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THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD IN HOBBESS MORAL PHILOSOPHY

According to Sidgwick, what distinguishes modern ethicalphilosophy from ancient Greek ethics and pre-modern thought derivingfrom it was that though the ancients recognized but one regulative and

governing faculty . . . under the name of Reason, in the modernethical view, when it has worked itself clear, there are found to betwo, . . . Conscience and Self-love (Sidgwick 1964: 198). Sidgwick alsoput this contrast in terms of Universal and Egoistic Reason. Thisresonates with Sidgwicks own famous dualism of practical reason, butit fails to capture an essential feature that he stresses elsewhere,namely, that conscience in modern ethical thought is essentiallyconceived in relation to quasi-jural notions of obligation, duty, andright (Sidgwick 1967: 105).1 We might, therefore, put Sidgwicks pointthis way: Whereas ancient ethics recognized a single fundamentalethical concept and source of normative reasons, the good, modern

ethics came to recognize two, the right as well as the good.

Sidgwicks central thought, I would say his central insight, is that,for the Greeks, Virtue or Right action [for example, Aristotles idea of anactions being noble and choiceworthy in itself (1980: II.3-4)] iscommonly regarded as only a species of the Good (Sidgwick 1967:105). In modern thought, by contrast, we find a distinctive ethicalconception, that of moralityincluding moral obligation and rightswhich purports to provide reasons for action that are very different fromand that can trump considerations of the good, whether the agents owngood, or even good impersonally conceived.2

This is the idea Butler gives voice to when he says thatauthority, indeed supreme authority, is part of the very idea ofconscience (e.g., 1983, 3.2),3 and what Kant expresses in hisdoctrine of the moral law as a categorical imperative. Let us call this theauthority of right, that is, the thesis that considerations of moral right,wrong, duty, and obligation have an independent normative force thatneither reduces to nor can be derived solely from that of the good(though it may partly depend upon it). It is consistent with the authorityof right, so formulated, that we might have but the single moral duty ofpromoting the good, or even of promoting our own good. The authority

of right would still claim that any such duty could not follow directly from

1 Ethical principles, however universal or impersonal, need not take a juridical form.2 In other words, there is a conceptual difference, for the moderns, between thethought that an action will advance either the agents good or overall good, on the onehand, and the thought that, perhaps because of that, the action is morally obligatory, aduty, or wrong not to do, on the other.3 Also: you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in

judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, ofthe faculty itself (1983: 2.14).

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any facts about the good taken by themselves.

By speaking of the authorityof the right I mean to echo Sidgwicksthought that the modern conception of right is a quasi-jural notion,that is, that it is conceptually tied to the idea of legitimate or de jure

authority.

4

I shall interpret Sidgwicks to entail that the authority ofright, so understood, is a distinctively modern thesis. In this paper, Iwish to discuss Hobbess moral philosophy in relation to authority ofright. The dominant scholarly opinion, including my own until recently,has been that Hobbes denies this thesis since he holds that allobligations and duties derive their normative force from their relation tothe good, in particular, to the agents own good, or even morespecifically, the agents self-preservation. Now, however, I am not sosure.

In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that the concepts of

moral right, wrong, and rights, which we inherit from modern ethics, areirreducibly second personal. They operate within a conceptual networkthat essentially includes the idea of a distinctive kind of reason foracting, what I call a second-personal reason, that is conceptually relatedto legitimate claims or demands that someone has the authority toaddress to the agent (or that the agent has, at least under a certainguise, the authority to address to herself). It is the element of addressthat brings in the grammatical second person. Claims and demandsnecessarily have addressees, whether individuals, groups, or the publicat large.

In this way, I argue, the ideas of moral obligation, right, wrong,and rights, are conceptually tied to that ofresponsibilityto someone inthe sense of accountability or answerability. Moral obligations are whatwe are answerable for doing. But answerable to whom? Who has theauthority to hold us accountable? According to early modern theologicalvoluntarists like Pufendorf and Locke, we are accountable to God, whohas authority over all his creatures. More defensibly, I argue, we areaccountable to one another (and indeed to ourselves) as representativepersons or members of the moral community. What we are morallyobligated to do is what we have the authority, as representativepersons, to demand of each other and ourselves that we do. I argue

that the seeds of this more adequate view can be found in thevoluntarists themselves, like Pufendorf, who holds that to see oneself assubject to obligation, one must be able to hold oneselfresponsiblethrough blame. This presupposes, I argue, not just anyones individualauthority, not even Gods, but both Gods and our representativeauthority, as representative persons. To hold oneself responsible and

4 Of course, Anscombe used this element to criticize modern moral philosophy asrequiring theological voluntarist foundations it no longer accepted (Anscombe 1958).

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blame oneself, one must be able to see oneself as being to blame, thatis, blameworthy; and this judgment must be able to be made not fromany individuals perspective, not even Gods, but from an essentiallyshareable standpoint available to any moral agent.

Moral rights, on the other hand, are conceptually tied to individualauthorityrather than representativeauthority. A claim right, forexample, entails a right holders individual authority to insist on certainconduct, to waive her right, to consent to what would otherwise be aviolation, to hold others accountable for violations (or to choose not to ather discretion), and so on. It follows that so-called directed orbipolar obligations to others that are the conceptual correlates ofclaim rights also implicate this individual authority. If you have a rightagainst me that I not step on your feet, then I am obligated to you not todo so, and you consequently have the authority to demand this of meand hold me accountable for it.5 Of course, if I have a moral obligation

to you not to do this, we can (and typically do) also think, that I have amoral obligationperiod not to do so as well. It is a reflection of this thatin cases that are sufficiently serious to warrant a criminal law, we thinkthat the question of whether to prosecute and how to hold someoneaccountable for violations is not distinctively up to the victim, but isproperly decided by the people and their representatives.

As I said, my aim is to discuss Hobbess moral philosophy inrelation to the authority of right. Hobbes is, by anyones accounting, amodern moral philosopher. Partly what we have in mind in socategorizing him, of course, is Hobbess respect for the emerging

empirical sciences, his metaphysical naturalism or materialism, orperhaps his search for something like Cartesian foundations andcertainty. But it is also widely agreed that Hobbes can be placed withina modern natural law tradition that is attempting to theorize the conceptof morality along something like the lines I have just been sketching.

