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HOW STREAMS OF COMMUNICATIONREPRODUCE AND CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL

LOGICS: THE ROLE OF CATEGORIES

WILLIAM OCASIONorthwestern University

JEFFREY LOEWENSTEINUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

AMIT NIGAMCity University London

We examine how streams of communication enable the reproduction and change ofthe underlying principles that constitute institutional logics. While past research hasshown that communication provides instantiations of institutional logics, the linkbetween specific instances of communication and the emergence of institutionallogics has not been explicitly shown. To remedy this gap, we propose that collectionsof communicative events distributed throughout organizations and institutional fieldscan converge on systems of categories so as to yield the meaningful and durableprinciples that constitute institutional logics. We explore how four analytically dis-tinct communicative functions—coordinating, sensegiving, translating, and theoriz-ing—enable this emergent process of reproduction and change.

During the past quarter of a century, institu-tional research on organizations has focused in-creasingly on the role of institutional logics—cultural structures that bring order to domainsof practice—in explaining structure and action(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Rao, Monin, & Durand,2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2008). Whilescholars have invoked communication as cen-tral to institutional logics (Green, Babb, & Al-paslan, 2008; Lammers, 2011; Sandhu, 2009) andas providing examples of how logics change(Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005), existing theory doesnot provide a good understanding of the mech-anisms by which communication shapes institu-tional logics. In particular, the constitutive func-tion of communication in the reproduction andchange of institutional logics, as well as howthis function relates to cognition, remainsunderdeveloped.

One exception is the work on vocabularies(Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Loewenstein,Ocasio, & Jones, 2012; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Buthere the focus has been on the communicative

content of vocabularies—through categoriesand category conventions—and their role inconstituting institutional logics (Thornton, Oca-sio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Communicative pro-cesses, except those involving theorization (Lok,2010; Rao et al., 2003) and sensegiving (Mc-Pherson & Sauder, 2013; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010),have received less theoretical or research atten-tion in research on institutional logics. Specifi-cally, researchers commonly conceptualize in-stitutional logics as higher-order culturalstructures that are constituted through commu-nication, but we have limited knowledge of howdiverse, local, and ephemeral instances of com-munication can create or constitute these higher-order cultural structures (cf. Giddens, 1984). Andwhile the communicative constitution of organi-zations (CCO) perspective (Brummans, Cooren,Robichaud, & Taylor, 2014; Cooren, Kuhn, Corne-lissen, & Clark, 2011; McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Tay-lor & Van Every, 2000), a key focus of communi-cation research, does link communication toorganizations, this literature does not explicitlylink communication to institutional logics.

To remedy this theoretical gap, we explorehow streams of communication shape the con-stitution of institutional logics. Past research

We thank Rudy Durand, the editorial team of the SpecialTopic Forum on Communication, Cognition, and Institutions,and three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable advice.

� Academy of Management Review2015, Vol. 40, No. 1, 28–48.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0274

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has established that communication provides ameans for representing institutional logics andtheir component practices (Durand & Jourdan,2012; Lok, 2010; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood,2011) and serves as a vehicle for rhetoric andpersuasion (Green et al., 2008; Suddaby &Greenwood, 2005; Vaara & Monin, 2010). But com-munication is seen more as a facilitator of thediffusion of logics and their political mobiliza-tion, as highlighted by social movement re-searchers (Benford & Snow, 2000; King & Pearce,2010; McAdam & Scott, 2005), than as an under-lying process directly generating or changinglogics. We develop an account of how commu-nication distributed throughout organizationsand institutional fields reproduces and changescategory conventions within vocabularies ofpractice and, as a result, reproduces andchanges institutional logics. In doing so we linkcommunication, cognition, and institutions toaccount for how diverse, local acts of communi-cation can constitute the higher-order culturalstructures of institutional logics.

In the following section we present our theo-retical model. We propose four communicativefunctions—coordinating, sensegiving, translat-ing, and theorizing—that shape the constitutionof institutional logics. If the category conven-tions across the four functions converge, theygenerate the underlying principles of institu-

tional logics. Finally, we discuss the contribu-tions of our theory, including implications forresearch.

HOW COMMUNICATION GENERATESCULTURAL STRUCTURES

We propose a recursive model, shown in Fig-ure 1, linking institutional logics with categoryconventions, practices, and the four communica-tive functions. In developing our theory, we relyon a defining property of institutional logics:logics are cultural structures that constitute en-during and broadly applicable configurations ofgoverning principles bringing order to particu-lar domains of practice (Thornton & Ocasio,2008). We propose that institutional logics arebuilt from more basic forms of cultural struc-tures—category conventions and vocabulary di-mensions—and that communication is critical tohow these cultural structures are generated andconnected to each other. Communication, as weexplore below, can cause category conventionsto converge, generating the underlying vocabu-lary dimensions that constitute the principles ofinstitutional logics.1 Institutional logics, in turn,

1 We take a critical realist approach to the existence ofvocabularies, vocabulary dimensions, and institutional log-

Figure 1Structures and Processes Reproducing and Changing Institutional Logics

Institutional logics

Category conventions

Practices

Vocabulary dimensions

Theorizing

Coo

rdin

atin

g

Convergingcategoryconventions

Theories

Social facts

Institutionalnarratives

Translating

Sensegiving

2015 29Ocasio, Loewenstein, and Nigam

indicate available and accessible vocabulariesto think, communicate, and generate practices(Thornton et al., 2012).

We emphasize that communication in organi-zations and institutional fields is situated intime and space in the context of communicativeevents. Communicative events are collections oforal and written statements and speech acts(Cooren, 2001; Cooren & Taylor, 1997; Searle,1969) that cohere to yield a macro speech act(Van Dijk, 1997). For example, a trading transac-tion coordinating buying and selling, a restau-rant review congratulating a new chef, and aspeech inviting new lines of action are all com-municative events. The question is how commu-nication processes, which are streams of spe-cific local and ephemeral communicativeevents, can shape institutional logics, which areenduring cultural structures.

To connect situated communicative eventswith enduring institutional logics, we are in-spired by, yet depart from, prior CCO theory(McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Taylor & Van Every, 2000).

A CCO account has not, to our knowledge, beenlinked to institutional logics, but CCO workhelps us understand how communicating in acurrent situation can yield enduring, higher-order structures (such as organizations) that per-sist beyond specific situations. Since CCOperspectives are themselves quite varied (Brum-mans et al., 2014; Putnam & Nicotera, 2008), ourtheory relies primarily on Taylor and Van Ev-ery’s (2000) insights on organizations emergingfrom distributed communication. Our approachis also related to McPhee and Zaug’s (2000), par-ticularly with respect to the four functions ofcommunication, as we explain in the next sec-tion. We differ, however, from more recent ver-sions of the Montreal School of CCO, which con-sider any macrostructure such as organizationsand, by extension, institutional logics as exist-ing ontologically in any communicative event(Cooren, 2004; Cooren & Fairhurst, 2008; Coorenet al., 2011). Our perspective relies instead onthe assumption that although institutional log-ics scale up and thereby emerge from situatedcommunicative events distributed throughout or-ganizations and institutional fields, they havean ontological reality distinct from communica-tion, as suggested by a critical realist approach(Leca & Naccache, 2006; Thornton & Oca-sio, 2008).

