how do information and cues affect citizens' election ... · 5/2/2017 ·...

Background Empirics Study 1 Study 2 Conclusion

How Do Information and Cues AffectCitizens’ Election Forecasts?

Thomas J. LeeperDavide MorisiRune Slothuus

Government Department ColloquiumLondon School of Economics and Political Science

2 May 2017


Most of my research has tried to understandhow citizens form opinions about policy issues.



My focus has been on information and cues.



My focus has been on information and cues.

Do these factors affect other outcomes ofinterest to political behavior researchers?


1 Background

2 Empirics

3 Study 1

4 Study 2

5 Conclusion


Election Forecasts

Election forecasts are a hobby for manypolitical scientists, journalists, and others

They matter for a variety of reasons:Can shape campaigning strategiesInfluence journalistic narratives aboutelectionsShape individual attitudes, behavior, andsocial interactions


Election Forecasts

How do they traditionally work?1 Polling firms sample individuals from the

population2 Respondents report their vote intention3 Those data are aggregated and modelled to

generate a forecast

Yet such efforts do not necessarily captureall information that citizens might haveabout an election


Election Forecasts

What might citizen know?Information about other citizens’ viewsHow certain or uncertain their own views areExpectations about forthcoming events in acampaignTheir or others’ turnout propensities

Traditional forecasts thus miss someinformation, therefore:

1 Betting markets2 Citizen forecasting


Citizen Forecasts ICitizen forecasts involve measuringperceptions rather than opinions

Ask citizens what they expect others to doAsk citizens what they expect an electionoutcome to be

Questions can be discrete or continuous1 What percentage of citizens will vote for Britain

to Leave the EU?2 Do you expect Britain will vote to leave the EU

or vote to remain in the EU?

These expectations are aggregated toproduce a forecast


Beyond “Atomic” ModelsMost research assumes “atomic” citizens

Exceptions to this:Network studies (Huckfeldt and Sprague;Mutz)Deliberation experiments (Karpowitz andMendelberg)Normative behaviour experiments (Bolsen;Gerber, Green, and Larimer)

But citizens are necessarily embedded in a socialcontext that seems likely to shape their beliefs

We are interested in how citizens understand thosesocial contexts


Our Contribution

Focus on citizen forecasts as an outcome

Attempt to understand how informationand cues affect those forecasts

Information: a message or argument receivedby a citizenCues: information about position-taking byelites or others

Provide a descriptive analysis of the factorsrelated to these forecasts and theaccuracy thereof


Aside: Social cues as “attitudinal norms”

Attitudinal norms“widespread viewpoints held by members ofa social group”A form of “impersonal influence”Cues about group rather than elite attitudes

Driven by inherent needs for belongingness(Baumeister and Leary 1995)

Very little research on downstreamconsequences of this form of impersonalinfluence (until Sara and I started workingon it)


Aside: Social cues as “attitudinal norms”

Attitudinal norms“widespread viewpoints held by members ofa social group”A form of “impersonal influence”Cues about group rather than elite attitudes

Driven by inherent needs for belongingness(Baumeister and Leary 1995)Very little research on downstreamconsequences of this form of impersonalinfluence (until Sara and I started workingon it)


1 Background

2 Empirics

3 Study 1

4 Study 2

5 Conclusion


This Project

Case study: 2016 referendum on Britain’smembership of the EU

Panel survey (BES)Assess the accuracy (prediction error) ofcitizen forecastsDescriptively characterize the factors thatshape forecasts and the accuracy thereof

ExperimentAttempt to measure the size of effects ofinformation and cues


Outcome Measures I

1 Overall forecast for election outcomeRescaled 0 to 1Higher values = Remain

2 Error in that forecast:

Errori = (Forecasti − 0.48)2

3 In-party forecast (how your party will vote)

4 In-party forecast error


Outcome Measures IIWe know overall results from officialelection records

Party-specific results have to be estimatedfrom data

Party BES (w) BES (uw) YouGovConservative 0.36 0.34 0.29Labour 0.63 0.66 0.65LibDem 0.73 0.75 0.68SNP 0.59 0.65 n/a


Study 1: BES Analysis

Goal is to understand the factors thatinfluence citizen forecasts

Data from BESWave 7 (pre-referendum) and Wave 8 (rollingcross section)Fielded by YouGov, weighted to be nationallyrepresentativen = 16, 503


Outcome Measures

How likely do you think it is that the UK willvote to leave the EU?

Continuous measure 0 – 1000: UK will definitely vote to remain in the EU100: UK will definitely vote to leave the EURescaled 0–1 (higher = Remain)

Do you think that other people who areclose to <PARTY> mainly want to remain inthe EU or leave the EU?

Mainly leaveMainly remainFairly evenly split


Results: Explaining forecasts

Forecasts cluster around true result, slightpro-Remain bias

Wisdom of crowds?50/50 guessing?

Largest effects:Left-wing more likely to forecast RemainEducated more likely to forecast RemainConservatives more likely to forecast Remain

False consensus dynamic!


