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Housing, Mutuality andHousing, Mutuality andCommunity Renewal: a review ofCommunity Renewal: a review ofthe evidence and its relevance tostock transfer in Wales

Housing Research Report HRR 4/04 - September 2004

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Welsh Assembly Government – Housing, Mutuality and Community Renewal

Further copies of this document can be obtained free of charge from:

Helen Wyatt

Housing Directorate

Welsh Assembly Government

Cathays Park

Cardiff

CF10 3NQ

Tel: (02920) 821718

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: http://www.wales.gov.uk/

ISBN 0 7504 3516 X © Crown Copyright 2004

Designed by CartoGraphics Typesetting by Text Processing Services

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Report by Richard Bromiley, Dave Adamson and

Sarah Connolly of the University of Glamorgan.

Tamsin Stirling provided editorial comment and

advice on an earlier version of this report which

contributed significantly to its improvement.

We would like to thank the many individuals and

organisations who agreed to be interviewed in

the course of the research, and who provided

resources and materials for the review. The

authors would also like to thank Dr Michael

Harmer of the Welsh Assembly Government for

his advice and input into the review.

Acknowledgements

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ContentsAcknowledgements

1 Introduction 1

2 Social Housing in Wales: The National Policy Context 3

3 Contemporary Experience of Mutuality in Housing 9

4 Housing and Community Regeneration 19

5 The Community Housing Mutual Model 33

6 Concluding Comments and Policy Considerations 41

Bibliography 49

Glossary 55

List of key interviewees 57

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1.1 Background to the review1.1.1 This report forms part of a WelshAssembly Government Social HousingManagement Grant funded project,investigating the potential of mutualhousing organisations to both managesocial housing and contribute to the socialand economic regeneration ofdisadvantaged communities. Morespecifically, the report seeks to identify howpotential benefits derived from mutualhousing organisations might be realised inWales through the introduction of theCommunity Housing Mutual Model(CHMM) within the stock transfer process.

1.1.2 The CHMM aims to harness thepotential of co-operative and mutualhousing organisations to achieve moreefficient management and furthercommunity regeneration whilst at the sametime acting as a vehicle to allow borrowingfrom the private sector. The CHMM wasintroduced in Better Homes for People inWales in 2001, and the Welsh AssemblyGovernment has subsequently facilitatedthe development of a rule set for guidingthe transfer of local authority housing tocommunity ownership.

1.2 Scope and purpose of the review1.2.1 This report seeks to identify andevaluate the potential of the CHMM as atenant management option and itspotential to promote the regeneration ofWelsh communities. The potential of theCHMM is gauged through a review ofevidence from both international and UKexamples of similar housing ownershipmodels. Much of the evidence is derivedfrom England and Scotland and, whilstthere are many similarities in experience, it

is acknowledged that the historicaldevelopment of housing provision in Waleshas created a distinct policy and socialenvironment.

1.2.2 This report investigates a numberof themes, all of which are pertinent to thepotential transfer of local authority housingstock to the CHMM. It is not possible tosuggest direct comparability with any ofthe models examined, as the CHMMrepresents a new, hybrid form which doesnot simply correspond with pre-existingmodels of practice. However, the reviewseeks to draw out the key features ofmodels which have been seen assuccessful, and which may be transferableto the Welsh context.

1.3 Methodological issues 1.3.1 The evidence in this report isderived primarily from academic, policy andpractice sources in the fields of housingand community regeneration. This issupplemented by opinions drawn from anumber of interviews carried out by theauthors during the period January-August2003. In addition, a seminar was held inSeptember 2003 at the University ofGlamorgan where the preliminary results ofthe research were reviewed with bothacademics and housing practitioners.

1.3.2 The report compares the CHMMwith similar housing management models.This is achieved through an examination ofthe legal structures in the CHMM rule set(Cobbetts 2002), and a consideration ofthe policy and institutional contexts inwhich Community Mutuals would operate.The report also considers the potentialimpact of the CHMM on community

1. Introduction

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regeneration processes in Wales in the lightof a definable relationship between localauthority housing and deprivation. ManyCommunities First localities arecharacterised by concentrations of singletenure local authority housing. Themanagement changes signalled by theCHMM model present major opportunitiesto link social and physical regeneration, andintroduce positive economic change.

1.4 Structure of the report1.4.1 Section Two of this report evaluatesthe Welsh policy context of the CHMMand analyses the investment needs of localauthority housing in Wales, the financialand political reasons for stock transfer, andthe genesis of the CHMM. Section Threeexamines the contemporary experience ofmutuality in housing management, withspecific reference to the primary forms of

co-operative housing in the UK. Thenewly-created Community Gateway model,currently being piloted in England, is alsoexamined. Section Four of the reportfocuses on the linkages between housingand community regeneration, and thevarying potential for communityregeneration offered by the managementmodels of local authorities, RegisteredSocial Landlords (RSLs) and Co-operatives.Section Five examines the CHMM in moredetail, to provide a critical review of thepotential of the model to achieve effectivehousing management and to providecommunity regeneration benefits. The finalsection evaluates the conclusions drawnfrom previous sections and presents thepolicy implications for consideration by theWelsh Assembly Government and otherhousing agencies.

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2.1 Background2.1.1 To fully explore the issues arisingfrom the introduction of the CommunityHousing Mutual Model it is essential toexamine both the housing context whichcurrently prevails, and the emergingenvironment in which it will operate. Thissection seeks to briefly summarise theWelsh housing context. It identifies themajor problems associated with localauthority housing in the last decade, andthe reasons why stock transfer of councilhousing stock is seen as a viable solution tothose problems.

2.1.2 Prior to devolution, Walesexperienced a limited degree ofadministrative independence from England.Tai Cymru, (also known by its English titleof Housing for Wales until 1997), wascreated in 1989 to mirror the role of theHousing Corporation in England. Its rolewas to fund and regulate housingassociations and to ensure high standardsof management and other services. Thesefunctions were incorporated into the WelshOffice in 1998 and after devolution,transferred to the Welsh AssemblyGovernment. This context has historicallyensured some deviation in policy in Walesfrom the English pattern, and sincedevolution, has provided greater scope forthe creation of policies and programmesthat are tailored to the Welsh housingcontext.

2.2 Council housing investmentneeds in Wales2.2.1 In 2002, local authorities in Walesmanaged 183,000 houses, approximately14% of the Welsh housing stock, with57,000 properties managed by Registered

Social Landlords (RSLs) representing 4% ofthe Welsh housing stock.

2.2.2 The Welsh social housing stock is inneed of repair. In 1998, the Welsh HousingCondition Survey estimated that 8.2% ofthe social housing stock was unfit. In total,the estimated essential repair cost for allsocial housing was £162.2 million.However, The Chartered Institute ofHousing in Wales estimated the repair costto bring council housing up to a good stateof repair to be considerably higher at £750million (CIH in Wales 1998). In 1999, theNational Assembly for Wales also reportedthat £750 million needed to be spent toclear the repairs backlog in council housingand carry out essential modernisation ofproperties (NAW 1999; cited in Harmerand Runnett 2000: 130).

2.2.3 The financial constraints imposedon local authorities have resulted in agradual reduction in funds available totackle this repairs backlog (Wilcox 2000).In addition, the standards set bygovernment and the Welsh AssemblyGovernment for housing condition havebecome more stringent. While the WelshHousing Condition Survey referred to theessential repair cost of housing, the WelshHousing Quality Standard (WHQS), definesa broader set of housing quality indicators.These are set minimum standards thatshould be met, so that “all households inWales … shall have the opportunity to livein good quality homes” that are:

• In a good state of repair;

• Safe and secure;

2. Social Housing in Wales: The National Policy Context



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• Adequately heated, fuel efficient andwell insulated;

• Fitted with up-to-date kitchens andbathrooms;

• Well managed (for rented housing);

• Located in attractive and safeenvironments; and

• As far as possible suit the specificrequirements of the household (e.g.specific disabilities).

(NAW 2001)

2.2.4 In the autumn of 2002, localauthorities were required by the WelshAssembly Government to estimate whatinvestment would be needed to improvetheir housing stock to the WHQS. Thesum of those estimates was £3 billion.

2.3 Right to Buy and residualisationof council housing in Wales2.3.1 The Right to Buy legislation,introduced in the 1980 Housing Act, led tothe selling, often at a significant discount,of much of the Welsh council housingstock. During the period October 1980-December 2002, more than 121,000council properties were sold; over one thirdof the total. These sales reduced theproportion of council housing from 28% to14% of the total Welsh housing stock.During the same period, housingassociation stocks rose from 11,000 to57,000 units, constituting an increase from1% to 4% of the total housing stock. TheRight to Buy had the effect, desired by theConservative government of the 1980s and1990s, “of promoting home ownership andreducing and changing the role of localauthority housing” (Williams 1992: 159).

2.3.2 The Right to Buy led to the gradualprivatisation of some of the most desirablecouncil properties in Wales. In parallel, aprocess by which social and economicallydisadvantaged tenants becameconcentrated in social housing, emerged inWales ( Welsh Office 1994; Welsh Office1999; Harmer and Runnett 2000; Hutsonand Stirling 2000). Therefore, much of thecouncil housing stock in Wales has becomeresidualised, and unattractive toprospective tenants. Many estatesdemonstrate complex and inter-relatedcharacteristics of social exclusion. Adamsonwrites that, “large local authority estates,often built on hill top locations above thevalley floor… demonstrated high rates oftenant turnover resulting in unstable andtransient populations. Allocations policiesoperated by many local authoritiesconcentrated social problems in keycommunities and by the late 1990s highvoid rates and declining demand werereaching levels where estate abandonmentcould be identified” (Adamson 2003, p82).

2.4 National responses to investmentneeds2.4.1 The National Housing Strategy,Better Homes for People in Wales, waspublished in 2001 (NAW 2001) andoutlined the Welsh Assembly Government’sstrategy for the improvement of councilhousing stock. The strategy requires:

“all Welsh local authorities to quantify theextent of the repair and improvementliabilities in respect of their council housingstock, and to produce plans thatdemonstrate that its stock will beregenerated within ten years” (NAW2001: 65).

2.4.2 To achieve the aim of regeneratingthe Welsh council housing stock in a


decade, a significant increase inexpenditure is required. However, currentgovernment policy has resisted wholesalechanges to the borrowing rules, and hasnot responded to calls for radical changesto the rents and subsidy regime byorganisations such as the Welsh LocalGovernment Association (WLGA 2003).Therefore, to achieve the WHQS, a limitednumber of investment options are availableto local authorities in Wales. These are:

• Prudential borrowing;

• ALMOs (Arm’s Length ManagementOrganisations);

• PFI (Private finance initiatives);

• Large-Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT),or other forms of whole and partialstock transfer.

2.4.3 The prudential borrowing regimeintroduced in 2004/05 presents revisedrules for local authority borrowing.Prudential borrowing removes the currentsystem of credit approvals, and allows localauthorities to set their own borrowinglimits under the rules outlined in thePrudential Code for Capital Finance inLocal Authorities (CIPFA 2003). This allowslocal authorities to borrow against theirincome in the Housing Revenue Account(HRA), but not against the Major RepairsAllowance (MRA). An MRA has beenintroduced in 2004-5 in Wales, and is ofthe value of roughly £108m.

2.4.4 Prudential borrowing offers localauthorities the possibility of borrowingfurther resources to meet the WelshHousing Quality Standard. Early indicationssuggest that some local authorities willaddress the investment requirement to

meet the WHQS through prudentialborrowing. However, it is likely that manylocal authorities will still be unable to meetthe standard, and will have to exploreother options.

2.4.5 Arm’s Length ManagementOrganisations allow local authorities toretain ownership of the housing stock,while passing on the management functionto another body. In England, councilssetting up ALMOs may get extraborrowing consent and subsidies (thevalue of which depends on the ratingachieved by the ALMO in relation toinspection of its housing services andgovernance arrangements). This offersincentives for ALMOs to perform wellagainst Best Value targets. However, whilstthe Welsh Assembly Government hassuggested that local authorities mayestablish ALMOs under certaincircumstances, there have been noadditional resources provided for thisapproach. Consequently, the option haslittle financial attraction to Welsh localauthorities.

2.4.6 The Private Finance Initiative (PFI)option involves contracting out therepair/maintenance functions to a SpecialPurpose Vehicle (SPV). This may involve anRSL linked with a contractor and funder tobring private investment into the stock. Thestock remains in the public sector, but theservice delivery arrangements aim to bringin the efficiencies of the private sector.However, the finance is likely to be moreexpensive. The PFI model is likely to belimited to local authorities where mostimprovements can be funded from existingresources. Additionally, the Welsh AssemblyGovernment has demonstrated a reluctanceto build service delivery in Wales on PFIfoundations.


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2.4.7 Large Scale Voluntary StockTransfer (LSVT) involves the sale of thehousing stock to another landlord, normallya housing association. The three optionsalready outlined do not offer solutions tolocal authorities whose stock is in need ofurgent repair and the investment needed isfar greater than borrowings and subsidieswould allow. Therefore, many localauthorities in England and Scotland,(though only one in Wales to date), havepursued the option of stock transfer byLSVT. This transfer of ownership out of thepublic sector allows the housing associationto borrow on the private markets toimprove the condition of the stock. Thefinancial incentives for local authorities totransfer stock will vary, depending on theTenanted Market Value (TMV) whichdefines the level of receipt to the localauthority. Where the capital receipt fortransfer is less than the debt on thehousing revenue account (HRA), thisoverhanging debt will be addressedthrough support from the Treasury. Thestock transfer guidelines in Wales arecurrently under review by the WelshAssembly Government, although no majorchanges to the LSVT funding situation areexpected.

