how the eu negotiates trade and democracy in asia: …paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_5205.pdfhow...
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Hubert Zimmermann (Cornell University) How the EU negotiates Trade and Democracy in Asia: The Case of China’s Accession to the WTO - Draft – Do not quote - The paper explores the characteristics of the EU as trade negotiator, using the talks about China’s entry to the WTO (1985-2001) as the main case study. This long negotiating process permits an analysis of the influence of democracy promotion and human rights policies on European trade strategies. Such objectives play an important role in the rhetorical framework of European bilateral trade relationships and in multilateral initiatives, such as ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). Based on an institutionalist theoretical framework, it will be argued that despite the ideological and rhetorical commitment of EU institutions and despite corresponding theoretical predictions by most of the literature, the system of decision-making in EU foreign trade policy allows its member states and the Commission to pursue a trade policy with little regard to these objectives (and also other societal interests). As a consequence, Europe’s trade relationship with Asia is considerably less conflictual than the American. I Introduction
The normative identity of the EU as well as its institutional
structure as multilevel system has sparked similar interpretations
regarding the EU as external actor: that social and democratic
norms play an important role in the formulation, negotiation, and
implementation of European foreign policies. These interpretations
seem particularly true for external trade policy-making because
social and democratic issues play an increasing role on the
international trade agenda and the public debate about trade since
the breakdown of the WTO meeting in Seattle. A more thorough
review of the institutional structure of EU policy-making in
international trade negotiations shows, however, that these
elements are either systematically disregarded or that they are
just used strategically. Geopolitical and mercantilist interests
dominate.
2
I will first briefly sketch the substantial recent research on the
EU as normative power. Then I will take a quick look at the
multilevel structure of EU governance in foreign trade policy
which also appears to suggest a strongly norm-oriented trade
policy. I will then confront the premises of these two theoretical
perspectives with empirical reality, and use the case of China’s
accession to the WTO (and also the current Doha Round) as
examples. Finally, I will analyse the institutional structure of
the EU in the different phases of international negotiations and
show why the EU, at least in foreign trade, acts only in a very
limited way as normative power. This will be contrasted with
American trade policy which permits societal interests much better
chances of representation at international trade negotiations.
II The EU as Norm Leader
The notion of the EU acting as „normative power” in the
international arena has gained wide currency among researchers in
the past decade.1 In his much quoted article about „Normative
Power Europe“, Ian Manners (2002) argues that the EU
systematically transmits the norms that are constitutive for its
own identity via its external policies into the international
system. According to Manners, the key norms are peace, liberty,
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, social solidarity, anti-
discrimination, and good governance. Consequentially, the EU’s
foreign policy is said to be characterized by an emphasis on the
peaceful and multilateral regulation of conflict. The British top
diplomat Robert Cooper calls the EU because of this a “postmodern
actor” (Cooper 2004). The historical lessons of 50 years of ever
closer integration have created, according to authors writing in
this vain, a cooperative and deliberative political style which
1 See also the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, March 2006, on this topic.
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has shaped the identity and the self-understanding of the actors
formulating European foreign policies (Teló 2006: 224). In his
recent book, Mario Teló describes this identity as a kind of „the
world’s Scandinavia“. He even regards such an identity as
essential for the continuation of the European project:
„’Scandinavian Europe’...cannot survive without both the desire
and the ability to confidently and clearly express its version of
the world in international and regional bodies through a vast
array of policies from trade links and development cooperation to
foreign policy” (Teló 2006: 227). Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 539)
suggest that the EU is predisposed to enact a „norm-driven foreign
policy which first and foremost stems from the values promoted
internally within the Union, such as social pluralism, the role of
law, democracy, market economy, etc.)”. These interpretations also
have a long precedent, in particular the conceptualisation of the
EU as a ‚civilian power’(Duchesne 1972).
