housing finance at a glance · size of the us residential mortgage market 6 private label...
TRANSCRIPT
June 2018
1
A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER
HOUSING FINANCEAT A GLANCE
ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK
The Housing Finance Policy Center’s (HFPC) mission is to
produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public policy, efficient markets, and access to economic opportunity in the area of housing finance. At A Glance, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, academics, journalists, and others interested in the government’s role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of this mission.
We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to [email protected].
To receive regular updates from the Housing Finance Policy Center, please visit here to sign up for our bi-weekly newsletter.
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER STAFF
Laurie GoodmanCenter Vice President
Alanna McCargoCenter Vice President
Edward GoldingSenior Fellow
Jim ParrottSenior Fellow
Sheryl PardoAssociate Director of Communications
Todd Hill Policy Program Manager
Jun ZhuSenior Research Associate
Bing BaiResearch Associate
Karan KaulResearch Associate
Jung ChoiResearch Associate
Bhargavi GaneshResearch Analyst
Sarah StrochakResearch Assistant
Andrea Reyes
Project Manager
CONTENTSOverview
Market Size OverviewValue of the U S Residential Housing Market 6Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market 6Private Label Securities 7Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities 7
Origination Volume and Composition First Lien Origination Volume & Share 8
Mortgage Origination Product TypeComposition (All Originations & Purchase Originations Only) 9
Securitization Volume and CompositionAgency/Non-Agency Share of Residen tial MBS Issuance 10
Non-Agency MBS Issuance 10Non-Agency Securitization 10
Agency Activity: Volumes and Purchase/Refi CompositionAgency Gross Issuance 11 Percent Refi at Issuance 11
Non-bank Origination ShareNonbank Origination Share: All Loans 12Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans 12Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans 12
Non-bank Credit BoxAgency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank 13GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank 13Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank 13GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank 14Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank 14GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank 14Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank 14
State of the Market
Mortgage Origination ProjectionsTotal Originations and Refinance Shares 15Housing Starts and Home Sales 15
Credit Availability and Originator ProfitabilityHousing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) 16
Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC) 16
Credit Availability for Purchase LoansBorrower FICO Score at Origination Month 17Combined LTV at Origination Month 17Origination FICO and LTV by MSA 18
CONTENTS
Housing Affordability National Housing Affordability Over Time 19Affordability Adjuste d for MS A-Level DTI 19
First-Time HomebuyersFirst-Ti me Homebuyer Sha re 20Comparison of Fi rst-time and Repeat Homebuye rs, GS E and FHA O riginations 20
Home Price IndicesNational Year-Over-Year HP I Growth 21Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MS As 21
Negative Equity & Serious Delinque ncyNegative Equity S hare 22
Loans in Serious Delinquency 22
Modifications and LiquidationsLoan Modifications and Liquidations (By Year & Cumulative) 23
GSEs under Conservatorship
GSE Portfolio Wind-DownFannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investme nt Portfolio 24
Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment P ortfolio 24
Effective Guarantee Fees & GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions Effective Guarantee Fees 25Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustme nt 25
GSE Risk-S haring Transactions and S preads 26-27
Serious Delinquency RatesSerious Delinque ncy Rates – Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 28
Serious Delinque ncy Rates – Single-Family Loans & Multifamily GSE L oans 29
Agency Issuance
Agency Gross and Net IssuanceAgency Gross Issuance 30
Agency Net Iss uance 30
Agency Gross Issuance & Fed PurchasesMonthly Gross Iss uance 31
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance 31
Mortgage Insurance ActivityMI Activity & Market Sha re 32
FHA MI Pre miums for Typical Purchase Loan 33
Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs . PMI 33
Related HFPC Work
Publications and Eve nts 34
INTRODUCTIONThe increase in first time homebuyers is likely to continue
The top chart on page 20 shows the first-time homebuyer (FTHB) share for purchase mortgages backed by the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The FTHB share has trended higher post-recession for both channels. For FHA, the FTHB share has historically hovered around 80 percent. It bottomed out at around 75 during the recession but has slowly crept up to nearly 83 percent today. The GSE FTHB share was much lower than FHA’s historically – about 25 percent during the early 2000s; it increased to about 40 percent during the housing bubble. After falling slightly during the recession, the GSE FTHB share has been on a sustained upswing since 2013, just shy of 50 percent today. The combined FTHB rate for FHA and GSE purchase mortgages is 60 percent, about 20 percentage points above the 40 percent pre-crisis average.
FTHB rate has increased post-crisis in part because improvements in the economy have allowed more FTHBs to enter the market. But a big chunk of the increase in the FTHB share is driven by pullback of repeat buyers from the market.
Between 2001 and 2007, repeat buyers accounted for anywhere from 1.4 to 1.8 million home purchases per year, while FTHBs drove anywhere from 900K to 1.3 million in annual home sales. Today the two have traded places – in 2017 repeat buyers were responsible for just over a million home purchases
while FTHBs bought close to 1.5 million homes. What caused this shift? Falling house prices during the recession deprived millions of homeowners from accumulating equity, which had historically provided the funds required to upgrade. However, as house prices have appreciated in recent years and homeowners have accumulated equity, will we finally see repeat buying activity rise to historical levels?
Likely not. Although homeowners have more equity today, most of them also have ultra-low rate mortgages they locked-in during the recession, when rates were persistently low, well below 4 percent, for an extended period of time (page 11). Today, mortgage rates are well above 4.6 percent according to Freddie Mac. If a homeowner with a rate of 3.5 percent were to trade up, they would need to get a new mortgage at the prevailing market rate. At these rates, an illustrative repeat homebuyer who funded the upgrade solely by monetizing their equity (without taking on additional debt) would pay several hundred dollars extra every month because of the higher rate. On a $300,000 mortgage, they would be paying $200 extra every month, or $2400 a year. Because homebuyers typically take on additional debt when they upgrade, the actual increase in the mortgage payment would be much bigger. Plus, the more rates rise in the coming years, the bigger the rate difference will become and the more interest trade up buyers will have to shell out. Surely, many homebuyers will find it much more economical to simply stay in their existing homes. This would continue to dampen repeat buying volumes and keep pushing the FTHB share higher.
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
• The total value of the US housing market continued to rise in Q1 2018, driven by a $538 billion increase in household equity over the last quarter (page 6).
• Originator profitability measure declined to new post-crisis low in May 2018 as rates went up (page 16).
• The first-time homebuyer share of GSE purchase loans reached the highest level in recent history in March 2018 (page 20).
• Both modifications and liquidations continued to slow down in Q1, 2018; there are no new HAMP modifications, as the program expired at the end of 2017 (page 23).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
1,800,000
2,000,000
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
First-time homebuyersRepeat homebuyersFTHB share
Source: eMBS, FHA, and Urban Institute.
6
MARKET SIZE OVERVIEWThe Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds report has consistently indicated an increasing total value of the housing market driven by growing household equity since 2012, and 2018 Q1 was no different. While total debt and mortgages was stable at $10.6 trillion, household equity reached a new high of $15.7 trillion, bringing the total value of the housing market to $26.4 trillion, 10 percent higher than the pre-crisis peak in 2006. Agency MBS make up 59.3 percent of the total mortgage market, private-label securities make up 4.9 percent, and unsecuritized first liens at the GSEs, commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions make up 30.1 percent. Second liens comprise the remaining 5.7 percent of the total.
