homo sociologicus do we need him

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Homo Sociologicus:Do We Need Him/Her?PETERABELL

London School of EconomicsUntil quite recently rational action or choice theory (spawned by Homo Economicus)had gained few adherents amongst those who struggle to find adequate foundationalideas for a sociological theory. Things now look more promising, however; Colemanhas given us a truly remarkablework, and a number of journals are beginning to carryarticles informed by a rational choice perspective (1990).For many, of course, the entire edifice of sociological theory rests upon assump-tions, either that human actions are neither self-regarding nor rational (i.e., notoptimally chosen) or that such actions are of peripheralinterest because human actorsare propelled by Durkheimian structural forces beyond their control-thus at leastone version of Homo Sociologicus. Yet for others, the vocabulary of action andmotive provides only post hoc rationalizations, and all we are entitled to examine arethe entrails of a rationalizing discourse. I suspect, however, that one reason whyrational action theory is experiencing a new lease on life is precisely because thesevarious approaches, when stripped of their verbalpretensions and quasi-philosophicalveneer, appear to be rapidly leading us nowhere. Although it would not be prudent toclaim that rational choice theory is likely to solve all the theoretical puzzles a sociologistmight pose, in my view it must be given pride of place.

In the space available I cannot make a sustained case for this assertion. Rather Ihave chosen to concentrate upon one issue, namely the relationship between explana-tions of human action from (on the one hand) the precepts of rational action theory(RAT) and (on the other) from the constraint or facilitation of normativeexpectations.I take this route for a number of reasons: first, because for many, the most compellingmode of sociological explanation is in terms of social norms (i.e., normative expecta-tions); second, because Coleman has argued that action compliant with social normscan be subsumed under RAT; and third, because Elster has argued to the contrary(1989). If Coleman is right and Elster wrong, then the case for at least one conceptionof Homo Sociologicus is undermined.Elster makes several claims, as follows:

(1) Social norms are to be distinguished from moral, legal, and private norms, andalso from conventions (in the sense of conventional equilibria), habits, andtraditional actions. Thus they stand apart as an independent category with theirown defining characteristics.(2) Normatively compliant actions, as opposed to rationally optimal actions, are notevaluated in terms of their consequences. They are not instrumental or condi-tioned upon future states of affairs.(3) Normatively compliant actions characteristically are emotionally charged in thesense that their violation will lead to states of negative affect, guilt, shame,embarrassment, and so on (generally internal sanctions).(4) Normatively compliant action cannot be derived (is not determined by) self-interest. More generally social norms have "an independent motivating power."This is called the "reality" of social norms.Sociological Theory 9:2 Fall 1991


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(5) Normatively compliant action is not a variety of optimal (rational) action, fromeither an individualistic or a collective standpoint. This is called the "autonomy"of social norms.I shall argue that there are good reasons to doubt the exclusivity which these claimscumulatively build for the role of social norms.It is useful, first of all, to distinguish between those individuals who "hold" or

promote a social norm (i.e., those who have a preference or expectation that the normshould be obeyed-usually in some specified circumstances and by designated actors)and those individuals whose actions comply (at least in part) with the norm inquestion. The two sets of individuals may or may not be coincidental or overlap. Froman RAT perspective, there is a question as to the rationality of both the holders andthose who are compliant. It is the ambition of the theory to make the actions of bothfall under its precepts. If this effort is to be entirely successful, the theory would haveto establish that(1) the existence (genesis) of normative expectations can be accounted for by assum-ing a) self-regarding, b) optimally chosen, and c) individual actions; and(2) the actions of both those who hold or promote and those who comply withnormative expectations can be accounted for by the same three assumptions.It is useful to keep (1) and (2) separate from each other because it may be possible toachieve a full RAT account of one but not the other.It appears that RAT answers to (2) are achieved comparatively easily; the geneticquestion proves more problematic. It will be entirely in accord with the self-regardinginterests of individuals to comply with the normative expectations of others if either d)they are subject to credible threats and/or trustworthy promises, or e) violationinduces intraindividual ("psychic") costs that tip the expected utility appropriately.Within this framework, the calculation of internalcost-benefit ratios, derivative of thestrength of the individual's normative conviction, counts towards the conception ofself-regarding interest. Both mechanisms (d) and (e) are widely recognized and under-stood, and there is no a priori reason to suppose that assumptions (1) (a), (b), and (c)cannot achieve the necessary explanatory closure. The existence of internalized normsand the capacity to issue credible threats or trustworthy promises are each exogenousin this scheme of things; no doubt for many, it is these which require explanation.Endogenizing the existence of internalized norms, however, takes us to question (1).Notwithstanding, much can be accomplished without taking this route. Elster saysthat "if some people successfully exploit norms for self interested purposes it can onlybe because others are willing to let norms take precedence over self interest" (1989).But surely it is possible to make this claim only if we ignore the impact of internalizednorms upon intraindividual cost-benefit ratios. Once again, the proper province forsuch enquiries is found under the auspices of question (1).If we turn now to those who "promote" normative expectations, is there any sensein which we must surrenderthe assumptions of either self-regardor optimality on theirbehalf? Clearly if the promoter has internalized the norm (with respect to the actionsof others), no a priori problem seems to arise. The net calculation of utility can leadher to rationally expect others to comply with a norm. If only external sanctions areinvolved, however, then (as Elster recognizes) things are not likely to be as straight-forward. In the unlikely world bereft of normative internalization, A will comply witha norm either because it reflects her interests or because of the credible threats and/ortrustworthy promises issued by B. But why does B so back a normative expectation?