At the same time, however, the preponderant view among Hobbesscholars is that Hobbes does not accept, nor is there anything in hisphilosophy that should lead him to accept, the authority of right as wehave defined it. Even when interpreters are agreed that Hobbesdistinguishes moral obligation and the requirements of the law of nature

from considerations of the (agents own) good, as for example inHobbess reply to the fool in Leviathan (L: 15.4-5), the predominantview has been that Hobbes nonetheless derives the normative force oflaws of nature from that of the agents own good, the good of self-preservation or peace, or something similar.6 So understood, the right

5 In a just society, not by taking the law into ones own hands, but through civilprocedures.6 See, e.g., Darwall 1995, 1997, and 2000, Gauthier 1979, Irwin 2008: 159-178, and

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has no fundamental independent authority.

On what seems to be the most common interpretation, Hobbessview is some kind of rule- or indirect egoism (Gauthier 1979, Kavka1985, 1995, Irwin 2008). Although considerations of moral right do not

themselves reduce to those of the agents own good, the rightsnormative force nonetheless derives from these. According to Hobbes,it is only because anyone will do better, because he will be likelier tosurvive and enjoy the benefits of peace, if his deliberative practicalreasoning is not egoistic but gives independent and even overridingweight to considerations of moral right (when these properly bind, e.g.,with the sovereigns backing), that these latter considerations have anynormative force at all. Nonetheless, because these benefits can ariseonly when they are pursued indirectly, by directlyfollowing the laws ofnature, considerations of right do have a normative force that is distinctfrom that of the good, however derivative it may be. Indeed, if it is

beneficial for agents to give the right supreme normative authority, thatis, as overriding the good, then, according to an indirect egoist (or more,generally, indirect consequentialist) interpretation, considerations of theright will then really have this normative authority, albeit derivatively.

I used myself to accept some version of this interpretation(Darwall 1995, 1997, and 2000). Although Hobbes employs a concept ofobligation that he explicitly defines independently of the good in termsof the right (roughly, the state one comes to be in when one lays downor transfers a right (L: 14.7)), it nonetheless seemed to me that anynormative force this defined notion could have within Hobbess moral

philosophy would have to be inherited from that of the good, alongsomething like the indirect egoist or consequentialist lines I justsketched. More recently, however, I have come to believe that this isnot right. In what follows, I want to lay out aspects of Hobbess viewsthat lead in the direction of theauthority of right, that is, fairly centralelements of his thought that require that obligation and right not simplynot reduce to, but also that they not solely derive their normative forceentirely from, that of the good. I shall argue, moreover, that theseelements require the authority of right precisely because they aresecond personal in the way I mentioned abovethey concern afundamental form of accountability to one another.

I do not claim, I should make clear, that Hobbes himself acceptedthe authority of right, or even that he would have on reflection. I amclaiming, rather, that there are important aspects of his thought thatlead in this direction. And I shall also claim that at least some elementsthat seem decisively to lead awayfrom the authority of right, in fact donot. In this, I shall be agreeing with much of Sharon Lloyds recent

Kavka 1986 and 1995.

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interpretation of the laws of nature as articulating a conception ofreciprocity, or, as I shall argue, mutual accountability, that cannot, by itsvery nature, be derived from the good (Lloyd 2009).7

I will proceed as follows. Before turning to Hobbes, I shall begin,

in Section I, by exhibiting how second-personal elements of the modernconception of morality are present right from the start in what isfrequently regarded as modern moral theorys originating work:Grotiuss Rights of War and Peace. Then, in Section II, I shall presentwhat I take to be the best case for attributing to Hobbes a rejection ofthe authority of right and the view that practical normative force mustultimately derive from the agents own ends (via instrumental practicalreason), or the agents own good, or the good period (whether personalor impersonal). In Section III, I shall discuss a basic obstacle that isfaced by any attempt to derive the rights normative force from that ofthe good, namely, that no such account can explain the rights second-

personal character. Then in Section IV, I shall exhibit how Hobbess ownclaims about the right presuppose this second-personal element andhow aspects of his view that may seem decisively to be odds with it arenot in fact. Finally, in Section V, I explain how Hobbes might accept theauthority of right, and so more adequately capture its second-personalcharacter, consistently with his deepest philosophical commitments.

To anticipate, the main idea will be as follows. Strawson pointedout in Freedom and Resentment that any attempt to deriveattributions of blameworthiness (and so implicitly, moral obligation andright) from considerations of the good, for example, from the good

consequences of holding someone responsible and blaming him, willgive a reason of the wrong kind to support the attribution (Strawson1968).8 The reason why this is so is that the good is as a conceptualmatter normative for desire, whereas obligation, right, andblameworthiness, are normative for the attitudes through which we holdpeople responsible and blame themwhat Strawson dubbed reactiveattitudes, like resentment, indignation, and guilt. It is a conceptualtruth that if something is morally wrong, then it is an action of a kindthat would be blameworthy, were it done without adequate excuse.

Now on the orthodox view, Hobbes is a value subjectivist; he holds

that claims about the good are reducible to claims about desiresatisfaction. I have argued, however, that this is not right (Darwall2000). When Hobbes says that whatsoever is the object of any man's

7 Lloyd follows Rawls (e.g., Rawls 2006) in interpreting the laws of nature in terms ofthe reasonable. Unlike Rawls, she does not see Hobbes as trying (impossibly) to derivethe reasonable from the rational.8 [E]fficacy . . . in regulating behaviour in socially desirable ways is not, Strawsonsays, a reason of the right sort for practices of moral responsibility as weunderstand them (1968: 72,74).

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appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good (L: 6.7),Hobbes is saying not that when we call something good we assert thatwe desire it. He is saying that when we desire something, we call itgood. The right way to read Hobbess metaethics of the good, therefore,is as expressivism or projectivism rather than subjectivism. This is also

supported by Hobbess acceptance of a Galilean projectivist view ofcolor, which he explicitly analogizes to value (Darwall 2000). I shallargue by analogy that the most philosophically satisfactory way forHobbes to develop aspects of his view that tend toward the authority ofright would be for him to hold aprojectivism about the right. What weproject, when we make judgments about blameworthiness and the rightare not our desires, but reactive attitudes through which we make andhold one another to (legitimate) demands. Of course, Hobbes might dobetter by both the good and the right were he to accept some kind ofnorm expressivism like Gibbards, which holds that these respectivenormative judgments express our acceptance of norms that warrant

their respective attitudes, but that is another matter (Gibbard 1990).

