxes collected represents their risk attitudes. Details on the

EET and the BRET will follow in later sections.

At the end of the session participants payoffs from all three tasks were added up

and converted into AUD at a rate of 20 ECUs to AUD $1. Each session lasted about

50 minutes. Average earnings was $15.37, where highest earnings was $23.4 and the

lowest $10.

30

3.2 Design

3.2.1 Treatment

Since situating participants in a natural environment gives an experience that is sim-

ilar to an original awe experience, this was deemed to be the most suitable treatment

methodology for this experiment. Similar methods of eliciting awe had been used by

Shiota et al. (2007) and Piff et al. (2015), asking participants to look at a full-sized

replica of a Tyrannosaurus rex skeleton and a grove of tall eucalyptus trees respec-

tively. But apart from nature, which itself had been shown by Weinstein, Przybylski

and Ryan (2009) and Zhang, Piff, Iyer, Koleva and Keltner (2014) to increase proso-

ciality, this study is interested in looking into another elicitor of awe - panoramic

views. Understanding the intensity of an awe experience decreases with time, the

location of the target experience is a potential factor. The fact that the location of

the balcony is close to the laboratory (3 levels apart) allows participants to complete

the tasks after the awe experience with minimal time in between (approximately 2

minutes), and minimises the interference of other factors.

Using panoramic views as an instrument to elicit awe requires control for the ef-

fect of the walk, and the potential group experience during the walk. Therefore, the

Walk/No Awe treatment group in comparison should have a similar group experi-

ence but without the natural awe environment. In order for the target experience

in the Walk/No Awe treatment to be as mundane as possible, the walk is designed

to be to the library and back to the laboratory, in between buildings. The downside

of this route is, participants had to walk up the stairs from the second floor to the

seventh floor. Another limitation, and a major difference between the Walk/Awe and

Walk/No Awe treatment is that participants in the main treatment spent most of

their time standing still in the awe environment, where those in the Walk/No Awe

treatment continued walking for the entire target experience, as there was nothing

that captures their attention like the awe experience so that they could stand still for

a few minutes. This tiring physical activity could have a potential effect on individ-

uals’ behaviour in the Walk/No Awe treatment.

Thus, a baseline treatment with no target experience or activity was necessary. Com-

paring the results from the Walk/Awe treatment with the Walk/No Awe treatment

and then to the baseline treatment is interesting, as it may indicate the significance

of the group experience, or reflect the nature of the Walk/No Awe treatment.

31

3.2.2 Emotion labels

It is important to capture participants’ emotions immediately after the target experi-

ence. Here the set of emotion labels from Shiota et al. (2007) was used. In the original

paper, participants in the nature condition were higher on awe, love, rapture and con-

tentment, while participants in the accomplishment condition were higher on pride,

surprise, fear and excitement. Different to the original paper asking participants to

rate the appropriateness of the words for describing emotions during the target expe-

rience, here the question was instead asking participants the appropriateness of the

words for describing their current feelings/ emotional state. The advantage of Shiota

et al.’s (2007) choice of wording is to remind subjects of their emotions during their

awe experience (since in the original task participants were asked to recall a recent

awe event), but since in this case the target experience happened just before this sur-

vey, participants were expected to have a fresh memory of the experience. Instead of

priming participants again of the experience by asking them to recall the experience,

it would be interesting to study the effect of the awe experience has on cooperation

without further priming. In addition, these emotion labels were all on separate pages,

leading participants to evaluate each item individually without having reference to

another.

3.2.3 Appraisal endorsement for target experience

Different to the emotion labels, the survey here was completed after Task A. This

task did not have the immediacy comparing to the emotion label, together with the

fact that it requires priming, it was designed to be after a lengthy and somewhat

monotonous Task A to remind participants of the awe experience before Tasks B and

C. In the original paper, participants in the nature condition rated higher on “Felt

small or insignificant”, “Felt presence of something greater than self”, “Unaware of

day-to-day concerns”, “Felt connected with the world around me” and “Did not want

the experience to end”, while participants in the accomplishment condition rated

higher on “Challenging”, “Tiring”, “Felt connected with my personal values” and

“Felt connected with my culture”.

3.2.4 Next hour activity

Literature of awe (eg. Keltner and Haidt, 2003) suggests that individuals who ex-

perienced awe would want to repeat the experience, or be in the same environment

again. Shiota et al. (2007) has found that participants in the awe treatment are more

32

likely to choose creative activities or to spend time in nature for their next hour It

would be interesting to study that as well in this study.

3.2.5 Equality Equivalence Test (EET)

The Equality Equivalence Test (EET) is an experimental task by Kerschbamer (2015)

to classify individuals into different distributional preference types. It includes a set

of 10 binary choices. The switching point implies an individual’s willingness to pay

for equality, which allows the classification into different types. The purpose of the

EET here is to study whether the awe experience has any effect on individuals’ more

complex distributional preferences. The EET task used in the experiment is the

same as that in the original paper by Kerschbamer (2015), but with adjusted payoffs

of ECUs instead of Euros. Instead of e = 10, g = 3, s = 1, t = 2 (in euros) in the orig-

inal task, in this task, e = 50, g = 15, s = 5, t = 2 (in ECUs), where e, g and s were

scaled with the common factor of 5, and the multiplier t which is 2 remains unchanged.

Calculating the (x,y) scores requires Step 1 in the original paper of eliminating pref-

erences that violate the strict m-monotonicity assumption, meaning that holding the

payoff of the other player constant, a decision maker should strictly prefer higher own

payoff than lower own payoff. That is, letting m denote ”my” payoff and o for the

”other” person’s payoff, given that (m, o) ∈ A and ∆ ∈ <++, the decision maker’s

utility u(m+∆, o) > u(m, o). Then the participants’ (x,y) scores were calculated from

the row number which they decide for the asymmetric allocation (left-hand side).

3.2.6 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)

The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) is an experimental task by Crosetto and

Filippin (2013) to elicit risk preferences. No prior theory of awe has established a

relationship between awe and risk preferences, therefore the task was carried out only

to serve as a possible control variable. Due to technical issues with this task, 27

observations were lost in the experimental process.

3.2.7 Demographics

Demographic data was collected before the target experience, after the pre-treatment

FFM questionnaire. Collecting data regarding participants’ religion and their de-

voutness was particularly necessary, to study whether that has any effect on their

33

awe-proneness and tendency to cooperate. Different to many laboratory experiments,

demographic data here was collected at the start of the experiment, as participants’

report of their happiness, health, devoutness in religious activities and interest in

politics would potentially be affected by the treatment.

3.2.8 Public Goods Game

The public goods game in this experiment consisted of 16 rounds. A multiple-round

public goods game captures the decay in cooperation, as a decline in contribution

levels is often observed in repeated play of the game. In many cases players in the

game withdraw from cooperation as they learn how behaviour affects payoffs, and

also as a form of punishment to the defectors.

The groups were shuffled after half of the rounds to observe any restart effect (An-

dreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996).

3.3 Summary

This chapter covered the experimental design and setup, as well as a simple theo-

retical framework of the approach and methodologies used. The main focus of the

experimental design is to create an experience of awe that allows studying of the

behavioural implications brought by it.