Our reliance on and interpretation of Taylorand Van Every’s (2000) account is that when en-gaged in communicative events, actors are es-tablishing that they are participating in anevent and assigning themselves roles and goalswithin that event. To use very simple examples,a purchasing event involves a buyer and aseller, and a hiring event involves an employerand a candidate. As a result of being engaged ina communicative event, actors develop a mutualunderstanding of events, role assignments, andgoals. These events, roles, and goals build onone another to generate organizations. For ex-ample, you could hire me to sell things to others.In this way you and I are together selling toothers, and so we have formed a larger socialentity composed of you and me. This new socialunit can then, recursively, play a role in a stilllarger event, have goals, and act (“we sold awidget today!”). This account can explain thegeneration of social structures, up to and includ-ing organizations, that are composed of manyroles and many events, encompassing actionover long spans of time and involving many

ics (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Leca & Naccache, 2006).These are real cultural structures that emerge from socialinteractions through communication and cognition but thatare not directly observable in any specific interaction orevent. These structures or symbolic meaning systems are theproduct of our culture and cognitive representations, yetthey exist in the real world independent of our ability toaccess them and represent them fully. Practices, symbolicsystems, and institutional logics are thereby emergent struc-tures of practitioners’ communication and social construc-tions but, through their emergence, constitute real structureswith causal powers to shape social reality (Archer, 1982).This critical realist approach has important implications inour theory.

First, symbolic meaning systems and material practices,while closely interrelated, have independent emergenceand existence. Note that this assumption of the theory differsfrom some discourse analysis approaches and strong socialconstructivist perspectives that do not distinguish betweenthe generation of symbolic meanings and material practice(cf. Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004).

Second, our critical realist approach interprets the consti-tution of practices as social facts such that practices emergeas real structures with their own causal powers. Unlike astructurationist (Giddens, 1984) or CCO approach, the criti-cal realist ontology assumes that practices, once consti-tuted, have a capacity to be involved in their own self-reproduction and need not be continuously renegotiated andreconstituted.

Third, our critical realist ontology views cultural struc-tures—category conventions, vocabulary dimensions, andinstitutional logics—as emergent structures, each with theircausal powers. Our article emphasizes this emergent pro-cess and the partial autonomy of culture and institutions.

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people. We extend this account to build our coreinsight that collections of communicative eventscan converge to yield the meaningful and dura-ble higher-order cultural structures that consti-tute institutional logics.

The other line of theorizing we draw on toconnect distributed communicative events andenduring institutional logics is that on vocabu-laries (Mills, 1939, 1940) and vocabularies ofpractice (Loewenstein et al., 2012; Thornton etal., 2012). Vocabularies of practice are symbolicsystems of both words and their meanings thatsocial collectives use to label and categorizepractices.2 Vocabularies are based on the ob-servable record of word use in communicativeevents (cf. Williams, 1985). Communicating in-volves putting words together to form state-ments about practices, and the ways in whichactors put words and practices together yieldvocabulary structure (Loewenstein et al., 2012).Conventions about how to use words in commu-nication about practices produce the vocabu-lary’s system of categories. For this reason werefer to them as category conventions.

Communication is not often the focus of re-search on categories. There are a number ofways to conceptualize categories, such as pro-totypes or causal models, each emphasizing adistinct set of cognitive and organizational func-tions (Cornelissen & Durand, 2012; Durand &Paolella, 2013; Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). Yet for ourpurposes we follow the work on vocabularies totheorize that categories are founded on socialconventions about using words while communi-cating (Loewenstein et al., 2012). There are cat-egory conventions about whether practices areacceptable as examples that can be labeledwith a given word, such as “Kaiser Permanente”and “Humana,” which are examples of the cat-egory labeled by the words “managed care pro-vider.” There are also category conventionsabout whether and how words are related toeach other, such as “companies are growing,

stagnant, or failing,” which links the category“company” to the categories of “growth,” “stag-nation,” and “failure.” These two kinds of cate-gory conventions—word-example relations tospecify what practices categories refer to andword-word relations to specify how categoriesrelate to one another—jointly shape the catego-ries that members of social collectives thenlearn and use (Loewenstein, 2014).

Category conventions yield systems, not inde-pendent lists, of categories. As a result, categoryconventions can form both small clusters of cat-egories and larger configurations of categories.Small clusters of categories collectively indicateschemas, or mental representations of struc-tured knowledge (Markman, 1999; Van Gorp,2007). Schemas provide coherence, as long agoidentified by Bartlett’s (1932) studies of commu-nication, as well as generate toolkits for commu-nication and action (Axelrod, 1973; DiMaggio,1997; Weber, 2005). Larger configurations of cat-egories can collectively indicate principles—thefundamental tenets that organize schemas andprovide governing logics for institutions. Wewill extend the work on vocabularies in severalways as we develop the links between commu-nication and institutional logics, building on itscore insight that collections of category conven-tions about practices can converge to yieldmeaningful and durable higher-order principlesof institutional logics.

As an example, the institutional logic ofshareholder value is grounded in specializedcategories. The vocabulary of the shareholdervalue logic includes such categories as “boardindependence,” “shareholder value maximiza-tion,” and “financial analysis.” These categoriesrefer to and draw meaning from practices of theshareholder value logic, which include specificactivities, such as appointing outside (i.e., “in-dependent”) directors, to influence financial an-alysts to raise their assessments of the firm’sshare price and thereby “maximize shareholdervalue.” Those assessments, in turn, are disso-ciable from the real performance of the firm (Jo-seph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, in press; Westphal &Graebner, 2010). Managing the impressions offinancial analysts is therefore part of the insti-tutional logic, even though the practice of im-pression management may not be directly ac-knowledged or explicitly articulated, eitherprivately or publicly (cf. Jackall, 1988). The prin-ciples of institutional logics, as embodied in

2 Vocabularies of practice are distinct from other kinds ofvocabularies, such as technical vocabularies (i.e., formallists of technical terms) and controlled vocabularies (i.e.,standardized terminology for indexing information). Theyalso differ from Weick’s (1995) vocabularies of sensemaking,which are not defined as systems of words but, instead, arediscussed as collections of theories, traditions, narratives,premises, norms, beliefs, values, standard operating proce-dures, and more and are defined by the type of contentrather than by communities.


practices, are never fully articulated, in part be-cause of symbolic management (which includespractitioners convincing themselves of the con-sistency of talk and action) and in part becausethere is always a tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1967)to practices. Yet, at the same time, the develop-ment of practices around financial analysis orboard independence would not be feasible ab-sent the distributed communication building upcategory conventions so as to produce the com-plex system of social meanings necessary toindividuate those practices (Loewenstein, 2014).So institutional logics depend on vocabulariesof practice, and vocabularies of practice dependon category conventions being linked to prac-tices through communication to yield systems ofmeaningful categories.

COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTIONS THATCONSTITUTE LOGICS FROM STREAMS OF

COMMUNICATIVE EVENTS

Communicative events, such as transactions,speeches, and reviews, vary in their local pur-poses, but for discussing their role in constitut-ing institutional logics, we develop a typology offour main functions. A typology of the functionsof micro speech acts—promises, declarations,orders, and so forth (Searle, 1969)—already ex-ists, but, being concerned with broader commu-nicative events, we emphasize broader kinds offunctions. Drawing on prior organizational liter-ature and institutional literature, we identifyfour functions of communicative events, operat-ing at increasing levels of abstraction: coordi-nating, sensegiving, translating, and theorizing.

