129 th Bergedorf Round Table

Frontiers and Horizons of the EU: The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

October 15 th –17 th, 2004, Lviv

Picture Documentation 1Participants 20An overview of the 129th Bergedorf Round Table by Alexander Rahr 21

Annex

Participants 99Recommended Literature 104Glossary 106Index 114Persons 118Previous Round Tables 119The Körber-Foundation 131Imprint 132

Protocol

Welcome 24

I.Paths to Europe ? Perspectives of the New Neighbors 25II.Aims and Instruments of the EU Neighborhood Policy 55III.The Strategic Triangle: EU — New Neighbors — Russia 76

CONTENTS

Statue of Liberty: Museum of

Ethnography and Crafts, Svoboda

Prospect, Lviv

Europa (left page): Hotel George,

Mickiewicz Square, Lviv.

2120

CHAIR

Roger de Weck,President, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

SPEAKERS

Ambassador Ian Boag, Head of the European Commission’ Delegation to Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus, KievAmbassador Oleksandr O. Chaly, Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Ukraine, KievGernot Erler, MdB,Deputy Chairman, SPD Parliamentary Group, BerlinProfessor Yaroslav Hrytsak, University of LvivProfessor Danuta Hübner, Member of the European Commission, BrusselsDr. Yevgenij M. Kozhokin,Director, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, MoscowDr. Wolfgang Schäuble, MdB,Deputy Chairman for Foreign, Security, and European Policy, CDU/CSU Parliamentary GroupJakub T. Wolski, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw

PARTICIPANTS

PARTICIPANTSRafał Antczak, Senior Economist, Center for Social and Economic Research, WarsawDumitru Braghis, Chairman, Alliance Our Moldova, ChisinauNicolae Chirtoaca, Director, European Institute for Political Studies of Moldova, ChisinauDr. Patrick Cohrs, Research Fellow, Humboldt University, BerlinDr. Eckart Cuntz, Director-General for European Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, BerlinAmbassador Toomas H. Ilves, MEP, Member of the European Parliament, Brussels

Professor Anatoli A. Mikhailov, Rector, European Humanities University, MinskDr. Thomas Paulsen, Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, BerlinInna Pidluska,President, Europe XXI Foundation, KievAlexander Rahr, Program Director, Körber Center Russia / CIS, German Council on Foreign Relations, BerlinAmbassador Janusz Reiter, Head, Center for International Relations, WarsawProfessor Karl Schlögel,European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/OderDr. Timothy D. Snyder, Associate Professor, Yale University, New HavenCarl-Andreas von Stenglin, Office President Richard von Weizsäcker, BerlinAmbassador Dietmar Stüdemann, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine, KievStefan Wagstyl, Central and East Europe Editor, Financial Times, LondonDr. Klaus Wehmeier,Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgDr. Richard von Weizsäcker,Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany, BerlinChristian Wriedt, Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, HamburgAndrei Yeudachenka,Ambassador at Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Belarus, Minsk

INITIATOR

Dr. Kurt A. Körber

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The Ukrainian revolution of November 2004 constituted a turning point in the history of Europe since the collapse of Communism. Through peaceful demonstra-tions, a nation that had practically vanished from international attention forced a regime change after the “establishment party” tried to fraudulently prevent the election of reformist Viktor Yushchenko as president. Is the Orange Revolution the continuation of the wave of political upheaval that began in Central and Eastern Europe 15 years ago ? What are the West’s policy options ?

The 129th Bergedorf Protocol before you analyzes the geopolitical situation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, and the options these countries face between Russia and the EU. Shortly before the dramatic events unfolded in Kiev and other cities, the Bergedorf Round Table gathered in Lviv from October 15 to 17 to attempt a purposely long-term view of the condition and future of the European Union’s eastern neighbors.

The discussion documented here examines fundamental issues and stances on Ukraine that have been thrown into sharp relief by recent developments: Can the West — meaning the EU and the United States — muster the energy to help

“upgrade” Ukraine into a modern democracy while integrating it with Western structures ? Can the EU, which has yet to digest its recent enlargement from 15 to 25 member states, offer Ukraine anything more than a “10 point plan” within the framework of a “privileged partnership” ? What form could and should Russia’s role be, and what does Ukrainian society want ?

Before the Orange Revolution, the European Union, having completed its enlargement in May 2004, seemed ready to settle into an extended pause in its process of expansion. Romania and Bulgaria would still be allowed to slip into the EU, while the Western Balkan states and former Soviet republics have received different offers from Brussels. Together with North African and Middle Eastern States, these countries would be integrated into a “ring of friendly states” that, according to the respective country’s willingness and cooperation, would result in “strategic,” “privileged,” or “pragmatic” partnerships, but not institutional in-corporation within the EU.

Two years ago, the EU still regarded the Balkans and the western part of the old Tsarist empire as “wider Europe.” This kind of terminology opened up for the countries there a prospect of becoming integrated into a “common European home” should they espouse Western democratic values. In 2003, however, the EU suddenly struck the concept of a “wider Europe” from its vocabulary and con-fronted its neighbors to the east and south with the idea of “EU neighborhood”

21

Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” and the EU’s Neighborhood Policy

An overview of the 129th Bergedorf Round Table by Alexander Rahr

22 23

instead. An exception was made only in the case of Turkey; Ukraine lost all hope of accession.

Russia, the resurgent power to the east, for its part offered the former Soviet republics an integration model called the “Single Economic Space.” At the time, the Kremlin said it was creating an “east EU” to be based on the same rules as the EU and which could, at some point, unify with it. To outside observers, however, Russia seemed to be more interested in reestablishing its lost superpower status. When Moscow, without having consulted the West, offered Moldova a confed-eration in which the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Transnistria would have gained veto rights over all state affairs, the EU intervened vigorously and thwarted the project.

Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had called on Belarus to quickly reunite with Russia, whereupon relations between Moscow and Minsk cooled substantially. In 2004, Ukraine became the focus of reintegration efforts in the post-Soviet region. After relations between then-president Leonid Kuchma and the EU had reached a new low point and Ukraine officially gave up its goal of integrating with NATO and the EU, Russia managed to draw the second-largest successor republic of the former Soviet Union into its orbit, both economically and in security policy. Unification was to be sealed after the election of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych as Kuchma’s successor.

Yet Russia’s overt interference in the election campaign on behalf of Yanuko-vych, the falsification of the balloting results and media manipulation by the “es-tablishment party,” Yushchenko’s mysterious illness — all these factors increased the potential for conflict in Ukraine. Putin attempted to offer Ukraine the Russian model of “directed democracy.” In 1999, many Russians were sympathetic to the idea of curtailing democracy and civil rights to reestablish state order and improve living conditions. Yet the people of Ukraine wanted to shake off the oligarchic system. They regarded the Western model as far more attractive than the idea of an authoritarian state.

At a stroke, Ukraine has again altered Europe’s political landscape, opened up new historic chances, but also thrown up dangers. In the midst of the euphoria over the triumph of democracy in Ukraine, one thing cannot be forgotten: Many in the country’s east and south preferred different policies and a different candidate. Ukraine, therefore, remains divided, its inner structure fragile. Only a minority of its people really wants membership in NATO; in the east, a recent opinion poll revealed that the majority desires good relations with Russia above all. Economi-

22 23

cally, Ukraine will remain dependent on Russia as long as it is not accepted into the EU.

The revolution in Ukraine also began a new phase in the common EU foreign and security policy. Not too long ago, the EU was always careful not to offend Russian sensibilities in the post-Soviet region. That has changed. We can now assume that, should additional democratic upheavals take place, for example in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, or Belarus, the EU would not remain on the sidelines. In this sense the EU has become, together with the United States, a geopolitical rival of Russia’s. In only a few years, the Black Sea could become an EU lake through the integration of Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia. The EU will play more than an observer’s role in future solutions to the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the former Soviet region. Simultaneously, however, the EU will seek to integrate Russia in a pan-European solution. A new European order cannot be established against Russian opposition. Unless it closely cooperates with Russia in the fields of energy security, ecology, climate protection, and the fight against terrorism, Europe will never find stability.

The EU decided first of all to expand the Action Plan with Ukraine that had been put on ice during Kuchma’s presidency. Meanwhile, the international com-munity expects Yushchenko to introduce market-economic reforms and bolster civil society and the rule of law. The EU hopes that Ukraine will take up a foreign policy in harmony with EU interests, such as in the Transnistria problem in neigh-boring Moldova or in the transfer of democracy to Belarus. The EU and the US will grant Ukraine the status of a market economy as early as this year, a step that will eliminate some trade barriers. Negotiations for Ukraine to join the WTO could follow. Along this “road map,” Ukraine may have taken a significant step within a year towards being granted an accession prospect to the EU, as it was offered to Turkey. Still, Ukraine would be well advised to seek out an influential country within the EU as an advocate. Germany and/or Poland could help Ukraine make its voice heard more clearly in Brussels.

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von Weizsäcker

Welcome

Welcome to what may be the most culturally impressive confer-ence room that the Bergedorf Round Table has ever had. Here, in the Royal Room of the Lviv Historical Museum, is where the Polish king John Sobieski grew up, and on the wall we see a German nobleman, Saxony’s August the Strong, who, as Polish King in Dresden, ruled over this now Ukrainian city.

A few days ago, the European Commission delivered a report on Turkish accession, and we are on the threshold of elections in both Belarus and Ukraine. In the coming days, however, we will consciously be looking beyond these current events, to give both fundamental and long-term consideration of Europe’s frontiers, the enlargement of the EU, and its relations with its neighbors, above all in the east. Roger de Weck has graciously agreed to lead our discussion.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the oral contributions.

PROTOCOL

24

Under the watchful gaze of the Polish kings and August the Strong, it is our com-mon duty to conduct a significant discussion. I am especially glad that we could hold our talk in Lviv, which Joseph Roth called the “city of blurred borders.” Allow me to open our discussion of borders with a small anecdote. German Chancel-lor Gerhard Schröder and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan are facing God, and Schröder asks God, “Tell me, when will Turkey join the EU ?” God thinks for a while and then says “not during my term in office.” Mr. Hrytsak, what are the prospects for Ukrainian accession ?

Let me start my presentation by stating that, personally, I do not have any doubts whether or not Ukraine will be a member of the European Union. I am confident that it will be. The only doubt that I have is whether this is going to happen dur-ing my lifetime.

Where does my confidence stem from ? My confidence is based on my profes-sional knowledge. I am a historian by profession, and as a historian, I see that Ukraine and Ukrainian lands have been tied to Europe in numerous ways. You may expect me to build my presentation upon the enumeration of these European-Ukrainian encounters from the times of Herodotus to the present. If this is what you expected I am afraid you will be disappointed. I will not walk this line, for two reasons. First, because I believe it is rather a pathetic exercise. As Ukrainian historian succinctly put it, statements about the European character of Ukraine may be factually true –as far as they go. Still, they smack of poor folk who like to boast of their wealthy relations.1 Secondly, such arguments seem not to persuade wealthy relatives anyway. As Romano Prodi stated, the fact that many Ukrainians and Armenians feel European means nothing to him, since New Zealanders also feel European.2

I would like to suggest different tactics. I would like to introduce another criterion for testing the European character of any nation. This is a strictly his-torical test. Historians know that “what men think is more important in history than the objective facts”.3 By the same token, it is the intensity of discussions about Europe that provides sound evidence of this country’s European-ness.

I. Paths to Europe ? Perspectives of the New Neighbors

25 de Weck | Hrytsak

de Weck

Hrytsakpresentation

Ukraine belongs to Europe

Which countries are “European” ?

1 Ivan L.Rudnytsky, Essays on modern Ukrainian history, Edmonton: 1987, p. 3.

2 Quoted after: Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine, Europe, and … Albania”, Ukrainian Weekly, March 9,

2003.

3 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918, Oxford / New York, 1991, p. 17.

Russia has an undeniably European culture, and numerous encounters with the West. Still, despite their European culture, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians do not discuss much whether Russia has to join the European Union. Nor, by that token, are there so many discussions along these lines in New Zealand.

By contrast, in the Ukrainian case, such discussions have been going on cease-lessly since the 19th Century. And since the collapse of Communism, they have grown in intensity — to the extent that nowadays they occupy the mainstream of current academic, literary and political discourse. Moreover, these are exactly the intensive historical encounters with Europe that are considered to be the essence of Ukrainian identity. Leading Ukrainian intellectuals and politicians believed, and continue to believe, that most of the national differences between Ukraine and Russia can be explained by the fact that until the 18th Century Ukraine, either di-rectly or through Polish mediation, was linked to Western Europe. Therefore the main differences between Ukraine and Russia should not be sought either in lan-guage or in race, but in different political traditions, different relations between state and society, and different principles of organization.4

To be sure, for the West, Ukraine is a migraine; it looks and behaves like the “sick man of Europe.” Here we have an authoritarian and corrupt regime, where political rights are restricted and the media are repressed. In Ukraine, opposi-tion leaders and leading journalists die under suspicious circumstances; people suffer from high unemployment, lack of social security, and miserable salaries. Given Ukraine’s current state, the achievements are more amazing. First of all, Ukraine managed to avoid the outbreak of civil war and ethnic conflicts that were very likely, given the deep ethnic and political divisions within society and a long record of xenophobia. Let me remind you that 10 years ago, on the eve of the second Ukrainian presidential elections, the CIA forecast that Ukraine was heading toward a bloody civil war that would make the Yugoslav war look like a picnic.5 Luckily, this prognosis proved to be false. There was no Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or Chechnya here. Secondly, in contrast to developments in Belarus and Russia, the Ukrainian state failed to subjugate society. Ukrainian society manages

Discussions about Europe in Ukraine

Ukraine’s shortcomings and achievements

Hrytsak 26

4 M. P. Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory, Prague: 1937, 1:70; V.Lypynsky, Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv,

Vienna: 1926, xxv. Both quoted in: Ivan L.Rudnytsky, Op.cit., p.18.

5 D. Williams and R. J. Smith,“U.S. Intelligence Sees Economic Flight Leading to Breakup of

Ukraine”, in: Washington Post, January 25, 1994.

to behave as an independent entity. Viktor Yushchenko, as the opposition’s new leader, has led the polls as the most popular political figure for two years in a row, and he still has a chance, despite pressure from the state, to win the coming presi-dential election. The Ukrainian presidential campaign seems to be a nightmare, and therefore is under scrutiny both at home and abroad. But, as the Financial Times wrote a few days ago in its report on the presidential elections in Ukraine: “despite it all, democracy is at work [here]”.6 So, despite the numerous odds, in a strange, sometimes paradoxical and, therefore, quite often barely recognizable way, Ukraine behaves like a “normal” European country.

Ukraine is a normal European country but in a peculiar way. Ukraine — and in a broader context, Eastern Europe — is a normal but second-hand Europe.7 Its second-handness is not a value judgment. It just reflects the fact that most of its modern political and cultural artifacts are not of local origin. Fascism, Nationalism, Liberalism, Socialism, the Enlightenment, Renaissance, Baroque period, Christi-anity — to name a few, in descending chronological order — were not originally produced here; they were brought here from outside and assimilated into a local cultural setting. Personally, I can think of only two major examples of East Euro-pean imports — that is the Black Death in the 14th Century and Communism in the 20th Century; but in both cases, it is hardly something to boast about. Given its second-hand aspect, Ukraine is European, but in a different way than, say, France, England, or Germany. It is European like Greece, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkans. And within these “peripheral” European countries, Ukraine belongs to a specific circle of countries that share a mutual Byzantine tradition. If one were to make two separate lists of the “winners” and “losers” of the post-Communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, the dividing line would roughly coincide with a division between Western and Eastern Christianity. Much has been said about the differences between the Christian West and the Christian East, and probably even more has been speculated. I do not want to increase the general confusion by presenting my own ideas on this topic. I would just like to reiterate what some very seasoned historians have said before me: the problem with Eastern Europe is that social transformation implies fusing elements that

Eastern Europe is a second-hand Europe

27 Hrytsak

6 Chrystia Freeland, Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, “East or west: Ukraine’s election could

alter relations with Russia and Europe”, in: Financial Times, October 12, 2004

7 Gale Stokes, Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York/ Oxford: 1997.

The Ukrainian presidential campaign seems to be a nightmare, but “democracy is at work here”.

Hrytsak

have little or no natural affinity with one another, such as Western technological accomplishments with non-Western cultural and political patterns.

I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not claim a Sonderweg for Eastern Europe. What I claim is that different historical legacies should be given their due. Or, to paraphrase the path-dependency theory, “where you get to depends on where you came from”.8 Knowing Ukrainian history, I did not expect Ukraine to become an EU member in the first 10–15 years after the collapse of Communism. I do not see how Ukraine could make it by 2004, as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Baltic republics made it. In my opinion, Ukraine, together with Belarus, Serbia, Romania, Moldova, and for that matter even Russia — if the latter wishes to become an EU member — should be kept in a purgatory, before they are welcomed into the European Union paradise.

What makes me so confident that Ukraine should and could be there ? His-tory gives many reasons. In 1981, not many people expected Communism would collapse in 10 years. But it happened. And, at the same time, the number of pos-sibilities history offers is not unlimited. History imposes certain limitations on the range of what is possible. History made it possible that Communism would collapse both in Ukraine and Poland. But it excluded the possibility that their post-Communist transformations would follow similar trajectories. In terms of astronomical time, post-communist Poland and post-communist Ukraine function in the same age. Historically, however, they belong to different times. If one is to compare Ukraine after 15 years of independence, it should not be with contempo-rary Poland, but with Poland in 1934, 15 years after it got its own independence. Then you see the common predicaments of weak democracy that most young states share.

But then again, this does not mean that Ukraine has to wait for another 70 years to enter the European Union, as occurred in the Polish case. Because the times they are changing. And, unlike in 1934, in 2004 there is no real danger either of Nazism or Communism, both Germany and Russia have lost their desire to fight for Eastern Europe, the idea of a European federation is not a chimera anymore, and now it neighbors the Ukrainian borders. And, last but not least, glo-balization has compressed the time continuum to provide unprecedented scope, and now generational differences are measured not by the books we read and

Ukraine could not have

joined the EU in 2004 …

… but it belongs in the European Union

Ukraine will not have

to wait another 70 years

Hrytsak 28

8 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton NJ:

1993, p. 179.

music we listen to, but by the computer programs kids are using. So, why wait another 70 years ?

So my message is that there are such realities as historical geography, histori-cal time, and historical legacy. They are not to be neglected. And each of them says, in one way or another, that Ukraine cannot escape Europe, and Europe cannot escape Ukraine. All these historical facts from the past cannot be upheld, however, in comparison with a simple fact of the present. Namely, the fact of an intensive, ongoing, two-way flood of people and ideas between Ukraine and the European Union. Since the collapse of the Communist system, Ukrainians are more and more visible in the West. There are about 5 million of them working abroad. They are now the largest minority in Portugal. Ukrainian, or Russians speaking Ukrain-ian, can be heard in Venice, Rome and Florence. As I travel a lot, I can testify to the large number of Ukrainian students at university campuses in Vienna, Rome, Munich, Cambridge, not to mention neighboring Warsaw and Budapest. As they say about Ukrainians in Portugal nowadays, they are ready-made Europeans. They are Europeans like tuna fish in a can — you just have to open it to consume it.

How could millions of Ukrainians exist without Europe when their living depends on being there ? How could Europeans exist without Ukrainians when Europe is aging, and the rate between pensions of eligible and working persons there will be one to one ? Now we get news that Scotland is thinking of “bringing in” Ukrainians to mitigate a lack of labor force in local agricultural farms. I do realize that this is a painful and embarrassing process, paved with many, probably too many personal tragedies. But few countries from the European periphery could do without it. I can refer here to millions of Italians, Turks and Poles. No-body, neither Ukraine nor the European Union, could stop that flood, even if they wished to. More so now that Ukraine and the European Union have become neighbors.

I would like to say now something that is not very conventional, probably even heretical, but definitely something that will not please the ears of my com-patriots from Western Ukraine: I do not believe that there will be a big difference in Ukrainian politics, no matter who wins the presidential election. Since 1991, Ukraine gained some momentum that no one could stop or change. It is a slow but sure shift toward democracy and the West. And more so since the European Union has become its closest neighbor. Ukraine will roam between West and East, shrouded in ambivalence — but with an undeniable tendency toward the West. I do not see how Yanukovych can stand it. The real difference between Yushchenko

Europe connot escape Ukraine because more

and more Ukrainians live in the West …

… and an aging Europe needs Ukraine

Whatever the outcome of the election —

Ukraine will turn to the West

29 Hrytsak

and Yanukovych concerning the European integration of Ukraine is the time it will take and the price we will have to pay. Yushchenko endows European integra-tion with a more reliable and human face and offers more efficient tactics.

And because I want it to happen in my lifetime, I would definitely vote for Yushchenko. What bothers me and makes me rather anxious is the frustrating silence with which Europe is approaching Ukraine in general and the Ukrainian elections particularly. It just so happened that, during the last month I spent in the US, I have had an opportunity to compare how much Ukrainian issues are discussed on different sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This comparison, unfortunately, does not favor Europe. It is not just the number of articles in leading newspapers that bothers me. Of more concern is a lack of strong and easily recognizable voices. Neither Jürgen Habermas nor Joschka Fischer raised a voice to say that Ukraine is important, in a way that it must be included, even though in a long term perspective.

It seems to me that most of the European intellectuals are spellbound by Russian splendor. And if Russia does not want to be in Europe, why then should Ukraine be ? In the end, Ukraine is punished for what Russia has done, that is for its failure to make a European choice, in either geopolitical or political terms. And it is highly unfortunate. As I do believe that, despite its pragmatic foundations and bureaucratic considerations, the European Union is a daring vision built by many intellectuals. This is very much an intellectual project, so intellectuals have some-thing important to say here. Otherwise, the future of the European integration of Ukraine will be left entirely in the hands of Brussels bureaucrats. If so, I will hardly see that integration during my lifetime, unless I have a remarkably long life.

The historian Heinrich August Winkler recently published a history of Germany called “The Long Way Westward.” Your presentation sketched out a similarly long path for Ukraine, against the backdrop of the West’s frustrating silence. Mr. Chaly, how do you assess Ukraine’s prospects ?

I am less optimistic than Mr. Hrytsak about Ukraine’s chances to join the European Union. Ukraine is part of Europe — in some aspects it is more European than many members of the EU — and it will develop an even stronger European identity in the future. But we must draw a clear distinction between Europe and the EU, and be-tween European integration as the transformation of societies according to Euro-pean values and as membership in the EU. Countries like Norway or Switzerland

Where are Ukraine’s advocats in the West

de Weck

Chaly presentation

Ukraine is European — but Europe

is not identical with the EU

Hrytsak | de Weck | Chaly 30

are thoroughly European without belonging to the EU. We must therefore define Ukraine’s European choice not only in terms of EU membership.

What challenges does the enlargement of the EU and NATO create for our country ? First, these enlargement processes provoked Putin’s Russia — which has achieved a certain internal consolidation — to develop a vision of Russian enlarge-ment and of the geopolitical place of Ukraine within Europe. The second and much more negative consequence of enlargement is that is has again turned Eu-rope into a two bloc system with the EU and NATO on one side, and Russia and its Security Union comprising six former Soviet states on the other side. The idea of one united Europe developed during the Gorbachev era has vanished. Ukraine to-day finds itself between these two blocs, between “elephant and bear,” as Michael Emerson aptly put it.

While Russia offers us a vision of our future geopolitical position, the EU, and particularly Germany, fail to do so. Our sincere wish to be part of the Union is answered with a “no, yes, no,” which ultimately means “no.” In 2002, the EU promised us an associated member status if we fulfilled certain requirements, but failed to react after we did everything we had been told.

Today, the extended EU leaves us feeling uncertain and isolated, especially after the introduction of the new visa system. People in Lviv are experiencing the negative consequences of EU enlargement very concretely. Uncertainty is preva-lent especially in the area of security. Our undefined political status as members neither of the EU nor of NATO nor of the Russian Security Union leaves us noth-ing but the United Nations umbrella of security. The war in Iraq proved that this is nothing you can count on. For Ukraine as a big nation which gave up nuclear weapons voluntarily and still has the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, insecurity is a new and not very desirable status.

The EU will probably fail to develop a clear strategy for Ukraine even if Yush-chenko should win the elections or once the Union has decided on the accession of Turkey. Because what keeps the EU and especially Germany from offering the Ukraine a real perspective is the fear of violating Russian interests. The Franco-German-Russian triangle which developed during the Iraq conflict has even increased European consideration for Russia and thus exacerbated Ukraine’s unfavorable situation.

As Ukrainian First Deputy Foreign Minister, I once asked the Foreign Minister of France why his country blocked even the most basic steps concerning Ukraine, such as a simplified visa system and a clear statement vis à vis Russia. Why does

Russia offers a geopolitical perspective …

… while the EU leaves

Ukraine out in the cold …

… because the Union does

not want to offend Russia

31 Chaly

Expansion has turned Europe into a two bloc system with the EU and NATO on one side, and Russia and its Security Union on the other side.

Chaly

the EU do so much more for the Western Balkans than for Ukraine even though the situation there is in some aspects considerably worse ? His answer was very clear: We are responsible for the Western Balkans and they create problems for us. From that, I drew the conclusion that as long as the Ukraine does not create problems for the EU and the EU does not develop a feeling of responsibility for our country, there will be no clear EU accession strategy for Ukraine.

We have to analyze this reality very clearly and adapt to it, developing a new geopolitical strategy. Irrespective of the outcome of the elections, European inte-gration is strongly supported by the population of the Ukraine and will remain the dominant strategy of our foreign policy. But in which form and through which tactical steps can we realize this European ideal ? There are four options.

First, we could keep pursuing full EU membership. This would imply putting our relations with Russia at risk because we would have to develop our policies according to the EU’s principles. We would, for example, probably have to close the border between Russia and Ukraine with a visa system, which would hinder the movement of people from the EU to Russia and vice versa. I do not think we should even consider doing that. It is stupid and dangerous to pursue a national goal which has no chance of realization even in the long term, because it can only disappoint the expectations of the population.

Though I believe it is unlikely to happen, it would be a present from God should the EU admit Ukraine as a candidate for membership in case Yushchenko wins the elections. In the Western Balkans, Constantinescu’s victory made this possible for Romania, and Mečiar lost the elections in the Slovak Republic because of his anti-European stance and afterwards changed his course. People expect Yushchenko to open a membership perspective for Ukraine in the EU; if he fails, he will be under pressure. But Romania and the Slovak Republic were associated members, which we are not. Therefore I believe that full EU membership is not a realistic option.

Our second option is to reintegrate back into Russia. This would mean adapt-ing to the norms of the Russian Union and would therefore be a strategic decision against developing closer ties to the EU.

Third, we may continue our present day strategy of taking one step towards the West and another step towards the East. This creates an attitude of mistrust and does not lead to anything. It is not a viable option also because it means fol-lowing one set of norms one year and another the next year.

Our fourth option is to declare very clearly that we pursue integration into the European and maybe the Euro-Atlantic community, but do not insist on EU

How can Ukraine achieve

European integration ?

EU membership is not a realistic option …

… integration with Russia would

cut our ties to the EU …

… wavering between the East and the West

creates nothing but mistrust …

… therefore Ukraine should be independent:

the Switzerland of the 21st Century

Chaly 32

Ukraine could become the Switzerland of the 21st Century.

Chaly

membership. Instead, we could follow the example of countries like Switzerland or Norway and become a bridge between the enlarged EU and Russia: Ukraine could become the Switzerland of the 21st Century. We would then not have to introduce a visa system with Russia, but could open up our borders and focus for example on developing transit and communication facilities.

Feeling ourselves caught between the elephant and the bear, we ask God that the Russian bear changes to become more liberal and that the European elephant does not change to become a closed society. The visa system and the rules govern-ing the entry of our goods and services to your markets have become more rigid, and we can only hope that this is a temporary phenomenon.

I am very strongly oriented towards Europe and convinced that European integration is our destiny for the future. Let me therefore ask you for advice: Which Ukraine does Europe want to see ? We have no use for general terms such as ‘democratic and stable,’ but need concrete statements about our membership in NATO and in the EU. If you want us in, tell us very clearly. If you do not, we then have to say that’s life — and develop a new geopolitical role for Ukraine as a bridge or center for communication. But this would also mean that we need new guarantees for our security.

