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VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II

VOLUME V

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

PCN 19000262800

Victory and

OccupationHISTORY OF U. S . MARINE CORP S

OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

VOLUME V

by

BENIS M . FRAN K

HENRY I . SHAW, JR .

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

1968

Other Volumes in this Serie s

I

LtCol Frank 0 . Hough, Maj Verle E . Ludwig, and Henry I . Shaw, Jr .

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcana l

II

Henry I . Shaw, Jr . and Maj Douglas T. Kane

Isolation of Rabau l

III

Henry I . Shaw, Jr., Bernard C . Nalty, and Edwin T . Turnbladh

Central Pacific Driv e

Library of Congress Catalog Card No . 58—6000 2

PCN 1900026280 0

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U .S . Government Printing OfficeWashington, D .C . 20402 - Price $11 .75

Foreword

This book represents the final work in the five-volume history of Marin eCorps operations in World War II . The story of the Okinawa campaign ,told earlier in a separate monograph, has been reevaluated and rewritte nto detail events in proper proportion to each other and in a correct per-spective to the war as a whole. New material, particularly from Japanes esources and from the recorded interviews conducted with senior Marin eCorps officers who participated in the Marine Corps Oral History Program ,has been included to provide fresh insight into the Marine Corps' contri-bution to the final victory of the Pacific War .

These pages cover Marine Corps activities in the Okinawa invasionand the occupations of Japan and North China as well as the little-knownstory of Marine prisoners of war . The book relates the Corps' postwardemobilization and reorganization programs as well . By 1945, amphibiou swarfare doctrine and techniques had become highly developed . While newand improved weapons were employed in the Okinawa campaign, th elanding operation itself realistically demonstrated the soundness of funda-mental amphibious doctrine developed over the years by the Navy and th eMarine Corps . Again, as at Guadalcanal, the battle for Okinawa clearl yreemphasized the fact that basic Marine Corps tactics and techniques wer esound. An outgrowth of the lessons learned at Okinawa was the establish-ment of a balanced air-ground amphibious force in readiness which ha sbecome the hallmark of the present-day Marine Corps . Many of thesenior officers and commanders at Okinawa were prewar teachers and plan -ners who had participated in the early operations of the war in the Pacific .The successful application at Okinawa of the knowledge, expertise, an dexperiences of these individuals against a fanatic foe fighting a last-ditchbattle to protect his homeland was a vital factor in the final victory overJapan.

The assault and capture of Okinawa represents the most ambitiou sjoint Army-Navy-Marine Corps operation in the history of the Pacifi cWar. Statistically, in comparison to previous assaults in this war zone, thenumbers of men, ships, and planes as well as the tons of munitions an dsupplies employed in this campaign stagger the imagination . But, had theenemy not capitulated in face of the American victories in the westernPacific and as a result of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Naga-

IV

FOREWORD

saki, the personnel and logistics figures reflecting the requirements for th eplanned assault on Japan would have been even more overwhelming .

Fortunately for both sides, the war ended before more blood was shed .After participating in several Central Pacific landings, I returned t o

the United States and was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps . Fromthis vantage point, I observed the conduct of Marine Corps operations i n

the late stages of the war, when ground, sea, and air forces drove relent-lessly towards the heart of the Japanese Empire. I also viewed with grea t

pride the outstanding performance of duty of Marine occupation troops i n

Japan and North China . Here, small units and individual Marines prove dthemselves and the validity of Marine Corps training and discipline unde r

conditions that were often trying. The fund of command experienceacquired by junior officers and noncommissioned officers in a variety ofcircumstances has since been drawn on constantly in peace and war .

Similarly, the discipline and training of Marines captured at th eoutbreak of the war and after was tried and found not wanting in face of

trials that beggar the imagination . In their own way, against the ever-present threat of death, these men continued fighting the enemy by variou smeans, including sabotage and escape . The heroism of such Marinesequalled and at times surpassed the records of the men who were engagedin the march across the Pacific . The record of our Marine POWs in WorldWar II is something we can all be proud of .

Like other active duty Marines at the end of the war, I, too, experience dthe period of transition when the Corps reverted to a peacetime role in thedefense of this nation. Responsive to its combat experiences in Worl dWar II, the Marine Corps made many tactical and organizational changes ,as this book shows. Unchanged, however, was our highly prized esprit d ecorps, which, even as this is written, is being as jealously guarded as whe nour Corps was first formed .

When the roll of America's battle honors is read, the names of theWorld War II campaigns in which Marines fought—Wake Island to Oki-nawa—will strike a familiar ring to all who cherish liberty and freedom .I am proud of my association with the men who won these honors and t ohave shared their hardships and their victories .

U ;to.rce.)

J . /aJ /tiA Cnn ~. .

N

WALLACE M. GREENE, JR .GENERAL, U .S . MARINE CORP S

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Reviewed and approved29 November 1967

Preface

After the amphibious assault of Guadalcanal, which marked the open-ing of the American offensive in the Pacific, the steadily accelerating temp oof successful operations against the enemy inexorably led to an Allie dvictory in the war. Highlighting American operations was the Navy-Marine Corps team's extensive reliance on the employment of amphibiou swarfare techniques developed in the years before the war and improve dupon under combat conditions .

The Okinawa landing has been accurately depicted as representin gthe culmination of amphibious development in the Pacific War and as th emost audacious and complex military effort undertaken by amphibiou sforces of the Pacific Fleet. This operation also marked the last majo rground action of the war against Japan, and the touchstone to the decisiveAllied victory here was the massive interservice effort which, as much asanything else, hastened enemy capitulation .

Victory at Okinawa and the subsequent end of the war did not signa lany letdown in the number and types of missions facing the Marine Corps ,for at the same time that the postwar demobilization program drasticall yreduced their strength, Fleet Marine Force units were assigned to occu-pation duty in Japan and North China and to re-establishing the Pacifi cgarrisons. This book treats these and such other hitherto-unpublished mat-ters as the tragic story of those Marines who became prisoners of war .Appearing here also for the first time is a full treatment of the developmentand organization of the Marine infantry division and the many changes itexperienced during the course of the war . In addition, this book presentsan overview of the salient facts concerning Marine Corps campaigns in thePacific War first discussed in the previously published volumes of thi sseries.

Our purpose in publishing this operational history in durable form i sto make the Marine Corps record permanently available for study by mili-tary personnel and the general public as well as by serious students o fmilitary history . We have made a conscious effort to be objective in ourtreatment of the actions of Marines and of the men of other services whofought at their side . We have tried to write with understanding about ou rformer enemies and in this effort have received invaluable help from th eJapanese themselves . Few people so militant and unyielding in war have, in

VI

PREFACE

peace, been as dispassionate and analytical about their actions . We owe aspecial debt of gratitude to Mr. Susumu Nishiura, Chief of the War HistoryOffice, Defense Agency of Japan, and to the many researchers and historiansof his office that reviewed our draft manuscripts .

This five-volume series was planned and outlined by Mr . Henry I.Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian, while Mr. Benis M. Frank was responsible forVolume V itself. Mr. Shaw wrote the story of Marines in North China andhis earlier research and writing provided the basis for that part of th ebook concerning Marines in the occupation of Japan . Mr. Frank wrotethe rest of this book, revising and editing it for publication. In his researchon the Okinawa operation, Mr . Frank frequently consulted the materia lassembled for the monograph Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific by MajorCharles S . Nichols, Jr., and Mr. Shaw. Mr. Frank also prepared all theappendices. Successive Heads of the Historical Branch—Major John H .Johnstone, Colonel Thomas G . Roe, Colonel Joseph F. Wagner, Jr., Lieu-tenant Colonel Richard J . Schening, and Colonel Frank C . Caldwell—madethe final critical review of portions of the manuscript. The book was com-pleted under the direction of Colonel Caldwell, current Head of the Branch .

A number of leading participants in the actions described have com-mented on the preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of the book . Theirvaluable assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Several senior officers, i nparticular General Alexander A . Vandegrift, General Lemuel C . Shepherd ,Jr., General Gerald C . Thomas, Lieutenant General Keller E. Rockey, Lieu-tenant General Louis E . Woods, Lieutenant General Pedro A . del Valle ,Lieutenant General Francis P. Mulcahy, Major General DeWitt Peck, MajorGeneral William A . Worton, Major General Ford 0. Rogers, Major GeneralWilburt S . Brown, and Rear Admiral Charles J . Moore made valuabl eadditions to their written comments during personal interviews . A numberof these interviews were conducted by Mr . Frank in his capacity as Head ofthe Oral History Unit, Historical Branch, which administers the Marin eCorps Oral History Program .

Special thanks are due to the historical agencies of the other service sfor their critical readings of draft chapters of this book. Outstandingamong the many official historians who measurably assisted the authorswere : the late Dr. John Miller, Jr ., Deputy Chief Historian, and Dr .Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History ,Department of the Army ; Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head, Operational Archive sBranch, Naval History Division, Department of the Navy ; and Dr. RobertF. Futrell, Historian, Historical Studies Branch, U . S. Air Force HistoricalDivision, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base .

Chief Warrant Officer Jo E . Kennedy, and his predecessors as His-torical Branch Administrative Officer, Second Lieutentant Gerald S . Duncanand First Lieutenants John J . Hainsworth and D'Arcy E . Grisier, ably

PREFACE

VI I

handled the many exacting duties involved in processing the volume fromfirst drafts through final printed form. A number of the early preliminarytypescripts were prepared by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood, Mrs . Joyce E.Bonnett, and Miss Alexandria Jozwick, while the remainder were done b yMiss Kay P . Sue, who expertly handled the painstaking task of typing th efinal manuscript for the printer . Miss Sue also did much of the meticulou swork demanded in preparing the index .

The maps were drafted by Sergeant Thomas L . Russell . Unless other-wise noted, official Department of Defense photographs have been use dthroughout the text.

H. NICKERSON, JR .MAJOR GENERAL, U .S . MARINE CORP S

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Contents

PART I PROLOGUE TO THE EN D

CHAPTER

PAG E

1. Strategic Background 3

2. The Japanese Situation 14

3. Marine Corps Order of Battle 23

PART II OKINAWA

1. The Target and the Enemy 3 1

2. Project ICEBERG 57

3. Assault Preparations 83

4. The First Days Ashore 109

5. Phase I Continued 157

6. The Defense Stiffens 188

7. Forging Ahead 214

8. Reduction of the Shuri Bastion 244

9. Breakout to the South 288

10. Battle's End 325

11. ICEBERG Dissolves 367

PART III THE END OF THE WA R

1. Future Operations 397

2. The Closing Days 41 0

3. Return to the Islands 449

PART IV OCCUPATION OF JAPA N

1. Initial Planning and Operations 475

2. Kyushu Deployment to December 1945 497

3. Last Months in Japan 510

X

CONTENTS

PART V NORTH CHINA MARINE S

CHAPTER

PAGE

1. Background for Military Assistance 5212. Ashore in North China 5373. An Extended Stay 57 14. Abortive Peace Mission 5945. Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division 6156. Withdrawal 635

PART VI CONCLUSION

1. Amphibious Doctrine in World War II 6532. A Final Accounting 677

APPENDICE S

A. Marine POWs 731B. Bibliographical Notes 790C. Guide to Abbreviations 804D. Military Map Symbols 810E. Chronology 811F. Fleet Marine Force Status—30 April 1945 819G. Fleet Marine Force Status—31 October 1946 . .