In the years following the transatlantic conflict about the war in
Iraq, the image of the EU as normative actor, characterized by the
use of soft power resources in foreign policy, has been
popularized beyond the narrow confines of EU research, for example
through bestsellers such as Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power
(2003) or Joseph Nye’s The Paradox of American Power (2002).
Despite their completely different assessments of European
international power, they both see the international activity of
the EU as shaped by norms rather than by a realist pursuit of
national interests, - contrary to the USA.2
There is substantial empirical evidence for these interpretations.
After all, the EU itself uses this image in its public self-
2 The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has used the topos of the EU as normative power in his widely discussed interventions on occasion of the Iraq war.
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representation. In Art. III-292 of its proposed constitutional
treaty, the European Convention formulated the norms shaping EU
external policies as follows: “The Union’s action on the
international scene shall be guided by the principles which
inspired its own creation….and which it seeks to advance in the
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect
for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and
respect for the principles of the UN charter and international
law”.
Since 1995, the EU insists furthermore that a so-called democratic
clause has to be included in all its international agreements. It
reads, in abbreviated form: “Respect for democratic principles and
human rights established by [the Helsinki Final Act and the
Charter of Paris for a New Europe] [as well as the principles of
market economy]….inspires the domestic and external policies of
the Community and of [third country] and constitute an essential
element of this agreement” (COM (95) 216final, 23.5.1995)”.
According to this clause, the EU can suspend agreements with third
countries which violate human rights or democratic principles.
Many target countries regard this as insulting or as an imposition
of EU standards onto unrelated areas.
In particular in the field of international trade, the EU is often
considered – and sees itself – as the main force promoting social
and democratic standards, sustainable development, and ecological
issues(Young 2004: 208). A reading of the public statements of EU
trade commissioners shows that they emphasize these points
especially frequently. The rationale behind this rhetoric stems
from an appreciation of the new agenda of international trade by
EU trade representatives. The failure of the WTO meeting in
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Seattle 1999 has led to a politicization of trade issues. New
themes, such as social justice, sustainable development and
democratic standards are widely discussed, transcending the narrow
confines of bureaucrats, industry representative and academics
that used to dominate the field until then (Flake 2005: 343). The
Commission has reacted to the new quality of the public debate on
trade by systematically including representatives of Civil Society
in the Brussels discourse about trade policy. This has to be seen
also in the framework of its efforts to counter increasing doubts
about the legitimacy of its decisions and to shield itself against
domestic criticism.
To sum up: both the international identity of the EU and its
reaction to the new trade agenda suggest a norm-oriented foreign
trade policy. This argument which forms the core of constructivist
analyses of EU foreign policy is reenforced by an interpretation
deriving the preferences of the EU from its basic institutional
structure and the way this structure shapes internal decision-
making.
III EU Multilevel Governance: The Example of Foreign Trade Policy
Foreign trade is among the most integrated policy fields of the
EU. The supranational level is responsible for negotiations with
third countries – this is inherent in the logic of a common
market. The size of its market makes the EU one of the central
players in the international trade arena. Despite that, EU foreign
trade policy has only recently been the subject of substantial
research. This research has shown the extraordinary reach of
European trade policy and the complexity of the political process
in which it is formulated (Aggarwal/Fogarty 2004; Meunier 2005;
Young 2002). The focus of this research, however, was particularly
the efficiency of the EU representation of its preferences on the
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international level, less the process of formulating these
preferences.
EU preferences in international trade emerge from a “multi-level
process engaging national, European and international levels of
governance" (Young 2000: 94). The policy field is characterized by
vertical and horizontal political arenas and negotiating games,
and thus shows the typical features of a multilevel system. In the
centre of vertical integration is a two-fold delegation of
competences: from the member states to the Council, and from the
Council to the Commission. According to Art. 133 of the Nice
Treaty, the Commission has the right of initiative for
international negotiations on foreign trade. It also conducts the
talks. Its negotiating brief, however, is based on a more or less
narrow mandate from the Council (Woodcock 2000). The Commission is
also closely controlled by a special committee of the Council, the
so-called Art.133 Committee. The Council of Ministers also decides
about the ratification of the results of negotiations.