My final point is this: While I am sure that Ukraine’s place at the moment is neither within the Russian, nor within the European bloc, I believe that Belarus has adopted a permanent position close to Russia. The future border between the EU and the rest of Europe — as long as we do not create one united Europe — will be the border between Belarus and the EU. Even a new democratic Belarusian government could not reverse the decision for forging a security, economic and customs union between Russia and Belarus. I am curious to hear from the Bela-rusian participants whether they think that a democratic Belarusian government could dissolve the union with Russia in the next 15 or 20 years.

The growing concern of Western democracies with regard to recent developments on the post-Soviet scene is not always accompanied by carefully devised strategies in their foreign policy. While euphoric expectations of the smooth democratiza-tion of totalitarian societies are slowly diminishing, in most cases we are still confronted with post factum descriptions of events taking place in various inde-pendent states of the former Soviet Union.

In this context Belarus presents a particularly challenging case, both for analy-sis and practical actions for the foreign policy of the West. Being more predisposed

The EU must state clearly whether

it wants Ukraine in or not

Mikhailov The West needs a strategy for Belarus

33 Chaly | Mikhailov

to social transformation at the beginning of the 90s than any other post-Soviet state, at present Belarus is drifting towards isolation from the world community and confrontation with the civilized world. Those who do not believe in this reality nowadays might be reminded that about 10 years ago nobody was able to predict such scenarios in the very geographical heart of Europe.

Of course, the main reason for such troublesome developments in Belarus, as in other states of the former Soviet Union, remains deeply rooted in the people’s collective unconscious of the totalitarian past with its prejudices, their atrophied capacity to act on their own, fears of being independent, etc. In addition, intellec-tual and professional expertise in confronting difficult issues of the transforma-tion period, having been concentrated in Moscow, proved absolutely inadequate in every country, and has resulted in wishful thinking and ideas borrowed from other historical and cultural traditions without considering the countries’ own historical realities..

Our Western partners, for their part, were not always able to realize that civil society as such is the result of an interplay of various factors deeply rooted in centuries-old intellectual developments. In order to stimulate similar develop-ments in different environments one has to understand the deepest challenge to the professionalism of those who are involved in this process. We have to acknowledge that in this case no a priori knowledge is available to be applied independently of the present reality. Unfortunately, in too many cases urgently needed assistance was substituted by general and abstract recommendations, and various conferences and seminars, which sometimes brought counterproductive results.

It remains to be seen whether, in the framework of the New Neighborhood Policy announced by the European Union, lessons from previous mistakes will be learned and a realistic long-term strategy derived from reality and not imposed on it can be formulated. Time is running out and it is highly possible that we might be confronted with an even more complicated situation very soon.

Ambassador Yeudachenka, how do you view the situation from the perspective of the government in Minsk ?

Belarus, like Ukraine, has been in a very specific position since the 1st of May 2004. Behind the Belarusian cities of Brest and Ashmiany we no longer find Poland and Lithuania, but a giant European Union, which has become our immediate

Belarus is struggling to overcome

its totalitarian past …

… and the EU must support the

transformation with a reliable strategy

de Weck

Yeudachenka Finding itself between Russia

and the enlarged EU …

Mikhailov | de Weck | Yeudachenka 34

Belarus: Time is running out.

Mikhailov

neighbor. In the East, we have the Euro-Asian giant-Russia. Belarus finds itself in-between.

But in contrast to the opinion of our Ukrainian colleagues, we believe that Belarus has not become a buffer-state, and we do not find ourselves trapped. On the contrary, our history and geography give us a unique chance to further im-prove the well-being of our nation. Therefore, we welcome European integration, which brings a lot of positive change and experiences with it. The EU is not only of great interest to us because neighbors are always the top priority of our foreign policy, but also because 700,000 Belarusians are living in the ten new EU member states.

At the moment, our relations with the European Union are very restrained. The EU maintains its resolution of 1997, which harshly criticizes our country, has suspended the ratification of our partnership and cooperation agreement, and the putting into effect of the interim agreement on trade. Belarus stands for full scale and systematic cooperation, which would include political dialog, as well as coop-eration on trade, economics, culture and education. As political dialog is limited at this point of time, economic relations are at the center of our interest.

Exports account for 55 percent of our GDP and affect 80 percent of our indus-trial products. In the period January – August 2004, 37 percent of our exports went to the EU, and 47 percent to Russia. 37 to 47 percent is much more balanced than the former ratio of 20 to 80 percent. To say that Russia is our only option from an economic point of view is simply not true. Furthermore, the European Union is an important source of investment, sophisticated machinery, and advanced tech-nologies. We receive 95 percent of our financial resources from European credit and financial institutions. All in all, proximity to the enlarged European Union is of clear strategic importance for Belarus.

Initially, there was resentment against EU enlargement. But most of it has dis-sipated as we have rectified many problems in recent months. We re-concluded our economic agreements, maintained our trade and economic commissions and found agreements which are acceptable for us, Brussels, and our other neighbors. We made progress in the field of certification and standardization, in the textile industry, and with anti-dumping sanctions. Contrary to the enlargement of NATO, in which we were not consulted, EU enlargement has always been accompanied by regular and constructive discussions and negotiations. In the interest of transpar-ent borders that should not be dividing lines, we appreciate the draft regulation of the European Union which allows for the creation of special checkpoints for the

… Belarus has a unique

opportunity to prosper

As the EU has suspended political dialog …

… economic relations with the Union

form the core of Belarusian interests

Belarus adapted its economic framework

to the needs of EU enlargement

35 Yeudachenka

local population. We are prepared to establish these checkpoints and encourage a network of them.

I deliberately went into detail to show that together with our Polish, Lithu-anian, Latvian, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian partners we have managed to make remarkable progress. Real life is going its own way, and because of our com-mon European interests Belarus cannot be isolated. Where there is a will there is way !

These positive results in the practical sphere, though, are in sharp contrast with the EU’s policy of virtual isolation of Belarus. This policy has nothing to do with reality. In this context we very much appreciate the EU’s new approach toward its neighbors. We are especially satisfied that the Commission, in its rec-ommendation to the European Council and the European Parliament, proposes in-volving Belarus in a process of step by step normalization and giving us a prospect of future integration into the neighborhood policy. I am convinced that today both Belarus and Europe need such a pragmatic and inclusive neighborhood policy.

To complete our panorama I would now like to call upon Mr. Chirtoaca to present the Moldovan view.

For a small country like Moldova, which needs an adequate strategy for survival in a rapidly changing world, our new neighborhood to the EU is of the utmost importance. Without focusing as much on the geopolitical context as our Ukrain-ian colleague has done, I would therefore like to address the perspectives of Euro-pean enlargement. To us, the crucial question is where the dividing line between Eastern societies with clear authoritarian tendencies and Europe will run and how the EU will deal with small neighboring countries. As a small nation of Christian and Latin origin, Moldova feels culturally very close to Europe and therefore as-pires to re-join the community of European states from which it has been isolated for decades.

For a long time, the EU has failed to develop an active strategy towards its Eastern neighbors, based on a clear vision of the finalité of Europe. The United States has restricted its vision for the region to establishing control and creating strategic corridors for the war against terror, using NATO as its main tool. We in Moldova have therefore read the New Neighborhood Policy paper with much in-terest. Nevertheless, we ask ourselves whether it is offering more than technical assistance and goes beyond the TACIS program.

We hope the EU will extend the functioning

economic relationship to other areas

de Weck

Chirtoaca For Moldova to become a part of Europe,

not an authoritarian Eastern society …

Yeudachenka | de Weck | Chirtoaca 36

What we need is help with the process of transition from Communism to a modern democratic society, which has failed up to now. At this moment, our states are captured states: the political groups in power associated with people from the nascent private sector are against completing the transition. The present state of well-controlled chaos gives them the possibility to make fortunes in a very short time. Other Central European countries like Romania or Bulgaria have been assisted much more efficiently. Why does the EU not offer us — and maybe also Southern Caucasian countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia — com-parable assistance for establishing effective democratic structures to ensure the establishment of stable democracies in the region ? With the prospect of mem-bership or at least associated membership the conditionalities would be very powerful.

The EU should also address the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia much more directly. The prevailing instability there is a major threat to European security. The OSCE, which is presently the main tool, lacks efficiency. While there is a wonderful strategy paper about the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU does not even want to open a permanent representation in Moldova. It seems hypocritical to me under these circumstances to conduct discussions about the need for instruments of an efficient policy in the Union’s new neighborhood.

For the time being, Moldova has not got the strategic partners it desperately needs to assist us with our painful transition process. After fifteen years without qualitative change, Moldova needs to move towards a stable democratic system and Europe needs stability in its new neighborhood to ensure stable frontiers. Ulti-mately, the limits of Europe will be defined at the intersection of culture, security and geopolitics, not exclusively by geography or politics.

The EU’s new neighbors are calling for a strategy and are displaying both will and desire for tough negotiations in place of empty words. Real problems along the new borders after eastward enlargement, such as movement of people and goods, are a major aspect of these protests, and I think we should keep them in mind as we continue.

At the Bergedorf Round Table in Warsaw on Europe’s frontiers in 1995, we spoke about how and when to bring Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the EU. When I dared to say that Estonia might also have prospects in the Union, Günter

… the EU must help Moldova

with its transition process …

… but the Union is failing to develop

an active strategy for Eastern Europe

de Weck

Ilves

37 Chirtoaca | de Weck | Ilves

At this moment, our states are captured states.

Chirtoaca

Burghardt from the European Commission on my right and Ambassador Robert Blackwill on my left looked at me like I was crazy. That was nine years ago — things can change and that makes me very optimistic.

But today, I fear that we are about to build a great wall around the EU after the enlargement. Even worse than dividing Eastern and Western Christianity, as Mr. Hrytsak said, this wall follows precisely the lines of Samuel Huntington’s

“Clash of Civilizations,” thus turning a historical construct into a physical real-ity. Greece and Cyprus being in and Croatia being out are the only exceptions. The policies that make the EU a success — the internal market with its common trade policy and free movement of people, or Schengen — require strong borders. Fears of illegal immigration, drugs and criminality increase the desire to build high walls. But these walls will limit the possibilities of the new neighbors to come in. The only relationship we have with these countries right now is the very formalist Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Even worse, the EU de-cided to put Albania under the responsibility of the enlargement commissioner but Ukraine in the hands of the external relations department. It thus offers a prospect of EU membership to a country like Albania which has not taken any steps towards integration and lacks all discussion about a European calling, while leaving Ukraine out. We are standing at a crossroads in EU policy and I hope that we will not keep out Eastern Europe permanently by the fences we are building at our frontiers.

It has been quite frightening to hear Mr. Chaly and Mr. Ilves dwell so much on the “negative” results of enlargement and the danger of a new wall. Eastward enlarge-ment has fulfilled the old hope that Europe would grow beyond not only its original six member states, but transcend the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall as well. The enlargement is also thoroughly positive for the new neighbors because it has brought them friends in the EU. Poland and Estonia act on behalf of Eastern Europe in Brussels.

Moldova and Ukraine want to know from the EU where they stand. The prob-lems of a new wall can not be solved by a simple “yes” or “no.” I would like to propose a more pragmatic approach. First, we must accept that the Mediterranean states also belong to the neighborhood. Second, we should ask quite specifically how we should act toward which state, what each neighboring state could do to help avoid a new border wall, and what we should do vis-à-vis Ukraine. Like it or not, the Schengen system demands strong external borders. We can talk about

Is the enlarged EU building

a wall around its borders ?

Cuntz Enlargement is not about building walls

but about overcoming divides …

… and accession is not a question of

“yes” or “no” but of pragmatic steps …

Ilves | Cuntz 38

I hope that we will not keep out Eastern Europe permanently by the fences

we are building at our frontiers.

Ilves

easing visa restrictions with countries such as Ukraine only once these countries have done a substantial amount of work. The same goes for economic ties, which have been flourishing and are just as positive for the new members as for the new neighbors.

One of the priorities of the Action Plan with Ukraine is establishing a constructive dialog on visa issues to pave the way for future negotiations on a visa facilitation arrangement. The plan for Moldova contains a similar formulation.

Taking into account that Ukraine has had a border with the EU only for 6 months while Russia has had one for 10 years, these offers seem fair to me. The discrepancy between the treatments of these countries is justified at this point of time and can be evened up in a very short period if our Eastern partners take the necessary steps.

Just a short observation on the visa issue: How can it be that citizens of many Latin American and Maghreb states, but not those of Ukraine and Russia, can enter the EU without a visa ?

It would indeed be a smart move by the European Union to create a possibility for multiple-access visas at least for certain people from neighboring eastern coun-tries. This might weaken the outside perception of a closed border and prevent cutting more links with the Union’s neighbors than necessary. It would also allow the EU to exert more influence on its neighbors than it has in recent years.

But let me turn the argument around: Why doesn’t Ukraine immediately abol-ish its own visa requirements for New Zealanders, Australians, Japanese, Ameri-cans, Canadians and Europeans ? This would lead to a massive increase in tourism and many related economic improvements; and it would change radically the im-age of Ukraine for the better. It would especially help the development of western Ukraine, which despite its favorable geographical position is in many ways lag-ging behind economically. I know the Ukrainian answers to this proposal, which refer to issues such as pride and reciprocity. The same objections could have been raised by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and similar countries after 1989. Yet instead of appealing to such arguments, these countries got rid of their visa requirements, to their great benefit. That policy bore fruit even without reciprocation, and it would bear fruit for Ukraine now.

Boag The EU Action Plan offers many concrete

steps, for example on the visa system

RahrSimplifying the EU visa system …

Snyder … for selected visitors from the East …

… or opening the Ukrainian border

for EU and US citizens could help

39 Cuntz | Boag | Rahr | Snyder

The pictures of August III on the walls surrounding our table remind us that, al-though this Polish king was no intellectual heavyweight, he could bend metal rods with his bare hands. So he was called August the Strong. However, some of that simple strength based on transparent rules and basic principles shared by the European family of nations should govern the enlarged EU policy towards its neighbors and other countries as well.

One of the main problems the new member countries see in the new EU for-eign policy is a lack of new long-term goals. Perhaps more time is needed for these new goals to be negotiated, precisely defined and unanimously accepted by all the EU countries. But in the meantime, and this could be years, it seems the new EU policy towards its Eastern neighbors, and especially Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, is a trade-off between law and order versus freedom and democracy. This quasi-policy may reflect a threat perceived by some EU national governments of potential con-flict between Russia and the EU, meaning that these governments may accept a special role for Russia in the former Soviet countries or in Russia’s “close foreign neighbors.” This view can hardly be accepted by the new EU member countries, which still remember their decades under Communist rule. If we assume, for a moment, that Russia under President Putin is not particularly interested in coop-erating with the Commission to influence the regimes of President Lukashenko in Belarus or the separatists’ governments in Transnistria in Moldova, or Abkhazia in Georgia, we may conclude that such partnerships are completely impotent. When we build external relations on particularisms based not even on national, but on some governments’ interests, the prospects for a common policy both towards the EU’s new neighbors and other countries in the world look rather bleak. As long as this combination of universalisms and Realpolitik prevails at EU decision-making levels, all dictators can sleep easily when visiting Paris, Berlin, London or Rome.

However, if fundamental decisions cannot be reached unanimously by the EU governments, we can still do simple things that matter a lot to ordinary people in the neighboring countries. Why doesn’t the EU offer long-term multiple-entry visas to those who are welcome, especially young educated people, specialists or professionals, like the US does ? As such regulations work at a national level, why not unify them on the European level ? On the other hand, a discriminatory visa system is a powerful tool for exerting pressure on the representatives of regimes, from dictators, corrupt bureaucrats and deputies of powerful ministers, to oli-garchs and shady businessmen — a tool the EU should use more. These regimes are not ruled by dictators themselves, but there is always a support group — a nomen-

Antczak

The EU’s foreign policy lacks long-term goals

How can the Union help ordinary people

in the neighboring countries ?

Antczak 40

klatura that, in exchange for financial privileges, supports criminal behavior and human rights abuses, not to mention the violation of other democratic principles. It hurts a lot for these people to be overwhelmingly powerful and wealthy in their country but unable to go shopping in Paris, educate their children in London, or get medical treatment in Berlin, and eventually all dictators get sick. This tool is even more effective if applied also to the families and children of the targeted per-sons. Such simple cost-benefit analysis which every nomenklatura member would be forced to make by the new EU visa system might eventually lead the regime to changing its domestic policy. The standard procedures of economic pressure like trade embargoes are usually too harsh for ordinary citizens, not for nomenklatura, and not very efficient when the last macro-political and -economic leverages on regimes are lost. Usually, as time passes or when humanitarian crises arise, trade embargoes become porous, which leads to their failure — recent examples include Cuba and North Korea. Another option, likewise hardly acceptable, is military conflict after sanctions have failed, with Iraq as the best recent example.

In a similar way, micro-political and -economic steering, including proactive visa systems, can be better targeted, and become more effective leverage for mar-ginal changes in regime countries, but also bear a smaller political risk for the EU. Simplifying the visa system is something that makes the ordinary man in the street outside the EU feel closer to Europe, while isolating dictators and regimes that pose a constant threat to the world.

This picture follows an old pattern of thinking. Several years ago, the Ukrainian foreign minister in Warsaw used the metaphor of a new Berlin wall between Cen-tral and Eastern Europe. I think this metaphor is wrong and misleading. Its roots lie in an inaccurate perception of what the Schengen border really is.

The enlargement does not create a two-bloc Europe. As a matter of empirical fact, the Finnish-Russian border does not much resemble the Finnish-Soviet bor-der, nor indeed are the relations between Europe and the US what they used to be in the 1980s. The European Union is not a geopolitical organisation but, as the US often complains, a kind of anti-geopolitical international agent. Interpreting European Union policies in geopolitical terms leads us down a blind alley.

Why do our Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan friends neverthe-less see the EU as a state or a bloc ? The creation and the policing of an external border, the Schengen border, are indeed classic functions of the Westphalian state. And even though Schengen is a great achievement insofar as it creates

SnyderThere is neither a new Berlin Wall

nor a two-bloc Europe …

… but the Schengen border makes

it appear this way to Eastern Europeans

41 Antczak | Snyder

internal mobility, from the outside it is seen as a border which keeps people out. This development of the EU is just an example of one of the trends of globalisa-tion, which is to create regional areas where people can move freely surrounded by hard borders. We should be very aware of what impression this creates on the outside.

What eastern enlargement and Schengen actually do is reinforce the EU’s foreign policy’s basic tendency to concentrate on domestic politics. Should the Eu-ropean Union one day extend to Moldova or to Ukraine or Belarus, this will be the result of changes in the domestic political systems of these countries. Schengen, for example, demands that every future new member state can defend its external frontier. Turkey would thus have to defend its border with Iraq, Ukraine its border with Russia — which it is far far removed from at this moment.

The EU is still far from having a common external border insofar as there is no common protection through joint forces. We are currently trying to financially involve all member states in the protection of our borders but not yet to establish a common force to police these borders. As long as there are no Germans or French at the Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Belarusian border, this border will not be publicly perceived as the border of the European Union.

Mr. Yeudachenka mentioned the moment of truth for many new neighbors, namely, their perspective on European history. For the states of East Central Eu-rope, EU accession was a kind of reunification with the Europe that was lost in the mayhem of World War II, but things look different for the Slavic world. The new neighbors are striving less to be under the roof of a joint European historical house — western Ukraine possibly, but not eastern Ukraine. However, I do not re-gard the choice facing these countries as one between blocs. Instead of a two-bloc Europe, I prefer to speak in terms of an EU Europe and a non-EU Europe. This is also the basis for many eastern countries’ fears. Some groups in the new neighbor countries fear that the West is trying to install a strict EU framework on the entire continent. The EU is no longer negotiating with Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev solely over economic questions, but increasingly over issues of politics and culture as well. The eastern partners are annoyed that, in these negotiations, small states like Estonia and Luxembourg have more weight through EU structures than they themselves do. Partnership-building institutions such as the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council are not functioning smoothly, the OSCE is trans-

Hübner

RahrEastern European countries are suspicious

of the EU’s know-it-all manner …

Snyder | Hübner | Rahr 42

ferring democracy eastward on behalf of the West, and the Council of Europe is perceived as the West’s inquisition tool.

Against this backdrop, Putin is trying to use the present pause in the EU’s enlargement process to build up an EU-East that would give the Eurasian world additional institutional weight. Yet this EU-East is no bloc. It is not a security alli-ance and will never become one. The reunification of Russia with Belarus failed in 1995, and the economic union with Ukraine can exist only because of Kuchma’s weakness towards the West. Only a few months ago, Ukraine and Russia were em-broiled in a serious dispute over Tuzla Island, there was speculation about Ukraine joining NATO, and that NATO troops would be stationed along the Sea of Azov. The present Russian-Ukrainian peace is a fragile one.

The situation could change radically if Russia were to again develop imperial tendencies and give up its pro-Western stance that Putin has been continuing in the tradition of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Then, indeed, we would have, as Mr. Chaly said, a two-bloc Europe — a catastrophe for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, which would become a gray zone.

Still, I think the EU is currently taking strategically important steps to influ-ence developments, and in contrast to Mr. Snyder, I very much see a geopolitical approach by the EU. Several EU strategy papers have identified Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as the EU’s close foreign neighbors — countries that, from the Rus-sian point of view, are also Russia’s close foreign neighbors. Despite Moscow’s huge interests to the contrary, it prevented a solution between Trans-Dniester and Moldova by undermining the plan of the deputy Kremlin chief, Dmitrii Kozak. The EU is strong enough to have accomplished this and, together with the United States, is gradually replacing Russia as the peacekeeping power in Georgia. The EU does not want to challenge Russia — its power would be insufficient even if it wanted to. However, the EU does want to prevent imperialist tendencies and instead integrate Russia into a pluralist security policy in Europe.

I would like to say one more thing in conclusion. Anyone walking through the streets of Lviv, a thoroughly European city, will hardly be able to comprehend why in 15 years, the eastern Anatolian villages should belong to the EU, but not Lviv !

I would contest that any of the supranational organizations Russia is a member of could be reasonably considered a bloc.

Russia is a member of some regional organizations, first and foremost the Commonwealth of Independent States. In its essence, CIS is a forum in which

… therefore the Russian “EU-East”

is an attractive alternative

Today, the EU is developing

a geopolitical strategy

Kozhokin None of Russia’s alliances is a bloc

43 Rahr | Kozhokin

Anybody walking through the streets of Lviv will hardly be able to comprehend why in 15 years, the eastern Anatolian villages should belong to the EU, but not Lviv.

Rahr

the national leaders of state-members discuss the most pressing and vital issues their countries face. We cannot even draw a parallel between CIS and the EU or NATO, as the first does not have those structures and mechanisms of imple-mentation that the EU and NATO has. There is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation that includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; this is the only organisation which has an explicit military dimension, but as a military entity it’s very specific. For example, Belarus is a neutral state and Belorussian authorities have no right to send Belorussian troops anywhere abroad. Belorussian soldiers don’t participate even in peacekeeping operations. Along with the four Central Asian countries and China, Russia is a member of the Shanghai-Cooperation Organisation. This organisation could hardly be considered a military entity. It deals with the problems of fighting terrorism. The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation incorporates Russia and all Central Asian coun-tries except Turkmenistan. Only this year Russia joined this organisation which is engaged in solving mostly economic and ecological issues.

I also think the image of a two-bloc Europe completely ignores reality. Since 1989, many more important things have taken place than the emergence of EU and non-EU regions. The remarkable point has been the return of large, historical re-gions with their own cohesion that are much older than the 20th Century. I’m thinking of the Baltic region, Central Europe and the Black Sea region. Polycen-tricity, not polarity, is the term that best expresses the tendency of developments in Europe.

Therefore, I think reminding ourselves of what Europe actually is is more important than producing strategy papers. If one can muster the courage to adopt this somewhat anti-political view, then one sees that Europe has come much far-ther than people often complain. On the level of mobility, cooperation, and border crossings in the millions, so much more has happened in the last 20 years than most mainstream political statements realize. Lviv, for example, which I saw for the first time 40 years ago, and 20 years ago for the first time consciously, was the end of the world back then, a capital of Europe’s backwaters so to speak. Since then, the city has become integrated in a web of relationships that simply cannot be adequately described as being “inside” or “outside” the EU.

Besides the comeback of historical regions, the return of old corridors in the age of globalization also play a significant role. No matter how hollow the term

“globalization” may be, in the last ten years, corridors have developed that are un-

Schlögel Europe is determined by the

return of historic regions …

… and huge dynamic corridors

Kozhokin | Schlögel 44

doubtedly huge and dynamic and are fundamentally changing Europe, irrespec-tive of national boundaries. Today, Moscow is a global city, not just a European city. From Berlin and Warsaw to Minsk and Moscow, metropolitan corridors have emerged that have their very own paces and lifestyles. We can place much more trust in the new network of regions and corridors than the strategy papers and action plans of politicians would have us believe. There is so unbelievably much more going on between Warsaw and Berlin and Minsk, between Petersburg and Helsinki, between Riga and Stockholm, between Odessa and Istanbul, than the talk about the European Union and nation states and other political organizations recognizes. Europe’s transformation process is taking place in deeper strata.

Ambassador Boag, you have been in Kiev for six weeks, and therefore have a fresh view of the EU’s relationship with Ukraine. What are the decisive transformations taking place ?

At a meeting with Prime Minister Yanukovych and a group of ambassadors yester-day it became clear to me that Romano Prodi’s declaration about a future member-ship of Ukraine has acquired a life of its own in national political discourse. But irrespective of what Mr. Prodi did or did not say, the treaties state that any Euro-pean country can apply for membership and the Copenhagen criteria set out what applicants need to do.

The question of Ukrainian membership is a matter of broad political vision and has important geostrategic consequences. But throughout its history the EU has implemented its — very courageous — political vision through essentially commercial, economic and technical steps. That is why the recent expansion was accompanied not by declarations of political intent but by negotiations over the 80,000 pages of the acquis communautaire. That is also why the European Commis-sion attaches far more importance to the action-plan recently negotiated under the neighborhood policy than to philosophical discussions about the European nature of Ukraine. This action plan is the key document that enables us to get from A to B in our aspirations to develop closer relations. Our Ukrainian partners may find it not a very sexy document because it does not offer geopolitical perspectives, but our future partners need to align themselves with our technological, bureau-cratic and essentially domestic policy-oriented approach to integration.

If our Ukrainian partners — like, for example, Mr. Chaly — complain that the message from the EU is unclear, I would like to turn the argument around. The

de Weck

BoagWhatever Prodi said, any European country

can apply for EU membership

Ukraine needs to send a clear message

that it wants to join the EU.

45 Schlögel | de Weck | Boag

Vice-President of the European Parliament yesterday reminded the speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament that Ukraine is wavering between the customs union within the Single Economic Space built up by Russia and membership of the European Union. Ultimately you will have to decide on one option. It may be good tactics to pursue both for a while, but this does not send a clear message either.

I agree with Mr. Boag. I was not convinced by the mantra of complaints over an indecisive EU that we heard from Mr. Hrytsak, Mr. Chaly, and Mr. Mikhailov. If it is anywhere, I see indecision in Ukraine itself.

It is simply not true that Yushchenko and Yanukovych are both Europe-ori-ented and fashion their policies accordingly. And I do not mean only technical questions or joining the Single Economic Space. To the present day, the Ukrainian president has been unable to clear himself of accusations of having been involved in a murder, remains part of a predatory oligarchic system, and wants to change the constitution because he cannot be sure of being elected a third time. Now, it is not the president who is supposed to have the most power, but the parliament, where Kuchma has a secure majority. The loser will surely denounce the election as fixed, and the sick and disfigured opposition leader accuses the government of trying to poison him. I see neither efforts to attain a European standard nor a stable pro-European consensus in Ukrainian politics.

It was a completely different picture in Poland for the last twelve years. There, the government changed every four years through democratic elections. Each new government continued the country’s pro-European policies and its efforts to fulfil the acquis communautaire, and was duly voted out of office every four years. Where is the willingness in Ukraine to enforce an unpopular reform policy with a consensus beyond party lines ? There is no sign of any conditions for a rap-prochement with the EU, not only from the viewpoint of European policy, but also from the viewpoint of a European civil society. So against this backdrop, I think it is problematic to accuse the EU of lacking decisiveness while demanding solid offers from it.

