hope and depression. light through the shadows

Hope and Depression: Light through the Shadows

Jen Cheavens

There is no despair so absolute as that which comes with the first moments of our first great sorrow, when we have not yet known what it is to have

suffered and be healed, to have despaired and recovered hope.

George Eliot, Adam Bede (1859)

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Depression is one of the most common mental health problems in the United States (Greenberg, Stinglin, Finkelstein, & Berndt, 1993; Maxmen & Ward, 1995). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) ( D S M -

I V ) (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994), the lifetime risk for major depressive disorder is 10 to 25% in women and 5 to 12% in men. Individuals who experience depression range in the severity of their symptomology. Most individuals suffering from depression, however, experience deep feelings of sadness, worthlessness, and pain. In fact, Winston Churchill described it as the "black dog" that followed and tormented him throughout his life (Cronkite, 1994).

Furthermore, based on studies drawn from "normal" community and college samples, it appears that many individuals who do not meet criteria for major depression nevertheless evidence symptoms of the disorder. If we were to examine the criteria for major depression in the D S M - I V (APA, 1994), most of us, in recalling difficult previous times in our lives, could identify with symptoms such as feeling sad, motor retardation, loss of energy, diminished ability to concentrate, or insomnia. Thus, because of the prevalence and gravity of depression and dysphoria, we need to understand them better.

To explore depressive symptoms and the related underlying vulnerabilities, researchers recently have focused on individual-difference variables and cognitive processing styles. One such variable that may play an important role in the onset,

Handbook of Hope CoDvri~ht �9 2000 bv Academic Press. All rights o f reproduction in anv form reserved. 321

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duration, and recovery from depression and dysphoria is hope. In other words, it is possible that via their high levels of hope, individuals are protected against the onset of depression, endure depressive episodes for short durations, recover quickly from depressive episodes, and are unlikely to experience recurrences. In regard to these issues, scholars for decades have advocated the importance of hope (or hopelessness) in the development of psychiatric disorders and subsequent therapeutic change (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Frank, 1968; Lazarus, 1980; Menninger, 1959).

In this chapter, I will explore the relationship of hope and the experience of dysphoria and depression. It is my contention that hope theory can be used both to understand the onset and experience of depression and to intervene so as to combat depressive symptoms. We already know that high- as compared to low-hope persons experience fewer depressive symptoms (Irving, Crenshaw, Snyder, Francis, & Gentry, 1990; Magaletta & 0liver, 1999; Snyder et al., 1991). By gaining a better understanding of this relationship, clinicians can use the potentially protective factors of hope when working with individuals diagnosed with depression.

I begin by using hope theory as an explanation for depression. Specifically, I will discuss the roles of goal blockage, agency loss, and pathway reduction in the experience of dysphoria and depression. I then will enumerate the reasons why hopeful thinking protects against depression. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting applica- tions of hope in treating depression. In this latter regard, I believe that most non- biological depressions can be explained as a lack of hopeful thinking and that depressive symptoms can be treated successfully by raising clients' hopes.

A CASE OF L O W H O P E A N D D E P R E S S I O N

At this point, I would like to recount the case of a young woman who was hospi- talized temporarily for a major depressive episode. The woman, Lisa (not her real name), described her life before coming to the hospital. In a listless voice, she told me there was absolutely nothing that she wanted to get done in a day. Her mind was full of thoughts about how terrible, worthless, and tired she felt. Lisa was in a state of almost total goal loss. The only goal she could conjure was to "end the pain." This was the one goal-related thought that Lisa repeated during the deepest stages of her depression. The only pathway, however, that Lisa could envision for ending the pain was to take her own life. Seeking therapy or asking for help from family and friends never crossed her mind. Although suicide was the only way that Lisa could imagine reaching her goal, she reported not having the necessary strength. In thinking about what was needed to commit suicide, she became even more exhausted.

Looking back, I see Lisa as a classic case of low hope and depression. Lisa did not engage in much goal-related thinking. In fact, she was able to articulate only one goal--end the pain. Furthermore, Lisa had restricted pathways thought. She was only able to generate one pathway to her goal of ending the pain. Finally, Lisa could

17 Hope and Depression: Light through the Shadows 323

not muster the agency to use the pathwaymkil l ing herselfmshe had generated for ending her pain. Obviously, Lisa was extremely low in all components of the hope t r iad~goals , agency, and pathways--and this rendered her deeply depressed.

A H O P E F U L D I A G N O S I S O F D E P R E S S I O N

The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) lists nine symptoms as diagnostic criteria for depression. In order to meet diagnostic criteria, an individual must have at least five of the nine symptoms present during a 2-week period, without an organic explanation. Sny- der (1994) previously has discussed how the three components of hope are related to the nine diagnostic symptoms of depression. As can be seen in Table 1, each symptom is related to at least one hope component.