34

Chapter 4

Results and Discussion

This chapter will present and discuss all the relevant findings from the experiment.

Section 4.1 presents descriptive statistics collected from the experiment, including

demographic data, emotion labels after the treatment, thoughts/ appraisals during

target experience, ideal next hour activities, as well as pre and post treatment FFM

Scores. Section 4.2 attempts to answer Key Research Question 1: How does

the emotion of awe affect cooperation in economic experiments? using results from

Task A. Regression analysis were completed to identify whether a treatment effect is

present on cooperation: whether individuals with the experience of awe exhibit higher

cooperation in the public goods game. Section 4.3 explores Key Research Ques-

tion 2: How does the emotion of awe affect distributional preferences in economic

experiments? using the results from the EET. Section 4.4 examines the mean-level

and rank-order stability in the measurement the Five Factor Model of Personality

Traits. The comparison of the pre and post treatment FFM scores across treatments

attempts to answer Key Research Question 3: To what extent does the emotion of

awe affect the stability in the measurement of personality traits?. Section 4.5 examines

the moderating effect of agreeableness on cooperation, originally proposed by Prade

and Saroglou (2015). Finally, Section 4.6 gives a general discussion of all results.

35

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.1: Demographics statistics.

Demographics (% of participants in treatment)Baseline Walk/No

AweWalk/Awe Total

Gender Male 14 (34.15%) 20 (48.78%) 19 (45.24%) 53 (42.74%)Female 27 (65.85%) 21 (51.22%) 23 (54.76%) 71 (57.26%)

Age Under 18 3 (7.32%) 3 (2.42%)18-21 17 (41.46%) 16 (39.02%) 17 (40.48%) 50 (40.32%)22-25 6 (14.63%) 16 (39.02%) 12 (28.57%) 34 (27.42%)26-29 6 (14.63%) 1 (2.44%) 4 (9.52%) 11 (8.87%)30 or above 9 (21.95%) 8 (19.51%) 9 (21.43%) 26 (20.97%)

Ethnicity Asian 21 (51.22%) 20 (48.78%) 23 (54.76%) 64 (51.61%)Caucasian 9 (21.95%) 10 (24.39%) 9 (21.43%) 28 (22.58%)Latin 2 (4.88%) 2 (4.88%) 4 (3.23%)Middle-Eastern

1 (2.44%) 3 (7.14%) 4 (3.23%)

Sub-continental

7 (17.07%) 7 (17.07%) 6 (14.29%) 20 (16.13%)

Other 2 (4.88%) 1 (2.44%) 1 (2.38%) 4 (3.23%)

Continuation of Table 4.1Religion Atheist 6 (14.63%) 6 (14.63%) 3 (7.14%) 15 (12.10%)

Buddhist 10 (24.39%) 5 (12.2%) 7 (16.67%) 22 (17.74%)Catholic 6 (14.63%) 1 (2.44%) 6 (14.29%) 13 (10.48%)Christian(Protes-tant)

4 (9.76%) 3 (7.32%) 4 (9.52%) 11 (8.87%)

Christian(Other)

4 (9.76%) 4 (9.76%) 3 (7.14%) 11 (8.87%)

Hindu 5 (12.2%) 1 (2.38%) 6 (4.84%)Muslim 3 (7.32%) 5 (12.2%) 10 (23.81%) 18 (14.52%)Sikh 1 (2.44%) 1 (0.81%)Taoism 1 (2.44%) 1 (2.38%) 2 (1.61%)Other 5 (12.2%) 6 (14.63%) 5 (11.9%) 16 (12.9%)

Table 4.1 reports the demographics statistics of the subjects. One participant from

the Walk/No Awe treatment and one participant from the baseline treatment did

not complete the demographics survey. Most of the participants in the experiment

fell into the age group of 18 to 25. 57.26% of participants were female, 52% Asian,

23% Caucasian, 16% Sub-Continental, 3% Latino/Latina, 3% Middle-Eastern and

3% of another ethnicity. Of religion, there is a higher proportion of atheists in the

36

Walk/No Awe and the baseline treatments. Given the possible effect religion has

on transcendence, awe-proneness and prosociality, this factor has to be considered in

later sections.

Table 4.2: Emotion labels.Emotion labels (S.D. in parentheses)

Baseline Walk/No

Awe

Walk/Awe t t

(Walk/Awe

vs Base-

line)

(Walk/Awe

vs

Walk/No

Awe)

Awe 41.83

(31.47)

60.74

(26.2)

60.69

(26.72)

-2.96*** 0.01

Love 47.21

(30.15)

49.60

(29.8)

62.55

(23.62)

-2.59** -2.21**

Rapture 39.33

(28.78)

47.17

(27.16)

49.55

(24.98)

-1.74* -0.42

Contentment 59.62

(25.46)

55.60

(26.31)

61.69

(20.37)

-0.42 -1.19

Pride 40.69

(27.33)

40.69

(27.32)

46.29

(25.09)

-0.98 0.51

Surprise 33.12

(28.11)

69.14

(28.66)

58.10

(28.89)

-4.01*** 1.76*

Fear 29.98

(29.76)

23.83

(26.57)

23.90

(23.97)

1.03 -0.01

Excitement 60.79

(25.52)

51.21

(27.46)

57.74

(27.85)

0.53 -1.08

Joy 54.19

(25.52)

49.69

(27.9)

61.86

(21.97)

-1.48 -2.22**

Sadness 29.10

(29.81)

23.10

(26.73)

24.79

(22.03)

0.75 -0.32

All t-tests are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.2 shows the mean word ratings from the post treatment emotion labels

adapted from Shiota et al. (2007). Of interest to note is the similar level of self-

reported awe in the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatment. Given that the self-

reported awe level in the baseline is significantly lower than that in the Walk/Awe

37

treatment, it gives indication about the design of the Walk/No Awe treatment. Par-

ticipants in the Walk/Awe treatment also reported higher levels of joy comparing to

the Walk/No Awe treatment, and higher levels love comparing to the Walk/No Awe

and the baseline.

Table 4.3: Thoughts/appraisals during target experience.

Thoughts/appraisals during target experience. (S.D. in parentheses)

Walk/No

Awe

Walk/Awe t

(Walk/Awe

vs

Walk/No

Awe)

Novel 54.90 (21.78) 54.05 (22.36) 0.27

Meaningful 49.63 (28.78) 50.45 (22.57) 0.49

Intense 46.73 (29.27) 41.12 (24.8) 0.87

Felt connected with my culture 29.73 (26.84) 32.60 (23.54) -0.39

Felt connected with my personal values 43.29 (29) 44.55 (23.86) 0.66

Tiring 40.44 (32.84) 34.69 (27.36) 0.29

Challenging 41.32 (28) 37.02 (26.81) 0.43

Did not want the experience to end 29.98 (23.72) 36.95 (27.03) -0.72

Felt connected with the world around me 42.83 (29.86) 44.00 (25.49) -0.68

Unaware of day-to-day concerns 45.59 (27.48)) 45.02 (21.95) 0.44

Felt presence of something greater than self 38.20 (28.19) 41.83 (24.34) -0.42

Felt small or insignificant 28.05 (26.77) 40.45 (30.35) -1.49

Table 4.3 presents the mean endorsements of thoughts/appraisals during the target

experience as from Shiota et al. (2007). No significant statistical differences were

found comparing between the two treatments.