I also disagree with the claim that the EU has no strategy. How can one disqualify the “Wider Europe” concept and the New Neighborhood policy as

“empty words” and thus reject the only strategy that exists ? The New Neighbor-hood Concept might not be “especially sexy,” to use Mr. Boag’s words, but it has a long-term perspective and will remain the only offer for a long time to come.

Erler

Ukraine must stop wavering between the EU

and Russia and reform its political system …

… like Poland did during the 1990s

As the Neighborhood Policy will be

the EU’s only offer for a long time …

Boag | Erler 46

If it is anywhere, I see indecision in Ukraine itself.

Erler

It gives Ukraine very substantial opportunities if it would only decide to accept and use it.

Ukraine would also be well-advised to take advantage of the opportunities its neighboring country offers. For the last few years, Poland has been develop-ing its own Ostpolitik because it knows Ukraine’s importance and has many ties, particularly with the country’s western part. The Poles are more than willing to share their own experiences with the integration process and take a leading role in implementing the New Neighborhood Policy. Ukraine should use the chances it is being offered and give Europe a clear signal instead of descending back into expressing grievances.

For years I have been urging my Ukrainians friends at discussions to stop seeing themselves solely as victims of geopolitical transformations. Like Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine has become a free and independent country for the first time. All three states should live up to their duty as independent agents. That includes a willingness to make commitments and reform their social and political systems. Because as long as there are no compatible structures and institutions in these countries, partnership will be possible only between individuals, which is always something subjective. The Ukrainian constitutional reform is a negative example. It redefines the balance of power yet ignores the question of checks on power, thereby not contributing at all to the development of a political system that cor-responds to our structures.

The Ukrainians often complain that the EU uses different criteria regarding their country than Russia does. Of course we do, because Ukraine wants more than Russia, namely membership in Euro-Atlantic structures.

If Ukraine sees a danger of being crushed between two powerful blocs, my reply is that these blocs do not yet exist. They might be currently emerging, if only because we live in a changing world. Yet even if that is the case and Ukraine fears Russian imperialism, then it must do something against it. Instead, the govern-ment is permitting Russia to economically infiltrate the country and the Russian president to plainly express his preference in the presidential election. It is not the European Union that is abandoning Ukraine — the New Neighborhood Policy’s Action Plan gives the country many concrete options for cooperation. Rather, the problem here is a lack of will to act independently. Instead of its constant power struggle, Ukraine needs clear political concepts and the will to implement them resolutely.

… Ukraine better accept it and

make use of its opportunities

Stüdemann

If Ukraine fears Russia, why does it allow

Russia to infiltrate its economy ?

47 Erler | Stüdemann

Your reactions to my presentation only show that we have reason to be upset about the EU’s inconsistency and uncooperative attitude ! I have the impression that the representatives from the EU member states simply do not want to hear us. You refuse to acknowledge that Ukraine as the first country in world history voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal and that it is the only former Soviet Republic whose political transformation took place without any bloodshed or use of force. You ig-nore the fact that, despite the negative consequences of Chernobyl, we have man-aged to achieve impressive economic growth. European businessmen who work here have a less ideologically distorted view of our country.

The EU Action Plan you are so proud of is unbalanced, does not include any val-uable commitments, and contradicts the valuable Common Strategy on Ukraine adopted by the European Council in 1999. And how can you justify putting Albania in the dossier of the enlargement commissioner, but not Ukraine ? Refusing to give Moldova an accession prospect is especially dangerous. Once Romania becomes a member of the EU in 2007, the considerable number of Moldavians with double citizenship will permanently cross the border if Moldova is not given the prospect of integration. In 1989, this was how East Germany collapsed as a state.

Ukraine must now take its future into its own hands. While we work to find our role as bridge and communication center between the Eastern and the Western blocs, the EU does everything it can to reduce us to a buffer state. Your mentality only allows you to think in terms of EU versus non-EU, and you always have your external border rather than our common border in mind. And while you speak about openness, the EU uses its enormous power as an economic agent to divide Europe with its discriminatory trade policy.

As former ambassador to the Council of Europe, I am also deeply skeptical about the European Union’s strategy for this only real pan-European organization we have. Rather than strengthening the Council of Europe’s human rights instru-ments, for example, the EU creates alternative jurisdictions through its constitu-tion and treaties with provisions for legal help in criminal matters. And now that the EU has 25 seats, it controls the Council of Europe entirely. This prevents us from expressing our voice and influencing the Council’s decisions.

I deliberately spoke about problems and challenges. Nevertheless, I am con-vinced that EU enlargement will in the long run have many more positive than negative effects. And I do still hope that, after a possible Yushchenko victory, the EU might reward this victory of democracy with a strong message and real com-mitments.

Chaly

Because the EU Action Plan for

Ukraine is a step backwards …

… Ukraine must make its own way by

becoming a bridge between East and West

The EU patronizes the Council of Europe

Chaly 48

Much of the opposition’s criticism about the lack of organization and the violation of democratic principles in the Ukrainian elections is justified. Yet I am sure that after the elections the sun will rise again and we will decide to live with the out-come. The European Union will follow the OSCE in stating that there were viola-tions of democratic standards but that they did not affect the results decisively.

It is therefore important that, as Mr. Chaly said, European integration is and remains Ukraine’s strategic goal no matter who will be president. True, there are differing views among politicians and citizens on what integration means and which aspects of it are desirable. But not only Yushchenko, also Yanukovych would have to make European integration, in the sense of closer ties on a practical level, a priority. The economic interests of those who back him lie in the EU. These people want the shares of their enterprises to be traded in international markets, to ex-pand their businesses and send their kids to study abroad. Therefore, they have no interest in being marginalized in the ghetto of Europe’s last authoritarian regime.

Even though Ukraine must indeed solve its own problems, foreign agents could do a lot to change the deplorable state of our political landscape. But there is an overwhelming consensus of disinterest for Ukraine all over Western Europe. Let me illustrate that with a story about the media: At the beginning of the presiden-tial campaign in early April, Adam Michnik, the director of Poland’s leading news-paper Gazeta Wyborcza, was approached by Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko asked him to help him gain access to the European newspapers, because other-wise the events in Ukraine would go unnoticed as nobody in Western Europe re-ally cared about them. He suggested writing a letter together with Michnik and distributing it to leading newspapers. Michnik rightly called it a sad irony that the leading candidate for presidency in the largest Eastern European country needs the support of a newspaper editor to get a letter published. However, after the letter eventually appeared in ”El Pais,” neither “Le Monde” nor “Die Welt” ap-proached Yushchenko to conduct an interview.

Even Mr. Erler, one of the most knowledgeable politicians with respect to Ukraine, with his request that Ukraine cooperate with Polish politicians, ignored the fact that we started to do that long ago. We have been engaged in dialog for more than 15 years, but outside of Poland nobody really knows or cares about that.

The lack of interest in Ukraine in large parts of EU Europe goes hand in hand with a lack of political vision. Our current ideas about Polish-Ukrainian coopera-

Pidluska

Yanukovych’s backers favor

European integration

Hrytsak Nobody in Western Europe

cares about Ukraine …

… and there is no vision for

the future of Eastern Europe

49 Pidluska | Hrytsak

Not only Yushchenko, also Yanukovch would have to make European integration a priority.

Pidluska

tion were developed largely by one single visionary, the Polish intellectual Jercy Giedroyc. During his exile in Paris in the 1940s he articulated the idea that Poland and Ukraine should form a strategic partnership to reform Eastern Europe. What EU politician is able to develop a similar vision of an Eastern enlargement of the Union ? The Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz recently drew an impressive picture of Polish foreign policy in the globalized post-9/11 world, aspir-ing to a special Polish role in transatlantic cooperation and strongly focusing on Ukraine. Adam Michnik is also a man capable of visions. But I can not see anybody in the EU or in the Western European media who cares enough for Eastern Europe and at the same time possesses the intellectual capacity to develop and fight for long term visions for Ukraine.

The EU certainly needs visions and long term strategies for Eastern Europe. Maybe this is more likely with the accession of the new member states, and particularly Poland. The enlarged European Union is only five months old. I would not dismiss the possibility that if we sit down with representatives from the 25 member states and work seriously, taking into consideration Poland’s experiences, we might come up with something useful.

This holds true not only for Ukraine. Belarus is also a very important neighbor for Poland — for three reasons. First, about 600,000 Poles are Belarusian citizens. Second, we have a Belarusian minority in Poland, Polish citizens who preserve their Belarusian language and culture. Third, Poland is interested in a democratic and open society in Belarus, because democratic neighbors are friendly neighbors. That is why, a few weeks ago, the Polish parliament adopted a resolution which stressed the importance of fair elections in Belarus.

Poland’s perspective on Belarus and Ukraine is of course different than that of our European partners in Lisbon or Athens, who lack the geographical proximity and close historical relations. Nevertheless, the EU can benefit from Poland’s ex-periences and relations when devising its own strategy — a strategy that is urgently required and that needs to be developed by all 25 EU member states.

Let me mention three aspects of what an EU strategy for Belarus could include. First, education in the broader sense should be a priority. Through Belarusian uni-versities, high schools and the media we must try to reach not only the elites but broader parts of society. Second, we must promote civil society in Belarus, which depends to a large degree on the Belarusian authorities. Finally, we therefore need a patient dialog with the Belarusian administration. Poland has gained experience

Wolski The new member states promote a more

active EU strategy for Eastern Europe

Poland proposes a dialog with

the Belarusian administration …

Hrytsak | Wolski 50

We need a patient dialog with the Belarusian administration.

Wolski

in this area and is ready to play its part in the comprehensive dialog between the EU and Belarus which Mr. Yeudachenka advocated.

Mr. Erler and Mr. Stüdemann demand that Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova com-pletely adopt the EU’s norms and standards as a precondition for talks. Mr. Wolski has now articulated an alternative position: rather than just wait and see whether our countries adopt these values, the EU could help us in the transition process. As our countries have different histories, it is only natural that we find ourselves at different periods of the development of democracy. Cooperating with us to as-sist in the transformation you deem necessary would be a more constructive ap-proach for the EU than waiting until we have fulfilled all standards. Seven years of isolation have not helped a lot with Belarus, have they ?

The EU’s double standards disappoint Belarus as much as Ukraine. Belarus demolished more conventional weapons than most other European nations put together. Should we not be rewarded with a minimum of recognition for that ?

A certain degree of cooperation would also be useful — maybe even indispen-sable — for the EU. If the EU wants to effectively protect nuclear power stations in Lithuania and Ukraine against terrorism, it needs to cooperate with Belarus. Investing huge political and financial resources in the closure of Ignalina and in the protection of the derelict reactor in Chernobyl is insufficient as long as Be-larus is not involved, because both reactors are situated practically at the border. Belarus is also an essential partner for the EU’s cooperation with Russia in the field of energy. 50 percent of Russian oil and 25 percent of Russian gas for Western Europe come through Belarusian territory. In these and other fields, an inclusive EU policy for Belarus would allow for practical improvements, while exclusion will postpone any steps forward for another dozen years.

Important as a sincere and open dialog might be, accusing each other of a lack of understanding and an inability to reform respectively will not bear any fruit. The real problem is at once more specific and more basic.

Belarus is struggling to overcome its totalitarian heritage. Mr. Stüdemann is therefore asking too much when he demands that we immediately start acting as fully fledged autonomous players in international politics. We are not yet able to play our new role properly. Particularly Germans should understand that, as after the Second World War, the Western powers did not leave Germany with the encouragement to “just do it yourself.” The US invented and implemented the

Yeudachenka … which Belarus gladly welcomes …

… and which could bear fruit for the EU, too

Mikhailov

Belarus cannot overcome its

totalitarian past on its own

51 Wolski | Yeudachenka | Mikhailov

Marshall Plan to help Germany overcome the consequences of its authoritarian regime.

Mr. Erler, I did not want to offend you when I called the New Neighborhood Policy empty words. But due to the radical situation in Belarus I must insist that the EU should not implement its old concepts unchanged. The Union must refor-mulate them together with new members like Lithuania and Poland who have a more profound understanding of the situation in Belarus. If the EU’s concepts need no improvement, how can it be that the situation in Belarus is deteriorating at such a rapid pace ?

12 years ago in my country we discussed whether the EU or Estonia should make the first move and I took the position Mr. Erler is advocating today. I was as con-vinced then as I am today that a country which does what is needed will be wanted in the European Union. No applicant that does not change the facts on the ground will be accepted just for political reasons or because it is owed something.

Visa freedom is a practical example. We had to work very hard to establish strong borders, but then we were rewarded with visa-free travel. There is no use in talking about our attitudes towards Ukraine before Ukraine starts to implement more concrete changes. Complaining about double standards is also a waste of time. Double standards do exist, and living with them is part of being an adult. No protest has ever changed that.

On the side of the EU, the top priority should be to prepare for a possible Yushchenko victory. When Saakashvili became president of Georgia, I asked the Italian foreign minister Frattini in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament: Donald Rumsfeld just went to see Saakashvili, so when will a EU rep-resentative be there ? Frattini answered: Only after we have spoken to our Russian friends. We should not follow that pattern in Ukraine.

The good news is that there is light at the end of the tunnel because the new EU member states have other priorities. When the Director General for Enlarge-ment, Eneko Landáburu, was asked two successive questions about Ukraine at the first meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he said: “I already mentioned Ukraine.” That was the wrong answer to give, and so the next 17 questions came from Poles, Czechs and Hungarians and were about Ukraine. There is a much greater awareness about Ukraine and you now have many more friends in the EU than ever before. But still you have to achieve some progress on the ground before your friends can help you — we are, after all, politicians.

Ilves Ukraine must make the first steps, for

example in the area of visa freedom …

… while the EU should prepare

appropriate reactions

Enlargement brought Eastern Europe

many new friends in the EU …

Mikhailov | Ilves 52

My last proposal for the Eastern European countries is to think more about NATO than about EU membership, because the standards for democracy, corrup-tion and similar issues are much lower in NATO. Remember that Turkey has been a member for quite a while. Maybe NATO could be a first step towards European integration.

Moldova is glad that enlargement brought countries like Poland, the Czech Repub-lic or the Slovak Republic, which have a very good understanding for our country, into the European Union. Enlargement has also brought almost all important political parties in Moldova to declare European integration as their strategic goal, even though on the part of the Communist Party, this might be empty rhetoric.

A less pleasant consequence is that Moldova lost some of its markets in Poland, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, and is facing the same in Romania and Bul-garia. We have received almost nothing in exchange, and the negotiations about different free trade agreements brought no results. Therefore, our dependence on the markets of the Commonwealth of Independent States has increased. It would be good for Moldova and probably also for the EU to restore at least the situation we had before the enlargement.

If the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus decisively reject the EU Neighborhood Policy, their decision could result in a reorientation of European integration. Per-haps Europe will stop integrating in an eastward direction in the manner that Mr. Schlögel portrayed so vividly. Instead, the EU might follow the course suggested by the United States, namely toward the Caucasus. There, the Neighborhood Strat-egy is already bearing fruit, not in the sense of a new value system, but in terms of security strategy.

For example, Georgia has been decisively transformed by its peaceful revolu-tion, and we are seeing important geopolitical changes elsewhere in the Caucasus as well. Some South Caucasian states in the Council of Europe, for instance, have been criticizing Belarus for its democratic shortcomings. The European Union is considering a Caucasian Stability Pact and, given the ramifications for security policy, would almost certainly be willing to spend money on it.

Poland’s policy for Ukraine lacked firmness in the past decade, at least in the field of economic transition. There was a window of opportunity in the second half of the1990s for pushing through profound economic reforms in Ukraine. But the

Braghis

… but countries like Moldova lost

markets in the new member states

Rahr If Eastern Europe rejects the Neighborhood

Policy, the EU might focus on the Caucasus

Antczak Poland must use enlargement

to push for reforms in Ukraine

53 Ilves | Braghis | Rahr | Antczak

Moldova lost some of its markets — it would be good to restore at least the situation we had before the enlargement.

Braghis

Polish politicians and the foreign ministry failed to exert the necessary pressure and instead chose to support Ukraine more or less unconditionally. The Giedroyc vision of the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership has bedevilled our policy mak-ers’ judgment. Instead of clinging to this emotionally compelling idea, they should have stuck to some basic principles in their actions by demanding genuine market reforms. The cost of dealing with difficult domestic reforms might serve as an excuse for Polish policies towards its Eastern neighbors. However, accession to the EU offers a new opportunity for Poland, as well as other new members, to com-plete transition and push harder for reforms in neighboring countries, especially Ukraine and Belarus. Once we establish and pursue these guidelines, instead of giving them up as soon as we encounter resistance, the question of who wins the elections in Ukraine becomes less significant.

Giedroyc’s identification of the importance of a stable and prosperous Ukraine for Poland was supplemented by Brzezinski’s definition of Ukraine as a “stabi-lizing” factor for expansionist Russian foreign policy in Europe. Both of these opinions still hold some truth, and Ukraine is too important to be put aside by an extended EU concentrating on deepening integration. The new EU policy should, sooner rather than later, define the prospect of membership for Ukraine, even if it is a long-term one as in the case of Turkey. This would also provide a guideline for other former Soviet countries if they wish to pursue integration with the EU. If not, particular interests of EU national governments or even EU political parties would compete in the EU’s “close foreign neighbors” As an economist I welcome competi-tion in economies, but as a Pole looking from a historical perspective, I would not welcome the return to spheres of interest among the EU’s new neighbors.

We have looked this morning at the EU’s relationship with its new neighbors at various levels. We have, for example, confronted the historical level with the fully tangible and sometimes technocratic level of practical policy. The desire for strat-egies and visions came up against the experience of Europe’s slow and arduous integration process, which has characterized the history of the EU. Our discussion incorporated the level of images — of each other, of what divides us and what holds us together. And we have seen how, in exploring integration, we face that geopolitical question that smacks of the 19th Century: should one go to the one side or the other ? I think these levels made occasional contact, sometimes they lay parallel, and other times they ran opposite to each other. Viewing them to-gether has opened perspectives unattainable from only one level.

de Weck

Antczak | de Weck 54

I welcome competition in economies, but I would not welcome the return to spheres of interest among the EU’s new neighbors.

Antczak

In May 2004, the European Commission announced its “European Neighborhood Policy,” which is also enshrined in the draft European Constitution. This strategy constitutes the framework for the Union’s relations with its new neighboring states in the East as well as with southern neighbors such as Morocco. What, ex-actly, should this neighborhood policy include ?

As Undersecretary in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jakub Wolski will first present the ideas of an important new member state; then Ian Boag, the Euro-pean Commission’s new delegation leader in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, will add the view of the Commission. After a discussion of the neighborhood policy’s concrete instruments, Wolfgang Schäuble, the CDU’s most experienced foreign policy expert, will open up a fundamental investigation into the nature and direc-tion of European integration.

As a new member of the European Union, Poland is fully aware that a further enlargement of the EU is a long term project and that the final limits of the Un-ion remain an open question. Yet we are determined not to forget those of our neighbors who remain outside the family of the Union for the time being. We did not join the EU to distance ourselves from the Eastern European countries, but to promote their integration into the European Union. Fostering stability in its neigh-boring countries in the East through effective cooperation is also in the interest of the EU and the transatlantic community, who need allies in their fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime. We therefore think that the EU needs a clean and bold vision as well as effective concepts for practical cooperation with Eastern Europe.

In order to take an active and responsible role in the creation and imple-mentation of an Eastern Dimension of the EU’s external policy, Poland pre-sented a non-paper in July 2003 which outlines some basic objectives and guidelines:

The countries of Eastern Europe face similar challenges due to their common history and economic and political interdependence. The EU therefore needs a co-herent and comprehensive policy framework specifically designed for its eastern neighbors. This “Eastern Dimension” of the EU would complement the Union’s Northern Dimension and make use of the experiences made in this context. To create synergies, the EU should coordinate its activities with other structures and organizations and facilitate the involvement of international financial institutions and private capital.

II. Aims and Instruments of the EU Neighbourhood Policy

55 de Weck | Wolski

de Weck

Wolski presentationPoland joined the EU to promote the

integration of Eastern European countries

The EU needs a comprehensive policy for

Eastern Europe: an Eastern Dimension …

The establishment of a common space of political and economic cooperation within Wider Europe would be the mid-term objective of this policy, without pre-judicing the final form of integration. A prospect, not a promise, of EU member-ship could be an important incentive for political elites and societies in Ukraine and Moldova, and also for a changed Belarus, to promote democratic reforms.

We believe that to efficiently cooperate with its neighbors, the EU must dif-ferentiate its policies according to regions, to the countries’ will to cooperate with the EU and their progress in the transformation process. A broad array of areas of action, instruments and institutions for cooperation is available.

First, fields of action: The European Union should promote initiatives in the areas of new media, local self-government, European education — especially people-to-people contacts for young leaders — and cross-border and regional co-operation.

Second, EU programs: The Union should use its TACIS program and its Euro-pean Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument to advance democratic and eco-nomic reforms and the development of civil society in Eastern Europe. Poland also proposes the creation of new EU instruments, namely a European Civil Society Fund for the promotion of democratic values and civil society in Eastern Europe. To provide agents in Eastern European countries with the know-how vital for the transition process, we recommend creating a European Scholarship and European Internship Program to facilitate peer-to-peer relations. The Union should strongly support the initiatives of NGOs in the region. They are very active in implement-ing civil society projects; they are experienced, flexible and free of political bias. Financial backing of national and European institutions allows them to broaden the scope of their work and provides an excellent opportunity for the EU to use its money efficiently.

Third, bilateral and trilateral initiatives: Together with its Russian and Lithua-nian partners, Poland is preparing trilateral neighborhood programs for trans-bor-der cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus for the years 2004–2006. We consider it of crucial importance that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently presented common proposals on the further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine to their EU colleagues.

Fourth, cooperation and conditionality: We opt for strengthening the political and security dialog between the EU and Ukraine, and also for promoting economic integration. The EU should make the first step by accepting Ukraine as a market

… which aims at a common space of

political and economic cooperation …

… includes initiatives in the area of new

media, self-government, education …

… uses TACIS and establishes new funds

and scholarship programs …

… builds on bilateral and

trilateral initiatives …

… and uses cooperation and conditionality

Wolski 56

economy, followed by negotiating and establishing a free trade area. While the possibility of integration into the EU is of crucial importance to provide a Eu-ropean prospect for Ukraine, integration must remain conditional on Ukraine’s progress in reforms — for example on whether the forthcoming presidential elections are transparent and fair. This way, the dynamics of Ukraine’s relations with the EU will depend on its internal political and economic reforms. The EU member states, including Poland, should offer assistance in this process, but it is primarily all the Ukrainian government’s responsibility to pursue reforms and implement EU standards.

Reforms may require serious efforts and comprehensive information cam-paigns to convince the public, but these efforts pay off. Good governance, democ-racy, the rule of law, transparency and fairness in economic and political life are to the benefit of the state and the public. The implementation of European and international standards for products is expensive but also opens up new markets and possibilities for growth.

Integrating Ukraine into EU structures will not be an easy task. The negotia-tion of the EU-Ukrainian Action Plan and the circumstances of the forthcoming presidential elections will make the next months a crucial period for determining the course of our mutual relations. We believe that the Ukrainian authorities and major political parties should take ambitious decisions to bring Ukraine closer to Europe.

In the last decade, the EU’s first foreign policy priority was enlargement, which we completed successfully on May 1st, 2004. Having achieved this, the EU and its Commission are now focussing on its neighbors in the broadest sense as their next priority. Romano Prodi, with his concept of a “Wider Europe,” called for a “ring of friends” in Eastern Europe and subsequently also in the Caucasus and the coun-tries south and east of the Mediterranean. The Neighborhood Policy implements this concept as it seeks to share the benefits of integration with our neighbors by strengthening stability, security and well-being. It aims at preventing the EU’s new borders from becoming new dividing lines. This is particularly relevant in Eastern Europe, where our borders effectively shifted eastwards.

The criticism of the Neighborhood Policy raised in this discussion reminds me of what I heard as Head of the EU Delegation in Cairo last year. The Egyptians asked me practically the same questions as our Eastern European partners. First: Why add yet another initiative to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

Reforms will pay off for the public

and for the economy

Ukraine’s next steps will

determine the country’s future

Boag PresentationEnlargement completed, neighborhood

is the EU’s next foreign policy priority

Why yet another initiative ?

The Neighborhood Policy

offers closer relations …

57 Wolski | Boag

The Neighborhood Policy aims at preventing the EU’s new borders from becoming new dividing lines.

Boag

with its Free Trade Agreement, to the Greater Middle East initiative, and to the whole array of existing multilateral and bilateral initiatives. Second: What is new about the Neighborhood Policy and which additional benefits will it bring us ? Let me try to answer these questions.

The Neighborhood Policy offers our neighbors a much closer relationship with the EU than hitherto. It allows for an enhanced political dialog and a greater stake in the European Union’s internal market and is based on the notion of shar-ing the EU’s fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, good govern-ance, civil society, market economy and sustainable development.

To implement the Neighborhood Policy, the EU negotiates Action Plans with each of its neighboring countries. The Action Plan for Ukraine, for example, sets out a whole series of projects for promoting democracy and human rights and specifically mentions the need to conduct this year’s presidential elections and the parliamentary elections in 2006 in accordance with OSCE standards.

The Action Plan also sets out concrete steps for bringing Ukraine’s — as well as Moldova’s — economy closer to the EU. In the long run, the approximation of laws, industrial norms, sanitary regulations and other standards will enable Ukraine to participate fully in the internal market. This promises is considerable added value compared to a free-trade agreement, which we offer once Ukraine completes its WTO membership. Such an agreement is of no use if your products are stopped at the frontier because they do not qualify to enter the markets which you are targeting. If the Action Plan is implemented, by contrast, this guarantees access to the EU market. That makes the country much more interesting not only for trading companies but also for investors.

The Action Plan also offers specific steps for cross-border cooperation. It sets out an agenda of capacity building for regional government, facilitating border management and eventually easier movement across borders for those who live in the border areas.

The methods of the Action Plans are very similar to those used to prepare the new member states for accession. One example is twinning, where administra-tions in partner countries work together with officials in member states to solve issues in accordance with EU practices. Here, the new member states can help a great deal in sharing their experiences of the last 10 years.

The Neighborhood Policy’s added value lies in differentiating and focusing our approaches. First, differentiation: there is no ‘one size fits all’-concept. The EU therefore conducts individual discussions with the neighboring countries in

… implemented through

individual Action Plans …

… which use some of the instruments

created for preparing accession

Boag 58

Eastern Europe, in the Mediterranean or in the Caucasus. Policies are designed to fit the needs of the country concerned and not some grand design produced in Brussels.

Second, focusing our policies: the Neighborhood Policy brings together all the different EU instruments to focus on the same policy objectives. We can thus move from cooperation to a significant degree of integration, avoiding a sense of exclusion in the neighboring countries. The Cooperation Council meets regularly to discuss political matters and we have offered to further upgrade these contacts. If the Council follows our proposal, we will create a new financial instrument combining all existing instruments and funds to effectively promote the Neigh-borhood Policy. While the budget has not yet been passed, the Commission also plans to propose a significant increase in funds for the countries concerned. The Union also wants to offer greater participation in European Union programs, par-ticularly in the sphere of culture, youth, education and technical and scientific cooperation, so that Ukrainians could soon participate in the Erasmus Mundi program. We might also soon conclude a new and more far-reaching cooperation agreement.

Basically, the Neighborhood Policy and the Action Plans are designed to put flesh on the bones of the existing contractual relationship. This is my answer to the question why we developed yet another initiative. My answer to the question

“What is in it for us ?” is as follows: There is a great deal in it for the partner coun-tries, if they accept the offer. I would strongly recommend that our partners put the European Union and the European Commission to the test. Even though we are not able to specify what the end point of the journey of European integration will be, this is an opportunity to move a considerable step forward. And — leaving aside the question of whether we are talking about membership or neighbor-hood — integration is what everybody in Ukraine in the past six weeks told me they wanted.