The first symptom, diminished interest in activities, is related to both goals and agency, but primarily to agency. Recall that agency is the sense that one has the ability to sustain movement along a pathway toward a goal. When individuals are robbed of this sense of movement, interest in activities is decreased because without agency, it is infeasible to imagine that the activities would be completed. To a lesser degree, diminished activity also is related to goal blockage in that low-hope persons will tend to lose interest in any impeded activities.

Psychomotor retardation or acceleration, the second symptom, also primarily is related to agency. Individuals with low agency have difficulty energizing themselves to set out on a path to a goal. In observable terms, this state of low agency appears to be psychomotor retardation. Thus, people who feel that they cannot get themselves going are experiencing low agency. Pathway problems also may account for

TABLE 1 Relationship of Hope Components and Diagnostic Criteria for Depression

Hope components

Depressive symptoms Goal blockage Agency Pathways

Diminished interest + + + +

Psychomotor retardation/acceleration + + +

Loss of energy/fatigue + + + +

Inability to concentrate

Depressed mood + + +

Worthlessness feelings + + + +

Suicidal thoughts/attempts + + + +

Weight loss or gain + + +

Insomnia or hypersomnia + + +

+ + +

+

+

+

Note. Interpret more plus signs (none to + to + + to + + +) as signifying greater emphasis attached

to a given component within hope theory.

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some instances of the atypical symptom presentation of psychomotor acceleration. Imagine an instance in which you feel ready to get working on your goal, but cannot determine a way to get there. This overabundance of agency, with no accom- panying pathway thought, results in psychomotor acceleration. Furthermore, goal blockage plays a role in the experience of this symptom as well. When an important goal has been blocked, the wind is temporarily knocked out of one's mental sails. This may lead to psychomotor retardation.

The third symptom, loss of energy and fatigue, is a prototypical experience of low agency. The loss of energy and fatigue experienced during a depressive episode is a mental, as well as physical, phenomenon. The inability to motivate oneself, feeling tired and overwhelmed, is synonymous with a lack of agency. This lack of agency is extreme when a person with depression cannot muster the energy to brush her teeth, eat, or get out of bed. The loss of energy felt by persons diagnosed with depression also may be related to goal blockage. Many times individuals who have a sufficient level of agency will experience a decrease in agency when a goal is initially blocked. It is as if the individuals interpret the goal blockage as a sign that efforts are not worthwhile. Thus, while fatigue and loss of energy are related closely to agency, these symptoms are also related, to a lesser degree, to goal blockage.

Just as loss of energy is a prototypically low agency symptom, the inability to concentrate and focus is a prototypically low pathways symptom. Once a goal is in mind, individuals must feel confident in their abilities to concentrate long enough to envision routes to that goal. People with inadequate pathways thinking, however, perceive themselves as being incapable of concentrating on ways to get to a goal.

Depressed mood, the fifth symptom, encompasses all three hope theory components. Goal blockage accounts for most of a depressed mood. As discussed in the next section, emotional consequences result from perceived loss or gain. Thus, depressed mood will result from a perceived blockage of an important goal. Low agency also contributes to this feeling. When agentic thinking is disrupted, perceptions of goal blockages and negative events will seem all the more insurmountable. Likewise, individuals with low pathways thoughts will heighten the experience of a depressed mood through the belief that there is no way to circumvent the goal blockage.

The sixth symptom, feelings of worthlessness, can be explained in a similar manner as the previous depressive symptom. If a goal is blocked, this will result in negative emotions, including feelings of worthlessness. Moreover, to the extent that a person feels that he has generated the best pathways that he can to this goal that has been blocked, his feelings of worthlessness will be increased. Low agency contributes to the feeling of worthlessness as well. When an individual believes that he cannot motivate himself to do even the most simple or important tasks in life, this belief may contribute to the feeling of worthlessness.

Suicidal thoughts and attempts, I believe, result primarily from goal blockage. When an individual has determined that the most important goal (whether interpersonal attachment or achievement) being sought is permanently blocked, that individual may begin to entertain thoughts of suicide. In addition, the suicidal indi-


vidual sees herself as being incapable of envisioning alternative pathways to the blocked goal and has a depleted sense of the necessary agency to generate new, more attainable goals. Thus, while goal blockage plays the major role in an individual's suicidal ideation, the person's pathways and agentic thoughts are also influential.

Weight loss or gain and sleep disturbance both are primarily accounted for by goal blockages through resulting ruminations. These behavioral manifestations of unsuccessful goal pursuits are linked to the negative emotional experience generated by the perception of failure. In addition, agency plays a role in both symptom presentations. Weight loss in depression typically is associated with the loss of appetite and energy. In terms of weight loss, low-agency individuals may not have the energy or motivation to go get food or cook a meal. The resulting weight loss then stems from a lack of willpower to meet even the most basic of nutritional needs. Similarly, the inability to maintain a sufficient sleep pattern also may be related to a reduction in agency. Hypersomnia may result from a decrease in a normal level of energy. Furthermore, insomnia may be related to ruminations about goal blockages in general, especially the goal of going to sleep. These latter thoughts, of course, only make it harder to reach the desired sleep goal.

