how fool is a holy fool

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© 2007 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

How Fool Is

a “Holy Fool”?

Agneta Schreurs

The editors asked

me to write a short re-sponse to your commentaries. They askedme to do that as a set; thereore, I respond

to your texts as a whole.First, I thank you or your comments. I appreci-

ate very much that you took the time to read andreect on my article. I am really very happy withyour positive evaluation o my article, particularlybecause my choice or this subject has much todo with my own biography. I have been raisedby nonreligious parents and grandparents. Mymother being a classical scholar and my ather

a scientist, I knew more about antiquity andchemistry than about the Bible, which in act didnot fgure at all in my education. However, whenI was orty years old, I took on theology at theUniversity o Utrecht as an extra study in my reetime, mainly because I elt embarrassed whenevermy students or clients brought the subject upand I did not know the frst thing about it. Rightrom the beginning I became absolutely excitedabout this study, not only about the broad rangeo ascinating subjects, but also because quite anumber churches had merged the academic part

o their seminaries with the theological aculty o the University o Utrecht into an academically veryhigh-standard curriculum. Students and teacherswere a mix o Dutch Reormed, Roman Catholic,Old Catholic, Baptist, and several other denomina-tions, in my time even a Jewish rabbi and a Winti(an indigenous religion in the ormer Dutch WestIndies). Outsider as I was, this oered me a unique

opportunity to become acquainted in a personaland natural way with their various aiths. Nev-ertheless, it took me three years beore I realizedwhat all those ascinating things had to do withmy lie and with my work! This realization wasthe reason why, ater getting my master’s degreein theology, I decided to choose a combination o philosophy o religion and psychology o religionor my doctoral dissertation and to change mygroup practice into work that explicitly dealtwith the interconnections between spirituality andpsychotherapy.

I also want to thank you or sharing yourthoughts on the larger contexts o my subject.From my biographical sketch, you can see that Iagree with both o you in that it is high time thatpsychiatry and psychotherapy pay more attentionto—and become more knowledgeable about—their religious patients’ religion and spirituality.Not because I think the “talking cures” may havemuch in common with “aith healing” (in act, Iagree with Gibson [2000] that they have muchmore in common with the gentle crat o takingconession), but because it is unproessional not

to do so. When a person consults a priest or min-ister with regard to a religious problem, it otenappears that there are also psychological problemsinvolved. That is why theological curricula includepastoral psychology and clinical training courses.This is also true the other way round: psychologicalproblems treated in psychotherapy and counselingmay involve a patient’s religious mindset. How-



206 ■ PPP / Vol. 13, No. 3 / September 2006

ever, most psychotherapists are generally neitherreligious themselves nor trained in assessing andunderstanding the great variety o ways in whichpeople may be religious and how these may beintertwined with the problems or which they

have sought therapeutic help. In particular, theyare mostly not trained in discovering how theirpatients’ religiousness may be a cause o therapeuticailure or, alternatively, a source o support and assuch a help toward therapeutic progress. In addi-tion to such lack in inormation and training, andin contrast with most clergy, clients in therapy mayeasily have very different religious backgrounds.As a result o this proessional situation, manypsychotherapists eel uncomortable in this areaand unprofessionally tend to ignore, avoid, or

reinterpret in psychological terms their patients’spiritual expressions.The point I tried to make is this: to successully

discover and assess how a patients’ religiousnessmay be a cause o psychological problems orconversely, be a source o support and as such ahelp toward therapeutic progress, you need at least some basic insight into the individual and usuallyimplicit theology of such a patient (I have calledthat a “personal theology” to distinguish it romthe systematic and explicit theology developedby proessional theologians). This need is present

because a theology unctions as the overall rameo meaning and purpose within which religiousand/or nonreligious problems arise, are verbal-ized, and can be solved. I agree that a therapist isethically prohibited rom discouraging a patient’sreligious belie, even i this is clearly the sourceo that person’s psychological difculty. As aresult, a therapist is required to make the choiceeither to work within the patient’s religious rameo reerence or to reer the patient to a religiousproessional. For making a choice that is in thebest interest o his patient, however, a therapist

must have some basic insight into the theologythis patient has been brought up in or has acquiredhimsel.