The offer is on the table, as Mr. Boag has said, and I would suggest that we now discuss its advantages and drawbacks. Is the EU Neighborhood Policy, with its path from cooperation to integration, its differentiated approaches and vision of participation in a free exchange of capital, people, goods, and services, a fair deal ? Or will the offer now on the table never really gain any meat on its bones, just like the Barcelona Process that Mr. Boag knows so well from Cairo ?

The Neighborhood Policy brings together

all EU instruments for the first time …

… and offers great opportunities

for the Eastern European countries —

if they accept it

de Weck

59 Boag | de Weck

The concrete content of the Neighborhood Policy depends on what the Com-mission negotiates with the individual parties in the Action Plans. As Mr. Boag rightly remarked, the Action Plan for Ukraine closely resembles the enlargement process — without, of course, providing the prospect of accession.

Still, the Council’s member states have yet to approve the Commission’s pro-posals. Not everything that Germany and Poland want, Mr. Wolski, will meet with the approval of all other EU member states. We will have to work on this if we want to reach our strategic goals in Europe.

As I negotiated the EU Action Plan on behalf of Ukraine until May 1st, I would like to tell you why this plan disappoints us. The Council of Ministers gave the Com-mission a very clear mandate: the Action Plan was to be a concrete document including mutual commitments and establishing benchmarks.

The Commission, however, presented us with an abstract document which includes neither benchmarks nor a basis for negotiations over the four freedoms. Clearly violating the mandate of the Council of Ministers, the document speaks in a very general way about the possibility of integration and postpones the dis-cussion of concrete projects like a free-trade zone. At the same time, the EU has started to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Moldova because it is a member of the WTO. But the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine es-tablishes no direct linkage between WTO membership and negotiations over a free-trade zone. Why should Ukraine still believe the EU’s promises ?

To sum up: the Action Plan provides no added value. In our relations with the EU’s new member states, like Poland, it even means a step backwards. Last but not least, everybody, including EU representatives, knows that there are no financial resources to implement the Action Plan until at least 2007. The only mechanism for which the EU seems willing to provide funding — and which therefore is much more interesting to us — is the New Neighborhood Instrument.

The Commission should have taken the Polish, Hungarian, Austrian and Czech proposals into account when formulating its Neighborhood Policy. It failed to consult those who know best and thereby confirmed an old prejudice: the gap between Brussels and reality is indeed huge and Brussels is best at producing drafts.

I would like to urgently advise all potential candidates for EU membership against overly criticizing the European Commission, because if you seek any kind of sup-

Cuntz

Chaly

The Action Plan remains abstract, provides

no added value and lacks financial resources

Reiter

Cuntz | Chaly | Reiter 60

Not everything that Germany and Poland want will meet with approval.

Cuntz

port, it will most likely come from the Commission. It was an extremely impor-tant driving force behind the 2004 enlargement.

Ukraine is divided between those who are critical of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy and those who do not even know that this policy exists. The political elite sees the Neighborhood Policy as a substitute for membership, which is at best a tem-porarily attractive situation. The idea of a “ring of friends,” though, suggests that each link must remain in that ring forever because taking it out would leave a hole.

We were especially disappointed that the four freedoms are no longer part of the offer — as the concept of Wider Europe had initially suggested. We also miss a vision. Especially the Action Plan confines itself to a list of practical steps without indicating a final destination.

Ukrainian representatives always complain that they are being fed nothing but empty words. Yet even now, when the EU offers them real projects, fields of co-operation, and priorities — which is all the Action Plan is — they condemn it as insufficient. Ukraine must indeed cast romantic visions of the EU aside, turn to realism and accept that the Neighborhood Policy and the Action Plans are here to stay. Our community of policy makers are quickly beginning to understand that we have to make the best of what the EU offers.

The Neighborhood Policy might indeed prove beneficial if it leads to concrete improvements in EU-Ukrainian relations. A top priority is the creation of infra-structure, of communication and transportation facilities, and the removal of obstacles at the borders and embassies. To understand how Ukrainians feel about the EU, join the queue in front of a European embassy. Changing these chaotic conditions would be a great step forward.

A very promising element of the Neighborhood Policy is the New Neighbor-hood Instrument. Ukraine and the EU have a real chance to create something of a new quality here if they manage to learn from their experience with previ-ous instruments. TACIS, for example, is not criticized because of the amount of funds available but because of its procedures and focus. The New Neighbourhood Instrument must develop a new way of interaction between the recipients and the donor, taking into account the priorities of beneficiaries. It should also focus

Pidluska Ukraine criticizes the Action Plan because

it does not offer much and lacks a vision …

Stüdemann

Pidluska … but Ukraine must accept the offer and try

to use it for concrete improvements such as …

… improving infrastructure …

… creating a new financial instrument —

the New Neighborhood Instrument — …

61 Reiter | Pidluska | Stüdemann

more on investments, rather than just on deploying experts. At the same time, though, Ukrainian institutions need to be strengthened to increase their absorp-tion capacity.

As for the twinning mechanism, it could be very effective, but only if institu-tional reforms precede any exchange of advisors on a large scale. As long as the institutions in our countries are incompatible, with whom should the EU experts be twinned ?

The Action Plan, to my mind, should cover a period of no longer than four years and should be aimed at developing a new framework for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Our Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will expire at this time and is completely outdated in its current form. For the imple-mentation of the Action Plan, cascading was applied successfully in the Polish case. This experience of negotiating with the EU and being pushed to meet dead-lines and benchmarks could be very useful for Ukraine.

Lastly, I think that reviving the Euro Regions could be a way of effectively promoting the Ukrainian-European partnership. Also, to articulate something closer to a vision: Maybe democracy is not and cannot be put on the agenda, but if we talk about good governance, transparency and greater inputs of civil society we might lay a basis for fruitful discussions which might eventually increase trust on both sides.

Mr. Stüdemann, what do you have to say about the German embassies’ practice of awarding visas ?

The crowds in front of our embassies are not only detrimental to our image; they are simply sad. I think we should have the courage to improve the permeability of the borders with Ukraine, both bilaterally and in a European context. Peo-ple-smuggling trials affect a miniscule percentage of the people who emigrate using our visas. All others return home. I cannot understand why we have panic reactions after two or three trials. Of course we have to come up with a unified European procedure within the framework of Schengen. Yet with Russia, a Ger-man-Russian and French-Russian agreement making visas easier to receive was possible, why not with Ukraine as well ?

At first sight, the EU’s Neighborhood Policy looks like a mission impossible. How to transform the weak states in Eastern Europe into stable democratic societies

… combining mechanisms such as

twinning with institutional reform …

… and reviving the Euro Regions

de Weck

Stüdemann

Chirtoaca

Pidluska | de Weck | Stüdemann | Chirtoaca 62

How to transform the weak states in Eastern Europe into stable democratic societies without

the conditionality of EU membership ?

Chirtoaca

without the conditionality of EU membership ? Stabilization is in the interest of the EU and of the Eastern European governments, but conditionality was the main mechanism of leverage for the new members of the EU.

Currently, we have stopped the process of transition midway. The old totali-tarian structures no longer work, but neither have we managed to establish new, functioning institutions. The most promising aspect of the situation in Moldova — as in all Eastern European countries — is that the country is very open towards Europe. Large parts of the leadership in these countries do indeed trust Brussels, even the Communists in Moldova who presently form the governing majority. They sent a letter to the European Commission in which they applied for membership. They unfortunately have not fully understood yet that a precon-dition for membership is to transform the country in accordance with European values and norms — but they want to get closer to Europe.

So how should the EU proceed ? I would advise against extending the TACIS program which provides technical assistance. To my mind, a program like PHARE which is tailored to fit the specific needs of each country and which aims at providing efficient assistance for restructuring the economy is more important. The new neighbors should be helped in their efforts to overcome the stagnation caused by unfinished democratic reforms. The macroeconomic stabilization in the majority of these countries must now be followed by an influx of private capital, which would bring a new management culture and create new markets. The EU must focus its programs on the weakest links and let the neighboring countries contribute their own visions. Otherwise misunderstandings instead of cooperation will determine our relations and the EU will have to deal with chronic instability at its borders for decades.

Mr. Boag rightly said that enlargement — as the EU’s first foreign policy priority over the past ten years — has been completed successfully. The integration of the new member states will be the primary priority of domestic policy for the next ten years. Estonia, for example, may be a formal member of the EU competition policy, but neither we nor any of the other new members really know how policymaking in this area works. Finnish representatives told me that it took them five years to learn how to play the game — it may take us even longer.

As this digestion period will take time and disparities within the EU will continue to exist, even Bulgaria and Romania might not receive the support they need to join in 2007. Governments will find it difficult to explain to their socie-

Without being able to offer

a prospect of membership …

… the Neighborhood Policy must help to

transform Eastern European societies …

… to ensure stability at the EU’s borders

Ilves Will the effort necessary for integrating

the new member states …

… allow the EU to devote resources to its

neighborhood ? The Union lacks money …

63 Chirtoaca | Ilves

ties why huge expenses should go towards programs in neighboring countries when large disparities continue to exist within the Union. Large member states want to reduce their payments, while new members want to catch up with their older counterparts. I therefore doubt the EU’s will to devote serious financial resources to its neighbors until 2007 or 2012. Robert Cooper’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big carrot” is theoretically very useful for integrating countries like Ukraine or Moldova. But in reality, the EU’s carrot may not be that big in the next few years.

What the EU has at its disposal, though, is the huge and very competent staff that managed the previous round of enlargement. Some of these people will be engaged in the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, but the others should work with the new neighbors. They know which policies worked in which countries, and which people were responsible for that.

In addition, as Mr. Boag said, we should use the considerable expertise and experience of the new members. While Germany’s border police did a great job teaching Georgian policemen how to establish a border guard, the Germans were not prepared for some of the problems involved in building such a force from scratch because they have had border police for 150 years. The Estonian experi-ence of having had border guards for only 10 years was very useful here. Apart from that, the new member states enjoy a certain credibility which exempts them from the complaint that “you people in the West do not understand our situation.” People who want to transform a formally communist administration respect those who have already successfully transformed theirs.

Thus, a combination of DG enlargement staff, Commission staff and the new members’ civil servants could be a very powerful tool that might make up for the lack of money to a certain extent.

Mr. Boag, how will the new Neighborhood Policy be correlated with the Northern Dimension Policy of the European Union ? And how will the EU deal with the 480,000 individuals in Latvia and 160,000 in Estonia who do not enjoy the rights of citizens ?

The Neighborhood Policy will certainly be related to the Northern Dimension, but at this stage I cannot tell you in what form.

The question of citizenship probably falls more into the domain of national governments than the EU. Many countries in the European Union have large popu-

… but the EU has a competent staff

that managed the accession …

… and the expertise of the new

member states at its disposal

Kozhokin How will the EU deal with the non-citizens

in its new member states ?

Boag

Ilves | Kozhokin | Boag 64

lations of non-citizens. The Turks in Germany, for example, have to go through a much more difficult nationalization process than people in Estonia or Latvia. The question does not seem as pressing to me as you suggest. No human rights of the non-citizens are violated. They can even vote in local elections, which is more than the usual practice in many countries of the European Union.

Respect for minority rights has to be treated with care. The Russian minority, 17 % of the countrys population, is massively overrepresented in the media and many other areas. The entire Ukrainian book market, for example, is dominated by Russian books. Far more movies are available in Russian than in Ukrainian. The Russian minority in Ukraine is not a group whose mother tongue is threat-ened. It is a group whose mother tongue can be used anywhere in the country. There is another more creative way that one might consider minorities in this context.

The Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland, on the other hand, could provide a natural bridge between Brussels, Warsaw and Kyiv. Many of these people are cosmopolitan, well educated, and bi- or trilingual. Therefore, they constitute an important resource for linking the new neighbors to the countries within the Union.

As to the idea of opening EU educational institutions to people from the East, I would like to add that education has to run in both directions. Historical under-standing could improve European solidarity and identity, which, as we heard, is lagging behind enlargement. The suffering of the Second World War is a European narrative which, in the course of EU integration, has been used as an antidote to war. It has not yet been understood, though, that the places which were most af-fected by this war were Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Once this east European ex-perience moves into the center of the historical narrative of the European Union, societies within the EU will perceive their eastern neighbors as a part of Europe. Fostering this perception is a step which can be undertaken by the European Union regardless of which policies Belarus and Ukraine decide to pursue. It is a matter of the European Union educating itself about Europe.

Our discussion seems to be based on the wrong premises. The East European — or Eastern Slavic — states have witnessed substantial changes since the 1990s in how they perceive their relations with the EU. The ruling elites of eastern Ukraine, Russia and Belarus no longer want a democratizing partnership with the EU, but

Snyder The Russian minority in Ukraine

is in no need of protection …

… while the Ukrainian and Belarusian

minorities in Poland will serve as bridges

RahrEastern European states no longer want a

democratizing partnership with the EU

65 Boag | Snyder | Rahr

The societies of eastern Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus want a modernizing partnership.

Rahr

a modernizing partnership. They want a community of interests instead of a com-munity of values; a purely pragmatic economic partnership instead of a dialog of civil societies. The elites oppose continued transfers of the democracy they regard as a dictation on the part of the West or the West’s brand of missionary work. In the past few weeks, these countries practically tried to throw out the OSCE. The Neighborhood Strategy is regarded as a partition strategy which, with its key points of migration, border security, and international crime, is much more important for the West than for the East, which is interested in the opening of EU markets. Education is the sole area where both sides quickly find common ground, if at all.

The EU must recognize this development — despite all respect for democracy, human rights, and civil society — if it does not want to lose sight of its strategic interests. Eastern Europe and Russia will only grow in importance for our energy security, especially when the oil and gas of the Persian Gulf no longer flows as freely as it has done. We need the East’s commodities, and not least, we need a security partnership in light of the terrorist threat.

The conditions for an economic partnership are better than many people think. The eastern markets have opened up increasingly to western investment. In the Bundestag on September 25, 2001, President Putin even offered to strate-gically integrate the commodities potential of Siberia and the Far East with the technologically more advanced EU. Unfortunately, the EU has yet to reply to this offer.

Real perspectives are opened up by the WTO, for instance. In the medium term, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor Belarus will either want or be able to join the EU, but they all want WTO membership. Moldova is already a member and Rus-sia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is a step towards pragmatic cooperation within the WTO. This will be the moment of truth, when the West will have to open up its markets and make up for its mistakes during the 1990s.

Moreover, I consider the EU’s “Four Common Spaces” strategy with Russia — cooperation in economic matters, foreign policy, inner security, and culture — a milestone. I would suggest extending this Four Spaces Strategy within the Neigh-borhood Strategy to Ukraine or Belarus. It would open up a path of pragmatic cooperation and substantially improve relations.

I am ashamed to admit that I do not even know the EU’s Action Plans. Still, I allow myself the liberty of thinking about Europe. I believe, for example, that

A modernizing or economic partnership

between the EU and Eastern Europe

offers many chances for both sides

Schlögel

Rahr | Schlögel 66

strategies and plans accomplish nothing if they are not supported by historical forces. I deeply wish that Europe’s movers and shakers in Brussels would come down from their plateau and finally make contact with the vibrant forces that are shaping Europe.

Take for example the women who travel six times a month from Kaunas to Warsaw to sell their goods in the bazaar in the stadium there. They are the ones who have kept the economy going and maintained the stability of our continent for the last ten years: The hundreds of thousands and millions of people conduct-ing their “biznes” in the bazaars of Sedmoi Kilometr in Odessa, in Tuzyn near Lodz, in Chernovci or in Luzhniki in Moscow. The pioneers of Europe’s integration are the logistics workers of Eurolines with their bus network from Cadiz in Spain to the end of Finland and the airline entrepreneurs of Ryanair. The children of the new Europe are the students of Viadrina University. There is no “Cold War Europe” for them — some of them don’t even know what Solidarnosc was — and they take for granted their freedom of movement in a Europe without the old borders.

Ukraine, too, is much more than the object of an EU Action Plan. It is itself a Europe in miniature, with all the extreme contrasts of this continent. To me it is a miracle that this country, with all its incredible breadth of cultural histories and neighborhoods, can withstand the contradictions between industrial Kharkov and Central European Lviv, between the Ottoman dimension of the Crimea’s southern coast to Dnepropetrovsk. Somehow, this country has managed to make the transition since 1989 without allowing violence to gain the upper hand, as it did in the Balkans and in the Northern Caucasus. These are the truly important developments.

We do not have to worry about the conceptual weaknesses of the EU strategies we have discussed or the manifold difficulties in implementing them, because in reality there are much deeper forces at work here. On the other hand we cannot permit ourselves to rest on the hope that Brussels’ Action Plans will shorten the span of historical processes of longue durée. A long time will pass before people in the West realize the extent to which the history of 20th Century Eastern Europe was one of violence with horrific human sacrifice, a history without normal and continual traditions. Directives cannot abbreviate a reorientation of the entire region’s perception of history.

Politics always lags behind what the people want. The will of the people is some-thing very alive, though, that can set free enormous potential for overcoming

Action Plans are less important than …

… the traders from Kaunas and

the logistics workers of Eurolines

We are unable to shorten

the process of understanding

Stüdemann

67 Schlögel | Stüdemann

I deeply wish that Europe’s movers and shakers in Brussels would come down from their plateau and finally make contact with the vibrant forces that are shaping Europe.

Schlögel

limitations and transcending problems. It is an almost subversive force. Like ants, they pour out, surmount all obstacles, and find their places once again.

Another level of development that we often forget during our technical dis-cussions is the emotional stance of the people of Europe. We act as if the whole population of Ukraine were waiting for a chance to emigrate. That is in no way a reflection of reality. A huge number of young people here are convinced that their place is in Ukraine. These people return from abroad and want to change their country. They are inspired by an experience that we cannot understand because we have come to take it for granted: people learning to determine their own lives. We should all realize what that means in a country where the parents’ generation, and in East Ukraine even that of the grandparents, could not freely choose their job nor where they lived nor their partner. One cannot extinguish this elementary experience among people, and therefore I do not see the danger of a relapse in Ukraine. The danger is that we do not take the changes and thirst for transformation in Ukraine seriously enough and therefore do too little to support them.

Business plays an important role in the enlargement of the EU and in developing relations with the countries further east. Although the bringing down of the Ber-lin Wall was a political act, business embraced integration much faster in the mid 1990s than the politicians and diplomats who tried to postpone enlargement. By investing strongly in the countries which were to become the 10 new members of the EU, business helped overcome the partition of Europe. Similarly, it can help today with the EU’s eastern neighbors. Business not only transfers technology and capital or creates products and markets. Large companies also tend to form power-ful lobby groups for the furthering of relations and the creation of political and institutional structures in the countries in which they invest, including eventual EU membership.

Business can also enhance cultural understanding because tourism is an im-portant economic factor. One reason why Turkey is so much discussed in Europe is because many people know the country because they have been on holiday there. Another example is the Czech Republic. Even though this is a rather unfamiliar country to the general public, everybody knows what Prague is: this lovely city in the middle of Europe and yes, of course, Prague should be in the European Union. A country’s image has a crucial influence on public perceptions of what politics and diplomacy should do.

Young people in Ukraine want to stay

in their country and transform it

WagstylIf business is allowed to invest,

it promotes integration …

… and enhances cultural understanding

Stüdemann | Wagstyl 68

So how can business be developed ? What could the role of the European Union be ? It could encourage business in the east, for example, by developing business training. There are very good management schools in Poland and also in Slovenia which offer world-class management education at much cheaper prices than in Western countries. These schools will be instrumental in developing con-tacts between business people from Western and Eastern Europe.

But for the most part, the process depends on the EU’s eastern partners. For Ukraine, the best way to make friends in Europe would be to attract a large inves-tor. It was a terrible pity that even though two major international groups were bidding in the privatization of Kryvorizhstal, in the end a domestic investor got the deal for a much lower price. This decision symbolizes a decade of misguided policies and disappointed hopes. Business was extremely interested in Ukraine from 1997 to 1998 because conditions seemed very good — until the Russian crisis smashed economic growth. Another, smaller surge of interest was triggered by the reforms Mr. Yushchenko implemented as Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 and ended with his being sacked by the Ukrainian Parliament. The new neighbors could do a lot in terms of encouraging business, and the benefits would extend far beyond the economic sphere.

I would like to point to the Lviv Project as an example for the living forces that determine the unification of Europe beyond official diplomacy. German NGOs and German partners asked themselves at an early stage what would happen in this city so close to the Polish border on May 1, 2004, when all of a sudden the Schengen Regime separates these newly-integrating regions of East Poland and West Ukraine. These people all drew on experience of the German-French border in a project sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation called “Talking Borders” which brought together Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, and French people in Freiburg, Berlin, and Lviv. The European Commission gained significant impe-tus from these discussions for its concept of small-scale border traffic — it was an exemplary contribution of civil society.

Wolfgang Schäuble, the debates between the EU and its neighbors can hardly ignore technical details. Messrs. Schlögel, Stüdemann, and Wagstyl addressed a different, perhaps more profound level with their discussion of economic flows and migrations. Yet as a political construct, the EU must nonetheless reach beyond technical discussions and ask what integration really is and in what direction it

Ukraine needs foreign investors

ErlerNGOs help to unify Europe

beyond official diplomacy

de Weck

69 Wagstyl | Erler | de Weck

The Czech Republic is a rather unfamiliar country, but everybody knows what Prague is: this lovely city in the middle of Europe and yes, of course, Prague should be in the European Union.

Wagstyl

should proceed. Your most recent book is entitled “Will the West Fail ? Germany and the New World Order.” The West also faces a challenge in Eastern Europe. Is there a threat of failure or do you regard the developments optimistically ?

I consider European integration and therefore the European neighborhood as a process, both in terms of time and space. We are not talking about a final set-tlement of borders, but about transitions and developments, and, I hope, about progress. EU enlargement and neighborhood, therefore, should not be seen as strict alternatives because one can change into the other at any time.

As long as our discussion over the finality of the unification process fails to produce a consensus — including that between old and new member states — then the reference to an “ever closer union” will remain a guiding principle of our journey. If we are to make progress on this path and in the issue of the EU’s neighborhood, we must determine what the Union actually is. Because even if, as Mr. Schlögel said, Europe is more than the EU, the European Union still radiates a considerable attraction, and many hopes and expectations rest on it.

For me, the European Union means the establishment of a political entity to which the member states gradually transfer their sovereignty, piece by piece. The negotiation of the European Constitutional Treaty is a step in this direction. It brings to light the manifold objections to giving up sovereignty, especially when the issues at hand are majority decision-making and the abolition of veto powers for nation states.

Against the backdrop of a globalized world, which is constantly growing more and more integrated and whose parts become increasingly interdependent, we must deepen European integration. Only when Europe speaks with a single voice will the European states be able to make sure their interests are heard, for instance in global developments such as in business or demography.

The EU is a model for the integration of nation states in the age of globaliza-tion. Yet we cannot conclude therefore that the EU is per se open to all states. Fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen Criteria cannot constitute the sole basis for EU membership, because these criteria are global in nature. Democracy, the rule of law, protection for minorities, and the like are just as universal as human rights. They should not be fulfilled just to become a member of the EU, nor should we strive to guarantee them only within the EU zone. Only those countries should become EU members that go beyond the Copenhagen Criteria, that establish the prerequisites for being part of Europe. This is because people in the old and new

Schäuble presentation

Integration as well as neighborhood

is not static

European integration must be deepened …

… and should not extend beyond

Europe to all democratic states

de Weck | Schäuble 70

The European neighborhood is a process. We are not talking about

a final settlement of borders.

Schäuble

member states must have a sense of identity, of belonging to the EU. Only then will they agree that their countries should gradually hand over more and more of their sovereignty to the EU.

The original driving force behind integration was economic union, the suc-cess of which has been displayed, for instance, by the triumph of the Euro, which so many people regarded sceptically at first. In the coming years, an emerging European Common Foreign and Security Policy will be the chief wellspring of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Opinion polls in Germany several years ago indicated that two-thirds of the people would prefer a European army to a national one. After a century marked by nationalism, we have a good chance of transfer-ring national sovereignty to an appropriately constructed Europe.

What, then, is exactly the relationship between deepening, enlargement, and neighborhood of the EU ? I am convinced that the only thing that can safeguard the dynamics of the unification process is a strengthening of political integration, and that the threat of falling support among the people must be taken very seri-ously. I fear that, when we are caught up in the difficult day-to-day politics of Brus-sels, whether in the Commission or the Parliament, we sometimes underestimate this danger. When he was vice-president of the Commission years ago, my friend Martin Bangemann once told me that his job was much more satisfying than na-tional politics. “I have a great deal to do, can concentrate on concepts, and do not constantly have to take part in some party- or parliamentary meeting.” I answered that he was providing a wonderful basis for people to suspect that politics in Brus-sels has relatively little to do with reality. We need the people’s acceptance, and for that we need to deepen integration.

By the way, 10 years ago Karl Lamers and I also understood our idea of a “core Europe” as an instrument of deeper integration. If the EU is to retain its dynamism, it needs to be led by a core that pushes integration forward instead of dividing Europe. In the current debate about the European Constitution it is therefore important that individual states’ possibilities for exerting influence should not be fixed too precisely, so that we can keep the possibility open, especially after new members join us, of again changing the EU’s decision-making mechanisms in a further step towards integration.

As important as deepening is, on the other hand I equally support Mr. Wolski’s statement that European integration cannot become synonymous with moving and stiffening borders. With every enlargement, we must promote greater open-ness and stability, both with members and neighboring states.

The European Common Foreign and

Security Policy is becoming more important

Integration must promote openness and

stability with neighboring states, too

71 Schäuble

For the eastward enlargement and the EU’s eastern neighborhood, that mainly means taking Russia into consideration. We must strictly avoid giving the impression in Moscow that these processes are directed against Russian interests. This is no easy task, but a conflict between the expanded EU and the re-establish-ment of spheres of influence within the former Soviet Union would certainly produce a new confrontation.

The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the Islamic world. We must make it clear that by pursuing integration, we are spreading openness and transparency. Our efforts to build bridges to the Islamic world and to support modernization, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the separation of church and state should never be perceived as an attempt to seize what we want while erecting new borders. Also, our neighborhood policies must consider the Mediterranean region just as much as they do Eastern Europe.

I think this year’s EU enlargement was the last one to be historically justified. Because it was rooted in European history, hardly anyone could publicly deny its moral authority. The generation of politicians who enlarged the EU of 15 would never have called for referendums because they would have regarded such a move as violating the candidate countries’ own legitimate accession wishes. All future enlargements will be carried out under different conditions.

The EU’s present situation is full of contradictions. On the one hand, the new EU is learning to think strategically with its New Neighborhood Policy. It is tak-ing on responsibility for security in regions vital for international security, and is therefore consciously taking risks — which is completely the right decision. Tak-ing up accession talks with Turkey is also being justified on strategic grounds. To stabilize a region important for European security, the EU is willing to experiment with integrating a predominantly Muslim country. The European alternative to the Iraq war, so to speak.

On the other hand, we are seeing the EU member states’ Europe policies becoming dominated by domestic politics. The calls for referendums symbolizes how decision-making in European policy is becoming subservient to domestic constraints — with all their contradictions, tactical maneuvers, and fear-monger-ing. Politicians no longer have the courage to take steps in European policy that come up against resistance among the people. That applies to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus even more than to Turkey. Who, in the old EU countries, still has the brazenness to tell his or her compatriots that these three countries could one day

The EU must take Russia into

consideration in the first place

Reiter The enlargement of 2004 was the last

one to be historically justified

While the EU takes up a new

role as geopolitical actor …

… the member states’ policies are

increasingly dominated by domestic politics

Schäuble | Reiter 72

This year’s EU enlargement was the last one to be historically justified.

Reiter

be EU accession candidates — for fear of overtaxing the people and therefore of the EU’s integrative powers ?

Mr. Schäuble rightfully spoke of a European spirit of belonging as the central condition for the EU’s integrative power. Yet this identity is no immovable mass. It is something we can and must actively shape. If the old EU countries had not consciously formed their sense of togetherness with the accession candidates, the ten new members would not be in the EU today. The EU enlargement of 2004 did not at all follow 1994’s sense of belonging, and just as that sense has since changed and continued to grow, new members such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia can and should foster it with their neighbors Ukraine and Belarus, to then pass it on to their western partners.