In The Elements of Law, Hobbes contrasts human beings withother living creatures who have no conception of right and wrong(EL: I.19.5). Such creatures, Hobbes says, experience pleasure andpain and so have desires and aversions.9 What they lack is any attitudeof censure of one another (EL:I.19.5). If Hobbes were to accept aprojectivist metaethics of right according to which judgments of rightand their conceptual correlates express reactive attitudes likeindignation, blame, and censure, he could then explain why in lackingthese attitudes, other creatures lack a conception of right and wrong,

though they are capable of desire, deliberation, and will (according toHobbes, the last appetite) (L: 6.1,11). Such a position, moreover,would enable Hobbes to capture more adequately the second-personalaspects of obligation and right that I shall argue he accepts. Were he toaccept it, moreover, he could accept the authority of right. First,however, we should see how the second-personal character of obligationand right were prominent already in Grotius.

I. GROTIUS AND THE SECOND-PERSONAL CHARACTER OFRIGHT

Hugo Grotiuss [Law or]Rights of War and Peace (1625) was seenby many of his contemporaries as marking a significant break with priormoral and political theory, and it has been viewed similarly by mostcommentators ever since.10 Barbeyrac, an early eighteenth-centurytranslator of Pufendorf, said that Grotius was the first who broke the

9 In Leviathan, Hobbes calls pleasure and pain the appearance[s] of delight andaversion, respectively (1994: 6.10).10 See, e.g., Schneewind 1998. A prominent exception is Irwin 2008.

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ice of the Scholastic Philosophy; which [had] spread itself all overEurope (1749: 67, 66).

We can begin with an element of Grotiuss view that has no directanalogue in Hobbes, namely, Grotiuss idea that human moral agentshave certain basic moral claimrights. For Hobbes, the basic right ofnature is no standing to claim specific conduct from others, but rather amoral libertythat entails the absence of any moral duty to forbearwhatever one thinks necessary to preserve ones own nature andlife (1994: 14.1). A claim right, unlike a moral liberty, concerns whatindividuals are in a position to demand, as Grotiuss own analysis willmake clear. Nonetheless, the idea of a moral liberty also involves theidea of legitimate demands, albeit by exclusion.The moral liberty inwhich Hobbess right of nature consists entails that no one can demandforbearance of anything judged necessary for self-preservation, hence

that any such demand would be unreasonable or illegitimate. Mostobviously, no one has the individual authority to demand forbearance,that is, a claim right to do so. But the right of nature is also, Hobbessays, a blameless liberty (EL: I.14.6).11 So no one can demand this asa representative person either, and it would be illegitimate orunreasonable to do so.

Grotius brings the individual authority to demand explicitly into hisconcept of claim rights, which he dubs perfect rights. Right or iuscan refer, Grotius says, to a moral Qualityannexed to the Person,enabling him to have, or do, something justly (RWP: I.138). Thisquality or right, can be perfect or imperfect. A perfect right is aFaculty of the person that includes, Grotius says, the authority todeman[d]what is due. What we have natural rights to claim,according to Grotius, is Liberty, or power over ourselves andproperty (RWP: I.138-139). Grotius adds that such a faculty answersthe Obligation of rendering what is owing (RWP:I.139). Perfect rightsare thus claim rights that entail correlative obligations.

An imperfect right, on the other hand, is not a Faculty but anAptitude. Under this heading, Grotius includes considerations ofWorth and Merit that can recommend actions as more or less worthyor meritorious, but which no one has standing to demand (RWP:I.141).Thus Prudent management in the gratuitous Distribution of Things towhich no individuals or society has a valid claim may nonethelessrecommend giving preference to one of greater before one of lessMerit, a Relation before a Stranger, a poor Man before one that is rich(RWP:I.88). But while Ancients like Aristotle, and even Moderns who

11 I take Hobbes to mean a genuine moral permission, not simply the denial of a moralduty, as might be true if neither the idea of duty nor that of permission had application.

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follow him, may take such considerations to fall within what they calljustice and therefore to concern right or ius (for example, Aristotlesdistributive justice,)12 nonetheless, Grotius says, Right, properlyspeaking, has a quite different Nature, namely, doing for [others] whatin Strictness they may demand (I, 88-89).

Grotius defines law as a Rule of Moral Actions, obliging us,andhe adds that such obligations differ from Counsels, and such otherPrecepts, which however honest and reasonable they be, lay us underno Obligation, and so come not under this Notion ofLaw, or Right(RWP.I.147-148). Hobbes makes a similar distinction betweencommand and counsel, and he similarly defines law as notcounsel, but command . . . of him, whose command is addressed to oneformerly obliged to obey him. (L:26. ) (Formerly here refers to thecovenant through subjects authorize and promise to obey thesovereign.)

Finally, Grotius holds not just that victims have the individualauthorityto make and hold others to demands in the case of perfectnatural rights, but also that any person has a kind ofrepresentativeauthorityto hold people to the natural law quite generally.

Is the power to punish essentially a power that pertains tothe state [respublica]? Not at all? On the contrary, just asevery right of the magistrate comes to him from the state,so has the right come to the state from private individuals;and similarly, the power of the state is the result ofcollective agreement . . . . Therefore, since no one is able to

transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident thatthe right of chastisement was held by private personsbefore it was held by the state (Grotius 1950: 91)

As further evidence, Grotius adds an argument that will later be pickedup by Locke in The Second Treatise in support of his view thatindividuals in the state nature have a right to punish that is additional totheir right to seek reparation for violation of their own rights (Locke1988: 272 (II.9)). This is that states normally claim the right to punishwrongs against not only their own citizens, but also against foreigners,yet it derives no power over the latter from civil law, which is bindingupon citizens only because they have given their own consent (Grotius

1950: 91-92).