835H. Table of Organization G–100—Marine Division .

840I. Comparison of Organization—Marine Division .

843J. Comparison of Equipment—Marine Division . .

847K. World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment

849L. Marine Task Organization and Command List 852M. Marine Casualties 884

N. Unit Citations 885

Index 893

ILLUSTRATION S

Admiral Nimitz Briefs the President at Pearl Harbor 10Combined Chiefs of Staff Meet at Quebec 10Thirty-second Army Officers Sit For a Portrait 42North Bank of the Bishi Gawa 42

CONTENTS xI

ILLUSTRATIONS—Continued PAG E

Landing Craft Form Up For the Run to Kerama Retto Beaches 10 1155mm Guns of the 420th Field Artillery Group on Keise Shima 10 1Main Batteries of USS Tennessee Hurl Tons of Explosives

. 110Aerial View of the Hagushi Anchorage 110Bewildered Civilians 124Two Marines Safeguard a Young Okinawan 124Heavy Undergrowth on the Ishikawa Isthmus 133Grinning Troops of the 29th Marines Heading For Chuta 133Japanese 105mm Gun Captured on Yae Take 137Suicide Boats Found at Unten Ko 137USS Enterprise Is Hit By a Kamikaze 156Tracers Fill the Sky 156Yellow Beach 3 On L Plus 2 161Causeways Relieve Logistical Problems 16 1Marine Reconnaissance Personnel Prepare Rubber Boats 165Dominating Ie Shima is Iegusugu Yama 165Marine Rocket Launchers in Support of the Drive South 170Awacha Pocket 170Sugar Loaf Hill 246Tanks Evacuate the Wounded 246Wana Ridge 258105mm Howitzer of the 15th Marines 258Aerial View of Shuri on 28 April 279Shuri, One Month Later 279Corkscrew 285Blowtorch 285Air Delivery Section Marines 294VMTB—232 TBM Drops Supplies 2946th Division Marines Land on Oroku Peninsula 317Final Sweep of Oroku Peninsula 317Marine Casualties Are Evacuated by Spotter Plane 3368th Marines Landing on Iheya Shima 336Marine Tanks Shelling Positions in the South 355Cooperative Prisoners 35 5Men of the Tenth Army Pay Homage 366Surrender of All Japanese Forces in the Ryukyus 366VMF(CVS)—511 Corsair Ready to be Launched

. . 420An Explosion Rips the Critically Damaged Franklin

.

. . 420Among the Few Marines Present At the Surrender Ceremony 440

Corsairs and Hellcats Fly in Formation Over Tokyo Bay 440

To The Colors 458

XII

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS—Continued

PAGE

Fleet Landing Force Personnel Are Transferred 480Members of the Yokosuka Occupation Force 486General Clement Looks Over Yokosuka Naval Base 486The "New" 4th Marines Passes in Review 49126th Marines Moves Into Sasebo 491Battered Buddhist Figures 504More Than 200 Japanese Planes Are Destroyed 5041st Marine Division Troops Landing at Taku 554Tientsin Citizens Welcome First Marines To Return 554Navy Carrier Planes in a "Show of Force" 562Repatriated Japanese Soldiers Salute American Flag 562Arrow Directs Corsairs to Village 587Communist Mine Damages Roadbed 587Chinese Nationalist Sentries 646A Portion of the Marines Remaining in Tsingtao 646North China Marines 735POW Quarters at Fengt'ai 735Shadow of a B–29 on a Supply Drop 784American and British POWs 784

MAPS

1. Nansei Shoto 332. Okinawa Shima 353. Japanese Defensive Positions 524. ICEBERG Scheme of Maneuver 595. Seizure of Kerama Retto 1056. Landing Plan 1137. Severing the Island 1198. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 14 April 1945

1439. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 15–16 Apri l

1945 147

10. 6th Marine Division Progress, Motobu Peninsula, 17–23 Apri l1945 153

11. Reconnaissance and Capture of the Eastern Islands 16312. Assault and Capture of Ie Shima 16813. 1st Marine Division Advances 200

14. Dakeshi–Wana 21 515. Capture of Naha 25516. Thirty-second Army Dispositions 291

CONTENTS XII I

MAPS—Continued PAGE

17 .

Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 4—6 June 1945

. . 30 118 .


. . 31219 .


. 31920 .

Battle for Oroku Peninsula, 12—14 June 1945 32221 .

Seizure of Kunishi Ridge 33422 .

Outlying Islands 34923 .

End of Organized Resistance 35924. Scheme of Maneuver, Operation OLYMPIC 40525 .

Marine Surrender and Occupation Duties 45126. Operations BLACKLIST, CAMPUS—BELEAGUER 47727 . Yokosuka Occupation 48228 . Maximum Deployment of VAC 49429 . VAC Deployment, 8 December 1945 51330. 2d Marine Division Deployment 51531 . Typical Deployment of a Marine Regiment 51732 .

China, 1945 52333 .

North China 53834. Hopeh Deployment 54935. Anping Ambush 61136. Attack on Hsin Ho 626

I. 14th IIB Defensive Dispositions Map SectionII. 6th Marine Division Progress in Northern Okinawa

Map Section

III. XXIV Corps Progress, 5—30 April 1945 . . . . Map Section

IV. Japanese Counteroffensive and Tenth Army Prog-

ress, 5—21 May 1945 Map SectionV. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 13—15 May 1946

Map Section

VI. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 16—17 May 1945

Map SectionVII. Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, 18—19 May 1945

Map SectionVIII. Tenth Army Progress, 21—31 May 1945 . .

. Map Section

IX. Breakout to the South, 1—12 June 1945 . .

Map SectionX. Tenth Army Progress, 14—21 June 1945 . . . . Map Section

XI. Significant Marine Corps Activities in World War II Map Sectio n

PART I

Prologue to the End

CHAPTER 1

Strategic Background

In a report submitted to Secretary ofthe Navy James V. Forrestal on 12March 1945, the Commander in Chief ,United States Fleet (CominCh) , FleetAdmiral Ernest J . King, stated that :

The amphibious operations of the spring ,summer and autumn of 1944 carried ou rforces such great distances across th ePacific that in February 1945 they wer eenabled to begin the assault upon th einner defenses of the Japanese Empir eitself. '

Recognizing all that had been accom-plished to the date of his report, Admira lKing at the same time cautioned agains tcomplacency and warned of "a long ,tough and laborious road ahead ." 2

Among the many factors leading tothe favorable Allied posture in the Pa-cific at the beginning of 1945 was thestrategic concept for the prosecution ofthe Pacific War adopted at the CairoConference (SEXTANT) in December

1943. In essence, President Roosevel tand Prime Minister Churchill agree dupon a grand plan that dictated thethrust of two concurrent and mutuall ysupporting series of operations acros sthe Pacific towards the heart of theJapanese Empire. These drives along

'The War Reports of General of the ArmyGeorge C. Marshall, General, of the Army H . H.Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J . King(Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott Company ,

1947), p . 613, hereafter War Reports.

Ibid ., p . 649.

310-224 0 - 69 - 2

separate approach axes would establis hbases from which a massive effort couldbe launched against the Formosa-Luzon -China coastal areas in the spring of1945 .

One drive, to be mounted by Al-lied forces under General DouglasMacArthur, Commander in Chief,Southwest Pacific Area (CinCSWPA), 3was to move along the northern coast of

On 3 March 1942, the Combined Chiefs o fStaff approved for the Western Pacific a di-viding line that separated assigned spheres o f

command in that area . Burma and all South -east Asia west of a north-south line betwee nJava and Sumatra were added to General Si rArchibald V. Wavell's India Command re-sponsibility, and the British Chiefs of Staffwere charged with the strategic direction o fthis theater. The whole Pacific east of the ne wline was assigned to American Joint Chiefs o f

Staff control . The JCS then divided the Pa-cific into two strategic regions ; the one inwhich the Navy would have paramount inter-ests was the Pacific Ocean Areas, and the otherin which the Army would be dominant was th e

Southwest Pacific Area . On 18 March 1942 ,MacArthur was designated CinCSWPA ; on 3April, Admiral Chester W . Nimitz, Commanderin Chief, Pacific Fleet, was confirmed as th ecommander of the Pacific Ocean Areas. SeeLtCol Frank 0 . Hough, Maj Verle E . Ludwig,

and Henry I . Shaw, Jr ., Pearl Harbor t o

Guadalcanal—History of U . S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II, v . 1 (Washington :HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1958) pp . 86-87, here-after Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harborto Guadalcanal, and Map I, Map Section of tha tvolume, for additional information concerningthese two American commands .

3

4

VICTORY AND OCCUPATIO N

New Guinea and thence to the Philip-pines ; in the second, forces of Admira lChester W. Nimitz, Commander inChief, Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPOA) ,would push through the Central Pacifi cto the core of Japanese island defense sguarding the heart of the Empire. Dur-ing this two-pronged advance, the majorcomponents of the Pacific Fleet, underNimitz as Commander in Chief, Pacifi cFleet (CinCPac), would support, as as -signed, specific amphibious operation swithin both strategic command areas ,and at the same time contain the Japa-nese fleet .

Almost immediately after the twoheads of state had approved at SEX-TANT the revised plan for the defeat ofJapan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ,forwarded the directive to MacArthu rand Nimitz, whose §taffs and command stook steps to implement it . January1944 opened with a landing at Saidor inNew Guinea. At the end of the month,Central Pacific forces landed in theMarshalls and spent February thrustingdeeply into the island group to collapsethose outposts of the imperial defenses . 4By the end of March, the BismarckArchipelago barrier had been perma-nently breached and airfields andharbors seized in the Admiralties .MacArthur's forces began the drive u pthe New Guinea coast in April, withlandings at Aitape and Hollandia . With

' For the story of the Marshalls landing an dthe Central Pacific drive, see Henry I . Shaw,Jr., Bernard C . Nalty, and Edwin T . Turnbladh ,The Central Pacific Drive—History of U. S.Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v .III (Washington : HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC ,1966), hereafter Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh ,The Central Pacific Drive .

the naval attack on and immobilization ofTruk, the capture of Guam, Saipan, andTinian in the Marianas during the sum-mer of 1944, and the defeat of the Japa-nese fleet in the First Battle of thePhilippine Sea, the Central Pacific driv ecut the inner ring of Japanese islanddefenses in several places and consoli-dated footholds from which the drivewestward was to continue . After theamphibious assaults on Peleliu an dAngaur and the unopposed capture ofUlithi for use as a fleet anchorage andan advance base, Admiral Nimitz' forcesstood poised on the threshold of theJapanese defenses ringing the Hom eIslands . 5

By the end of July, Admiral WilliamF. Halsey's South Pacific troops ha dadvanced up the Solomons, andMacArthur's forces along hundreds ofmiles of the northern coast of Ne wGuinea, in a series of leapfrogging op-erations. Thousands of Japanese soldierson Bougainville, New Britain, Ne wIreland, and New Guinea itself wereneutralized and isolated, and beyon dhope of being effectively employe delsewhere . In September, MacArthur' sforces occupied Morotai, southeast ofthe Philippines, before the planne dlanding on Mindanao .