2.4.8 The very limited level of LSVT inWales to date may be due to a lack ofpolitical support in local authorities for thesale of stock to an independent landlord, inwhat is regarded by some as a privatisationof the housing stock. Stock transfers inWales have thus far been on a muchsmaller scale than in England; only onelocal authority, Bridgend, has put the casefor stock transfer in Wales and achieved a71.5% ‘yes’ vote on a turnout of 69.8%(5325). In addition, there have been partialtransfers of council housing to existingRSLs. The requirement to meet the Welsh

Housing Quality Standard means that LSVTmay become more attractive to localauthorities as an investment option.

2.4.9 The Community Housing MutualModel (CHMM) was proposed in BetterHomes for People in Wales (NAW 2001) asa possible alternative to LSVT. The CHMMwas commissioned by the Welsh AssemblyGovernment, and developed within thecontext of the particular political andhousing history of Wales. The approachdraws on various forms of co-operativeownership and tenant management ofhousing (Mutuo 2001; CIH 2003). This isin contrast to more traditional large scaletransfers to existing or new housingassociations. The purpose of the model isto enable residents to take a stronger rolein decision-making processes affecting theprovision and management of their homes.This should empower individuals to becomeinvolved in the housing issues that affectthem, with a follow on affect of creatingmore cohesive communities (CobbettsSolicitors 2002). The National HousingStrategy, Better Homes for People in Walesargues that the CHMM aids thedevelopment of “a real sense ofownership… and a real sense ofparticipation and involvement by thetenants. It also avoids any sense of someremote or unaccountable organisationowning and running the properties” (NAW2001: 69).

2.4.10 Community Mutuals would be not-for-profit organisations, pursued for thesole purpose of benefiting their membersand directed at a strategic level by thosemembers. Thus any profit would bereinvested in order to further the principlesof the Community Mutual. The CHMMstipulates that in the period of transition,before the members take control of the


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housing stock, the members should work inpartnership with the local authority andany other organisations that it considers torepresent tenants in the area served by theCommunity Mutual.

2.4.11 The CHMM offers the option ofstock transfer in a way that is moresensitive to the political situation in Wales.Stock transfer options pursued in Englandand Scotland have produced significantopposition from direct labour organisationsand local authority housing departments, aswell as from tenants (for example inBirmingham). However, this oppositionstems mostly from the perception of thestock transfer option as a privatisation

process. In contrast, the CHMM is as muchconcerned with the possibility of localcontrol of housing decision-making,although the possibility of debt removaland borrowing-funded housing repairbudgets remain the key attractions. Thistherefore helps to circumvent, though noteradicate, the potential political hostility tostock transfer.

2.4.12 Ideas such as local control andmutual ownership mean that the CHMMoffers a more community-orientatedhousing stock transfer option. Whether theCHMM in its current form is able to meetthis expectation will be analysed in theremainder of this report.


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3.1 Alternative models of socialhousing3.1.1 To understand the potential benefitsof the CHMM, the advantages anddisadvantages of other mutual and co-operative housing models need to beexamined. This section of the reportinvestigates the practice of co-operativeand tenant-controlled housing. Specifically,this section examines the three modelsmost relevant to this study:

• Tenant Management Organisations;

• Ownership Housing Co-operatives;

• Resident-Controlled HousingAssociations.

These models have historically representedthe primary mechanisms for the delivery ofhousing within a co-operative orcommunity controlled framework. Theirstructure and practice has evolved overtime and provides an opportunity for someprediction of the likely outcomes of theCHMM in Wales. For each of these threemodels, an evaluation of benefits anddisadvantages of the model in question ispresented. In addition, this sectionsummarises the more recently createdCommunity Gateway Model (CIH 2003)which is being piloted in England as amodel of resident-controlled housing.

3.1.2 Much of the evidence in thissection draws on the most recentcomprehensive study of models of residentcontrolled housing by Gillanders andBlackaby (1999).

3.2 Co-operative and Tenant-Controlled Housing: Overview3.2.1 A number of co-operative andtenant/resident controlled and managedhousing models exist in the UK, Europe andworld-wide. These models are mostlydifferentiated in two ways: theirlegal/organisational form; and the way inwhich they are developed andsubsequently supported or linked to a‘parent’ (Gillanders and Blackaby 1999:15).However, some housing organisations existin grey areas between other models, andmay not fit to the ideal types outlined here.Similar models may also have differentnames in different parts of the UK andworld-wide. This section will attempt todescribe in as much clarity as possible thekey models and compare their benefits anddisadvantages with local authority housingand the more traditional UK housingassociation model.

3.2.2 The UK-based Confederation ofCo-operative Housing (CCH) identifies fivekey types of co-operative housingownership models that operate within theUnited Kingdom to a greater or lesserextent. These are:

• Self-build co-operatives;

• Short-life co-operatives;

• Tenant Management Organisations(TMOs);

• Ownership housing co-operatives;

• Resident-controlled housingassociations.(http://cch.coop/coopinfo/types.html)


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3. Contemporary Experience of Mutuality in Housing


3.2.3 Self-build co-operatives arecharacterised by tenant involvement in thebuilding of the properties, while short-lifeco-operatives lease, for a fixed period oftime, properties that are unlettable. Theparticular features of these two models arenot shared with the CHMM and furthercomparison is not worthwhile. However,the remaining three models share featureswith the CHMM and comparison willprovide insight into the likely advantagesand disadvantages of the approach.

3.2.4 Gillanders and Blackaby (1999)note several generic advantages of residentcontrol of housing. They note that

• Resident control brings clear benefits interms of better housing management,capacity building and communitysustainability (Gillanders and Blackaby1999: 1);

• Resident-controlled housingorganisations ‘produce high levels oftenant satisfaction, and in terms of arange of indicators in general seem tomanage as well as or better than localauthorities or RSL…comparators,although their costs are higher becausethey are small. They have helped toturn around difficult estates and makedifficult-to-let housing popular even inareas of low demand’ (Gillanders andBlackaby 1999: 1).

3.2.5 However, Gillanders and Blackaby(1999) also note some disadvantages:

• Resident control also involves asignificant cost in terms of the requiredinput from residents, and externalsupport and monitoring. The balanceof costs and benefits is unclear; it isnot possible to determine whether, in

general, the benefits justify the costsor how these compare betweendifferent forms of resident control(Gillanders and Blackaby 1999: 1);

• Co-operatives have given rise to muchhigher levels of regulatory action bythe housing corporation than otherRSLs, generally because of potentialweaknesses in governance or financialmanagement (Gillanders and Blackaby1999: 1).

3.2.6 These generic issues arise tovarying degrees in the specific models tobe addressed here.

3.3 Tenant ManagementOrganisations3.3.1 Tenant Management Organisations(TMOs) are characterised by themanagement of properties owned byanother landlord, often local authorities.TMOs are supported in local councilhousing by the existence of a ‘right tomanage’. This right does not exist inhousing associations, and so fewer TMOsemerge in this sector. There are two typesof TMO:

• Tenant Management Co-operatives(TMCs) - run as tenant co-operatives,wherein each tenant is a member andeach member a tenant, managing theproperty collectively through anelected board;

• Estate Management Boards (EMBs) -the stock is managed by an electedboard comprised of tenants andrepresentatives from otherorganisations, such as the localauthority.


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3.3.2 TMOs have inherent advantages inthat they involve residents in themanagement of the housing stock. As partof this, there may be enhancedaccountability and information flows,alongside other broader communityregeneration advantages:

• Research found that, “there is strong,consistent, evidence from the datacollected in our study that… TMCshave been successful in deliveringimproved housing managementservices…” (Price Waterhouse 1995:113). This improvement in services isattributed to the involvement oftenants in the management of theirhomes;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 43)state that, “in terms of hard indicatorsof effectiveness, the evidence is alsothat tenant-managed organisationsperform as well as or better thancomparators”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 44)also state that “evidence supports theview that establishment of a TMOleads to improvements in themanagement of local authority estates,and our own observations were thatthese estates look much better caredfor than one would expect from a localauthority estate of similar age and builtform. It seems that TMOs are often setup in response to very badmanagement, and rise to the challengeof doing better than their landlord”;

• Resident involvement “tends to help tomake housing more popular- there arenumerous examples of TMOs helpingto turn round difficult-to-let estates,reducing turnover and leading to more

stable communities” (Gillanders andBlackaby 1999: 48);

• Price Waterhouse (1995: 113) suggestthat TMOs also provide “a range ofadditional unquantifiable benefits”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 43)note interview evidence whichdemonstrates that “tenant controlledorganisations are successful in makingsure the tenants’ agenda takes priorityand giving tenants the power to act ifthings are not done”. Later, they notethat, “where they work well, they canoffer many of the benefits of otherforms of resident control in terms ofgood management, capacity building,and community spirit” (Gillanders andBlackaby 1999: 57);

• In conclusion, Gillanders and Blackaby(1999: 57) note that, “TMOs, alongwith forms offering more limiteddelegation of control, are the onlyforms of resident control likely to beacceptable to most existing RSLs fortheir existing stock. Hence if the aim isto spread the benefits of residentcontrol as widely as possible, theseforms should be encouraged”.

3.3.3 A number of disadvantages ofTMOs have also been identified:

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)note that the process of setting up aTMO can be “adversarial, slow,cumbersome and expensive comparedwith more limited forms of control”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)also note the potential for, “conflictwith the landlord over policies andpriorities as well as over the level of


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resourcing”. This is compounded bythe fact that TMOs may have limitedcontrol over allocations and so “areless able than independentorganisations to pursue allocationspolicies that reflect social need as wellas individual housing need”;

• Further, Gillanders and Blackaby (1999:57) suggest that residents “may beunwilling to accept ‘ownership’ of theproblems. The board may becomeunrepresentative”.

3.4 Ownership Housing Co-operatives3.4.1 Whilst clearly an ownership modelrather than one based on tenancy there arefeatures of the ownership co-operativemanagement approach which haveimplications for appraisal of any housingmanagement approach based on mutuality,such as the CHMM. Ownership housingco-operatives are characterised by the factthat the residents own or lease theproperty. As such they have collectivecontrol over the management of thehousing stock. Each resident can havedirect input into the management of thehousing, though often management boardsare elected to oversee the day-to-dayrunning of the stock. Residents are usuallygiven a share in the co-operative that isnon-transferable, thus restricting the abilityof individuals to sell off these shares forprofit. Indeed the ownership-housingmodel normally prevents individualmembers from capital gain through the co-operative, with any surplus ploughed backinto the co-operative as a whole.

3.4.2 Ownership housing co-operativesfall into two key subgroups:

• Co-ownership co-operatives, in whichmembers have an individual financialstake in their home;

• Par Value co-operatives, in whichmembers just have a nominal financialstake. Par Value co-operatives may beeither fully mutual, in which all tenantsare members and vice versa, or non-fully mutual, in which tenants do nothave to be members, and members arenot necessarily tenants.

3.4.3 Advantages of ownership housingco-operatives have been identified:

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999:43)outline that data from the housingcorporation “provides evidence thatpar value co-operatives and residentcontrolled housing associations areeffective housing managers”;

• McCafferty and Riley (1989) notedthat tenants preferred co-operativesdue to the enhanced repairs serviceand sense of community;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)note that, “in general they managetheir housing effectively, and comparewell with mainstream providers.Although they may suffer fromdiseconomies because of their smallsize, self-help in many co-operatives(as well as tight cost control) helps tokeep management and maintenancecosts low”;


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• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 42)note that tenants in co-operatives“tend to have higher levels ofsatisfaction than those inaccommodation managed by localauthorities or RSLs”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)state that Par-Value co-operatives are“capable of generating and sustaininga strong community spirit based on selfhelp and mutual support amongstmembers. This effect seems to be morepowerful than in other forms ofresident-controlled housing. Howeverit is not clear how far this reflects the‘bottom up’ origins of many existingco-operatives and extends to co-operatives formed more recently asshells, housing people nominated fromthe local authority waiting list”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 53)outline that Par Value co-operativesare able to offer housing to groupsthat may wish to be housed together,particularly those with needs that maynot be met adequately by themainstream. As a result, Par-Value co-operatives, “can contribute (in a smallway, reflecting their small scale) todiversity of tenure and social mix.However this latter contribution maybe compromised if they have to adoptpurely needs-based allocationspolicies”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 53)suggest that Co-operatives are“focused on the needs of their tenantswith no outside interests; the bundleof services they provide is thereforelikely to reflect tenants’ priorities”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)state that Par-Value co-operatives“develop the capacities of members;this effect seems to be much broaderbut perhaps not as deep as thecapacity building in larger resident-controlled organisations”.