II. WHY IT CAN BE NATURAL TO THINK THAT HOBBES DENIES,AND MUST DENY, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHT

We can return now to Hobbes. In this section, we shall briefly

12 On the curious difference between this traditional and our contemporary notion ofdistributive justice, see Fleischacker 2004: 17-28.

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consider why it is so natural to think that Hobbes must deny theauthority of right consistently with his deepest philosophicalcommitments. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that Hobbes himselfsays that the laws of nature are but improperly called laws sincethey are are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth

to the conservation and defense of themselves (L: 15.41). Takensomewhat literally, this passage seems to say that Hobbess consideredview is that Leviathans laws of nature are something like natural laws inan empirical sense, that is law-like generalizations about what kinds ofconduct are necessary for self-preservation.

An obvious philosophical, though not necessarily an interpretative,problem with so understanding Hobbes is that this interpretation makesit puzzling not just how Hobbes could regard the laws of nature ashaving any moral normative forcethat is, as binding, as Hobbes says inDe Cive in the court of conscience (DC: 3.27but how he could think

of them as having any intrinsic normative force at all. Interpreting themas generalizations about what will promote peace and self-preservationmakes the laws of nature into iss rather than oughts. Of course, peaceand self-preservation are not just any old end state; they are, Hobbesbelieves, what all human beings strongly desire, perhaps desire moststrongly.

A natural thought, then, is that Hobbes is saying that the laws ofnature lay out conduct that is instrumentally rational in promoting ourdesired ends. Thoughts, Hobbes says, are to the desires, as scouts,and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired (L:

8.14). To an agent with a desire for self-preservation or peace, thethought that conduct is necessary to achieve these ends can have anobvious practical and so, one might think, normative significance. Evenif, however, we add in the proposition that we desire self-preservation orpeace to the thought that certain conduct is necessary for these, itnonetheless remains hard to see how the contentof these propositionseven taken together is itself normative. So the problem seems toremain: How can a law of nature as Hobbes understands it, a preceptthat can dictate or forbid (L. 14.3, 15.41)?

It is at this point that the subjectivist interpretation of Hobbess

metaethics of good enters (Gauthier 1967 1979; Hampton 1986; Kavka1986). If we read Hobbes as holding that good just means somethinglike desired by me or desired by the agent or something similar,then from the premises provided by any law of nature, interpreted asthe claim that a specific kind of action will promote self-preservation orpeace, Hobbes will be able to conclude something he will be able toexpress by some sentence such as conduct of such-and-such kind isgood. And isnt good a paradigmatically normative term? So wont

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that make the laws of nature normative claims, at least as Hobbesunderstands them?

Well, not necessarily. Since being desired by the agent orpromoting what the agent desires are not normative terms, it would

seem that any attempt to define good in terms of them will not be ableto render it or claims expressed by it normative either. Supposesomeone were to define good as twelve inches long. He wouldntthereby have rendered the statement the standard ruler is twelveinches (or is good) as a normative claim. So if we think that good is anormative term, there will be a strong philosophical reason to resist anysuch subjectivist definition.

We can see the same thing from the other direction by noting thefamiliar point that the object of any actual desire we can always askwhether it is desirable, that is whether it is worth desiring or warrants

desire, whether there is any normative reason to desire it. When wedistinguish between the claims that conduct promotes the satisfaction ofthe agents actual desires, even her strongest desires, and that itpromotes what there is reason for her to desire (or what warrants or isworth her desiring), it is surely the second that is the normative claim,not the first.

These are only some of the philosophical issues confronting ametaethical subjectivism about the good.13 So we should avoidattributing the view to Hobbes if we can find a better alternativesupported in the text. As I said earlier, a major reason for attributing theview to Hobbes is his saying that what we desire, we call good, and thatwhat we are averse to or hate, we call evil (L: 6.7). But this no moresupports subjectivism than would a comparable statement about belief:Whatsoever is the object of a mans belief, that is it which he for hispart calleth true. No one would think to interpret that as saying thatwhen we say that something is true, we are saying that we believe it.That would overrun a distinction between expressing and self-attributinga belief, just as the subjectivist interpretation of Hobbess text overrunsa distinction between expressing and self-attributing a desire.

It is more charitable, both philosophically and interpretatively,therefore, to interpret Hobbes as some kind of expressivist orprojectivist rather than subjectivist. Additional support is provided bythe fact that Hobbes clearly accepts a Galilean projectivist theory ofcolor according to which the real and very object seem invested withthe [color] fancy it begets in us (L: 1.4). Moreover, Hobbes explicitly

13 Another is that subjectivism has difficulty explaining genuine evaluativedisagreement. This is relevant to interpreting Hobbes since he holds that evaluativecontroversies are a cause of war (L. 15.40). See Darwall 2000: 329.

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analogizes the case of value to that of color. Though there is nothingmore to color metaphysically, Hobbes says, than motion caused by theaction of external objects, this is nonetheless to the sight as lightand colour. So similarly, although there is really nothing more thanappetites and aversions, these nonetheless also involve their respective

appearances, which are of good and of evil, respectively (L: 6.10-11). The analogous metaethics of good is thus expressivist orprojectivist, not subjectivist. When people say something is good orjudge it good, they are projecting their desires, and contrariwise for eviland aversion.

This interpretation also helps explain another text that issometimes cited in favor of reading Hobbes as a subjectivist: Good andevil are names that signify our appetites and aversions (L: 15.40).Metaphysically, as with color, all that exists, standing behind, that canenter into an account for value, are material motions, in this case,

desires and aversions (L: 4.15). But when we judge objects to becolored or good we do not judge or see them as causing these materialmotions, we see them as though they had an intrinsic property they donot actually have, in one case a phenomenal property, in the other, anevaluative or normative one.

This interpretation also helps us see how Hobbesian laws ofnature, even interpreted as generalizations about what promotesdefense, can have genuinely normative implications for human beingswho contemplate them. According to Hobbes, anyone desiring self-preservation and peace, will accept the premise that these are good,

and when we add this to any theorem about which acts promote theseends, that person will be then be able to conclude that there is reason toperform these acts because they will bring about something good,maybe something whose value has the highest priority.