We emphasize these four functions becausethey bridge the domain of practice and the do-main of theory that together constitute the prin-ciples underlying institutional logics (Thorntonet al., 2012). In doing so we build on past theoryon cognition (and, implicitly, communication)and on institutional logics, which emphasizethe functions of theorizing and sensegiving. Thetheorizing function of communication is themost developed in prior work on institutionallogics and emphasizes reproduction and changeat the institutional field level (Greenwood,Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Lok, 2010; Rao et al.,2003). Sensegiving has been emphasized in priortheory and research on institutional logics (Lam-mers, 2011; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Weber &Glynn, 2006). These two communicative func-

tions do not, however, guarantee that institu-tional logics are linked to practices. Theorizingrefers to abstract principles that may or may notbe experienced in practice (Nigam & Ocasio,2010; Thornton et al., 2012). And sensegiving mayreflect rhetorical considerations and attempts atpolitical influence, which may be decoupledfrom the generation of practice (Fiss & Zajac,2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).

To remedy this gap, we add two additionalcommunicative functions— coordinating andtranslating—such that, combined with sense-giving and theorizing, they explicitly link com-munication about institutions to communicationabout practices. The four communicative func-tions do so because they are distributed throughorganizations and institutional fields. Inspiredby CCO approaches, we rely on the coordinat-ing function of communication as key to the con-stitution of local practices (McPhee & Zaug, 2000;Taylor & Van Every, 2000). The coordinatingfunction of communication is further estab-lished in the organizational literature (Bechky,2003; March & Simon, 1958; Okhuysen & Bechky,2009) but has not been emphasized in the liter-ature on institutional logics (cf. Thornton et al.,2012). Here we emphasize that coordinating pro-vides a building block of institutional logics,providing opportunities for reproduction andchange in the instantiation of logics in localpractices.

To bridge between the local level of practiceand the level of the overall field, where theoriz-ing takes place, we build on prior research ontranslating, which allows communication to re-late individual practices to other practices inorganizations and institutional fields. Translat-ing builds on prior work on how translation ofpractices within and across societies and insti-tutional fields shapes institutional logics (Djelic& Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Zilber, 2006). However,this work does not focus on communication orcommunicative functions. Here we emphasizethe role of narratives in translating, which es-tablish linkages across local practices that ei-ther reproduce or challenge the establishedprinciples of institutional logics.

Our specification of four communicative func-tions has similarities to McPhee and Zaug’s(2000) four flows model of the CCO. McPhee andZaug’s four flows are membership negotiation,reflexive self-structuring, activity coordination,and institutional positioning. The first two are


specific to the constitution of organizations andare less directly relevant to institutional logics.Activity coordination is directly related to thecoordinating function we discuss. And while theinstitutional positioning flow focuses on the re-lationship between the organization and its en-vironment, it can also be understood as a spe-cific form of sensegiving (cf. Lammers, 2011),which we discuss as well.

Like McPhee and Zaug (2000), who rely on theirdefinition of organizations to identify the fourflows, we rely on our definition of institutionallogics to identify the four communicative func-tions. But there are important differences be-tween the two theories. The four flows inMcPhee and Zaug’s model relate to different andrelatively separable components of the defini-tion of organizations. In our case the four func-tions do not relate to separable components oflogics but to how interrelated communicativeevents lead to the reproduction and change oflogics. Our focus is on emergent structures froma critical realist view, whereas McPhee andZaug (2000) rely instead on structuration theory(Giddens, 1984).

The four functions in our theory span bothlevels of analysis and degrees of analytical ab-straction. They range from the coordination ofconcrete roles and practices in the context ofmicrolevel social interactions to the theorizingof fundamental concepts at the level of the in-stitutional field. Each of the four functions oper-ates at a relatively distinct level of abstraction,allowing us to theorize distinct propositions fordifferent steps in the process by which local andephemeral communicative events can constitutemore enduring and abstract institutional logics.Although we focus on these four functions ofcommunicative events, we are not claiming thefour as an exhaustive list of functions. For ex-ample, framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cornelis-sen & Werner, 2014) is another function of com-municative events, one that the four functionsthat are our focus necessarily intersect with. Wefocus on the four communicative functions ofcoordinating, sensegiving, translating, and the-orizing to specify distinct components andmechanisms in our process model.

In examining the four functions of communi-cative events, we should note that while all fourare analytically distinct, they can be combinedin communicative events. For example, a busi-ness memo might serve both a coordinating

function (e.g., expressing decisions and plans)and a sensegiving function (e.g., providing jus-tifications). Or some letters to shareholders,such as Warren Buffet’s letters for BerkshireHathaway discussing the determinants of thecreation of shareholder value, involve not justsensegiving but also theorizing.

We further indicate that the four communica-tive functions are linked through streams ofcommunicative events (cf. McPhee & Zaug, 2000).No single communicative event will change aninstitutional logic (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Lok,2010; Nigam, 2012; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Fur-thermore, no single communicative function issufficient to change an institutional logic. In-stead, as we will discuss, reproducing andchanging institutional logics require streams ofcommunicative events with all four functions.

Coordinating to Link Categories with Practices

The first of these four functions of communi-cative events is coordinating. As noted earlier,coordinating organizational activities is a keyfunction of communicative events (McPhee &Zaug, 2000; Taylor & Van Every, 2000; see alsoOkhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Coordinating func-tions specify how individual and collectiveactors interact with other actors, and withpractices, throughout an organization andinstitutional field. For example, the communi-cation in a budget meeting provides a coordi-nating function for organizations, thereby estab-lishing sources of revenue, expected costs, andprofit goals. Coordinating involves establishingjoint attention and developing shared intention-ality (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; Taylor, 2000;Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Mol, 2005),which transform individual acts of attention andintentions into collective ones. Coordinatingalso indicates roles and relationships that de-fine how actors coorient with one another andwith artifacts (Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2009).For example, coordinating a sales transactioninvolves communication indicating that one ac-tor take the role of a buyer, another actor takethe role of a seller, some good or service beprovided, and some form of payment be ren-dered (Gentner, 1975; Taylor, 2000). So communi-cation processes involved in coordinatingprovide a basis for drawing on category conven-tions and instantiating them with particularpractices.


Taylor and Van Every (2000) emphasized thatthe object of communicative events could be an-other actor or collection of actors and, as a re-sult, communicative events could build upmacro social actors such as groups and organi-zations. We emphasize that the object of commu-nicative events could also be any organizingpractice. Just as actors are placing themselvesinto roles within events and assigning goals bycommunicating and so mutually generating anaccount of their activity, so, too, are they placingaspects of practice into roles and assigningthem purposes within events (cf. Durand, Rao, &Monin, 2007; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). Speakersgenerate and coordinate (Grieco & Lilja, 1996) byusing words to stand for new practices, as wellas to stand for key actors, products, locations,and other components involved in the practice(Clark, 1996). As practices are referenced bywords and so participate in category conven-tions across multiple events, playing multipleroles, those practices are increasingly individu-ated and perceived as items in themselves,standing apart from the particular events inwhich they are involved and as instances ofcategories of practices named by category con-ventions. Consequently, the communicativefunction of coordinating is critical for establish-ing the ostensive property of practices (cf. Feld-man & Pentland, 2003), allowing participants tounderstand that practices have particular prop-erties, are linked with other practices and ac-tors, and are available to be performed in othercontexts. In any one communicative event, whendiscussing an aspect of practice in a specificsituation, actors are contributing to producingnot just social actors as indicated by the CCOperspective but also to producing practices.

With this discussion of the communicativefunction of coordinating, category conventions,and practices, we are extending CCO theorizingto practices and linking it to categories and cog-nition. In the course of communicative eventswith a coordinating function, actors rely on cat-egory conventions to give meaning to and toorganize practices. If speakers had to establishwords and examples anew in every conversa-tion, little would get done. Relying on existingcategory conventions and using category con-ventions in typical ways foster efficient mutualunderstanding. This becomes particularly ap-parent in communicative events between mem-bers of different communities, when coordinat-

ing is so evidently difficult (Gumperz, 1964;Molinsky, 2013). Actors expect others to followtheir community’s category conventions(cf. Clark, 1998), even in adversarial interac-tions (e.g., Grieco & Lilja, 1996).