I am not willing to simply accept that, in the wake of developments since World War II, many Western Europeans have — for understandable reasons — be-come closer to Turkey than Ukraine. This attitude is not objectively valid. It has emerged historically through certain influences since 1945 and can certainly change again under different circumstances.

First of all, I would like to thank you for having broached the subject of Turkey, an essential component of our discussion of Europe’s future and expansion. Dur-ing a conference focusing on the Weimar Triangle — France, Poland, and Ger-many — the Polish participants spoke in a similar vein about Turkey. They may have supported opening negotiations with Turkey and offering the country a prospect of accession, but only on the condition that Ukraine be treated the same way.

I ask for your understanding that a different opinion prevails in Germany. It is simply a fact that we know far less about Ukraine. When thinking about the EU’s strategic tasks, we do not think primarily about Ukraine. We think of our relation-ship with Russia, for example, with Poland in the middle, not Ukraine. Whenever the Chancellor travels to Moscow, he pays his respects along the way in Warsaw.

The great interest in Turkey has less to do with the search for a European alter-native to American policy in Iraq than with the fact that Germans deal with Turk-ish people day in, day out — but hardly at all with Ukrainians. We have, moreover, an essential interest in not leaving the crisis zone of the Middle East solely to US policymaking — and the path to an active role in this region leads through Turkey. And, to add a polemical remark, Leonid Kuchma is further way from Europe in his policies than Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Perhaps it this verdict that justifies the

We should not simply accept

that Western Europeans feel closer

to Turkey than to Ukraine

von Weizsäcker

German foreign policy hardly takes Ukraine

into account when developing strategies …

… and Germans simply know more

about Turkey than about Ukraine

73 Reiter | von Weizsäcker

It is simply a fact that we know far less about Ukraine.

von Weizsäcker

knowledge deficits in respect of Ukraine among EU states, but, after all, we are here to keep learning. We hope that our Polish partners will be especially helpful in this respect.

Mr. Mikhailov and Mr. Hrytsak, do you wish that the Europeans would start dis-cussing Ukraine as passionately as they do Turkey ? I would also be interested to know why the Turkish question awakens so much passion, while the discussion of the EU’s Eastern neighbors is marked above all by caution.

All I know is that we need a language powerful enough to give strength and vital-ity to the idea of European integration. This is the only way that we can succeed in psychologically putting the heavy burden of the past behind us and recognize democracy as the new normality. Yet only those politicians whose bravery goes beyond maintaining their own position of power will find this language.

There is certainly no lack of passion at least in the Eastern European countries. For us, Europe means certain democratic standards and values for which we have been striving for a long time. Right now, we feel that we risk missing our last chance to join Europe and thus to leave the violent history of the past century behind. In Eastern Europe from the beginning of World War I until the end of World War II, every other male and one woman in four died a violent death. As one historian put it, we had a mad history with short lucid intervals. Trying to escape this past, the risk of failure certainly does not leave us dispassionate. Maybe people in Western Europe are more interested in Turkey than in our countries because they do not know what Europe means to us or the past we are trying to overcome.

We must indeed realize that a phase of the unification process has now irrevo-cably ended. The accession of the eight Central- and Eastern European states on May 1 — besides Malta and Cyprus — completed the reconstitution of a European geography and history. All these states had historical points of contact that made the transcendous speed of their reform and accession processes possible, moti-vated by the incentive of joining quickly. This will no longer exist in the future. It is no coincidence that Romania and Bulgaria are lagging behind, because there are fewer historical points of contact with them.

After 2007, a completely new page will be turned. In the five states of the Western Balkans, with the exception of Croatia, the link between the prospect

de Weck

Mikhailov

HrytsakOnly European integration would allow

Eastern European societies to put

their violent history behind themselves

ErlerSince the enlargement of 2004 completed the

reconstitution of a European geography …

… negotiations about possible accession will

be conducted very differently in the future

von Weizsäcker | de Weck | Mikhailov | Hrytsak | Erler 74

We feel that we risk missing our last chance to join Europe.

Hrytsak

of accession in the foreseeable future and a resulting rapid pace of reform has dissolved. Policies in these countries are contradictory, and there are also forces that are not working at full speed toward accession, but resist it. It is completely unforeseeable when they will reach the point at which they can enter into serious negotiations with clearly defined target dates.

In Turkey, the prospect of beginning negotiations has been incentive enough to forcibly move the country toward fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. But now we are beginning a very long phase of 14 or 15 years — Erdogan himself uses the date 2019 — without a result that anyone can foresee. Who would have said in 1989, for example, that we would have a ten-country expansion in 2004 ? Back then we still had the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War.

The EU has made it abundantly clear that it will be pursuing a very different accession policy in the future. The three pillars suggested by the Commission present a new paradigm: negotiations are an open process that can be broken off; not only laws, but also their implementation, will be monitored; and the process can be suspended if reforms are insufficient.

The New Neighborhood Policy is far removed from our former means of bring-ing applicant countries closer. In practice, it resembles our policy towards all the other applicant countries. We have to make this much clearer, and above all, our new neighbors have to be more aware of it as well.

At the end of this very intense discussion, please permit me to make a personal remark. When Mr. Schlögel described Ukraine as a Europe in miniature, I was reminded of parallels to a land not completely unknown to me, namely Switzer-land. Perhaps it is the fate of those countries that carry in themselves the entire European principle to be non-members of the European Union. And perhaps it is precisely the countries that encompass the most diverse traditions and cultures that have good diplomats, but weak foreign policies. The more heterogeneous a political entity is, the more difficult it becomes to devise a coherent, proactive, and dynamic foreign policy. Sooner or later, the European Union could face this threat. I hope we succeed in learning from the examples of countries such as Switzerland and Ukraine.

de Weck

75 Erler| de Weck

We will be talking today about Russia, a country with a twofold relationship to our topic of the “EU’s new neighbors.” On the one hand, Russia is itself a new neighbor that has its own, very individual characteristics. It is different from the other eastern neighbors in more ways than just its size. It has no interest, even in the medium term, in joining the EU. Russia’s enclave of Kaliningrad presents a special problem. Russia’s rejection of an action plan within the New Neighbor-hood Policy has already led Russia and the EU to conceive their cooperation on a different plane. Within the framework of a strategic partnership, four joint

“spaces” are being constructed. However, Russia is also relevant to EU neighborhood policy in another respect.

It acts as a second center of gravity, besides the EU, for countries like Ukraine, Be-larus, and Moldova — I need only mention the Single Economic Space, with which Russia is pursuing its own integration strategy.

Where are the lines of cooperation and confrontation in the Russia-EU-New Neighbors triangle ? Is Russia a completely normal eastern neighbor or should it have a special status ? Or, what kind of friction could develop with two overlapping spaces of integration, between the EU and Russia ?

We will first analyze the EU’s relations with Russia, which, in turn, decisively influence the EU’s relations with its new neighbors. Perhaps you all know the joke about the new European Commission President Barroso’s first working visit to Russia’s President Putin. Barroso asks Putin, “In one word, how are rela-tions between the EU and Russia ? The Russian President answers “good.” The Commission President is glad to hear this, but becomes so suspicious of the positive verdict that he asks, “Tell me in two words, Mr. President: how are rela-tions ?” Putin answers … “not good.” Evgenii Kozhokin, of Russia’s Institute of Strategic Studies, please tell us in more than two words, how are these relations really ?

During the last decade we have witnessed changes in Russia’s attitude towards the European Union. Ongoing discussions concerning relations between the EU and Ukraine or Moldova remind us very much of those between Russia and the EU in the early 1990s. Then, a considerable part of the Russian political elite clamored for full integration. Today there is little left of those demands.

Nowadays Russia favors the concept of a strategic partnership with the EU. At the EU-Russian Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to intensify their strategic cooperation by working out four so-called common

III. The Strategic Triangle: EU — New Neighbors — Russia

de Weck Russia as a neighbor and a rival

of the European Union

Kozhokin presentation

Russia no longer wants integration in

the EU, but a strategic partnership

Cooperation in four areas

de Weck | Kozhokin 76

spaces, these being the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security, research and education.

High-ranking politicians were nominated by the Russian President Vladimir Putin as coordinators of the process: the Prime Minister M. Fradkov is responsible for general coordination; the Minister of Energy and Industry V.Khristenko is re-sponsible for economic cooperation, V. Ivanov, Assistant to the President, super-vises the domain of justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov is responsible for the domain of security and S. Yastrzhembskiy, another Assistant to the Presi-dent, for the field of science and culture. We have already achieved some positive results, but there is plenty left to be discussed and developed. A supplementary protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which extends the PCA to the new EU Member States is about to be ratified in the Russian Duma, and the EU-Russia Summit to be held on November 11 is expected to enable further progress to be made in developing these four spaces.

Today, our political elite considers the EU a partner we have to negotiate with on a pragmatic basis. We have accepted the conditions which the EU has set for Russia’s accession to the WTO although the results for our economy will be dra-matic, for example causing significant increase in gas prices.

The EU is thus a very important partner in the economic sphere, too. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement sets the goal of liberalizing trade on the basis of the most-favored-nation status and legislation harmonization.

Our business community is ready to undertake important steps to improve cooperation with the EU: The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepre-neurs planned to open its office in Brussels. For this it was necessary to obtain legal status under the European Commission but the latter did not grant this status.

The Association of Financial Industrial Groups of Russia implements EU pro-grams for the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises.

At the same time some serious problems have emerged, especially in the economic sphere, as a result of EU enlargement. Cargo transit to and from the Kaliningrad region has been hampered by lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Since the region’s borders have become borders with the EU, the check-in procedure has become much more time-consuming, now taking 24 hours, and sometimes even up to five days. As to the transit of people, the EU should be flexible in handling the Schengen agreement to prevent the creation of new dividing lines in Europe. Russia has already signed visa agreements with Italy, France and Germany during

The EU is an important economic

partner and supporter of

Russia’s accession to the WTO

New economic problems were

created by enlargement

77 Kozhokin

Our political elite sees the EU as a partner we have to negotiate with on a pragmatic basis.

Kozhokin

the last months and is now negotiating an agreement within the framework of Russian-EU cooperation.

Today, security is an important field of cooperation, and the EU seems to have understood at last how dangerous the threat of terrorism really is. Cooperation in the field of security lies within the jurisdiction of our security agencies and should be based on mutual trust. To my mind, the security agencies of the other CIS member countries should be incorporated into the process.

The problem of migration between the EU and its neighbors — Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova — is also becoming increasingly acute with the enlargement of the European Union. Migration is taking place at two levels. First, ordinary people from Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova leave their countries to work in Rus-sia or the EU because salaries there are higher. This stream of people cannot be stemmed as long as standards of living differ significantly. Illegal immigrants are a problem not only in the EU, but also for Russia, which unfortunately has recently toughened conditions for acquiring Russian citizenship. Being human beings, we must find ways to stop this new form of slavery in the heart of Europe; in the century when human rights have a priority in almost all spheres of state life thousands of these “new white slaves” have no rights at all. The migration of elites is not so much a humanitarian problem. If the smartest, best educated and most active young people go to the European Union countries, they do it mostly in a legal way. But this kind of migration poses a serious political and economic problem for Russia and the Eastern European countries as they lose their most valuable scientists, engineers and businessmen. From the point of view of the EU, this brain drain has positive effects only in the short term. In the long run, the European Union should be interested in keeping qualified political and economic elites in its neighboring countries, because that is the only way to stabilize these regions.

Furthermore, the EU and Russia should openly start discussing a challenge which both societies face: the declining number of native citizens and the chang-ing ethnic composition of the population. It goes without saying that Russia and the EU need dialog on different levels and in different formats and the fact that there is no anti-European feeling in Russia makes it easier.

Our political elites may have problems in understanding the rules of the bureaucratic game and the distribution of power in Brussels. But they are very willing to learn if the Europeans are prepared to share this knowledge.

Migration into the EU is a humanitarian

problem and an economic challenge

Both the EU and Russia face a changing

ethnic composition of their populations

Kozhokin 78

For the new neighbors, good relations between the EU and Russia are vitally important. The neighbors often express their dissatisfaction at special treatment being given to Russia, in which one senses the old trauma of Russian-European collaboration and decisions being made over these countries’ heads. However, only intact relations with Moscow will allow the Union to make its influence felt in the interest of the new neighbors — I need mention only EU intervention in problems concerning pipelines, payment of energy deliveries, or the Transnistria question.

European-Russian relations, however, are currently at a crossroads. I would like to demonstrate this using four examples: Russian traumas with the EU, the EU’s interests toward Moscow, the perception of Russia in Brussels, and finally the consequences of the events in Beslan for relations between Russia and the EU. First, the trauma: Russia’s political class has yet to overcome the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The fact that both the European Union and NATO have absorbed parts of this former empire is a permanent burden on relations. That ethnic Russians in the Baltics have become minorities in need of protection in EU states is something considered in Russia as a vile act of ingrati-tude. Russia is convinced it did a great deal during Soviet times for the develop-ment of the Baltic region.

The trauma of having lost former Soviet republics is, in turn, made worse by fears for the integrity of the Russian Federation. The weaknesses of the central government, the regions’ centrifugal forces and, consequently, the fragility of the Federation are all thrown into sharp focus in the North Caucasus and by the Chechen problem.

Secondly, what interests does the EU have in Russia ? First and foremost, the Union needs stability from its giant neighbor with so many of its own problems. The geographic proximity and economic importance of Russia, especially in the energy sector, are reason enough. Germany, for example, receives 30 percent of its oil and 40 percent of its gas from the Russian Federation. The wish for democ-ratization is derived from this interest in stability. Europe knows that a function-ing democracy and market economy have a stabilizing effect on countries. Yet when stability and democratization come into conflict, the interest in stability has priority.

Besides domestic Russian stability, the EU also has an interest in keeping Rus-sia within the structures of international cooperation. In the NATO-Russia Coun-cil, the EU needs Moscow as a partner to help resolve the conflicts in the Balkans

Erler presentationOnly good relations with Russia

allow the EU to intervene on

behalf of its Eastern neighbors

But European-Russian relations are at a

crossroads: EU enlargement exacerbates the

Russian trauma of losing the Soviet empire

The EU is interested in

keeping Russia stable …

… and within the structures

of international cooperation …

79 Erler

or in the so-called broader Middle East. Russia is also indispensable in helping find solutions to international problems — for example in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, after 9/11, Russia has become an essential partner of international antiter-rorism policy.

Thirdly, Russia’s perception of the EU: Putin’s Russia has a difficult time with the EU as a neighbor because the EU contradicts the Russian principle of bilateral foreign policy. That is why Putin attempts to bilateralize relations with those EU states he considers most important: Germany, France, Britain, and occasionally Italy. When Putin discusses a topic with Chancellor Schröder, he assumes that the results of his talks will automatically become EU law. This problem will only become more acute when the integration of European policies, especially foreign and security policy, increase with the implementation of the European Constitution.

Fourth, the hostage taking in the school in Beslan in late August and early September turned into an acute danger for relations between the EU and Russia. In that crisis situation, Russia received harsh criticism instead of the support it expected, raising the possibility that Russia might isolate itself.

That week of terrorism plunged Russia into the deepest crisis of the Putin era. It demonstrated that Putin had failed in his strategy of Chechenizing the conflict by transferring authority to Chechens loyal to Moscow. Instead, the violence began overflowing from Chechnya into the rest of Russia, which now considers its situation comparable to that of the US after September 11, 2001, and expects comparable concern among other countries.

Yet in the wake of a short wave of solidarity after Beslan, all the suppressed criticism of Russia that Putin had very adroitly kept in check by his cooperative stance in the fight against international terrorism after 9/11 suddenly spewed forth. Now, all the objections to Russia’s Chechnya policy that had been kept silent have come to the surface, as well as to the concentration of power in the presi-dent’s hands, treatment of the opposition and lack of press freedom, and finally to the treatment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. This criticism from the EU, by the way, does not come so much from official channels as from voices in society in the EU member states, criticizing Russia, accusing the EU of weakness and vacillation to-wards Russia, and demanding clear statements against the state of affairs there.

This criticism, which Russians regard as completely unjustified, causes a very dangerous reaction there, namely, for Russians to bury their heads in the sand and make lonely decisions without consulting their partners such as the EU. The

… while Russia has difficulties in

dealing with the EU because the

Union does not work bilaterally …

… and feels abandoned after

the terrorist attack of Beslan …

… which creates the danger of

Russian unilateralism and isolation

Erler 80

The European Union’s main task must be to keep open the channels

of cooperation with Russia.

Erler

European Union’s main task, then, must be to keep open the channels of coopera-tion and to counteract the Russian tendency towards unilateralism.

I see a danger that “old” and “new” Europe could become as fractured over Russia as over Iraq. The new EU states have had plenty of experience with the USSR and the “Russian yoke.” They want the EU to respect these experiences and they are angry that Putin does not express any feelings of guilt towards them. They should, however, also take into account the German, French, and British experiences, namely the sensibilities of powers that have lost their empires.

Envisage the following, if you wish to understand the Russian soul: Once a superpower, Russia today has hardly any allies, and is becoming increasingly confrontational with China as well as the Islamic world. It is a country that has already experienced several economic catastrophes and was, until recently, in terribly deep debt. We Westerners see in Chechnya a colonial war, while the Rus-sians are convinced they are fighting against foreign-bankrolled terrorists.

Against this backdrop, Russia is not experiencing the NATO eastward enlarge-ment as the consolidation of Europe, but as the extension of a military alliance up to one’s own borders. Meanwhile, NATO and by extension, the United States, is expanding its own bases in Central Asia in the war on terrorism.

The EU eastward enlargement robbed Russia of its Central-East European mar-kets. It failed in its efforts to prevent the expansion of the EU-Russia partnership and cooperation accords to East Central Europe. Now, all its bilateral treaties with Central Europe have been voided. Russians can use the transportation arteries to and from Kaliningrad only if they have visas. The EU is active in Georgia; a Yush-chenko victory in Ukraine would further enhance the Union’s influence there, and a possible EU-Caucasus pact would not necessarily take the Russian national interests into consideration.

Russia fears being encircled. This is a phase in which Putin is attempting to build up a nation state, through highly centralized laws and governance, perhaps understandably, because the whole process is about power after an era of anarchy. We might have objections about the democratic foundations of his power, but firstly, the Russian parliament was elected by the people, and secondly, completely free and fair elections would have produced the same result. The liberals in Russia have failed, but the new center from which Putin gains his support is real. The power-political aspect that is at center stage today seems dangerous to most Euro-peans, which is why Russia must submit to a debate over values instead of simply

Rahr

Will “old” and “new” Europe split

over Russia as they did over Iraq ?

Russia has lost its empire …

… feels threatened by the

enlargement of NATO …

… and has been robbed

of its European markets

Therefore Putin is trying to build up

a strong nation state — we should try

to understand that

81 Erler | Rahr

hoping to profit from the West’s transfer of prosperity. I therefore appeal to the West to take seriously Russia’s fear of encirclement. I hope that economic rela-tions will promote a sensible and pragmatic relationship with Russia, and that the media will again begin reporting more positively. The worst case, of a new process of self-isolation by a Russia pervaded by mistrust, is a very real danger.

As a Pole, I would never claim to know the “Russian yoke” or the “Russian soul” better than a Western European. I hope that by now we have left behind this kind of cliché.

Yet I ask you, in view of all of Russia’s indisputable problems, what “encircle-ment” are you talking about ? Who is supposed to encircle Russia ? Russia is being courted these days by everyone, particularly as a key player in the strategic game of raw materials.

For me, Russia no longer exists as a single term. There is the planet Moscow, planet Petersburg, and a vast country that we hardly know. Out of the ruins of the Soviet Union, Moscow and St. Petersburg have risen to become the most dynamic cities in Europe — a great success story. The Berliners are simply wrong in calling their city Europe’s biggest construction site — much more is being built in Moscow, and of course much is being torn down, even more than during Stalin’s time.

I support Gernot Erler’s description of the huge asymmetry in the perception of violence in Russia. We do not yet have in our heads the new map of Europe marked by the attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, Moscow, and Beslan. We often forget that the first decapitations filmed on video and then shown on television were from Chechnya, not Iraq.

Mr. Erler pointed out the central danger for the EU’s relations with Russia when he mentioned bilateralization. Not only Putin prefers bilateral ties. The Americans are also reluctant to accept that the EU does not function bilaterally. Even the EU’s own leaders sometimes succumb to the temptation of bilateral relations.

We must put up a concerted fight against the bilateralization of the EU’s exter-nal relations, both in terms of Russia and our other neighbors. This Round Table has made it even clearer to me how much the member states along our border would like to see a proactive EU policy toward their respective neighbors. Spain and Italy are interested in a Mediterranean policy, while Poland takes a special responsibility for new neighbors in the east such as Ukraine. This cannot, however,

Reiter

Schlögel

Schäuble Not only Putin seeks to bilateralize

Russia’s relations with the EU …

… member states are also tempted

towards bilateralization

Rahr | Reiter | Schlögel | Schäuble 82

Out of the ruins of the Soviet Union, Moscow and St. Petersburg have risen to become

the most dynamic cities in Europe.

Schlögel

lead to these states placing more emphasis on bilateral relations. That is one reason why we must incorporate Poland much more strongly into the EU’s leadership.

The unique feature of the European experiment is its replacement of bilateral relations with an integrated external policy. We must rein in those former global powers among us that Mr. Schlögel has described into integrated structures in this radically transformed, globalized world. Europe’s integration and the neigh-borhood processes do not only transfer prosperity. They offer an answer to the instabilities and destructive, violent tendencies that determined the European continent’s development for centuries. We cannot afford to stray from the path of this integration, both in respect of Russia and the new neighbors.

Bilateralization of EU foreign policy is especially dangerous in this post-Cold War era. The clear and rigid structures of the bipolar world were an effective barrier against the foreign policy mistakes of individual countries. Today, there is a scope for idiocies that people could hardly have imagined earlier. Therefore we need mechanisms that minimize the risk of bilateral foreign policy mistakes. And that is why it is so important to expand the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an effective and comprehensive instrument as quickly as possible.

I couldn’t agree more on the dangers of bilateralism and the temptation for strong national leaders to articulate their own foreign policy. The EU has taken steps to further develop the supranational mechanism of its Common Foreign and Secu-rity Policy. One of these steps is to reform the external service under the mandate of the Council. The next big step will be the Union’s Foreign Minister who will take office in 2007 if the Constitution is adopted by then. But even if the Constitution is not ratified, we will have to find a way to create the post of Foreign Minister. The Union can thus develop one single common mouth to force itself to speak with one single voice.

Russia does indeed not quite understand the genuinely multilateral nature of the European Union. This has its roots in the Soviet period, when the EU was wrongly perceived as a mere clearing system, as a capitalist version of COMECON. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained that attitude, even though the political integration of the EU deepened. This manifested itself when the Central European states began their accession negotiations with the EU in 1998. In a fundamental misunderstanding of how the European Union works, Russia

Reiter

Hübner The EU tries to counter the danger of

bilateralism with the development of its

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Ilves Russia simply does not understand

the multilateral nature of the EU

83 Schäuble | Reiter | Hübner | Ilves

approached all EU governments to demand trilateral accession negotiations for the six former Soviet countries. It became clear that the Russians had only failed to object to those countries’ joining the EU — contrary to its stance on NATO enlargement — because they had misjudged the nature of the Union. Once they realized that the EU is a powerful political entity where Poland or Latvia can now influence decision-making, they tried to correct their mistake.

Russia has in fact been quite successful in trying to bilateralize relations with certain European Union countries. As George Bush Senior used to do, Putin estab-lishes close relations to European leaders like Gerhard Schröder or Jacques Chirac to achieve his political goals. He found an even closer friend in Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi is so proud of getting along well with Putin that when Putin was asked about human rights violations in Chechnya at a press conference, he put his arm around him and said: “I will be your advocate for this,” thus completely contradict-ing the position of the Commission and the Council.

Putin has achieved more than such symbolic successes. Were it not for the Commission, he might have succeeded several times in influencing European pol-icies. He made Chirac and Berlusconi exert such pressure that the EU and Russia almost decided on a visa system between Lithuania, Russia and Kaliningrad with-out involving Lithuania — at that point an accession candidate — in the decision-making process. Fortunately, the Commission stopped that. Russia also tried to convince the EU to agree that Moldova be forced to turn into a federation — which would have meant to legitimize the criminal state called Transnistria. Fortunately, this effort also failed.

Russia is well aware that the Commission will be the main champion of the Union against bilateralization, defending the interests of all those against single countries. It therefore actively tries to stir up the feelings of single member states against Brussels. When the Commission criticized Russia last spring, an article by the influential Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov in the Western Press called upon “the Teutonic soul and Gallic reason to triumph over the bureaucrats who are trying to run things in Brussels.”

The new members’ impact on EU foreign policy will manifest itself much more clearly in pushing for a tougher stance against Russia than in acting as Tro-jan horses for the USA. The EU no longer shares only the unpopulated Finnish bor-der with Russia. Three Baltic and four Visegrad states border on Russia and have people living at these borders. The experience of the 75 million people inhabiting these countries of Russia and the Soviet Union is long and not very positive. Their

Putin has been quite successful in

his attempts to bilateralize foreign

relations to EU countries

The Commission is the main

champion against bilateralization …

… and the EU’s new member states will

push for a tougher stance against Russia

Ilves 84

The new member’s impact on EU foreign policy will manifest itself in pushing

for a tougher stance against Russia.

Ilves

representatives will bring their expertise and critical attitude toward Russia to the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. They will help avoid concessions to Russia resulting from incompetence, and they will be partners in preventing deals between the EU and Russia from being made over the heads of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

Some bilateralist modes of thinking must indeed be overcome, both within the EU and in Russia, on the way towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreo-ver, we must be very clear that the Commission still needs the support of the member states in its external policy negotiations, such as in regulating personal transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad.

We must resist with all our will Russian efforts to bilateralize foreign ties. Conducting the negotiations between Russia and the EU in a relationship of one to 25 would be absurd. We must nurture more strongly a single voice, instead of keeping a rotating presidency every six months, the Commission, and a series of other agents. If we have a European Foreign Minister before too long, and Mr. Boag becomes the ambassador not only of the Commission, but of the EU, we will be able to discuss common interests as well as problems with Russia much more constructively.

Especially the large EU members are indeed often very tempted towards bilateral-ism. Shortly before Putin was elected President for the first time, Tony Blair took it upon himself as Prime Minister to visit Yeltsin’s nominated successor in St. Pe-tersburg, and to go to the opera with him. Even though the Foreign Office justified the visit as a means to develop relations with a major political player in Russia, the real reason was to get close to the new President before the French and the Germans. There is a competition for the best bilateral relations with Russia among the major European states which leads statesmen like Berlusconi to set their own agenda based on what they think is their deeper understanding of Russia.

As we cannot simply factor out this competition, I suggest finding pragmatic political approaches to use it constructively. Why do we not create a forum for those countries who most value their special relations with Russia to coordinate their efforts ?

Britain once believed it had a monopoly on access to the former Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher said at the time, anyone who wanted to contact Mikhail Gor-

Cuntz

WagstylLarge member states of the Union

are competing for the best bilateral

relations with Russia

von Weizsäcker

85 Ilves | Cuntz | Wagstyl | von Weizsäcker

bachev would have to do so through London. Blair’s attempt to pick up where she left off was, happily, not a complete success. Bilateralizing relations with Russia is not a practicable option. It would be extremely counterproductive for Putin to think that, having spoken to Schröder, he had simultaneously reached an agree-ment with the EU. I believe that the path to eliminating bilateralism does not lie primarily in a joint foreign minister, a draft constitution, or other contractual agreements. We will have left bilateralism behind once the big EU powers recog-nize that cooperation is more useful to them than jealously vying for Mr. Putin’s attention in the Bolshoi Theater. The path, then, leads through London, Paris, Warsaw, and Berlin. Once Britain, France, Poland, and Germany coordinate their policy toward Russia, they will also have established a durable foundation for a common EU foreign policy. This policy would benefit all members as well as ena-bling us to help our new neighbors much more effectively.

The success of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy does indeed not only depend on institutions and on political will — which we will constantly have to fight for – but also on the capacity for consensus-building in the Union of 25. The old Franco-German nucleus does not work efficiently anymore, and we have not yet established a new mechanism. Building consensus within a nucleus of impor-tant member states — Wolfgang Schäuble’s concept of a Core Europe — seems to me a promising way. It will not be easy, though, to really integrate Great Britain and avoid creating new dividing lines in the EU.