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HOMO SOCIOLOGICUS: DO WE NEED HIM/HER?The obvious answer, of course, is because the norm enshrines B's self-regardinginterests. Marxism's theory of norms, for instance, takes this simple form.Yet it might be that B promotes the norm because of potential sanctions' (threatsand promises) on the part of a third actor, C (consider, for example, hierarchies ofsanctioning authority). We may conceive of metanorms (i.e., norms that take theungainly form-sanctions of those who fail to sanction others who violate basicnormative expectations). In the absence of cyclical sanctioning structures (which arenot impossible-e.g., some cooperatives), backward induction must produce a pro-moter of metanorms who does so irrespectiveof any threat of sanctions upon himself.Consequently, as Elster puts it, "some sanctions must be performed for motives otherthan the fear of being sanctioned" (1989, p. 133).This is a rather tortuous point, but RAT will fail if indeed such a "prime mover"cannot be intellectually positioned so as to embrace the ultimate norm (and thus thederivative metanorm(s)) from a self-regarding standpoint. I believe, however, thatthis is empirically improbable. Thus the basic assumptions of RAT, in my view, arelikely to hold up fairly well in examining action that is fashioned by institutionalizednormative expectations.

Question (2) is altogether the more tricky. The first essential point of note about anyRAT account of the genesis of normative expectations is that it cannot, from the start,invoke internalization and any associated psychic costs and benefits. These mustnecessarily come later. Thus it might very well be within the compass of my rationalself-regarding interest both to promote and to comply with the fine-grained expect-ations of social etiquette, given the likely opprobrium, shame, embarrassment, and soon consequent upon any violation on my part.But is the genesis of these selfsame expectations explicable in RAT terms? Or, totake another example-of which I have implicitly made extensive use-can RAT pre-cepts (net of any normative internalization) explain the norms of "keeping promises"and "delivering threats" that underlie the existing normative expectations in anysocial system? These latter issues, of course, have been debated widely by economistsbecause Pareto-improving voluntary exchange of goods and services is usually depen-dent upon theprior existence of norms that promote both promise keeping the respectfor property rights (Rowe 1989).Despite Elster's claim to the contrary, following Coleman (1990) and the intellectualtraditions he draws upon, it is possible to see the broad shape of a general rationaltheory of the genesis of normative expectations. Such expectations will emerge wherea) individuals' encounters are repeated and b) their actions (constitutive of the interac-tion) have external effects, so that individual and collective optimization do not gene-rally coincide. It is well known, for instance, that norms of "promise keeping" can beconceived and modeled by a sequential game with the same ranking of payoffs as inthe prisoner's dilemma. The second mover, by making trustworthy promises to playthe cooperative strategy (e.g., to complete the exchange at a later date), is able topromote normative expectations about her own action in the mind of the first moverand thus to increase the likelihood of cooperation by the first mover (Schelling 1960),leading to a Pareto optimum. Notice that the causal direction in the theory runsfrom an individual voluntarily establishing a normative expectation of her own actionin the minds of others-not, as in many "sociological" theories, in the oppositedirection, where normative constraint supposedly is causally operative.Of course there would be no rational grounds for the second mover to keep apromise in any single encounter, and indeed no rational grounds for the first mover toexpect the second mover to honor any such promise. Each will play the dominant

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strategy rationally, procuring a Nash outcome. With indefinite encounters, however,there is some likelihood that normative expectations will arise. The strength of thissort of framework results from the fact that it predicts an absence of normativeexpectations where encounters are nonrecurrent. No doubt, with exchanges thatmanifestly start from very unequal points, any normative expectations would have tobe buttressed rapidly by credible threats whose imposition would have an almostidentical logical structure.Elster perhaps would accept all this but still would resist the conclusion that RATprecepts can account for the origin of all social norms.Consider, for instance, the norms of social etiquette. Elster thinks we are all worseoff because of these (net of shame and such)-they are in no sense Pareto-functional.The argument that he uses against the standard RAT interpretation of their origin-namely that they serve to support a social identity and to exclude outsiders-isdismissed upon two grounds: first, their complexity (redundancy)-they appear to befar too elaborate for their supposed (rational) purposes; second, their appearance inlow-status groups, which have no need to protect their boundaries against interlopers."It is not clear," Elster argues, "why the working class as a whole would benefit fromthe fact that it contains an infinite variety of local subcultures" (1989).Surely this is correct, but why should we require from our theory this sort of globalconstraint? Indeed, only if we are prepared to consider the "working class" as atheoretically relevant category would we be inclined to construct the problem in thisway and ask for classwide optimality. The origin of the fine-grained structure of"working-class" social norms may be perfectly explicable in terms of rationally basedlocal recurrentinteractions, where local demarcations, rivalries, and such are of primesignificance. I can see no good reason against adopting this perspective as a workingassumption. Of course, as circumstances change and different patterns of recurrentinteraction emerge, existing normative expectations will become redundant. Also,because by now they are invested with the emotions of internalized norms, they maypersist and appear to be connectively suboptimal. Yet none of this counts against theRAT interpretation of what is going on.Should we not be more inventive in trying to chart evolutions of this nature throughthe RAT perspective, rather than turning prematurelyto a Homo Sociologicus?

REFERENCESColeman, James Samuel. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.Elster, Jon. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Rowe, Nicholas. 1989. Rules and Institutions. Hemel Hempstead: Phillip Alan.Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.Selten, Reinhard. 1975. "Re-Examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in ExtensiveGames." International Journal of Game Theory 4: 25-55.

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homo sociologicus do we need him

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