3.4.4 Disadvantages of ownershiphousing co-operatives have beenidentified:

• Co-operatives have an inherenttension in that they work best whenthey are small (probably less than 500units). However, Gillanders andBlackaby (1999: 54) note that “thissmall size limits their capacity tocompete with other RSLs in delivering‘Housing Plus’, to have a significantimpact in building communities, or toengage in wider regeneration.” .Further to this, Blackaby and Gillanders(1999: 55) note, “co-operatives areseen by many local authorities asunable to deliver to the current agenda(regeneration, value for money,deliverability and affordable rents).Our conclusions are that thisassessment is probably correct, exceptin a limited role, in the terms in whichthe agenda is currently defined. Even ifthis view is incorrect, development ofnew co-operatives would be limited bythe lack of local authority support, andgrowth of the sector would requirethat local authorities be convinced ofthe benefits that co-operatives bring.However co-operatives are not wellplaced to influence local authoritystrategies”;

• The generally small scale of co-operatives means that “problems offactionalism and low levels of active


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participation have often threatenedgood governance, organisationalstability and sustainability. Whenproblems start to emerge, it is difficultto put them right in the currentregulatory framework”. (Gillanders andBlackaby 1999: 54). Gillanders andBlackaby also note that, “becausethere is likely to be a lack of financialexpertise amongst committee membersand staff, co-operatives often havedifficulty in attaining requiredstandards of financial management,thereby placing at risk taxpayers’money, failing to safeguard theinterests of their members and placinga disproportionate burden on theregulator. Structures to manage thisrisk are lacking in most parts of thecountry”.

3.5 Resident-Controlled HousingAssociations3.5.1 Resident controlled housingassociations (RCHAs) (also known astenant-controlled housing associations) areowned and managed by the tenants on anot-for-profit basis. Ultimate control of thehousing stock lies with the tenants,through numerical domination of themanagement boards. In addition, thesehousing associations often have a widerange of individuals, including professionalexperts and community representatives,who sit on their boards. Indeed there arespecific rules as to the composition of thismanagement board. Due to the small areabasis required for these organisations tofunction properly, in Britain they are alsooften referred to as Community-BasedHousing Associations (CBHAs), thoughScottish research and practice also refers tothese as Community-Based HousingOrganisations (CBHOs). In the UnitedStates there exists a parallel model, dubbedMutual Housing Associations.

3.5.2 Advantages of RCHAs have beenidentified:

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 57)suggest that RCHAs “manage theirhousing effectively and efficientlyalthough they appear to suffer, like co-operatives, from diseconomiesreflecting their small size”;

• According to Gillanders and Blackaby(1999: 55); in contrast to RSLs, whichare not community-based, RCHAs “have a real stake in the communities inwhich they are located and a greaterincentive to make the community workwell; any surpluses are retained forinvestment in the local community.This is a powerful argument for RSLswith a community focus even if theseare not resident-controlled”;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999: 56)outline that there is also “no evidencethat RCHAs, unlike co-operatives, haveany more problems maintainingstandards of governance than anymainstream RSL; they are able toinclude specialist financial and businessskills on their board and being largercan afford to employ specialist staff”;

• Clapham and Kintrea (2000:533) notethat CBHOs are generally regarded aslegitimate and trustworthyorganisations by the locals that theyserve, more so indeed than localauthorities and housing associations;

• CBHOs are generally smallorganisations capable of rapid andappropriate action in the community,contrasted with the perception of over-arching, often heavy-handed centralhousing association approaches(Clapham and Kintrea 1992). Clapham


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and Kintrea (1992) noted that tenantsatisfaction improved over time and incomparison with other housingmodels. Clapham et al (1998) alsonote that tenants’ opinions of housingmanagement had improved over timeunder tenant control.

• Clapham et al (1998) note thattenants’ opinions of housingmanagement had improved over timeunder tenant control;

• Clapham and Kintrea (2000: 555) statethat interest in the management ofCBHOs tends not to dwindle despiteinitial fears about sustainability of thetenant participation process; thesustained level of interest has enabledthese organisations to continue toprovide a good level of service for overten years;

• Gillanders and Blackaby (1999:55)note that “they can be big enough toengage in regeneration and to have asignificant impact in wider building ofcommunities- unlike par-value co-operatives”. They also note thatRCHAs “help to create and sustain astrong community spirit” .

3.5.3 Disadvantages of RCHA have alsobeen identified:

• RCHAs may have a lack ofindependence from housingauthorities, as in the case of ScottishCBHOs from Scottish Homes andGlasgow City Council. However, it isnoted that there is very little that theCBHOs can in practice do to reversethis position due to the currentregulatory environment;

• RCHAs may not encourage allmembers to be active; Gillanders andBlackaby (1999: 56) note that, “unlessparticipatory structures below boardlevel are effective, they may becomecontrolled by a group of residents whoare not truly representative”.

3.6 The Community Gateway Model.3.6.1 In addition to the currently existingco-operative and resident controlledmodels of housing ownership, theCommunity Gateway Model is a recentlycreated management option for socialhousing. It is aimed at local authorities whoare considering either ALMO or stocktransfer options.

3.6.2 The Community Gateway is still atthe pilot stage in England, and as a resultthere is no direct evidence as to theefficiency of the management that mightbe delivered within the model. However, abrief analysis of the Community GatewayModel will allow a more meaningfulassessment of the CHMM later in thisreport.

3.6.3 The Community Gateway Modelhas two key elements:

• Community Gateway process;

• Community Gateway Association.

3.6.4 The Community Gateway process is“a way of approaching the selection anddelivery of housing options that createsmore opportunities to devolve power totenants” (CIH 2003:7). The processinvolves 5 key strands:

• The development of a communityempowerment strategy that spells outhow tenants and leaseholders can


15


increase their involvement in decision-making and management;

• Agreeing ‘local community areas’ thatwill be the focus for community-basedactivities and decision-making;

• Carrying out a programme ofcommunity options studies, whereevery local area gets the chance toconsider how it wants to be involvedin the future;

• Consulting other residents and thewider community about decisions thatare relevant to the whole community;

• Giving every local community a widerange of options for involvement, fromconsultative approaches through tomanagement and ownership (CIH2003:7).

3.6.5 The Community GatewayAssociation is a housing organisationchosen by local authorities and theirtenants to manage or to take ownership ofthe council stock. It can be a free-standingorganisation, or operate as part of afederated group structure. The CommunityGateway Association may also develop awider range of activities and includegeneral community regeneration of thearea in which the housing is located.

3.6.6 A Community Gateway Associationwould be “obliged to secure the widestpossible involvement in the organisation,and promote opportunities for increasedtenant and leaseholder control” (CIH2003:8). The Community Gateway Modeltherefore includes a toolkit forimplementing community empowermentwhich elaborates the management model

rules and the community empowermentstrategy. The latter consists of combinationsof community options studies, actionplanning, encouraging diversity andimplementation, monitoring and reviewprocesses (CIH 2003:92-98).

3.6.7 Technical differences between theCommunity Gateway Model and theCHMM include:

• The Community Gateway establishestenants as the largest group on theboard (with one less than the majorityof seats);

• The Community Gateway rules requirethe support of a three quartersmajority of board members to enablekey rule changes or the removal ofboard members;

• The Community Gateway rules requiretenants to ‘sign-up’ to becomemembers, rather than assuming thatevery tenant is automatically amember as does the CHMM.

3.6.8 The preceding discussion providesa range of evidence which suggests thatmutual approaches to housing bring clearbenefits to the housing managementprocess and to the quality of serviceexperienced by tenants. Whilst the modelsconsidered are not without disadvantages,the weight of evidence is positive.Although none of the models considereddirectly replicate the rule set of theCHMM, there is no reason to suspect thatsome of the advantages identified abovewill not occur under the CHMM. However,it is also the case that some of theidentified disadvantages will also apply.


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3.7 Lessons from co-operatives for theCHMM3.7.1 Each of the co-operative housingmodels outlined above has individualadvantages and disadvantages. However,the evidence shows they offermanagement of the housing stock that iscomparable to, or better than other localauthority or housing association providers.This positive outcome derives from anumber of factors:

• Greater involvement of residents in themanagement of the housing stock;

• Improved accountability andinformation flows, including improvedrepair services;

• Continuing capacity developmentopportunities for tenants and residents;

• A sense of community and a desire toimprove the condition of the stockthrough common ownership.

3.7.2 The evidence reviewed shows thattenant satisfaction is generally greater inTMOs, Ownership housing co-operativesand RCHAs than in comparable localauthority or housing association housing.Mutual approaches to housing provisioncan bring clear benefits to tenants andhousing professionals. However, theevidence also suggests that co-operativesdo not achieve benefits merely because oftheir legal or organisational framework.The advantages also derive from relatedactivities (including commitments toeducation and capacity building) that helpto develop and consolidate the positivebenefits. These related activities are acritical component of the success of mutualapproaches to housing management.Mutuality and co-operation are not just

organisational frameworks but also requiresocial and developmental processes thatcontribute to the success of the examplesoutlined here.

3.7.3 The success of co-operatives alsodepends on the social and political contextin which the co-operative develops. Thesevary widely, although the factors can beroughly separated into two categories: thestructural and political characteristicscreated and influenced by the governmentand agencies that exist in an area; and thesocial and economic characteristics of thecommunities that are seeking to develophousing co-operatives.

Structural and political characteristicsinclude:

• A supportive and unbureaucratic legalframework, including financial supportand support in kind for co-operatives;

• Political backing and support fromofficers and politicians in localauthorities, regional government andother agencies;

• Genuine partnership and trust betweenagencies and organisations involved inhousing and community regeneration;

• Understanding of the ethos of a co-operative, and a desire to see itsucceed in order to benefit all agenciesinvolved. This helps create a sense of‘mutual endeavour’.

Social and economic characteristics include:

• Cohesion in the community – higherlevels of ‘bridging’ social capital, andless ‘divisive’ social capital. These arethe networks, linkages and trust that


17


help to facilitate communityregeneration and mutual housingorganisations;

• The presence of capacity and skillswithin the community to act in acollective manner. This may come fromparticular individuals who haveexperience of action in the workplaceor through political action. The greaterthe number of people with these skillsand any linkages to networks, thegreater the chances of success;

• A deeply-felt reason for communityaction. In some cases, co-operativesemerge as a response to poor housingconditions, where the neighbourhoodorganises itself to fight for betterhousing conditions and communities;

• Co-operation is more likely to behigher in small estates than in largeones; in estates with high socio-economic status than in low-statusareas; in culturally homogeneousestates than in heterogeneous ones;and in estates with special proceduresof recruitment than in others(Bengtsson 2001: 183).

3.7.4 Local authorities wishing to developcommunity mutuals will have to make surethe optimum conditions for mutual housingorganisations exist. If these conditions donot exist, there may be a need for specificcapacity building and communityregeneration programmes to develop thesecharacteristics.


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4.1 The policy context of communityregeneration4.1.1 Section Three analysed thepotential of mutual and resident controlledapproaches to housing. This section setsout the potential of linking housingownership options with wider processes ofcommunity regeneration. The WelshAssembly Government’s stock transferguidelines state that a local authority’shousing strategy should indicate:

“how the transfer proposals form partof the authority’s strategy for tacklingsocial and economic problems anddelivering sustainable communityregeneration, including whereappropriate, linkage to theCommunities First programme”(WAG2002: 3).

4.1.2 Measurement and analysis ofpoverty in Wales demonstrates the multidimensional pattern of its causes (Adamson2001; NAW 1999, 2000). Complexinteractions between unemployment,underemployment, high levels of benefitdependency, poor housing quality, illhealth, and low educational achievementcreate a complex environment of socialexclusion, especially in the larger localauthority housing estates whichcharacterise South Wales (Adamson 2001).Under such circumstances, co-ordinatedpolicy responses are needed to addressthese problems (Carley 1990, 2000). Theinterrelationship between social problemsautomatically suggests the need for clearlinkages across the conventional policydivisions. The connection between housingpolicy and community regenerationstrategies immediately identifies itself in

any analysis of the problems of the regionand in discussion of policy solutions thatwill be required to resolve them. This isparticularly evident given the correlationbetween those areas with the highestcumulative indices of deprivation and theconcentration of social housing. Censusdata reveal that over 80% of CommunitiesFirst wards have above the Welsh averageconcentration of social housing. Included inthis, 9% of the Communities First wardshave over 50% of their housing in thesocial sector.

4.1.3 The previous section of this reporthas outlined the potential of tenant ownedor controlled models of housing to offerbetter management and tenantparticipation in housing. This sectionextends that analysis to consider whatcommunity regeneration outcomes mayemerge from the different housingownership models. The linkage betweenhousing and regeneration is central withincurrent policy debates, such that“regeneration, in its broadest sense, is oneof the [UK] government’s broader housingaims” (Walker 2001: 692).

4.1.4 This section will focus primarilyupon the role of tenant participation inhousing and its implications for theemergence of community regenerationactivities in social housing communities.Contemporary community regenerationpolicies place major emphasis on tenantand resident involvement as a coreprinciple of the approach (Stewart andTaylor, 1995; Frazer, 1996; Hoban 2002).This participatory approach is provided forby the Local Strategic Partnerships inEngland and in Community First


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4. Housing and Community Regeneration


Partnerships in Wales. Communityinvolvement can occur at a range of levels,from limited consultation exercises, toparticipation in the regeneration processthrough partnership activities andultimately to empowerment whereresidents manage and control key areas ofservice provision to the community.(Arnstein 1969, Carley 1990). In manydisadvantaged communities there is nohistory of even the most rudimentary levelsof involvement with either the housingagenda or the regeneration process.Elsewhere, tenant groups have providedthe only vehicle through whichcommunities have secured even the mostbasic levels of influence. Consequently, themodel of housing management and theextent of tenant participation can be animportant influence on the emergence andsuccess of community regenerationstrategies which are based on anassumption of high levels of residentengagement.