38

Table 4.4: Next hour activity.

Next hour activity (Count)

Baseline Walk/No

Awe

Walk/Awe

Next hour activity Contact loved ones 7 11 9

Creative activity 18 6 13

Play sports 6 10 6

Sleep 4 9 5

Spend time in nature 6 5 9

The ideal next hour activities as from Shiota et al. (2007) are presented in Table 4.4.

39

Table 4.5: Average FFM Scores.

Average FFM Scores (S.D. in parentheses)

Baseline WN WA t t

(WA

vs B)

(WA

vs

WN)

Before

treat-

ment

Agreeableness 5.15

(0.79)

5.19

(0.79)

5.12

(0.71)

0.17 0.42

Conscientiousness 5.07

(0.99)

4.96

(0.86)

4.82

(0.73)

1.35 0.78

Extraversion 4.20

(0.89)

4.29

(0.83)

4.18

(0.87)

0.09 0.55

Neuroticism 4.32

(0.87)

4.34

(0.85)

4.41

(0.84)

-0.51 -0.37

Openness 4.78

(0.85)

4.67

(0.92)

4.64

(0.93)

0.72 0.13

After

treat-

ment

Agreeableness 4.99

(0.87)

5.11

(0.90)

5.18

(0.72)

-1.13 -0.40

Conscientiousness 5.18

(0.93)

4.91

(0.89)

4.82

(0.76)

1.93 0.46

Extraversion 4.18

(0.85)

4.22

(0.92)

4.21

(0.80)

-0.16 0.09

Neuroticism 4.42

(0.90)

4.46

(0.94)

4.65

(0.93)

-1.16 -0.91

Openness 4.73

(0.90)

4.65

(0.87)

4.54

(1.00)

0.95 0.54

Note: WA=Walk/Awe, WN=Walk/No Awe, B=Baseline

Table 4.5 reports the average pre and post treatment FFM Scores. T-tests found no

significant differences comparing each of the five factors across treatments.

4.2 Awe and Cooperation

Based on the previous findings of awe’s positive effect on prosociality and helping by

Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou (2015), awe’s positive impact on cooperation

in the public goods game is expected.

40

Figure 4.1: Contribution in the Public Goods Game. (N=126)

Figure 4.1 shows the contribution levels in the public goods game across different

treatments. From the figure it appears that participants in the baseline treatment

started with the highest contribution levels, but exhibited the greatest magnitude of

decline. With the groups shuffled at round 8, a slight restart effect was observed in

the participants’ contribution in round 9.

Using Stata 15, regression analyses were conducted using different estimation tech-

niques. The dependent variable here is the participants contribution in the public

goods game, as a measure of cooperation. The independent variable of focus here

is the treatment dummy, which allows investigation of whether a treatment effect is

present. The first group of variables is demographic variables of age and gender, as

well as age’s interaction effect with the treatment dummy, to control for any gen-

der and age effects. The second group of control variables is related to the payoff

structure of the task, controlling for round number, individual payoff in the previous

round and the group contribution in the previous round. Including round number

as an independent variable controls for the decay in the level of contribution over

rounds, while the groups contribution and the participants payoff in the previous

round are important predictors of the individuals contribution in the current round.

41

The remaining control variables are self-reported awe and its interaction effect with

the treatment dummy.

Five different regression models are used in the above estimation. Model 1 is a

Pooled OLS regression, mainly for comparison purposes. Model 2 is a standard ran-

dom effects model. Model 4 is a panel random effects tobit model, with 0 and 100

as the censoring points for the dependent variable. The censoring is suitable in this

context, as the contribution in the PGG can only fall between 0 to 100. Model 5 is

a fractional probit model, where the dependent variable takes values between 0 and

1. From another perspective, contribution in the PGG can be seen as a proportion,

and scaled to be in [0,1]. Different to the previous random effects estimators, this is a

quasi-likelihood estimator. However with a clustered data structure, the most appro-

priate model of estimation is Model 3, which is a multilevel mixed-effects regression.

The fact that individuals play the game in groups and the groups are shuffled at

round 8 means that the data needs to be nested in two different levels, individual and

group (each player has one individual id and two group ids). It is important to note

that the individuals choice of contribution in the PGG has a level of dependence on

other group members decisions (and past decisions). Without clustering for groups,

standard errors will likely be underestimated and statistical significance will therefore

be overstated. With two different group ids for a single individual (for the first and

second half of the rounds), the multilevel mixed-effects regression model is a model

that allows a correct clustering of data in this scenario.

42

Table 4.6: Public Goods Game (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Depvar: PGG Contribution OLS RE ME Tobit Fractional

Treatment (dummy) 9.230** 9.230** 14.37* 30.02 0.340**

(4.571) (4.571) (8.443) (19.98) (0.148)

Self-reported awe -0.0480 -0.0480 -0.0688 -0.168 -0.00141

(0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0823) (0.191) (0.00152)

Treatment x self-reported awe -0.0321 -0.0321 -0.0620 -0.241 -0.00155

(0.0590) (0.0590) (0.107) (0.262) (0.00209)

Payoff (previous round) -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.220*** -0.241*** -0.0121***

(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0615) (0.0574) (0.00125)

Group contribution 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.272*** 0.388*** 0.0113***

(previous round) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0176) (0.0252) (0.000449)

Round no. -0.355** -0.355** -0.625*** -1.044*** -0.0134**

(0.180) (0.180) (0.222) (0.285) (0.00654)

Age 2.900*** 2.900*** 4.387*** 11.00** 0.108***

(1.034) (1.034) (1.524) (4.665) (0.0408)

Treatment x Age -3.895*** -3.895*** -6.123** -11.08* -0.143***

(1.398) (1.398) (2.600) (6.214) (0.0520)

Gender -2.821* -2.821* -2.412 -5.636 -0.126**

(1.532) (1.532) (2.468) (6.769) (0.0560)

Constant 52.97*** 52.97*** 40.43*** 30.85* -0.0385

(5.433) (5.433) (9.986) (18.40) (0.204)

Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245

R-squared 0.545

Number of id 83 83

Number of groups 56 56 56 56

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.6 shows the estimation output from analysing only the Walk/Awe and Walk/No

Awe treatments. A significant treatment effect was found with Model 2 and 5, but

not with Model 4. With Model 3, the treatment effect is only significant at a 10%

level. The awe experience appears to have a borderline significant impact on cooper-

ation when comparing the Walk/Awe treatment with the Walk/No Awe treatment.

Of interest to note is that age and its interaction effect with the treatment dummy is

significant across all models.