In the course of naval covering strike sprior to the landings on Morotai and i nthe Western Carolines, Admiral Halsey' s

For the Peleliu operation and the story ofMarine aviation in the Central Pacific, seeGeorge W. Garand and Truman R . Strobridge ,"Operations in the Western Pacific—History ofU. S. Marine Corps Operations in WorldWar II," v . IV, to be published in 1969, here -after Garand and Strobridge, "Western Pacifi cOperations ."

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

5

fast carrier forces had discovered sur-prisingly weak enemy resistance in thecentral Philippines . In a follow-up tothis discovery, the line of advancethrough the Southwest Pacific was re-oriented northwards. Fully aware of"the necessity of being alert for symp-toms of enemy weakness and of bein gready to exploit them," Halsey recom-mended an early return of Americantroops to the Philippines in the Leyte-Samar area and cancellation of certain

operations scheduled elsewhere . 6 Hisrecommendation was approved by the

JCS.In the overall planning for the defeat

of Japan, the strategists anticipated that

the final phase of the Pacific War woul dinvolve a massive assault against theindustrial heartland of the Empire bymeans of amphibious landings on thesouthern coast of Honshu in the areabounded by Shimonoseki in the sout hand the Kanto Plain near Tokyo in thenorth. Successful Allied operations in1944 had brought ultimate victory int osight, and submarine blockade and ai rbombardment both had the Japaneseviewing ultimate defeat, but someAmerican commanders doubted the wis-dom of using the Formosa-Luzon-Chin aarea as a springboard from which tolaunch the attack against Japan in 1945.More importantly, they believed thatvaluable time was being wasted and thata decision had to be made . In view of th eSEXTANT Plan, and the advanced stat eof the operations against Japan, JC S

FAdm William F. Halsey, USN, and LCdr

J. Bryan, III, USNR, Admiral Halsey's Story

(New York : Whittlesey House, McGraw-HillBook Company, Inc., 1947), p . 199, hereafterHalsey and Bryan, Halsey's Story .

planners were confronted with the prob-lem of whether American forces should :(1) move on to Luzon and the rest of thePhilippines, (2) invade only Luzon in thePhilippines and also strike at Formosaand the China coast, or (3) attack th ePhilippines, Formosa, and the Chinacoast . Arising out of the third optio nwas an additional thorny problem—which area to attack first .

While Admiral King and some plan-ners in Washington considered the pos-sibility of entirely bypassing the Philip -pines, this concept was apparently onlya minor aspect of the major effort bymany officers to have Luzon, in particu-lar, bypassed. The alternative to this

was the seizure of Formosa . On the othe rhand, ample evidence exists to indicatethat those who sought the Formosa ob-jective did not intend this to be an ex-clusive operation, for they believed thatthe invasion of Luzon could procee dsimultaneously with the Formosa opera-tion or take place at a later date . ?

Determined to return to the Philip -pines, MacArthur doubted the necessityof the Marianas campaign but generallyapproved the Palaus landings since theywould directly support his impendingoperations . Admiral King took just the

opposite view ; he concluded that theoccupation of the Marianas was essen-tial and that the necessity of recapturin gall of the Philippine Islands was ques-tionable. Furthermore, he was firmlyconvinced that the main American effortshould be bent in mounting a driv e

across the Central Pacific to Formosa

Dir, Naval Hist, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3Div, HQMC, dtd 4Nov65, hereafter Dir, Naval

Hist ltr I .

6


and then on to the China coast . $ Al-though various subordinate commander sin the Pacific Ocean Area held conflict-ing views regarding what course shouldbe taken for the final phases of the war ,the SEXTANT decision made it impera-tive that their staffs spend most of 1944in planning for Operation CAUSEWAY ,the invasion of Formosa, projected fo rthe spring of 1945 .

On the basis of a JCS directive issuedon 12 March 1944,9 the prevailing con-flict was partially allayed . Admiral Nim-itz was directed to land on 15 June inthe Southern Marianas and on 1 5September in the Palaus . Genera lMacArthur was instructed to seize Hol-landia in April and make plans for alanding on 15 November on Mindanao .Contained in the JCS order was a state-ment of long-range objectives that re-quired Nimitz as CinCPOA to preparethe plans for an assault early in 194 5on Formosa, and assigned CinCSWP Athe responsibility of planning for th erecapture of Luzon "should such opera-tions prove necessary prior to the mov eon Formosa." t o

In view of the March JCS directive ,which outlined the general concept o fCAUSEWAY, Nimitz reconsidered andrevised the troop list for the operation

8 FAdm Ernest H . King and Cdr Walter M .Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King : A Naval Rec-ord (New York : W. W. Norton & Co ., Inc . ,1952), p . 537, hereafter King and Whitehill ,King's Naval Record.

'JCS 713/4, dtd 12Mar44, cited in MajCharles S . Nichols, Jr ., and Henry I . Shaw, Jr. ,Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific (Washington :HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, 1955), p . 12, here -after Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa Victory.

10 Ibid.

many times, and finally designated th etask force commanders. AdmiralRaymond A . Spruance, Commander ,Fifth Fleet and Central Pacific Tas kForces was to be in overall charge . ViceAdmiral Richmond K . Turner was tocommand the expeditionary forces, an dLieutenant General Simon B . Buckner ,Jr., USA, was to command the expedi-tionary troops and the Tenth Army . 1 1

Further discussion regarding whatthe nature of Pacific strategy was to befollowing the Marianas operation con-tinued after the JCS had directed thepreparation of plans for CAUSEWAY.This topic was the subject of one of th eperiodic conferences which AdmiralsKing and Nimitz and their key deputiesheld throughout the war, either at Pear lHarbor or San Francisco . At one suchmeeting on 6 May 1944, Vice AdmiralCharles M. Cooke, Jr., King's chief ofstaff, pointed out that, although the JC Sdirective envisioned a landing on For-mosa in February 1945, the best timefor this operation—in view of other con-siderations—would probably be Novem-ber-December 1944 . 12 Cooke also notedthat once Japan had been cut off fromthe mainland, her islands could b ebombed and perhaps Kyushu eveninvaded .

During 1944, the Joint War Plan sCommittee (JWPC) had also considere d

11 CinCPOA msg of 10Aug44 to addees, cite din History of USAFMidPac and Predecesso rCommands During World War II, 7Dec41 —2Sep45, Hist of G—5 Sec, n .d ., p . 174, (OCMH) ,hereafter USAFMidPac G—5 Hist .

12 Minutes, 2d meeting, CominCh—GinCPacPacific Conference, 6May44, p . 14 (OAB ,NHD), hereafter Minutes CominCh-CinCPacConference with date .


7

what the nature of future Pacific strat-egy should be. In early June, it issueda comprehensive study which far ex-ceeded in scope and perspective theprevious strategic positions taken bythe Joint Chiefs and the Combine dChiefs of Staff (CCS), and outlined aseries of campaigns that would lead toan assault on the Tokyo Plain by the en dof 1945 . 13 In this study, the JWP Cpointed out that in view of the presentand anticipated rate of advance of in-creasingly stronger American forces inthe Pacific, it would appear that the "In-ner Zone Defense of Japan" would bereached by spring 1945. The study con-cluded that the overall strategy ap-proved at SEXTANT was inadequate ,i .e ., future operations as planned ex-tended only to the perimeter of theFormosa-Luzon line .

Instead, the JWPC recommended anew schedule or strategic concept forending the war in the Pacific . The com-mittee suggested that three phases pre -cede the invasion of Japan : (1) Duringthe period 1 April to 30 June 1945 ,American forces would seize positionsin the Bonins and the Ryukyus fromwhich they would launch an invasio nagainst the central China coast in th eHangchow Bay area ; (2) They woul dspend the time from 30 June to 30 Sep-tember in consolidating and initially ex-ploiting the China beachhead ; and (3)The forces would land in Southern

13 JPS 476, dtd 4Jun44, Subj : Operation sAgainst Japan, Subsequent to Formosa, citedin Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post :The Operations Division—United States Armyin World War II (Washington : OCMH, DA ,1951), p . 337, hereafter Cline, Washingto nCommand Post .

Kyushu 1 October and on the TokyoPlain on Honshu on 31 December. Thisplanning paper was passed to the JointStaff Planners, who approved and for -warded it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,who likewise favored the revised con-cept. On 11 July, the CCS received thestudy along with a JCS recommendationthat the SEXTANT timetable for opera-tions in the Pacific be changed to re-flect the suggested JWPC schedule .

At one of the meetings held duringthe CominCh—CinCPac conference in theperiod 13—22 July 1944, Admiral Kinginformed the conferees of the JCS actionregarding the JWPC study. He also indi-cated that he believed Luzon could no tbe invaded before Formosa or Japanwithout the Americans first investigat-ing what Saipan and Guam could offer inthe way of fleet anchorages and bas efacilities for the support of the Luzoninvasion forces . 14 Vice Admiral John H .Tower, Commander, Air Forces, Pa-cific Fleet, stated that neither the areasin American possession at that time o rprospectively available would permit th eestablishment of naval and supply base swhich would be adequate for the supportof the future operations contemplate din the JWPC study . 1 5

Along these lines, it was suggeste dthat the feasibility and advisability of

"Minutes, CominCh-CinCPac Conference ,13-22Ju144, p . 10. It should be noted thatSaipan, invaded on 15 June, was not secure duntil 9 July, when the general mop-up began .The invasion of Guam, which had been delaye duntil 21 July, had caused a backup in thesupply pipeline and it was contemplated thatthis situation could adversely affect subsequentoperations .

13 Ibid., p . 13 .

8


taking San Pedro Bay in Leyte Gulf a sa fleet anchorage be investigated . Al-though considerable discussion of thi srecommendation resulted, no firm de-cision was made at this time .

Regarding the invasion of the Bonins ,Admiral Tower stated that, because theUnited States plans for the establish-ment of VLR (very long range) bomberbases in the Marianas were close tobeing realized, steps to enhance theireffectiveness should be taken at theearliest practicable date . This meant th eseizure and development of positions inthe Bonins, where fighter and bombe raircraft stationed on fields develope dthere could supplement and support th eplanned air raids on Japan. On theother hand, Admiral Tower added that astudy of the prospective employment offleet and assault forces did not indicat ethe Bonins could be taken until 1945,unless the timing of then currentlyplanned operations could be drasticall yrevised. Because these were of greate rimportance in the overall scheme for thedefeat of Japan, the occupations of IwoJima and Chichi Jima would have to b edeferred . l s

Most of the others present at thi smeeting generally agreed with Admira lTower's conclusions. Rear Admiral For-rest P. Sherman, Nimitz' chief of staffand head of his War Plans Division ,pointed out that for the invasions o fLeyte and Formosa—the two major op-erations of a decisive nature schedule dfollowing the completion of the landingsin the Palaus—American forces hadbeen tailored down considerably. Sher-man emphasized that if more ships and

troops became available, they should b eemployed to supplement those alreadyassigned to the landings on Leyte an dFormosa. In no case, should they b ediverted for such "minor operations"as the occupation of Iwo Jima andChichi Jima ."