4.1.5 An analysis is presented here of thepotential of the different housingownership models to offer tenantparticipation as a building block for broadercommunity regeneration objectives. Afteroutlining the principles and practice ofcommunity regeneration, the section willbe split into three parts, analysing thepotential of the three key housingownership models – local authority, RSLand tenant controlled/co-operative - tofoster community regeneration.

4.2 What role for housing incommunity regeneration?4.2.1 Community regeneration is aprocess that seeks to create an holisticchange in the economic, social andenvironmental conditions of a community(Adamson 1997). Conventionally,

‘community’ tends to be definedgeographically but can equally apply tocommunities of interest. Such communitiesof interest are currently supported withinthe Communities First Programme in Wales.However, area based or communityregeneration focuses on a specified spatialcommunity. In many instances thiscommunity is defined as a particularhousing estate or the electoral division inwhich it sits. Critical to current communityregeneration policy is the idea thatcommunities should be able to take greaterownership of the issues and problemswithin the community, and to be part of aprocess whereby these issues are tackled.The resulting programme of locallydetermined actions is then intended tobuild the economic, social andenvironmental sustainability of thecommunity, by meeting identified need, inways accepted and promoted by thecommunity itself.

4.2.2 The specific role of tenantparticipation in promoting communityregeneration has recently been emphasisedby the Policy Action Team (PAT) researchby the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). Whilstthe remit of the SEU is limited to England,and the conclusions of the 18 PAT Reportsare also based on evidence from England,the findings are equally relevant to thepatterns of social exclusion evident inWales. One of the Unit’s 18 areas ofresearch (PAT 9) examined community-selfhelp. The PAT 9 report suggested 10features which help build a goodcommunity:

• A learning community, where peopleand groups gain knowledge, skills andconfidence through communityactivity;


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• A fair and just community, whichupholds civic rights and equality ofopportunity, and which recognises andcelebrates the distinctive features of itscultures;

• An active and empoweredcommunity, where people are fullyinvolved, and which has strong localorganisations and a clear identity andself-confidence;

• An influential community, which isconsulted, and has a strong voice indecisions which affect its interests;

• An economically strong community,which creates opportunities for work,and which retains a high proportion ofits wealth;

• A caring community, aware of theneeds of its members, and in whichservices are of a good quality andmeet these needs;

• A green community, with a healthyand pleasant environment, conservingresources and encouraging awarenessof environmental responsibility;

• A safe community, where people donot fear crime, violence or otherhazards;

• A welcoming community, whichpeople like, feel happy about, and donot wish to leave;

• A lasting community, which is wellestablished and likely to survive (HomeOffice 1999: 3).

4.2.3 The report by PAT 9 suggests thatself-help is critical to the development of

such principles. It notes, “without effectiveself-help, it is unlikely that any othermeasures of community regeneration,however well-resourced, will provide long-term solutions to long-term problems”(Home Office 1999: 1). However, it goeson to state that, “community self-help isnot something that can be imposed” (ibid:2) and, “by definition, this is activity doneby local communities, not for or to them”(ibid: 15).

4.2.4 This notion of self-help concurswith wider ideas that communityregeneration works best where initiativesengage directly with the population. Thisoccurs most effectively where regenerationissues and needs are identified by thecommunity itself (Adamson et al 2001).Fortunately, there are many examples ofgood practice in Wales where this hasoccurred (Adamson 1997: 279). By themid-1990s, in the face of effectiveabandonment by the public services, manycommunities formed action groups totackle issues that they were collectivelyfacing (Morgan and Price 1992; Adamson1997). Community organisations werebeginning to establish projects thattriggered a regeneration process atcommunity level. Increased fundingavailability through the LotteryCommission, Objective One and Two andprogrammes such as People inCommunities and Sustainable Communitiesprovided the financial basis forconsolidation and development ofactivities. By the end of the 1990s,community based organisations with multi-million pound budgets had emerged inmany communities in Wales. They wereproviding comprehensive services includingyouth provision, IT training, crèches,community education, transport,community cafes and leisure and


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recreational services. Such organisationswere often completely outside the publicsector and entirely community owned andmanaged. Often in direct conflict or inuneasy co-operation with the localauthority, such organisations were creatinglocalised service provision and innovativedelivery mechanisms. Despite thisburgeoning of community basedregeneration initiatives, housing has notemerged as a focus within the sector. Manyprojects have emerged in localitiescharacterised by single tenure socialhousing, usually local authority controlled.Consequently, regeneration groups havenot considered housing supply andmanagement to be within their remit.

4.2.5 In contrast, there has beensignificant research and experimentationinto the possibility of housing providerstaking on an enhanced role in communityregeneration activities. This has been partlydriven by the Housing Plus agenda and thediversification of housing associations’activities beyond simple management ofthe housing stock. Additionally, there hasbeen a recognition by some housingassociations that social development is acritical element of the housingmanagement process. Consequently, manyhousing associations have establishedcommunity regeneration teams andallocated budgets to the process ofcommunity development in their housingcommunities. In South Wales there is nowa network of regeneration workersemployed by Welsh housing associations.

4.2.6 Attention has been drawn to thiswidening role for housing associationselsewhere. For example, Garratt andPorteus (2002) note the potential ofhousing issues to act as a driver for broadercommunity regeneration activities. They

state, “properly supported involvement inresidents’ and tenants’ associations canhelp to develop the confidence and skillsresidents need to influence mostorganisations. Consequently, spending timeand energy on developing and supportingtenants’ and residents’ groups will helpthem gain greater control over areas oftheir lives beyond the housing issues, whichmight be the starting point” (Garratt andPorteus 2002: 19).

4.2.7 Housing issues offer a potentialdriver which can foster a sense ofcommunity involvement and contribute tocommunity regeneration process. However,the manner in which this develops isdependent on the structure and ethos ofthe housing provider. Garratt and Porteus(2002) note that some local authorityhousing departments act in a paternalistmanner, an accusation that has also beenlevelled at some housing associations.Where this occurs, they argue, any gainsfrom community or tenant involvementmay be lost. They state, “there is a fine linebetween providing access and fightingresidents’ battles for them...Whilst it issometimes necessary, or even vital, to takeup a case on behalf of residents, this is notnecessarily a good community regenerationapproach as it does not pass direct controlto the resident” (Garratt and Porteus 2002:19-20).

4.2.8 With reference to housingassociations, Garratt and Porteus (2002)note two questions about their behaviour,the answers to which can influencecommunity regeneration. These are:

• How do we structure what we do sothat residents and other users havemaximum input into decision making,and what resources must we commit


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to enable them to make that input (ifthey wish)?

• How do we support residents toenable them to have an input intodecisions about services and facilitiesnot provided by us? ( Garratt andPorteus 2002: 18)

4.2.9 Positive answers are brought aboutmost effectively by housing organisationswhich ensure that community and tenantinvolvement are integral and core parts oftheir operations. The rest of this section willanalyse the evidence for such tenantinvolvement processes in local authoritylandlords, traditional housing associationsand co-operatives.

4.3 Local authorities and communityregeneration4.3.1 Local authorities have historicallybeen seen as the key drivers of broad-scaleregeneration activity, through policies inWales such as the Strategic DevelopmentScheme, People in Communities andSustainable Communities. They also have akey role in delivering European funding,including Objective Two and more recentlyObjective One programmes. Such policieshave been able to deliver significantbenefits to local authority controlledhousing communities, through physical,economic and social development of thearea. However, these programmes have notconventionally been integrated withhousing issues. Local authority-runcommunity regeneration initiatives have amixed record of success. Whilst some localauthorities have achieved some successes,best practice analyses suggest that localauthority led community regenerationinitiatives often lack roots within thecommunity (Hoban 2002). This has theknock-on effect of reducing thesustainability of community regeneration,

the breadth of impact and depth of outputsand outcomes.

4.3.2 Local authority-run or partnership-orientated community regenerationinitiatives have often suffered from a lackof the tenant and resident participationthat is essential in creating sustainablecommunity regeneration (Hoban 2002).Stewart and Taylor (1995) suggest that thatlocal authority partnerships are establishedin ways which favour established interests,and which make it difficult for arepresentative tenant voice to be heard.Local authority partnerships have tended towork with groups that already exist prior toregeneration funds becoming available, andas a result the breadth of communityinvolvement and engagement with morerepresentative groups of residents may belimited. This may lead to local conflictswhere rivalries emerge due to a perceivedlack of inclusion of community membersand groups not involved directly inregeneration initiatives (Gillanders andBlackaby 1999). However, there areexamples of effective local authority ledregeneration practice in Wales and animproving understanding of the value ofcommunity involvement.

4.3.3 These issues must be addressed torealise the full potential of communityregeneration. Success depends on thecommunity being given influence andcontrol over the community regenerationprocess. As Tony Blair stated in 1998, “toomuch has been imposed from above, whenexperience shows that success depends oncommunities themselves having the powerand taking the responsibility to make thingsbetter. And although there are goodexamples of rundown neighbourhoodsturning themselves around, the lessonshaven’t been learnt properly” (SEU 1998:7).


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4.3.4 Tenant involvement can provide amore open and structured framework forpeople to become involved in a widerrange of community based issues.However, links between communityregeneration and housing issues are oftenweak in local authority areas. Birchall(1992) noted that, “From the point of viewof the tenant…the structure of public-sector housing has always been deeplyflawed because it has always, as a matterof course, excluded the interest of theusers” (Birchall 1992: 163). While localauthorities do not necessarily seek toexclude their users, there is a body ofevidence that suggests that local authoritieshave not actively sought to include tenantsin decision-making (Cooper and Hawtin1998; Spink 1998). It is only recently thatthe introduction of tenant participationcompacts (NAW 2000) brought tenantparticipation fully onto the agenda forWelsh local authorities. The basis for theirintroduction was the acknowledgementthat some local authorities offer genuine,effective opportunities for tenants toinfluence the decision-making process. Insome authorities, the structures they havein place may be little more than window-dressing, with tenants having no realpower or influence. Some authorities seemreluctant to involve tenants fully, or at all.Some even question the ability andwillingness of tenants to play a full part inmaking decisions and in managing theirhomes (NAW 2000: 8).

4.3.5 Tenant participation, as a valuablebuilding block for broader communityregeneration initiatives, has not alwaysbeen embraced enthusiastically by localauthorities. Therefore, its use as amechanism for engaging the communityand as a driver for community regenerationhad not emerged to any great extent by

the mid-1990s (Stewart and Taylor 1995).This has compounded the problem thatlocal authorities may be seen as distant.Clapham et al (1998) note that confidencein the process of representation was low,with 83% of respondents believing thatlocal councillors ‘had lost touch’ and 73%stating they had ‘no say in what the councildid’. This is compared to just 35 % sayingthey had no say in Community-BasedHousing Organisations (CBHOs). Similarly,75% said they trusted the association to dowhat is right for tenants, whereas only26% said they trusted the council.Alongside this, just 4 per cent said theyhad complete faith in the council,compared to 38% in the CBHO.

4.3.6 This therefore means that moreviable forms of direct participation inhousing issues and decision-makingprocesses are needed to engage residentsin both housing management andcommunity regeneration activities.Clapham et al (1998) note that, “theargument is that a strong local governmentis needed to balance central governmentpower, to mobilise local knowledge, tomeet local needs and preferences, and toallow greater ease of access to the politicalprocess. However, it is often argued thattraditional local government is notsufficient to achieve these ends and thatmore direct or participative forms ofdemocracy are needed” (Clapham et al1998: 32). Clapham et al also note two keyarguments that have been put forward tojustify this latter view:

• Participation helps to correctimbalances of power. By participating,people gain experience and confidencethat enables them to challenge existingpower structures;


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• Participation changes people’sattitudes, and leads them to considernot only their own self-interest butalso wider common concerns (Claphamet al 1998: 32-33).

4.3.7 The literature reviewed heresuggests that, despite the potential ofhousing issues to act as a spur for a moreholistic community regeneration process,this has not generally occurred in localauthority controlled housing communities,in part because of a relative lack of genuinetenant participation opportunities.

4.4 Housing Associations, communityregeneration and the Housing Plusapproach4.4.1 In contrast to this perception of agenerally poor accountability and low levelsof tenant empowerment/ participationwithin local authorities, HousingAssociations have in general, demonstrateda more open style of management andparticipation with their tenants. Thereasons for this are twofold. Firstly,Housing Associations require a businessplan to survive, and to create confidence intheir actions from lenders. Tenantinvolvement has been seen as an elementof effective management which is requiredto promote organisational efficiency. Thisimperative was identified by the HousingCorporation in 1998, who stated thattenant participation:

…makes business sense. RSLs need toensure that their services are responsive,efficient and effective in order to meet theneeds of their consumers. Experience hasshown that the involvement of tenants canprovide crucial help in designing suchservices (Housing Corporation 1998: 7).

4.4.2 Secondly, throughout the 1990sthere was a growing realisation that

Housing Associations could not deliverhousing service of quality withoutaddressing some of the background socialissues faced by their tenants (CIH 2003;CIH Cymru 2003). This therefore requiredthe input of tenants’ views and experiencesin a more structured and positive mannerin order to gain wider positive outcomesfor the tenants and the RSL. As such,Housing Associations offer many examplesof models of community regeneration thatmight also be created through CommunityMutuals, albeit in a different tenantparticipation and management framework.The implications for Community Mutualswill be examined in greater detail later inthis report.