On a horizontal level, a multitude of actors participate in the
formulation of EU foreign trade policy and they come in at
different points in the process of vertical delegation. For the
purposes of the paper, the European Parliament (EP) is
particularly important. It has set up committees which require the
foreign trade Commissioner to appear in front of them regularly.
The EP has become increasingly active in trade policy and is the
main promoter of the new trade agenda, emphasizing particularly
non-commercial aspects. The image of the EU as norm-driven actor
is anchored intensely in the EP (Erikson/Rossbach 2004).
Further groups influencing European foreign trade policy are, of
course, industrial lobbies (at the national level as well as in
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the form of European-wide associations in Brussels), the already
mentioned NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty
International), the press and national parliaments.
The most important interest groups are consulted in an
institutionalised setting by the Commission. The central forum is
the so-called Civil Society Dialogue which encompasses a wide
array of groups.
Members of the Contact Group of DG Trade in the Civil Society Dialogue (6/2006)
Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE) – http://www.wide-network.orgAssociation of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry www.eurochambres.beBureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs – BEUC http://www.beuc.orgComité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles de l'UE &Comité Général de la Coopération Agricole de l'Union Européenne COPA-COGECA - COPA-COGECA www.copa-cogeca.beCoopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité – CIDSE http://www.cidse.orgEurocommerce http://www.eurocommerce.beEurogroup for Animal Welfare – http://www.eurogroupanimalwelfare.orgEuropean Economic and Social Committee – EESC http://www.esc.eu.intEuropean Trade Union Confederation – ETUC http://www.etuc.orgForeign Trade Association – FTA http://www.fta-eu.orgSOLIDAR http://www.solidar.orgThe European Services Forum – ESF http://www.esf.beUnion of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe – UNICE http://www.wto.unice.orgWorld Wildlife Fand – WWF http://www.panda.org/epo Source: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civilsoc/contactgroup.cfm
European Foreign Trade policy therefore appears at first sight as
a heavily integrated negotiating system with several differently
defined and interconnected policy arenas.3 The mode of policy-
making in such systems has been analysed by a substantial part of
the recent EU literature as network governance, relying on
consultation, dialogue, expert knowledge, and bargaining & arguing
3 According to Benz the EU displays the characteristics of a concordant democracy, which reaches decisions not via Bargaining, but rather in a consensual process which is negotiated between the executive and relevant societal groups.
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among different institutions and actors (Eising/Kohler-Koch 1999).
Reference is frequently made to “comitology” in the EU, locating
the place where these negotiations happen in the myriad of
committees and sub-committees in the EU (which also characterize
trade policy in the EU). The rules, norms and procedures of such a
system over time transform, according to this literature, the
expectations and therefore also the behavior of the actors
(Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 2003: 16). Decision-making in policy
arenas characterized by network governance usually corresponds to
a deliberative policy model (Neyer 2003): most decisions are taken
unanimously. This is also true for foreign trade policy, despite
the possibility of qualified majority voting in the case of
conflicts, as stipulated in the EU treaties. It is one example for
the frequent prevalence of informal over formal rules in this
field: even in the allocation of competencies there are
substantial grey areas regarding the question whether the
Commission or the Council is responsible. The ubiquity of informal
rules requires incessant renegotiations among the core actors. EU
trade policy therefore appears an ideal instance of a policy field
creating decisions by negotiations among different levels which
closely interact. The final decisions are not hierarchical but
they depend on consent by various levels (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-
Koch, in Wiener/Diez 2004).