Admiral King agreed with this lin eof thinking, and added that it would b eunwise to assault the Bonins unti lAmerican forces were ready to invad eJapan following the Formosa operation .Nonetheless, at this time, he directe dCinCPac to prepare plans for the in-vasion of the Bonins .

As for determining those objective sthat were to follow the capture of th eSouthern Marianas and the Pal us an dwere to be mounted before the vasionof Japan, even President R osevelt' svisit to Pearl Harbor late in July to con-fer with MacArthur and Nimitz faile dto resolve the impasse. When the con-ference began, Admiral Nimitz, thefirst to speak, presented the Navyposition .

Contrary to general belief, no rea lcontroversy arose between Nimitz andMacArthur regarding the conduct offuture operations against Japan . Nimitzmade this quite clear in a letter to Ad-miral King, summarizing in a fe wwords the discussions at the Pear lHarbor meetings . Nimitz told CominC hthat :

. . . our conferences with the Commande rin Chief of the Army and Navy [Presi-dent Roosevelt] and the Commande rin Chief, Southwest Pacific Are a[MacArthur] were quite satisfactory . Th egeneral trend of the discussion, like ou rown, was along the line of seein g

16 Ibid., p . 14 .

17 Ibid .


9

MacArthur into the central Philippines ,thereafter going direct to the Formos aStrait, and leaving the SWPA forces towork into Luzon under the cover of theFormosa operation. It was made clearthat the time has not yet arrived for firmdecisions on moves subsequent to Leyte . 1 8

It is possible, however, that Nimitzand some of his staff had some doubts o nthe feasibility of the Formosa operatio nand the concept underlying the Formosa -first policy . Partial evidence for this isfound in the fact that CinCPac staffmembers had prepared plans to seizeOkinawa as a substitute for Formosa"well before such an operation gaine dserious consideration among high-leve lplanners in Washington ." 1 9

After listening to the views of bothMacArthur and Nimitz, the Presidentreturned to Washington without render-ing a decision on the courses of action tobe followed after the landings on Leyte .Nor does it appear that a firm decision

for post-Leyte operations was expected .Although Nimitz may have entertaine dother opinions concerning future strat -

18 Adm Chester W . Nimitz ltr to Adm Ernes t

J . King, dtd 31Ju144 (OAB, NHD) . This let-

ter also indicates that King favored the estab-lishment of positions in the southern or centralPhilippines.

19 Robert R . Smith, Triumph in the Philip-pines—United States Army in World War II—The War in the Pacific (Washington :

OCMH, DA, 1963), p . 9 . For a thorough dis-

cussion of the Luzon-Formosa controversy, see

Ibid., chap 1, "The Debate Over Luzon," and

Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of thePhilippines—Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas :

1944–1945—History of United States Nava l

Operations in World War II, v . XIII (Boston :

Little, Brown and Company, 1959), chap 1 ,"Planning for Luzon, October–December 1944 ."

egy, he was still operating under a JC Sdirective relative to the Formosa op-eration. On 23 August 1944, the CinCPa cjoint staff study of CAUSEWAY wa spublished. In this document AdmiralNimitz indicated that he intended toinvade Formosa after SWPA forces ha destablished positions in the south an dcentral Philippines . Following the suc-cessful operations on Formosa, theRyukyus and the Bonins or the Chinacoast were to be invaded as a prelude tothe assault on Japan itself . A Luzonoperation, as such, was not mentioned inthis plan .

The dispute remained unresolved unti l9 September, when, at the Quebec Con-ference (OCTAGON) , the Combine dChiefs of Staff formally adopted an dincorporated the JWPC concept withinthe SEXTANT schedule for the defeatof Japan, and in effect revised it. Forplanning purposes, the CCS then ap-proved a new schedule of operations,

which ended the campaigns of 1945 witha landing on Kyushu in October and onthe Tokyo Plain in December . 20

The Combined Chiefs also agreed that,if the Formosa operation materialized ,it would be preceded by invasions of th eBonins in April, the Ryukyus in May,and the China coast in the period Marc h

to June 1945. On 15 September 1944, th eJCS further clarified impending Pacifi coperations by cancelling the scheduled

invasions of Mindanao and Yap and

2 ° CCS 417/8, dtd 9Sep44, title : Opn for th e

Defeat of Japan ; CCS 417/9, OCTAGON, dtd

11Sep44, title : Over-All Objective in Wa r

Against Japan; Min 173d Meeting CCS ,

13Sep44, all cited in Cline, Washington Com-

mand Post, p . 339 .

10 VICTORY AND OCCUPATION

ADMIRAL NIMITZ briefs General MacArthur, President Roosevelt, and AdmiralLeahy at the July 1944 Pearl Harbor conference. (USA SC207297)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF meet with President Roosevelt and Prime MinisterChurchill at the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec, September 1944 . (USA SC194469)


1 1

setting 20 October as the date for theinvasion of Leyte . 2 '

On 11 September, Lieutenant Genera lMillard F. Harmon, Commanding Gen-eral, Army Air Forces (AAF), PacificOcean Areas, proposed the abandonmen tof the Formosa operation in favor o famphibious landings in the Bonins andthe Ryukyus. Harmon recommended thecapture of Iwo Jima by 1 January 194 5and Luzon by 1 June 1945 . Further, hesuggested that POA troops seize Oki-nawa and Amami 0 Shima afterMacArthur's forces recaptured Luzon ;Kyushu was to be invaded in September1945. Harmon also stated that he be-lieved that the seizure and use of Luzo nwas an important consideration in theoverall strategy of the Pacific War an dthat the launching of a major operationagainst Formosa would dilute some o fthe force being applied against th eJapanese in other action areas . 22 In

21 The invasion of Mindanao was restored tothe plans for the recapture of the Philippines,and MacArthur's X Corps landed on thebeaches of Illana Bay on 17 April 1945 .

" General George C . Marshall, Chief of Staffof the Army, had favored the Formosa-firs tplan, and like Admiral King "had expresse dthe opinion that Japan itself, rather thanLuzon, should be considered the substitute fo rFormosa." Smith, op . cit ., p . 9 . In September ,General Marshall revised his opinion and be-lieved, that, in view of existing facts, th echoice for the next operation would have to b eLuzon. It seemed more logical to him to secur eLuzon—which MacArthur promised to take i nsix weeks—than to concentrate on Formosa ,which would take longer to capture . Marshal lreasoned that if all of the resources that wer eto be poured into Formosa were diverted t oLuzon, Admiral Nimitz could get ready to at -tack the Bonins and Ryukyus all the sooner ,and the timetable for the invasion of Japa n

could be advanced.

order to husband resources and to ac-celerate the march toward Japan, Har-mon believed that the capture of Luzo nfor its airfields was imperative . Airoperations launched from Luzon coul dneutralize Formosa and effectively cutJapanese communications to SouthChina and Malaya . 2 3

Less than a week later, after areview of the plans contemplated fo rthe CAUSEWAY operation, Admira lNimitz set forth his thoughts in a lette rcirculated to his senior commanders . Ina key section of this letter, CinCPacrecommended to consider the possibility :

. . . of a re-orientation of a strategy i nthe Pacific which will provide for an ad-vance northward with eventual assaults onthe Empire itself, rather than intermediateaction along the China Coast, thus indi-cating the probability of occupation ofIwo Jima and Okinawa with targe tdates as early as practicable afterCAUSEWAY. 2 4

He also directed Admirals Spruance an dTurner and General Buckner to recom-mend suitable physical targets in the

Formosa-Amoy-Pescadores areas forOperation CAUSEWAY . Criteria forthe selections were the number of naval

and air bases that would have to beestablished and the type and total o fmajor troop units required . On 26 Sep-tember, General Buckner submittedwhat he considered to be the primar yobjection to the entire projected opera-tion ; he said that the shortage of avail -

able supporting and service troops in the

" CGAAFPOA ltr to CinCPOA, dtd 11Sep4 4(no file or serial number), cited in Nichols an dShaw, Okinawa Victory, p. 15 .

' CinCPOA ltr to ComFifthFlt, ComGenTen ,and ComPhibsPac, Ser 000113, dtd 16Sep4 4

(OAB, NHD) .

12


POA for CAUSEWAY made it infeasi-ble . 25 In an afterthought, on 4 OctoberBuckner wrote Nimitz that the need forinvading Formosa would be diminishedgreatly if plans for the invasion ofLuzon came to fruition . 26

The minutes of the CominCh-CinCPacconference held in San Francisco from29 September to 1 October 1944, indicatethat by this time, Admiral King hadgiven serious thought to bypassing For-mosa. He told Nimitz that, at his pro-posal, the Joint Logistics Committe e(JLC) had made a survey of theresources available for the Formosa op-eration, and that the report of thi scommittee was very discouraging. At thetime of its survey, the JLC found thatresources were not available fo rCAUSEWAY, and would not be avail -able unless Germany capitulated a longtime before it was expected to do so .

CinCPac then told King of GeneralBuckner's requirements for additionalmen and equipment and that he, Nimitz ,was in no position to dispute these fig -

CG, Tenth Army ltr to CinCPOA, dtd26Sep44, Subj : Feasibility of CAUSEWAY ,cited in USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, p. 177 . Con-cerning the Marine troop requirements fo rFormosa, Lieutenant General Alexander A .Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marin eCorps, informed Admiral King that many o fthe service forces General Buckner had saidwere needed to support the Marine componentof the Tenth Army were, in fact, alread yorganic to the Fleet Marine Force or else wereneither suited nor required for Marine Corp samphibious operations . CominCh-CNO Memoto JCS, dtd 4Sep44, Subj : Employment ofMarine Divisions in "Formosa" Operation s(OAB, NHD) .

28 CG, Tenth Army ltr to CinCPOA, dtd40ct44, Subj : CAUSEWAY Objectives, citedin USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, p . 179 .

ures. Nimitz then submitted a memo-randum recommending changes fo rfuture Pacific operations based on th enon-availability of necessary resourcesand the favorable results of recent car-rier operations . Admiral Nimitz recom-mended that CinCPac forces support theSWPA invasion of Luzon with a targetdate of 20 December 1944, and the in-vasions of Iwo Jima on 20 January 1945and of Okinawa on 1 March by PO AForces . 2 7

CinCPac stated that the proposal forthe SWPA forces to work up throug hthe Philippines from Leyte by shore-to-shore operations had been discusse dwith President Roosevelt and Genera lMacArthur at the Pearl Harbor con-ference in July. Because MacArthur ha dstated that he could not undertake thes eoperations and in view of the insufficientresources for Formosa, Nimitz believe dthat the best way to keep pressure on theJapanese was for him to support theLingayen Gulf operation proposed byMacArthur and to take the Bonins andthe Ryukyus with POA forces . 28

Admiral Sherman then told King thatNimitz expected to take Iwo Jima withtwo divisions and then to send in larg enumbers of construction personnel t obuild up the airfields rapidly. Followingthat, assuming that enemy air power onFormosa had been neutralized by carrie rstrikes assisted by shore-based air fromLuzon, it was expected that Okinawawould be invaded on 1 March. Kingasked Nimitz why he was going to seizethe Bonins if Okinawa was to be taken .