43

Table 4.7: Public Goods Game (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Depvar: PGG Contribution OLS RE ME Tobit Fractional

Treatment (dummy) 9.358** 9.358** 17.79** 34.15** 0.325***

(3.961) (3.961) (8.555) (17.36) (0.120)

Self-reported awe 0.0376 0.0376 0.0462 0.135 0.00127

(0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0658) (0.155) (0.00101)

Treatment x self-reported awe -0.119** -0.119** -0.214** -0.548** -0.00433**

(0.0532) (0.0532) (0.107) (0.234) (0.00175)

Payoff (previous round) -0.452*** -0.452*** -0.113** -0.116** -0.0126***

(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0556) (0.0473) (0.00117)

Group contribution 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.196*** 0.268*** 0.0108***

(previous round) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0207) (0.0205) (0.000461)

Round no. -0.399** -0.399** -1.102*** -1.081*** -0.0135**

(0.178) (0.178) (0.215) (0.228) (0.00633)

Age -0.292 -0.292 0.0417 0.589 -0.0134

(0.785) (0.785) (1.498) (3.429) (0.0259)

Treatment x Age -0.728 -0.728 -2.283 -1.369 -0.0246

(1.191) (1.191) (2.870) (5.232) (0.0402)

Gender -2.397 -2.397 -2.765 -5.149 -0.0939*

(1.527) (1.527) (3.082) (6.713) (0.0533)

Constant 55.28*** 55.28*** 42.08*** 29.49** 0.0778

(4.857) (4.857) (7.616) (14.37) (0.173)

Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245

R-squared 0.497

Number of id 83 83

Number of groups 56 56 56 56

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.7 shows the estimation output from analysing only the Walk/Awe and base-

line treatments. Different to the results from Table 4.6, here a significant treatment

effect with all models was found. In this estimation, age is not a significant variable,

but the significance of the interaction between self-reported awe and the treatment

dummy is something noteworthy given the results from Table 4.2.

44

Result 1. Awe has a significant positive impact on cooperation.

The above estimations have confirmed the finding that the emotion of awe enhances

cooperation. Given the proven social function of awe in relation to prosociality, gen-

erosity and helping, it is within expectation that awe also leads to higher cooperation

in groups. The finding by Campos et al. (2013) and Piff et al. (2015) that awe

induction leads to the “small self” is a reasonable explanation for the increased con-

tribution levels in the awe treatments in this study. Individuals experiencing awe are

likely to feel less significant, reducing their attachment to their personal success and

goals.

4.3 Awe and Distributional Preferences

This section attempts to answer Key Research Question 2 using the results obtained

from the EET in Task B.

Figure 4.2: Frequency of the (x,y) scores. (N=117)

Figure 4.2 presents a jittered scatterplot of the (x,y) scores of the remaining 117

participants (9 out of 126 participants’ responses were eliminated due to inconsistent

45

preferences). According to Kerschbamer (2015), an individual’s x-score is defined by

(t+1.5) points minus the row number in which the individual switches from right to

left (the asymmetric allocation), and an individual’s y-score is calculated by the row

number in which the individual makes the switch minus (t+1.5) points. From the

graph it is apparent that most participants are consistent with the selfish type, and

the second and third most common are the inequality averse and altruistic types.

Table 4.8: Frequency of Distributional Types.

Frequency of Distributional Types

Total Baseline Walk/No

Awe

Walk/Awe

Altruistic 13 2 4 7

Equality Averse 2 1 1 0

Inequality Averse 24 9 9 6

Spiteful 6 2 1 3

Selfish 51 18 18 15

Table 4.8 shows the frequency of the five distributional types across treatments. In

the Walk/Awe treatment, there seems to be a higher proportion of altruists, and

slightly fewer number of equality averse, inequality averse and selfish individuals.

Table 4.9: Test of Proportions for the Distributional Types

Test of Proportions for the Distributional Types

Walk/Awe vs

Baseline

Walk/Awe vs

Walk/No Awe

(z-score) (z-score)

Altruistic -1.76* -0.97

Equality Averse 1.01 1.01

Inequality Averse 0.85 0.85

Spiteful -0.46 -1.02

Selfish 0.67 0.67

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.9 formally tests the frequency of the five distributional types across treat-

ments. The only significant difference if found in the number of altruists between the

Walk/Awe treatment and the baseline treatment.

46

Table 4.10: Rank Correlation Tests for x,y scores

Rank Correlation Tests for x,y scores

Walk/Awe vs

Baseline

Walk/Awe vs

Walk/No Awe

(z-score) (z-score)

x-score -1.90* -1.32

y-score -0.50 -0.63

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.10 presents the rank correlation z-scores for the (x, y) scores between treat-

ments. It shows that individuals in the Walk/Awe treatment has higher x-scores than

those in the baseline with weak significance. In other words, between being inequal-

ity averse and altruistic, individuals with the awe experience have a slight tendency

towards altruism.

Table 4.11: OLS Regression on x scores (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

(1) (2)

Depvar: xscore xscore

Treatment dummy 0.583** 0.777***

(0.286) (0.291)

Self-reported awe -0.0136***

(0.00486)

Gender 0.512*

(0.277)

Age -0.0823

(0.105)

Constant -0.775*** -0.733

(0.201) (0.496)

Observations 79 79

R-squared 0.051 0.191

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To further analyse the difference in x-scores, OLS estimations were performed with

respect to treatment, as shown in Table 4.11. Without controlling for other factors,

the treatment dummy is significant at 5% level. While controlling for self-reported

47

awe, gender, and age, the significance of the treatment dummy rises to 1% level. This

suggests that awe has an effect on participants’ x-scores in the Walk/Awe and baseline

treatments. Participants with the awe experience are more likely to be altruistic than

being inequality averse.

Table 4.12: OLS Regression on x scores (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

(1) (2)

Depvar: xscore xscore

Treatment dummy 0.413 0.415

(0.295) (0.290)

Self-reported awe 0.000548

(0.00551)

Gender 0.551*

(0.290)

Age -0.191

(0.126)

Constant -0.605*** -1.033

(0.210) (0.657)

Observations 77 76

R-squared 0.025 0.096

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

48

Table 4.13: OLS Regression on y scores (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

(1) (2)

Depvar: yscore yscore

Treatment dummy 0.0885 0.0632

(0.294) (0.321)

Self-reported awe -0.00127

(0.00537)

Gender 0.233

(0.306)

Age -0.101

(0.116)

Constant 0.950*** 0.928*

(0.207) (0.548)

Observations 79 79

R-squared 0.001 0.020

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

49

Table 4.14: OLS Regression on y scores (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

(1) (2)

Depvar: yscore yscore

Treatment dummy 0.144 0.159

(0.308) (0.313)

Self-reported awe -0.00612

(0.00593)

Gender -0.105

(0.313)

Age 0.127

(0.136)

Constant 0.895*** 1.123

(0.219) (0.708)

Observations 77 76

R-squared 0.003 0.030

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Carrying out the same regression in Table 4.12 between the Walk/Awe and Walk/No

Awe treatments for x scores, and y-scores in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 between the

Walk/Awe and Baseline and Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treatments, no signifi-

cant treatment effect was found.