Mr. Erler maintained that the EU must keep its means of influencing Putin by keeping up good relations with Russia. I do not believe that anyone can really influence Russia. The experience of the past 15 years has shown that the Kremlin makes its own decisions.

At a diplomatic and strategic level, one can reach agreements with Russia and calmly work together to help overcome both regional crises and global problems. The EU can react to Russian policy by cleverly articulating its own interests. Only then will it be recognized as a foreign policy partner to be taken seriously.

Any hope of a more profound influence with the goal of establishing a com-munity of values with Russia through cooperation would prove illusory, however. It seems questionable to me whether it will ever be possible to bring Russia to accept Western rules of policymaking. After 9/11, the West stopped applying

The large member states should

coordinate their policy vis-à-vis Russia

Hübner

ReiterNobody can influence Russia’s

policy from outside …

von Weizsäcker | Hübner | Reiter 86

I do not believe that anyone can really influence Russia.

Reiter

pressure on Russia anyway. Washington’s invitation to Russia to help fight inter-national terrorism included a willingness to abandon the goal of a community of values. That signal was very well recognized in Moscow, which saw that the US had become less selective in its search for allies. Putin can now pursue his goal of a “controlled democracy,” and by eliminating societal checks and balances, has gained scope for formulating foreign policy that goes far beyond that of Western governments.

I think we must tell Russia clearly that we cannot accept its current domestic political development. I do not think that would endanger cooperation on strate-gic and diplomatic levels.

I agree with Mr. Reiter that it is almost impossible to influence Russia’s internal policy. The EU is able to influence it for the worse, but not for the better. The over-simplified criticism of Russia which the Western mass media expressed has not only failed to change Russian policy but has seriously damaged relations between Russia and the EU.

It is not true that we cannot influence Russia. Excessive criticism is detrimental, no doubt about that. But Russia’s signing of the Kyoto Protocol shows that sus-tained diplomatic efforts can lead to success. The same applies to the modified CSCE Treaty. Europe has also achieved a number of things in the area of civil society and human rights policy, thanks to intensive exchanges. I do not mean just official politics, but also work done by foundations, for example. The Körber Foundation’s history competition, for example, has motivated thousands of young Russians to critically confront their own history.

On the other hand, fundamental criticism, such as the open letter to the EU, signed by Janusz Reiter, that Russia is approaching dictatorship, seems to me ut-terly counterproductive. We must start with the positive points. On September 13, Putin announced seven responses to Beslan. These responses included more than claiming the right to act preventively against terrorism, as the United States has done. Putin also referred explicitly to the social origins of terrorism, and an-nounced a regional initiative for the North Caucasus, for which purpose he has established a federal commission led by his important adviser Dmitri Kozak. Ger-man policy very rightly seeks to support these positive points instead of staging some kind of theatrical criticism.

Kozhokin … except for the worse

Erler No ! Russia’s signing of the Kyoto

Protocol is an example of successful,

patient, external influence

87 Reiter | Kozhokin | Erler

We must not overburden Putin during the present crisis situation, but neither can we afford to gain a reputation for only looking after our own interests and investment opportunities in Russia. The Ukrainians, incidentally, ask me as Ger-man ambassador more about our policy toward Russia than toward Ukraine, because they think our relations with Russia determine our relationship with Ukraine.

Maintaining efforts toward a community of modernization instead of values is a very useful approach in this respect. Modernization means simply installing a network of institutions and a market economy that correspond to our institu-tions sufficiently to enable us to cooperate. Currently, any reference to a Russian parliament is completely misleading, because the Duma is no such thing. The same applies to a Russian audit court or rule of law, neither of which really exists. Developing these kinds of institutions, and thereby gradually enclosing Russia within a common framework, would certainly bear fruit as far as our investment opportunities are concerned.

Russia certainly cannot be remade in our image and we are unable to change its policy directly, but there is some potential for leverage to influence Russian thinking in the long term. In contrast to China, Russia partly shares the Euro-pean culture and history. Russians are therefore torn between European and other traditions and often express their will to adapt to European standards and to be judged by them. Many Russians want to visit Western Europe and have their children educated in Western European and American universities. Using this attraction to Western Europe gives us a possibility to change the Russian debate from the inside, of course not instantly but over a period of ten or twenty years.

As a professor of economics, former Polish representative at the UN, and finally the country’s minister for European affairs, Danuta Hübner brings a wealth of ex-perience to her new office as European Commissioner for Regional Development. She represents Poland, a new EU member that shares both long borders and a long common history with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

All this equips her to expand the horizons of our discussion. After the EU’s relations with Russia, we will now turn our attention to the EU-Russia-Ukraine/Belarus/Moldova triangle. Also, it is time to consider concrete strategies: What should the EU do, and what do its new neighbors expect ?

Stüdemann

Russia needs a functioning network of

institutions and a market economy

Wagstyl We can use the Russian attraction to

Western values and lifestyle as leverage

de Weck

Stüdemann | Wagstyl | de Weck 88

The European Neighborhood Policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is of paramount importance not only for the countries in Eastern Europe, but for the Union itself. Terrorism and similar threats to European security can be com-bated successfully only in close cooperation with the Eastern neighbors. People within Europe are afraid of the volatile political and economic developments in some of the neighboring countries and need to be shown that the EU has an instrument at its disposal which is capable of handling regional instability and steering political dynamics. Finally, the Union’s absorbance capability, political weight and ultimately survival depends on its economic potential. Cooperation with its Eastern neighbors, turning these countries from dangerous competitors into assets, is the only way to protect or re-establish the EU’s competitiveness on a global scale.

For this reason, the European Neighborhood Policy should not focus exclu-sively on abolishing as many barriers as possible, but pursue the broader goal of making use of the political and economic opportunities which the new neigh-borhood creates. This policy must take into account the complex and constantly changing relations and balance of power between the Russian giant and Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

The recent enlargement has significantly increased the weight, the nature and the responsibilities of the European Union as a foreign policy agent. It has also increased the diversity of players within the Union who bring in their indi-vidual attitudes towards, for example, the United States, Russia or Ukraine which are rooted in their history. This might not fundamentally change the style and substance of EU foreign policy, but subtle differences become decisive in moments of crisis. I think that the controversy over Iraq was the first step in a process of learning and adapting. 25 instead of 15 members do not only mean a change in quantity but also in quality.

Like all new members in the past, the 10 states which joined on May 1st, 2004, bring a new geographic dimension and a new policy focus to the European Union. The accession of Spain and Portugal led to the development of a Mediterranean and Latin American dimension and to the development of the cohesion policy. Sweden and Finland not only brought with them the Northern Dimension but also more democratic and transparent institutional structures for the Union.

The recent enlargement first of all increases the importance of the Russian dimension. It not only makes Russia an important neighbor but brings countries into the EU which formerly either depended very heavily on the Soviet Union or

Hübner presentationThe EU needs Eastern Europe

The Union must learn to build consensus

within the community of 25

The new member states bring new

dimensions to the EU, such as …

… a focus on relations with Russia …

89 Hübner

Cooperation with its Eastern neighbors is the only way to protect the EU’s competitiveness on a global scale.

Hübner

were part of it. These new members will push for a more proactive policy concern-ing Russia.

The new members also strengthen the Euro-Atlantic dimension because of their historic connection to the US and because of the large expatriate groups in America. The common threats facing the EU and the Atlantic community, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, can only be mastered together with the EU’s eastern neighbors. An important basis for cooperation in this area is the strengthening of economic ties.

Let me therefore go into more detail about the EU’s economic relations with its Eastern neighbors. We have not yet understood the tremendous economic con-sequences of the enlargement and the new neighborhood.

Enlargement has significantly changed the parameters of competition. France or Germany fear a flight of companies to Lithuania or Poland. We tend to forget the cheaper locations further east which are major competitors not only for the old but also for the new member states. Ukraine and Russia are important players not only in the field of energy. Their agricultural potential might bring tremen-dous change to the European economy not only in the long run but in the near future. Seen from a global perspective, though, these competitors may turn out to be major assets if we manage to establish a functioning method of economic cooperation. In a globalized word, the EU also faces competition from places as remote and as dynamic as China. Only if it uses the complementary potential of its immediate Eastern neighbors will the Union be up to these challenges.

I am convinced that regulatory convergence plays a crucial role in enabling us to benefit from the opportunities that our neighbors in Eastern Europe and Russia offer. The EU’s Neighborhood Policy recognizes this, but it requires great effort on the part of our neighbors to harmonize regulatory standards and thus fulfill a basic precondition for the development of business opportunities. This will prove beneficial first of all to our neighbors. After Polish standards were brought into line with those of the EU, the influx of direct foreign investment rose significantly and boosted our economic development. It took five years, though, until this trend developed its full potential. Therefore, the neighbors should take steps immediately to start a development which will be of tremendous medium-term importance.

Strengthening common economic interests with our Eastern neighbors is not only important for maintaining competitiveness in a globalized world. The EU’s history shows that economic cooperation is probably the most solid basis for

… and on the Euro-Atlantic

and Eastern dimensions

Economic relations to the EU’s Eastern

neighbors are of paramount importance …

… to compete successfully

with economies like China

Harmonizing regulatory standards

is benefical for both sides

Hübner 90

the convergence of social and political security. Peace, stability and security are equally essential to business communities within and outside the Union. On the other hand, terrorism and crime are equally dangerous to all of them.

Successful cooperation with our Eastern neighbors can thus be based on pragmatic economic interests, as Alexander Rahr suggested. We should not for-get, though, that shared values must form the core of our cooperation. The socie-ties of our Eastern neighbors do indeed share many values with the European Union. Rather than using conditionality — the “carrot and stick” approach can be very humiliating — we should build on these shared values. Helping, for example, Russian society to further internalize our values would allow us to do away with hypocrisy and double standards. People in Eastern Europe do not have a psyche quite as different from ours as you suggest, Mr. Rahr. Mr. Hrytsak rightly pointed out that European values were imported so early that they have melted into the core of the identity of people in Russia and even more so in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This is what we have to focus on.

I would like to discuss Russia’s role as a power center and initiator of integration policies. Russia’s influence radiates incomparably stronger in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova than in Germany, France, or even Poland. Recently, in the Interna-tional Herald Tribune, Viktor Yushchenko warned of a division in Europe between a real center of power in Moscow and a symbolic center of power in Brussels. If they are not incorporated into Brussels’ structures, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova run the risk of becoming Russian satellites.

The new neighbors have weak political and economic structures and can therefore be easily and profoundly influenced. The European Union could gain influence if it decides to proceed as it did earlier toward Poland and the other new members. If the EU fails to do this, Russia will fill the gap and use its many ways of exerting influence. The state-owned energy corporation Gazprom, for example, is a gigantic instrument for wielding power. I am not accusing Putin of imperialist intentions, but merely pointing out that, in countries with weak structures, one can achieve much with very little effort. I wish that the EU would realize this and act on it.

Europe cannot simply bow out politely while Russia massively expands its influence. Without plunging into an all-out fight over Ukraine, we must recognize that the developments in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova are parts of a strategic game that will have consequences for the European order. It is not only in the

Economic cooperation must,

be based on shared values

ReiterRussia is conducting its

own integration policy …

… trying to influence the politically and

economically weak Eastern European states

The EU must play the strategic game with

Russia over Eastern Europe intelligently

91 Hübner | Reiter

Europe cannot simply bow out politely while Russia massively expands its influence.

Reiter

interests of the EU and its eastern neighbors that Brussels plays this game intel-ligently. A determined response to Russia’s external ambitions would, in the end, also contribute positively to the development of democracy in Russia.

I indeed believe that the triangle of EU-Russia-New Neighbors presents many more opportunities than our discussion of blocs would suggest. If the EU and Russia put some effort into filling in those four spaces, it could very well be in our neighbors’ interest. Cooperation over external security, for example, would open up possibili-ties for progress in the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Transnistria.

We tend to exaggerate the role Russia plays for the relationship between the EU and its new neighbors. It is no doubt true that both the EU and Russia put greater emphasis on their mutual relations than at least the EU puts on its relations with the Eastern neighbors. The EU has not abandoned Ukraine to the mercy of Russia, as many Ukrainians say, but it certainly avoids violating Russian interests.

This does not mean, however, that Ukraine will inevitably be drawn into complete integration in a Single Economic Space dominated by Russia and thus be lost to the EU because of Brussels’ lack of resolve. First, I doubt that Russia at this point has the power to create a strong economic bloc. Second, it is hard to draw a country into an integrated structure if this country refuses. If there are forces in the Ukraine promoting the idea of a Single Economic Space, that is not the fault of the EU. We would of course like to receive stronger signals that the EU is interested in closer relations, in opening a dialog on other matters besides justice and home affairs, and in making as significant progress on visa issues and economic relations as with Russia. But if we remember Mr. Stüdemann’s state-ment that Ukraine and the other new neighbors are players and not victims and should behave as such, the prospect of Ukraine being dragged into the Russian sphere of influence becomes less frightening. The next tactical moves by Ukraine should thus not be overestimated, the country can still change its course later on if it wants to. Nevertheless, we must state clearly what our strategic vision is: inte-gration into the European Union. I am convinced that the majority of Ukrainians want that, and not integration into a Russian sphere of influence.

The EU must offer its Eastern neighbors equal treatment. If it is discussing visa is-sues with Russia, why does it not offer the same to Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus at the same time ? Even worse, the EU’s negotiations with Moldova for example

CuntzEU-Russian cooperation in the

Four Spaces can resolve the

frozen conflicts of Eastern Europe

Pidluska We exaggerate Russia’s importance

for EU-Ukrainian relations …

… because Ukraine will be free

to change its course later on

Braghis The EU should not offer Russia

special treatment …

Reiter | Cuntz | Pidluska | Braghis 92

are quite often conducted only after consultations with Russia. Why are we not treated as equal partners ?

On the other hand, giving Russia a say in negotiations between the EU and its Eastern European neighbors certainly makes sense insofar as Russia’s funda-mental interests are concerned and Russian cooperation is indispensable. Without Russia, we will for example never be able to find a solution for Transnistria.

The best way to improve the EU’s relations to its neighbors is to define con-crete common projects in the political and economic sphere. Solving the Tran-snistria conflict, improving security at the Ukrainian border, fighting corruption and organized crime and establishing economic projects would facilitate not only improved government-to-government cooperation, but also the inclusion of the private sector and civil society.

Instead of the Eastern and Western block of the Cold War, today we find ourselves within the dynamic interaction of Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Eu-rope and Russia. Putin’s Russia further complicates this already complex interplay because it is governed by contradictory trends in its domestic development. Au-thoritarian flaws in the political system and the role of oligarchs stand in the way of a stable and coherent domestic and foreign policy. The resulting lack of predict-ability is dangerous for Moldova. We want a democratic Russia which is integrated into the international community, shares the international community’s values and respects the territorial and political integrity of its neighbors like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine.

The frozen conflict in Transnistria forms the core of our problematic relation with Russia. Transnistria’s criminal regime, Igor Smirnov and his son, controls a paramilitary formation with a military potential almost equal to the power of Moldova’s national army. A corridor for trafficking all kinds of illicit goods leads from the separatist region of South Ossetia in Georgia to Transnistria. All this is possible because Russia still has soldiers and vast amounts of ammunition in Transnistria and supports Smirnov, thus keeping our country divided for almost 15 years. We are the only country in Europe where foreign troops are stationed against the will of the people as expressed by the parliament and against the de-mands of important international forums like the NATO summit in Istanbul.

To my mind, Transnistria is the real test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy vis à vis Russia. Is the European Union capable of produc-ing more than words ? Can it promote stability by forcing Russia to withdraw

… but give Russia a say where its

fundamental interests are concerned

Chirtoaca Moldova needs a democratic Russia

with a reliable foreign policy

Transnistria is a main obstacle for Moldova’s

transformation to a stable democracy …

… and constitutes a test for the

EU’s foreign policy vis à vis Russia

93 Braghis | Chirtoaca

Transnistria is the real test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy vis-à-vis Russia.

Chirtoaca

its troops and ammunition and by establishing a new peace-keeping format ? Will the EU support President Voronin’s course of fighting Russia’s support for the separatist regime and solving the conflict with a stability and security pact which could be developed in an international conference for all countries involved ?

Our discussion began with the concern and resignation of the eastern neighbors over the EU’s silence and empty words. We have heard the call for clarity, for an end to ambivalence. Antagonizing factors, such as human rights, were raised just as were unifying ones, including those that stem from economic interests.

The power of Eastern European history, steeped in violence, which is often stronger than any action plan, was compared and contrasted with the system of European unification, which is more of a process. This process includes convinc-ing people of Europe’s geographical borders, such as in the litmus test of Turkey. Yet changes within the European Union are also part of this process. Today, the Union must think more strategically once it has entered the field of international politics with its New Neighborhood Policy, for instance. We have heard the key-word complexity mentioned many times, both referring to the complex European Union and the complex relationships among the new neighbors, and especially with Russia.

Emphasis was placed on the key roles of the new member states, who bring with them their own experiences with Russia and with the process of transfor-mation. The decisive players, however, are of course the new neighbors. Here the central idea was that Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova should act as subjects instead of seeing themselves as objects.

A word from Danuta Hübner encapsulated a central conclusion of our dis-cussion: that neighborhood policy is, at its core, peace policy. Thank you very much.

Our conference has been held in a place that epitomizes both the new neighbors’ European traditions and the historical crossroads at which these countries now stand. I was impressed by more than the traces of the German-Polish-Jewish his-tory of the profoundly European city of Lviv. Young, enterprising, and optimistic people dominate the street scene here and bear witness to the enormous potential the East European neighbors have, and the mutual enrichment that a conver-gence with the European Union could bring.

de Weck

Eastern Europe between Action Plans

and transformation processes

Neighborhood policy is peace policy

von Weizsäcker The Ukrainian city of Lviv

is profoundly European

Chirtoaca | de Weck | von Weizsäcker 94

Finally, we are experiencing here the dramatic election campaign between the Europe-oriented Viktor Yushchenko and his more pro-Russian rival, Viktor Yanukovych. A controversial topic of our discussion was whether a Yushchenko victory really would open up a path to the EU, and whether Yanukovych really stands for a one-sided convergence with Russia. However, Yushchenko’s young supporters campaign for their candidate with such ardor that one thing cannot be doubted. They see in Yushchenko perhaps their only chance to enter the free and democratic Europe that they feel they belong to. However the election turns out, I believe that these people represent most of Ukraine, that Europe cannot forget them, and that they will play a decisive part in their country’s future.

People place their hope in Yushchenko

to open a path to Europe

95 von Weizsäcker

I believe that Yushchenko’s young supporters represent most of Ukraine, that Europe can not forget them and that they will play a decisive part in their country’s future.

von Weizsäcker

ANNEX

99

99

Rafał AntczakBorn 1970Senior Economist, Center for Eco-nomic and Social Research (CASE), Warsaw; co-editor of the Polish Economic Outlook Quarterly and the Belarussian Economic Outlook

Quarterly; since 1995 economic advisor to govern-ment officials in seven FSU countries, incl. former advisor to the Ukrainian Prime Minister and to the President of the Ukrainian National Bank (1995–98); advisor to the Polish Parliament; economic advisor to the Civil Platform (since 2003).Selected Writings: Failure of the IMF in Preventing Currency Crises in CIS Countries (co-author) and The Russian Currency Crisis of 1998, in: Marek Dab-rowski, Currency crises in Emerging Markets (2003); Monetary Expansion and Its Influence on Inflation Performance in Transition Economies, in: Marek Dabrowski, Disinflation in Transition Economies by (2003); Belarusian Economy, from market to plan, 1995–2000, co-author and co-editor (forthcoming).Pages: 40, 53

Ambassador Ian BoagBorn 1946Head of the European Commis-sion’s Delgation to Ukraine, Moldo-via and Belarus, Kiev; former Head of Delegations of the European Commission to Morocco, Brazil and

Egypt; joined the European Commission in 1978; former member of the British Diplomatic Service.Pages: 39, 45, 57, 64

Dumitru BraghisBorn 1957Chairman, Alliance Our Moldova, Chisinau; member of the Parlia-mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group); former Prime

Minister; former Deputy Minister of Economy and Reforms; former General Director, Department for Foreign Economic Relations.Pages: 53, 92

Ambassador Oleksandr O. ChalyBorn 1954Ambassador Extraordinary Pleni-potentiary of the Ukraine, Kiev; former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Ukraine, responsible for ques-

tions of the European integration; former member, Presidential Commission for Sea Policy; former Am-bassador of the Ukraine to Romania; former head of the Ukrainian delegation at talks on political agree-ments with Russia and Romania.Pages: 30, 48, 60

Nicolae ChirtoacaBorn 1953Director, European Institute for Political Studies of Moldova, Chisi-nau; Chairman of the Managing Board, Euro-Atlantic Centre, Chisi-nau; former National Security Advi-

sor to the President of Moldova.Selected writings: Moldova Within the Emerging Euro-Atlantic Security order, in: European Perspec-tives for the Republic of Moldova (2004); The Creation of Political Parties and the Institutions of Civil Society;

Participants

100 101

Their Relations with Military Structures on Ensuring the Security Of Post Communist Countries (1996).Pages: 36, 62, 93

Dr. Eckart CuntzBorn 1950Director-General for European Af-fairs, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; former Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the European Union, Brussels;

former Chief of Cabinet of the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Brussels; former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Brunei.Selected Writings: Ein ausgewogener Gesamtkom-promiss: Die Ergebnisse des Konvents aus Sicht der Bundesregierung in: Integration (2003).Pages: 38, 60, 85, 91

Gernot Erler, MdBBorn 1944Deputy Chairman, SPD Parliamen-tary Group, responsible for Foreign, Security and Development Policy and Human Rights, Berlin; Coor-dinator of the German-Russian Co-

operation in the Field of Intersocietal Relations; Chairman of the German-Kazakh Association; Presi-dent, Southeast Europe Association.Selected writings: Global Monopoly. Weltpolitik nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion (1998).Pages: 46, 69, 74, 78, 87

Professor Yaroslav HrytsakBorn 1960University of Lviv and Central Eu-ropean University, Budapest; Vice-President, International Associa-tion for Ukrainian Studies.Selected writings: Passions after

Nationalism (2004), Making of Modern Ukrainian Nation (2000).Pages: 26, 49, 74

Professor Danuta HübnerBorn 1948Member of the European Commis-sion, Brussels; former Minister for European Affairs, Poland; former Head of Office of the Commit-tee for European Integration and

Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Po-land; Deputy Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva; former Minister Head of the Chancellery of President Kwasniewski; former Editor in Chief, “Gospodarka Narodowa.”Pages: 42, 83, 86, 88

Ambassador Toomas H. Ilves,MEPMember of the European Parlia-ment, Brussels; former Foreign Mi-nister of the Republic of Estonia.Pages: 37, 52, 63, 83

100 101

Dr. Yevgenij M. KozhokinBorn 1954Historian; Director; Russia’s Insti-tute for Strategic Studies (RISS), Moscow; former Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Nationa-lities and Federation Issues; former

Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Intelligence of the Committee of Defense and Security Issues; former member of the Permanent Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in the North Atlantic Assembly.Selected writings: Armenia: Problems of Independent Development (1998).Pages: 43, 64, 76, 87

Professor Anatoli A. Mikhailov Born 1939Rector, European Humanities Uni-versity, Minsk; lifetime member of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus; member of the Euro-

pean Academy of Sciences and Arts; Goethe Medal (2004); France Palme Academique (2003).Selected Writings: Die Russische Idee als Versuch der Selbstidentifikation (1993), Contemporary Philoso-phical Hermeneutics (1984).Pages: 33, 51, 74

Inna PidluskaPresident, Europe XXI Foundation, Kiev; co-founder, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Kiev; member, British Council’s Ukraine-UK Professional Network; Member of the Ukrainian Contact

Group to the World Bank; former NATO Democracy Fellow; former Fellow, Advocacy Institute.Selected Writings: “Issue of Corruption in Ukraine: Promoting Public Resistance to Corruption and Re-ducing Corruption Opportunities”, in: Countering Corruption: Role of Civil Society (2000), Ukrainian Business Elites. Part 1: the Parliament (2000).Pages: 49, 61, 92

Alexander RahrBorn 1959Program Director, Körber Center Russia/CIS, German Council on Foreign Relations; Berlin; former Senior Analyst, Research Institute, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,

Munich; former Project Manager, Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, Co-logne; member, Supervisory Board, Petersburg Dia-logue, Commentator on TV and Radio broadcasts; Federal Cross of Merit Award.Selected writings: Wladimir Putin. The German in the Kremlin (2000).Pages: 39, 42, 53, 65, 80

Ambassador Janusz ReiterBorn 1952Head, Center for International Relations (CSM), Warsaw; former Polish Ambassador to Germany; regular contributor to “Rzeczpos-polita”; former expert on Germany

for Solidarnosz and Gazeta Wyborcza.Selected writings: Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union- Und was kommt danach ? (2003).Pages: 60, 72, 82, 83, 86, 91

102 103

Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, MdB Born 1942Deputy Chairman for Foreign, Se-curity, and European Policy, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group; mem-ber of CDU presidency; former chairman of the CDU; former fede-

ral minister.Selected writings: Scheitert der Westen ? Deutschland und die neue Weltordnung (2003) , Mitten im Leben (2001).Pages: 70, 82

Professor Karl SchlögelBorn 1948European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder; winner of the Sigmund-Freud-Prize (2004), the Dehio-Prize (2004), the European Anna Krüger Prize of the Berlin

Institute for Advanced Study (1999) and the Charles Veillon European Essay Prize (1990).Selected writings: Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik (2003), Die Mitte liegt Ostwärts. Europa im Übergang (2002), Berlin, Ostbahnhof Europas. Russen und Deutsche in ihrem Jahrhundert (1998).Pages: 44, 66, 82

Dr. Timothy D. SnyderBorn 1969Associate Professor, Department of History, Yale University; win-ner of the George Louis Beer Prize; former Academy Scholar, Harvard Academy for International and

Area Studies, Harvard University; former British Marshall Scholar, University of Oxford.

Selected writings: The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (2003); The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in Europe and North America (co-ed.) (2000); Nationalism, Marxism and Modern Central Europe: A Biography of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz 1872–1905 (1997).Pages: 39, 41, 65

Ambassador Dietmar StüdemannBorn 1941Ambassador of the Federal Repub-lic of Germany to Ukraine, Kiev; former Director, Political Section, German Federal Foreign Office;

former Director, Economic Section, German Federal Foreign Office; former Director, Political Section, German Embassy Moscow. Pages: 47, 61, 62, 67, 87

Stefan WagstylBorn 1957Central and Eastern Europe Editor, Financial Times, London; former Tokyo Bureau Chief, South Asia bureau chief, international news editor, industrial editor, Financial

Times.Pages: 68, 85, 88

Roger de WeckBorn 1953President, Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales/Gra-duate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva; Visiting Pro-fessor, College of Europe, Bruges;

102 103

publicist, contributions to German, French and Swiss media; presenter of television programm Sternstunden (3Sat / SF 1); member of PEN-Club and Board of Trustees of the Charlemagne Award in Aachen; former editor-in-chief of DIE ZEIT and Tages-Anzeiger.Selected Writings: Kuhschweizer und Sauschwaben. Schweizer -deutsche, Schweizer und ihre Hassliebe (2003); Das Erwachen der Alten Welt (2003).Pages: 26, 30, 34, 36, 37, 45, 54, 55, 59, 62, 69, 74, 75, 76, 88, 93

Dr. Richard von WeizsäckerBorn 1920Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany (1984–1994); former Governing Mayor of West Berlin (1981–1984); former Vice President of the German Parlia-

ment (1969–1981); former member of the Federal Executive Board of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); former President of the German Lutheran Church Council; Winner of the Heinrich Heine (1991) and Leo Baeck Awards (1994); Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table of the Körber Founda-tion.Selected Writings: Drei Mal Stunde Null ? 1949–1969–1989 (2001); Vier Zeiten. Erinnerungen (1997); Richard von Weizsäcker im Gespräch (1992); Von Deutschland nach Europa (1991); Die deutsche Ge-schichte geht weiter (1983).Pages: 24, 73, 85, 94

Jakub T. Wolski Born 1950Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw; former Ambas-sador of the Republic of Poland to Libya; former Senior Counselor to

the Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Re-public of Poland.Pages: 50, 55

Andrei YeudachenkaBorn 1958Ambassador at Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, Minsk; former Ambassador of Belarus to Budapest (2000 –2004); former Director, Department of Eu-

rope (1999), Department of International Economic Co-operation (1998), Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Pages: 34, 51

104 105

Recommended Literature

Malcolm Anderson/Eberhard Bort, The Frontiers of the European Union, London: 2001.