This reliance on existing category conven-tions to foster coordinating should foster the en-trenchment of the vocabulary and, accordingly,any accompanying institutional logic. Collec-tively, the stream of communicative events oc-curring within an institutional field should havea tendency to reproduce the vocabulary’s cate-gory conventions and incorporate congruent cat-egory conventions. Since category conventionscall attention to particular practices and shapethe meanings of those practices, the reproduc-tion of category conventions should tend to becoupled with the reproduction of practices andthe maintenance of practices consistent with thecategory conventions (Durand et al., 2007; Rao etal., 2003). It can even be a self-perpetuating cy-cle. For example, economics theories, communi-cated with particular category conventions, canbecome self-fulfilling as actors abide by thoseconventions, reproducing the practices and con-ditions ascribed by the theories (Ferraro, Pfeffer,& Sutton, 2005). As a result, we propose thefollowing.

Proposition 1: Coordinating throughcategory conventions congruent withprevailing logics generates practicesthat reinforce existing logics.

Because communicative events are local, andbecause coordinating adapts to local demands,there is leeway for actors to develop categoryconventions that contradict existing institu-tional logics. Presumably, most such local devi-ations will remain local and have marginal ef-fects on changing practices. However, if streamsof communicative events replicate and add tothe deviating category conventions, this couldlead to broader changes. As categories shift, theinterpretations of the practices shift, changingthose practices (cf. Kennedy, 2008; Kennedy,Chok, & Liu, 2012; Rosa, Porac, Runser-Spanjol, &Saxon, 1999; Sewell, 1992). New category conven-tions could, for example, relate two categories.Actors could then engage in practices that pre-sume those categories are linked, reinforcingthe category conventions and making them holdmore reliably. More generally, the communica-tive function of coordinating provides opportu-


nities for changing category conventions, fromwhich changes in practices can follow. If thosecategory conventions are not congruent withcurrent institutional logics, practices that thendeviate from those logics can develop. As a re-sult, we propose the following.

Corollary 1: Coordinating through cat-egory conventions that contradict pre-vailing logics generates practices thatenable changes in logics.

Sensegiving to Establish CategoryConventions As Social Facts

In sensegiving, actors communicate their in-terpretation of events and practices with others,influencing further coordinating (Cornelissen &Clarke, 2010; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick,1995) and, in general, framing and articulating aparticular vision of organizational and institu-tional reality (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Lammers, 2011;Weber & Glynn, 2006). We follow prior theoryand research in highlighting the importance ofcommunication yielding narratives (Czar-niawska, 1997; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Jameson,2001; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011) as a means forsensegiving (Boje, 1991, 2001; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005;Garud, Dunbar, & Bartel, 2011). Actors draw onavailable logics and categories to engage insensegiving,3 providing opportunities to repro-duce and transform interpretations of organiz-ing practices through indicating the continuityand the novelty of organizations or practices(Weber & Glynn, 2006). Thus, practice variationsgenerated through coordination can be inter-preted as new or as consistent. For example, intheir classic study, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) doc-umented the rise of professional departments,such as business and engineering, within U.S.liberal arts colleges, an anomalous practice forthe field of higher education. But while therewas considerable debate regarding the legiti-macy of the new practice, the more consistent

forms of sensegiving categorized them as a le-gitimate variant of liberal arts schools.

In explaining the communicative function ofsensegiving and its influence on practices, wefurther extend the CCO perspective by high-lighting the role of generics. Generics are nounphrases and sentences that indicate what ap-plies normally—“corporations have boards ofdirectors”—rather than what is happening justin a specific instance—“this corporation has aboard of directors” (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995).Thus, generics express meanings that applybroadly. Generics capture patterns and regular-ities (Gelman, 2003). They are derived from pro-jecting regularities from individual instances oridentifying regularities across multiple specificinstances. As a result of going beyond currentparticulars, generics necessarily make broadassumptions. Audiences tend to interpret gener-ics as indicating that the categories involvedare natural, objectified, and serving as core ac-counts of category examples (Cimpian, Bran-done, & Gelman, 2010). In the example just used,generics indicate that corporations and boardsof directors are enduring kinds. The use of ge-nerics in communication thus indicates funda-mental concerns about beliefs, attitudes, andobligations about the actors and practices underdiscussion, and whether those actors and prac-tices themselves are provisional or objectifiedproperties of the social world (Berger & Luck-mann, 1967). Within a larger narrative for sense-giving, then, generics anchor what is under dis-cussion by indicating the broader, enduringconcerns at stake.

When social groups communicate about prac-tices using generic language, they are engagedin a process of typifying those practices(Gelman, 2003). The use of generics in sensegiv-ing leads individuals to form the presumption(Levinson, 2000) that the practices are socialfacts—explicit, collective agreements on the ob-jectivity of some aspects of social reality (Searle,1995). Social facts do not require continuous re-negotiation to establish their validity, functions,and potentialities. Practices, when establishedas social facts, become not just specific in-stances or variations but established patterns ofsocial action and behavior presumed to endureand to be, fundamentally, whatever the categoryconventions indicate them to be.

For example, the chief executive officer (CEO),as the top executive in corporations, with a re-

3 We draw on sensegiving, rather than sensemaking, be-cause sensemaking is mainly focused on interpreting newkinds of events and situations (Weick, 1995), whereas we areequally concerned with reproducing existing interpreta-tions, and because sensemaking is mainly focused on inter-pretations among a local group of actors, whereas sensegiv-ing can be concerned with meanings spanning socialcollectives.


lated set of roles and responsibilities, has beena social fact in the United States since the latetwentieth century. Yet the formal title of CEOwas predominantly established as a coordinat-ing function in corporations such as GeneralMotors only in the post-World War II period. Itwas generated to designate either the presidentof the corporation or the chairman of the board,typically two distinct executive roles, as the topor “chief” executive. Category conventionsabout the CEO title could then be used in com-municative events with a sensegiving function,in the generic form, to talk about the CEO role(“CEOs should . . .”). By the 1980s the CEO be-came an established social fact, with categoryconventions used generically to state that cor-porations had CEOs as the title of their top ex-ecutives. Accompanying the establishment ofthe category CEO as a social fact, practiceslinked with the category can also be discussedusing generics, and so extend the perception ofnaturalness, concreteness, and taken-for-grant-edness to practices associated with the cate-gory. More generally, we propose the following.

Proposition 2: The greater the repro-duction of existing generics, the morethe categories and practices are takento be social facts and the greater thereproduction of practices that embodyinstitutional logics.

Social facts are not fully constraining. Theyalso exhibit variability: exactly how and to whatextent CEOs are or should be accountable to theboard of directors varies across firms and situ-ational contexts, and while CEO replacement isa possibility and an empirical regularity underpoor financial performance, it is not a necessity.As institutional logics change, new practicesand social facts emerge, and the experience ofpractices as social facts changes.

For an example of changing social facts, thepractice of stock buybacks was experienced as adifferent social fact under different institutionallogics (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). From the per-spective of communicative functions, under amarket logic the sensegiving of stock buybacksindicated that it increased the value of the firm,and this led to coordinating price increases. Foran example of new practices becoming socialfacts, nouvelle cuisine established new prac-tices, such as “service à la japonaise,” and “cui-sine du marche,” that came to be experienced

not as idiosyncratic practice variations but associal facts (cf. Rao et al., 2003). The develop-ment of new social facts or changes in socialfacts as contributors to institutional logics willdepend on changes in the generics that areused in communicative events to characterizepractices.