This briefly sketched, widely accepted theory of the EU as multi-
level system and a policy area characterized by network governance
has focused its interests mainly on the tracing of political
processes and here above all on a descriptive analysis of the
input-dimension.4 Less attention has been paid to the political
output. Most of the time, the output has been analysed with regard
4 This research first concentrated on the analysis of EU structural policies (Benz/Eberlein 1999).
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to the efficiency of the decision making process and the
democratic legitimacy of the results.5
However, most of the works dealing with the EU in this way contain
more or less explicit predictions regarding the formation of
preferences in the EU. They usually claim, that the EU reflects
its internal decision making processes also in its external
behavior. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch write in their much-quoted
introductory chapter of „Europäische Integration“: „The structure
of the political system of the EU is responsible for the
characteristics of the political processes and the substance of
political results“(2003: 18). Thus, a political system which
solves its internal conflicts by deliberation, consensus and
negotiations, will behave in such a way also towards the outside.6
Furthermore, it will try to achieve a far-reaching representation
of all societal actors which participate in the deliberative
process.
In a recent special edition of European Foreign Affairs Review
dealing with the EU as international actor, Mary Farrell
summarizes this in a similar vain: “to understand EU actorness …
we have to both understand the internal governance structure and
to identify how this is used in the international arena … [The EU]
model of governance can be defined as a norms producing process
which in turn structures the EU as a normative power” (458)
3) Theoretical Predictions
Therefore, both the top-down approach of the normative power
school as well as the bottom-up approach of the multilevel game
5 Grande 2000: “the institutional structure of the European system of multi-level governance has a decisive influence on the problem solving capacity of EU policies (12). 6 This echoes democratic peace theory.
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literature generate similar predictions regarding the preferences
of the EU in international trade talks. Or, phrased differently,
the mode of policy formulation and the self identity of the EU
predispose it to integrate democratic and social viewpoints into
its positions during such talks. Do these predictions hold when
confronted with empirical evidence?
4) Empirical Evidence
Despite the wide distribution of these theoretical predictions
they correspond only very little to empirical reality. The trade
policy of the EU is widely criticized for destabilizing the socio-
economic structures of many poor countries and thus undermining
any chances for political liberalisation in these societies
(Youngs 2001: 39). One indicator is that the trade deficits of
developing countries with the EU have grown since the mid-1990s.
Empirical research, furthermore, has shown that the use of
positive or negative conditionality by the EU in foreign trade
policy is very inconsistent and limited to less important and
uncontroversial cases and measures (Smith 2001: 197)
Normative and economic components thus seems to be still separated
in EU foreign policy as Söderbaum/Hettne, have recently concluded
in a review of the interregional strategies of the EU: “whereas
much of the EU’s interregional relations are officially conducted
ander the pretext of civilian norms and a liberal institutionalist
agenda, the actual implementation of this agenda seems to be (at
least partly) a function of the relative power positions of the EU
vis-à-vis its counterparts“.(2005: 550)7
7 See also Lightfoot/Burchell (2005).
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These rather anecdotical first impressions, however, need to be
backed up by more detailed research. This papers first looks
briefly at the EU negotiating posture during the current Doha
Round of multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization, and,
second, on EU negotiations with China during the process of the
latter’s application for WTO accession between 1985 and 2001.
Doha-Round
The Doha Round, which started in November 2001, owes its existence
mainly to an initiative by the EU. When the Round began, the areas
of services (investment, IPR, transparency) and agriculture turned
out to be of particular importance. Thus, the EU represented
defensive as well as offensive interests. In its public
pronouncements, the EU promoted an explicitly postmodern agenda,
in particular with regard to the sustainability of trade and the
promotion of social standards (not surprisingly, the multilateral
negotiations were sold as Doha Development Round). A link between
trade and labor standards, however, was soon abandoned by the EU.
Ecological topics also disappeared quickly from the agenda. Ahnlid
(2005: 133) argues in a recent volume on „EU Negotiations“, that
these topics were above all bargaining chips to avoid far-reaching
concessions in agriculture.