OVERVIEW
Debt,household
mortgages,$9,833
$6.43
$3.20
$0.56
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
($ trillions)
Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market
Agency MBS Unsecuritized first liens Private Label Securities Second Liens
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Inside Mortgage Finance, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac , eMBS and Urban Institute. Last updated June 2018. Note: Unsecuritized first liens includes loans held by commercial banks, GSEs, savings institutions, and credit unions.
$10.6
$15.7
$26.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
($ trillions)Debt, household mortgages Household equity Total value
Value of the US Housing Market
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. Last updated June 2018.
$0.46
7
MARKET SIZE OVERVIEWOVERVIEW
As of April 2018, debt in the private-label securitization market totaled $487 billion and was split among prime (18.8 percent), Alt-A (37.0 percent), and subprime (44.3 percent) loans. In May 2018, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled $6.47 trillion and were 43.6 percent Fannie Mae, 27.4 percent Freddie Mac, and 29.1 percent Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae has had more outstanding securities than Freddie Mac since May 2016.
0.220.18
0.09
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
($ trillions)
Private-Label Securities by Product Type
Alt-A Subprime Prime
Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute. April 2018
2.8
1.8
1.9
6.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
($ trillions)Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Total
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.May 2018
8
OVERVIEW
ORIGINATION VOLUMEAND COMPOSITION
$0.176
$0.004$0.087
$0.113
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
$1.5
$2.0
$2.5
$3.0
$3.5
$4.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
($ trillions)
First Lien Origination Volume
GSE securitization FHA/VA securitization PLS securitization Portfolio
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated June 2018.
First lien originations totaled $380 billion in Q1 2018, down 16 percent from the first quarter of 2017, mostly due to high interest rates. The portfolio originations share was 28 percent, the GSE share was around 46 percent, and the FHA/VA share was around 23 percent, all consistent with 2017 shares. Origination of private -label securities was under just over 1 percent, slightly higher than the 2017 share.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated June 2018.
(Share, percent)
29.7%
1.1%
22.9%
46.3%
9
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PRODUCT
TYPEAdjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for as much as 42 percent of all new originations during the peak of the 2005 housing bubble (top chart). The ARMs fell to an historic low of 1 percent in 2009, and then slowly grew to a high of 6 percent in April 2014. Since then, ARMs have begun to decline again to 2.4 percent in March 2018. The 15-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM), predominantly a refinance product, accounted for 14.1 percent of new originations in March 2018. If we exclude refinances (bottom chart), the share of 30-year FRMs in February 2018 stood at 91.1 percent, 15-year FRMs at 5.2 percent, and ARMs at 2.0 percent.
OVERVIEW
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PRODUCT TYPE
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
All Originations
Fixed-rate 30-year mortgage Fixed-rate 15-year mortgage Adjustable-rate mortgage Other
Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Purchase Loans OnlyFixed-rate 30-year mortgage Fixed-rate 15-year mortgage Adjustable-rate mortgage Other
Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute. March 2018
March 2018
10
SECURITIZATION VOLUME AND COMPOSITION
OVERVIEW
$-
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Q1
($ billions) Re-REMICs and other
Scratch and dentAlt ASubprimePrime
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
Non-Agency MBS Issuance
$1.51$3.11$1.89$0.89$4.23
96.04%
3.96%0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
YT
D
Agency share Non-Agency share
Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance
The non-agency share of mortgage securitizations in the first five months of 2018 was 3.96 percent, slightly above the 3.4 percent share in 2017. The non-agency securitization volume totaled $11.62 billion in the first quarter of 2018, only a 2 percent increase over the same period in 2017, but there is a change in the mix. The non-performing and re-performing (scratch and dent) deals dropped 48 percent compared to a year ago, while the prime securitizations surged 80 percent year over year. Non-agency securitizations continue to be tiny compared to pre-crisis levels.
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.Note: Based on data from May 2018.
4.44
$0
$2
$4
$6
$8
$10
$12
$14
May
-13
Au
g-1
3N
ov-
13
Feb
-14
May
-14
Au
g-1
4N
ov-
14
Feb
-15
May
-15
Au
g-1
5N
ov-
15
Feb
-16
May
-16
Au
g-1
6N
ov-
16
Feb
-17
May
-17
Au
g-1
7N
ov-
17
Feb
-18
May
-18
($ billions)
Monthly Non-Agency Securitization
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
$0
11
AGENCY ACTIVITY: VOLUMES AND PURCHASE/REFI COMPOSITION
Agency issuance totaled $478.8 billion in the first five months of 2018, $1.149 trillion on an annualized basis. This is down about 9.0 percent from the first five months of 2017. In May 2018, the refinance share continued to decline for all three agencies. This is a result of increasing interest rates and the spring uptick in purchase activity. Loans sold into GSE pools in May are based on March and April home sales.
OVERVIEW
$0.48
$0.28
$0.39
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Ann.
($ trillions)
Agency Gross Issuance
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Annualized figure based on data from May 2018.Note: Annualized figure based on data from November 2017.
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
May
-04
No
v-0
4
May
-05
No
v-0
5
May
-06
No
v-0
6
May
-07
No
v-0
7
May
-08
No
v-0
8
May
-09
No
v-0
9
May
-10
No
v-1
0
May
-11
No
v-1
1
May
-12
No
v-1
2
May
-13
No
v-1
3
May
-14
No
v-1
4
May
-15
No
v-1
5
May
-16
No
v-1
6
May
-17
No
v-1
7
May
-18
Percent Refi at IssuanceFreddie Mac Fannie Mae Ginnie Mae Mortgage rate
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Figure based on data from May 2018.
Mortgage ratePercent refi
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
64%
55%59%
79%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Jan
-13
Ma
r-1
3
Ma
y-1
3
Jul-
13
Se
p-1
3
No
v-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
r-1
4
Ma
y-1
4
Jul-
14
Se
p-1
4
No
v-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
r-1
5
Ma
y-1
5
Jul-
15
Se
p-1
5
No
v-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
r-1
6
Ma
y-1
6
Jul-
16
Se
p-1
6
No
v-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
r-1
7
Ma
y-1
7
Jul-
17
Se
p-1
7
No
v-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
r-1
8
Ma
y-1
8
Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans
All Fannie Freddie Ginnie
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Jan
-13
Ma
y-1
3
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Fannie Freddie Ginnie
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Jan
-13
Ma
y-1
3
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Fannie Freddie Ginnie
Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans
12
NONBANK ORIGINATION SHARE
OVERVIEW
Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans
The nonbank origination share has been rising steadily for all three agencies since 2013. The Ginnie Mae nonbank share has been consistently higher than the GSEs, standing at 79 percent in May 2018. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nonbank shares stood at 55 and 59 percent, respectively. The nonbank originator share is higher for refinance loans than for purchase loans across all three agencies.