Corollary 2: The greater the use of ge-nerics that contradict existing institu-tional logics for sensegiving aboutpractices, the greater the potential forchange to institutional logics.

In this discussion we have emphasized howsensegiving uses generics in the local, bot-tom-up establishment of social facts for sense-giving about specific instances. Once estab-lished, generics can be used to reinforce andbuild on social facts. This is because genericsenable communication about meanings that gobeyond particular instances and immediatepractice. The two further communicative func-tions that we discuss next, translating and the-orizing, make use of generics for these reasons.Translating uses generics to connect instances,and theorizing uses generics to communicate ata meta level, beyond instances. For this reason,as we will return to later, generics are importantfor combining the effects of the communicativefunctions.

Translating Category Conventions intoInstitutional Narratives

Translating involves applying practices andnarratives in new contexts and, in the process,reshaping the understandings that are transmit-ted (Zilber, 2006). The communicative function oftranslating allows for local variations in bothpractices and narratives (Czarniawska &Joerges, 1996), as well as elements of continuityin practices and narratives across contexts inthe form of institutional narratives—narrativesthat transcend a specific situation and becomeapplied more broadly across an organizationalfield. Theory and research on translation in theinstitutional logics perspective have focused ontranslating across countries, institutional fields,or from societal to local contexts (Djelic & Sah-lin-Andersson, 2006; Zilber, 2006). Our applica-tion of translating is broader, including translat-ing across contexts both within organizationsand within institutional fields. For example, the


characteristics of modern architecture weretranslated across practices (e.g., the use of steeland concrete as building materials) and theircorresponding narratives (e.g., the associationof steel and concrete with a narrative of moder-nity and technological progress), highlightingboth similarities and differences across build-ings (Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012).

The communicative function of translating isparticularly critical for vocabularies that spaninstitutional fields. Translating narrativesacross contexts to yield institutional narrativesis important for the generation of field-level log-ics, because if the narratives were bound to par-ticular practices in particular organizations, theconventions about categories inherent in thenarratives would have limited impact on vocab-ularies of practice at the level of the institu-tional field. Translating narratives acrosscontexts enables the categories within the nar-rative to apply to new examples and allowsnarratives to act as analogies to (e.g., Spellman& Holyoak, 1992) and sources for blending with(Cornelissen, 2005) current practices. Thesetranslations may start out with tentative expres-sions marked as possibilities, but they then be-come conventional and discussed using gener-ics. Translating narratives allows narratives’uses of categories and conventions to becomewidespread and widely applicable within avocabulary.

By making category conventions widelyknown and applicable, translating gives struc-ture to vocabularies. That structure provides ac-counts of the typical foci of category research,such as category boundaries and membershiptypicality. Items that are, by convention, morefrequently given the category label, and so morefrequently discussed as examples of the cate-gory, are likely to be perceived as more centralor typical members of the category (i.e., fre-quency of instantiation; Barsalou, 1985). Itemsthat are denied the category label, and so dis-cussed as not being examples of the category,are likely to be perceived as not being membersof the category. Categories embedded in com-monly translated narratives can have meaningsshaped by conventionally acknowledged causalrelations, resulting in categories defined bycausal models (Ahn, 1998; Murphy & Medin, 1985;Rehder, 2003). Conventionally using generics fora word indicates that the word is an enduringcategory defined by an underlying essence

(Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010). So categoryconventions indicate how a category has beenused in streams of communicative events, whichthen shape how individuals understand the cat-egory (Markman & Ross, 2003). Category conven-tions provide a means for building a vocabu-lary’s systems of categories, and structuresarising from streams of communicative eventscan provide the cognitive and normative foun-dations for category meanings, shaping furthercommunication. Therefore, we propose thefollowing.

Proposition 3: The greater the transla-tion of existing narratives across con-texts, the greater the reproduction ofexisting institutional logics.

This discussion of category conventions aris-ing from streams of communicative events andgiving structure to categories within vocabular-ies implies that translating narratives is a keystep. But it is not just narratives that are consis-tent with existing logics that can be translated.Narratives that account for surprising newevents and practices (Cornelissen, 2012) are par-ticularly likely to be remembered and shared(Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001; Loewenstein,Raghunathan, & Heath, 2011). These narrativesbecome part of what members of the social col-lective come to know (cf. Norenzayan, Atran,Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006). Narratives that havebeen translated across contexts increase thelikelihood that new social conventions will be-come adopted. For example, the narrativearound the Clinton health care reform effort,translated into narratives about related privatesector practices, led to changing category con-ventions around managed care and contributedto changes in prevailing institutional logics(Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Thus, narratives aremore than just discussions of particular prac-tices. They can be proposals for a small collec-tion of category conventions to be added to thevocabulary.

In contrast to prior discussions of narratives inorganization theory, we focus on narratives ashaving the capacity to adapt and spread,through translation, a growing collection of in-terrelated categories. This is because formingand translating narratives involve generating,selecting, modifying, and applying categories.Multiple narratives, even competing narratives,can draw on some of the same words and exam-


ples, and so can collectively reinforce existingor establish new category conventions implicitin institutional logics. Accordingly, translatingis instrumental in building up meanings withbroad scope, which is key not only to reproduc-ing institutional logics but also for allowingchanges to institutional logics. As new narra-tives translate across contexts, potentialchanges to institutional logics emerge. Conse-quently, we offer the following.

Corollary 3: The greater the transla-tion of new narratives across contextsthat contradict existing narratives, thegreater the potential for changes ininstitutional logics.

Theorizing Abstract Category Conventions

Strang and Meyer defined theorizing as “theself-conscious development and specification ofabstract categories and the formulation of pat-terned relationships such as chains of causeand effect” (1993: 492). We emphasize that theo-rizing occurs in communicative events. Theoriz-ing is done not only by scientists, intellectuals,policy analysts, and professionals with a spe-cific theoretical intent (Strang & Meyer, 1993) butalso by practitioners, activists, and the media,reflexively generalizing beyond individual in-stances. We also note that theorizing differsfrom sensegiving in its emphasis on the abstractand the general, going beyond not just the situ-ation at hand but also any particular situation.Theorizing may stem from and can certainly re-late to current practices, as in the restaurantreviews of French cuisine (Rao et al., 2003). Buttheorizing is also focused on indicating general,abstract aspects of categories (e.g., the fresh-ness or seasonality of ingredients) that go wellbeyond any specific situation.

Past theory and research have already high-lighted the role of theorizing in the emergenceand transformation of institutional logics, withimplicit, if not explicit, discussions of the role ofcommunication (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lok, 2010;Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Rao et al., 2003). Conse-quently, we do not develop new propositions onhow theorizing shapes the generation of andchange in institutional logics. It follows fromprior work that theorizing congruent with pre-vailing logics should reinforce those logics, andthat theorizing that contradicts prevailing logics

should enable changes in logics. Our theory fur-ther implies that theorizing has these effects byinfluencing the development and use of cate-gory conventions about abstract categories.Those abstract category conventions then havethe potential to apply to, and hence potentiallyto structure, many areas of practice. Yet just ascoordinating alone, sensegiving alone, andtranslating alone are insufficient to reproduceor change institutional logics, so, too, is theoriz-ing alone insufficient. Rather, as we discussnext, the four functions combine to influencelogics.