A H O P E F U L E X P L A N A T I O N OF D E P R E S S I O N

According to the tenets of hope theory, emotional consequences result from cognitions related to the pursuit of goals and the eventual attainment or loss of those goals (Snyder, 1994; Snyder et al., in press). In this model, the cognitions related to goal pursuits precede the experience of emotion. An individual's perception of loss or gain will determine the emotional response. For example, the experience of receiving failure feedback in relation to goal pursuit has been shown to produce negative emotions (Palys & Little, 1983; Ruehlman & Wolchik, 1988; Snyder et al., 1996). Suppose, for example, that a student has set a goal of receiving an A on the first exam in a class, but receives a C-. The student is likely to view this inability to reach the grade goal as a failure and respond with negative emotions (for empirical support of this exact scenario, see Snyder and Clair, 1976).

In the previous example, we see how a person initially experiences negative affect in response to goal-failure or blockage cognitions. Although everyone has under- gone goal blockages or failures that result in negative emotions, major depressions are far less prevalent. Why? In the following sections, I will consider the role of each hope component (goals, agency, and pathways) in the onset and course of major depression.

Goal Blockages

For some individuals, the initial experiences of negative emotions resulting from blocked goals become sustained and exceedingly painful. I propose that there are

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three goal blockage patterns that are unique to these people and that may account for their clinical depressions.

An Important or Fundamental Goal is Blocked

Snyder (1994) has theorized that, in the context of hope theory, a goal must have some minimal level of importance in order to affect agentic and pathways thinking, as well as emotional reactions. For example, every day I have the goal of getting something to eat for breakfast. Some days this goal is accomplished and many days it is not. In the grand scheme of things, however, this goal has relatively little importance. Contrast my breakfast goal with the goals of finding a mate or finishing an academic degree. At the risk of stating the obvious, these latter goals, when not met, should have a more profoundly negative emotional impact than missing my breakfast. In a similar manner, I propose that dysphoria and depression typically will be associated with the blockage or loss of goals that are of great importance to an individual.

Depression researchers have examined the relationship between personality types and stressful life events. Many have proposed that individuals can be classified as either affiliative or autonomous (Angyal, 1951; Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Bakan, 1966; Beck, 1983; Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976; Bowlby, 1980), with stressful life events differentially predicting the onset of depression for persons with these two personality types. For instance, if an individual has an affiliative personality style and loses an important relationship (e.g., divorce, death of a loved one), that person will be at risk for a depressive episode because an important goal has been blocked or disrupted. If the individual has an autonomous personality, however, then an achievement-related loss (a demotion at work or the rejection of an important project) should greatly increase the risk of depressive symptoms. On this issue, researchers consistently have found that the importance of the goal is linked with the vulnerability to depression (Clark, Beck, & Brown, 1992).

It should be highlighted that goal importance is based on the person's subjective appraisal. Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) have proposed a titration model for cognitive vulnerability and stress. They suggest that the intensity of the negative stressor must interact with the individual cognitive vulnerability in order to result in a depressive episode. Expanding my previous example, a highly affiliative individual might become depressed after a big fight with a loved one. A mod- erately affiliative individual, however, might not experience similar depressive symptoms unless the relationship tie actually is severed. Thus, we can see the neces- sity of examining the subjective level of importance given to an event by an individual. Abramson et al. posit that most people will experience depressive symptoms after undergoing events that are universally negative and extremely important (e.g., a concentration camp imprisonment). Events with less universal negativity and extreme importance, on the other hand, will interact with an individual's specific cognitive vulnerability.


Choosing Unsatisfying Goals

The proponents of hope theory define a goal as a desired outcome with a proba- bility of occurrence that is above zero, but below 100%. Setting goals that are sure things or impossibilities may enhance the likelihood of a depressive experience. If there is a 100% chance that a goal is going to be realized, then this outcome is not really a goal-- i t is a certainty. Take, for example, an older man whose daily goal is to get up from bed, walk over to the couch, and watch television for the majority of the day. This goal is relatively easily met--barr ing some physical limitation. Therefore, the man should experience success and positive affect. According to hope theorists, however, the associated lack of challenge in the goal setting largely under- mines the benefits related to goal attainment (Snyder, 1994). Related to this point, researchers have reported that dysphoria is associated with setting minimal goals under success conditions (e.g., Catanzaro, 1991). In the previous example, the minimal goal setting provides no challenge; thus, the goal attainment does not bolster expectancies about one's abilities or subsequent likely tasks that are more important, yet uncertain in outcome.