Result 2. Awe has a significant positive impact on altruistic preferences

Summing up the findings in this section, the regression outputs showed that indi-

viduals in the Walk/Awe treatment had significantly higher x-scores than those in

the baseline treatment. Participants in the Walk/Awe treatment are likely to be

more concerned about the sum of payoffs than being concerned about the inequality

in payoffs (the utility of an altruistic individual increases as the payoff of the other

individual increases). In other words, if the other player has higher payoffs than the

individual, the individual with the experience of awe are less likely to take away from

the other player’s payoff. This ties into the finding in Section 4.2 that participants in

the Walk/Awe treatment exhibited higher levels of cooperation.

50

4.4 Awe and the Stability in the measurement of

the Five Factor Model of Personality Traits

This section attempts to answer Key Research Question 3 using the the pre and post

treatment Five Factor Model questionnaire results. OLS regressions, two sample t-

tests, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test were employed to study whether there is a

treatment effect on the stability in the measurement of the Five Factors. In other

words, whether awe experience changes people’s personality traits.

4.4.1 OLS Estimation on Measurement of Personality Traits

Stability

The OLS regressions below study the mean-level stability in the measurement of

personality traits. Here the difference between the Five Factor scores before and

after the treatment were calculated (as the measure of personality trait stability),

and use that difference in the scores as the dependent variable. The independent

variable is the treatment dummy, indicating whether a treatment effect is present.

Table 4.15: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

in personality traits A C E N O

Treatment dummy 0.187** 0.0243 0.0696 0.123 -0.133*

(0.0806) (0.0844) (0.0733) (0.0881) (0.0768)

Constant -0.122** -0.0209 -0.0488 0.115* 0.0314

(0.0574) (0.0600) (0.0521) (0.0627) (0.0546)

Observations 83 83 83 83 83

R-squared 0.062 0.001 0.011 0.024 0.036

(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion

, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.15 reports the estimation including only Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe treat-

ments. From the regression table it appears that the emotion of awe has a significantly

positive impact on agreeableness, whereas the treatment effect on openness is nega-

tively significant at 10% level. Other factors remain stable on the mean level. Further

51

testings are required to examine the validity of the findings from this estimation.

Table 4.16: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

in personality traits A C E N O

Treatment dummy 0.224** -0.102 0.0476 0.136 -0.0578

(0.0938) (0.0919) (0.0661) (0.0894) (0.0777)

Constant -0.160** 0.105 -0.0268 0.102 -0.0442

(0.0663) (0.0650) (0.0467) (0.0632) (0.0549)

Observations 84 84 84 84 84

R-squared 0.065 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.007

(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion

, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.16 reports the estimation including only Walk/Awe and baseline treatments.

Again a significant positive treatment effect on agreeableness is apparent. Other

measurements of personality traits were stable on the mean level, including openness

to experience.

4.4.2 Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Two-sample t-test on Mea-

surement of Personality Trait Stability

The above results were further examined by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which exam-

ines the mean-level stability in the measurement of personality traits.

Table 4.17: FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

Rank Correlation z-score

Agreeableness 2.12**

Conscientiousness 0.69

Extraversion 0.96

Neuroticism 1.29

Openness -1.95*

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

52

Table 4.17 confirms the findings in Table 4.15. Comparing the Walk/Awe and

Walk/No Awe treatments, there is a significant positive change in agreeableness for

individuals who experienced awe, in both absolute and differential level. The negative

change in Openness here at 10% significance also corresponds to that in Table 4.15.

Table 4.18: FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

FFM Personality Traits (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

Rank Correlation z-score

Agreeableness 2.15**

Conscientiousness -0.15

Extraversion 0.77

Neuroticism 1.56

Openness -1.09

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Similarly, Table 4.18 confirms the findings in Table 4.16. The positive treatment effect

on the measurement of agreeableness is again verified by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test

and a two sample t-test.

4.4.3 Components of Agreeableness

To analyse the factors that are driving the change in the measurement of agreeable-

ness, it is necessary to dissect the change in different components of agreeableness.

Table 4.19: Rank Correlation Tests for change in components of Agreeableness

Rank Correlation Tests for change in components of Agreeableness

Walk/Awe vs

Walk/No Awe

Walk/Awe vs

Baseline

(z-score) (z-score)

Sympathetic -0.01 -0.42

Kind -1.94* -0.49

Cooperative -0.79 -0.33

Warm 1.09 1.46

Harsh 0.81 2.40**

Cold 2.26** 2.66***

Selfish 1.94* 2.66***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

53

From the rank correlation test results in Table 4.19 it appears that cold and selfish

are the two common components driving the change in the Walk/Awe treatment.

4.4.4 Further Analysis on Stability in the measurement of

Agreeableness

To further investigate the change in the measurement of agreeableness, it is necessary

to break down the mean-level change with respect to different demographic factors.

Estimation 1 is an OLS regression similar to Table 4.15 and 4.16, but included an

interaction term between gender and the treatment dummy. Estimation 2 analysed

the change in the measurement of agreeableness with respect to Age. Estimation 3

broke down the change with respect to religiosity.

54

Table 4.20: Further Analysis for Stability (Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Indepvars: Gender Age Religiousness All

18-21#1 0.239* -0.217

(0.128) (0.150)

22-25#0 0.140 0.135

(0.130) (0.126)

22-25#1 0.271* -0.239

(0.140) (0.154)

26-29#0 -0.181 -0.132

(0.375) (0.368)

26-29#1 0.319 -0.0977

(0.204) (0.214)

30 or above#0 0.337** 0.305*

(0.159) (0.153)

30 or above#1 0.502***

(0.153)

Female#1 -0.0355 0.324*

(0.106) (0.181)

Male#0 -0.228** -0.210*

(0.111) (0.112)

Male#1 0.231** 0.591***

(0.111) (0.174)

Non-religious#1 0.191 0.0299

(0.148) (0.140)

Religious#0 0.137 0.135

(0.118) (0.114)

Religious#1 0.295**

(0.112)

Constant -0.0204 -0.248*** -0.205** -0.221*

(0.0766) (0.0936) (0.0919) (0.119)

Observations 82 82 83 82

R-squared 0.174 0.162 0.085 0.269

#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

55

Table 4.20 shows that males in the Walk/No Awe treatment exhibited a significant

reduction in their measurements of agreeableness, where males in the Walk/Awe

treatment exhibited a significant increase in their measurements of agreeableness.

For females, no significant changes were found. With student participants as subjects

in this experiment, age was relatively homogeneous, therefore it is within expectation

that little insightful results with regards to age is found. The only interesting finding

with regards to age is that participants aged 30 or above increased in their measure-

ments of agreeableness in both treatments. Religious individuals in the Walk/Awe

treatment, on the other hand, exhibited a significantly positive change. Putting gen-

der, age and religiosity together in the same estimation (in 4), it is shown that the

significant factor that continue to stand out is the treatment effect on male partici-

pants.