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
727
745
716
680
690
700
710
720
730
740
750
760
770
Se
p-1
3
No
v-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
r-1
4
Ma
y-1
4
Jul-
14
Se
p-1
4
No
v-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
r-1
5
Ma
y-1
5
Jul-
15
Se
p-1
5
No
v-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
r-1
6
Ma
y-1
6
Jul-
16
Se
p-1
6
No
v-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
r-1
7
Ma
y-1
7
Jul-
17
Se
p-1
7
No
v-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
r-1
8
Ma
y-1
8
Agency FICO: Bank vs. NonbankAll Median FICO Bank Median FICO Nonbank Median FICOFICO
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
670
690
710
730
750
770
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Median FICO Bank Median FICONonbank Median FICO
Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank
670
690
710
730
750
770
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Median FICO Bank Median FICONonbank Median FICO
GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank
13
OVERVIEW
NONBANK CREDIT BOX
FICO FICO
Nonbank originators have played a key role in opening up access to credit. The median GSE and the median Ginnie Mae FICO scores for loans originated by nonbanks are lower than their bank counterparts. Within the GSE space, both bank and nonbank FICOs have declined since 2014, with further relaxation in FICOs since 2017. In contrast, within the Ginnie Mae space, FICO scores for bank originations have increased since 2014 while nonbank FICOs have declined. This largely reflects the sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many banks.
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
66687072747678808284868890
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank
All Median LTV Bank Median LTV
Nonbank Median LTV
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Median LTV Bank Median LTV
Nonbank Median LTV
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
All Median DTI Bank Median DTI
Nonbank Median DTI
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
Se
p-1
3
Jan
-14
Ma
y-1
4
Se
p-1
4
Jan
-15
Ma
y-1
5
Se
p-1
5
Jan
-16
Ma
y-1
6
Se
p-1
6
Jan
-17
Ma
y-1
7
Se
p-1
7
Jan
-18
Ma
y-1
8
GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank
All Median DTI Bank Median DTI
Nonbank Median DTI
14
OVERVIEW
NONBANK CREDIT BOX
Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank
Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank
LTV LTV
DTI DTI
The median LTV ratios for loans originated by nonbanks are similar to their bank counterparts, while the median DTIs for nonbank loans are higher, indicating that nonbanks are more accommodating in this as well as in the FICO dimension. Note that since early 2017 there has been a measurable increase in DTIs. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and GSE loans, banks and nonbank originators. Rising DTIs are to be expected in a rising rate environment, as higher rates and usually accompanying higher home prices drive up borrowers’ monthly payments, and the reduction in refinance volumes makes lenders more apt to work a bit harder to get a loan approved for a marginal borrower.
15
STATE OF THE MARKET
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PROJECTIONS
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and MBA all forecast origination volume in 2018 to be marginally lower than the 1.7-1.9 billion estimated for 2017. These 2017 and 2018 numbers are considerably lower than the $2.0 trillion of originations in 2016. The differences owe primarily to a decline the refi share: from 48-49 percent in 2016 to 35-36 percent in 2017 to a forecasted 25 -29 percent in 2018. Fannie, Freddie and MBA all forecast 2018 housing starts to be around 1.3 million units, up from a 1.2 million units in 2017. Home sales forecasts for 2018 are around 6.3 million, a slight increase from 2017 levels.
Total Originations and Refinance Shares
Housing Starts and Homes Sales
Originations ($ billions) Refi Share (%)
PeriodTotal, FNMA
estimateTotal, FHLMC
estimateTotal, MBA
estimateFNMA
estimateFHLMC
estimateMBA
estimate
2018 Q1 372 373 346 41 44 37
2018 Q2 468 441 447 27 20 26
2018 Q3 433 478 450 23 20 22
2018 Q4 393 428 370 25 21 27
2019 Q1 339 430 355 32 24 28
2019 Q2 463 456 465 24 23 22
2019 Q3 455 450 460 24 23 22
2019 Q4 412 424 365 26 21 26
FY 2014 1301 1350 1261 40 39 40
FY 2015 1730 1750 1679 47 45 46
FY 2016 2052 2125 1891 49 47 49
FY 2017 1826 1850 1710 36 36 35
FY 2018 1667 1720 1613 29 25 28
FY 2019 1670 1760 1645 26 23 24
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market. Column labels indicate source of estimate. Regarding interest rates, the yearly averages for 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 were 4.2%, 3.9%, 3.8%, and 4.0%. For 2018, the respective projections for Fannie, Freddie, and MBA are 4.4%, 4.6%, and 4.3%.
Housing Starts, thousands Home Sales. thousands
YearTotal,FNMA
estimate
Total, FHLMC estimate
Total, MBA
estimate
Total, FNMA
estimate
Total, FHLMC estimate
Total, MBA
estimate
Existing, MBA
estimate
New, MBA
Estimate
FY 2014 1003 1000 1001 5377 5380 5360 4920 440
FY 2015 1112 1110 1108 5751 5750 5740 5237 503
FY 2016 1174 1170 1177 6013 6010 6001 5440 561
FY 2017 1203 1200 1208 6123 6120 6159 5542 617
FY 2018 1300 1300 1313 6279 6300 6295 5642 653
FY 2019 1306 1400 1376 6375 6440 6450 5783 667
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market; column labels indicate source of estimate.
16
CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND ORIGINATOR PROFITABILITY
STATE OF THE MARKET
1.61
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Dollars per $100 loan
Originator Profitability and Unmeasured CostsWhen originator profits are higher, mortgage volumes are less responsive to changes in interest rates, because originators are at capacity. Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC), formulated and calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a good relative measure of originator profitability. OPUC uses the sales price of the mortgage in the secondary market (less par) and adds two additional sources of profitability; retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g -fees), and points paid by the borrower. OPUC has generally been high when interest rates were low, as originators are capacity constrained due to refinance volume, and have no incentive to reduce rates. Conversely, when interest rates are relatively high and refi activity is low, originators are competing for a more limited amount of mortgages, driving profitability down. In May 2018, OPUC stood at $1.61, the lowest value in recent history.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, updated monthly and available at this link: http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html and Urban Institute. Note: OPUC is a is a monthly (4-week moving) average as discussed in Fuster et al. (2013).
Sources: eMBS, Corelogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated April 2018.
HFPC’s Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) assesses lenders’ tolerance for both borrower risk and product risk, calculating the share of owner-occupied purchase loans that are likely to default. The index shows that credit availability increased for a second quarter in a row to 5.8 percent, the highest level since 2013, in the fourth quarter of 2017 (Q4 2017). This increase was mainly driven by the credit expansions within both the GSE and government channels, thanks to higher interest rates and lower refinance volumes. More information about the HCAI, including the breakdown by market segment, is available here.
Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)
Q4 2017
May 2018
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PercentTotal default risk
Borrower risk
Product risk
Reasonable lending
standards
17
CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR
Access to credit remains extremely tight, especially for borrowers with low FICO scores. The mean and median FICO scores on new purchase originations have both drifted up about 21 and 20 points over the last decade, respectively. The 10th percentile of FICO scores, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness needed to qualify for a mortgage, stood at 644 as of March 2018. Prior to the housing crisis, this threshold held steady in the low 600s. Mean LTV levels at origination remain relatively high, averaging 88.0, which reflects the large number of FHA purchase originations.
CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR PURCHASE LOANS
STATE OF THE MARKET
797
725
731
644
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
FICO Score
Borrower FICO Score at Origination
90th percentile Mean Median 10th percentile
Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.
March 2018
100
88.0
96.5
72
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
LTV
Combined LTV at Origination
90th percentile Mean Median 10th percentile
Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only.
March 2018
18
CREDIT AVAILABILITY FORCREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR PURCHASE LOANS
STATE OF THE MARKET
Credit has been tight for all borrowers with less-than-stellar credit scores- especially in MSAs with high housing prices. For example, the mean origination FICO for borrowers in San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco, CA is 774, while in Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia, MI it is 732. Across all MSAs, lower average FICO scores tend to be correlated with high average LTVs, as these MSAs rely heavily on FHA/VA financing.
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
700
710
720
730
740
750
760
770
780
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Origination LTVOrigination FICO
Origination FICO and LTV
Mean origination FICO score Mean origination LTV
Sources: CoreLogic, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only. Data as of March 2018.
19
HOUSING AFFORDABILITYSTATE OF THE MARKET
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
San
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, MI
Mortgage Affordability by MSAMortgage affordability with 3.5% down
Mortgage affordability with 20% down
Median housing expenses to income
Sources: CoreLogic, US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, American Community Survey, Moody’s Analytics, Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and the Urban Institute. Note: Mortgage affordability is the share of median family income devoted to the monthly principal, interest, taxes, and insurance payment required to buy the median home at the Freddie Mac prevailing rate for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and property tax and insurance at 1.75 percent of the housing value. Data as of April 2018. +
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
No
v-0
0
Oct
-01
Se
p-0
2
Au
g-0
3
Jul-
04
Jun
-05
Ma
y-0
6
Ap
r-0
7
Ma
r-0
8
Fe
b-0
9
Jan
-10
Dec
-10
No
v-1
1
Oct
-12
Se
p-1
3
Au
g-1
4
Jul-
15
Jun
-16
Ma
y-1
7
Ap
r-1
8
Mortgage affordability with 20% downMortgage affordability with 20% down at 5.3% rateMortgage affordability with 3.5% downMortgage affordability with 3.5% down at 5.3% rate
Median housing
expenses to income
National Mortgage Affordability Over TimeHome prices remain affordable by historic standards, despite increases over the last five years and the recent interest rate hikes. As of April 2018, the share of median income needed for the monthly mortgage payment with a 20% down payment stood at 23 percent. With a 3.5% down payment, the share of income is higher, at 26 percent in April 2018. If interest rates rise to 5.3%, the housing expenses to income share with both a 20 percent and a 3.5 percent down payment would be the same as the 2001-03 averages (24 and 28 percent, respectively). As shown in the bottom picture, mortgage affordability varies widely across MSAs.
20
FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYERSSTATE OF THE MARKET
49.1
82.6
60.0
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
First-Time Homebuyer Share
GSEs FHA GSEs and FHA
In March 2018, the first-time homebuyer share of GSE purchase loans was 49.1 percent, its highest level in recent history. The FHA has always been more focused on first-time homebuyers, with its first-time homebuyer share hovering around 80 percent; it stood at 82.6 percent in March 2018. The bottom table shows that based on mortgages originated in February 2018, the average first-time homebuyer was more likely than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan and have a lower credit score and higher LTV and DTI, thus requiring a higher interest rate.
Sources: eMBS, Federal Housing Administration (FHA ) and Urban Institute.Note: All series measure the first-time homebuyer share of purchase loans for principal residences.
Comparison of First-Time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations
GSEs FHA GSEs and FHA
Characteristics First-time Repeat First-time Repeat First-time Repeat
Loan Amount ($) 235,213 258,885 202,085 225,081 220,836 253,194
Credit Score738.4 753.8 671.4 678.3 709.3 741.1
LTV (%) 87.4 79.4 95.6 94.2 91.0 81.9
DTI (%) 36.3 36.8 43.0 44.1 39.2 38.0
Loan Rate (%) 4.63 4.51 4.71 4.61 4.66 4.53
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.Note: Based on owner-occupied purchase mortgages originated in March 2018.
March 2018
21
MSA
HPI changes (%) % Rise needed to achieve
peak2000 to peakPeak totrough
Trough to current
United States 93.8% -33.1% 55.4% -3.7%
New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ 111.4% -16.8% 31.3% -8.5%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA 177.0% -38.4% 78.5% -9.1%
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL 65.9% -35.6% 38.0% 12.6%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA 38.0% -33.0% 67.9% -11.1%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV 155.1% -34.0% 38.2% 9.7%
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX 39.6% -14.0% 49.0% -21.9%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ 123.7% -52.6% 81.8% 16.0%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA 186.1% -52.6% 80.0% 17.2%
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX 34.4% -13.7% 64.9% -29.7%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI 72.8% -30.2% 50.4% -4.7%
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA 90.9% -29.1% 99.4% -29.3%
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO 35.6% -13.1% 84.7% -37.7%
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD 122.8% -24.6% 17.4% 12.9%
San Diego-Carlsbad CA 144.9% -37.5% 69.3% -5.5%
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine CA 160.5% -35.6% 60.7% -3.4%
Sources: CoreLogic HPIs and Urban Institute. Data as of April 2018.Note: This table includes the largest 15 Metropolitan areas by mortgage count.
Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAsAfter rising 55 percent from the trough, national house prices have now surpassed pre -crisis peak levels. At the MSA level, ten of the top 15 MSAs have exceeded their pre-crisis peak HPI: New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Atlanta, GA; Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; Minneapolis, MN; Seattle, WA; Denver, CO, San Diego, CA, and Anaheim, CA. Two MSAs particularly hard hit by the boom and bust– Phoenix, AZ and Riverside, CA– would each need to rise 16 and 17 percent, respectively, to return to peak levels.
HOME PRICE INDICESSTATE OF THE MARKET
CoreLogic HPI
6.9%8.7%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year-over-year growth rate
National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth
Sources: CoreLogic, Zillow, and Urban Institute.
Zillow HPI
Home price appreciation remains very robust, as measured by both the CoreLogic’s repeat sales index and Zillow’s hedonic index. We will be monitoring the impact of rising interest rates on home prices. Historically, rising interest rates (generally observed in tandem with a stronger economy and higher inflation) have been associated with higher home price increases, despite the impact on affordability.
April 2018
22
STATE OF THE MARKET
NEGATIVE EQUITY & SERIOUS DELINQUENCY
2.6%
1.5%
1.2%0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1Q
02
3Q
02
1Q
03
3Q
03
1Q
04
3Q
04
1Q
05
3Q
05
1Q
06
3Q
06
1Q
07
3Q
07
1Q
08
3Q
08
1Q
09
3Q
09
1Q
10
3Q
10
1Q
11
3Q
11
1Q
12
3Q
12
1Q
13
3Q
13
1Q
14
3Q
14
1Q
15
3Q
15
1Q
16
3Q
16
1Q
17
3Q
17
1Q
18
Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure
Percent of loans 90days delinquent or inforeclosurePercent of loans 90days delinquent
Percent of loans inforeclosure
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.