I agree also that it is clinically inappropriateto engage clients in philosophical and theologicaldebates on theism, atheism, deism, agnosticism,and so on. A therapeutic session is not the appro-priate place to engage in any debates, ull stop.

Not about such issues, not about anything else.I also agree that a therapist is supposed to workwith the client’s worldview to achieve the goals o therapy. My point is, though, that to be able to do so you need at least some basic insight into your

clients’ worldview and its implied anthropologicaland metaphysical presuppositions (be these o thereligious variety or not), and, as Utsch insists, alsointo your own worldview and your own tacit an-thropological and metaphysical presuppositions.Otherwise, you are in danger o misdiagnosing thepatient’s problems, misinterpreting their expres-sions, and projecting your own tacit presupposi-tions onto them. You also need such basic insightto help them discover the positive and healthytherapeutic potential o their own type o spiritual-

ity. Moreover, with such insight, therapists are ina much better position to help their patients helpthemselves in this respect. This is so because, withsuch insight, therapists do not need to steer suchpatients away rom their religious belies, nor tohonor the therapeutic ethic o neutrality in sucha strict way that they always have to respectullydesist rom asking any critical questions abouttheir patient’s perceived spirituality. And yes, thedierences between human relations and spiri-tual relationships should not be glossed over, andneither should any other aspects o spirituality

I have omitted. Discussing these, too, however,would make this article at least twice as long andthus not ft into the journal’s ormat. In my book(Schreurs 2002) on this subject, I could be moreelaborate, but even there I had to limit mysel inthis respect.

Another point you raise is that o terminology.There is indeed a huge conusion about the con-cepts related to spirituality and religion. “Spiri-tuality” originates rom the Christian tradition inwhich the concepts o the human spirit (“spiritus”= “pneuma,” a human aculty that is dierent

rom “anima” = “psyche”) and the Holy Spirit(“Spiritus Sanctus”) are quite central in the contexto pneumatology rather than psychology. But asyou rightly observe, in modern language use theterm has come to denote a dierent concept, muchtoo vague and much too broad to be useul or aca-demic studies where you need more precise terms.In practice-oriented conceptualizing, we have to



Schreurs / How Fool Is a “Holy Fool”? ■ 207

think very careully about the level o abstractionwe choose. I that is too high, it is probably notvery relevant. For example, i we take all religionstogether and select rom them the ew things theyhave in common in our concept “religion,” it is

questionable whether the ew eatures they shareare also the most central ones in any particularreligion or the most relevant ones or designinga useul methodology. The same is true i we putthe properties all spiritualities have in commoninto our concept o “spirituality.” On the otherhand, i we choose our abstraction level too low,our conceptual instrument applies only to a muchtoo small sample o our clients.

That is why in most studies in this feld theauthors start with speciying what they in their

publication mean with “spirituality” and relatedterms. That is also why in my article and bookI state explicitly that I address primarily nonre-ligious psychotherapists and counselors dealingwith Christian clients and that I try to explainsome therapeutically relevant structures o such clients’ personal implementation o spirituality.As much as I can, I do my explaining in termsand descriptions that are more amiliar or thisintended readership than most traditional Chris-tian terminology would be, and less likely to makethem suspicious o any hidden evangelizing agenda

in my text.Unortunately, I seem not to have quite suc-

ceeded in this respect, because you seem to inter-pret my subject as “one’s ‘direct experience’ o thesacred or numinous.” That is a reduction I cannotsubscribe to, nor intended to make. In Christianityspiritual lie is supposed to be primarily a com-mitment that you engage in as a response to beingsomehow touched or convinced by the lie andmessage o Christ. Certainly, what triggers o suchresponse may be an experience, or example, beingmoved by a text, or, as you describe, by paintings