Combining Communicative Functions to YieldVocabulary Dimensions

To examine how the four communicativefunctions combine to reproduce and change in-stitutional logics, we first discuss vocabularystructure. Vocabulary structure is what medi-ates between communicative events and insti-tutional logics. We then discuss the role thecommunicative functions play in shaping vo-cabulary structure.

Latent in vocabulary structure are principlesof institutional logics. In discussing categorieswe noted that category conventions link catego-ries to one another as part of vocabulary struc-ture. Through category conventions individualcategories work together to generate largermeanings. To explain this effect, we first con-sider smaller systems of categories. Small col-lections of closely interconnected categories ina vocabulary structure implicitly convey sche-mas. For example, the system of interconnectedcategories within vocabularies of corporate gov-ernance relating such categories as board, di-rectors, CEO, insiders, outsiders, nominatingcommittee, and election together imply aschema of the board selection process in U.S.corporations. Conventional vocabulary struc-ture allows members of social collectives tolearn similar schemas. This facilitates sharedunderstanding of practices, such as the boardnominating process, and the ability to commu-nicate and coordinate those practices. Conse-quently, category conventions and the schemasimplicit in those conventions facilitate the com-municative constitution of practice, as dis-cussed earlier.

Categories vary in their level of abstractionand interconnectedness with other categories,


and the same holds for systems of categories. Tocontinue the example of schemas, the schemasimplicit in a vocabulary structure vary in theirlevel of specificity or abstraction and in the de-gree to which they are interconnected with orindependent from other schemas (Weber, Patel,& Heinze, 2013). For instance, the schema forboard selection is more specific and yetinterconnected with the more abstract schemaand category conventions for board indepen-dence. The board independence schema, whichcontains abstract categories such as indepen-dence, monitoring, structure, and shareholdervalue, is also interconnected in vocabularystructure with other more specific implicit sche-mas for board accountability, agendas, compen-sation, CEO evaluation, and voting, each withits own category conventions (Fiss & Zajac,2004, 2006).

Turning now to our primary focus on the prin-ciples of institutional logics, we consider largersystems of interconnected categories. Similar tohow schemas are implicit in interconnected sys-tems of categories, the principles of institutionallogics are implicit in the higher-order structureswithin vocabularies— dimensions—that orga-nize those interconnected systems of categories.Specifically, category conventions with high de-grees of interconnection with other categoryconventions, in terms of shared categories andexamples, and with varying degrees of specific-ity and abstraction comprise higher-order di-mensions of vocabulary structure (Loewensteinet al., 2012; see also Weber et al., 2013). Thesehigher-order dimensions of vocabulary structureimply a set of interconnected schemas that con-stitute the organizing principles for institutionallogics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Thornton et al.,2012; see also Ruef, 1999).

For example, a board independence dimen-sion, implicit in the contemporary vocabulary ofU.S. corporations, is organized around the cate-gory conventions of highly abstract categoriessuch as board independence, as well as inter-connected conventions around more specificcategories such as board accountability, agen-das, compensation, CEO evaluation, and voting,as described above. As a second example, vo-cabularies of modern functionalist architecture(Jones et al., 2012) in the early twentieth centurywere organized in part around an operationaldimension of efficiency. This dimension incorpo-rated category conventions around abstract cat-

egories such as technology, industry, and eco-nomics, and category conventions around moreconcrete categories such as, well, reinforcedconcrete and steel. In summary, dimensions arehigher-order vocabulary structures that orga-nize collections of categories and indicate theunderlying concerns of those categories. Im-plicit in vocabulary dimensions are the princi-ples of institutional logics.

Combining communicative functions gener-ates vocabulary dimensions. While prior theoryand research has identified relationshipsamong category conventions, dimensions, andthe principles of institutional logics (DiMaggio,1997; Loewenstein et al., 2012; Thornton et al.,2012), researchers have not fully explored therole of communication in generating categoryconventions, dimensions, and so principles ofinstitutional logics. In particular, we proposethat although researchers have recognized thecommunicative functions of sensegiving andtheorizing in generating principles of institu-tional logics (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Rao et al.,2003), their accounts are incomplete. Institu-tional logics, while shaped by theorizing, aredistinct from theories, since theories may not beapplied in practice (Thornton et al., 2012). Sense-giving connects examples of institutional logicsto practices (Jones et al., 2012; Nigam & Ocasio,2010). But sensegiving may diverge from theoriz-ing as well as from practice, since sensegivingis concerned with rhetoric, persuasion, and thelegitimation of practice (Erkama & Vaara, 2010;Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and may often bedecoupled from practice (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Pfef-fer, 1981; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).

We propose that the communicative functionsof coordinating and translating, in addition tosensegiving and theorizing, are important forthe generation of vocabulary dimensions and sofor the principles of institutional logics. Earlierwe noted the role of coordinating in shapingpractices and grounding talk in practices. Forthis reason, coordinating plays a key role inintegrating material aspects into institutionallogics. We also noted earlier the role of translat-ing in distributing categories and enablingthem to apply generally. For this reason, trans-lating is critical for categories and dimensionsto attain the broad scope needed for institu-tional logics, rather than the scope being limitedto particular contexts or practices.


The most basic reason why all four communi-cative functions play a role in generating vocab-ulary dimensions is that all four draw on gener-ics. Generics are crucial because they allow forcommunication to be about category-levelmeanings. Generics can be called upon in coor-dinating, are critical in sensegiving for estab-lishing social facts, as we discussed earlier, andcomprise progressively larger proportions ofcommunicative events engaged in translatingand theorizing. Generics enable the communi-cative functions to be removed from particularinstances and instead be about broader, endur-ing concerns.

Not only are all four communicative functionsrelevant to generating vocabulary dimensions,but they tend to have their greatest influence atdifferent levels of abstraction and so have thepotential to build on one another. Coordinatingdevelops and instantiates categories that sense-giving further elaborates upon, integrates withadditional categories, and establishes as socialfacts, yielding a stable basis for schemas anddimensions. Translating expands the scope ofthese categories and schemas, increasing thecontexts in which they apply and their level ofabstraction. Theorizing clarifies and extendsthese efforts, increasing the ordering and dom-inance of particular emerging dimensions.Thus, the communicative functions indicate apotential process for the elaboration and con-struction of an institutional logic.

To generate, reproduce, or change an institu-tional logic, then, we propose that the commu-nicative functions need to converge. For cate-gory conventions to converge, communicativeevents with the different functions need to drawon the same set of category conventions (e.g.,board, incentives, shareholders) and dimen-sions (agency, board independence, corporategovernance). The result is that the communica-tive functions generate congruent category con-ventions organized in consistent ways aroundthe vocabulary’s dimensions.

This convergence on particular category con-ventions is powerful in shaping vocabularystructure. The bottom-up process, from coordi-nating up through theorizing, is one of filtering,making particular categories more important,more widely applicable, and more centralwithin vocabulary structure. There is also a top-down process, from theorizing down through co-ordinating. This top-down process is one of

drawing on chronically accessible categoriestheorized to be core concerns when engaged incommunicative events of translating, sensegiv-ing, and coordinating, and so taking central cat-egory conventions and applying them to stillmore instances and in still more contexts.

The convergence of the four communicativefunctions on category conventions is alwaysonly partial. Coordinating and sensegiving ex-hibit greater variability in category conventionsthan translating and theorizing. Also, internalcontradictions are never absent (cf. Seo & Creed,2002). So there are always some category con-ventions that rely on different categories anddimensions and, as a result, are not closely con-nected in vocabulary structure. For example, inthe institutional logic of patrimonial bureau-cracy (Jackall, 1988), the dimensions aroundcompensation include abstract categories, suchas incentives, that differ from the abstract cate-gories, such as loyalty, that are included in thedimension around personal relationships.