Ninety day delinquencies rose sharply due to the hurricanes in the second half of 2017, but have declined from 1.72 to 1.45 percent in the first quarter of 2018. The percent of loans in foreclosure continued to edge down to 1.16 percent. The combined delinquencies totaled 2.61 percent in Q1 2018, down from 2.91 percent in Q4 2017 and 2.76 percent in the same quarter a year ago.
4.71%
5.89%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
3Q
09
4Q
09
1Q
10
2Q
10
3Q
10
4Q
10
1Q
11
2Q
11
3Q
11
4Q
11
1Q
12
2Q
12
3Q
12
4Q
12
1Q
13
2Q
13
3Q
13
4Q
13
1Q
14
2Q
14
3Q
14
4Q
14
1Q
15
2Q
15
3Q
15
4Q
15
1Q
16
2Q
16
3Q
16
4Q
16
1Q
17
2Q
17
3Q
17
4Q
17
1Q
18
Negative Equity Share Negative equity Near or in negative equity
Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.Note: CoreLogic negative equity rate is the percent of all residential properties with a mortgage in negative equity. Loans with negative equity refer to loans above 100 percent LTV. Loans near negative equity refer to loans above 95 percent LTV. Last updated June 2018.
With housing prices continuing to appreciate, residential properties in negative equity (LTV greater than 100) as a share of all residential properties with a mortgage continued to edge down to 4.71 percent as of Q1 2018. Residential properties near negative equity (LTV between 95 and 100) comprise another 1.18 percent.
MODIFICATIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS
23
STATE OF THE MARKET
Total modifications (HAMP and proprietary) are roughly equal to total liquidations. Hope Now reports show 8,359,438 borrowers have received a modification since Q3 2007, compared with 8,618,645 liquidations in the same period. Modifications and liquidations have slowed significantly over the past few years. In Q1 2018, there were just 59,537 proprietary modifications and 56,137 liquidations. There were no new HAMP modifications as the program ended in 2017.
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
2007(Q3-Q4)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
Number of loans (thousands)
Loan Modifications and Liquidations
HAMP mods
Proprietary mods
Liquidations
Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute.Note: Liquidations include both foreclosure sales and short sales. Last updated June 2018.
March 2018
1.7
6.7
8.6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2007 (Q3-Q4) 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
HAMP mods
Proprietary mods
Liquidations
Number of loans (millions)
Cumulative Modifications and Liquidations
Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute.Note: Liquidations includes both foreclosure sales and short sales. Last updated June 2018.
March 2018
24
Both GSEs continue to contract their portfolios. Since April 2017, Fannie Mae has contracted by 17.4 percent and Freddie Mac by 17.1 percent. They are shrinking their less-liquid assets (mortgage loans and non-agency MBS) faster than they are shrinking their entire portfolio. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolios are now both below the $250 billion maximum portfolio size; they were required to reach this terminal level by year end 2018. Fannie met the target in 2017, Freddie met the target in February 2018.
GSE PORTFOLIO WIND-DOWNGSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
($ billions)
FHLMC MBS in portfolio Non-FHLMC agency MBS Non-agency MBS Mortgage loans
Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition
Current size:$240.3 billion2018 cap: $250 billionShrinkage year-over-year: 17.1%Shrinkage in less-liquid assets year-over-year: 21.0%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
($ billions)
FNMA MBS in portfolio Non-FNMA agency MBS Non-agency MBS Mortgage loans
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition
Current size: $222.0 billion2018 cap: $250 billionShrinkage year-over-year: 17.4%Shrinkage in less-liquid assets year-over-year: 21.0%
April 2018
April 2018
25
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES
Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)
LTV
Credit Score ≤60 60.01 – 70 70.01 – 75 75.01 – 80 80.01 – 85 85.01 – 90 90.01 – 95 95.01 – 97
> 740 0.00% 0.25% 0.25% 0.50% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.75%
720 – 739 0.00% 0.25% 0.50% 0.75% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 1.00%
700 – 719 0.00% 0.50% 1.00% 1.25% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.50%
680 – 699 0.00% 0.50% 1.25% 1.75% 1.50% 1.25% 1.25% 1.50%
660 – 679 0.00% 1.00% 2.25% 2.75% 2.75% 2.25% 2.25% 2.25%
640 – 659 0.50% 1.25% 2.75% 3.00% 3.25% 3.75% 2.75% 2.75%
620 – 639 0.50% 1.50% 3.00% 3.00% 3.25% 3.25% 3.25% 3.50%
< 620 0.50% 1.50% 3.00% 3.00% 3.25% 3.25% 3.25% 3.75%
Product Feature (Cumulative)
High LTV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Investment Property 2.125% 2.125% 2.125% 3.375% 4.125% N/A N/A N/A
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.Note: For whole loans purchased on or after September 1, 2015, or loans delivered into MBS pools with issue dates on or after September 1, 2015.
57
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1Q
09
3Q
09
1Q
10
3Q
10
1Q
11
3Q
11
1Q
12
3Q
12
1Q
13
3Q
13
1Q
14
3Q
14
1Q
15
3Q
15
1Q
16
3Q
16
1Q
17
3Q
17
1Q
18
Guarantee Fees Charged on New AcquisitionsFannie Mae single-family average charged g-fee on new acquisitions
Freddie Mac single-family guarantee fees charged on new acquisitions
Basis points
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.
The latest 10-Q indicates that Fannie’s average g-fees on new acquisitions increased from 55 to 57.1 bps in Q1 2018 and Freddie’s increased from 46 to 50 bps. This is markedly higher than g-fee levels in 2011 and 2012, and has contributed to the GSEs’ profits. The GSE’s latest Loan-Level Pricing Adjustments (LLPAs) took effect in September 2015; the bottom table shows the Fannie Mae LLPAs, which are expressed as upfront charges.
GSE RISK-SHARING TRANSACTIONS
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute. Note: Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fa nnie Mae and Freddie Mac. “CE” = credit enhancement.