or choral music. In some cases, it may even involvea visionary, auditive, and mystical experience suchas James (1902/1994) describes and some authorsconsider as potential evidence o the existence o atranscendent being. However, such triggers are notrestricted to what since James has become called“religious experiences,” they may, or example,also be intellectually convincing arguments—or

a mix o both as seems to have been the case withAugustine. My impression is that in early, patris-tic, and medieval Christianity logical argumentsdid indeed have a greater “trigger potential” thanemotional experiences, although both types are

reported all through history. In act, during thefrst centuries, Christianity was even describedas being a philosophy. Irrespective o the trigger,however, i the response to such a trigger is notollowed by a commitment to strive sincerely ora lie o Christ-like aith in God, altruistic love,and compassionate justice, then I do not think itqualifes or the concept o Christian spiritual-ity. Ater the initial commitment, an ensuing liethat is being lived in, inspired by, and developedthrough this striving and the tensions it evokes,

may include special transcendent experiences,visions, etcetera—or it may not. But in Christianspirituality they are a grace, a git, and addedvalue. Not something to be earned through goodworks or be brought about by manipulating yourconsciousness.

To answer your question about “how thisramework would be relevant to a growing recog-nition in our present culture o spiritualities thatreject the idea o a personal godhead;” the answeris rather simple: I do not think it is relevant. But i you really want to know, fnd out precisely what

it is that such spiritualities are rejecting (a brokenor distorted relationship may still be a relationalaspect; it may even be an important part o sel-identity), ask what is central to their spiritual lie,whether that has any relational aspects, and i so,fgure out how their underlying “relational gram-mar” compares with the one I sketched. Easier saidthan done, o course. My approach is not designedor working with a clientele such as the other 30%o the UK population you mention. They probablyneed another approach. The relational approachmay be relevant, however, or other (mono- or

poly-)theistic spiritualities, either within or outsidetraditional religions.

You ask, “What distinguishes a personal rela-tionship with a deity, however wholesome it maybe, rom a delusion?” In Christian spirituality, itis a central tenet that there is a personal God withwhom human beings can have a relationship andwho can communicate with us, albeit oten in




quite unexpected ways and with quite unexpectedpeople. Thereore, yes, within this spirituality thereis a real possibility o authentic mutuality. Thatdoes not mean that we should uncritically acceptall reported visions, auditions, prophecies, and so

on, as such. From the earliest times, Christianity,as well as most other theistic religions I know o (world religions as well as tribal religions), havedeveloped criteria or distinguishing the authenticrom the ake or pathological. In ancient times,this was an even more vital issue than it is today,because visionaries could exert immense moraland political power. Old Testament prophets, orexample, sometimes openly opposed their kings,and Russian “holy ools” once walked naked andburdened with heavy chains through the streets,

publicly reprimanding the Czar or his cruelty.Nobody else dared to criticize the Czar. Theirvoluntary “oolish” behavior o nakedness andpain simultaneously symbolized God’s solidaritywith the Czar’s victims and made it clear that theythemselves were immune to whatever cruelty theCzar would subject them to: they had nothingto lose.

These examples are exceptional o course, butbasically the criteria are still the same as in earliertimes: the character o the person involved, theresult o the process o “purication” with the

help o an experienced spiritual director, and the“ruits” o the experiences under consideration,that is, whether in the long run the religiouscommunity involved has proted (in a spiritualsense) rom it. It is never supposed to be a purelyindividual matter. DSM-IV TR ormulates alsocriteria or a delusion:

a alse belie based on incorrect inerence about exter-nal reality that is rmly sustained despite what almosteveryone else believes and despite what constitutesincontrovertible and obvious proo or evidence to thecontrary. The belie is not one ordinarily accepted by

other members o the person’s culture or subculture(e.g., it is not an article o religious aith). When aalse belie involves a value judgment, it is regarded asa delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as todey credibility . . .