Judy Batt, The EU’s New Borderland, CER Working Paper, 10/2003.www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pr_483_borderlands.pdf

Ivan T. Berend, History Derailed: Central and East-ern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century, Berkeley: 2003.

Nicolae Chirtoaca, Moldova within an Emerging Euro-Atlantic Security Order, in: Südosteuropa Mitteilun-gen, 44 (2004) 2/3, S. 108–117.

Bartosz Cichocki, The Eastern External Border of the Enlarged European Union, 2004.www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/eprace/14/PRACE_14.pdf

Michael Emerson, Two Cheers for the European Neigh-bourhood Policy, 2004.www.ceps.be/Article.php ?article_id=338&

Michael Emerson, The Wider Europe Matrix, Brus-sels: 2004.

Michael Emerson/Marius Vahl/Nicholas Whyte, The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroad, Brussels: 2001.

European UnionEU Delegation to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova: http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/page47.html European Security Strategy: europa.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf Neighborhood Policy: europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm External Relations Eastern Europe: europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm

Heather Grabbe, How the EU Should Help Its Neigh-bours, 2004.www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_eu_neighbours.pdf

Iris Kempe/Helmut Kurth (eds.), Presidential Election in Ukraine. Implications for the Ukrainian Transition, Kiev: 2004.www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/2004/ukraine-election.php

Ann Lewis (ed.), The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels, London: 2002.

Anatol Lieven/Dmitri Trenin (ed.), Ambivalent Neigh-bors: the EU, NATO and the Price of Membership, Wash-ington: 2003.

Don Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Un-resolved Conf licts and De Facto States, Washington: 2004.

More than Neighbours. Final Report of The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine: New Relations Project, Warsaw: 2004.www.batory.org.pl/doc/final_rep.pdf

Inna Pidluska, “Ukraine and the EU: What Prospects for Integration”, in: Ann Lewis (ed.), The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, Friends, Partners ?, London: 2002, 183–197.

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Inna Pidluska, Ukraine-EU Relations: Enlargement and Integrationhttp://www.policy.hu/pidluska/EU-Ukraine.html

Polish non-paper on the EU Eastern policywww.msz.gov.pl/start.php ?page=1040000001

Karl Schlögel, Marjampole oder die stille Verfertigung Europas, Munich: 2005.

Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999, New Haven: 2003.

USAState Department/Osteuropa: usinfo.state.gov/eur/europe_eurasia/eurasia_caucasus.html Belarus Democracy Act of 2004: http://thomas.loc.gov

Rura Vainiene et al., Belarus: Reform Scenarios, War-saw: 2003.www.batory.org.pl/doc/wybor_a.pdf

William Wallace, Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for EU-25, Notre Europe Policy Papers, 2003.www.notre-europe.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/Policypaper4.pdf

Anne Warren, The Economic Effects of Wider Europe, 2004.www.ceps.be/Article.php ?article_id=358

Roman Wolczuk, Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy, New York: 2004.

Romain Yakemtchouk, »L’Union Européenne et Ka-liningrad«, in: Revue du marché commun et de l’Union Européenne, Nr. 466, 2003, S. 160–167.

Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound — Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, Lon-don: 2002.

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Barcelona ProcessThe “Barcelona Declaration,” signed in 1995 be-tween the EU states and their Mediterranean neighbors, lays down the goals of a European-Medi-terranean partnership also known as the Barcelona Process. The declaration includes three areas of cooperation: promoting a peaceful and stable re-gion through political and security dialog; a zone of economic cooperation by gradually integrating the region in a free-trade agreement; and tolerance and exchange among civil societies through social and cultural partnerships. The Barcelona Process is to be implemented both bilaterally, through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, and multilaterally through regional cooperation. The process is financed by the EU finance arm MEDA and loans from the European Investment Bank. Two states involved in the Barcelona Process, Malta and Cyprus, joined the EU in 2004. Today the Process includes 35 states — the 25 EU members and 10 Mediterranean states (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunesia). Libya has had observer status since UN sanctions against it were suspended in 1999, and is to be fully integrated after it accepts the acquis of the Barcelona Process. Turkey is included as an EU accession candidate. The states of the Barcelona Process are a target region of the European Neigh-borhood Policy. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/

BelarusAfter almost 70 years as a Soviet republic, Belarus be-came an independent state in 1991. The constitution of 1994, amended in 1996 and 2004, defines Belarus as a “unitary, democratic, social state based on the rule of law” and with a presidential form of govern-ment. More than any other former Soviet state, Be-

larus has aligned itself politically and economically with Russia. For its part, Moscow uses its economic links with Belarus, especially the country’s depend-ence on Russian energy supplies, to exert influence which is sometimes overtly political. On December 8, 1999, the Presidents of Belarus and Russia signed a treaty of union between their two states. At present, however, only the treaty’s defense and customs provisions have been implemented. Together with Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, Belarus founded the Single Economic Space in September 2003. Market economic reforms were quashed by Presi-dent Aleksandr Lukashenko in favor of central economic control. The forced closure of Minsk’s European Humanistic University in the summer of 2004 reinforced Belarus’ reputation as Europe’s last dictatorship. In October 2004, the US House of Representatives passed the “Belarus Democracy Act” authorizing support for democratic opposition groups in the country. President Lukashenko has cool ties with the West, but maintains active rela-tions with North Korea, Sudan, and Libya. Belarus is still afflicted by the effects of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which took place close to its border with Ukraine. EU EnlargementAccording to Article 49 of the Treaty of Maastricht that came into force in 1993, every European coun-try that fulfils the basic tenets of liberty and democ-racy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and rule of law, may file a petition to become a member of the European Union. Also in 1993, the EU heads of state and government laid down the basic condi-tions for membership in detail in the form of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,

Glossary

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and the Netherlands, was renamed the European Community (EC) in 1957. Denmark, Ireland, and Britain joined in the first round of enlargement in 1973. With the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the EC gained a southern dimension. As a result of German reunification in 1990, the former East Germany became the first state of the former Soviet bloc to enter the EC, which, through the treaty of Maastricht in 1992–3, was renamed the European Union. In 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland joined the EU. With the so-called eastern enlargement in 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined, increasing the EU’s size to 25 states with a total population of 450 mil-lion people. Bulgaria and Romania are due to accede in 2007. Additional accession negotiations are being conducted with Croatia and Turkey. The Southeast European Stability Pact, established in 1999, gives the Balkan states of Albania, Bosnia and Herze-govina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro the long-term prospect of complete EU integration. The countries of Eastern Europe ( Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), the South Caucasus (Armenia, Az-erbaijan, Georgia), and the Barcelona Process states (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunesia), which form a kind of southern and eastern ring around the EU, are being offered a prospect of privileged partnership instead of full membership within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. A strategic partnership already exists with Russia. The European countries of Andorra, Iceland, Liech-tenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, and Vatican City maintain close bilateral ties to the EU and do not have any intention at present of enter-ing a petition to join. http://europa.eu.int/pol/enlarg/overview_de.htm

European Neighborhood Policy In March 2003, the European Commission, seek-ing to prevent the building of new walls at the EU’s new frontiers, produced the initiative “Wider Europe — Neighborhood: A New Framework for Re-lations with our Eastern und Southern Neighbors,” which formed the core of the European Neighbor-hood Policy (ENP). Instead of the prospect of acces-sion, it offers neighboring states privileged partner-ship on the basis of rule of law, market economy, good governance, sustainable development, and respect for human rights. The strengthening and deepening of political, economic, and cultural co-operation is to lead to greater stability, security, and prosperity for all concerned. In addition, the EU neighbors are offered access to EU programs and, later, integration in the EU common market. In July 2003, the Commission ordered the establishment of a Wider Europe Task Force for the coordination and conception of the ENP. The Commission’s strategy paper, presented on May 12, 2004, on “European Neighborhood Policy” formulates the ENP’s princi-ples and methods of implementation, as well as its geographical framework. It names 16 states in the EU’s neighborhood: Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova in the east, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunesia (also known as the Barcelona Process states) in the south, and Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in the South Caucasus. The incorporation of Belarus into the ENP has been postponed because of the authoritarian regime there. Anticipating the end of Libya’s political isolation, the Commission is plan-ning to incorporate the country in the Barcelona Process and, in the medium term, in the ENP as well. Within the framework of the ENP, previous forms of European regional and subregional cooperation (TACIS, PHARE, MEDA, INTERREG, CARDS) are to be

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integrated into individual neighborhood programs by 2006 and developed further. On the basis of so-called country reports, bilateral accords or “action plans” are to be agreed for the next 3 to 5 years. In the longer term, the Partnership and Coopera-tion Agreements and Association Agreements that already exist with certain states are to be replaced by European Neighborhood pacts. The financing for these projects is to be augmented beginning in 2007 and implemented through the European Neighbor-hood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm

KaliningradThe Russian administrative region (oblast) of Kalinin-grad and its eponymous capital city belonged to the German territories occupied by the Soviet Union. In the 1990 2 + 4 Treaty, the Federal Republic of Ger-many renounced all claims to territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, thereby recognizing Kaliningrad as part of the Soviet Union. When the Baltic republics became independent in 1991, Kaliningrad became a Russian enclave. Kaliningrad’s physical isolation and socioeconomic disparity from its surroundings were intensified when Poland and Lithuania joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 respectively, and the EU on May 1, 2004. In making Kaliningrad a “pilot region” for relations between the EU and Russia, the two sides agreed streamlined visa requirements for Rus-sian citizens there. As a year-round ice-free seaport, Kaliningrad holds considerable importance for the Russian economy, yet is marked by significant eco-nomic, ecological, and social problems such as the spread of HIV/AIDS. The region, with a population of 970,000, is generally considered the “poorhouse of Europe.” When it celebrates its 750th anniversary in 2005, Kaliningrad will surely enter the European public consciousness to a greater extent.

Kuchma, Leonidborn 1938In 1994 Leonid Kuchma was elected President of Ukraine, and won a second term in 1999. He did not run in 2004. According to the Ukrainian consti-tution, the president is the guarantor of the consti-tution, the country’s sovereignty, and its territorial integrity, as well as of civil rights and freedoms. Also, he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairs the national security- and defense councils. A trained engineer, Kuchma rose through manage-ment positions into the elite of the Communist Party. From 1990 to 1992 he was a member of the Ukrainian parliament; he became Prime Minister in 1992 before resigning his office in 1993 to run for the presidency. Kuchma’s record as president is mixed. His political convergence with the West in the 1990s, marked by a stabilized foreign policy, lib-eral treatment of ethnic minorities, abolition of the death penalty and closure of the Chernobyl nuclear plant, was accompanied by economic decline. The economy has been growing again since 2000, but Kuchma came under increasing political pressure in the course of several scandals. Critics also point out gross infringements on press freedoms, and accuse him of involvement in the kidnap and murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in 2000. Since then, Kuchma has sought the support of the Moscow establishment. Viktor Yanukovych was initially declared victor over his more pro-Western rival Viktor Yush-chenko in the race to succeed Leonid Kuchma as president. Yanukovych had the explicit support of both Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Pu-tin. Allegations of gross electoral fraud led to mass protests that resulted in a re-run of the election (“Orange Revolution”), from which Yushchenko emerged as the clear winner. Kuchma had previ-

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ously withdrawn his unconditional support for Yanukovych.

Lukachenko, Alexandr G.born 1954In 1994, Aleksandr Lukashenko, a former secretary of the CPSU and director of a kolkhoz (agricultural collective), became President of the Republic of Belarus and elected to a second term on 2001. In a referendum in 2004, an amendment to the con-stitution was approved that enabled Lukashenko to seek a third term in 2006. Electoral observers from the OSCE pointed out gross irregularities in the voting. Lukashenko is also commander in chief of the armed forces and chairs the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus. His foreign policy is warm toward Russia and antagonistic toward the EU. He suppressed market economic reforms. In the West-ern media, Lukashenko is characterized as Europe’s last dictator.

MoldovaIn 1991, the formerly Romanian province of Moldova, which had been under Soviet control for almost 50 years, became independent. The Moldovan lan-guage is identical to Romanian; many people there also hold Romanian citizenship. The Republic of Moldova is a parliamentary democracy. It head of state is the communist Vladimir Voronin, who was elected president in 2001. Politically, Moldova, which lies between Ukraine and Romania and has a population of 4.4 million, consists of three parts. First, the separatist “Republic of Transnistria,” the autonomous region of Gagauzia, and the rest of the republic. The Gagauz, an ethnic Turkic, orthodox people, were granted a high degree of autonomy. As late as 1990, Moldova was the most prosperous Soviet republic and was regarded in the West as a pioneer of

market economic reforms. Since then the economic situation has greatly deteriorated. A quarter of the Moldovan population lives abroad. These people’s cash transfers home amount to more than the coun-try’s GDP. Important pillars of Moldovan foreign rela-tions are European integration and strong regional cooperation with neighboring states, chiefly with Romania. Moldova has been a member of the Stabil-ity Pact for South East Europe since 1999. In 1998, Moldova and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement — PCA, when exports to EU states accounted for 36.1 % of all exports. Moldova has also been a member of the GUUAM group, founded in 1997, largely due to US pressure. However, resur-gent communist traditions and the ethnic conflicts within the country have prevented it from integrat-ing more strongly into European structures.

NATO enlargementArticle 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty states that any European country that contributes to security in the Euro-Atlantic zone can become a NATO member state if its accession has the unanimous support of all countries in the alliance and it is prepared to as-sume all requirements placed on members. Also, a potential NATO member should have sufficient mili-tary capabilities, be prepared to take on military du-ties, have put aside ethnic and territorial conflicts, and uphold economic liberty, social justice, and ecological responsibility. In practice, individual countries’ aptitude for accession, the preferences of individual NATO members, and regional stability re-quirements often stood at odds with one another, so that the acceptance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999, for example, was ultimately a political decision. After the NATO accessions of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia

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in 2004, NATO encompassed a total of 26 states. To the club of 12 founding members (USA; Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Luxembourg, and Can-ada) were added Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1954, and Spain in 1982. Presently, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are members of the “NATO Membership Action Plan” (MAP), which assists potential accession candidates in reaching NATO standards and prepares them for later mem-bership. NATO maintains partnership relationships with its eastern neighbors Russia and Ukraine. Since 1997, The NATO-Russia Council or NRC has existed to promote dialog over security policy chal-lenges and close cooperation in areas of common interests. Russia, both under Yeltsin and Putin, has been very critical of NATO’s eastward enlargement. Since 9/11, cooperation in the fight against terror-ism has gained importance and Russia’s influence within the NATO-Russia Council has grown. http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html

Northern Dimension of the EUWhen Sweden and Finland joined the European Un-ion as part of the EU enlargement in 1995, their 1300 kilometer common border with Russia gave a new importance to regional cooperation in northern Europe. In 1997 at the EU summit in Luxembourg, Finland outlines the strategy of a northern regional cooperation or Northern Dimension, meant to deal with the region’s special challenges (hard climate, great distances, social-geographical disparities, en-vironmental problems). The Northern Dimension of the EU stretches from Iceland in the west through the Norwegian Sea to the Kara Sea in the east, from the Barents Sea in the north to the southern shores of the Baltic, and therefore including — besides Iceland — Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ger-

many, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia. After an incremental development of the Finnish initiative, the 2000 EU summit in Santa da Feira approved the “Action Plan for the Northern Dimen-sion in the External and Cross-Border Policies of the European Union.” It provides for more intense cooperation between the EU states, accession candi-dates, and Russia in the areas of economics, the en-vironment, nuclear security, energy, Kaliningrad, infrastructure, legislative- and domestic policy, and social development. It is being implemented within the EU financing instruments PHARE, TACIS, IN-TERREG, SAPARD, and ISPA. The Northern Dimen-sion focuses on transnational societal cooperation, involving regional institutions, the private sector, and international financial institutions. Since the 2004 EU enlargement, the Northern Dimension includes eight EU states bordering the Baltic Sea. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/

Single Economic SpaceIn 2003 at the CIS summit in Yalta, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to establish a “single economic space” (Russian acronym EEP). The goal of the EEP is to gradually integrate the national economies into a common market for goods, services, capital and labor within the next five to seven years. The EEP was implemented through bilateral treaties ad-justed to the norms and rules of the World Trade Organization. All signatory states seek to become WTO members in the medium term. Compared to multilateral associations such as the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Community, the structure of the EEP calls for closer cooperation among international and supranational elements that are to grow more integrated and hand over elements of sovereignty to a unified regulatory body. Largely because of

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these structural parallels with the European Union, the EEP is often referred to as an “eastern EU.” EEP signatories emphasize that organization is open to accession by other CIS states while maintaining an exclusively economic character and not seeking to establish any forum for political integration in the post-Soviet region. However, the various signatories hold differing opinions regarding the depth of in-tegration. With the exception of Belarus, most CIS states hope to join the EU and NATO in the long term and thus evolve towards Western structures, rather than attaching themselves solely to a resur-gent Russia.

Strategic Partnership of the EU with RussiaThe 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agree-ment (PCA) between Russia and the European Union forms the basis for their so-called “strategic partnership.” The PCA says the foundations of the strategic part-nership are common values, primarily rule of law, human rights and basic freedoms, and the market economy. Main goals are to foster economic and po-litical stability in Russia and to continue solidifying bilateral ties between Russia and the EU. Within the framework of the PCA the European Council con-cluded an EU “Common Strategy on Russia” in 1999, which lists four core goals of bilateral relations: 1) in-tegrating Russia into a common European economic and social space; 2) continuing the political dialog to strengthen democracy in Russia; 3) improving cooperation in matters of security and stability in Europe; and 4) cooperating in common challenges, including energy policy and environmental protec-tion. It maintains that a dynamically developing European continent requires constant adjustment in the formulation of new goals in the partnership. Shortly before the 2004 EU enlargement, for exam-

ple, Russia agreed to extend the PCA accord to the new member states and to renounce the economic advantages stemming from existing bilateral agree-ments with those countries. In return, the EU agreed to compromises in Russian export quotas. On the is-sue of Kaliningrad, so far only the transit of people has been agreed. Issues in the movement of goods and services and energy supply have yet to be settled. Within the PCA and the “Wider Europe” initiative, the EU and Russia agreed on November 6, 2003, i. e. before the EU’s eastward enlargement, to establish four “common spaces” for the economy, domestic security, external security, and research, culture, and education. However, signs are increasing that despite geographic and economic convergence there remains important differences in the area of politi-cal values. By curtailing democracy and civil rights, the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin has increasingly been taking on authoritarian traits. Another problem in EU-Russian relations is the Chechen conflict. On the other hand, Russia has signed the Kyoto Protocol, thereby fulfilling a central EU request. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm

TransnistriaThe part of Moldova that lies east of the Dniestr River, known as the Transnistrian Moldovan Re-public, is a separatist region with Tiraspol as its capital. When Moldova became independent in 1991, Transnistria, under the Soviet general Igor Smirnov, declared its independence from Moldova over fears the former Soviet republic would seek reunification with neighboring Romania. Russian troops remained in Transnistria and ended the undeclared war between Moldova and Transnistria in 1992 — to the latter’s advantage. Transnistria

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is not internationally recognized but is a de facto independent state and has its own state structures (government, parliament, army, constitution, social welfare system, etc.) Of its 633,600 inhabitants (as of 2004), 34 % are Moldovan, 28 % Ukrainian, and 28 % Russian. Large Russian weapons and munitions depots remain in Transnistria to this day, as do some 2,500 Russian troops, because Moscow says they are necessary to guard the weapons and ammunition depots. They are also stationed in a strategically important area well to the west of Russia’s present borders. Transnistrian separatism also has origins other than the region’s strong Russian population, however. Between the World Wars and during World War II, the Transnistrian region belonged to various states as the remainder of present-day Moldovan territory. Transnistria’s leadership is criticized by the West as mafia-like. Transnistria is considered a freeway for criminals. Western experts say that, due to the high concentration of Russian weaponry and its own weapons production, Transnistria is a center of arms smuggling, international terrorists and organized crime. The Transnistria problem prevents Moldova both from exercising control over its complete territory and fully accomplishing its international commitments.

UkraineBefore Ukraine became a Soviet Republic in 1922, its territory was long contested by various regional powers, especially Poland, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire. Ukraine gained independ-ence in 1991. The country (2004 pop. 47.7 million) borders on Belarus to the north, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the west, Romania and Moldova to the southwest, and Russia to the northeast. The military port of Sevastopol is leased to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Western Ukraine is more closely as-

sociated with Europe, while Ukraine’s Orthodox and industrial eastern and coastal regions have stronger ties with Russia. However, this division should not be considered strictly.Ukraine’s economy consists mainly of agriculture, mining, and heavy industry. After a period of decline in the 1990s, Ukraine’s economy began growing again in 2000. However, this growth was based largely on state intervention in the price system and has been accompanied by high infla-tion. The majority of the population has remained poor. The country remains dependent on Russian energy supplies. Russian private and state-control-led corporations are investing heavily in Ukrainian firms. In security terms, Ukraine occupies an important po-sition between Russia and the European Union. The popular disturbances that many prophesied after independence because of the state’s homogeneous makeup never materialized. The large Soviet nuclear arsenal stationed in Ukraine was transported to Rus-sia. Ukraine initially sought a diplomatically neutral position between Russia and the West. To gain some economic independence from its main trading part-ner Russia, Ukraine helped found the GUUAM as-sociation of states in 1997. The 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter laid the foundation for a special partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Ukraine was also the first CIS state to sign the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO in 1994. Since September 2003, Ukraine has committed 1800 soldiers to pacify and rebuild postwar Iraq. At the Ukraine-EU summit in 2004 the two sides agreed to devise an Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. President Kuchma, who has come under increas-ing suspicion of corruption and other crimes, has turned to Moscow for support. In 2003, together with the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and

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Russia, Kuchma signed the basic accords for the establishment of a Single Economic Space. After a dramatic presidential election campaign and widespread protests against electoral fraud, the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko won a December repeat of the October 2004 election against Viktor Yanukovych, who was supported by both President Leonid Kuchma and Russian Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko has declared Ukrainian EU mem-bership a strategic goal.http://www.botschaft-ukraine.de/www.guuam.orghttp : / /www.nato . int / i s sues /nato -ukraine/ index .htmlIndex

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9/11 September 11th, 2001Abkhazia 26, 38acquis communautaire EU, acquis

communautaireAlbania 38, 48, also Balkans Armenia 25, 37, 44, also CaucasusAzerbaijan 37, 93, also CaucasusBalkans 27, 32, 67, 74, 79 also AlbaniaBaltic states 28, 44, 79, 84, also Estonia, Latvia,

LithuaniaBarcelona Process EU, Barcelona Process,

glossaryBelarus 26, 28, 33 – 35, 40 – 42, 47, 50 – 52, 55 – 57,

65 – 66, 72 – 73, 76, 78, 84, 88 – 89, 91 – 92, 94, glossary

- elections 50- and the EU EU, relations to Belarus- reforms 56 - WTO membership 66

»Berlin Wall« through Europe ? Europe, divide into two blocs

Beslan 79 – 80, 82, 87, also Russia, terrorismborder regime EU, border regime; Ukraine, visa

regimebilateralization of foreign policy EU and Russia,

bilateralization of foreign policyBulgaria 27, 37, 53, 63 – 64, 74, also EU,

candidate countriesCaucasus 53, 57, 59, 67, 79, 81, 87, also

Armenia, Azerbaijan, GeorgiaCentral Asian Cooperation Organisation 44Chernobyl 48, 51Chechnya 26, 79 – 82, 84, also BeslanChina 44, 81, 88, 90, also Asian Cooperation

Organisationchristianity 27, 38Clash of Civilizations 38Cold War 67, 75, 83, 93

Collective Security Treaty Organization 44Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

43 – 44, 53, 78Communism 27 – 28, also Soviet Union, collapse

of; Warsaw PactCopenhagen Criteria EU, Copenhagen CriteriaCouncil of Europe 43, 48, 53Croatia EU, relations to CroatiaCzech Republic 36 – 37, 39, 52 – 53, 60, 68 – 69Cyprus 38, 74Democracy Eastern Europe, transformation

process; Belarus; Moldova; Ukraine, reforms; EU and Russia, democratizing or modernizing partnership

Eastern dimension of the EU EU, Eastern dimension

Eastern Europe, transformation processes 27 – 28, 30, 34, 45, 47 – 48, 51, 56, 68, 93 – 94

energy EU, energy supplyEstonia 37 – 38, 42, 52, 63 – 65EU

- acquis communautaire 45 – 46- Action Plans 39, 47 – 48, 57 – 62, 66 – 67- Barcelona Process 59, also glossary- border regimes 31 – 33, 39 – 41, 52, 62, 77, 84,

92- candidate countries EU, integration- Commission 36, 40, 45, 55, 57, 59 – 61, 64, 69,

71, 75, 77, 84 – 85- Common Foreign and Security Policy 37, 71,

80, 83 – 86, 93- Constitutional Treaty 55, 70 – 71, 80, 83, 86- Copenhagen Criteria 45, 70, 75- core Europe 71, 86- Council of Ministers 60- Council, European 36, 48, 83 – 84- Eastern dimension 55, 89

Index

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- Eastern Enlargement 35 – 37, 41 – 43, 48, 50, 52 – 53, 55, 57, 60 – 61, 63 – 64, 68 – 74, 77 – 79, 81, 89 – 90 glossary

- energy supply 51, 66, 79- finality 70- Franco-German nucleus 86- foreign policy EU, Common Foreign and

Security Policy- geo-political actor ? 41, 72, 89, 31- integration EU, Common Foreign and

Security Policy; EU, Eastern Enlargement; EU, integration, economic; EU, Neighborhood Policy; EU, sovereignty; Europe, historic regions

- Internal Market 38, 58- integration, economic 45, 55 – 56, 71, 90, also

EU, trade policy- Latin American dimension 89- Mediterannean dimension 38, 57, 59, 72, 82,

89- Neighborhood Policy 34 – 37, 45 – 47, 52 – 53,

55 – 66, 72, 75 – 76, 88 – 90, 94, also EU, Action Plans, glossary

- Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument 56, 61

- new member states EU, Eastern Enlargement; EU, Neighborhood Policy

- Northern Dimension 55, 64, glossary- Parliament, European 36, 71, 84- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PAC)

38, 57, 60, 62, 77- programs 36, 56, 59, 63 – 64, 77, also PHARE,

TACIS- relations to

- Albania 38, 48- Belarus 28, 33 – 36, 40 – 43, 50 – 54, 65 – 66, 72,

78, 88, 92- Bulgaria 37, 63 – 64, 74- Caucasus 53, 57, 59, 81

- Croatia 38, 74- Islamic world 72, 81- Mediterranean 38, 57, 59, 72- Moldova 56, 58, 60, 63, 68, 72, 76, 88, 92 – 93- Romania 37, 63 – 64, 74- Russia 77 – 82, 88, 92- Russia: bilateralization of foreign policy

80, 82 – 86- Russia: democratizing or modernizing part-

nership 65 – 66, 72, 78, 81, 87- Russia: Four Common Spaces strategy 66,

76 – 77, 91- Russia: Strategic Partnership 76, 81- Turkey 25, 54, 68, 72 – 75, 94- Ukraine 28 – 33, 38 – 43, 45 – 48, 50 – 51, 58 – 62,

69, 73, 78, 88, 92- USA 40, 41, 73, 84, 89

- “ring of friends” 57- Schengen Area / Schengen borders 38, 41 – 42,

62, 69, 77- sovereignty 70 – 71- trade policy 37 – 38, 48, 53- Weimar Triangle 73- Wider Europe 46, 56 – 57, 61, also EU,

Neighborhood PolicyEU Russia Summit EU and Russia: Strategic

PartnershipEurasia 43Europe

- borders EU, border regimes; EU, finality- divide into two blocs ? 31, 39, 41 – 43, 91 – 92- historic regions and dynamic corridors 42,