4.4.3 Much of the work of housingassociations in this field has been providedthrough the vehicle of Housing Plus whichemerged to foster community regenerationby Housing Associations. The Housing Plusinitiative came onto the policy agenda inEngland as a means to create a communityregeneration focus alongside the ‘core’housing management outputs of a HousingAssociation. The initiative reflects a widerperception of the role of HousingAssociations, both by central governmentand within Housing Associationsthemselves which emerged during the1990s. Briefly, Housing Plus can be definedas a programme that promoted acommunity-wide perspective in themanagement of housing and thedevelopment regeneration initiatives.Hooten, (1996) noted that Housing Plustargets many aspects of the social exclusiondynamic including unemployment, anti-crime strategies, accessing public services,healthy and sustainable environments andpromoting community participation.Similarly, the Housing Corporation definedHousing Plus as an approach tomanagement and development which


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consists of the creation and maintenance ofsustainable social housing; obtaining addedvalue from housing management andinvestment; and building partnerships withbroader communities (Housing Corporation1998:8). Such definitions are broad-ranging; essentially they refer to a movetowards incorporating communityregeneration issues into the roles ofHousing Associations.

4.4.4 The key driver for the creation ofthe Housing Plus policy was the perceptionthat housing offered the best meansthrough which to deliver communityregeneration in a joined-up manner. Evans(1998) noted that:

“Many [housing associations] belongto a diminishing band of locally basedstakeholder organisations, uniquelyplaced to help reconnect disillusionedcommunities to the mainstream. Theyhave local credibility because theygenerally possess a good track record.The tangibility of housing investmentcan boost local morale and help restoreresidents’ confidence in their ability toshape events and lead to successfulcampaigns for wider improvements intheir quality of life” (Evans 1998:724).

4.4.5 The result of Housing Plus was aprogramme designed to develop the localpresence of Housing Associations into abroader community regeneration role. Thisis in addition to the ‘core’ housing valuesand practices which promote good housingprovision. These include the selection ofappropriate sites for housing, suitablelayouts and space, sensitive lettings andnominations, and a social mix that aids thebuilding of sustainable communities.Analyses and policy evaluations of Housing

Plus have shown that a number of separateinitiatives have been taken by HousingAssociations to engage with the broaderchallenges of community regeneration.These have in the main been successful,with significant community benefit beinggained from the activities carried out.Typically, Housing Plus involved activitiessuch as childcare, public transport, retailand crime prevention projects. Someprojects worked well in conjunction withothers, enhancing the overall impact. Evans(1998) notes the following examples:

• Complementary investment in housingand local shopping facilities;

• Provision of community facilities toprovide a venue for welcoming newtenants and local meetings and socialevents;

• Linking training and employmentschemes with local needs (e.g. childcare, estate maintenance) and broaderrecruitment strategies, and combiningdifferent forms of crime preventionsuch as designing out crime andproviding additional leisure activitiesfor youngsters (Evans 1998: 718).

4.4.6 Kemp and Fordham (1997) alsonote a number of themes that relate localpriorities to local actions:

• Facilities for young children;

• Activities for older children andteenagers;

• Working with elders;

• Community safety initiatives;

• Employment and training;


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• Environmental and physicalimprovements;

• Lettings policies.

4.4.7 The result was that:

The nature and mix of [Housing plus]projects closely matched residents’quality of life priorities which said a lotfor [housing associations’] sensitivity tolocal needs. Residents stressed theimportance of wider measures byrating safety, attractive environment,good shops, schools and play facilitiesmore highly than quality andaffordability of housing in makingsomewhere an attractive place tolive… the combined effect of [HousingPlus] initiatives upon respondents andtheir areas was more impressive.Around two-thirds of residents in eachestate wished to stay in the areafollowing project completion whereasin the worst cases less than a thirdwished to do so prior to regeneration(Evans 1998: 718).

4.4.8 Many of the Housing Plus initiativesled to significant gains in the quality of lifefor tenants and residents. Evans notes that,“although it proved difficult to disentanglethe effect of core housing activity, [HousingPlus] projects and the contributions ofdifferent agencies, there was a correlationbetween the amount of [Housing Plus]activity in the different case studies and thedegree to which community confidencehad improved” (Evans 1998: 718). Kempand Fordham (1997) also note thatresidents’ opinions of an estate generallybecame more positive after an interventionthrough Housing Plus.

4.4.9 These benefits were most evidentwhere Housing Associations developed the

following approaches to Housing Plusissues:

• They had an open attitude towardsinvolving tenants and working withother organisations, and incorporatedHP principles within their corephilosophy rather than viewing themas an added extra;

• The more effective RSLs alsodemonstrated a capacity to produceinnovative solutions to local needs,rather than adopting standardisedsolutions (Evans 1998: 721).

4.4.10 This evidence suggests that tenantparticipation and empowerment are crucialto the development of successful housingand community regeneration initiatives.Most crucial to the difference made by theHousing Plus programme was the impactthat the activities had on HousingAssociation tenants, and the subsequentmobilisation of community resources tohelp the community regeneration process.Evans (1998) notes that, “the greatestimprovements in confidence occurred onestates where resident empowerment wastaken most seriously” (Evans 1998: 720).Empowering tenants has therefore beenseen as key to developing the capacity andimpetus for housing-related communityregeneration initiatives (Stewart and Taylor1995). Where this community capacity canbe activated, there are potentiallysignificant gains in terms of communityregeneration. The actions of a unified andactive community can encourage coreservice providers to be more responsive tothe needs of that neighbourhood, as wellas being active in the pooling of ideas andresources.

4.4.11 Despite the positive nature of theevidence on the effectiveness of Housing


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Plus, some caveats remain regarding theuse of housing funds for communityregeneration. Evans notes a fundamentalquestion of whether housing should be thedriver for community regeneration. Hestates:

Conceptually it is flawed andconfusing. It conflates what [housingassociations] should consider doinganyway and the rather fuzzy area ofnon-housing activity that ‘supports’housing investment where division ofresponsibilities between [housingassociations] and other agencies varies.This has introduced uncertainties aboutrespective roles, what is fundable bythe Housing Corporation and made itdifficult for the Corporation to gaugeand compare the performance of[housing associations] in [HousingPlus] terms since the range of activityis so enormous (Evans 1998: 722).

4.4.12 However, it is clear that HousingAssociations have been able to generateconsiderable community regenerationbenefits to their neighbourhoods. There isevidence from the reviews of HousingAssociations that where there is a morestructured form of tenant engagement,there is the potential to foster and maintainboth tenant involvement on a broader scaleand the continuing involvement of thosetenants within the running of the housingassociation. However, this is dependent ona continual process of capacity and skillsdevelopment; a process that not allHousing Associations are committed to.There is therefore a difference between themore managerialist Housing Associationsand those that are personal or welfare-

orientated (Walker 2000; 2001). Thosewhich are more managerialist are unlikelyto foster tenant involvement as theiremphasis is on specialisation of tasks. Theyare likely to lack the depth of communityinvolvement in decision making that wouldbe required to promote fully inclusivecommunity regeneration. There is thereforea continuum of positions that need to belooked at in considering the potential forthe CHMM to promote communityregeneration. Levels of participation andempowerment are infinitely variable andcan range from tokenistic procedures to fulltenant empowerment. At the top of the‘ladder of participation’ (Arnsteins 1969)lies full resident control which is mostoften realised in patterns of collective ormutual ownership. Ownership, in the formof co-operatives is considered in thefollowing section.

4.5 Co-operative housing andcommunity regeneration4.5.1 The discussion of the impact oftenant participation brings into focus thequestion of full tenant control, as opposedto models of mere participation, in theachievement of community regenerationobjectives. Housing Corporation guidancefrom 1999 in England notes the examplesof tenant participation that are thought tobe central to RSLs developing betterservices. This builds on a 1992 strategythat set out to:

• Improve accountability to tenants andopportunities for participation.

• Promote tenant control, whereappropriate (Housing Corporation1992).


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The Housing Corporation also notes threedistinct themes with regard to the level ofTenant Participation that can be enteredinto:

• Consumer Accountability, includinginformation, consultation and redressfor service delivery problems;

• Tenant Participation, includinginvolvement in local service decisions,management decisions andmanagement structures;

• Control and Ownership, includingTenant Management Organisations(TMOs), co-operatives and tenant-majority RSLs (Housing Corporation1998: 5).

4.5.2 Implicit in this hierarchy of tenantempowerment is the notion that theultimate level of tenant participation isachieved where residents control or ownthe housing stock. Many communityregeneration activities fail to achieve suchlevels of resident involvement, and imposetenant participation and consultationwithout building the necessary structures ofempowerment and control. Communityregeneration evaluations suggest thatwhere the community is not fully engaged,the impact of community regenerationactivities is limited to a relatively smallelement of the population. Baker (2002)notes several problems with currently-existing community regeneration strategies:

• They often cover areas that are muchlarger geographically than manypeople would relate to;

• They are professionally driven, givinglimited control to ordinary communitymembers, who become disillusionedand vote with their feet, which can

lead to the representativeness ofcommunity nominees being called intoquestion;

• Even where representatives aregenuinely representative of the widercommunity, they struggle to get theirvoices heard around a table withprofessional workers unused toworking with local residents;

• Most of the activities are time limitedand cease when the programme comesto an end.

4.5.3 As a result, there is an imperativeto ensure that there is full engagementwith the community, and that engagementleads to full participation in the communityregeneration process. One mechanism thathas gained credence is tenant control orownership, which is also offered by the co-operative models of ownership. Baker(2002) suggests that the co-operativehousing model has the potential for greatercommunity regeneration than RSL HousingPlus or local authority models, due to theorganisational model of co-operatives. Henotes:

Community development happens as amatter of course in co-operatives notas an add-on with extra workers as isoften the case in traditionalmanagement models. People on lowincomes don’t have to pass their daysisolated in impersonal estates but canbe part of a community, with supportfrom neighbours when it was needed.They don’t have to sign on at the localbenefit office for special programs butcan build their own confidence andself-assurance, both individually and asa whole community and invariablyreceive real training as they go (Baker2002).


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4.5.4 Co-operatives and TenantManagement Organisations and ResidentControlled Housing Associations, by theirvery nature as participatory structures,have one of the essential elements of asuccessful community regenerationventure. However, the purpose of much ofthis report is to demonstrate how such co-operatives are able to enhance both theirhousing management role, and to feed intobroader community regeneration. An earlyexamination of six Scottish Community-Based Housing Organisations (CBHOs) overthe period 1988-1991 suggested that:

At least in the short term, the CBHOswere largely very successful as housingdevelopers and housing managers, andwere effective at generating residentinvolvement. The evaluation also notedthat the scheme had a very positiveimpact on the feelings of thecommunity in the areas in which theyoperated, and that their committeeswere keen on using the basis of theCBHO to address problems other thanhousing which were prevalent in theirareas, such as lack of employment anda lack of facilities. Some organisationshad made some limited progress onthose social, economic andenvironmental issues (Clapham et al1998: 31).

The examination of the literatures, many ofwhich draw on case studies from across theUK, therefore suggest that co-operativesallow the integration of people intocommunity regeneration activity moreeffectively than tenant participation modelsthat rely on a more typical non-co-operative housing management style.Evidence suggests that tenants involved intenant-controlled organisations, “feel thatthey are either solving the key issues faced

by their community, or that theirorganisation has given them a sense ofcontrol over their neighbourhoods andfuture that makes other issues [such associal exclusion] irrelevant” (Clapham et al2001: 3). Clapham et al also note thattenant-controlled organisations score highlyagainst the criteria of what constitutes agood community outlined in PAT 9. Theco-operative model is therefore able tohelp create community regeneration inthree potentially different, althoughinterrelated, ways that relate to theaspirations of PAT 9:

• The social impacts of interaction andownership which may be createdthrough involvement in the housingmanagement process;

• The knock-on effects of creating asafer and more environmentally soundneighbourhood;

• The potential economic benefits fromthe creation of jobs in the locality.

4.5.5 The first of these, positive socialinteraction, is perhaps the most easilycreated form of community regenerationassociated with tenant-controlled or co-operative housing models. By allowing aneighbourhood to gain control of itshousing as a resource, there is animperative to become involved in themanagement of that housing, sincedecisions that are made can be seen todirectly affect the residents. There istherefore an impetus for collective action,with the knock-on effects of thedevelopment of bridging social capital, aconcept introduced by writers such asColeman (1988) and Putnam (1993). Thismay be the product of positive interactionswhere people work together to produce


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solutions to common problems. This maynot only create physical regeneration butalso a social cohesion and communityregeneration as people get to know theirneighbourhood and their communitybetter. As Baker (2002) states, “simply inthe way they run, housing co-operativesmake housing socially sustainable byencouraging the growth of community, bycreating opportunity through the structureof the management body for people tocome to know their neighbours and workout common solutions to commonproblems together” (Baker 2002: 3).