It seems to me that both the traditional religiousand the DSM criteria resemble each other ratherclosely. Small wonder, because both are designed

or practical use and thereore both context de-pendent, and moreover changeable i they wouldappear to be unsatisactory. And just as with thetraditional religious criteria, there are also prob-lems with this DSM denition and its implicit

criteria. They are the subject o an ongoing criticaldiscussion (e.g., Glas 2006; Jackson and Fulord1997; Jones 1999). Recently, the ocus o this dis-cussion has moved rom the issue o the contento “alse” belies, which is bristling with pitalls,toward the question o the function and the qual-ity o a patient’s belies, irrespective o their being“alse” or not (e.g., Drinnan and Lavender 2006;Musalek 2003).

I do not think that religious dogma should berejected because o the “mindless violence and

suering that is almost always the inevitable con-sequence o religious dogma.” With Sophokles Iwould say, “See that thine own judgment is just,beore thou blame thy neighbour” (1924, 550-1). What should be rejected is what I would callideological abuse o dogma. Should democracybe rejected because it is misused in the interesto oil companies, arms industries, and politicalambition? Should Marx’s criticism o the capital-ist system be rejected because o its having beenhijacked by dictators? Is there any reason why“spirituality,” in the sense you use it, would not

become susceptible to “spiritual abuse” now thatthis type o spirituality has become so ashionableand is selling so well—in act, is that not alreadyhappening here and there, in some “spiritual thera-pies,” or example (Carrette and King 2005; Utsch2005)? It seems to me that the right questions are:“What problems were the Church Fathers tryingto solve when they designed these dogma’s?”; “Inwhat ways did they try to do that?”; “Are we stillconronted with these problems?”; and i so, “Aretheir solutions still adequate or us, and should wethereore try to explain them in modern concepts?

And i their solutions are not adequate or ourgeneration, should we design new ways o tack-ling these problems?” Only ater having refectedon these questions we can ask, “Should we rejectthese dogma’s altogether?” and i not, “How canwe prevent or discourage their ideological abuse?”I cannot elaborate on this here, but perhaps read-ing Allison’s (1994) book could be helpul. In an



Schreurs / How Fool Is a “Holy Fool”? ■ 209

accessible style, he explains how the theologicaldebates in patristic times about whether Christ waseither a human being who was adopted by God, ora divine being who only appeared to be a man andthereore had not really suered and died, were

eorts to solve a very real pastoral–psychologicalproblem, a problem that is still with us and stillcauses psychological problems. In my view, mostother traditional doctrines also need either to beexplained and reconnected to pastoral–psycho-logical problems or to be reormulated in modernconcepts. That is what Brümmer (1993, 2005) andother philosophers o religion are trying to do.

In the course o your argument, you extend theissue o delusions into the epistemological questionabout the evidential justifcation o any religious

conviction, or rather, o the existence o any God.I like that challenge and will now in my turn puton my philosopher’s coat, which distinctly smellso post-Wittgensteinian and post-Ricoeurian sweatbecause that is what I have taught or many years.It is a dierent discourse rom what I try to do inmy article, so I restrict mysel to a ew remarkshere. Maybe we can continue at some other timeand place?

First, I think the quest or “experience,” beit pure or impure, as evidence or the existenceo God (or evidence o anything at all, other

than the existence o such experiences) is ratheroutdated. Philosophically, the search or objec-tive truth via detached introspection cannot beheld in the light o the critique on essentialismand on the mind–body distinction. Psychologi-cally, detached introspection and concepts suchas Winnicott’s (1990) “True Sel” may be useulor helping people clariy their inner turmoils,but then we are talking about instrumental, notveridical value. However, even i I would or thesake o this argument grant you that the existenceo God or some other transcendent reality could in

principle be proved by detached and noncontex-tual introspection, even then I think “experience”is a ar too broad and vague concept to be useulor any such goal. I am not an expert in this area,but I understand that studies o the body’s geneticpredispositions, neurochemical unctions, andemotional programs indicate that unusual and/orunexpected experiences trigger o simultane-