This goes some way to accounting for the laws of naturesnormativity, or at least, for why Hobbess readers would judge themnormative, but only some way. Most obviously, it doesnt yet sayanything about why, laws of nature, as Hobbes understands them wouldhave any moral normativitywhy they would bind in conscience. Butneither does it show why someone should follow a natural law on those

occasions when it does notpromote the end the reader judges good,and when some other action would do so better. This latter, of course, isprecisely the question that is posed by Hobbess fool when hechallenges whether there is reason to follow the third law of nature andkeep covenants on occasions when violating them would better promoteends he judges good (L. 15.4-5). Hobbes admits that such occasionscan arise and so implicitly concedes that this law is not an exceptionlesstheorem, but he argues that from the fact that the fools violation of

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covenant might turn out well, it does not follow that it was reasonablyor wiselydone (L. 15.5). And this has led commentators to a rule-or indirect egoist interpretation. Agents should follow laws of naturebecause they articulate rules such that if the agent follows them, shewill do better than if she were to follow any other rule, including the rule

of doing only what promotes what she judges good (Kavka 1986, 1995;Irwin 2008).

Below I shall want to question this as an interpretation of Hobbessreply, but we should note that even if it were interpretatively correct, itwould give Hobbes a view that would be saddled with the problems thatconfront indirect consequentialisms, whether egoistic or not, face quitegenerally, namely the charge of irrational rule worship (Hampton1986: 93). If it is the good of, say, self-preservation, that justifies anyinterest whatsoever in the rule, then why should one follow it when onehas impeccable evidence that some other action would better promote

that end.14

For our purposes, however, we can simply set this problem aside.The issue we shall be concerned with is how the moral normativity ofHobbesian laws of nature can be accounted forhow, again, they canbind in conscience and impose moral duties, albeit ones that only bindin foro interno without the backing of the sovereigns sanctions.

III. WHY THE RIGHT CANT BE DERIVED SOLELY FROM THE GOOD

In the next section, I will exhibit a variety of ways in which Hobbestreats the laws of nature as having genuine moral force, including bysupporting censure and other second-personal attitudes throughwhich we hold one another responsible. In this section, I describe P. F.Strawsons analysis of why this aspect of moral obligation and rightmakes it impossible for the right to derive solely from the good, whetherthe agents own good or good impersonally conceived.

Strawsons targets in Freedom and Resentment are

consequentialist accounts of responsibility employed to defuse theproblem of freedom of the will. To any such account, whether egoisticor impersonal, Strawson poses a quite general objection: desirabilityisnot a reason of the right sort for holding people responsible or for ourpractices of moral responsibility as we understand them. (1968:72,74) When we seek to hold people accountable, what matters is notwhether doing so is desirable, either in a particular case or in general,

14 Cf. Parfit on indirectly self-defeating ethical theories in Parfit (1986).

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but whether the persons conduct is culpable and we have the authorityto bring him to account. Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind towarrant the attitudes and actions in which holding someone responsibleconsists in their own terms.

Strawsons point is a specific instance of the wrong kind ofreason problem. Different attitudes have their respective distinctivenormative reasons, so it is important always to be clear for whatattitude (including intention and choice in the case of action) a putativereason is being considered. A corollary is that different normativeconcepts, such as the desirable, the credible, the estimable, thebeautiful, the culpable, the morally right or obligatory, and so on, areconceptually related to the distinctive attitudes they implicate. Soreasons that can support the proposition that something is F-able mustcome, quite generally, from reasons that are distinctively relevant to anattitude of kind F.

To take some obvious examples, that there are instrumentalreasons for believingp, say that one will win a prize if one believesp, donot tend to show thatp is credible. That there will be goodconsequences if one intends or chooses to doA will not support theproposition thatA is choiceworthy, or, at best, it will do so only if that isbecauseA itself has good consequences and therefore the intention orchoice of doingA does also. Similarly, that holding someone responsibleand blaming her would have good consequences does not provide onescintilla of support to the claim that her action is culpable.

Whether someones action is blameworthy or not cannot dependin any way on the good consequences of blaming him. The only thingany such proposition about the good can support is the desirability ofblaming him. But this is not a reason of the right kind for blaming him,only a reason to wish one could. Whether an action is blameworthyconcerns reasons of the right kind not for desire, but for the reactiveattitudes, like indignation, resentment, guilt, and moral blame, throughwhich we hold people responsible

What about more indirect consequentialist derivations? Can thegood consequences of having a practice of holding people responsibleand blaming them under certain conditions tend to show that someoneunder those conditions really is worthy of blame? Someone who putsforward such a suggestion either means by blame a Strawsonianreactive attitude or he means certain kinds of actions, like sanctioningthe behavior in some way or other. If the former, then Strawsons pointstill clearly applies. If the latter, then it seems reasonable that thepractice in question involves something more like penalties in a gamethan blame as an attribution of moral responsibility as we normally

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understand it.

Strawsons point has important implications also for any conceptsthat are analytically related to blameworthiness or other concepts thatsimilarly implicate reactive attitudes.15 In The Second-Person

Standpoint, I argue that the concepts of moral obligation, rights, andright are thus analytically related. It is a conceptual truth that violationsof moral obligation, that is, acts that are morally wrong, areblameworthy if they are done without adequate excuse. What is morallyobligatory is thus, as a conceptual matter, what we demand of and holdone another and ourselves to with reactive attitudes, as I see it, asrepresentative persons or members of the moral community. It followsthat no proposition of moral obligation, right, or rights can derive solelyfrom propositions concerning the good.

Of course, someone might take this as support for the hypothesis

that Hobbes sees not only the state, but also morality itself as entirelyartificial, a kind of pretense we engage in for mutual advantage. In thenext section, I will exhibit a number of reasons for thinking that this isnot Hobbess view. What we have seen in this section is thatinterpretative charity recommends not interpreting Hobbes as holdingthat the right can be derived solely from the good or that morality isconventional all the way down. The concept of moral right is analyticallytied to that of warrant for familiar reactive attitudes that are no less apart of human psychology than are desires and aversions. As Hobbeshimself says, the human capacity for a conception of right and wrongis tied to censure ((EL: I.19.5).