4.5.6 Secondly, the tangible socialimpacts of the co-operative model can leadto achievement of some of the quality oflife issues identified by PAT 9; namely acaring, green, safe and welcomingcommunity. Such aspects may be met inpractice by a number of schemes such aslandscaping, gardening help,neighbourhood watch and warden systems,which all help tenants engage with eachother and give collective benefits to theneighbourhood. The results of suchschemes may be the improvement of theenvironment, a reduction in crime and thefear of crime, and non-quantifiable shifts inthe feeling of belonging as socialinteractions become more frequent.

4.5.7 Thirdly, community regenerationinitiatives can create local jobs bydeveloping building, repair andmaintenance co-operatives. Suchdevelopments have the potential toprovide both jobs and training whichcapitalise on local expertise, skills andenergy to meet the needs of thecommunity. Intermediate Labour MarketActions developed in this way have strongtrack records in channelling long termunemployed into local provision and

onwards into the mainstream labourmarket (Adamson and Byrne 2003,McGregor et al 1997).

4.5.8 Baker (2002) notes the potential ofa number of job creation and trainingschemes that have been successfullypiloted by housing co-operatives, such as:

• Credit unions;

• Health and fitness clubs;

• After school clubs;

• Care for the elderly;

• Food co-ops;

• Workspaces.

4.5.9 A secondary effect deriving fromjob creation and local provision of servicesis the retention of funding expenditurewithin the community. Multiplier effectsemerge from local circulation ofexpenditure, and projects often seek tominimise ‘leakage’ of money externally.

4.5.10 However, the benefits outlinedabove are not automatically achieved byhousing co-operatives promoting initiatives.Clapham et al (1998) are cautious in theirassessment of the advantages derived fromScottish CBHOs noting:

The CBHOs have been relativelyunsuccessful in widening their spheresof operation beyond housing. Whiletheir small size gives them advantagesin housing administration andcommunity development, it conspiresagainst other activities such as businessdevelopment and employmentprojects, which are increasingly taken


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on by other larger, local organisations.This may prove to be a problem in thelonger run as services to meetcommunity needs and aspirations onceagain became fragmented, and run byprofessional bodies (Clapham et al1998: 38).

4.5.11 Housing co-operatives are not thepanacea for all the economic problems ofdisadvantaged neighbourhoods. However,co-operatives and greater tenantempowerment offer a means tosignificantly improve the chances of aregeneration initiatives succeeding in thedevelopment of economic and employmentoutcomes, given the right external supportand institutional arrangements.

4.5.12 This section has demonstrated thepotential of each of three broad housingownership and management models toproduce community regeneration outcomesthrough tenant participation. All offerinsight to the potential of CHMMs to builda broad regeneration agenda from thebasic pattern of housing managementwhich will be established by the creation ofthe CHMM. The next section will examinethe specific opportunities provided by theCHMM, and the barriers to achievement oflocal community gain which has beenillustrated by the review of UK experienceso far.


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5.1.1 Previous sections have outlined thepotential of different housing ownershipmodels to facilitate good managementpractice, to procure the involvement oftenants in decision-making, and to promotepositive community regeneration outcomes.This section seeks to compare these modelswith the features of the proposed CHMMand to note similarities and differences inthe policy and delivery mechanisms.

5.1.2 The CHMM shares somecharacteristics with tenant/resident ownedor controlled housing organisations in theUK. The legal framework of the CHMMoffers tenants a nominal financial stake,and as such also has a similarity with parvalue co-operatives. As a result, there is apotential to learn a great deal from thesemodels of housing. However, the CHMMalso differs in a number of ways in themanner in which it is to be implemented.These key differences, and theirimplications, will now be outlined.

5.2 The distinction between tenants,residents and members 5.2.1 Geographical areas that will betransferred from local authority control willinclude housing that does not changetenure, i.e. former council propertiesbought under the Right to Buy. It iscurrently unclear from the model rule setwho could benefit from the communityregeneration efforts that may emerge fromthe creation and implementation of aCommunity Mutual. The precise remit ofany individual Community Mutual willdictate who should benefit from its actionsand who should pay for them. It is alsounclear from the CHMM rule set how thevoices of residents of a neighbourhoodwho are not tenants of a Community

Mutual, such as those who have boughttheir housing, may be integrated properlyinto the community regeneration actions ofa Community Mutual.

5.3 Ownership and control ofCommunity Mutuals 5.3.1 Ownership and control within aCommunity Mutual are not as clearlydefined in the interests of tenants as theyare in an ownership co-operative model.The CHMM rule set (Cobbetts Solicitors2002) notes that tenants would not, ontheir own, be able to amend theconstitution. Consequently, whilst theCHMM is likely to deliver a greater degreeof local accountability and control, it alsopreserves local authority influence and thelocal authority’s role representing widercommunity interests beyond those of thetenants (Bransbury 2002). While in manyways a useful safeguard, this restricts thedecision-making autonomy of anyCommunity Mutual, so that the benefit ofa co-operative style of management that issuited to member decision-making islimited.

5.4 Board composition5.4.1 The composition of the board isexpected to reflect the ‘three thirds’ modelof representatives, of which a third shouldbe tenant representatives, a third localauthority representatives and a thirdindependent. Such representatives wouldnot be imposed, but would be chosen bythe tenants of the Community Mutual byballot. However, even through such aprocess, the board composition is still atrade-off between the idealised model oftenant-controlled co-operativemanagement and conventional RSL models,that have brought tenants into enhanced


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5. The Community Housing Mutual Model


decision-making roles. As a result, furtheranalysis of how tenants would react to thisboard structure is required before a properjudgement may be made about thepotential of this model to produce realtenant participation in decision making.

5.5 Professional management ofCommunity Mutuals5.5.1 There is a continuing role forprofessionals in the day-to-daymanagement of the housing stock, and assuch some decisions may be madeautonomously by those professionals, withreference to a schedule of delegatedauthority approved by the board. Thisoffers a sensible model for housingmanagement, but could lead to twoimportant issues. First, even though thehousing will be ‘owned’ by the tenants,board and management procedures will notvary significantly from that of an RSL whichhas a tenant participation remit. Therefore,the CHMM may not offer significantlygreater participation for tenants,particularly in everyday management tasks,leading to less impact on communityregeneration initiatives than is seen in someco-operatives. Second, the commitment tolocal neighbourhood management is againlittle different to the kinds of mechanismsthat are possible without the creation of aCommunity Mutual. As a result, while theCHMM may present a slightly moreinvolved form of tenant participation, itmay be possible to create such impactswithout the need to transfer ownership andresponsibility to the community. These willbe crucial questions that will have to beanswered for tenants if the process oftransfer to Community Mutuals is proposedby a local authority.

5.6 The scale of proposed transfer RSLsand Community Mutuals 5.6.1 The evidence outlined in SectionThree from tenant managementorganisations, ownership co-operatives,and resident-controlled housingassociations, comes from organisations thattend to operate at a small scale, typicallyup to 500-1,000 homes, but sometimesmuch smaller. The scale of transfer to acommunity mutual may be much largerthan this; with up to 16-17,000 localauthority-owned houses in a single localauthority area (e.g. Cardiff or Swansea).The scale of Community Mutuals to becreated is therefore considerably largerthan the scale of housing co-operatives.Even the smallest local authority stock ofroughly 2,500 in Ceredigion remains verylarge for a housing co-operative or TMO.

5.6.2 This potential scale of transfercreates problems in terms of therepresentation and accountability of thetenant board members. The ‘directdemocracy’ associated with some of thesmaller-scale organisational modelsconsidered above may have to be replacedwith a more structured form of tenantinvolvement that may not be as effective asthe very direct forms of tenant involvementidentified earlier (Ward and Lupton 1998;Davies and Gidley 1998). It may also limitthe potential of broad scale tenantparticipation and the development of anindividual feeling of influence on thedecision-making process. If this does notoccur, some of the crucial management andcommunity regeneration benefits outlinedin the evidence from Section Four may notbe transferable. Walker (2001) notes thatsuch larger transfers are “unlikely to


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achieve [community regeneration]outcomes, and continue to remain focusedupon core property business unless fundingopportunities are made available toundertake this diversified form of activity”(Walker 2001: 692). One way ofcountering this problem is the creation offederated group structure with smaller,localised organisations under a parentbody. This option has proved moreconvincing for tenants in focus groupsassociated with this study. For them, theprospect of a single stock transfer vehiclewith indirect tenant involvementmechanisms appears no more attractivethan current tenant compacts and othermodels of Local Authority engagementwith tenant groups.

5.7 ‘Top-down’ mutuality?5.7.1 An important difference is evidentbetween the CHMM and the pattern ofresident/tenant involvement in the co-operative and mutual housing movementas a whole. As Clapham et al (1998) notein their study of community-based housingorganisations, “local residents’ groups whowere campaigning to improve their housingconditions and wanted more influence overhousing in their areas” were important(Clapham et al 1998: 31). This essentiallyinvolves a voluntary participation in amovement to achieve these aims, reflectingone of the central principles of the co-operative movement, that of open andvoluntary membership. However, theCHMM in contrast is an externally derivedprocess of participation, which emergesfrom a national policy rather than localmotivation. To use conventionalterminology, most co-operative housingschemes emerge from a ‘bottom up’process in contrast to the ‘top down’nature of the CHMM.

5.7.2 The CHMM supposes a first-stagetransfer which is largely similar to otherLSVTs. This effectively involves theimposition of a co-operative framework(albeit with a tenant vote required tolegitimise the transfer), rather than thisemerging as a local response to perceivedneed. This creates a tension between thenotion of ‘mutuality’ in the CHMM, andthe way it is expressed in more traditionalhousing co-operatives. There may besubsequent problems with the branding ofthe CHMM as a ‘mutual’ model when itsevolution does not reflect this. There mayalso be problems in attracting tenants tothis model in any transfer vote if theyperceive it as effectively an externalimposition, and are unable to distinguish itsmutual characteristics from the standardtransfer option.

5.7.3 However, in drawing comparisonswith other national and internationallybased housing co-operative models, it isthe organisational similarity which offers apotential for comparison and theidentification of the potential advantages ofthe CHMM. However, it should be notedthat the management of the transfer to theCHMM will need to emphasise andconstantly re-iterate its differences fromthe standard transfer model.

5.8 Rural Issues5.8.1 Questions emerge as to theoperation of the CHMM in rural areas inwhich the co-ordination and targeting ofcommunity regeneration activities is morelikely to happen across a number ofcommunities, with differing problems andneeds. This will introduce greatercomplexity in meeting the needs ofindividual communities. There are alsocritical issues involved in the much lower


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densities of local authority housing in ruralareas where the opposite problem to thelarge scale transfer identified earlier mayoccur. Many rural council estates consist ofless than 40 properties and the generalstock may be dispersed over a widegeographical area in counties such asPowys.

5.8.2 This can create key barriers to theimplementation of greater tenantinvolvement and to the development ofcommunity regeneration activities on theback of stock transfer. Transport difficultiesare a simple example of the barriers whichexist in rural communities, and maycritically affect the ability of mutualmembers to attend management meetingsand critical constitutional events such asAGMs. More isolated areas may be able tocircumvent the problems by deployingcommunications technology, although thiswill also require significant investment.

5.9 Capacity issues for theCommunity Housing Mutual Model 5.9.1 To fully replicate the lessons fromother co-operative housing models, there isa need to address the skills of tenants, andtheir willingness to participate inCommunity Mutuals, as well as the supportthey receive from external agencies. Inmany of the models identified above thereis an ‘organic’ growth of skill and capacityas the ‘bottom up’ process extends therange of activity and responsibilityembraced by active members. In contrast,the stock transfer route to a mutualorganisation is immediate and requiresfunctioning tenant members frominception. Consequently, capacitydevelopment actions are a pre-requisite ofthe CHMM implementation. Capacitydevelopment in this context extends farbeyond the narrow definition of capacitybuilding as training courses, to one which

emphasises the needs of tenants to beinformed, confident, and capable to act intheir individual and collective interests, andto influence the decisions made about theirhousing.

5.9.2 Capacity building should offer botha depth and breadth of opportunities toallow the successful participation of tenantswithin the management process of aCommunity Mutual. In terms of depth, thismeans addressing the training needs of theindividuals who have made an activechoice to become part of the decision-making process of a Community Mutual.Such training will allow the participants tounderstand in detail the processes ofmanagement and strategic planning, toensure that they play a full and responsiblerole in the management of a CommunityMutual. This can operate both at the levelof understanding specific duties by anindividual as part of the managementteam, and at a more regulatory level bywhich the tenant member is able tounderstand and hence question the actionstaken by members of staff. In addition,there is a breadth of knowledge that willbe required by the majority of tenants toenable them to make informed decisions astenants within a mutual housingmanagement environment. As well as theformal skills which might be identified thereare wider processes of confidence building,challenging low aspiration in relation tohousing quality and the development ofpeople and team skills which are oftenabsent in low trust and conflictualdisadvantaged areas.

5.9.3 At every stage of any housingtransfer process, there is a need to establishthe specific training needs and theresources associated with that stage. Thisbegins with the appointment of anIndependent Tenant Advisor (ITA) through


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to pre and post-ballot stages and the finaltraining for board members of aCommunity Mutual. Some of these trainingissues will be shared with CommunitiesFirst processes of capacity developmentand, where this is the case, activities toimprove local capacity may be generic orshared across these related policy streams.