Results: Explaining Accuracy

Citizens are on average quite accurate

Smaller errors for:Leave votersPolitical right-wingConservatives and LibDemsOlder peopleHigher educationOther than White English


Results: Explaining In-PartyForecast

The descriptive results suggest citizens getthe gist of where their co-partisans stand

Unfortunately BES question is kind of crapThree-category discrete measure(leave/remain/split)

Trying to decide how to analyze this


Study 1 SummaryCitizens are on average highly accurate inforecasting the referendum outcome

Various demographic factors explainforecasts and accuracy thereof

Also a “false consensus effect”

Next step: Leverage the panel design totry to pick up causal effects

Exposure to government leafletExposure to interpersonal discussionExposure to Leave and Remain campaignsAwareness of in-party MPs positions


Study 2: Survey Experiment

Goal is to assess the degree to whichinformation and cues affect forecasts andforecast error

Basic design:Supply a mass cue or elite cueSupply pro-leave or pro-remain argumentsMeasure overall forecast and in-party forecast

Fielded w/ YouGov Omnibus05/30 – 02/06/2016


Experimental Design

Elite Cue Mass CueNone n=299 320Remain Argument 321 352Leave Argument 288 320

Also “pure” control group (n=151)Also cue ambiguity factor (ignored here)Arguments pilot tested through Prolific


Partisan Composition of Sample

Experimental data only for supporters ofpro-Remain parties

Party identification drawn from YouGovprofile data

Conservative 901 (43.2%)Labour 856 (41.0%)LibDem 249 (11.9%)SNP 82 (3.9%)


We would now like to know what you expect the resultsof the referendum will be, expressed as a percent. Apercent can be thought of as the number of votes outof 100. For example, a number like 5 percent means 5out of every 100 votes will be for “leave”, 50 percentmeans 50 out of every 100 votes will be for “leave,” and95 percent means 95 out of everyone 100 votes will befor “leave.”

Regardless of how you yourself intend to vote, whatpercent of voters do you anticipate will vote forBritain to leave the European Union? (Please entera number between 0 and 100.)

What about <PARTY> voters? What percent of<PARTY> voters do you anticipate will vote forBritain to leave the European Union? (Please entera number between 0 and 100.)


Treatment: Elite Cue Only

When deciding how to vote in the upcomingreferendum on Britain’s membership of the EuropeanUnion, many voters want to know where their preferredparty stands. A clear majority of < PARTY> politiciansfavour Britain remaining in the EU.


Treatment: Mass Cue Only

When deciding how to vote in the upcomingreferendum on Britain’s membership of the EuropeanUnion, many voters want to know where their fellowcitizens stand. Polls show a clear majority of < PARTY>voters favour Britain remaining in the EU.


Treatment: Cue + RemainArgument

One argument being made in the debate is that the EUsafeguards British jobs because it provides access to amarket of 500 million consumers and because EUmembership attracts foreign firms keen to be part ofthat market. The attractiveness of Britain as a place toinvest is clearly underpinned by its membership of theEU. It is estimated that over three million jobs in Britainare linked, directly or indirectly, to its exports to theEuropean Union. Walking away from Europe’s singlemarket would be catastrophic for people’s jobs, andwould leave households £4,300 worse off, according toestimates. A vote to Remain would safeguard theeconomic benefits of the EU single market.


Treatment: Cue + RemainArgument

One argument being made in the debate is that in theEU, Britain’s borders lay open to criminals and terroriststrying to enter the UK from the continent. This makes thewhole of the UK vulnerable to terrorist attacks andcrimes committed by those from abroad. At present,more than 100 EU migrants per day are convicted ofcrimes ranging from theft to rape and murder. Theserates have risen as the EU has expanded further intoEastern Europe. Outside the EU, the Westminsterparliament will regain its sovereignty and the ability tosecure the country’s borders and towns. Failure to leavenow significantly decreases public safety andendangers the British people.


Results

1 Cues and pro-Remain informationincreases expected Remain vote share

2 All treatments seem to reduce forecasterror

3 Party-specific results are noisy (obviously)

Effects on forecast error mirror these


Results






Results



3 Party-specific results are noisy (obviously)Effects on forecast error mirror these


Study 2 Summary

Information and cues both seem to beable to move citizen forecasts

This isn’t necessarily a good thing becausethat movement doesn’t necessarilyimprove the accuracy of these forecasts

Any wisdom in crowds?Size of one-off impersonal influence is smallCitizen forecasts don’t seem to just parrot elitecommunications


1 Background

2 Empirics

3 Study 1

4 Study 2

5 Conclusion


Conclusion

Citizen forecasts are reflect a falseconsensus dynamic

Citizen forecasts are somewhat sensitive toelite cues and information but the effectsare small

Some citizens have social informationabout their groups and society as a whole

Limitations to an atomic model in politicalbehavior research

how do information and cues affect citizens' election ... · 5/2/2017 ·...

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