HOW CO‐DECISION IS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE CAP NEGOTIATIONS

Alan Matthews

Trinity College Dublin

alan.matthews@tcd.ie

Presentation to the AIEAA, 2nd Annual Conference June 6‐7 2013, Parma

Introduction

Political negotiations on the CAP reform between Council, Parliament and Commission continue at the time of this presentation

Thus, how co-decision has affected CAP outcome cannot yet be answered

Instead, this presentation highlights a number of relevant issues for future research

Literature

Both theoretical and descriptive literature on how institutional rules influence EU agricultural policy making

Runge and von Witzke (1987), Pokrivcak, de Gorter and Swinnen (2001), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2008), Crombez and Swinnen (2011)

Blumann (2008), Geuguen and Marissen (2012) Arovuori and Niemi (2009), Greer and Hind

(2012), Swinnen and Knops (2012)

Co-decision (‘Ordinary legislative procedure’)

Parliament gained co-decision powers over many policy domains (not CAP) in Maastricht Treaty 1993

Co-decision introduced into the CAP by the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 Except Art 43(3) – fixing prices, levies, aid and

quantitative limitations Formal process includes first reading, second reading,

conciliation Then delegated and implementing acts, implementation by

member states Strong preference for first reading agreement

(possibility introduced by Amsterdam Treaty in 1999) highlights the importance of the trilogue process

What are implications for CAP reform of EP involvement?

What are implications of EP involvement?

How much influence? (potentially measured by number of EP amendments incorporated into final legislation)

What kind of influence? (has EP supported or constrained CAP reform?)

Who determines EP influence? (within the EP, what is role of parties, committees, Presidency, national interests of individual MEPs?)

The struggle for influence (potential for contested ‘constitutional’ issues with the Council to influence the CAP reform outcome, both substance and timing)

Implications for Commission’s influence (has co-decision weakened role of Commission as ‘agenda setter’? (Greer and Hind, 2012; Crombez and Swinnen, 2011)

What can we expect from co-decision?

Political science literature Surveys experience across multiple dossiers Literature finds that co-decision increased Parliament’s

powers vis a vis the Council No previous studies have examined EP’s role in the CAP

(Greer and Hind, 2012) Spatial models of decision-making (Crombez

and Swinnen, 2011) explain policy outcomes as a function of legislative

procedures, the preferences of the political actors and the location of the status quo

Are not predictive models without knowing EP preferences

Preference for first reading agreement highlights importance of trilogue process

Trilogue

Political agreement

EP mandate

Council general position

Resort to conciliation committees has decreased from 39% in 1993-1999 to

only 4% in 2009- 2011 while first readings have increased

from 28% in 1999-2004 to 78% in 2009-2011.

Co-decision process

First reading procedure

Further implications of trilogues

Early trilogues avoid the ‘race against the clock’ which starts ticking once first reading is completed

Greater flexibility in appointing members to trilogues Refers especially to EP where sometimes political group leaders

become involved in addition to committee rapporteurs and chairs Unlike conciliation where the committee can only discuss

amendments previously made by either the EP or the Council, trilogues allow committee members to introduce completely new amendments to proposals and then to offer the compromise text for a single vote in each chamber

Members of trilogue negotiations have considerable flexibility in determining the outcome of legislation which is then voted on up-down basis by the two bodies

Implications of changes in formal procedures

Consultation procedure (EP opinion) Commission proposes policy. MS can propose amendments.

Amendments need unanimity for adoption. Council votes on (amended) proposal by QVM.

Co-decision procedure Commission proposes policy. EP can propose amendments (1st

reading). Commission can decide to include in its proposal. Council decides on (amended) proposal with QMV, unanimity required for amendments (1st reading)

2nd reading – similar to 1st Conciliation committee – Council and EP can jointly amend

Commission’s proposal in a ‘joint text’ Commission loses much of its formal influence, especially

in CC Trilogue process introduces conciliation prior to 1st reading

Parallelism with MFF negotiations

CAP reform and CAP budget are being decided simultaneously

Lisbon Treaty gave EP enhanced powers in MFF negotiations, but not co-decision

Two issues EP has linked timing of CAP agreement to MFF agreement this issue defused by the very limited cuts to CAP budget in

the European Council conclusions but could still delay final ratification of CAP agreement

MFF agreement extended to key parameters in the CAP debate

European Council MFF positions incorporated into Agricultural Council general position – what role for co-decision for these paragraphs?