Instead, the EU formulated a link between the removal of
agricultural subsidies in the EU with the so-called Singapur
Issues (Investment, Competition Policy, Trade Issues, transparency
in public offerings). This link was partly responsible for the
breakdown of the WTO-negotiations in Cancun (Woolcock 2003). When
the Commission formulated the EU-position prior to the Cancun-
Negotiations even the member states had difficulties to influence
the agenda, given information deficits and time constraints. Of
course, the EP or NGOs fared even worse.
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Likewise, in the meanwhile stalled talks after Cancun, commercial
interests were completely dominating the positions of the EU. Even
this cursory look therefore suggests a strategic use of democratic
and social norms in international trade talks. This is visible also
in cases which seem to be counter examples. In the 2000 Mexiko-EU
Cooperation agreement, the EU insisted on having the democracy
clause in the agreement. It tied its own hands by granting the EP
an exceptional right to ratify the agreement (Szymanski/Smith
2005). However, as (Youngs 2001: 29) remarked subsequently the
clause turned out to have no practical meaning.
WTO/China Talks
A similar picture emerges when analysing the negotiations about
the accession of China to the WTO. The core forums of this process
were bilateral talks of the People’s Republic with the most
important trading powers. The talks had hardly started when the
Tienanmen Square incident in June 1989 interrupted the talks and
caused intense public criticism in the engagement policy of the EU
member states towards China. The EU reacted with some sanctions;
however, despite ongoing human rights violations in China, there
was a very quick normalisation of mutual relations. Much faster
than the US, the EU returned to a concentration on trade relations
and a policy of positioning itself geopolitically in East
Asia(Friedrich 1998). The promoters of an active human rights
policy, in particular the very active EP and the Brussels-based
NGOs, did not succeed in placing their issues in any meaningful on
the agenda of Sino-European talks. They also failed during the
rest of the negotiations, as demonstrated by an analysis of the
available evidence and interviews with decision-makers (for
details, see: Zimmermann 2005).
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The ratification of the results of the negotiations was a de-
politicised process. The Council accepted the text presented by
the Commission without long debate (European Council 2001a;
2001b), despite criticism from the EP.8 In the ratification
process as in the whole negotiations, the role of the EP turned
out to be negligible. In contrast to the American negotiations
with China, human rights issues played no role.
How can these results be explained which so obviously contradict
the theoretical premises of much of the literature on the EU as
external actor?
5) An Institutional Explanation
My hypothesis is the following:
The formation of preferences during international negotiations in
the EU-system of multi-level governance is decisively shaped by a
path-dependent process. This process opens or closes possibilities
of access and veto points for the different actors shaping EU
trade policy in the different phases of trade negotiations.
The hypothesis can be illustrated by looking at the access points
of societal interests in a typical negotiating process of the EU.
The following scheme is based on interviews with EU officials and
a comprehensive evaluation of the literature on EU foreign trade
policymaking. It shows the three phases of a negotiating process:
agenda setting, negotiations and ratification. Of particular
importance, is the veto potential of actors, especially with
regard to the final ratification of an eventual agreement.9
8 Despite its concern with the human rights situation in China, the EP has consistently supported China’s WTO accession (ER 2233, 19.6.1997, 3); however, it promoted social and democratic conditionality. 9 This article uses Tsebelis’ Vetoplayer theory. See: Tsebelis 2002.
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EU Decision-making in international trade negotiations
(volume of arrows indicates importance)
A
G
E
N
D
A
S
E
T
T
I
N
COUNCIL approves mandate
COMMISSION negotiates
EP
ART. 133-COMMITTEE
Industrial Lobby Groups
in-form
reports to informs
NGOs Member States
in-struct
controls
R A T I F I C A T I O N
COMMISSION concludes
informsPresents results
Council ratifies (QMV/ unanimity)
EP takes notice
N E G O T I A T I O N S
COMMISSION: Writes mandate
Industrial Lobby Groups
Member States
EP
COREPER
Art.133-Subcommittees
ART. 133-COMMITTEE
NGOs
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Lets first look at the agenda setting phase, that is, the
question which societal interests the Commission has to consider
when it draws up a negotiating mandate. At first, it is obvious
that the European Parliament plays a very minor role.10 The draft
mandate the Commission presents to the Council is defined by DG
Trade in cooperation with those economic interest groups that have
a stake in the future negotiations. In this process, the
Commission systematically anticipates eventual veto positions of
member states the consent of which it needs for the approval of
the draft mandate.