IV. ELEMENTS IN HOBBES LEADING TOWARD THEAUTHORITY OF RIGHT

One way of seeing our way into aspects of Hobbess view thattend toward the authority of right is to consider what leads him to ageneral golden-rule-like formulation of the laws of nature. BothHobbess reasons for thinking that duty-imposing natural laws must beundergirded by a general principle that is available in ordinaryconsciousness and the various different ways in which he formulates thisprinciple illustrate second-personal aspects of the right that were ondisplay in the last section.

Consider how Hobbes introduces the principle towards the end ofChapter 15 ofLeviathan:

to leave all men inexcusable, they [the laws of nature]have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible, even

15 I believe it is the same point that underlies Prichards Does Moral Philosophy Reston a Mistake? (Prichard 2002).

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to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that toanother, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself (L:15.35).

Hobbes tells us here both why there must be such a general principle,and what it is.16 The reason why natural laws must be able to be

sum[med into something that is intelligible, even to the meanestcapacity, is that otherwise violations might be widely excusable, that is,nothing that could be reasonably expected or demanded of people andthat they could properly, or perhaps even fully intelligibly, be heldanswerable for complying with. But for Hobbes to say this, he must beassuming that in order for actions to violate laws of nature and betherefore wrong, they must warrant censure or blame, unless, that is,the person doing them has some more specific excuse.

In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that the presuppositionthat those subject to moral obligations must be capable of knowing and

acting on their obligations is rooted in obligations conceptualconnection to answerability. I follow Strawson and a number of otherrecent philosophers in holding that when we hold one another andourselves to moral obligations and blame wrongdoers when they fail todischarge their obligations without excuse, we implicitly addressdemands to them.17 As Gary Watson puts it, that ordinary moral agentshave the relevant moral knowledge and capacity is a constraint ofmoral address18or, as I put it, it is a normative felicity condition(Darwall 2006: 3-5).

Consider now Hobbess formulation: Do not that to another,

which thou wouldest not have done to oneself. How should weunderstand: wouldest not have done to oneself? A momentsreflection shows that Hobbes cannot plausibly be interpreted to meanwouldprefernot to have done to oneself. Someone might prefer aworld in which others peel grapes for him to a world in which they dont,and in this sense would not have others forbear this. But clearly aperson with such preferences would not therebyhave any duty to peelgrapes for others or any reason to accept such a duty.

Suppose, however, that he expects others to peel him grapes, thathe holds them to this, feels indignant and resents it when they dont,

and so on. Such a person makes a claim on or demand of others that he16 I am tempted to say, and why it must be formulated in some such way. Forfurther argument, see Darwall 2006.17 Thus Strawson: the making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes(1968: 92-93). And Wallace: there is an essential connection between the reactiveattitudes and a distinctive form of evaluation . . . that I refer to as holding a person toan expectation (or demand) (Wallace 1994: 19).18 Demanding requires understanding on the part of the object of the demand(Watson 1987: 264).

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implicitly addresses to them, if only in imagination. This is, I take it, thesense of wouldest have done to oneself that Hobbes has in mind. Thesum of the laws of nature is that one should not act towards others inways that one would expect or demand of others that they not acttoward one and would blame them for doing, were they to do it without

excuse. This fits perfectly with the second-personal analysis of moralobligation I presented earlier. If moral obligations are what wewarrantedly demand of one another and blame people for failing tomeet these demands without excuse, then the law of nature issomething like a formal principle of right: Dont do to others what youwould regard as wrong for them to do to you.

This reading is confirmed by other formulations that Hobbes givesof the same idea. Thus Hobbes also says that one should not act inways that one would not approve in another or that one thinkestunreasonable for others to do to one (L: 27.4, 26.13).19 What one

would disapprove or think unreasonable of others in the requisite senseis not just anything one might criticize, even as against reason in asufficiently broad sense. It is what one would blame someone for andimplicitly demand he not do. In this way, moral demands, as Hobbesmust be thinking of them, are on the command side of the commandvs. counsel divide (as Grotius claimed). They are not simply advice, butconcern things we are authoritatively demanded not to do. As Hobbesalso puts it: whatsoever you require that others should do to you, thatdo ye to them (L: 14.5, emphasis added).

This may seem to create something of a puzzle, however. If all

that the laws of nature are really saying at bottom is that it is wrong toact in ways one thinks wrong, we seem to have no more that a principleof moral consistency, or perhaps integrity or non-hypocrisy. How couldHobbes have thought that such a formal principle could possible sum upor help one understand or accept the almost twenty quite specific lawsof nature that Hobbes details in Chapters 14 and 15 ofLeviathan? Hereagain, it seems to me that the only sensible answer confirms thesecond-personal analysis of moral obligation and right to which I havebeen referring. Hobbes must be assuming that there is something moreto thinking someones action wrong than simply thinking that the personis making some kind of error, even error of reason. It is implicitly to

make a claim on or demand of the other and, thereby, to direct theothers will (to require it of the other), albeit it via the othersreasoning through his acceptance of ones legitimate claim or demand.

19 The latter supports Hobbess identification between acting wrongly and actingagainst right reason. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all menaccount to be done justly, and with right (DC. 1.7). For a general argument that thelaws of nature should be interpreted as theorizing the idea of the reasonable asopposed to the rational la Rawls and Scanlon, see Lloyd 2009. See also Rawls2007.

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Indeed, Hobbes tells us how his golden rule can be used withthis assumption to help us work out our obligations more specifically:

he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but,when weighing the actions of other men with his own, theyseem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the

balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions,and self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and thenthere is none of these laws of nature that will not appearunto him very reasonable (L: 15.35)

To work out whether our demands of others are reasonable or not, wemust consider whether we can accept others making the very samedemands of us in similar situations. Similarly, we should permitourselves to do things to others only if we are prepared to permit othersto do the very same thing to us in similar conditions. And so on.Legitimate demands are those we can accept from the standpoint of arepresentative person. Understood in this way, Hobbess principle is not

simply a principle of moral consistency or integrity. It can be of use,Hobbes says, in learning the laws of nature themselves.