56

Table 4.21: Further Analysis for Stability (Walk/Awe vs Baseline)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Indepvars: Gender Age Religiousness All

18-21#1 0.0672 -0.217

(0.138) (0.172)

22-25#0 -0.0434 -0.0431

(0.191) (0.191)

22-25#1 0.0994 -0.239

(0.152) (0.177)

26-29#0 -0.401** -0.398**

(0.191) (0.194)

26-29#1 0.147 -0.0977

(0.223) (0.246)

30 or above#0 0.171 0.169

(0.166) (0.166)

30 or above#1 0.330*

(0.166)

Under 18#0 -0.782*** -0.786***

(0.252) (0.259)

Female#1 0.103 0.204

(0.121) (0.211)

Male#0 -0.00454 0.0358

(0.141) (0.136)

Male#1 0.369*** 0.471**

(0.128) (0.203)

Non-religious#1 0.205 0.0299

(0.182) (0.161)

Religious#0 0.0868 0.0202

(0.145) (0.140)

Religious#1 0.309**

(0.142)

Constant -0.159* -0.0756 -0.220* -0.101

(0.0822) (0.0975) (0.120) (0.141)

Observations 83 83 84 83

R-squared 0.110 0.263 0.074 0.305

Standard errors in parentheses

#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

57

Table 4.21 analyses the change in the Walk/Awe and baseline treatments, with re-

spect to the same demographic factors as above. Similar to Table 4.20, males in the

Walk/Awe treatment demonstrated a significant increase in their measurements of

agreeableness. Participants aged 26-29 showed a decrease in their measurements of

agreeableness in the baseline treatment, while those aged 30 or above increased in

their measurements of agreeableness at 10% significance level. Meanwhile, similar to

above, religious individuals in the Walk/Awe treatment showed a significant increase.

In estimation 4, males in the Walk/Awe treatment continue to be the one significant

factor throughout the analysis.

4.4.5 Discussion

Result 3. Awe has a significant positive impact on the personality trait of agreeable-

ness.

As shown from the above tables, treatment effect does not seem evident on other

personality trait factors. This change can be explained in different ways, especially

given that the second FFM measure is after 16 rounds of the PGG. A possible ex-

planation of the change in agreeableness ties into the findings by Yang et al. (2016),

where they found that awe reduces aggression. Studies such as Barlett and Anderson

(2012), Gleason, Jensen-Campbell and South Richardson (2004) and Trninic, Baran-

cic and Nazor (2008) all found a significantly negative correlation between aggression

and agreeableness. It is possible that individuals in the awe treatment have reduced

levels of aggression and is therefore is comparatively higher on agreeableness.

It is also important to address the potential critique that the increase in the mea-

surement of agreeableness arose from the increased level of contribution in the public

goods game. Whilst that could be true to a certain extent, the appraisal endorsement

for target experience was intentionally placed immediately after the 16-round PGG.

It was done in order to prime participants of the target experience before completing

the post treatment FFM questionnaire. The following regressions attempt to address

this critique:

58

Table 4.22: Stability of Agreeableness

Depvar: (1) (2)

Difference in Agreeableness Walk/Awe vs Walk/No Awe Walk/Awe vs Baseline

Contribution in PGG #0 0.000708 -0.000656

(0.000920) (0.00137)

Contribution in PGG #1 0.00311*** 0.00285***

(0.000868) (0.000941)

Constant -0.116** -0.0968

(0.0571) (0.0629)

Observations 1,328 1,344

R-squared 0.069 0.062

#0: Non-treatment, #1: Treatment

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.22 shows the OLS regressions with change in measurement of agreeableness

as the dependent variable and the interaction between contribution in the PGG and

the treatment dummy as the independent variable. It is clear that with individual

contribution in the PGG as the independent variable, the treatment effect is still

strongly significant when comparing the Walk/Awe treatment to both Walk/No Awe

and baseline treatments.

4.5 Moderating effect of agreeableness on cooper-

ation

According to the finding by Prade and Saroglou (2015, p.258)

“the effect (of generosity) was present mainly among those low in agreeableness ...

For people who are dispositionally low in agreeableness, awe may be a specific self-

transcendent, stimulus-oriented, positive emotion that stimulates them and facilitates

prosocial behavior ... people low in agreeableness may exhibit, thanks to awe, proso-

cial behavior at similar levels to those high in agreeableness, who may need less of the

emotion of awe to express their personal prosocial dispositions in agreeableness”

It would be interesting to investigate into the role of agreeableness in cooperation

59

in the public goods game. As the mean score of agreeableness is our data collected

is 5.15 (median is 5.14), individuals who score higher than 5.15 were considered to

be high in agreeableness and those who were lower than 5.15 were considered low in

agreeableness. The following regressions were estimated with the multilevel mixed-

effects model in section 4.2 with individuals who are high in agreeableness and low in

agreeableness respectively.

Table 4.23: Public Goods Game Contribution with respect to Agreeableness

(1) (2) (3) (4)

High Low High Low

WA vs WN WA vs WN WA vs B WA vs B

Treatment (dummy) 11.02 14.52* 15.61 17.53**

(10.90) (7.721) (12.06) (8.099)

Self-reported awe -0.0654 -0.0650 0.0399 0.0435

(0.0759) (0.0754) (0.0637) (0.0620)

Treatment x self-reported awe 0.0234 -0.113 -0.129 -0.260**

(0.110) (0.104) (0.128) (0.109)

Payoff (previous round) -0.279*** -0.273*** -0.134** -0.152***

(0.0726) (0.0652) (0.0656) (0.0590)

Group contribution 0.297*** 0.303*** 0.205*** 0.226***

(previous round) (0.0197) (0.0185) (0.0249) (0.0226)

Round no. -0.730*** -0.501** -1.364*** -0.982***

(0.260) (0.256) (0.227) (0.255)

Age 3.981*** 3.914*** 0.0122 -0.0155

(1.465) (1.442) (1.488) (1.398)

Treatment x Age -5.897 -5.104** -2.036 -1.696

(3.867) (2.471) (4.691) (2.780)

Gender -2.636 -2.847 -3.406 -3.198

(2.651) (2.262) (3.641) (2.948)

Constant 45.77*** 42.53*** 46.85*** 42.47***

(11.25) (10.39) (8.991) (7.997)

Observations 885 975 885 975

Number of groups 49 53 49 53

WA=Walk/Awe, WN=Walk/No Awe, B=Baseline

High=High in Agreeableness, Low=Low in Agreeableness

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

60

The results in Table 4.23 agrees with the finding by Prade and Saroglou (2015). In

this experiment, the effect of awe on cooperation was mostly found among individuals

who are low in agreeableness, and not among those who are high in agreeableness.

It thus suggests that for individuals that are low in agreeableness, experience of awe

increases their agreeableness and enhances their cooperation. However the difference

between those who are high and low in agreeableness is small and insignificant.

4.6 General Discussion of Results

The overall findings in this studies builds on the “Small self” hypothesis, and con-

firms previous findings by Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou (2015), that the

emotion of awe has a positive impact on prosociality. It also aligns with the vast lit-

erature on the impact of positive emotions on prosociality. Taking a slightly different

approach, and based on the findings by Piff et al. (2015) and Prade and Saroglou

(2015), Result 1 adds to the literature about the social function of awe by proving its

impact on cooperation.