National parliaments, like the EP, do not play a role in
agenda setting. Thus, this phase is removed from the democratic
process. In fact, the extent to which the positions of parliaments
are honored is at the mercy of the Commission and the Council.
This is explained by a look at the constellation in the other two
negotiating phases: European parliaments, contrary to the US
Congress, are in none of the typical phases of negotiations
effective veto players. This also is true for the so-called ‚civil
society’. The Commission accepts its advice, as long as it does
not contradict its general negotiating strategy; much of this
acceptance, however, remains rhetorical, as the China case shows.
In contrast, the member states dominate the overall agenda of
European foreign trade policy. Although nominally the Commission
has the sole right of initiative in foreign trade matters, there
are of course many ways for the member states to make their
specific requests known to the Commission, either via the Art.133-
Committee or in direct contact with DG Trade (Johnson 1998).
10 Just one example: Prior to the WTO talks in Seattle the European Parliament tried without success to shape the agenda of the EU (Elsig 2002: 148).
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The preferences of the Commission n international trade
negotiations are the strengthening of the geopolitical and geo-
economic position of the EU, safeguarding its own role in the EU
system, the representation of commercial interests and the
promotion of European ideals. However, some of these interests are
more likely to ‘survive’ the trajectory of decision-making than
others. Because of its limited knowledge, especially on
complicated questions of market access, the Commission uses
systematically private actors when drawing up a negotiating
mandate (Lahusen/Jauss 2001: 41). It does need the cooperation of
business lobbies not only for gathering expert information, but
also with regard to its own bargaining game with the member
states. Despite of that, industrial lobbies have to surmount high
barriers in case they want to create a potential veto coalition
against mandates they don’t like. The Commission is financially
independent and it also does not need to bother about reelection.
Interest groups therefore have to convince a member state to
assume a veto position. Member states, however, use their veto
only in very important matters; otherwise, European foreign trade
policy would be quickly paralysed. Geopolitical and geo-economic
interests therefore dominate the Commission’s agenda-setting.
How does the negotiating phase look like? Industrial lobbies
are systematically consulted also during the actual negotiations.
However, again high institutional barriers prevent them from
torpedoing the general strategic line of the Commission. Only
member states can do this but because of the consensual mode of
decision-making in the Council, the information advantage of the
Commission and a substantial overlap of Commission and Council
preferences, this happens much less frequently than suggested by
rationalist analyses of EU trade policy. Despite the ritual
mentioning of the EP in official statements its role in the
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negotiating phase is very peripheral, although Members of
Parliament were observers in the EU-delegations in Seattle and
Doha. The Commission has no obligation to consult the European
Parliament; however, the EP is getting informed about the
proceedings and content of the talks.11 Thus there is, at least, an
informal participation during the negotiations, yet, without the
right to vote and participation in the talks themselves.
Accordingly, the Parliament has lamented repeatedly a lack of
transparency in EU negotiations and the exclusion of parliaments.
Despite verbal support by the Commission it had no success.12
Its distance from the national arena and national parliaments, the
lack of reelection concerns, and, linked to that, its financial
independence from lobbying groups makes the EU system of
multilevel governance in the area of foreign trade relatively
resistant against pressure by concentrated interests. This is
particularly welcome for the member states themselves which have
achieved, through the Europeanization of foreign trade policy,
considerable maneuvering space against industrial lobbies, but
also against trade unions and NGOs. Because they have the last
word on ratification, the member states created a principal-agent
relationship in which the Commission anticipates their positions
systematically to ensure ratification.