44 – 45, 50, 65, 72- historical understanding 65

European Council EU, Council, EuropeanFinland 63, 84, 89Four Common Spaces EU and Russia:

Four Common Spaces glossary

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France 31, 62, 69, 73, 77, 80 – 81, 85 – 86, 90, 91Franco-German-Russian Triangle 31Gazprom 91Gazeta Wyborcza 49Georgia 37, 40, 43, 52 – 53, 64, 81, 91, 93 also

CaucasusGermany 60, 62, 69, 71, 73, 78

- and Turkey 65, 73- and Ukraine 31, 73, 87

globalization 28, 44, 70, 82, 90good governance 57 – 58, 62Great Britain 80 – 81, 85 – 86Greater Middle East 58Greece 27, 38Hungary 36 – 37, 52 – 53, 60, 73Iraq 42, 73Iraq Conflict 31, 41, 72, 80 – 82, 89Kaliningrad Russia, Kaliningrad glossary Kazakhstan 44Latin American dimension of the EU EU, Latin

American dimensionLatvia 36, 64 – 65, 83Lithuania 34, 36, 51 – 52, 56, 84 – 85, 90Lviv 25, 31, 43 – 44, 67, 69, 94, also UkraineMediterranean dimension of the EU EU,

Mediterranean dimensionMiddle East 58, 73, 79, also EU, relations to

Islamic worldmigration 38, 66, 69, 78modernizing partnership EU and Russia:

democratizing or modernizing partnershipMoldova glossary

- and Russia 76, 84, 88 – 89, 91, 93- Transnistria 40, 79, 84, 91 – 93, glossary- reforms 56 - WTO membership 60

Nagorny-Karabakh 26, also regional conflicts

NATO 31, 36, 43 – 44, 53, 79- enlargement 35, 81 – 83 glossary- NATO-Russia Council 42, 79- summit in Istanbul 93- Ukraine Council 42, also Ukraine and Russia

Neighborhood Policy of the EU EU Neighborhood Policy; glossary

non-governmental organizations (NGO) 56, 69Northern Dimension of the EU EU, Northern

Dimension glossaryNorway 30, 33organized crime 55, 89, 90, 92OSCE 37, 42, 49, 58, 66Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

EU, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement glossary

PHARE 63, also EU, programsPoland 28, 34, 37 – 39, 46 – 54, 55 – 57, 69, 82 – 83,

88, 90 – 91- and Belarus 56, 65, 73- non-paper on the Eastern Dimension of the EU

55- reforms 54- and Russia 86- and Ukraine 56 – 57, 60, 65, 73, 82

Portugal 29private sector EU, integration, economicreform processes Eastern Europe,

transformation processes; Ukraine, reformsregional conflicts 26, 37, 79 – 80, 91 – 93, also

Abkhasia, Chechnya, Nagorny Karabakh, Transnistria

Romania 27 – 28, 32, 37, 48, 53, 63 – 64, 74, also EU, relations to Romania

Russia- Chechnya Policy Chechnya- Eastern Europe 81- and EU EU and Russia

116 117

- integration policy 65 – 66, 76, 81, also Single Economic Space

- Kaliningrad 76 – 77, 81, 84 – 85- Kyoto protocol 66, 79, 87- and NATO NATO-Russia-Council- Russian minorities 65, 70, 79- Soviet Union, collapse of 26, 79, 82 – 83- terrorism 44, 78 – 80, 86 – 90- and Ukraine Ukraine and Russia- Western criticism 80 – 81, 84, 87- WTO membership 66, 77

Schengen Area EU, Schengen Areasecurity EU, border regimes; Russia, terrorism September 11th, 2001 50, 86, 79 – 80Shanghai Cooperation Organization 44Single Economic Space 46, 76 – 77, 92 glossarySlovak Republic 32, 36, 53, 73Slovenia 69Solidarnosc 67South Ossetia 93Soviet Union Russia, Soviet Union, collapse ofStrategic Partnership of the EU with Russia EU

and Russia: Strategic Partnership glossarySwitzerland 30, 32 – 33, 75TACIS 36, 56, 61, 63, also EU, programsTajikistan 44, also Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS)terrorism 44, 51, 55, 78 – 81, 86 – 90, also Beslan;

Russia, terrorism; September 11th, 2001transatlantic relations 50, 55, 89, also EU,

relations to USA; Germany and USAtransformation processes Eastern Europe,

transformation processesTransnistria Moldova, Transnistria, glossaryTurkey 42

- and EU EU, relations to Turkey - and NATO 53

Turkmenistan 44, also Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Ukraine, also glossary- civil war, prevention of 26- constitutional reform 46 – 47- disinterest of the West 49 – 50- elections 26 – 27, 30 – 32, 46, 49, 54- and EU EU, relations to Ukraine - Kuchma regime 46, 73 – 74- nuclear arsenal 31, 48- and Poland 56 – 57, 60, 65, 73, 82- reforms 53, 56 – 57, 69- and Russia 30 – 33, 91 – 94- visa regime 31 – 33, 39 – 41- WTO membership 58, 60, 66

USA - and EU EU, relations to USA- Eastern Europe policy 30, 36, 43, 53

visa regime of the EU EU, border regimesVisegrad states 84, also Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland, SlovakiaWarsaw Pact 75, 79, also communism, Eastern

EuropeWeimar Triangle EU, Weimar TriangleWider Europe, also EU, Wider EuropeWorld War I 74World War II 42, 51, 65, 73 – 74WTO Belarus/Moldova/Russia/Ukraine, WTO

membershipYugoslav War 26, also Balkans

118

Bangemann, Martin 71Barroso, José Manuel 76Berlusconi, Silvio 84 – 85Blackwill, Robert 38Blair, Tony 85Burghardt, Günter 38Bush, George Senior 84Chirac, Jacques 84Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz 50, 56Constantinescu, Emil 32Cooper, Robert 64Emerson, Michael 31Erdogan, Recep T. 25, 73, 75Fischer, Joschka 30, 56Fradkov, Michail 77Frattini, Franco 52Giedroyc, Jercy 50, 54Gorbachev, Michail 31, 43Habermas, Jürgen 30Herodot 25Huntington, Samuel 38Ivanov, Viktor 77Karaganow, Sergey A. 84Khristenko, Victor 77Kozak, Dmitri 43Kuchma, Leonid 43, 46, 73Lamers, Karl 71Landáburu, Enek 52Lavrov, Sergej 77Lukashenko, Alexandr G. 40Meciar, Vladímir 32Michnik, Adam 49 – 50Prodi, Romano 25, 45, 57Putin, Vladimir 66, 76, 84 – 87, 91, 93Roth, Josef 25Rumsfeld, Donald 52Saakashvili, Michail 52Schröder, Gerhard 25, 80, 84 – 85

Smirnov, Igor 93Thatcher, Margaret 85Winkler, Heinrich-August 30Yanukovych, Viktor 29, 45 – 46, 49, 94Yastrzhembskiy, Sergej 77Yeltsin, Boris 43, 85Yushchenko, Viktor 27, 29 – 32, 46,48, 49, 52, 69,

81, 91, 94

Persons

Chair

119

Previous Round Tables*

Protocol Topic Speakers

1961 1

2

3

4

1962 5

6

7

8

1963 9

10

11

12

1964 13

14

15

16

1965 17

Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft

Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft

Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe

Welche Fragen stellt uns die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten ?

Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik

Die Erziehung zum Europäer

Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems

Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Maschine — Denkmaschine — Staatsmaschine

Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache

Die westliche Gesellschaft und die kommunistische Drohung

Wohin treibt die EWG ?

Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft

Wohin Deutschland in Europa ?

Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls ?

Industrielle Gesellschaft — menschlich oder unmenschlich ?

Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand

Prof. Dr. F. W. Schoberth

Prof. Dr. Erik von Sivers

Prof. Dr. Fritz Baade, MdB

Prof. D. Helmut Gollwitzer

Dr. Rüdiger Altmann

Stéphane Hessel

Prof. Dr. Theodor Pütz

Dr. Hans-Constantin Paulssen

Prof. Dr. Pierre Bertaux

Prof. Dr. O. W. Haseloff

Winfried Martini

U. W. Kitzinger, Roland Delcour

Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin

Prof. Alfred Grosser, Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg, MdB

Dr. Walter RauDr. E. F. Schumacher

Prof. Dr. Raymond Aron

Prof. Dr. Helmut MeinholdProf. Dr. H. J. Wallraff

Dr. H. B. Tolkmitt

Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt

Dr. Günther Buch

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

Josef Müller-Marein

François Bondy

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt

Prof. Dr. Arnold Gehlen

Dr. h. c. Freiherr von Stackelberg

Prof. Dr. Th. Eschenburg

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

François Bondy

Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

*a complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

120

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

121

18

19

20

1966 21

22

23

24

1967 25

26

27

1968 28

29

30

31

1969 32

33

Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft ?

Automatisierung — eine gesellschaftliche Herausforderung ?

Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien : Kurzfristige Soziallösungen contra langfristige Regionalpolitik

Die “unterentwickelten” hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften

Muss unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden ?

Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis — Das Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie

Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ?

Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung ?

Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform

Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft ?

Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer programmierten Gesellschaft

Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicherheit Europas ?

Haben wir im entstehenden Europa noch eine Chance für die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte

Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht

Verstärken oder verringern sich die Bedingungen für Aggressivität ?

Prof. Dr. Alexander Mitscherlich

Prof. Dr. Gottfried BombachDr. Günter FriedrichsDr. Kurt Pentzlin

Prof. Dr. Leo H. Klaassen

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heer

Dr. Rüdiger AltmannJoseph Rovan

Prof. Dr. Helmut SchelskyDr. Ulrich Lohmar, MdB

Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Prof. Dr. Helmut Arndt

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Ph. D.

Alfred Mozer

Prof. Dr. Jeanne Hersch

Prof. Wladimir Chwostow

Dr. Hans von der Groeben

Dr. Robert Jungk

Prof. Dr. Adolf Portmann

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Hacker

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Hans Wenke

Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich v. Weizsäcker, Frhr.

Prof. Alfred Grosser

Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Ipsen

Prof. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Hoimar von Ditfurth

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

120

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

121

34

1970 35

36 Leningrad

37

1971

38

39

40

1972 41

42

43

1973 44

45

Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspannungspolitik ?

Zugänge zur Friedensforschung

Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit

Demokratisierung der Demokratie ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen einer internationalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik — Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Prioritäten

Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ?

Der bevollmächtigte Mensch — Kann sich die freie industrielle Gesellschaft zur Stabilität und Reife entwickeln ?

Sprache und Politik

Arbeitsgespräch : Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein in der Bundesrepublik

Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken

Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft ?

Die “neue Mitte” :Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ?

Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft ?

Prof. Alfred Grosser

Prof. Dr. Carl-FriedrichFrhr. v. WeizsäckerProf. Dr. Richard Löwenthal

Prof. Alfred GrosserNikolai E. Poljanow

Prof. Joseph Rovan

—

Ministerpräsident Dr. Helmut Kohl

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

Prof. Dr. Dennis Gabor

KultusministerProf. Dr. Hans Maier

Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal

Prof. Dr. R. DahrendorfJean-Pierre BrunetSir Con O’Neill

Prof. Dr. Helge Pross

Dr. Richard v. Weizsäcker, MdB

Bundesminister Dr. Hans-Jochen VogelDr. Hugo Thiemann

Dr. Theo Sommer

Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens

Nikolai E. Poljanow

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Dr. Franz Karasek

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Prof. Hellmut Becker

François Bondy

Bundesaußenminister Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger

D. Klaus von Bismarck

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

122

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

123

46 Vienna

1974 47

48

49

1975 Moscow

50

51 Bonn

52

1976 53

54

55

1977 56 Bonn

57 Luxemburg

Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die europäische Sicherheit

Revolution der Gleichheit — Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ?

Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung

Entwicklungshilfe — eine Illusion ?

Arbeitsgespräch : Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit

Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise ?

Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Demokratie westlicher Prägung ?

Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ?

Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung

Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki

Ein anderer “Way of Life” — Ist der Fortschritt noch ein Fortschritt ?

Europa und die Weltwirtschaft

Bundesaußenminister Dr. Rudolf KirchschlägerAußenminister Gaston ThornVizeaußenminister Jósef Czyrek

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. H. B. G. CasimirDr. Manfred Schäfer

Prof. Dr. Peter T. BauerProf. Dr. Karl-Heinz Sohn

Prof. Dr. Ralf DahrendorfDr. H. Ehrenberg, MdBDr. Theo SommerProf. Dr. C.-F. Frhr. v. WeizsäckerProf. Dr. G. ArbatowProf. Dr. O. BogomolowSchalwa SanakojewGeorgij Shukow

Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt,MdB

Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn

Prof. Dr. Kurt H. Biedenkopf

Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

—

Prof. Dr. G. ArbatowLeonard H. MarksDr. Theo SommerRyszard Wojna

Dr. E. F. Schumacher

Claude CheyssonProf. Dr. Herbert Giersch

Prof. Dr. Olivier Reverdin

D. Klaus von Bismarck

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

Dr. Max Thurn

Dr. Kurt A. KörberLew Tolkunow

Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Dr. Theo Sommer

Prof. Dr. Hellmut Becker

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider

Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

122

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

123

58

1978 59

60

61

1979 62 Moscow

63

64

1980 65

66

67

1981 68

69Washington

70

Energiekrise — Europa im Belagerungszustand ?

Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft

Arbeitsgespräch : Alternativenergien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sonnenenergie

Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal — oder brauchen wir einen anderen Arbeitsmarkt ?

Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Alternative Rationalitäten ?

UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland — wirtschaftliche und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren

Jugend und Gesellschaft. Chronischer Konflikt — neue Verbindlichkeiten ?

Weltrezession 1980 ?Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen

Der Westen und der Nahe Osten — Krise im Zeichen der islamischen Revolution ?

Europas Sicherheit

Voraussetzungen und Ziele der Entspannung in den 80er Jahren

Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes

Europe and America facing the crisesof the 80’s

Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens ?

Dr. Guido Brunner

Prof. Walter Laqueur

Joachim Gretz

Bundesminister Dr. Volker Hauff, MdBProf. Dr. Gerhard FelsProf. Dr. Erich Streissler

Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

Staatsminister Dr. Klaus von DohnanyiAlexander E. Bowin

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Leopold Rosenmayr

Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch Bundesbankpräsident Karl Otto Pöhl

Dr. Arnold HottingerProf. Dr. Hans A. Fischer-BarnicolM. A. H. Hobohm

Dr. Christoph BertramDr. W. R. Smyser

W. A. MatweewProf. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann

Prof. Dr. R. DahrendorfParl. Staatssekretärin Anke Fuchs

Prof. Dr. R. DahrendorfProf. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann

Dr. Hans-Jochen VogelProf. Dr. E. Noelle-Neumann

Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Werner H. Bloss

Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Dr. K. A. KörberBoris A. Borrissow

Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider

Dr. Udo Steinbach

Dr. Theo Sommer

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Armin Gutowski

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

124

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

125

1982 71

72 Bonn

1983 73 Zurich

74 Berlin

1984 75 Moscow

76 Rome

1985 77

78 Bonn

1986 79 Brussels

80

Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft ?

Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Die politisch-kulturelle Herausforderung Europas — Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft

Die deutsche Frage — neu gestellt

Zukunft Europas : Probleme der politischen und militärischen Entspannung.

Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ?

Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ?

10 Jahre Helsinki — die Herausforderung bleibt

Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ?

Bürger und res publica — die Zukunft der Verantwortung

Minister Dr. Werner RemmersProf. Dr. Richard Löwenthal

Prof. J. TobinProf. M. FeldsteinSir Alec CairncrossA. A. WaltersProf. P. E. UriProf. P. SalinProf. A. GutowskiDr. H. Schulmann

Präsident Gaston Thorn

Regierender Bürgermeister Dr. Richard v. Weizsäcker

Ministerialdirektor Horst TeltschikWadim W. Sagladin

Franz Kardinal KönigBundeskanzler a.D. Helmut Schmidt

Prof. Dr. Helmut MeinholdSenator Ulf FinkSenator a.D. Olaf Sund

Botschafter R. BurtProf. Dr. S. TichwinskijDr. M. SzürösBotschafter Prof. L. V. Graf FerrarisProf. Dr. M. Dobrosielski MinDir. H. Teltschik

Präsident Jacques DelorsGen.-Sekr. Lord CarringtonBundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt

Staatsminister Prof. Dr.Hans Maier

Dr. Hans Heigert

Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Karl KaiserJuri Shukow

S. E. Botschafter Prof. Luigi Vittorio Graf Ferraris

Fides Krause-Brewer

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

124

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

125

1987 81 Moscow

82 Geneva

83 Budapest

1988 84 Berlin

85 Munich

86 Bonn

1989 87 Dresden

88 Bonn

89 Prague

1990 90 Dresden

91 Moscow

1991 92 Moscow

93 Berlin

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Die Modernität in der Industrie-gesellschaft — und danach ?

Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung

Systemöffnende Kooperation ? Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West

Die ökologische Wende — hat sie noch Chancen ?

Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Globale Umweltproblematik als gemeinsame Überlebensfrage

Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Perspektiven einer gemeinsamen westlichen Ostpolitik

Chancen für die europäische Kultur am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts

Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa ?

Europa im Aufbruch — auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Friedensordnung

Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende ?

Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Wie geht es weiter mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa ?

Volker Rühe, MdBWadim W. SagladinEgon Bahr

Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe

Dr. M. SzürösBundeskanzler a.D. Helmut SchmidtProf. Dr. R. BogdanowProf. Dr. H. Sonnenfeldt

Prof. W. LeonhardProf. Dr. Harry Maier

Dr. H. Frhr. v. LersnerStaatss. Alois Glück

Wadim W. SagladinMinDir. Horst Teltschik

Prof. W. MundtProf. Dr. W. Haber

Stellvertr. Außenminister Lawrence EagleburgerBots. Sir Christopher MallabyMinDir. Horst Teltschik

Dr. Valtr KomárekProf. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf

Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy BrandtKonsistorialpräsident Dr. Manfred StolpeMinisterpräsident Dr. Lothar Späth

Wadim W. SagladinMinDir. Horst Teltschik

Prof. W. WladislawlewDr. F. W. Christians

Ministerpräsident a.D. Tadeusz MazowieckiSir Ralf Dahrendorf

Valentin FalinDr. Theo Sommer

Botschafter Prof. Luigi V. Ferraris

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Jürgen Engert

Staatsminister a.D. Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Max Schmidt

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Dr. Hans Heigert

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

126

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

127

1992 94 Dresden

95 Paris

96 Tallinn

97 Kiev

1993 98 Berlin

99 Ditchley Park

100 Dresden

1994 101 St. Petersburg

102Friedrichsroda

1995 103 Oxford

104 Warsaw

105 Munich

Wege zur inneren Einheit

Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf die neuen Einwanderungswellen ?

Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit : wie findet Europa zusammen ?

Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ?

Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven der Demokratie

Will the West survive the disintegration of the East ?

Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft ?

Russland und der Westen : Internationale Sicherheit und Reformpolitik

Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

Die Verfassung Europas

Europa — aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ?

Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ?

Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Wolfgang Thierse, MdB

Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy BrandtPräsident Jacques Delors

Jim HoaglandDr. KrenzlerPräsident Lennart MeriBotschafter T. ÖrnStaatsmin. B. Schmidbauer

Dr. Hermann KrämerMin. Prof. W. SkljarowHelga SteegProf. Dr. Y. Rudenko

Dr. Antje VollmerProf. Dr. Wolf Lepenies

Senator Bill BradleyDr. W. F. van EekelenDr. H.-G. Poettering

Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt BiedenkopfProf. Dr. Albert O. Hirschman

Minister A. A. KokoschinBMin. Volker RüheBürgermeister Prof. A. A. Sobtschak

Dr. Lothar SpäthLeo A. Nefiodow

Prof. Jean-Claude CasanovaTimothy Garton AshDr. Wolfgang Schäuble

Prof. Bronislaw GeremekAnders BjörckSenator J. François-Poncet

Bundesminister Horst SeehoferProf. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller

Dr. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Jürgen Engert

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Dieter Grimm

Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Jürgen Engert

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Dr. Hermann Korte

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

126

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

127

1996 106 Jerusalem

107

108 Moscow

1997 109 Istanbul

110 Berlin

111Amsterdam

1998 112 Leipzig

113 Baku

1999 114Magdeburg

115 Berlin

Europe and the Future of the Middle East — an Agenda for Peace

Medien — Macht — Politik

Was bewegt Russland ?

At the crossroads of geo-politics — Turkey in a changing political environment

Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft

Wie ist Europa zu sichern ?

Wachsende Ungleichheiten — neue Spaltungen ?

Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum

Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport ?

Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Herausforderungen für die repräsentative Demokratie

Dr. Mahdi F. Abdul HadiHanan Bar-OnProf. Leonard HausmanJean-Paul JesseStaatsminister Helmut Schäfer

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang DonsbachSenator Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann-RiemDr. Theo Sommer

Sergej BaburinSir Rodric Braithwaite

Ilter TürkmenMorton AbramowitzHans-Ulrich Klose

Dr. h. c. André LeysenBundesminister Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers

Dr. Ulrich CartellieriSir Christopher MallabyWolfgang IschingerMarten van HeuvenFrits BolkesteinProf. David P. CalleoMax KohnstammElmar Brok

Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt BiedenkopfProf. Dr. Heinz BudeProf. Dr. Wolfgang Huber

Dr. Terry D. AdamsBotschafter Vafa GoulizadePaul HaseldonckxStaatssekretär Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz

Prof. Dr. Hans LenkHerbert Riehl-HeyseProf. Dr. Jürgen Palm

Prof. Dr. Antonia GrunenbergBundesministerin a.D. SabineLeutheusser-Schnarrenberger, MdB

Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer

Thomas Kielinger

Staatssekretär a.D. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Prof. Dr. Curt Gasteyger

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer

Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller

Staatssekretär a.D. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Prof. Dr. Hermann-Anders Korte

Prof. Dr. Jutta Limbach

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

128

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

129

116 Moscow

2000 117 Berlin

118 Berlin

119 Beijing

2001 120 Berlin

121 Helsinki

122 Moscow

2002 123 Belgrade

Russland in Europa :Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg

Modell Deutschland :Reif für die Globalisierung ?

Ein föderatives Europa ?

China : Partner in der Weltwirtschaft

Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Möglichen — Möglichkeiten der Politik

The Baltic Sea — a Region of Prosperity and Stability ?

Russia’s European Dimension

The Future of Southeast Europe

Wolfgang IschingerOleg MorosowDr. Ulrich CartellieriAndrej A. Kokoschin

Dr. Henning ScherfProf. Dr. Carl Christian v. Weizsäcker

Sylvie GoulardProf. Dr. Klaus Hänsch, MdEPDr. Jerzy Kranz

Prof. Yang QixianMinister Zheng SilinMinister Wang ChunzhengVice Minister Shen JuerenProf. Dr. Zhu MinShi MingdeSong JianDr. Konrad SeitzDr. Horst TeltschikDr. Martin Posth

Prof. Dr. Dieter GrimmDr. Annette Fugmann-Heesing

Minister a.D. Bertel HaarderBotschafter Dr. Artur J. KuznetsovAlar J. Rudolf OlljumHans OlssonTimo SummaAußenminister Dr. Erkki TuomiojaStaatsminister Dr. Christoph Zöpel

—

Andy BearparkDr. Erhard BusekNebojša ČovićBozidar DjelićDr. Alexandra JovičevićDr. Herwig KempfGerald KnausDr. Wolfgang PetritschGoran Svilanović

Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

Dr. Klaus v. Dohnanyi

Prof. Dr. Rudolf von Thadden

Präsident Mei ZhaorongProf. Dr. Karl Kaiser

Prof. Robert Leicht

Minister Dr. Jaako Iloniemi

Sergej W. JastrschembskijDr. Sergej A. Karaganow

Martti AhtisaariDr. Erhard Busek

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

128

Topic Speakers ChairProtocol

129

124 Berlin

125 Hamburg

126 Florence

2003 127 Isfahan

2004 128Wilton Park

Contours of a “New World Order” ?

Reinventing Europe — Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening

The Future of Democracy — European Per-spectives

The Middle East and Western Values: A Dialog With Iran

Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order

Prof. Dr. Egon BahrProf. John L. HirschDr. Peter W. SingerProf. Paul W. SchroederProf. Georges-Henri SoutouKarsten D. VoigtProf. Dr. Norbert WalterProf. Samuel F. Wells Jr.

Prof. Dr. Hélène AhrweilerProf. Dr. Üstün ErgüderMonika Griefahn MdBProf. Yudhishthir Raj IsarHywel Ceri JonesProf. Dr. Karl SchlögelDr. Gary SmithGijs de Vries

Henri de BressonProf. Andrea ManzellaProf. Dr. Gesine SchwanProf. Larry SiedentopGijs de VriesProf. Helen Wallace

Dr. Gilles KepelDr. Michael McFaulDr. Homayra MoshirzadehDr. Ahmad NagheebzadehGiandomenico PiccoDr. Johannes ReissnerDr. Hossein Salimi

Prof. Paul SchroederDame Pauline Neville-JonesDavid RieffHeather GrabbeProf. Ghanim AlnajjarDr. Michael SchaeferAmbassador Avis Bohlen

Lord Ralf Dahrendorf

Otto von der Gablentz

Roger de Weck

Dr. Christoph BertramDr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour

Dr. Christoph Bertram

Iran is attracting more and more attention in international policy circles, not least because of the country’s nuclear program. It is a land between tradition and modernity, between democratic tendencies and authoritarian structures, Western politicians are demanding that Iran abandon what they consider recklessness in its foreign policy while opening its doors wider to democracy. For their part, Iranian representatives demand more respect for the country’s normative-political traditions, its rapid process of social change, and its geopoliti-cal and economic interests.

At the 127th Bergedorf Round Table in Isfahan, representatives of Iran’s various political camps met with politicians, analysts, and journalists from the Middle East, Europe, the US, Russia, and the Asia-Pacific region. They discussed how Islamic cultures react to the West’s norms of democracy and human rights, and whether Western states should seek to demo-cratize other countries from the outside or a “dialog of cultures” over values and social models. The debate produced concrete recommendations for the role of the EU, a security conference for the Middle East, ways to harness the region’s econo-mic dynamism, and establishing dialog structures.

The Middle East and Western ValuesA Dialog With Iran

127th Bergedorf Round Table | IsfahanSoftcover | 22 x 24,5 cmISBN 3-89684-356-7Euro 11,– (D)

Is our international system effective against the problems of the 21st Century ? Asymmetrical

terrorist threats, WMD proliferation, and the military hegemony of the United States since

the end of the Cold War have radically shifted the coordinates of security policy. Poverty,

epidemics, and failed states also pose serious threats. Would steps such as reforming the UN

Security Council or strengthening the EU’s foreign policy improve matters ? Should Asia

and the Global South be more closely incorporated into multilateral institutions ? Or do the

US Security Strategy’s principles of unilateral pre-emption and regime change simply work

better ?

The 128th Bergedorf Round Table “Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order” sets

forth the Round Table’s cycle focusing on actors and institutions of global governance. After

Round Tables on the transatlantic partnership (Berlin 2002) and the West’s role in the Middle

East (Isfahan 2003), we now explore the question of what norms and rules, strategies and in-

stitutions are best suited to help us master today’s challenges.

Power and RulesElements of a New World Order

128th Bergedorf Round Table | Wilton ParkSoftcover | 22 x 24,5 cmISBN 3-89684-357-5Euro 11,– (D)

The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors) Dr. Thomas Paulsen (Managing Director)

Program Assistant Karen Pehla, M. A.

Program Manager Dr. Patrick Cohrs Dr. Thomas Weihe

Address Bergedorf Round Table Berlin Office of the Körber Foundation Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8 D -10117 Berlin Phone : +49 -30-206267-60 Fax : +49 -30-206267-67 E-Mail : bg@stiftung.koerber.de www.bergedorf-round-table.org

Imprint

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen BibliothekDie Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http ://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2005

Editors Julia Steets Horst Rödinger Dr. Thomas WeiheTranslations Nicolas KumanoffPictures Marc DarchingerDesign Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.dePrinted in Germany by Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

ISBN 3-89684-358-3All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request.

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versionsare available for download and research at www.bergedorf-round-table.org