5.9.4 The jump from landlord-tenantrelationship to active tenant control is asignificant one. Tenants may have noprevious experience of management, or benaïve when it comes to negotiating skills,yet these are precisely the kinds of skillsthat must be employed on a daily basis iftenant management of co-operatives is tobe successful. This need is recognisedwithin training programmes such as theNational Tenants’ Training Programme(NTTP). The DETR commissionedEvaluation of National Tenants’ TrainingProgramme found that the majority oftenants who had undertaken NTTP trainingfelt that the training was essential andsuggested that it should be delivered on anational basis (DETR 2000).

5.9.5 Recent work by the Consortium forCommunity Regeneration Training (2003)recognises a consensus amongst trainingproviders that community capacity‘learning’ must provide communitymembers with ‘soft’ entry points with a lowlearning threshold. Learning progressionshould involve easily completed stages andstepped progression to higher levels.Fundamentally, learning opportunities mustbe presented within the community. Itshould be noted that the report alsoidentifies a dearth of communityregeneration training opportunities in manyparts of Wales as well as an absence ofnational standards and endorsementprocesses for existing provision. Thesedifficulties are also likely to affect the

development of training for tenants,although it is noted that the WelshAssembly Government is currentlycommissioning the development of a guideand training resource for local authorities touse with their tenants as they movetowards transfer.

5.9.6 As well as training and education,guidance from housing professionals andagencies must be forthcoming to providetechnical assistance to tenants’ groups. Thiswill facilitate the options appraisal processand devolution of decision-making to localareas. The level of professional inputrequired will vary depending on the stageof evolution of a Community Mutual, but itis essential that professional experienceshould only guide, and must be careful notto dominate. Otherwise, communitydependence will merely switch name andformat. Housing professionals willthemselves need to develop their capacityto work in community-sensitive wayswhere their expertise is placed at theservice of the community. There are clearadvantages of long-term professionalinvolvement in management boards andthe partnerships that will emerge tomanage transferred housing stock, and it isessential that the procedures andframeworks in which this occurs aresensitive to community models of servicedelivery.

5.10 Capacity building for tenantparticipation and communityregeneration5.10.1 The vision of a Community Mutualis of a housing provider that develops intoa process of, or structure for, communityregeneration. However, achievement ofthe maximum community regenerationbenefits will require the active participationof tenants in a wide range of housingmanagement and community regeneration


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activities. Such activities are dependent ona set of skills that may be lacking withinthe tenant and resident population. Socialhousing has to some extent beenresidualised in Wales, with those whoremain in social housing disproportionatelyrepresented by unemployed people, olderpeople and lone parents. The result,therefore, is that social housing tends tohouse significant numbers of people whoare educationally disadvantaged andsocially excluded, and who may lack theskills or confidence to participate fully inthe decision-making process of a co-operative or tenant-controlled housingorganisation or associated communityregeneration activities. Moreover, therelative transience of the tenant populationin such areas means that individuals withthe skills to take an active role incommunity regeneration may be residentonly long enough to make a short termcontribution. As a result, the basic buildingblocks of community regeneration andtenant participation are often lacking inhighly disadvantaged and marginalisedcommunities.

5.10.2 Despite these observations it is alsotrue to say that communities often possessconsiderable pools of skills, although oftennot expressed as formal qualifications orcompetencies. Harnessing these latent skillsis one key element of a communityregeneration process, and presents a clearrole for the Community Mutual to developmotivated communities which can helprenew neighbourhoods in a broad andeffective manner (Baker 2002; SEU 1998).

5.10.3 Two further features of capacitybuilding are key to achieving the potentialbenefits of the CHMM: participation, andrelated to this, empowerment.

5.10.4 The participation of individualswithin a community is vital to anycommunity regeneration and tenantmanagement process. It may be possible tophysically improve a locality, but it isunrealistic to expect that communities cangrow socially and economically withoutengaging the community directly.Engagement of community members is thecentral challenge of any communitycentred approach. History of powerlessnessand the social experience of exclusionmilitate against community involvement.There may be a simple disbelief that thingscan be changed. Overcoming suchattitudes requires skilled intervention bycommunity regeneration teams and theprovision of some factual evidence thatthings can change. In Communities Firstareas in Wales, such actions will be in placewithin the next year as Community ActionPlans are delivered. Clearly, anyCommunity Mutuals delivered in suchcommunities will benefit from thisapproach to tenant and residentparticipation.

5.10.5 In involving communities it is alsoessential that everyone in that communitybe engaged. Often, the wider ‘community’is reached through the action of a smallgroup of residents. If this small group iseffective and truly interested in theregeneration of the wider community, thenthere is no reason why they cannot initiatea process of education and empowermentwith the help of wider support networks.However, there is a risk that within anygiven community some members may beoverlooked as others are targetedspecifically. It is widely recognised incommunity regeneration literature thatthere are ‘hard to reach’ groups in anycommunity, and that minority and


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unrepresentative groups can dominate theregeneration process (Adamson et al,2001). There is also a particular risk of notengaging black and minority ethnic groupsin a community.

5.10.6 A key to encouraging communitiesto become involved is to promotecommunity responsibility. Once acommunity realises that it has the power tochange its future directly, it is more likely toinvolve itself in the running of thatcommunity. This is empowerment. Theissues involved in a discussion about theconcept of empowerment are beyond thescope of this study, but involve providingresidents with opportunities to makedecisions, allocate resources and effectchange. This can be achieved directly byresident participation on managementboards and partnership committees, or lessdirectly through community visioningevents, and participatory consultation(Adamson et al 2001). As Right-To-Buyempowered people to take the necessarysteps to buy their homes, so co-operativesand Right-to-Manage (such as the right tomanage under section 16) can empowerpeople to engage with the management oftheir housing in order to improve it. Usingideas from human rights has anempowering effect and as such it may beworth considering using this tool in thefuture. This notion of key social andpolitical rights has received increasingattention in the wake of the adoption ofthe 1998 Human Rights Act. A rights

discourse is informing communityperceptions of their entitlement to qualityhousing. Such discussions may in the futurebe an important component of theempowerment equation.

5.10.7 The discussion of capacitydevelopment suggests the CHMM cannotbe implemented overnight, and thatsignificant lead in times will be necessary tosecure the community involvement and therequired levels of community capacity.There are significant areas of work to beundertaken, particularly in the field ofpreparing the relevant communities for thetask of taking ownership of decision-making processes. While there are specificcapacity building requirements for theCHMM, most aspects of capacity buildingare applicable to all forms of skillsdevelopment for tenant participation inhousing. Capacity building should thereforenot be confined to promoting skills for theCHMM option. Broader attempts should bemade to generate tenant and residentinvolvement in housing issues and othercommunity regeneration-related activities.Efforts to build capacity and tenantempowerment into the everyday workingsof all social housing providers should becontinued, both through incentives toundertake this, and through regulatoryrequirements. Alongside this, it is importantto acknowledge that, even if a capacitybuilding exercise does not produce tenantmanagement, it is not a wasted process.


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6.1.1 This report has examined thepotential for the CHMM to offer botheffective tenant management, and topromote community regeneration in Welshcommunities. Section Two of the reportoutlined the policy context in which theCHMM is being considered as a possiblemechanism for housing stock transfer. TheWelsh Assembly Government hascommitted itself to achieving the WHQS by2012, despite the council housing stock inWales suffering from a £3bn repairsshortfall. To address this, the options ofPrudential Borrowing, ALMOs and PFIwere outlined as possible mechanisms ofhousing investment. However, the scale ofresource input needed in many localauthorities in Wales is large enough torequire investment subsidised by privateborrowing. This has brought stock transfer(LSVT) onto the agenda, and one particularmechanism outlined by the WelshAssembly Government in the CommunityHousing Mutual Model.

6.1.2 In order to assess the potential ofthe CHMM, Section Three examinedmodels of social housing including TenantManagement organisations (TMOs),Ownership housing co-operatives, andResident-Controlled Housing Associations(RCHAs). The evidence presented suggeststhat these housing management modelshave a record comparable or better thanlocal authorities and housing associations.This has been attributed to four keyfactors:

• Greater involvement of residents in themanagement of the housing stock;

• Improved accountability andinformation flows, including improvedrepair services;

• Continuing capacity developmentopportunities for tenants and residents;

• A sense of community and a desire toimprove the condition of the stockthrough common ownership.

Section Four outlined the communityregeneration prospects of the three broadmanagement options for social housing -council housing, housing associations andco-operatives. This concluded thatcommunity regeneration is more likely tohappen as a matter of course in a co-operative or other management optionwhere tenants feel empowered and havean influence over the decision-makingprocesses concerned with their housing.The results concur with the argument thatthe co-operative housing model “is themost effective in tackling the underlyingcauses of urban decline” (Baker 2002: 3).

6.1.3 Section Five located the conclusionsderived from Sections Two to Four in adiscussion of the Community HousingMutual Model. This discussion identifiedthe similarities and contrasts between theCommunity Housing Mutual Model andthe other housing models identified. In thisconcluding section, the implications of theanalysis presented are developed as a seriesof issues and themes, whichimplementation of the CHMM will have toaddress. The principal issues are identifiedas:


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6. Concluding Comments and Policy Considerations


• The design and function of the CHMMrule set;

• The social context of the model;

• The policy and funding context of themodel.

6.1.4 These issues will now be examinedin detail to provide a series ofconsiderations for the Welsh AssemblyGovernment and other organisationsengaged in the implementation of theCHMM. A number of subsidiary issues canbe identified in relation to the design andfunction of the CHMM

6.2 Scale and the CommunityGateway Model6.2.1 The first of these relates to thescale at which the CHMM will operate.Under current proposals, the initial stocktransfer to Community Mutuals will be farlarger than the typical UK co-operativehousing models explored in earlier sectionsof this report. This introduces risk that themodel will be initially less responsive to theneeds of the tenants, less accountable totenants, and less effective in ensuringparticipation. The scale may also challengethe community regeneration potential ofthe model.

6.2.2 The CHMM addresses this risk byallowing a further devolution ofmanagement functions to local groups,each managing smaller ‘communities’ ofhousing. It is suggested here that thislocalised approach to participation in theCHMM will be an essential ingredient to itssuccess. Early indications from tenantgroups suggest that failure to localise theCHMM will present a major barrier tocommunity engagement, even incommunities with very active communityand tenant organisations.

6.2.3 However, there is little explicitdetail in the CHMM of how thislocalisation might be achieved. Althoughthere is an obligation to establish a tenantempowerment strategy, there is a need tofurther detail the routine systems of tenantconsultation, tenant participation andgeneral mechanisms for identifyingcollective community objectives. Forexample, The CHMM model rule set(Cobbetts Solicitors, 2002) currently statesthat a ‘body of opinion’ could initiatemanagement change within theCommunity Mutual. This notion of a ‘bodyof opinion’ requires further ‘constitutional’definition. Moreover, there should be legalsafeguards to ensure that such a ‘body ofopinion’ does not represent narrow,sectoral interests that may be divisive. Thisshould include guidance on the integrationof established black and minority ethnicpolicy introduced by the Welsh AssemblyGovernment, to ensure equal and openaccess to housing within the community.

6.2.4 In contrast, the CommunityGateway Model (CIH 2003) outlines atenant empowerment strategy and ongoingoptions appraisal process. This supports thenotion that communities, which should beas far as possible self-defined, should beable to determine their own housingownership and management choices. TheCommunity Gateway Model seeks tocreate a continuing, ongoing process ofinformation dissemination and optionsappraisals by the neighbourhood orcommunity in question. This understandingthen allows for the full range of optionsfrom RSL control through to full localmanagement groups operating under theauspices of the original ‘gateway’association. This offers the mostappropriate course of action to generatethe benefits of co-operatives as outlined inthe literature reviewed in this report. The


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CHMM may benefit from this moreproactive approach and it is suggested herethat a ‘gateway’ approach will significantlycontribute to the achievement of both thehousing and the community regenerationobjectives of the CHMM.

6.3 The Model Rules for theCommunity Housing Mutual Model6.3.1 The CHMM rule set as it stands isunable to guard against significantproblems that may occur from theimplementation of Community Mutuals.Several issues stand out, which are outlinedin the following paragraphs.

6.3.2 Review of mutual status: Shouldthere, for whatever reason, be a problemwith the functioning or financial stability ofa local Community Mutual, there is no fall-back position evident to allow transfer ofcontrol to a statutory agency, a transferRSL or to a different form of RSL. Thissituation requires consideration by theWelsh Assembly Government to ensurethat safeguards are provided.

6.3.3 The devolution of powers to localCommunity Mutuals: There needs to beconsideration of the mechanism throughwhich devolution to local groups will occur.Using existing community regenerationgroups as the organisational framework fordevolved mutual management may raiseissues of accountability and representationin that it cannot be guaranteed that suchorganisations wholly represent communityinterests and sections within thecommunity. Two further points emergehere:

• A process of validation of any localorganisation should be provided toensure that it conforms to theobjectives of the CHMM and is able todeliver the management of the

Housing Mutual and the effectivecommunity participation andrepresentation required.

• While localised housing managementgroups may be formed under theauspices of the wider CommunityMutual, their relationship with the‘parent’ organisation should becarefully defined to ensureaccountability at both ends of themanagement chain.

6.3.4 Membership of CommunityMutuals: There is a further need to defineand formalise the membership rules of theCHMM. For example, whether jointtenants should be considered as jointmembers. Membership rights of othermembers of that household are alsocurrently undefined, as are the membershiprights of local homeowners who haveexercised the Right to Buy. Membership bycorporate bodies also requires furtherelaboration in that there is a need toaddress tenant concerns that these bodieswill be operating in their own corporate orprivate interests.