The formal and informal institutional set-up of the negotiating
process thus causes a situation in which so-called postmodern
demands, represented by the EP and the NGOs, are systematically
11 Article III-217 Paragraph 3 draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe “ . .The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the EP on the progress of negotiations”. Comissioner Lamy: “Le Parlement européen n'est pas encore constitutionnellement associé à cette politique mais je lui rends déjà compte régulièrement. L'association à part entière du Parlement aux discussions sur les politiques commerciales internationales devrait d'ailleurs être . .l'un des acquis du futur Traité constitutionnel (Statement, Institut de France, Paris, 29 Mar 2004). 12 See the debate in the EP on 12.03.2001 and the remarks of Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy; European Report 2579, 24.3.2001, 18-21.
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discarded, whenever this seems opportune. If, however, the EP
became a veto player in one of the phases of negotiation, the
chances of access for all kinds of societal actors would improve
dramatically.
6) The US Example
This last claim can be demonstrated by a brief look at the
institutional structure of US decision-making in foreign trade
negotiations. This structure leads to an often tenacious pursuit
of norms and particular societal interests. In the WTO meeting in
Seattle, the Clinton administration stuck to the issue of labor
standards although many developing countries threatened to walk
out and eventually did so because of this issue. The NAFTA
agreement also contains social clauses, some of which were
introduced only at the ratification stage. The clearest example,
however, is the China/WTO negotiating process. Despite the huge
interest of the US industry and the geopolitical goals of the
administration, social and democratic norms kept appearing at the
agenda during the 15 years of negotiations, particularly during
the quasi-ratification of US-China trade relations during the
yearly debates about a continuation of China’s MFN status. Recent
FTAs with Chile, Singapur, and Jordan contain democratic and
social clauses. Thus, although the US is only rarely seen as
postmodern actor and societal support for this kind of issues
seems to be lower than in Europe, norms play a bigger role in the
formation of US preferences during international trade
negotiations. This is, however, also true for comparatively small
protectionist groups with strategic veto-power, like cotton and
citrus farmers as well as the sugar industry, all of which are
located in so-called swing states. The core explanation for this
is the institutional shape of decision-making in international
trade talks.
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Institutional Mechanisms in US Foreign Trade Negotiations
Issue leaders
PRESIDENT consults ITC consults Ministries
A G E N D A S E T T I N G
USTR creates mandate
lobbies Industry
represented through Private Sector Advisory Groups
Hearings
RATIFICATION
PRESIDENT
notifies
Congress discusses Committees (Finance/Ways & Means)
ADVISORY COMMITTEES Reports
President signs agreement
asks for briefings
Consultation
Congressional Oversight Group
ITC
Departments
Consultation (2.Vetopoint) Congress
Consultation
USTR Negotiates and concludes
NE GO TI AT IO NS
Industry NGOs
Congress
Congress agrees or disagrees (3.Vetopoint) legislates with majority in both houses
discuss implementing legislation
(1.veto position) CONGRESS
Industry initiates
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The crucial issue in this diagram is the location of the veto
points: in all three phases Congress can stop the negotiations.
Given that trade liberalisation since many years has only very
small majorities in Congress (the latest example being CAFTA which
was approved by a one vote majority), US negotiators cannot afford
to keep issues which are pushed by strategic groups of Congressmen
from the table. This includes social and democratic norms. The EU,
however, is capable of disregarding these factors, although
ideologically it might be more predisposed to include them.
6) Resummee
The constructivist school, which defines the EU as new normative
power, as well as the multilevel governance approaches, which sees
the modes of policy-making in the EU as determining its external
behavior, disregard the path-dependent institutional determinants
characterising different policy fields in a specific way. Norms
are certainly important in EU external policies but they are
filtered through the institutional system. In the field of trade
policy this means that the much-hyped notion of the EU as
normative actor is far from the reality.
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