ously emotional and cognitive responses. Thereis, however, no one emotional–cognitive centerin the brain; humans possess a wide variety o emotional systems with various adaptive cognitiveunctions. According to evolutionary researchers,

most o these are directed toward biological andsocial/cultural survival. As Fuller (2006) puts it,“. . . the brain’s most pressing concern is that o discerning agency and intention in what are other-wise causally opaque situations. The brain is wiredto seek the source o causal agency, purpose, orintentionality o events that vitally impinge on ourlives” (p. 368). Fuller points to the act that someo such emotional programs, particularly thoseo wonder and curiosity, rather than leading toidentiying agency in the immediate environment,

lead to moral and metaphysical reection. Re-searchers have shown that there exists a amily o emotions, each o which can motivate higher levelconceptions o existence, exploration, creativity,and lively engagement in the environment. Fuller’sanalysis o wonder suggests that “wonder playsan important role in shaping a religious sensibil-ity toward lie. Moreover, the religious sensibilityshaped by wonder squares well with the pragmaticcriteria we might reasonably use to assess thevalue o spiritual postures toward lie: immediateluminousness, important elements o philosophical

reasonableness, and moral helpulness.”It seems to me that all this implies that philo-

sophically we can never go behind these intricateconnections between unusual experience and itsemotional–cognitive responses. However, it is notirrational at all to argue that a transcendent Some-thing or Someone may trigger off such experiencesand their higher order cognitions. It seems to methat we can rationally argue that if the Biblical God exists, and if He would want to reveal Hisexistence to us other than by means o revealingHimsel in Christ and the Bible, and if He exists

as pure Divine Love, then it would be much morepractical and efcient or Him to do such reveal-ing by using as a channel our evolutionary brainstructures through experiences that trigger o emotions o deep love and awe and their relatedcognitions, rather than to do so by using detached“pure” experience as His channel—whatever thatmay be. In that case, it would be quite sensible




to develop a “psychology o love” additional toFuller’s “psychology o wonder.” Its veridicalpotential could then be tested by trying to love asmuch and as deeply a we can—and seeing to whatexperiences that leads us and how convincing these

are or the existence o the Biblical God. I do notknow whether such reasoning would convince me(still talking as a philosopher), but if we want tolook or experiential evidence outside the Biblicaltradition, then this looks more promising to methan reasoning rom experiences that trigger o a “pure” emotional–cognitive program.

Second, you combine the quest or experientialevidence or the existence o God with your desireto do away with religion (in the sense you usethat term). I am not sure what you mean: do you

suggest that we should throw away all religion i we ail to fnd inallible evidence or the existenceo God or gods or something transcendent o anykind? I so, then let us or the sake o this argu-ment make that position still stronger and supposethat you and I and a ew other philosophers haveound proo that such transcendent Someones orSomethings do not exist. Proo that is irreutableaccording to our strict philosophical criteria, albeitunconvincing to the large majority o religiousSomeonists or spiritual Somethingists who arequite happy with their own implicit criteria. My

question to you is: Do you really mean that insuch a case we should throw away all religion?We would then be in the same position as Tawfqal-Hakim presents in his philosophical play Riverof Madness. In this play, the whole population hasdrunk water rom a poisoned river, and as a resulteverybody has become mad. They are all quitehappy and do not realize that they are mad. Theirmadness makes them think that they are alrightbut that everybody who has not drunk rom thewater is mad. Only the king and his grand vizierhave not drunk. They are the only ones who are

not mad, who know that they are not mad andwho know the truth: all the others are mad. Theydiscuss their options: what is truth, what is wis-dom, what is madness? The last line is:

The King (with insistence): Let there be brought to mea cup of the river’s water.

References

Allison, F. C. 1994. The cruelty of heresy. London: SPCK.Brümmer, V. 1993. The model of love: A study in philo-

sophical theology. Cambridge/New York: Routledge& Kegan Paul.