6.3.5 Complaints procedure: There is aneed to ensure that a proper complaintsprocedure is implemented, to providetenants with continued rights andprotection from unreasonable treatment.

6.3.6 Training for board membership:There is a need to ensure balance betweenthe requirement of board members to beproperly trained, and the notion of equaland open membership of boards.Therefore, the requirement to produce awritten statement outlining suitability forboard membership before election (article54) ought to be reconsidered in case it actsas a deterrent. If not, help must beforthcoming to produce this written


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statement. Similarly, the potential formisinterpretation of article 55.6 into arequirement of tenants to have hadtraining before standing for election mustbe addressed, otherwise this may act as adeterrent or disqualification for standing.

6.3.7 Election of board members: Theelection of tenant board members every 3years may be problematic, as it may be thecase that there are not enough peoplewishing to be (re)elected. As such, the‘election’ process may be meaningless andwasteful and be presented as a routineelement of general meetings. There mustbe a clear rule set to ensure adequatedissemination of nomination and electioninformation so that as wide a number ofpotential candidates are courted.

6.3.8 Potential for decisions to betaken by tenant majorities: The CHMMrule set limits the potential of tenantcontrol of the key decision-making process,by stating that no resolution can be passedby a majority of tenant board members.Consequently, the power of tenants islimited by the board structure and this maycreate tension where there is a differenceof opinion between board representatives.If tenants feel that their interests are notbeing addressed, it may impact on the levelof participation on the Community MutualBoard and the level of participation in anycommunity regeneration initiativesassociated with the Community Mutual.

6.3.9 Tenant empowerment strategy:The CHMM obliges a Community Mutualto have a tenant empowerment strategy.However, little detail is given on how thisprocess may occur. This may lead todiversity in the quality and scope of thesestrategies. The tenant empowermentstrategy could be crucial in determininghow thoroughly and how far devolution to

local areas could be carried out under theCHMM. The current rule set presentsmanagement devolution as a reactiveprocess to a ‘body of opinion’ rather thanone that is pro-actively pursued by aCommunity Mutual. Therefore, it would bebeneficial to incorporate guidance as to theformat of a tenant empowerment strategyinto the CHMM rule set. Alternatively thiscould be regulated by the Welsh AssemblyGovernment.

6.3.10 The CHMM rule set provides asignificant degree of flexibility in the way itoperates to help develop locallyappropriate policies. However, thisflexibility could, in some cases, lead toproblems where the rules are interpreted inways which do not maximise the benefitsfor tenants. There may also be problemswhere tenants, prior to transfer, wantdetailed guarantees as to how theCommunity Mutual will operate. Thereforethere is a need to either address theseconcerns within the rule set itself or toensure greater regulatory control over thequality of locally determined outcomes.

6.4 The social context of the Model 6.4.1 The discussion of the capacitybuilding requirements in Section Five of thisreport suggests that there is a need todevelop community capacity and interestbefore the CHMM can be brought intooperation. As outlined, this process ofcapacity building should consider bothcapacity building for the management ofhousing, and for tenant participation incommunity regeneration activities.

6.4.2 To fully integrate this capacitybuilding process with the implementationprocess of the CHMM, it is essential thatthe level of education is front-loadedwithin the transfer process to ensure thatthis is an integral part of the creation of a


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community mutual. This will encouragebroader recognition of the issues and hencegreater community involvement in theprocess of implementing the CHMM. Inthis way both the breadth and depth ofknowledge and skills can be addressed toensure that the creation of localCommunity Mutuals is able to replicate asclosely as possible the benefits of co-operatives as outlined in Section Three.

6.4.3 Many (if not the majority) ofcommunities are not ready to take onmanagement control of their housing.Focus groups with communityorganisations in two highly activecommunities have revealed significantapprehension on the part of tenants andcommunity members about theimplications of them adopting the CHMM.As a result, a wider process of capacitybuilding for all tenants and residents, whichmay or may not be directly related to agoal of creating a community mutual,should be implemented. The CommunitiesFirst programme may be a suitable vehiclefor these generic capacity buildingactivities. Without such preparatory actionsit is difficult to envisage communities beingpersuaded to follow the CHMM option intheir stock transfer choice.

6.4.4 There is also scope for CommunityMutuals to link with Communities First andits community regeneration activities.However, if such a synthesis of housingand community regeneration is to occur tothe greatest benefit in Wales, there is aneed to discuss how each programme willfit together as part of one holistic, joined-up housing and regeneration programme.The assessment of the Communities Firstliterature suggests that there is significantscope for Communities First to be the keyvehicle for any community regeneration

activities that emerge from the tenantinvolvement within a Community Mutual.

6.4.5 In some cases, there may never besuitable levels of capacity and skills tofacilitate a successful second-stagedevolution of power in a CommunityMutual. Therefore there is the need toensure that the tenants are satisfied with asituation in which an independentcommunity mutual is the end product ofthe transfer process. This may be donethrough an ongoing process of optionsappraisal for tenants.

6.4.6 The Communities First programmeand other community regenerationprogrammes should be able to supportareas that are seeking to devolvemanagement control. However, theseprogrammes should also continue to fullysupport, and even focus efforts on thoseareas which seem less likely to movedirectly towards devolution of control,indicating a need for even furthercommunity regeneration activity.

6.5 The policy and funding context ofthe Model6.5.1 There are far wider policyobjectives, particularly those related to tax,benefits and public services, which oughtto be reviewed at the UK level to addressthe wider policy context for the CHMM.In particular, issues of poverty and socialexclusion require vital macro levelinterventions in the tax and benefitsystems. These are beyond the scope ofthis review, and in many cases the policyremit of the Welsh Assembly Government.However, it should be recognised thatthese structural opportunities andconstraints on the economic and socialwellbeing of neighbourhoods may dwarfthe impact of a change of housing tenure.


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6.5.2 Within the remit of the WelshAssembly Government, there is a need tointegrate far more closely thedevelopments in the CHMM, and broadercommunity regeneration and communityregeneration programmes. This may bedone effectively at the all-Wales level withthe Communities First programmes and itsobjectives.

6.5.3 Housing renewal has been seen asa key potential driver for communityregeneration and the creation of moresustainable communities. However, housingproviders should not be given theresponsibility for community regenerationwithout funding and political support;previously existing regeneration policiesshould also be able to fit into this housing-centric policy. Most importantly, thispotential shift in policy towards RSLs andCommunity Mutuals as a driver forcommunity regeneration, albeit withsignificant gaps and some duplication, leadsto questions of whether new and existingRSLs and Community Mutuals are readyand have the capacity and skills to meetthis responsibility.

6.5.4 The co-ordination of housingrenewal and community regenerationhinges on the scale at which stock transferand community regeneration activities takeplace. Community Mutuals, if created,would have to mesh with the alreadyexisting community regeneration strategies.Communities First operates mostly at theward-level, with some sub-ward pocketsand non-geographical communities ofinterest. However, Community Mutualsmay be operating at a far wider scale thanthis. Therefore, some key issues must beaddressed:

• support agency scales: the scale atwhich support agencies operate, and

their flexibility to be able to supportboth small and large scale mutualhousing organisations;

• funding scales: the scale at whichfunding is made available (sub-ward tolocal authority-scale and above), andwhether these scales are appropriate tofund the community regenerationactivities of mutual housingorganisations;

• funding mechanisms: the mechanismsof application for funding and theaccountability criteria - are thesesuitable to allow access from bothlarge and small-scale mutual housingorganisations?

• strategic funding aims: whetherhousing-related communityregeneration activities fit within thestrategy of the funding partner.

6.5.5 To fully benefit the communitieswhere Community Mutuals operate,private finance that is brought in throughborrowing must be additional in twosenses:

• it should not replace sources offunding which come from centralgovernment and would be usedotherwise;

• local authorities should ensure theymaintain their statutory duties ofservice delivery and communityregeneration in all areas.

6.5.6 The new transfer CommunityMutuals and devolved management groupsmust be fully integrated with existingbudgetary streams and communityregeneration strategies. There is significantpotential for the Community Mutuals to


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work with the Communities Firstprogramme through its ward and sub-wardtargeting.

6.6 Concluding Comments6.6.1 The Welsh Assembly Governmentand other policy makers should not put toomuch emphasis on Community Mutuals asa panacea to the problems of housing andcommunity regeneration in Wales. Themodel may be part of the solution, but it isjust that: one part of the jigsaw thatincludes statutory and local authorityactivities being carried out efficiently andequitably, central government tax andredistributive social policies and housingpolicies. While the Welsh AssemblyGovernment may be taking a step in theright direction by bringing housing firmlyonto the community regeneration agenda,and vice versa, this move is still within abroader policy context that needs to beaddressed.

6.6.2 There is a potential problem in theway social housing is regarded by the UKand Welsh Assembly Governments, as wellas by tenants and the broader population.Housing ownership has increasinglybecome an aspiration for tenants, as shownby the level of right-to buy completionssince 1980. At the same time, socialhousing has evolved from a housing choicefor a significant number of people across arange of social and economic circumstancesto housing of ‘last resort’. When peoplehave been adequately resettled orcircumstances improve, there is a generalassumption that they will move into homeownership or the private market. As such,the social housing sector has a challenge toconvince its tenants that social housing is agenuine housing choice for a wide numberof tenants.

6.6.3 To create this change, there is aneed for political backing to establish theconditions where those who are tenantscan cherish social housing. Without thisthere could be a continuation of the‘escalator’ approach to social housingwhereby “many…housing policiesencouraged those who had improved theirlot to move out of social housing estatesrather than remaining there as stakeholdersand act as role models for those stillstruggling” (Evans 1998: 723).. Wheresuch outward flows emerge, the hoped-forbenefits of the CHMM will not accrue. TheCHMM seeks to create stable communities,and a reduced turnover is both afacilitating process and a desired outcomefrom the mutual model. This requiressignificant support to assist the ongoingcommunity regeneration process topromote population stability.

6.6.4 Involving tenants and residents inlocal issues, including housing, is a crucialelement in community regeneration. Thistherefore provides a compelling reason forthe Welsh Assembly Government to offerthe CHMM programme to local authoritiesand to provide support. It enables theWelsh Assembly Government to furtherpromote one of its core policy activities.The evidence has shown that co-operativesare able to create tenant participation andsustain this reasonably well in the mediumterm. If the CHMM is to achieve thesetenant participation and communityregeneration outcomes, continued researchinto the pilot schemes set up under theCommunity Gateway Model will offersome insight into how this may beachieved most effectively.


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GLOSSARY

Some key terms are used in the report. For clarity, the distinction between similar terms isoutlined here. The report seeks to use as few technical terms as possible.

Housing Association refers to an independent, not-for-profit organisation run on avoluntary basis in order to provide homes for those in need. The 1996 Housing Act widenedthe scope of organisations able to claim state funding and created the term Registered SocialLandlord (RSL) of which housing associations became just one category, albeit the mostnumerous (Malpass 1999). This report will refer to both housing associations and RSLswhere appropriate.

Social housing is used within the report to refer to all council and RSL-provided housing.

The Community Housing Mutual Model (CHMM) refers to a stock transfer optionfacilitated and developed by the Welsh Assembly Government. The option has developedfrom initial work by Mutuo (2001), which also led to the parallel creation of the CommunityGateway Model in England (CIH 2003). The CHMM is based on a co-operative ownershipmodel and legal framework, although it offers a hybrid which retains many of themanagement features of more traditional RSLs.

Community regeneration refers to a process of revitalisation of the economic, social andenvironmental conditions of a community. ‘Community’ in this sense normally, though notexclusively, refers to a geographical concept. Community regeneration is used in preferenceto community development, which refers more accurately to the social and economicdevelopment of a community, with less emphasis on physical regeneration.


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KEY INTERVIEWEES

A number of interviews were carried out in the process of compiling this report. Theinterviews were conducted in order to add further depth to the review of literatures,indications of further reading to be carried out, and to indicate further avenues for theresearch.

The key interviewees included:

Name Organisation

Susan Crookston Blairtummock Housing Association, Glasgow.

Archie Thomson Chairperson, Cordale Housing Association

Keith Edwards CIH Cymru

Rita Stenhouse Communities Scotland

Dewi Llwyd Evans Community Projects Manager Cymdeithas Tai Eryri

Nic Bliss Confederation of Co-operative Housing

Stephen Gibson Director, Cordale Housing Association

Walis George Director, Cymdeithas Tai Eryri

Ashley Williams Glyntaf Estate Resident

Barbara Castle Independent Consultant

Eilidh Jones Independent Consultant

David Tomlinson Powys County Council

Peter Deacon Preston City Council ‘Gateway’ Pilot Initiative

Jonathan Morris Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council

Michael Clarke Rosehill Housing Co-operative, Glasgow

Gerlayn Lewis Scottish Federation of Housing Associations

Arnold Phillips Swansea City and County Council


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David Evans Swansea City and County Council

Greg Brown Tenants Information Service, Glasgow

Carol Kay TPAS Cymru

Professor David Clapham University of Cardiff

Dr Joyce Liddle University of Durham

Dr Keith Kintrea University of Glasgow, Urban Studies Department

Douglas Robertson University of Stirling

Mary Taylor University of Stirling

Howard John Welsh Federation of Housing Associations


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