26
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)Date Transaction Reference Pool Size ($ m) Amount Issued ($m) % of Reference Pool Covered
2013 CAS 2013 deals $26,756 $675 2.5%
2014 CAS 2014 deals $227, 234 $5,849 2.6%
2015 CAS 2015 deals $187,126 $5,463 2.9%
February 2016 CAS 2016 – C01 $28,882 $945 3.3%
March 2016 CAS 2016 – C02 $35,004 $1,032 2.9%
April 2016 CAS 2016 – C03 $36,087 $1,166 3.2%
July 2016 CAS 2016 – C04 $42,179 $1,322 3.1%
August 2016 CAS 2016 - C05 $38,668 $1,202 3.1%
November 2016 CAS 2016 - C06 $33,124 $1,024 3.1%
December 2016 CAS 2016 – C07 $22,515 $702 3.1%
January 2017 CAS 2017 – C01 $43,758 $1,351 3.1%
March 2017 CAS 2017 – C02 $39,988 $1,330 3.3%
May 2017 CAS 2017 – C03 $41,246 $1,371 3.3%
May 2017 CAS 2017 – C04 $30,154 $1,003 3.3%
July 2017 CAS 2017 – C05 $43,751 $1,351 3.1%
August 2017 CAS 2017 – C06 $31,900 $1,101 3.5%
November 2017 CAS 2017– C07 $33,900 $1,200 3.5%
February 2018 CAS 2018 – C01 $44,900 $1,494 3.3%
March 2018 CAS 2018 - C02 $26,500 $1,007 3.8%
May 2018 CAS 2018 - C03 $31,100 $1,050 3.4%
Total $1,044,772 $31,637 3.0%
Freddie Mac – Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Date Transaction Reference Pool Size ($ m) Amount Issued ($m) % of Reference Pool Covered
2013 STACR 2013 deals $57,912 $1,130 2.0%
2014 STACR 2014 deals $147,120 $4,916 3.3%
2015 STACR 2015 deals $209,521 $6,658 3.2%
January 2016 STACR Series 2016 – DNA1 $35,700 $996 2.8%
March 2016 STACR Series 2016 – HQA1 $17,931 $475 2.6%
May 2016 STACR Series 2016 – DNA2 $30,589 $916 3.0%
May 2016 STACR Series 2016 – HQA2 $18,400 $627 3.4%
June 2016 STACR Series 2016 – DNA3 $26,400 $795 3.0%
September 2016 STACR Series 2016 – HQA3 $15,709 $515 3.3%
September 2016 STACR Series 2016 – DNA4 $24,845 $739 3.0%
October 2016 STACR Series 2016 - HQA4 $13,847 $478 3.5%
January 2017 STACR Series 2017 – DNA1 $33, 965 $802 2.4%
February 2017 STACR Series 2017 – HQA1 $29,700 $753 2.5%
April 2017 STACR Series 2017 – DNA2 $60,716 $1,320 2.2%
June 2017 STACR Series 2017 – HQA2 $31,604 $788 2.5%
September 2017 STACR Series 2017 – DNA3 $56,151 $1,200 2.1%
October 2017 STACR Series 2017 – HQA3 $21,641 $600 2.8%
December 2017 STACR Series 2017 – HRP1 $15,044 $200 1.3%
January 2018 STACR Series 2017 – DNA1 $34,733 $900 2.6%
March 2018 STACR Series 2017 – HQA1 $40,102 $985 2.5%
June 2018 STACR Series 2018 – DNA2 $49,346 $1,050 2.1%
Total $986,685 $26,843 2.7%
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been laying off back-end credit risk through CAS and STACR deals as well as through reinsurance transactions. They have also done front-end transactions with originators and reinsurers, and experimented with deep mortgage insurance coverage with private mortgage insurers. FHFA’s 2018 scorecard requires the GSEs to lay off credit risk on 90 percent of newly acquired loans in categories targeted for transfer. Fannie Mae's CAS issuances to date total $1.04 trillion, while Freddie's STACR totals $987 billion. In 2018 so far, Fannie and Freddie have each issued three securities.
27Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Press Releases and Urban Institute.
GSE RISK-SHARING SPREADSGSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Sep
-13
Jan
-14
May
-14
Sep
-14
Jan
-15
May
-15
Sep
-15
Jan
-16
May
-16
Sep
-16
Jan
-17
May
-17
Sep
-17
Jan
-18
May
-18
Low-LTV Pools (61 to 80 %)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
De
c-1
3
Mar
-14
Jun
-14
Sep
-14
De
c-1
4
Mar
-15
Jun
-15
Sep
-15
De
c-1
5
Mar
-16
Jun
-16
Sep
-16
De
c-1
6
Mar
-17
Jun
-17
Sep
-17
De
c-1
7
Mar
-18
High-LTV Pools (81 to 95 %)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
De
c-1
3
Mar
-14
Jun
-14
Sep
-14
De
c-1
4
Mar
-15
Jun
-15
Sep
-15
De
c-1
5
Mar
-16
Jun
-16
Sep
-16
De
c-1
6
Mar
-17
Jun
-17
Sep
-17
De
c-1
7
Mar
-18
Jun
-18
Low-LTV Pools (61 to 80 %)
CAS and STACR spreads have moved around considerably since 2013, with the bottom mezzanine tranche and the first loss bonds experiencing considerably more volatility than the top mezzanine bonds. Tranche B in particular has been highly volatile because of its first loss position. Spreads widened especially during Q1 2016 due to falling oil prices, concerns about global economic growth and the slowdown in China. Since then spreads have resumed their downward trend but remain volatile.
Fannie Mae CAS Spreads at-issuance (basis points over 1-month LIBOR)
Freddie Mac STACR Spreads at-issuance (basis points over 1-month LIBOR)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
De
c-1
3
Mar
-14
Jun
-14
Sep
-14
De
c-1
4
Mar
-15
Jun
-15
Sep
-15
De
c-1
5
Mar
-16
Jun
-16
Sep
-16
De
c-1
6
Mar
-17
Jun
-17
Sep
-17
De
c-1
7
Mar
-18
High-LTV Pools (81 to 95 %)
Tranche 1B
Tranche 1M-2
Tranche 1M-1
Tranche 2B
Tranche 2B-1
Tranche 2M-2
Tranche 2M-1
Tranche B
Tranche M-3
Tranche B-2
Tranche M-2
Tranche M-1
Basis points (bps) Basis points (bps)
Tranche B-1
Tranche B-2
Tranche B
Tranche M-3 Tranche B-1
Tranche M-2
Tranche M-1
Basis points (bps) Basis points (bps)
Tranche 1B-1
28
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES AT THE GSEsGSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage of total loans
Serious Delinquency Rates–Fannie MaeSingle-family: Non-credit enhanced (including credit risk transfer) Single-family: Credit enhanced (PMI and other)
Single-family: Total Single-Family: Non-credit enhanced (Excluding credit risk transfer)
Credit Risk Transfer
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.Note*: Following a change in Fannie reporting in March 2017, we started to report the credit risk transfer category and a new non-credit enhanced category that excludes loans covered by either primary MI or credit risk transfer transactions. Fannie reported these two new categories going back to January 2016.
1.55%1.17%1.09%0.37%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage of total loans
Serious Delinquency Rates–Freddie MacSingle-family: Non-credit enhanced Single-family: Credit enhanced
Single-family: Total PMI Credit Enhanced*
Credit Enhanced: Other*
Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.Note*: Following a change in Freddie reporting in September 2014, we switched from reporting credit enhanced delinquency rates to PMI and other credit enhanced delinquency rates. Freddie reported these two categories for credit-enhanced loans going back to August 2013. The other category includes single-family loans covered by financial arrangements (other than primary mortgage insurance) including loans in reference pools covered by STACR debt note transactions as well as other forms of credit protection.
1.22%1.04%0.94%0.42%
April 2018
April 2018
Serious delinquency rates of GSE loans came down slightly in April 2018. Overall, there has been a marked long term decline in serious delinquency rates as the legacy portfolio is resolved and the pristine, post -2009 book of business exhibits very low default rates. As of April 2018, 1.09 percent of the Fannie portfolio and 0.94 percent of the Freddie portfolio were seriously delinquent, down slightly from 1.16 percent for Fannie and 0.97 percent for Freddie in March 2018.