Key Research Question 2 aims to further investigate how the social preferences of

individuals change with the impact of awe. From previous studies, participants with

the experience of awe are expected to be less selfish and more altruistic. However,

it is interesting to see the effect of awe on other distributional types. Overall no

statistically significant results were found between the Walk/Awe and Walk/No Awe

treatments, but significant difference is found in the x-scores between participants

in the Walk/Awe and the baseline treatments. The findings here agree with Result

1, where participants in the Walk/Awe treatment care more about the sum of total

payoffs than the relative “fairness” in payoffs.

Key Research Question 3 explores the rather open question of the stability in the

measurement of personality traits after an awe experience. Result 2 shows that the

awe treatment increases individuals’ agreeableness. In fact, Peterson and Seligman

(2004) have shown that agreeableness links with appreciation of beauty and excel-

lence, and that subjective experience of beauty was proven to be associated with

greater empathy and charitable giving by Einolf (2011). Prade and Saroglou’s (2015)

findings of the moderating effect of agreeableness have also been replicated with re-

spect to cooperation in the public goods game, suggesting that awe leads to higher

agreeableness and higher cooperation levels for individuals who are low in agreeable-

ness. This study agrees with Prade and Saroglou’s (2015) proposition that individuals

who are high in agreeableness do not require the same level of awe as those who are

61

low in agreeableness to exhibit a high level of prosociality or cooperation, therefore

the effect of awe on prosociality/cooperation is more substantial to the latter. On a

side note, this does not imply that the low agreeableness group is more awe-prone

- it simply means that the effect of awe on prosociality/cooperation is maybe more

significant on the low agreeableness group.

There is an evident parallel in the above findings. In answering KRQs 1 and 2,

participants with the awe experience behaved more cooperatively and prosocially in

purely economic tasks. Their behaviour in those tasks can then be explained by the

increase in their psychological measurement of agreeableness. Through exploring the

stability of personality traits with the effect of the awe treatment, the social function

of awe is further bolstered on both the individual level and the group level.

62

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Understanding the factors that affect cooperation and social preferences is an impor-

tant topic in economics. Previous studies on awe have given a glimpse of the transfor-

mative power of awe on both the individual level and the group level. Building from

the existing literature, this study provides insights on how the emotion of awe affects

behaviour, in particular, cooperation, distributional preferences and stability in the

measurement of personality traits. Chapter 1 posed the three research questions and

motivated the research problem. Chapter 2 provided background literature of awe

and key dependent variables of interest such as cooperation, distributional prefer-

ences and stability in the measurement of personality traits. Chapter 3 outlined the

details of the experimental treatments and tasks employed to answer the key research

questions. Chapter 4 provided the answers to the following key research questions

Key Research Question 1. How does the emotion of awe affect cooperation in

economic experiments?

In a 16-round public goods game, participants in the Walk/Awe treatment (balcony

with panoramic views) exhibited higher levels of cooperation. This result suggests

that the self-transcendent ability of awe shifts one’s focus, brings a greater sense of

community and therefore enhances cooperation.

Key Research Question 2. How does the emotion of awe affect distributional

preferences in economic experiments?

Participants in the Walk/Awe treatment were found to have higher x-scores than

those in the baseline treatment. This indicates that after an awe experience individ-

uals tend to be more altruistic.

63

Key Research Question 3. To what extent does the emotion of awe affect per-

sonality reporting?

The personality trait of agreeableness increased in participants after the awe experi-

ence. Given that agreeableness is a predictor of cooperation and prosocial behaviour

(Habashi et al., 2016; Caprara et al., 2009; Volk et al., 2011; Carlo et al., 2005; Kagel

& McGee, 2014), the results here establish a potential indirect relationship between

awe and prosocial behaviour/ cooperation.

However this key finding is not without limitations. To the best of the author’s

knowledge, there were no previous studies showing that a shock experience like awe

can lead to a sudden change in the measurement of personality traits. For the results

to be robust, this finding has to be replicated in future studies.

In this study, the emotion control in Walk/ No Awe appeared to be unsuccessful.

According to Table 12, self-reported awe in the Walk/Awe treatment (M=60.69) is

significantly higher than that in the Baseline treatment (M=41.83), with a t-statistic

of 2.96 (two-tailed p=0.004). However, it is not significant different to the Walk/No

Awe treatment (M=60.73), with a t-statistic of -0.0082 (two-tailed p=0.9934). There

is no clear explanation of why the level of self-reported awe in the Walk/No Awe

treatment is higher than the anticipated level. It may also imply that the design of

an appropriate baseline treatment could be improved.

The design of the Walk/No Awe treatment in this experiment is a potential lim-

itation of this study. The appropriateness of the Walk/No Awe treatment design

affects the significance and validity of the results, as the main results were produced

by comparing the Walk/Awe treatment to the Walk/No Awe treatment.

As with most laboratory experiments, one of the limitations of the study is external

validity. Even though the natural environment bears a closer resemblance to a real

life awe experience, the intensity and complexity of experimentally elicited awe does

differ from a real life awe experience. It is also possible that participants experienced

less awe, as they may have felt less relaxed because they were in an experimental en-

vironment. As in many other studies conducted with student participants, there are

questions as to the extent to which a student sample reflects the entire population.

However these limitations point to opportunities for future studies to be carried out

in the field, especially given the surprisingly scarce number of studies on the emotion

of awe done in the field.

64

The question of how long does the impact of awe experiences last requires further

exploration. Understanding that awe experiences generally occur within a short pe-

riod of time, and understanding whether experiences of awe have a lasting impact on

personality reporting is still yet to be studied.

From a neuro-biological standpoint, it would be interesting for future studies to mea-

sure the Heart Rate Variability (HRV) or brain activities of participants with the

impact of an awe experience. Unfortunately, the scope and duration of this study did

not allow inclusion of these factors.

Overall, this study has more firmly established the social function of awe, and the

role of personality traits in the social function of awe. It has facilitated further under-

standing of awe on both individual and group level. There are important theoretical

implications especially for social preferences in decision making.

65

Appendix A

Experiment screenshots

Figure A.1: Welcome page. Participants were to enter their participant label into the

box above.

Figure A.2: Welcome Page. The experimenter presented participants with a brief

introduction. This screen captures no data.

i

Figure A.3: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the first screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience.

ii

Figure A.4: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the second screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience.

iii

Figure A.5: FFM (Pre-treatment). This is the third screen of the standard FFM

questionnaire before the target experience.

iv

Figure A.6: Demographic questions. This is the first screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions such as age,

gender, education, marital status, field of study and whether English is their first

language.

v

Figure A.7: Demographic questions. This is the second screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions regarding their

ethnic and religious background.

vi

Figure A.8: Demographic questions. This is the third screen of the demographics

questions to be answered by the participants. It includes questions about their de-

voutness to religion, interest in politics, political views, next hour activites as in

Shiota et al. (2007), life satisfaction, health and comments on the experiment.

vii

Figure A.9: Emotional labels (as in Shiota et al., 2007). After the target experience,

participants were asked to describe their emotional state according to the emotional

labels on a scale of 0-100. Two examples of the emotional labels are shown above.

viii

Figure A.10: Instructions for Task A. This screen is to inform participants that Task

A is about to start. The instructions for Task A were read aloud by the experimenter.