So far, this is all evidence that Hobbes understands the laws ofnature as norms of right and wrong that people are appropriately held toand that bind in conscience, as he says in De Cive. Because this is so,there are weighty philosophical reasons, as we saw in Section III, forHobbes to hold that such norms cannot be derived solely from the goodand, consequently, to accept the authority of right. In the final section, Ishall argue that there is a way for Hobbes to do this consistently with hismetaethics. To conclude this section, however, I want briefly to consider

what would seem to be two obstacles to Hobbess accepting theauthority of righthis reply to the fool and his doctrine that the laws ofnature do not bind in foro externo and are not genuine laws without thebacking of the sovereign. Far from precluding the authority of the right,I shall suggest that, properly understood, both are actually quitecompatible the authority of the right.

Regarding the fool, we should recall the philosophical problemsthat afflict the familiar indirect egoist interpretation. In addition toissues about rule worship that indirect consequentialisms face quitegenerally, there is simply no way to derive propositions about what

people can legitimately be held answerable for from propositions aboutthe good alone, whether personal or impersonal good. We have seenstrong evidence in this section that this is indeed how Hobbes envisionsthe laws of nature. Moreover, when we turn to the passages in whichHobbes replies to the challenged posed by fool, there is nothing thatrequires the orthodox interpretation; indeed, the text can be read inways that support the authority of right.20

20 Sharon Lloyd argues against the orthodox interpretation of Hobbess reply to fool at

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The fool questions whether there is reason to keep covenant whenit is against ones interest and, by implication whether there is anyreason not to make advantageous that one has no intention of keeping.It is widely agreed that Hobbes concedes that specific violations of thethird law of naturethat men perform their covenants made (L: 151)

can turn out to an agents benefit. The issue, Hobbes says, is whethersuch acts are reasonably or wisely done. According to the orthodoxinterpretation, Hobbes implicitly claims that that is determined by whichrule an agent reasons by, with the right rule being whichever it wouldbenefit the agent most to use. Agents who try to promote their owninterest directly, accept and act on an egoistic rule. But if othersdiscover this, they will be unlikely to make covenants with them. Undersuch conditions, egoistic agents will likely lose the benefit ofcovenanting, so they will neither be able to exit the state of nature norcombine with confederates within it for self-defense. Such an agent willbe unable to be received into any society, that unite themselves for

peace and defence, but by the error of them that receive him (L:15.5).

Now the first thing to notice is that even if Hobbess reply is thatfools would do better were they to pursue their interests indirectly andreason by the third law of nature, this would not commit Hobbes tothinking that the authority of natural laws derives from this fact. So faras the dialectic goes, this reply could simply be one that proceeds frompremises that are closer to those the fool himself accepts. On reflection,in fact, it is somewhat puzzling that interpreters have given so muchweight to this passage as evidence for Hobbess most fundamental

normative justificatory views. So far as the text goes, the situationcould be much the same as Butlers famous cool hour passage, inwhich Butler accepts arguendo something he actually denies, namely,that the authority of conscience depends on support from self-interest.21

Moreover, there are ways of interpreting Hobbess reply that are closerto the authority of right.

Hobbes says that the fool declares he thinks it reason to deceivethose that help him; and again: he declareth that he thinks he maywith reason do so (L: 15.5, emphasis added). Why does Hobbesrepresent the fool as declaring these things?22 If what were in

question were simply how one might most sensibly promote onesinterest, whether directly or indirectly, why would Hobbes be talkingabout the fools declarations? Surely the fool would try to cover histracks and be more or less successful in doing that. If, however, what is

Lloyd 2009: 302-317.21 For discussion, see Darwall 1995: 265n-266n.22 For a different explanation see Hoekstra 1997. See also Lloyd 2009: 310-312 for acriticism of Hoekstra that is closer to the view presented here.

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in question is a principle of right, of what one may legitimately demandof people and what one may not, of what people mayand may notdo,then this is indeed properly determined by what the fool is prepared todeclare and endorsepublicly. Because they concern mutualaccountability, principles of right are subject to a test of public

endorsability by their very nature. Thus far, anyway, Hobbess reply tothe fool is thoroughly within the authority of right.

Note next that what Hobbes then says is that a fool who declaresthe view that covenants maybebreached or falsely entered into can beaccepted into society through covenant only by the error of them thatreceive him (L: 15.5). The orthodox interpretation is that someonewho reasons egoistically rather than by the third law of nature will bereceived into society only by others mistaking his real intentions. Analternative interpretation that is actually closer to the text, however, isthat someone who puts forward what the fool declares as a

proposition of rightcannot be so received, except by a mistake notregarding the fools intentions, but about the obligation to keepcovenants and so about the right itself. So understood, the mistake thatboth the fool and his potential covenanters make is not a strategic errorin advancing their respective interests; both make a mistake of right. Acovenant, by its very nature, is something that transfers a right; but nosuch transfer is possible if both parties know that one of them has nointention of following through. Even reasonable suspicion ofnonperformance is enough, Hobbes says, to render a covenant void (L:14.18). In other words, the view that covenants maybe broken orentered into falsely for reasons of self-interest is itself mistaken. And

anyone who attempts to covenant with someone who declares such aview must mistake the nature of covenants, since covenants are void onany reasonable suspicion of nonperformance.

What then, about Hobbess view that the laws of nature bind toexternal conduct but rarely in the state of nature and require thesovereigns sanctions to provide genuinely obligating law? Here again, itmight seem that Hobbes is saying that the normative force of any dutyor obligation to follow natural law must derive from reasons of self-interest coming from the sovereigns sanctions. But here again suchappearances can be deceiving, although I shall have to be brief in saying

exactly how they are in this case.

First, although Hobbes clearly does say that it takes thesovereigns commands to create genuine law, even to make theimproperly called laws of nature laws properly so-called, it isnonetheless of great importance to him that subjects see themselves asobligated to follow the sovereigns commands and not just as havingreasons of self-interest for doing so (DC: 2.10; L: 13.13, 26.passim).