29
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATESGSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
Serious delinquencies for single-family GSE loans, FHA loans, and VA loans declined in the first quarter of 2018, after increasing in the previous quarter due to the impact of hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria. GSE delinquencies remain high relative to 2005-2007, while FHA and VA delinquencies (which are higher than their GSE counterparts) are at levels lower than 2005-2007. GSE multifamily delinquencies remain at the levels prevailing before the financial crisis, although they did not reach problematic levels even in the worst years of the crisis. In November 2017, Fannie multifamily serious delinquency rate rose to 0.11 percent, its highest level since early 2014, mostly due to the recent hurricanes; it increased further to 0.13 percent in March 2018 and stayed at that level in April 2018. Freddie declined slightly to 0.01 percent.
0.01%0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
1.0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Percentage of total loans
Serious Delinquency Rates–Multifamily GSE LoansFannie Mae Freddie Mac
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.Note: Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.
0.13%
April 2018
1.16%
0.97%
4.22%
2.22%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1Q
05
3Q
05
1Q
06
3Q
06
1Q
07
3Q
07
1Q
08
3Q
08
1Q
09
3Q
09
1Q
10
3Q
10
1Q
11
3Q
11
1Q
12
3Q
12
1Q
13
3Q
13
1Q
14
3Q
14
1Q
15
3Q
15
1Q
16
3Q
16
1Q
17
3Q
17
1Q
18
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac FHA VA
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute. Note: Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Not seasonally adjusted. Last updated May 2018.
Serious Delinquency Rates–Single-Family Loans
30
Agency Gross Issuance Agency Net Issuance
AGENCY GROSS AND NET ISSUANCE
AGENCY ISSUANCE
Issuance Year
GSEs Ginnie Mae Total
2000 $360.6 $102.2 $462.8
2001 $885.1 $171.5 $1,056.6
2002 $1,238.9 $169.0 $1,407.9
2003 $1,874.9 $213.1 $2,088.0
2004 $872.6 $119.2 $991.9
2005 $894.0 $81.4 $975.3
2006 $853.0 $76.7 $929.7
2007 $1,066.2 $94.9 $1,161.1
2008 $911.4 $267.6 $1,179.0
2009 $1,280.0 $451.3 $1,731.3
2010 $1,003.5 $390.7 $1,394.3
2011 $879.3 $315.3 $1,194.7
2012 $1,288.8 $405.0 $1,693.8
2013 $1,176.6 $393.6 $1,570.1
2014 $650.9 $296.3 $947.2
2015 $845.7 $436.3 $1,282.0
2016 $991.6 $508.2 $1,499.8
2017 $877.3 $455.6 $1,332.9
2018 YTD $316.33 $162.41 $478.75
2018 YTD% Change YOY
-8.7% -9.7% -9.0%
2018 Ann. $759.19 $389.78 $1,148.98
Issuance Year
GSEs Ginnie Mae Total
2000 $159.8 $29.3 $189.1
2001 $368.4 -$9.9 $358.5
2002 $357.2 -$51.2 $306.1
2003 $334.9 -$77.6 $257.3
2004 $82.5 -$40.1 $42.4
2005 $174.2 -$42.2 $132.0
2006 $313.6 $0.2 $313.8
2007 $514.9 $30.9 $545.7
2008 $314.8 $196.4 $511.3
2009 $250.6 $257.4 $508.0
2010 -$303.2 $198.3 -$105.0
2011 -$128.4 $149.6 $21.2
2012 -$42.4 $119.1 $76.8
2013 $69.1 $87.9 $157.0
2014 $30.5 $61.6 $92.1
2015 $75.1 $97.3 $172.5
2016 $135.5 $125.3 $260.8
2017 $168.5 $131.3 $299.7
2018 YTD $50.5 $40.7 $91.2
2018 YTD% Change YOY
-20.7% -25.0% -22.7%
2018 (Ann.) $121.1 $97.7 $218.9
Agency gross issuance was $478.8 billion in the first five months of 2018, $1.149 trillion on an annualized basis. This is down 9.0 percent year-over-year. When measured on a monthly basis, the agency gross issuance year-over-year has been declining for fifteenth consecutive months since March 2017, reflecting higher mortgage rates. Net issuance (which excludes repayments, prepayments, and refinances on outstanding mortgages) totaled $91.2 billion in the first five months of 2018, down 22.7 percent from the same period of 2017.
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.Note: Dollar amounts are in billions. Data as of May 2018.
31
AGENCY GROSS AND NET ISSUANCE BY MONTH
AGENCY ISSUANCE
AGENCY GROSS ISSUANCE & FED PURCHASES
0
50
100
150
200
250
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
($ billions)
Monthly Gross Issuance
Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae
May 2018Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Urban Institute.
While government and GSE lending have dominated the mortgage market since the crisis, there has been a change in the mix. The Ginnie Mae share rose from its low levels in the pre-crisis period to 28 percent in 2010, then declined to 25 percent in 2013. Since then, the share has bounced back sharply, and now stands at 33.6 percent in May 2018. The increase in this share over the past year is due to the fact that rates have risen, and Ginnie Mae is less dependent on refi activity than its conventional counterparts.
0
50
100
150
200
250
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
($ billions)
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance
Gross issuance Total Fed purchases
The Fed has begun to wind down their portfolio, and we are beginning to see the effects in slower absorption rates. During the period October 2014-September 2017, the Fed had ended its purchase program, but was reinvesting funds from mortgages and agency debt into the mortgage market,absorbing 20-30 percent of agency gross issuance. With the wind down, which started in October 2017, the Fed will continue to reinvest, but by less than prepayment and repayments. The amount of the MBS taper (amount permitted to run off each month) increased from $8 billion to $12 billion in April 2018. In May 2018, total Fed purchases declined to $9.15 billion, yielding Fed absorption of gross issuance of 9.1 percent, the lowest level since the Fed began its MBS purchase program.
Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.
May 2018
32
MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY
AGENCY ISSUANCE
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018Q1
MI Market Share Total private primary MI FHA VA
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.
58
5239
150
0
50
100
150
200
($ billions) Total private primary MI FHA VA Total
MI Activity
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated May 2018.
In 2018 Q1, mortgage insurance activity via the FHA, VA and private insurers declined from the previous quarter’s $173 billion to $150 billion, down 5.7 percent year-over-year from the same quarter in 2017. This seasonal decrease is driven by all three channels. Private mortgage insurers decreased by 12 billion, FHA decreased by $7 billion, and VA decreased by $5 billion. In the first quarter of 2018, FHA accounted for 34.8 percent of the market, down from 36.6 percent in 2017, losing 1.4 percentage market share to VA (26.1 percent) and 0.5 percent to private mortgage insurers (39.1 percent).