Next slide shows the overlap between MFF and CAP negotiations

CAP issues in European Council agreement (adopted into Ag Council general position) Overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 2, including

specific ceilings for direct payments Level and model for redistribution of direct support – details of

convergence across Member States The model for capping support to large farms - voluntary Method for financial discipline Allocation of 30% of Pillar 1 payments to greening Recommendation that EFAs will be implemented in ways that do not

take land out of production and that avoid unjustified income losses to farmers

Flexibility between pillars Principles for allocation of rural development support, including

‘sweets’ Co-financing rates for rural development support Operation of the crisis reserve Introduces macro-economic conditionality in deciding on the release of

EAFRD rural development funds (as well as for the structural and cohesion funds) as part of Common Strategic Framework regulation

The co-decision process to date – lengthy, messy but working!

EP Resolution on Lyon Report July 2010 to influence Commission’s consultation paper in November 2010

EP Resolution on Dess Report June 2011 responded to Commission’s consultation paper Dess draft report heavily amended in COMAGRI COMAGRI report strongly backed by Parliament plenary

COMAGRI rapporteurs’ reports responded to Commission’s legislative proposals October 2011 Over 7,000 amendments to Commission proposals reduced to

smaller number of consolidated amendments The Parliament’s mandate March 2013

Largely backed COMAGRI amendments Confusion over greening amendments

The Agricultural Council’s general position March 2013 Evidence that Presidency incorporated EP’s text where there was

no substantive disagreement

The Parliament’s position on CAP reform(dimensions of market orientation, targeting, subsidiarity, simplification)Example Direct Payments regulation

Art Issue Pro Con

9 Active farmer – negative list approach x

18 Payment entitlements – allow SAPS to continue

x

22 Flexibility in internal convergence x

28(a) Complementary payment for first hectares x

29 Flexibility wrt greening measures C

30 Crop diversification x? x?

31 Maintenance of permanent pasture x? x?

32 Ecological focus areas x

33 Mandatory payment to young farmers x

38-9 Voluntary coupled support x

C implies EP position agrees with Commission proposal, which in turn is placed in Pro or Con columns

‘Constitutional’ issues

Distribution of powers between Council and EP post-Lisbon still to be clarified Article 43(3) exceptions on fixing prices, levies, aid and

quantitative limitations Choice between delegated and implementing acts

Council and Parliament failed to reach agreement on Commission 2010 proposals on alignment of CAP regulations with Lisbon Treaty provisions

EP favours greater use of delegated acts, Council favours more use of implementing acts where MS exercise influence through comitology

Contested ‘constitutional’ issues may yet complicate completion of CAP2020 negotiations

Co-decision and Commission’s role Commission’s power of initiative determined by:

power to propose power to amend power to withdraw a proposal

The CAP2020 experience Initial proposal based on most extensive consultation process

yet Cautious initial proposal – result of Commissioner preferences

or realistic assessment of what might be possible to achieve? Commission has lost ability to control legislation

EP proposal to introduce milk supply control measures Council proposal on approximation for internal convergence From ‘co-participant’ to ‘honest broker’ Mandate must be renewed as negotiations proceed

Discussion

Co-decision has given the EP greater influence Evidence of EP positions influencing the Council legislative

track Outcome of trilogue process will shift Council/Commission

positions on at least some issues EP influence has largely pulled CAP2020 reform in a

backward direction The critical role played by COMAGRI Question mark over administrative and technical resources

Disagreements on constitutional issues could provide unexpected last-minute sticking point for EP agreement

What happens if no political agreement in June?