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Sovereigns are established, as it were, either from below, by subjectscovenanting with one another to authorize and follow a sovereign (L:17), or from above, by conquest. An obligation to follow the sovereignscommands follows directly from the covenant authorizing him. But evenin conquest, Hobbes is clear that it is not . . . victory that giveth the

right of dominion, but his own covenant, which the vanquished enterinto when they submit to the conqueror and promise to obey as theprice of survival (L: 20.11). Hobbes distinguishes between thecondition of a slave who is kept in thrall by chains and threats ofreprisals, on the one hand, and a servant who upon promise not torun away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him (L:20.10), on the other. And he explicitly analogizes the case of servantsto that of submitting subjects.

If masters and sovereigns thus trust their servants and subjects,respectively, they must think that believing oneself to be obligated can

make a difference in conduct that cannot fully be explained by motivesof self-interest. And this is far from the only place in which Hobbesrelies on this difference between motivation by self-interest andmotivation by a sense of right. The most central, of course, is in themaking of the covenant itself. Since a covenant involves a transfer ofrights by its very nature, it is only possible if the covenanting parties seethemselves as giving themselves and one another a reason to complythat is not reducible to self-interest. Or to put the point the other wayaround, individuals who recognize and know themselves to recognizeonly reasons of self-interest cannot covenant. But there are many otherplaces also where Hobbes recognizes the possibility of conscientious

conduct. Some particularly important examples for his politicalphilosophy are instances in which sovereigns commands conflict withsubjects consciences or, contrariwise, when a proposed act of seditionwould violate conscience. Thus, Hobbes says that subjects will hardlybe drawn into the field and fight with courage against their consciences(Behemoth. 185). And that though a man be discontent, yet if in hisown opinion there be no just cause of stirring against, or resisting thegovernment established, nor any pretence to justify his resistance, andto procure aid, he will never show it (EL: 2.8).

However, this still leaves a large question hanging. If it takes the

sovereigns command to make genuine law, including of the laws ofnature, how then can Hobbes accept the authority of right? But Hobbescannot possibly think, and does not think, that it takes the sovereignscommand to obligate, since the sovereign can himself exist, only if acovenant that establishes him and authority obligates independently ofhis command. Moreover, there are reasons ofrightwhy, at least inHobbess view, it takes the sovereigns command to create genuine law.These reasons fit, briefly, under two main headings: publicity and

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assurance.

Genuine law requires genuine publicitypublic practices andinstitutionsand those are unavailable in the state of nature bydefinition. Second, like any covenant, the covenant establishing the

sovereign requires joint performance and is void under reasonablesuspicion of nonperformance. Covenanters will need assurance,therefore, not just that there will be reasons of right to comply, but thatless conscientious individuals will have reasons to comply beyond theirbeing obligated to. The crucial point is not that the covenanters mighthave a strategic, self-interested reason for this assurance; they havereasons for assurance that are grounded in the authority of right itself.Perfectly conscientious beings who know one another to be so might notneed the assurance provided by the sovereigns sanctions, but ordinaryhuman beings, knowing one another to be guided both by conscienceand by self-interest, do. Since reasonable suspicion of nonperformance

voids contract, even conscientious subjects have reasons of right forwanting there to be reasons of self-interest for compliance also. But thisdoes not mean that the reasons of right derive their authority from self-interest in any way. It just means that they would not bind toperformance in foro externo unless sanction-creating reasons of self-interest were in play also.

V. PROJECTIVISM ABOUT THE RIGHT

In this last section, I want to close with some remarks about howHobbes might accommodate the elements of his thought that tend inthe direction of the authority of right by holding a projectivism about theright that is analogous to his projectivism about the good. The idea, in anutshell, is that there is no less philosophical motivation for holding thatjudgments of praiseworthiness, moral obligation, and moral rightexpress or project reactive attitudes through which we hold oneanother responsible than there is for thinking that judgments of goodand evil express or project desires and aversions. We have seen thatHobbes regards the concepts of moral right and wrong as intrinsicallyrelated to moral responsibility, blame, and excuse. And Strawsonianreactive attitudes find their way into his moral psychology also. Forexample, Hobbes says that indignation is anger for great hurt done to

another, when we conceive the same to be done injury (L: 6.21). Ofcourse, if Hobbes were to think that indignation is a reaction to a priorbeliefabout injury and wrong, he could not then say that these beliefsabout right project the reactive attitude. But there is no philosophicalreason for Hobbes to be a judgmentalist about reactive attitudes thatwould not apply also to being a judgmentalist about desire.23 Neither

23 For arguments against judgmentalist theories of emotion, see DArms andJacobson 2000 and Nye 2009.

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view, moreover, seems to fit with Hobbess fundamental philosophicalorientations.

How, then, would a projectivism about the right fit with aprojectivism about the good? Hobbes believes that deliberation is but

the succession of appetites and aversions and that the will is simply thelast appetite before action. There is no doubt that such a stripped-downview of deliberation and the will fits less comfortably with a doctrine ofthe authority of right than a moral psychology and philosophy of actionthat connects these more tightly to autonomous agency. Only thelatter, it would seem, can best fit with a moral and political philosophythat give authority and consent fundamental roles.

Nonetheless, there is nothing that is flatly inconsistent betweenHobbesian deliberation and the authority of right. Just as a Kantianethics and moral psychology can be fit within a sufficiently formal

Humean theory of motivation (for example, by making Rawlssdistinction between object-dependent and principle-dependent desires),so also might a projectivism about the right be fit with a Hobbesianprojectivism about the good (Rawls 2000). Thus we might regard one ofthe subjects Hobbes discusses in the passage quoted above whoforbears self-interested rebellion because he lacks just cause, ashaving his desires affected by his reactive attitudes in ways that makehis judgments of good influenced by his judgments of right. Realizingthat such rebellion would be blameworthy by imaginatively placinghimself in an impartial position and blaming rebellion from thatperspective, he desires not to rebel, which he expresses with the

judgment that that would be bad to do (and good to forbear doing)because it would be wrong.

I should reiterate, in conclusion, that I have not been trying toconvince you that Hobbes actually accepted the authority of right. Mypoint has rather been to show that there are elements of his thoughtthat definitely point in that direction and that other elements that arewidely thought to rule it out, definitely do not. Once we have clearedthe latter away, Hobbes could accept the doctrine without compromisinganything fundamental to his view.

Stephen DarwallYale University

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