Converging category conventions across com-municative functions is critical to the generationof vocabulary dimensions and so to the princi-ples of institutional logics. If the category con-ventions in coordinating practices do not con-verge with those of sensegiving, the schemas forcoordinating and sensegiving will be decoupledfrom each other. Rhetoric will be decoupled frompractice (cf. Zajac & Westphal, 1995), and no gen-eral organizing principles will be apparent.Similarly, category conventions generatedthrough coordinating must converge with thoseof theorizing, or practices will become de-coupled from theoretical principles and no cleartheoretical principles will be associated withthose practices (Kellogg, 2011). If category con-ventions used for coordinating do not convergewith those for translating, large variations oflocal practices will result, with no coherence inpractices or in the underlying schemas that helpgenerate practices, with again no clear organiz-ing principles implicit in the vocabulary struc-ture (cf., Lounsbury, 2001, 2007).

The various communicative functions may de-velop independently of each other and be gen-erated through distinct communicative events,which are separated in time and place and in-volve different members of social collectives.Consequently, a lack of convergence acrosscommunicative functions may be commonplace,resulting in cultural fragmentation (Martin,


1992). A lack of convergence will result in a pro-liferation of category conventions and schemaswith relatively limited dimensions (Stark, 1996).While some degree of higher-order vocabularystructure and cultural order is necessary to gen-erate common understandings through commu-nication and generate practices, the structuremay result from societal conventions not firmlyconnected to institutions or to vocabulary di-mensions generated within organizations or in-stitutional fields (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).

Given the large potential for decoupling, con-verging category conventions across communi-cative functions is a complex achievement. Ifand when dimensions emerge and become sta-ble over time, the structure of category conven-tions becomes self-reinforcing and dimensionsare more readily reproduced. The cognitive re-inforcement of category conventions and dimen-sions emerges as category conventions becomemore widely and broadly used across contextsand situations, more readily learned, and morehighly accessible in memory (e.g., Adelman &Brown, 2008). An increase in the use of genericsindicates the hold of the category conventionsas social facts that can be relied upon broadly.While individual agency and departures fromcategory conventions are always possible, theirsocial acceptance becomes less likely as cate-gory conventions become taken-for-granted so-cial facts (Zucker, 1977). Consequently, we pro-pose the following.

Proposition 4: The more that commu-nicative functions converge on con-sistent category conventions, thegreater the reproduction of vocabu-lary dimensions and the principles ofan institutional logic.

For example, board independence is sus-tained by theorizing around abstract agencytheory principles (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Herma-lin & Weisbach, 1998), translating across indus-tries and board selection practices, sensegivingby analysts evaluating corporate governancepractices, and coordinating by CEOs and boardmembers committed to the principles of boardindependence. While contradictions do exist, asis well documented by management scholars,the principle of board independence is widelyreproduced at least in the structures of corporategovernance practices, if not always in interac-tions between corporate boards and CEOs.

A direct implication of the proposition is thatchanges in the implicit principles of an institu-tional logic must be manifested throughout allcommunicative functions. If changes occur inonly a subset of the functions, the vocabularydimensions will become less structured and theprinciples less clear, more readily challenged,and less easily reproduced. Alternative categoryconventions that depart from the dimensions ofexisting logics may generate frames for mobili-zation and collective action (cf. Misangyi,Weaver, & Elms, 2008). But absent their conver-gence across functions at different levels of ab-straction—from coordinating to theorizing—nocoherent organizing principles will emerge.Consequently, we propose the following.

Corollary 4a: The more that changes tocategory conventions diverge acrosscommunicative functions, the greaterthe fragmentation in the underlyingdimensions and principles of aninstitutional logic.

As stated above, it is a complex achievementthat communicative functions converge on aconsistent set of category conventions, andwhen dimensions are generated, the principlesthose dimensions convey implicitly become re-sistant to contestation and challenge. Institu-tional logics provide readily available and ac-cessible vocabulary conventions that shapecommunicative functions facilitating the self-reproduction of logics (cf. Lammers, 2011; Thorn-ton et al., 2012). But contestation and challengeare possible, of course, as past research onchanges in logics has demonstrated (Jones et al.,2012; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Rao et al., 2003). Giventhe centrality of vocabulary dimensions to thegeneration of new institutional logics, for thepotential for change in logics to be realized,changes in category conventions must be ob-served across the four communicative functions.For example, in the Rao et al. (2003) study ofnouvelle cuisine, our theory implies that itwas necessary not only for new category con-ventions to emerge in theorizing, the focus oftheir original research, but also for the samecategory conventions to be used in coordinatingthe production of dishes and restaurant prac-tices, sensegiving about those practices, andtranslating narratives across organizationalpractices. Consequently, we propose thefollowing.


Corollary 4b: The more that changes tocategory conventions converge acrosscommunicative functions, the greaterthe emergence of new vocabulary di-mensions and new underlying princi-ples of changing institutional logics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this article we developed an integratedmodel of how streams of communicationshape institutional logics. The challenge wasto link local, situated, communicative eventswith the higher-order cultural structures of in-stitutional logics. To generate an account ofthis process, some intervening building blocksare necessary that can apply to current activ-ity and also persist beyond that moment. Wedrew on category conventions and vocabularydimensions as the key intervening buildingblocks. Actors apply them to give meaning tocurrent practices, and they are durable por-tions of cultural structure out of which institu-tional logics are composed. We then examinedhow four kinds of communicative functions—coordinating, sensegiving, translating, andtheorizing— can generate and interweavethose building blocks to reproduce andchange institutional logics.

Our integrated model contributes to theorylinking communication to institutional logicsin four distinct yet interrelated ways. First, weexplain the process by which institutional log-ics—relatively stable cultural structures in or-ganizations and institutional fields— emergefrom streams of diverse communicativeevents. We propose that the four communica-tive functions combine to constitute the prac-tices that embody institutional logics as socialfacts. Here we build on early work in the CCOperspective (McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Taylor &Van Every, 2000). We extend and modify theseresearchers’ insights in several ways. Whiletheir focus on coordinating is primarily on theconstitution of organizations, we extend it toaccount for the constitution of practices moregenerally. We also highlight how sensegivingand theorizing help constitute the pattern ofinterrelationships between distinct practicesand how translating and theorizing help con-stitute practices and their interconnectionsacross distinct organizations in institutionalfields. Hence, we extend accounts of the con-

stitution of organizations to the communica-tive constitution of institutional logics (cf.Lammers, 2011).

Streams of diverse communication are centralto the account (cf. McPhee & Zaug, 2000). Whileany single communicative event may contributeto reproducing and changing institutional log-ics, no single communicative event is sufficient.Communicating through theorizing and sense-giving, either together or separately, is not suf-ficient for generating logics (cf. Nigam & Ocasio,2010; Rao et al., 2003). The communicative func-tion of coordinating is also necessary for theconstitution of the concrete practices that em-body institutional logics (cf. Friedland & Alford,1991; Thornton et al., 2012). And translating pro-vides a mechanism for communicating common-alities across concrete practices, while at thesame time allowing for differences (cf. Sahlin &Wedlin, 2008). All four communicative functionsplay a role and need to converge to reproduceand change institutional logics.