27 Minutes, CominCh–CinCPac Conference ,29Sep–lOct44, p . 4 .

28 Ibid., p . 5 .


1 3

Nimitz replied that fighters based in theBonins could give protection to th eB—29s raiding Japan, and that the AAFwanted this added protection.

King returned to Washington and o n2 October proposed to the JCS a courseof action for the Pacific. He stated thatin view of the lack of necessary re -sources in the POA for CAUSEWAY ,and because of the inability of the WarDepartment to make up the deficit befor ethe end of the war in Europe, he believe dthat operations should be mountedagainst Luzon, Iwo Jima, and th eRyukyus in succession. He also addedthat CAUSEWAY might be feasible a ta later date if conditions in the Pacificand Europe warranted . 29 Concurringwith King's proposal, the next day theJCS ordered MacArthur to invade Luzonon 20 December 1944 and Admira lNimitz to land Marines on Iwo Jima on20 January 1945 . Following these opera-tions, Operation ICEBERG was to belaunched on 1 March 1945. 3° This datewas flexible, however, since it would be

29 CominCh—CNO Memo to JCS dtd 20ct44 ,Subj : Future Operations in the Pacific (OAB ,NHD) .

30 JCS 713/19, dtd 30ct44, cited in Nichol sand Shaw, Okinawa Victory, p . 17 .

affected by the : (1) Capture of Iw oJima in time for the prompt release offire support units and close air supportsquadrons required at Okinawa ; (2)Prompt release of supporting navalforces and assault shipping from th eLuzon operation ; and (3) Attainmentof undisputed control of the sea and airin the target area in preliminary strike sagainst the Ryukyus, Formosa, andJapan . 3 1

With all attention and efforts nowfocused on the new objectives, th eFormosan venture was reserved as astrategic goal for possible future recon-sideration . 32 Although the basic com-mand concept and troop list organizationthat had been set up for CAUSEWAYwere retained for employment in ICE-BERG,33 there was much to be donebetween the time that the JCS ordere dthe capture of Okinawa and the actua ldate of the invasion .

81 CinCPOA Joint Staff Study—ICEBERG ,dtd 250ct44, p . 1 (Okinawa AreaOp File ,HistBr, HQMC), hereafter ICEBERG Study .

"= JCS 713/19, dtd 30ct44, cited in Nicholsand Shaw, op . cit., p . 17 .

" Tenth Army AR, Ryukyus, 26Mar-30Jun45, dtd 3Sep45, chap 3, p . 3 (Okinaw aArea Op File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafterTenth Army AR .

CHAPTER 2

The Japanese Situation 1

As early as the spring of 1944, th e

high commands of the Japanese Arm yand Navy in the Imperial General Head-quarters (IGHQ) 2 had, with some ac-

curacy, predicted the trend of America nstrategy in Pacific War. The Japanes eforesaw that the turning point of th econflict would begin developing in Marchor April in the Marianas . Further, the

military chiefs were concerned with

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material i nthis chapter is derived from : Foreign Historie sDiv, G-3, Hq, U . S. Army Japan, Japanes eMonograph No. 45, rev . ed. 1959, Histor yof Imperial General Headquarters, Army Sec-tion (OCMH), hereafter IGHQ Hist ; Rober tJ. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrende r(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1954) ,hereafter Butow, Japan's Decision ; TakushiroHattori, Dai Toa Senso Zenshi [The CompleteHistory of The Greater East Asia War], M Strans, 4 vols (Tokyo : Matsu Publishing Co . ,1955), v . IV (OCMH, DA), hereafter WarHistory ; Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox ,Kogun (Quantico : Marine Corps Association ,1959), hereafter Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ;Toshikasu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, DavidN. Rowe, ed. (New Haven : Yale Universit yPress, 1950), hereafter Kase, Journey to theMissouri ; USSBS, Japan's Struggle to End th eWar (Washington : July 1946), hereafterUSSBS, Japan's Struggle.

2 IGHQ was only a term used to denote theco-equal status and existence of the Tokyo-based headquarters of the Army General Staffand the Navy General Staff and their subordi-nate general and special staff sections . Thisduality of command typified the Japanese mil-itary system not only at the highest level, bu tin the lower echelons also.

what Japanese strategy should be atthis critical time .

Faced with an impending accelerate dAmerican drive in the Central Pacific ,IGHQ issued an Army-Navy agreemen tfor Japanese operations in that area .The Navy was given primary responsi-bility for denying the Allies bases fromwhich further operations could belaunched against other islands and fi-nally Japan itself. By the spring of1944, defenses in the Carolines, Ma-rianas, and Volcano Islands were to becompleted . Japanese Army units wereto reinforce the island defenses andwould operate under overall naval con-trol in conducting ground operations . 3A broader aspect of Japanese strategywas the decision to try to entrap an ddefeat decisively a major portion o fU. S . naval forces . As island defense swere being strengthened, the Japanes eNavy committed the bulk of its aeria lstrength—about 1,000 aircraft of whichonly 650 were operational— 4 to theMarianas and part of the remainder t othe Carolines. Meanwhile, surface force swere to remain alert and ready to steaminto combat when the time to strikearose .

Most IGHQ officers and governmentofficials alike were supremely confiden tof winning the war and directed every

IGHQ Hist, p . 154 .J Hayashi and Coox ; Kogun, p . 106 .

14

THE JAPANESE SITUATION

15

effort to ensure an ultimate Japanesevictory. Not so certain that Japan wasgoing to be the victor was an oppositio ngroup composed of former ministers ,cabinet members, and elder statesmen(Jushin) who had opposed the war inthe pre-Pearl Harbor period . Also inthis group were some other influentia lJapanese leaders who, while not hold-ing positions of power, had given merelip service to their nation's involvemen tin a conflict . Rounding out the opposi-tion were other formerly powerful men ,who had "retired" in the early years ofthe war . The original doubts of the op-position gave it a basis for believing a searly as the spring of 1944 that Japa nwas faced with inexorable defeat . Thesebeliefs were buttressed by a demonstra-tion of the American determination tofight aggressively and an ability t omount successful operations in the Pa-cific even before a second front had beenopened in Europe . Alone, these tw ofactors gave portents of disaster t othose Japanese who were able to inter-pret them. 5

Between September 1943 and Febru-ary 1944, Rear Admiral Sokichi Takagi ,

chief of the Naval Ministry's researc hsection, prepared a study of Japanes e

lessons learned in the fighting to tha t

date. He maintained that it was im-possible to continue the war and that

it was manifestly impossible for Japan

to win. He thus corroborated an esti-mate made by top Japanese naval of-

ficers before 1941 . At that time, the yconcluded that unless the war was wo nbefore the end of 1943, Japan wa s

USSBS, Japan ' s Struggle, p. 2 .

doomed, for it did not have the resource sto continue the war after that time .

Takagi's study and his conclusionswere based on an analysis of fleet, air ,and merchant shipping losses as of th elast of 1943. He pointed out the seriousdifficulty Japan was facing in importin gessential materials, high-level confusionregarding war aims and the directionof the war and the growing feelin gamong some political and military lead-ers that General Hideki Tojo, Prim eMinister since 1941, should be remove dfrom office .

Takagi stated also that both the pos-sibility of American bombing raids o nJapan and the inability of the Japaneseto obtain essential raw and finishe dproducts dictated that the nation shoul dseek a compromise peace immediately .In March he presented his findingsorally to two influential naval officers ,Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, a formerprime minister, and Vice Admiral Seib iInouye, who employed the facts of thestudy to induce other members of theopposition to take firm steps to helpchange the course that Japan was travel -ling. 6

Less than two months after the in-vasion of Normandy in June 1944 ,Japanese leaders began receiving re -ports of the massive numbers of menand amount of materiel that the Allie swere able to land unopposed each dayon the French coast . As a Japaneseforeign ministry official later wrote :

That was more than enough to dis-hearten us, the defenses of our hom eislands were far more vulnerable than th eEuropean invasion coast. Our amazemen t

Ibid ., p . 3.

16


was boundless when we saw the Americanforces land on Saipan only ten days afterD day in Europe. The Allies could executesimultaneous full-scale offensives in bothEuropean and Asiatic theaters 1 7

By all accounts, Japanese and other ,what really tipped the scales in favo rof an eventual Allied victory in the Pa-cific, and more immediately caused th efall of the Tojo government, were th elandings at Saipan and Japanese losse sin the First Battle of the Philippine Sea.Only 1,350 miles from Tokyo, Saipanconstituted one of the most vital pointsin the Japanese outer defense system.Toshikasu Kase, the foreign ministryofficial quoted above, wrote that th eisland :

. . . was so strongly defended that it wa sconsidered impregnable. More than once Iwas told by the officers of the General Staffthat Saipan was absolutely invincible . OurSupreme Command, however, made a stra-tegic miscalculation. Anticipating an earlyattack on Palau Island, they transferre dthere the main fleet and the land-based ai rforces in order to deal a smashing blowto the hostile navy. The result was thatSaipan, lacking both naval and air pro-tection, proved surprisingly vulnerable . 8

An even greater disaster befell theJapanese in the Battle of the PhilippineSea, 19–20 June 1944. This two-dayconflict began when carrier-based air -craft of the Japanese First Mobile Fleetattacked Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleetwhile it covered the Saipan operation .On the first day, two U. S. battleships,two carriers, and a heavy cruiser wer edamaged ; the Japanese lost over 300aircraft and two carriers . Pilots fromVice Admiral Marc A . Mitscher's fast

° Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p . 90 .° Ibid ., p . 73.

carrier task force struck back violentlythe next day, sinking another enemycarrier and downing many Japaneseplanes . According to American esti-mates, their opponents suffered stag-gering losses in the two days : 426carrier planes and 31 float planes . Inaddition, the Americans claimed thatapproximately 50 Guam-based aircraf thad been destroyed . 9

Japanese sources confirm the loss o fcarriers and state that four others ofthe nine committed in the fight wer edamaged. Enemy records show that ofthe 360 carrier-based aircraft sent toattack the American fleet, only 25 sur-vived. "Although no battleships orcruisers were sunk, . . . the loss of air -craft carriers proved an almost fata lblow to the Japanese navy. With theloss of the decisive aerial and nava lbattles, the Marianas were lost ." 10 Des-pite this thorough defeat, most Japanes ewere told that it was a glorious victor yfor them ; "it was customary for G H[IGHQ] to make false announcementsof victory in utter disregard of facts ,and for the elated and complacent pub-lic to believe in them." 1 1

Although the Japanese governmentdid not announce its losses in the Battleof the Philippine Sea—or that it ha deven lost the battle—news of the fall o fSaipan was made public. Upon learningthis in July, an opposition group con-sisting mainly of Jushin determined to

° Samuel Eliot Morison, New Guinea andthe Marianas—History of United States Nava lOperations in World War II, v . VIII (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp . 319-321 .

10 IGHQ Hist, p . 172 .11 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p . 74 .


17

overthrow the Tojo regime, and force dthe Prime Minister to resign from of-fice on 18 July 1944 .