33
MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY
AGENCY ISSUANCE
FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan
Case number dateUpfront mortgage insurance premium
(UFMIP) paidAnnual mortgage insurance
premium (MIP)1/1/2001 - 7/13/2008 150 50
7/14/2008 - 4/5/2010* 175 55
4/5/2010 - 10/3/2010 225 55
10/4/2010 - 4/17/2011 100 90
4/18/2011 - 4/8/2012 100 115
4/9/2012 - 6/10/2012 175 125
6/11/2012 - 3/31/2013a 175 125
4/1/2013 – 1/25/2015b 175 135
Beginning 1/26/2015c 175 85
Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.Note: A typical purchase loan has an LTV over 95 and a loan term longer than 15 years. Mortgage insurance premiums are listed in basis points. * For a short period in 2008 the FHA used a risk based FICO/LTV matrix for MI. a
Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 150 bps.b
Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 155 bps.c
Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 105 bps.
FHA premiums rose significantly in the years following the housing crash, with annual premiums rising 170 percent from 2008 to 2013 as FHA worked to shore up its finances. In January 2015, President Obama announced a 50 bps cut in annual insurance premiums, making FHA mortgages more attractive than GSE mortgages for all borrowers. The April 2016 reduction in PMI rates for borrowers with higher FICO scores and April 2018 reduction for lower FICO borrowers has partially offset that. As shown in the bottom table, a borrower putting 3.5 percent down will now find FHA more economical except for those with FICO scores of 720 or higher.
AssumptionsProperty Value $250,000Loan Amount $241,250LTV 96.5Base Rate
Conforming 4.66%FHA 4.70%
Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI
FICO 620 - 639 640 - 659 660 - 679 680 - 699 700 - 719 720 - 739 740 - 759 760 +
FHA MI Premiums
FHA UFMIP 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75%
FHA MIP 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85%
PMI
GSE LLPA* 3.50% 2.75% 2.25% 1.50% 1.50% 1.00% 0.75% 0.75%
PMI Annual MIP 2.25% 2.05% 1.90% 1.40% 1.15% 0.95% 0.75% 0.55%
Monthly Payment
FHA $1,444 $1,444 $1,444 $1,444 $1,444 $1,444 $1,444 $1,444
PMI $1,711 $1,648 $1,613 $1,524 $1,482 $1,443 $1,402 $1,378
PMI Advantage ($267) ($204) ($169) ($80) ($38) $1 $42 $66
Sources: Genworth Mortgage Insurance, Ginnie Mae, and Urban Institute.Note: Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. Grey shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while light blue indicates PMI is more favorable. The PMI monthly payment calculation does not include special programs like Fannie Mae’s HomeReady and Freddie Mac’s Home Possible (HP), both offer more favorable rates for low- to moderate-income borrowers.LLPA= Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 25.
34
Projects
The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative
Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)
Access and Affordability
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Projects
Publications
Credit Risk Transfer: A Fork in the RoadAuthors: Laurie GoodmanDate: June 7, 2018
GSE Reform is Dead- Long Live GSE Reform!Authors: Jim Parrott, Mark ZandiDate: May 9, 2018
Exploring the Viability of Mansion Tax ApproachesAuthors: Jung Hyun Choi, Bhargavi Ganesh, Sarah Strochak, Bing BaiDate: May 8, 2018
The Impact of Proposed Changes to HMDAAuthors: Laurie Goodman, Ellen Seidman, Bhargavi GaneshDate: April 27, 2018
Small-Dollar Mortgages for Single-Family Residential PropertiesAuthors: Alanna McCargo, Bing Bai, Taz George, Sarah StrochakDate: April 25, 2018
What Fueled the Financial Crisis?Authors: Laurie Goodman, Jun ZhuDate: April 4, 2018
Housing Affordability: Local and National PerspectivesAuthors: Laurie Goodman, Wei Li, Jun ZhuDate: March 28, 2018
Is Limited English Proficiency a Barrier to Homeownership?Authors: Edward Golding, Laurie Goodman, Sarah StrochakDate: March 26, 2018
Blog Posts
Boston’s housing market, in three chartsAuthors: Bhargavi Ganesh, Sarah Strochak, Sheryl PardoDate: June 5, 2018
Ten years after the crash, what is the state of the housing market?Authors: Rob AbareDate: May 30, 2018
The Bay Area’s housing crisis, in four chartsAuthors: Bhargavi Ganesh, Sarah Strochak, Sheryl PardoDate: May 22, 2018
Failure to fund system upgrades at the FHA could cost taxpayers $41 millionAuthors: Karan Kaul, Edward GoldingDate: May 3, 2018
Expanding small-dollar mortgages can put homeownership in reach for more familiesAuthors: Sarah Strochak, Alanna McCargoDate: April 30, 2018
Proposal to limit mortgage data collection would not help rural, vulnerable areasAuthors: Laurie Goodman, Ellen Seidman, Bhargavi GaneshDate: April 30, 2018
The case for expanding mortgage credit, and one way to do itAuthors: Rob AbareDate: April 20, 2018
Rental pay history should be used to assess the creditworthiness of mortgage borrowersAuthors: Laurie Goodman, Jun ZhuDate: April 17, 2018
Will fintech innovation benefit borrowers of all incomes?Authors: Karan KaulDate: April 16, 2018
Fannie Mae’s efforts to ease mortgage access show how hard it is to balance risk and accessAuthors: Karan Kaul, Bing Bai, Laurie GoodmanDate: April 5, 2018
Upcoming events:July 11: GSE Pricing and Cross-Subsidization
PUBLICATIONS AND EVENTSRELATED HFPC WORK
35
Copyright June 2018. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved. Permission is granted for reproduction of this file, with attribution to the Urban Institute. The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the social, economic, and governance problems facing the nation.
Acknowledgments
The Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) was launched with generous support at the leadership level from the Citi Foundation and
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional support was provided by The Ford Foundation and The Open Society Foundations.
Ongoing support for HFPC is also provided by the Housing Finance Innovation Forum, a group of organizations and individuals that support high-quality independent research that informs evidence-based policy development. Funds raised through the Forum provide flexible resources, allowing HFPC to anticipate and respond to emerging policy issues with timely analysis. This funding supports HFPC’s research, outreach and engagement, and general operating activities.
The chartbook is funded by these combined sources. We are grateful to them and to all our funders, who make it possible for Urban to advance its mission.
The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders. Funders do not determine research findings or the insights and recommendations of Urban
experts. Further information on the Urban Institute’s funding principles is available at www.urban.org/support.
Housing Finance Innovation Forum Members as of June 2018
OrganizationsArch CapitalBank of America Foundation BlackRock Caliber Home Loans
DownPayment ResourceEllington Management GroupFICOFinancial Services RoundtableFreddie MacGenworthHousing Policy CouncilJPMorgan ChaseMortgage Bankers Association Mr. CooperNational Association of Home BuildersNational Association of Realtors OcwenPennyMacPretium Partners PricewaterhouseCoopersProspect MortgagePulte Home Mortgage Quicken LoansTIG AdvisorsTwo Harbors Investment Corp.U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI)VantageScoreWells Fargo & Company400 Capital Management
Individuals
Raj DateMary MillerJim Millstein Beth MlynarczykToni MossShekar Narasimhan Faith Schwartz Mark Zandi
Data Partners CoreLogicMoody’s AnalyticsZillow