Conversely, if there is a 0% chance that a goal is going to be met, this is not a realistic goal. Imagine a young woman who is 5 feet tall. Her ultimate goal is to be a supermodel and walk the runways of Paris and Milan. The minimum height requirement at the modeling agencies where she applies is 5 feet 9 inches. Day after day she walks into one modeling agency after another, striving for a goal that never will be accomplished. Her goal blockages and failures will become increasingly difficult to bear over time, and her negative feelings will mount. On this point, researchers have found that levels of depression are related to extreme goal difficulty and perceived stress, as well as lack of control in goal attainment (e.g., Lecci, Karoly, Briggs, & Kuhn, 1994). Furthermore, when time and energy are wasted setting unattainable goals, the opportunities to set new, more realistic goals are limited or perhaps even squandered (Lecci, Okun, & Karoly, 1994). Thus, by setting goals that are too dit~cult or impossible, the person is likely to become depressed.

Generalized Expectancy for Failure

According to hope theorists, the process and end result of goal pursuits affects subsequent perceptions of goal value and pursuit capabilities (Snyder et al., in press). More simply stated, if individuals have a successful goal pursuit and attain the goal, they will strengthen their perception that the goal is indeed valuable and that they have adequate capabilities (both in general and specific to this goal) to achieve success in goal pursuits. If these individuals have an unsuccessful goal pursuit, however, they may begin to devalue the goal object and/or question their ability to successfully complete goal pursuits, both specifically and generally. When unsuccessful goal pursuits occur repeatedly, individuals become more and more likely to develop a generalized expectancy that they never will be able to attain their desired life goals. With this generalized expectancy, they are at risk for becoming depressed.

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Abramson et al. (1989), in advocating the hopelessness theory, reason that expectations of encountering highly aversive consequences or expectations of not achieving highly desirable consequences are enough to place some people at risk for depression. These theorists believe that a person begins to feel deficient or unwor- thy when undesirable but important consequences are attributed to stable and global (far-reaching) causes. Hopelessness thus occurs when goal pursuits are unsuccessful and the individual believes that the previous unsuccessful goal pursuits are indica- tive of future unfulfilled goal pursuits.

Once individuals regularly expect negative consequences, they may become biased to reify such dour self-referential outcomes. For example, researchers have reported that depressed subjects show greater processing eflqciency for depressive, negative self-referential information than they do for positive information (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, DonneR, & Ronan, 1987). Thus, depressed individuals are more likely to select and remember information that reinforces their perceived inade- quacies. Furthermore, Clark, Beck, and Brown (1989) have shown that depressed individuals have a tendency to be past oriented in their information processing. Unfortunately, this tendency to search for congruent information in the past (in this case, examples of failure or unwanted consequences) is facilitated by confirmation biases--the likelihood that one will find what he or she looks for in an environment (Snyder & Swann, 1978). If this process of emphasizing past and future failures continues, generalized expectancies for failure may be adopted and, with the next occurrence of a failure, the person becomes depressed.

The three components of hope interact with one another either to keep the flow of hopeful thinking alive or to deplete the level of hopeful thoughts. Thus, goal blockages that result in frustration and sadness inevitably will affect one's level of agentic and pathways thinking. Conversely, the initial levels of both agentic and pathways thinking will affect goal pursuits and goal setting tendencies, as well as one another. In the following sections, I will discuss how agency and pathways thinking are affected by goal blockages and how each of these components contributes to the likelihood that significant goal blockages will occur.

Lack of Agency

Agency Loss from Goal Blockage

Frank (1961) stated that clients enter therapy in a demoralized state. After meeting blockages to desired goals, clients give up on achieving those things that they want most. While the act of coming to therapy suggests that these clients are not totally demoralized (Snyder et al., in press), the picture painted by the term demoralized is useful for a discussion of the relationship between depression and agency. Imagine someone who has encountered several dead-ends in the pursuit of an important goal. It is easy to see why such a person gives up and becomes unwilling to move


forward with other plans or to set new goals. Because of the repeated goal blockages, this person's agentic thinking wanes.

Coyne, Gallo, Klinkman, and Calarco (1998) report that people feel less confi- dence and trust in themselves after experiencing goal blockages and depressive episodes. Moreover, these research participants indicated that they were less likely to seek new relationships or occupational advancement after a depressive episode. These same authors also examined recovered depressed participants and never depressed, yet currently distressed, participants. Whereas the recovered depressed participants had lower depressive symptomology than did distressed participants, they had higher levels of concern about limitations on their lives and their abilities to maintain relationships. In hope terms, this suggests that even following recovery from depression resulting from goal blockage, agency remained tenuously low.

In the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day is listed as one of nine possible criteria symptoms for diagnosing clinical depression. Indeed, researchers have shown that this symptom is one of the most prevalent in cases of major depressive disorder. For example, Buchwald and P,.udick-Davis (1993) reported that 93% of outpatients diagnosed with major depression reported a loss of energy. Furthermore, researchers found that energy loss information can be used effectively to distinguish depressed from nondepressed persons (Buchwald & Rudick-Davis, 1993; Christensen & Duncan, 1995). Clients who have recovered from depression also give testimonials to the significance of this symptom (Coyne et al., 1998). These respondents reported that their lowered expectations were related, in part, to their worries about lacking energy for their future activities. It is clear, therefore, that agency is deeply affected by the experience of goal blockage and depression and that these effects do not spontaneously remit with the symptoms of the disorder.