Second, we contribute specific mechanismsthat link local, situated acts of communicationwith enduring cultural structures. Coordinatingfosters joint attention to practices understoodwith respect to category conventions. This linkscurrent activity to existing systems of meaning.Sensegiving, through the use of generics, en-ables communication about categories gener-ally and allows actors to apply those generalmeanings to current activity. Translating fostersthe development of common narratives acrossdiverse contexts. This links collections of inter-related categories—schemas and vocabularydimensions—to a broad swath of current activ-ity. Theorizing generates abstract understand-ings of the motivation for and operations ofsystem-level practices. This provides founda-tions and organization for current activity acrossthe social system. The process of generatinglogics’ enduring cultural structure requiresbringing together diverse streams of communi-cation with different functions and levels of ab-straction. We propose the convergence of cate-gory conventions across the four communicativefunctions as the mechanism by which streams ofcommunicative events about current activitycan generate enduring cultural structure.

Third, we link communication to institutionallogics in a way that integrates cognition. Dis-cussions of communication can be so focused onaspects of social process that they take for


granted that words have meanings and that thisnecessitates a concurrent cognitive process. Anaccount of communication has to include howthose communicative events come to be mean-ingful to actors in a social collective. For rhetor-ical acts to influence, for acts of framing toshape someone’s views, the communication hasto somehow link to cognition such that somemeaning is formed by speakers and understoodby listeners. So we provide accounts about co-ordinating, category conventions, and the con-stitution of practices, as well as accounts aboutsensegiving, translating, and the generationand distribution of meaningful categories as so-cial facts. As a result, we provide accounts of thegeneration of systems of cognitive categories toform meaningful communicative events aboutpractices.

Likewise, discussions of cognition are oftendissociated from discussions of communication.This work typically deemphasizes communica-tion, seeing it as unimportant. Actors somehowgenerate meaningful knowledge structures—categories, frames, repertoires, logics, theories,schemas, and so forth—and only use words tocommunicate those preexisting meanings (cf.Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2007; March & Simon,1958). For example, Walsh’s (1995) influentialpiece on schemas, categories, and other cogni-tive knowledge structures specifies no role forwords or communication. These separations anderasures (Gal & Irvine, 1995) are limiting. Thereis no workable account of how collectively un-derstood meanings can stand apart from lan-guage or some other semiotic system, so weoffer theory for how communication plays a con-stitutive role in the generation of systems ofcognitive categories and how they come toguide practice.

Fourth, we extend work on vocabularies andits links to communication. Prior work has em-phasized the importance of category conven-tions, as we do here (Loewenstein et al., 2012),but has not explained the communicative func-tions by which actors reproduce category con-ventions. Here we contribute by explaining hownarratives have the capacity to adapt andspread, through translating functions, a grow-ing collection of interrelated categories. Unlikepast work on translation that emphasizes vari-ations in communication and practices (Sahlin& Wedlin, 2008), we highlight how translatingalso results in spreading consistencies in cate-

gory-to-example and category-to-category rela-tionships. Translating adapts collections of cat-egory conventions to a broader array of contexts,instances, and practices. The result is collec-tions of categories that can be applied widely,become widely known, and so organize agreater array of practice.

Likewise, past work on vocabularies has ar-gued for the importance of vocabulary dimen-sions, particularly for institutional logics (Loew-enstein et al., 2012; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Ruef,1999), without discussing the process by whichactors generate vocabulary dimensions. Wecontribute by proposing that convergenceacross all four communicative functions is nec-essary for the generation of dimensions. Theirconvergence serves to integrate categoriesacross various levels of concreteness and ab-straction. Coordinating and sensegiving arenecessary for the instantiation of dimensions inlocal examples of practices. Translating andtheorizing are necessary for linking examples ofpractices across contexts and for abstractingcategories that underlie dimensions. Together,the four communicative functions can generatevocabulary dimensions that collectively providethe principles of institutional logics.

It follows from our discussion that research oninstitutional logics can gain considerably frommore detailed examination of communication.In discussing different communicative func-tions, we provide empirical guidance for consid-ering a range of communicative events. A cen-tral focus for research would be assessingwhether acts of coordinating, sensegiving,translating, and theorizing converge on a con-sistent system of category conventions. This pro-vides the means for documenting that, for exam-ple, the products of theorizing are (or are not)guiding practice, or that practices are (orare not) understood according to a consistentsystem of dimensions. This, in turn, fosters re-search on when contexts are likely to produce,perhaps in a bottom-up fashion, systems of prac-tices that become interdependent but not yetaligned with interdependent dimensions in avocabulary, and that ultimately result or not inthe reproduction and change of institutionallogics.

For example, Hallett (2010) examined whathappened in an elementary school when theo-rizing about accountability converged with co-ordinating about teaching practices. The result


was changes to practices, including shifts inmonitoring teachers and grading student work,as well as changes from sensemaking about“standardizing” teaching materials, grading“consistency,” and managing “difficult” stu-dents. Our theory suggests that this researchcould be extended by analyzing the use of ge-neric language in acts of sensegiving to estab-lish new practices as social facts, tracing theacts of translating to adapt the changed systemsof categories across contexts and practices, andexamining the theorizing linking principles ofaccountability with other principles in thelarger logic, such as those around studentachievement. It also follows from our discussionthat tracing the use of the generic modality canbe instructive. For example, studying a changein an institutional logic could be advanced byfollowing shifts from possibility to necessity togeneric descriptions over time and across ac-tors. For example, if the Financial Times usesgenerics for describing the shareholder valuemaximization role of CEOs and boards (Lok,2010), is this before or after its generic use byCEOs, labor representatives, or others? As a fur-ther example, conflicting logics could be ob-served through the challenge to statements ingeneric modality, over and above tracing differ-ent collections of categories that are deemedrelevant to the discussion.

Overall, our theory posits that institutionallogics are a complex achievement, generatedthrough communicative functions. Institutionallogics, once generated, are available and acces-sible and are instantiated recursively throughcommunication, practices, and vocabularies, orsubject to potential change. Our work buildsand yet departs from approaches to communica-tion in organization theory in our emphasis oncategories and category conventions as key me-diators between communicative functions andorganizing practices and institutions. We concurwith communication theory and discourse anal-ysis that texts (e.g., documents, narratives, andtheories) are critical to the production and repro-duction of organizational and institutional life(e.g., Phillips et al., 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 2012;Putnam & Cooren, 2004; Vaara, Tienari, & Lau-rila, 2006). However, we also posit that both thegeneration and interpretation of texts are medi-ated through category conventions, conventionsthat are themselves collectively generatedthrough the production and reproduction of oral

conversations and written texts. Category con-ventions are instantiated through texts (cf. Tay-lor & Van Every, 2000). Texts do not, however,speak for themselves; texts speak, both directlyand indirectly, through category conventions,and category conventions are grounded in bothexamples of practices and the coordinating,sensegiving, translating, and theorizing aroundpractices that embody institutional logics.

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William Ocasio ([email protected]) is the John L. and Helen KelloggProfessor of Management and Organizations at the Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford University. His currentresearch interests include institutional logics, managerial and organizational attention,power in organizations, and the role of vocabularies in organizations and institutions.

Jeffrey Loewenstein ([email protected]) is an associate professor of business adminis-tration at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He received his Ph.D. fromNorthwestern University. His current research examines how people generate, learn,change, and apply knowledge, primarily through studying analogy, categories, andvocabularies.

Amit Nigam ([email protected]) is a senior lecturer at the Cass Business School,City University London. He received his Ph.D. from Northwestern University. His currentresearch examines processes of institutional and organizational change, with a particu-lar focus on the role of professions and occupations in change processes.




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