The problems facing Japan wer ehardly resolved with the appointmen tand installation of General KuniakiKoiso as premier. The Japanese Arm ywas still a political power, capable o fdictating the rise, fall, and course o fgovernment, and Tojo and his follower sremained uncontrite in their adherenceto a chauvinistic program of Japanes econquest and supremacy. Although theHome Islands had not yet experiencedthe devastation and chaos to be brough tby the vast Allied air raids, after th efall of Saipan a number of critical do-mestic problems affecting the war effor tfaced the Japanese government . Theoutput of a number of essential item sfell below peak requirements, and sever eshipping losses reduced the amount o fraw and finished material reachingJapanese shores to a point far short ofneeds .

On the home front, despite its unhap-piness with Tojo and his handling o fthe war, the Japanese public was con-fident in ultimate victory. Those leadersin government opposed to the war, op -position leaders behind the scenes, andsome of the war hawks, too., began t ohave greater misgivings as they learnedof previous defeats and potential disas-ters. As this knowledge spread, themilitary factions slowly lost face andbecame discredited, but not until thelast months of the war did they losepower .

Nonetheless, confident of their abilit yto guide Japan to what they consideredwould be a just victory, the militaryleaders made adjustment after adjust-

ment in strategy and troop dispositionsin one area after another as the Alliedthreat to the Home Islands intensifie dand accelerated . On the other hand, itis possible to understand their reluc-tance to view the situation realistically .From their earliest days, Japanese citi-zens were taught to believe that theone alternative to victory was death andthat surrender was so disgraceful as tobe unthinkable . And the high comman dplanned, therefore, to continue the war ,even on Japanese soil if necessary, bu tto fight to the finish in any case .

Even lower ranking Japanese Arm yand Navy officers, many of them prod-ucts of a prewar conscript system, wh overy often came from peasant families ,held the same beliefs as their senior sregarding honor and obedience and th edisgrace of surrendering . The code ofthe samurai had been all-pervasive formany years and had influenced the at-titude and outlook of nearly every face tof Japanese society .

IGHQ took steps for the defense ofthe homeland as early as the beginnin gof 1944, when it perceived the cours ethat the war was taking and judgedwhat future American strategy was t obe. Japanese strategists believed thatAllied forces would attack Japan prope rfrom the direction of the Marianas andthrough the Philippines . The Tokyo

headquarters prepared for this even-tuality by setting up a defense line alongthe sea front connecting the Philippines ,Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, the Jap-anese homeland, and the Kurile Islands ,and strengthened the garrisons on each .

According to this plan, the Japanes ewould concentrate their full strength

18


to destroy the Allied threat at whateve rpoint it developed .

A schedule of four prepared reactions ,called the Sho-Go operations, was draw nup. For the defense of Formosa and th eNansei group, Sho-Go No. 2, IGHQplaced the Thirty-second Army underthe command of the Formosa Army inJuly 1944, and added two divisions tothe order of battle of the former. Inthe 10 months between the landing onSaipan and the invasion of Okinawa ,Japanese strength was built up in theRyukyus from an estimated 10,000 toapproximately 155,000 air, ground, an dnaval troops . 1 2

For the defense of the Philippines ,the high command had planned Sho-GoNo. 1 . Based on a decision of the Im-perial War Council on 19 August 1944 ,Japan staked her national destiny onthe outcome of the impending battle o fLeyte. 13 It was here that the Army andNavy had to destroy the Americans .The critical losses sustained by the Com-bined Fleet in the four-day battle fo rLeyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944, threedays after the invasion of Leyte, and th einability of ground forces to contai nthe invaders, created a grave threat t oJapanese hegemony in the Western Pa-cific and even more so to the safety ofJapan proper . Allied task forces dom-inated the waters surrounding Japa nproper and the East and South ChinaSeas as well . An additional liability re-sulting from American successes wasthe concomitant loss of airdromes fro m

12 MID, WD, Disposition and Movement ofJapanese Ground Forces, 1941-1945, dtd10Dec45 (OAB, NHD) .

la Hattori, War History, p . 1 .

which land-based planes could pumme lJapan unmercifully .

Seeing that no good purpose wouldbe served by prolonging the Leyte op-eration, IGHQ decided to withdrawJapanese forces from the island and toconduct delaying tactics elsewhere i nthe Philippines . The Luzon landing inJanuary 1945 made it apparent tha tthere was no further way of holding offthe Americans. From November 194 4on, American air attacks on Tokyo,Nagoya, Osaka, and northern Kyush uincreased in intensity, destroying grea tsections of these areas and seriousl yimpeding the war effort .

In January, the overall IGHQ esti-mate of the situation concluded thatalthough Japan and Germany had suf-fered many reverses, the Axis ha dexacted a heavy penalty of their enemy .In viewing the Japanese cause in th esame way that the viewed the Emperorand sacred homeland—through an emo-tional and reverent haze— 14 the seniorcommanders concluded that "the fina lvictory will be for those who will standup against increasing hardship and wil lfight to the last with a firm belief inultimate victory ." 15 While it acknowl-edged that the defeat of Germany woul dmean the unleashing of tremendousl ypowerful forces against Japan, IGHQbelieved that one of the major America nproblems would be in the area of man -power mobilization . The Japanese com-manders hoped that, tiring of the war ,the American people would favor it send. 1 6

14 USSBS, Japan's Struggle, p . 2.

16 IGHQ Hist, p . 236." Ibid.


19

Believing that the United Stateswanted to terminate the war quickly ,IGHQ speculated that American force swould take the shortest possible routeleading to Japan . This estimate fore -saw that after the landings in the Phil-ippines, the Allies would move to For-mosa, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. Basedon the fact that most Japanese suppl ylines to the south had been well inter-dicted early in 1945, and an interpreta-tion of radio intelligence reports, i tseemed very likely that Iwo Jima wasto be attacked in the very near future ."IGHQ also speculated that America nforces would land on mainland China i nsouthern Kwantung and Hongkong ."

In the face of the impending invasio nand to strengthen homeland defense sfurther, IGHQ planned a large-scalemobilization of all segments of the pop-ulation. In October 1944, when th egovernment invoked general mobiliza-tion, there were 6,390,000 reservistsavailable for call-up. Of these, 4,690,000were ready for immediate assignmen tto active duty . There was a problem ,however, of achieving a proper balanc ein the armed forces, since a shortage oftrained technical personnel existed .Moreover, of the approximately 87 per-cent of the Japanese adult populatio nalready employed in the vital food an dmunitions industries, 47 percent wer ereservists and not available unless thewar effort was to be damaged . "

1R Ibid., p . 239 ." Chief, War History Office, Defense Agency

of Japan, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC ,dtd 4Feb66, hereafter War History Offic eComments.

19 Ibid.

310-224 0 - 69 - 3

Further, at this late stage in the war ,all branches of science were mobilizedin the faint hope that they could developsurprise attack weapons . Unfortunatelyfor this program, students at Armyschools and serving officers were notvery well trained in scientific and tech-nological subjects ; because of the natureof their duties and the weapons whic hthe Navy employed, naval officers werein a little better position. The Army,however, was and always had been th edominant military authority in Japan ,and as in the past, determined how th ecountry would fight a war . Neverthe-less, as the Japanese war situation dete -riorated, military leaders optimisticall ysought the development of miraculouslyeffective weapons .

Nonetheless, it became abundantly clearthat the low scientific level of the nationcould not possibly yield elaborate weapons .. . . The Army's attitude toward tech-nology incurred many kinds of greatcriticism from private sources at the time ,the major points being the following :

The Army keeps matters tightly secret .The Army has a great predilection forbamboo-spear tactics, and has little under -standing of technology . . . .2 0

Despite the many imposing obstacle slooming ahead, IGHQ prepared to exe-cute a protracted war in the Japaneseislands. The command headquarter smade itself the supreme authority forthe operation of the war and took step sto see that the governmental structurewould be revised so that the PrimeMinister would have comparable au-thority over political matters . In addi-tion, the entire nation was to be mobil-ized and all citizens capable of bearing

20 Hayashi and Coox, Kgun, pp. 118-119.

20


weapons were to be armed. Key indus-tries as well as the communications an dtransportation facilities were to be re-organized and operated by the stat ealong rigidly controlled lines . 2 1

As Japan was already a corporatestate, i .e ., a nation in which the govern-ment controlled every facet of industryand all other productive areas, and sinc emilitary control of the state had beena fact of life from the time that Japanembarked upon her course of conques tin the early 1930s, there was little ne win this revised policy, except for onephrase, " . . . in a military manner . "This was a naked declaration of militaryascendancy and control over all govern -mental functions . Even Tojo had givenlip service to civilian primacy in non-military matters. But opposition ele-ments were not yet strong enough totake over the reins of government an dto begin steps to sue for a negotiatedpeace ; the militarists were still inpower, and they continued preparationsfor a last-ditch fight .

IGHQ remained convinced the Amer-ica was wearying of the war and that ,even if this were not so, Japaneseground strength of some 4,747,000 menin uniform—a million and a half o fwhom were based in Japan— 22 wasenough to prevent the Americans fromreaching Japanese shores . If invadersdid attempt to come ashore, homelan ddefense forces would drive them backinto the sea. At the beginning of 194 5

21 Hattori, War History, p . 5.

OCMH, DA Estimate of Japanese Strengthand Disposition of Forces, dtd Oct55, File No .320 .2, Geographic V—Japan (OCMH) . Thiscollation was derived from authoritative Amer-ican intelligence sources published in 1945 .

a large proportion of Japanese troopstrength overall was tied down in Chin aand Manchuria, however, and a smallerportion was isolated in the Central andSouthwest Pacific, where replacements ,reinforcements, and replenishment coul dnot be sent. Nor could these units b ewithdrawn to Japan or elsewhere, socomplete was the Allied encirclement .For all practical purposes, the units i nthe Pacific were lost to Japan and ou tof the war for good .

In late 1944 and early 1945, Americanbombings, fast carrier task force raids ,and especially the submarine blockad ehad increased in intensity and reducedthe Japanese north-south maritime ship -ments to a mere trickle, so that the eco-nomic structure of that country wasslowly forced to a halt . Undoubtedly ,the single most effective agent in thisaction was the blockade imposed by th eships of the U. S. Pacific submarine fleet.American submarines torpedoed or de-stroyed by gunfire 60 percent of th e2,117 Japanese merchant vessels, total -ling 7,913,858 tons, sunk by Americanforces during the war . In addition, U. S .underseas forces accounted for 201 ofthe 686 enemy warships sunk in WorldWar II . 2 3

On 13 January 1945, IGHQ wasstartled to learn that an entire convo yof nine tankers and its escort squadro nhad been sunk off Qui Nhon, a tow non the east coast of French Indo-China .In face of this crowning blow and t o

23 JANAC, Japanese Naval and Merchan tShip Losses (Feb47), pp. vi, vii, cited inSamuel Eliot Morrison, Leyte, June 1944 —January 1945—History of United States Nava lOperations in World War II, v. XII (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p . 413 .


21

evade American planes and submarines ,the Japanese devised a new system em-ploying small convoys guarded by dis-persed escorts instead of the largerconvoys and concentrated escorts sen tout previously . Even this method failedwhen air and naval bases on Luzon be-came operational and American attacksfrom the island quickened in pace withthe submarine attacks .

At the beginning of March 1945 ,IGHQ stopped sending convoys to thesouth ; northbound convoys carryingessential war material continued the at-tempt to reach Japanese ports, however .Some 70 to 80 percent of the ships neve r

made it . Later in the month, Tokyoordered shipping halted altogether . 24

The noose around Japan was drawin gtighter and tighter .