Chronically Low Agency

In the preceding section, I describe individuals who have lost agency due to one or more goal blockages over time. Additionally, we all may have known people, both professionally and personally, who seem to be chronically low-agency. These individuals seem sluggish and have a hard time getting motivated to meet their goals m if they even have sufficient agency to set their goals in the first place. The low- agency individual may be at an increased risk for depression due to this perpetual low mental energy. As Christensen and Duncan (1995) point out, most researchers have examined the loss of energy as a symptom of depression. The authors argue, however, that a lack of energy also may contribute to depression via the development of other symptoms such as lack of interest or pleasure and psychomotor retardation.

Moreover, Thayer (1978) has proposed a theory of mood in which mood states are linked directly to levels of energy and tension. He reasons that an optimal mood state is associated with reduced tension and higher energyman energetic calm. On

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the other hand, low levels of energy and high levels of tension are associated with negative or aversive mood statesmtense tiredness. This theory is entirely consistent with the contention that individuals with chronically low levels of agency are at increased risk for negative mood states, including depression. According to hope theorists, this tense tiredness is problematic for three reasons. First individuals are less likely to pursue goals if they lack the mental and physical energies necessary for goal pursuits. Second, even if the individuals by chance should attain the desired goal, they may lack the agency to appreciate and value the goal object. Third, they cannot even enjoy the journey to their goals. Thus, the relationship between agency and depression is likely bidirectional. Chronically low agency increases the risk of depression; however, depression decreases current and future agency.

Insufficient Pathways

Inability to Generate Pathways

The pathways component of hope theory includes both the actual ability to generate routes to a goal and, more importantly, the perception that one has the ability to generate routes to a goal. Thus, there are two subtypes of low-pathways thinking that are related to depression.

In the first scenario, an individual cannot come up with viable routes to his or her goal. As a child, my mother taught my sister and I the bear hunt game. The leader of the game decides to go on a bear hunt but encounters many obstacles along the way. For example, the protagonist of the bear hunt comes to a fence in her adven- ture. She exclaims, "A fence! Can't go around it! Can't go under it! I guess I'll have to go over it!" This type of goal blockage and reworking of the plan continues throughout the game. Although this seems like a simple children's game, the message is an important one. Without the ability to generate new pathways, an individual will always be stranded at dead-end goal blockages. This type of pathway diNculty is rdated to depression because as goal blockages are encountered, the individual will be left with a perception of failure as opposed to new pathways thoughts.

The second, and more crucial, type of pathway difficulty related to depression is the belief that one cannot generate workable routes to a goal. In hope theory (Sny- der, 1994), an individual's perception or self-referential belief is a key process. Sny- der believes that the constructivist lens through which we view the world always affects our realities. Thus, while the actual ability and the perceived ability to generate pathways are usually positively related, many clients perceive their abilities to generate pathways as being much lower than their actual abilities. Consider a client who has a goal, and you ask her to brainstorm different ways to achieve this goal (a solution-focused approach). The client responds that she cannot think of any ways to reach that goal. You assure the client that there is no need to worry about the viability of the options, but to just call out any route that comes to mind. The client then reiterates her d iNcu l ty - -no routes come to mind. This type of pathway diN-


culty is related to depression due to the inherent inability to move toward a goal. In other words, this type of individual is stuck at the starting line of goal pursuit. The client can imagine a goal and would likely have the agency to move toward that goal; however, she does not perceive herself as being capable of conceptualiz- ing how to get there.

Inability to Disengage from Dead-End Pathways

Every once in a while, we may fall into the trap of truly believing that there is one right way to reach a goal. We map out the perfect path and away we go. There are, however, inevitably rough spots even in the best laid plans, and sometimes the road we choose will not lead us to our desired destination. At times we have to change our plans in order to meet our goal. People who are unwilling to disengage from the original pathway are at an increased risk for depression. For example, assume that Mike's goal was to have a job that allowed him to work with and help children. Mike decided that the best pathway toward this goal was to become a pediatrician. Therefore, he took his required pre-med courses and applied to medical school. Mike was denied admission to medical school. The next year, he took a class to raise his MCAT scores, he made some contacts at different medical schools, and he reap- plied for admission. Again, he was denied admission to medical school. This pattern continued for three years until Mike became very despondent and depressed. Mike became so engrossed in pursuing this specific pathway (medical school to become a pediatrician) that he lost sight of the goa lmto help children. When Mike was presented with this information in psychotherapy, he began to understand that there were many different pathways to reach his goal. Thus, his inability to disengage from the pathway that he thought would be most rewarding was related to his experience of depression.

Researchers exploring the point I have made in the previous paragraph indeed find that the inability to disengage from unattainable goals is related to higher depression (Lecci, Okun, and Karoly, 1994). Lecci and colleagues found that regrets affected present functioning to the greatest degree in individuals who believed that the regretted goal could have been accomplished. In other words, individuals who believed that their goal was completely blocked were less likely to dwell on this regret than individuals who believed they somehow could have reached their goal. Based on this finding, I would reiterate the importance of disengaging from unworkable routes and finding new, workable routes in order to increase later life satisfaction and decrease depression.