Participants also received a physical copy of the instructions when they reach this

screen.

Figure A.11: Contribution page for Task A. Participants were to choose their contri-

bution to the joint project on this page. The top of this page shows participants the

round they are in.

ix

Figure A.12: Results page. This page shows participants the details of all the contri-

butions in the group, as well as the participants earnings for the round.

Figure A.13: Question on the reasoning behind their decisions. Participants were

asked this question about the reasons behind their choice of contribution to the joint

project, after round 8.

x

Figure A.14: Appraisal endorsement for target experience (as in Shiota et al., 2007).

Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they remembered having several

appraisals of the target experience, on a scale of 0-100.

Figure A.15: Question on whether the target experience affected their decision to

contribute. Participants in the main treatment were asked this question, whether

they felt the target experience affecting their decisions on how much to contribute in

the PGG.

xi

Figure A.16: Question on participants previous visits to the Gibson Room. Partici-

pants in the main treatment were asked this question, as familiarity may reduce the

level of awe during the experience. Participants were to complete the FFM question-

naire the second time after this question.

Figure A.17: Task B instructions. After the second FFM questionnaire (post-

treatment), the instructions for Task B were shown to participants. Participants

were told by the experimenter that Task B involves ten decisions of splitting money

between you (the participant) and another participant.

xii

Figure A.18: Decision Task for Task B. This is the decision task from Kerschbamer

(2015), with earnings adjusted.

xiii

Figure A.19: Task C instructions. This screen is to inform participants that Task C

is about to start. The instructions for Task C were read aloud by the experimenter.

Participants also received a physical copy of the instructions when they reach this

screen.

xiv

Figure A.20: Decision screen for Task C. Participants start collecting boxes by press-

ing the Start button and they can press Stop anytime. Every second before the Stop

button a box will be marked by a tick symbol, indicating that the box is collected.

Participants press the Solve button to locate the bomb after pressing Stop.

xv

Figure A.21: Results screen for Task C. Participants were informed their earnings for

Task C, including the number of boxes collected and whether the bomb is located in

one of the boxes they collected.

Figure A.22: Payment screen. This is the final screen of the experiment. Participants

were informed the details of their earnings from the experiment, including the selected

rounds for payment.

xvi

Appendix B

Experiment instructions

B.1 Task A instructions

Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please end all conversations now and

switch off your mobile phone.

Please read the following instructions carefully.

Your earnings in this experiment will depend on the choices you make. Please

think carefully when making decisions. Your earning will be paid to you in

cash at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate of Experimental Cur-

rency Units (ECUs) to Australian dollars (AUD) will be 20ECU to $1 AUD.

Task A

Task A comprises 16 rounds. You will be in random groups of 3. Each group will be

undertaking a joint project Each group member will be endowed with 100 ECUs for

every round. In each round, you will be asked to choose how much to contribute to

the joint project.

For each round, the contributions of all participants are added up, and multiplied

by the factor of 1.5. That resulting amount will be evenly split among all members

in the group. Your payoff for that round equals your earnings from the project, plus

the amount you did not contribute.

After each round you will see a screen as follows:

xvii

ONE round of the game will be randomly selected by the end of the experiment and

you will be paid according to your earnings in that round.

B.2 Task C instructions

In the following, you will see a 10x10 matrix containing 100 boxes on your screen. As

soon as you start the task by hitting the ’Start’ button, one of the boxes is collected

per second, starting from the top-left corner. Once collected, the box marked by a

tick symbol. For each box collected you earn 2 ECUs.

xviii

Behind one of the boxes hides a bomb that destroys everything that has been

collected. You do not know where the bomb is located.

You only know that the bomb can be in any place with equal probability. The longer

the collecting process, the more likely it is that one of your ticked boxes contains the

bomb but also the more money you will potentially receive.

Your task is to choose when to stop this collecting process. You do so by hitting

’Stop’ at any time. If you collect the box where the bomb is located, the bomb will

explode and you will earn zero. If you stop before collecting the bomb, you gain the

amount accumulated that far and this is added to your final payoff for today.

Please note that you will not know if one of your ticked boxes contains the bomb

until AFTER you have pressed the ’Stop’ button.

xix

At the end of the task boxes are toggled by hitting the ’Solve’ button. A dollar

sign or a fire symbol (for the bomb) will be shown on each of your collected boxes.

xx

Appendix C

Other tests

Table C.1: FFM Personality Traits Stability in measurement (Walk/No Awe vs Base-

line)

FFM Personality Traits Stability in measurement (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)

Rank Correlation z-score Two sample t-test t-stat

Agreeableness 0.02 -0.40

Conscientiousness 0.94 1.46

Extraversion 0.20 0.33

Neuroticism -0.43 -0.15

Openness -0.85 -0.99

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

xxi

Table C.2: FFM Personality Traits Stability (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)

Depvar: Difference (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

in personality traits A C E N O

Dummy for Walk/No Awe 0.0379 -0.126 -0.0220 0.0129 0.0756

(0.0946) (0.0866) (0.0673) (0.0853) (0.0762)

Constant -0.160** 0.105* -0.0268 0.102* -0.0442

(0.0665) (0.0609) (0.0473) (0.0599) (0.0535)

Observations 83 83 83 83 83

R-squared 0.002 0.026 0.001 0.000 0.012

(A = Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, E=Extraversion

, N=Neuroticism, O=Openness)

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

No significant effect was found in any measure of the five factors when comparing the

Walk/No Awe treatment to the Baseline.

xxii

Table C.3: Public Goods Game (Walk/No Awe vs Baseline)

(1)

Depvar: PGG Contribution ME

Treatment dummy for Walk/No Awe 0.592

(5.327)

Self-reported awe 0.0415

(0.0499)

Treatment x self-reported awe -0.107

(0.0863)

Payoff (previous round) -0.310***

(0.0564)

Group contribution (previous round) 0.309***

(0.0166)

Round no. -0.833***

(0.208)

Age -0.142

(1.077)

Treatment x Age 3.911**

(1.759)

Gender -3.502*

(2.114)

Constant 49.76***

(6.913)

Observations 1,230

Number of groups 56

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

No significant effect was found comparing the contribution levels between the Walk/No

Awe treatment to the Baseline.

xxiii

Table C.4: Rank Correlation Coefficients (Five Factors Before vs After)

Rank Correlation Coefficients (Five Factors Before vs After)

(Before and after

treatment)

Baseline Walk/No

Awe

Walk/

Awe

All

Agreeableness 0.86 0.91 0.85 0.87

Conscientiousness 0.88 0.90 0.82 0.88

Extraversion 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.93

Neuroticism 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.90

Openness 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.93

All of the above measures of the five factors before and after the treatment have a

significantly positive correlation according to Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients.

It shows that the treatment itself does not have an effect on the base measurement

of the five factors.

xxiv

Appendix D

Experimental treatment

The following pictures show the view from the balcony (Walk/Awe treatment)

xxv

xxvi

xxvii

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