Since February, IGHQ had receiveda mounting influx of reports of increas-ingly larger numbers of American con-voys operating in the vicinity of th eMarianas and Ulithi . On 12 February ,Tokyo was alerted to the movement of asizable task force heavily protected b ycarriers and headed towards Iwo Jima .On the 16th, IGHQ was certain that th e

Bonins were the American target. Whenthe actual invasion of Iwo began threedays later, there was litle doubt thatOkinawa would be next . 2 5

In March, the Army and Navy con-cluded yet another agreement concern-ing joint defense operations, this oneestablishing responsibilities for con-taining Allied advances into the EastChina Sea. According to the plan, whenAmerican task forces approached thi s

=4 Hattori, War History, p . 6 .26 IGHQ Hist, p . 256 .

area, Army and Navy air elementswould mount massive attacks agains tthe convoys. Included in the Japaneseaerial formations were to be specialaircraft flown by pilots trained in sui-cide tactics .

At the end of the month, Japaneseair strength available for the defens eof Okinawa was as follows :

8th Air Division (Army), Formosa ;120 fighters, 60 bombers, 10 reconnais-sance planes, 250 special attack planes .The targets of the latter were Americantransports.

Sixth Air Army (Army), Japan ; 90fighters, 90 bombers, 45 reconnaissanc eaircraft, and 300 special attack plane swere assigned to attack American trans-ports ; 60 fighters, 30 bombers, 20 recon -naissance aircraft, and 100 special at -tack planes were assigned to strike taskforce carriers, and Ryukuyan airfieldswhen captured by the Americans . Anadditional 400 fighters and 45 recon-naissance planes were assigned to fl ycombat air patrols .

First Air Fleet (Navy), Formosa ; 40fighters, 40 bombers, 5 reconnaissanceplanes .

Third Air Fleet (Navy), Japan ; 40fighters, 30 bombers, and 20 reconnais-sance planes .

Fifth Air Fleet (Navy), Japan ; 200fighters, 310 bombers, and 10 reconnais -sance aircraft .

Tenth Air Fleet (Navy), Japan ; 700combat planes, 1,300 training planes .This fleet was a reserve force, and itsaircraft were to be employed as specia lattack planes . According to the Army-Navy agreement, the Navy planes wereto attack the U. S. task forces and theescort shipping guarding them. To en-

22


large the number of special attack units ,both the Army and the Navy were t oindoctrinate their pilots "in the spiri tof suicide attacks ." '- "

From early January until the middl eof March, American carrier-based pilot shad battered Formosa and Okinawa i nan aerial onslaught that showed no signsof letting up. It seemed inevitable t othe Imperial General Headquarters thatthe U. S. move following Iwo would b eagainst the Ryukyus. Late in March ,the Tokyo command received word tha tAmerican forces had steamed out o fanchorages at Ulithi and in the Mari-anas. During the same period, fast car-rier task force aircraft pummelledOkinawa with from 500 to 700 sortiesdaily. The prologue to the grand climaxwas reached on 26 March when theKerama Retto was invaded ; Okinawa' stime was not far off.

Despite the clear indication that Oki-nawa was the major U . S. target, Jap-anese air strength had dwindled to th epoint where it was in no condition tocontest the landing. The Fifth Air Fleet ,

"e IGHQ Hist, pp . 274-275, 277-278 .

with a major assignment in the defens eof the Ryukyus, had been soundl ycrushed in February when America nfast carriers visited Kyushu . The othermajor air commands slated for impor-tant roles in protecting Okinawa eitherwere not yet deployed in positions fromwhich they could fly out to hold backthe impending invasion or, having beenseverely punished in earlier Americanattacks, were unable to strike back .

Japanese naval strength was hardl yin better condition . The fleet was in woe-fully sad shape and unbalanced . Thehigh toll in the loss of its carriers, de-stroyers, and aircraft had left it in apitiable condition, while the overal lshortage of fuel would have immobilize dit in any case. By March 1945, it "wasnothing but a partially paralyzed sur-viving unit." 2 7

Following the news of the fall of IwoJima, the Thirty-second Army on Oki-nawa stood wary—listening, waiting ,and watching for an invasion force toappear over the horizon. Its expecta-tions were soon to be fulfilled .

27 Hattori, War History, p . 26 .

CHAPTER 3

Marine Corps Order of Battle 1

In July 1940, the Marine Corps ha d28,000 men in uniform . The January1945 strength figure of the Corps re-flected some 421,605 Marines, men an dwomen ; before the end of the war., thisnumber was to become even larger .Broken down, the Marine Corps Jan-uary strength figure represented : FMFground forces, 212,165 ; aviation, 125,-162 ; sea-going Marines, 9,430 ; foreignand domestic naval and shore activities ,54,483 ; Women's Reserve, 18,365. Inaddition to the above and not include din the overall total were 16,017 doctors ,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material inthis chapter is derived from : CMC AnRpt t oSecNav for the Fiscal Year Ending 30Jun45 ,hereafter CMC Rpt 1945 (CMC Rpts for othe ryears will be cited CMC Rpt with year) ;DivAvn, HQMC, OpD, Jan45 (AdminFile ,HistBr, HQMC), hereafter DivAvn OpD withdate ; G—1 Sec, Div P&P, HQMC, OpDs,7Dec4l-31Dec44 and Jan45 (AdminFile Hist-Br, HQMC), hereafter G—1 OpD with date ;CO, 1st ProvHistPlat, FMF, MS, "Historica lOutline of the Development of Fleet Marin eForce, Pacific, 1941—1950 (Preliminary)," 195 1(HistBr, HQMC), hereafter FMFPac Hist ;Kenneth W. Condit, Gerald Diamond, an dEdwin T. Turnbladh, Marine Corps GroundTraining in World War II (Washington :HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, 1956), hereafte rCondit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, Marine CorpsTraining ; George McMillan, The Old Breed :A History of the First Marine Division inWorld War II (Washington : Infantry Journa l

Press, 1949), hereafter McMillan, The Ol dBreed ; Richard W. Johnston, Follow Me! Th eStory of the Second Marine Division in Worl dWar II (New York : Random House, 1948) ,hereafter Johnston, 2d MarDiv Hist ; IstLts

hospital corpsmen, and other naval per-sonnel assigned to the Marine Corps . 2

In the beginning of 1945, no majorMarine ground force as such was en-gaged in a major operation against th eenemy. The 2d Division on Saipan an dthe 3d on Guam, where veterans andnew replacements alike participated i non-the-job training, however, were mop -ping up survivors of the major Japanesedefense garrisons which were defeatedwhen those islands were officially de-clared secured in 1944 .

The senior Marine commander in thePacific at this time was Lieutenant Gen-eral Holland M. Smith, Commandin gGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacifi c

Robert A . Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia . TheThird Marine Division (Washington : Infantr yJournal Press, 1948), hereafter Aurthur an dCohlmia, 3d MarrDiv Hist ; Carl W. Proehl, ed . ,The Fourth Marine Division in World War I I(Washington : Infantry Journal Press, 1946) ,hereafter Proehl, 4th MarDiv Hist ; Howar dM. Conner, The Spearhead : The World War IIHistory of the 5th Marine Division (Washing-ton : Infantry Journal Press, 1950), hereafterConner, 5th MarDiv Hist ; Bevan G. Cass, ed . ,History of the Sixth Marine Division (Wash-ington : Infantry Journal Press, 1948) here -after Cass, 6th MarDiv Hist ; Robert Sherrod,History of Marine Corps Aviation in WorldWar II (Washington : Combat Forces Press ,1952), hereafter Sherrod, Marine Air Hist .

2 G—1 OpDs, 7Dec4l-31Dec44 and Jan45 ;FMF Status Rpts, Ground and Air for Jan45 ,prepared by G—3 Sec, Div P&P, HQMC (Per sand Loc File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter FMFGrd (or Air) Status Rpt with month . See AppF for a complete location and strength break -down of the FMF as of 30Apr45 .

23

24


(FMFPac) . 3 His was a type commandwhich involved administrative contro lonly over FMFPac units . 4 The majorityof Marine combat troops were locatedin the Central Pacific under Admira lSpruance's control . By January 1945 ,six Marine divisions had been activated ,grouped three each in two corps . Head-quarters of Major General Roy S .Geiger's III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC )was on Guadalcanal, where Major Gen-eral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., based his6th Marine Division . On Pavuvu in th eRussells, approximately 65 miles north -west of Guadalcanal, was the 1st Marin eDivision commanded by Major Genera lPedro A. del Valle . Also in IIIAC wa sMajor General Thomas E . Watson's 2dMarine Division on Saipan . The othermajor Marine ground command underFMFPac, V Amphibious Corps (VAC) ,was headed by Major General HarrySchmidt, whose headquarters wa slocated on Maui, Hawaiian Islands .Also on Maui in VAC was Major Gen-eral Clifton B. Cates' 5 4th Marine Divi-sion. On the island of Hawaii was Majo rGeneral Keller E . Rockey and his 5thMarine Division, and on Guam was th e3d Marine Division of Major Genera lGraves B . Erskine .

All six divisions had long been in re-ceipt of orders for their next combat

' For the history of FMFPac, see Garandand Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations . "

' Generally, a type commander has an admin-istrative mission only and has no tactical re-sponsibilities. For the Iwo Jima operation ,General Smith was assigned an additiona ltactical responsibility as Commander, Ex-peditionary Troops .

' Generals Cates and Shepherd later becamethe 19th and 20th Commandants of the MarineCorps, respectively.

assignments and were actively engage din preparing for them . Authorizedstrength for a Marine division at thi stime was 856 officers and 16,069 enlistedMarines . The 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisionswere short a few officers, while the 3dDivision was short 271 enlisted men an dthe 6th Division, 513. Replacementdrafts had been assigned to the divi-sions, however, and were in transit tojoin them either before or just after th eimpending landings. In January 1945 ,11 replacement drafts, containing 14, -331 Marines and naval corpsmen an ddoctors, were either en route to or i nthe process of joining the six Marin edivisions at the staging areas . °

In addition to the combat divisions ,there were other FMF organizationsspread throughout the Pacific under-taking assigned support, garrison, o rdefense missions . A total of 74,47 4Marines and naval personnel was in-volved in the operations of these units . ?Two provisional field service commands ,one at Guam and the other at Guadal-canal, and seven field depots and fou rservice and supply battalions based inclose proximity to the Marine divisionsprovided major supply support in th ePacific. Also available from FMFPa cfor support of and attachment to th etwo corps for upcoming operations wer ea variety of other units . These included11 antiaircraft artillery battalions, 6155mm gun and 6 155mm howitzerbattalions, 3 armored amphibian bat-talions, 9 amphibian tractor battalions,and 6 amphibian truck companies .In January, most of these organiza-tions were a part of the III and V

° FMF Grd Status Rpt, Jan 45 .7 Ibid.

MARINE CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE

25

Amphibious Corps, although a few o fthe antiaircraft artillery battalions wer estill fulfilling island defense missions .Within FMFPac also were such othe rtypes of organizations as defense bat-talions, Joint Assault Signal Companies(JASCOs), provisional rocket detach-ments, war dog platoons, motor trans-port battalions, corps evacuation hos-pitals, bomb disposal companies, an dseparate engineer battalions ; not all ofthem would be employed in future oper-ations .