H O W H O P E P R O T E C T S A G A I N S T D E P R E S S I O N

In the preceding section, I described how low or damaged hope can result in depressive symptoms and/or episodes. Now, I turn to the mechanisms through which

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hope protects individuals against depression. These are attributes that high-hope individuals possess in their day-to-day functioning.

Setting More Goals

High-hope individuals set more goals than their low-hope counterparts (Snyder et al., 1991). This engagement in more than one goal at a time ensures that a goal blockage is not devastating. Take the following example. A young man's only goal is to convince the woman he is dating to marry him immediately. Instead, the young woman ends the relationship with her boyfriend and thus he is left with his only valued goal being blocked. As previously discussed, this blockage will result in negative emotions (Snyder et al., 1996) and possibly a depressive episode. Now, consider the same young man with the same goal of marriage to his girlfriend. In the second scenario, however, he also has a valued goal of advancing in his .job, travel- ing around the world, and building a house. The breakup of his relationship under these latter circumstances still will produce negative emotions; nonetheless, he will be less likely to become very depressed because he has other important goals to pursue. It even is possible that a displacement of sorts occurs in which he channels the negative emotions of the breakup into extremely hard work at his .job.

More Pathways and More Agency

The Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) has been derived to measure a sense of agentic and pathways thinking. In other words, this scale is designed to measure an individual's belief that he or she has the capability to produce workable routes and the requisite mental energy to initiate and sustain progress along those routes. Researchers have shown that, in addition to the beliefs about agency and pathways, high-hope people actually generate more pathways and sustain more agency than do medium- or low-hope individuals (Snyder et al., 1991). In fact, even in the face of failure feedback, high-hope individuals generate more pathways and continue to sustain more agency than those lower in hope. This finding is important for two reasons. First, it provides evidence that, in high-hope individuals, failure does not immediately result in depression; thus, hope is protective. Second, the actual ability to generate more pathways and sustain agency, in addition to the belief that one can do so, defends against depression indirectly through protection against failure. If one's goal is to become a great cook, the likelihood that this will occur is enhanced by having several strategies (taking lessons, buying cookbooks, and listening to Martha Stewart) and maintaining the agency to pursue the generated strategies. As stated previously, the belief and the ability to generate pathways are linked in this model. Thus, affecting either the belief or the ability to generate pathways invari- ably will affect the other.


General ized Expec tancy for Success

just as a generalized expectancy for failure can result in depressive symptoms, a generalized expectancy for success can protect against those same symptoms. High- hope individuals believe that they will reach their goals. For example, high-hope students are more likely to believe that they will reach their final grade goals than low-hope students (Snyder et al., 1991). With their generalized success expectancies, high-hope individuals are able to view goal blockages as temporary setbacks. Thus, a goal blockage is not conceptualized as a failure if one continues to expect success. The blockage is merely viewed as a learning experience for a high-hope individual about a strategy that does not work. Snyder (1994) suggests that high- hope individuals have learned that they will encounter goal blockages in their goal pursuits. Thus, when a goal blockage occurs, the high-hope individual can use this information to do the mental detective work to generate new alternative pathways leading to goal attainment. Through an adaptive learning strategy, these individuals continue to expect success in their goal pursuits.

Focus on Past Success

The generalized expectancy for success is determined, in part, by focusing on past successes, as opposed to past failures. In addition to setting positive goals for the future, there is evidence that high-hope individuals attach themselves to past successes and distance themselves some from past failures (Snyder et al., 1997). High- hope individuals derive two benefits from this process. First, individuals who are able to distance themselves from past failures may achieve useful objectivity to learn from these failures. In other words, the distancing process may allow individuals to use failure as a learning experience for future goal pursuits (Snyder, 1994). Second, through the distancing process, the individuals can view the experiences as failures without viewing themselves as a failure. This stance of viewing the failure experience as unstable, specific, and external is protective against depressive symptoms (Abramson et al., 1989).

Growth Seeking Goals

There is evidence that people who set validation-seeking goals are more prone to depressive episodes and self-esteem loss than those who set growth-seeking goals (Dykman, 1998). Validation-seeking goals are strivings to prove one's self-worth, competence, and likeability through attainment of a goal. In contrast, growth-seeking goals are strivings to learn, grow, and improve. Dykman has found that individuals with validation-seeking goals are more likely to engage in self-blame, disengage from goal pursuit, and suffer from depression when faced with failure than growth-

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seeking goal setters. Based on these findings, he has termed growth-seeking individuals as depression-resistant and validation-seeking individuals as depression- prone.