———. 2005. Atonement, Christology and the Trinity:Making sense of Christian doctrine. Burlington, CT:Ashgate.

Carrette, J., and R. King. 2005. Selling spirituality: The si-lent takeover of religion. Abingdon/Oxon: Routledge.

Drinnan, A., and T. Lavender. 2006. Deconstruct-ing delusions: A qualitative study examining therelationship between religious belies and religiousdelusions. Mental Health, Religion and Culture 9,no. 4:317–31.

Fuller, R. 2006. Wonder and the religious sensibility:A study in religion and emotion. The Journal of Religion 86, no. 3:364–384.

Gibson, T. L. 2000. Wholeness and transcendence inthe practice o pastoral psychotherapy rom a Judeo-Christian perspective. In The psychology of maturespirituality, ed. P. Young-Eisendrath and M.E. Miller,175–86. London: Routledge.

Glas, G. 2006. De overtuigingsdader. Tussen overtuigingen psychopathologie [Between belie and psychopa-thology]. Ontmoetingen 12:33–48.

Jackson, M., and K. W. M. Fulord. 1997. Spiritualexperience and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psy-chiatry, & Psychology 4, no. 1:141–65.

James, W. 1902/1994. Varieties of religious experience.New York: Random House.

Jones, E. 1999. The phenomenology o abnormal belie:A philosophical and psychiatric inquiry. Philosophy,Psychiatry, & Psychology 6, no. 1:1–16.

Musalek, M. 2003. Meaning and causes o delusions.In Nature and narrative: An introduction to the new philosophy of psychiatry, ed. B. Fulord, K. Morris, J.Sadler, and G. Stanghellini, 155–69. Oxord: OxordUniversity Press.

Saward, J. 1980. Perfect fools: Folly for Christ’s sake inCatholic and Orthodox spirituality. Oxord: OxordUniversity Press.

Schreurs, A. 2002. Psychotherapy and spirituality:Integrating the spiritual dimension into therapeutic practice. London: Kingsley.

Sophokles. Elektra, trans. R. C. Jebb, 1924.Tawfq al-Hakim. 1963. River of madness. In Islamic

literature, 203–11. New York: Washington SquarePress.

Utsch, M. 2005. Religiöse Fragen in der Psychotherapie:Psychologische Zugänge zu Religiosität und Spiritu-alität . Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Winnicott, D. W. 1990. The maturational processes and the facilitating environment . London: Karnac Booksand The Institute o Psycho-Analysis.




psychiatry and philosophy of mind to illuminateone another. He can be contacted via e-mail [email protected].

Patricia A. Ross is a Research Associate at the

Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science atthe University of Minnesota. She is also currentlyvisiting assistant professor of philosophy at Car-leton College. Her philosophical background isin philosophy of science, and she has a particularinterest in philosophy of psychology and psy-chiatry. She is writing a book on the concept of mental disorder. She can be contacted via e-mailat [email protected].

Agneta Schueurs has studied social psychol-ogy, theology, and philosophy at the universitiesof Amsterdam and Utrecht (The Netherlands)and worked as a lecturer and researcher at theUniversity of Utrecht and the Vrije Universiteitof Amsterdam, and as a group therapist at the

Institute of Spiritual Direction and Pastoral Psy-chotherapy in Utrecht. She is a member of theChristian Society of Psychiatrists, Psychologistsand Psychotherapists, the Dutch Association forGroup Psychotherapy, the International Associa-

tion for the Psychology of Religion, and the Societyfor the Study of Theology. She can be contactedvia e-mail at [email protected].

Demian Whiting is Lecturer in Health Care Eth-ics at the University of Liverpool. His researchinterests include philosophy of emotion, philo-sophical psychopathology, and applied ethics. Hehas written a number of articles on these topics,including one paper entitled “Standing Up for anAffective Account of Emotion” (Philosophical

Explorations, 2006), in which he defends the claimthat emotions are nothing more than sui generisfeeling states. He can be contacted via e-mail [email protected].



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