Similarly, Dweck (1999) discusses performance and learning goals. Individuals who set performance goals focus on measuring ability while individuals with learning goals focus on mastering new information or skills. Through her research, Dweck has found that individuals with performance goals have increased helpless- ness in response to goal pursuit difficulties. Due to the focus on talent or ability, these students begin to question themselves and their skills when faced with challenges. Conversely, individuals with mastery goals expect that they will encounter problems as they struggle to develop a new domain. In fact, Dweck believes that when learning goals are set, individuals faced with failure are likely to increase their efforts to learn and continue working toward their goals.

Snyder (1994) has proposed that high-hope individuals are more invested in the process of goal pursuit than the actual goal attainment. Furthermore, research has shown that high-hope participants set higher goal standards with the opportunity for growth and learning as opposed to lower goal standards with the assurance of attainment (Snyder et al., 1991). One interpretation of these findings is that high- hope individuals are more likely to set growth-seeking, stretch goals than their low- hope counterparts. Thus, enjoying the process of goal pursuit and setting goals that provide the opportunity for growth and learning should protect high-hope people from depressive symptoms due to the lessened tendencies of individuals with these types of goals to engage in self-blame and to suffer from depression after goal failure.

I N S T I L L I N G H O P E IN D E P R E S S E D P E R S O N S

Several researchers have found that hope and depression, while separate constructs (Magaletta & Oliver, 1999), are negatively correlated (Chang, Rand, Strunk, & DeSimone, 1999; Elliott, Witty, Herrick, & Hoffman, 1991; Magaletta & Oliver, 1999; Snyder et al., 1991). Therefore, depressed people are more likely to have lower levels of hopemparticularly during the time of the depression. In the following section, I make suggestions for increasing hope in persons who are depressed.

Goal Setting

Concrete Manageable Goals

Often depressed individuals are unable to separate the issues in their lives into dis- tinct, manageable goals. Beck and his colleagues (1979) have stated that, in the treatment of depression, clinicians "provide symptom relief by translating major complaints to solvable problems" (p. 167). This strategy of translating complaints and


desires into concrete goals with subgoals and visible end points also has been sug- gested by Snyder and colleagues (in press). Imagine a client who comes to the first therapy session with the goal of "feeling better and getting things done." Although this is an understandable goal for someone who is feeling down and unproductive, it is not a hopeful goal in terms of generating the requisite pathways and agency to accomplish the goal. Relatively small changes to this broad, abstract goal, however, can transform it into a hopeful goal. For example, instead of "getting things done," the goal might be restated as "finishing the painting I have been working on and learning to do calligraphy." Now the goal has a concrete end point (the client will be able to identify when the painting is done), as well as the possibility for subgoals (buying a calligraphy book, learning lower case letters first, etc.). By setting goals with concrete end points and subgoals, persons with depression will have more success experiences and, therefore, begin to change their generalized expectancies.

Setting Approach Goals

In keeping with the premise of utilizing concrete end points in goal-setting, it is important to encourage clients to set approach goals. It is imperative that clients set such goals because avoidance goals do not have concrete end points. If someone's goal is to stop smokingmwhen is that goal accomplished? Is it accomplished when the individual stops smoking for a day, or a week, or five years? In addition, there are several other reasons to encourage clients to set approach goals. For one, avoidance goals have been associated with depression and negative self-evaluation, regard- less of task performance (Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996). Therefore, even when participants were successful in their avoidance goal pursuits, they felt more depressed and less positive about themselves than did those participants with approach goals. Second, it is easier for clients to generate pathways for approach goals. Using a weight loss goal, the pathway to stop eating so-called bad foods is basically to not engage in that behavior. The goal of increasing fitness level, however, can involve several pathways, including jogging three times a week, starting to swim, or taking the stairs instead of the elevator at work. Third, Coats et al. discuss the effect that avoidance goals have on the process of monitoring for success in goal pursuits. When persons are pursuing a goal, they monitor the environment for signs of their progress. If the goal is to jog three times a week, the individual can keep track of the days during which jogging took place. These days will be marked as successes. If the goal is to not feel bad, however, the individual will monitor the environment for negative feelings and the presence of these feelings will be marked as failures.

Setting Intrinsic Goals

Researchers have shown that a focus on external rewards and the approval of oth- ers can result in high levels of depression and physical symptoms (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Thus, in order to avoid depressive symptoms, clients should be encouraged

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to consider their own needs and wants when setting goals. When setting goals with a client, it may be important to explicitly ask the client why he or she would like to engage in a given goal pursuit. For example, a client reports that he or she would like to earn a significant amount of money. Upon examining this goal with the client, the therapist discovers that the client has set this goal because he or she believes that his or her spouse would like him or her to make more money. Unless the client is intrinsically invested in that goal, the goal pursuit is likely to increase negative emotions and depressive symptoms--even when this pursuit is successful. Therefore, in this case, it would be beneficial to the client to set goals that he or she is interested in attaining and/or achieving.

Agency

Exercise

Thayer, Newman, and McClain (1994) found that when presented with a wide vari- ety of options, participants rated exercise as the most successful tool employed to change a bad mood, the fourth most successful strategy for raising energy, and the third-place technique in reducing tension. Exercise has been hypothesized to be related to increases in agentic thinking (Snyder, 1994) as a result of these increases in mood and energy with a simultaneous decrease in tension. Therefore, via exercise, the client will attain the necessary energy and buoyancy to begin thinking in a hopeful manner. Because the agency and pathways components are iterative, this increase in energy and motivation should lead to increases in hopeful thinking.

Cognitive Pep Talks

High-hope individuals prefer positive self-referential statements such as "I know I can do this" (Snyder, LaPointe, Crowson, & Early, 1998). Additionally, high-hope people tend to remember positive, as opposed to negative, information over time. This type of positive cognitive self-talk has been shown to increase energy levels and mood (Thayer et al., 1994), which is consistent with cognitive theories of depression (Beck et al., 1979). Therefore, it is important to encourage clients to speak to themselves in a positive manner in order to increase agency and hope. Help- ing clients to generate some phrases that they feel are true and positive will help facilitate their using this type of self-talk. As hope begins to increase in these clients, it is likely that they will begin to replace their typical negative self-statements with the positive self-statements.

Praise for Decision to Seek Treatment

As has been discussed elsewhere (Snyder et al., in press), the decision to enter therapy reflects a certain level of agency because the client has sustained movement


along the pathway of seeking help. Furthermore, researchers have shown that clients begin to experience improvement after agreeing to seek treatment, but before the initial treatment session (Beckham, 1989). Therefore, a client presenting with a depressive episode is most likely experiencing some degree of agency loss, but he or she has summoned enough agency to come in for help. This decision and effort on the part of the client must be acknowledged and praised by the "expert" or therapist. This praise may be encoded as a success, which will begin a pattern of success experiences for the client in therapy.

Pathways

Skill Training

A fundamental approach for increasing hopeful thinking in a depressed client is to provide new skills that will enable future pathways generation. Individuals with depressive symptoms often set important goals, but lack the pathways to reach the goals (Lecci, Karoly et al., 1994). Thus, when the therapist helps the client to link these goals with the skills or behaviors that will allow the client to accomplish the goal's, success experiences will be available. Skills training with depressive clients can take several forms, including the recognition of automatic thoughts (Beck et al., 1979), social skills training (Segrin, 1992), and engaged coping skills (Chang et al., 1999). Whether the skills deficits are real or perceived, training in specific techniques (pathways) may increase the client's perception about his or her skills repertoire.

Recognize Successes

When a client enters therapy, she often is feeling as though she cannot do anything correctly. It is unlikely, however, that this is actually the case. There are two hope- related strategies that therapists can use to help the client in beginning to recognize her successes and, ultimately, build on those successes. First, the therapist can point to accomplishments that the client is overlooking. For example, imagine that a client has the goal of going grocery shopping for the week, but she believes this to be impossible because "she cannot get anywhere these days." The therapist in this case might point out that the client, in fact, somehow arrived at therapy. Then, the therapist can ask the client to describe the successful pathways that allowed her to get to therapy. It is possible that these same pathways might be useful in getting to the grocery store; however, even if they are not, the presence of past successful pathways thinking should open the client to the possibility of increasing future successful pathways thinking.

Second, the therapist can provide success experiences for the client within the therapy sessions. If a client is not experiencing success experiences outside of the therapy room, the therapist may build these experiences into sessions. For example, a client may complete part of a homework assignment in session to ensure that he

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can identify ways to get the assignment done. Or, a therapist and client may work together in order to devise a plan to make sure that the agenda items are covered in session. This type of intervention will allow the client to participate in coming up with strategies to be used in session. In essence, the client is developing success experiences for generating pathways and simultaneously structuring the session in a pro- ductive manner. Furthermore, any opportunity that the therapist has to serve as an example for pathway generation will help the client observe that this is a normal part of goal pursuits. Thus, a therapist may wonder aloud how she will make next week's appointment when it cannot be at the regularly scheduled time. This would be an opportunity for the therapist to generate different alternatives and choose the most feasible pathway in the presence of the client.

C O N C L U S I O N S

The tenets of hope theory can be used to both understand and combat the symptoms of depression experienced by millions of people around the world. Every day people exemplify hopeful thinking as they struggle to overcome goal losses and blockages in their lives. The lesson of this chapter has been that negative emotions result from our perceptions of goal blockages. Hopeful thought changes the perceptions of failure in two very important ways. The first means of changing perceptions in a hopeful direction is to focus on ways around a goal blockage. Thus, not attaining a goal does not have to be a failuremit can be a lesson in how to reach that goal in a more efficient way next time. The second means by which hopeful thought changes the perception's of goal blockages is that a hopeful individual looks for a way to keep going. When obstacles occur, as they always will, a hopeful person will perceive them as challenges to one's wi l lmnot as stopping points. Thus, when these two lessons are taken together, a goal blockage that might lead to depressive symptomology will instead lead to a reinvigorated effort to find a new way to one's goal. Hope, therefore, provides a light for emerging from the psychological darkness of depression.

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