The highest level Marine aviationechelon in the Pacific, Aircraft, Flee tMarine Force, Pacific (AirFMFPac) ,was commanded by Major Genera l

Francis P. Mulcahy, whose headquarterswas at Ewa, on the island of Oahu . Atype command like FMFPac, AirFMF-Pac organized, administered, supplied ,and deployed all Marine aviation squad-rons in the Pacific, but controlled

none. The four Marine aircraft wing s(MAWs) in AirFMFPac were based o nislands at widespread points in thePacific . Included in the four wings wa sa total of 16 Marine aircraft group s(MAGs) holding 70 tactical squadronsbroken down as follows : 28 fighter(VMFs) ; 14 scout bomber (VMSBs) ; 7bomber (VMBs) ; 7 transport (VMRs) ;5 night fighter (VMF(N)s) ; 5 obser-vation (VMOs) ; and 3 torpedo bombe r(VMTBs) .

Major General Ralph J. Mitchell's 1stMAW headquarters was on Bougain-ville. He had under his command si x

MAGs ; three of the groups and part ofa fourth were assigned to CinCSWP Afor the Philippines campaign ; and onesquadron of a fifth group was en routeto join MacArthur . MAG–25, the latter

group, and the portions of the other twonot committed in the Philippines, wer ebased on Emirau, Green Island, Manus ,and Cape Torokina at Bougainville . 8(See Map XI, Map Section .) A trans-port group, MAG–25 also had anothe rdesignation, SCAT (South Pacific Com-bat Air Transport Command), and a ssuch, with a few AAF transport squad-rons assigned from time to time flewmany extensive air supply missions al lover the Pacific from the time it wa sactivated, 24 November 1942, until theend of the war. When available for suc han assignment, the group also evacu-ated casualties from captured islandswhich had strips capable of sustainingthe operations of transport-type air -craft.

Headquarters of the 2d MAW was atEwa. Major General James T . Moorehad only one MAG within his commandat this time, and it was based onEspiritu Santo, in the New Hebrides .The reason that the wing was so de-pleted in January was that in mid-1944most of Moore's squadrons had beentransferred to the 4th MAW, and at th eend of the year his command becamethe nucleus for Tactical Air Force ,Tenth Army, and assigned as a taskunit for the invasion of Okinawa .

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing wascommanded for the first seven days i nJanuary 1945 by Colonel Ford 0 .Rogers, who was relieved on the 8th byColonel Byron F. Johnson. The winghad its headquarters command and agroup at Ewa, and a MAG based o n

' Green Island is approximately 80 milesnorth of the tip of Bougainville, and Manus i s280 miles southeast of Emirau and 80 milesnorth of the northeast coast of New Guinea .

26


Midway. Four fighter squadrons of the

Ewa-based group were on carriers an dsupported the Lingayen landings in Jan-uary and later flew strikes againstLuzon, Formosa, and Indochina . Essexcarried two of the VMFs, and Wasp theother two. The primary mission of 3dMAW was to train AirFMFPac tactica lsquadrons and pilots in night-fighting ,air-warning, and radar-bombing tech-niques .

Major General Louis E . Woods' 4t hMAW was based on Majuro in th eMarshalls, and with seven group slocated on islands all over the Centra lPacific, his was the largest of the fou rAirFMFPac wings. From airfields o nsuch widely separated islands as thosein the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus ,

Woods' squadrons took off day after da yto neutralize bypassed Japanese de-fenses. Although boring and seeminglyprosaic in nature, important benefit sderived from the operations of the 4thWing squadrons in neutralizing theMarshalls . "The 4th MAW's perfection

of the napalm fire jelly formula was abig contribution to the rest of thePacific . Also important was the develop-ment of the fighter bomber, that trustyweapon so sorely needed when moreplanes had to be had to save the fleetfrom the Kamikaze." 9

There were two other major aviationcommands in the Marine Corps ; thesewere based on each coast of the UnitedStates and held similar missions . AtSan Diego, Marine Fleet Air, WestCoast, administered, operated, trained ,

and equipped all Marine aviation organ -

Sherrod, Marine Air Hist, p . 246 .

izations on the west coast ; it also chan-nelled personnel and materiel to Air -FMFPac for further deployment in th e

Pacific. The east coast training com-mand was the 9th MAW, with head-quarters at the Marine Corps Air Sta-tion, Cherry Point, N. C. Within thesetwo commands were 14 groups—6 onthe west coast and 8 on the east. Therewere in turn a total of 100 tactical and29 training squadrons of various type sin the groups . On the west coast wer e22 carrier squadrons, 16 fighter(VMF(CVS)) and 6 torpedo bombin g(VMTB(CVS)), that were slated to g oaboard new Commencement Bay-clas sescort carriers as soon as the latter hadcompleted shake-down trials .

At the beginning of 1945, MarineCorps aviation had already passedthrough a period of expansion and wa sentering an era of consolidation withrespect to its ultimate objectives in thewar effort. Three months earlier, i nOctober 1944, the Chief of Naval Oper-ations had approved a plan to man fou rof the new class of escort carriers withMarine squadrons . Accordingly, thatsame month, the Marine Corps redesig-nated two groups already in existenc eon the west coast as Marine Air Sup-port Groups (MASGs) . By January1945, the VMF (CVS) s and VMTB -(CVS) s were ready to begin a period o fintense training from the decks of th ecarriers and at their former home bases ,the Marine Corps Air Stations at E lCentro and Mojave, in California . Toeach MASG was attached a MarineCarrier Group (MCVG), composed ofa fighter and a torpedo bombing squad-ron ; one of six Carrier Aircraft Serv-ice Detachments was to complete the

MARINE CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE

27

Marine complement in the carriers afterthe detachments had been organized o nthe west coast in February.

To enable Marine Corps aviation "togive support to the Fleet Marine Forcein landing operations" more effectivelyin the future, the Navy approved amajor revision of the Corps aviatio nstructure at the beginning of 1945 .Marine Corps planners envisioned aprogram encompassing balanced land -based and carrier-based aviation forces,which would be soundly supported b yshore activities. Not all of the Marinecarrier program went into effect befor ethe end of the war, but its progress wa ssuch that the validity of basing Marinesquadrons in the flattops was proven .

Fleet Marine Force ground trainingfacilities in 1945 had advanced far be-yond those in existence at the beginningof the war . In addition to base commandhousekeeping and training units, CampLejeune had 10 battalions undergoinginfantry training in January 1945 an dCamp Pendleton had 12 . Besides thi snumber, Camp Pendleton housed four

replacement drafts, a total of som e5,000 Marines, who were awaiting ship-ment to the Pacific . With the recordnumber of six Marine divisions in thefield, the constant demand for replace-ments and the heavy burden impose dupon the training command continuedincessantly .

As IIIAC and VAC completed theirtraining phases and began combat load-ing for the trip to the target areas, theanticipated demands for replacement o fexpected casualties on Iwo Jima andOkinawa were already being met by th eorganization and training of new re-placement drafts. As each Marinedestined for assignment to a comba torganization in the Pacific left th eUnited States, he was aware that hi swas the same path taken by fellowMarines who had fought at such now -famous places as Guadalcanal, Bougain -ville, and Tarawa. His sole consolation ,if one was needed, was the knowledg ethat, although he had not participatedin the beginning of the fight, he migh tpossibly be there to help end it .

PART I I

Okinawa

CHAPTER 1

The Target and the Enem y

BACKGROUND '

Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide don Okinawa as a future target, intensiveplanning and preparations were begu nfor the assault on this once obscureisland . Large amounts of information ofvarying importance poured into the in-telligence centers concerned with theimpending operation, and were added to

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the material inthis chapter is derived from : HQUSAFPOAG–2 Study of Okinawa Gunto, n .d ., hereafterHQUSAFPOA Study ; MIS, WD, Survey of theNansei Shoto, dtd 15Feb43, hereafter WDSurvey ; War Reports ; USSBS (Pac), Nav-AnalysisDiv, The Campaigns of the PacificWar (Washington, 1946), hereafter USSBS ,Campaigns ; Roy E. Appleman, et . at., Oki-nawa: The Last Battle—U. S. Army in WorldWar II—The War in the Pacific (Washington :HistDiv, DA, 1948), hereafter, Appleman, et .at., Okinawa Battle ; Wesley Frank Craven andJames Lea Cate, eds ., The Pacific : Matterhor nto Nagasaki—The Army Air Forces in WorldWar II, v. 5 (Chicago : The University o fChicago Press, 1953), hereafter Craven an dCate, Matterhorn to Nagasaki ; Jeter A. Iselyand Philip A. Growl, The U. S. Marines an dAmphibious War (Princeton : Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1951), hereafter Isely andGrowl, Marines and Amphibious War ; Nichol sand Shaw, Okinawa Victory . Documents nototherwise identified in this part are located i nthe following files of the HistBr, HQMC : UnitHistorical Reports ; Okinawa Area Operations ;Publications ; Aviation ; and Okinawa Mono-graph and Comments . Because Appleman,et . at., Okinawa Battle, and Nichols and Shaw,Okinawa Victory have served as guidelines forpt II, hereafter they will be cited in directreference only.

files already bulging with a store ofknowledge of the Ryukyus group . Oki-nawa soon became the focus of attentio nof the CinCPac-CinCPOA headquartersand staff members who, in compliancewith the JCS directive to AdmiralNimitz " . . . . to occupy one or more posi-tions in the Nansei Shoto," 2 filled inthe details of an outline plan. A flurryof disciplined activity immediately en-gulfed the commands and staffs of theexpeditionary forces assigned to theassault as they began their operationa lstudies for ICEBERG, the code-namegiven to the approaching invasion .

The strategic importance of Okinawawas its location, and all other consider-ations stemmed from this . The Japanes eviewed it as an integral link in a chainof islands, the Ryukyus or the Nanse iShoto, which formed an effective bar-rier to an Allied advance from the eastor southeast towards the Chinese main -land, Korea, or the western coast o fJapan. This group of islands was ideallysituated to aid in the protection of theJapanese maritime lines of supply an dcommunication to imperial conquests i nsoutheast Asia . The island chain als oprovided the Japanese Navy with theonly two substantial fleet anchorage ssouth of the Home Islands 3 between

2 ICEBERG Study, p . 1 .

' The Home Islands were generally consid-ered to consist of the four principal islands an dthe hundreds of smaller islands immediatel yadjacent to Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, andKyushu, which formed Japan .

31

32


Kyushu and Formosa, and numerousoperating bases for aircraft of all types

as well. (See Map 1 . )

From the Allied point of view, th econquest of Okinawa would be mos tlucrative. As the largest island in theRyukyus, it offered excellent locationsfor military and naval facilities . Therewas sufficient land area on the island onwhich to train and stage assault troop sfor subsequent operations against theheart of the Empire. Kyushu was only350 nautical miles away, Formosa 33 0miles distant, and Shanghai, 450 . Twoother major purposes of the impendin ginvasion were to secure and develop air -base sites from which Allied aircraftcould operate to gain air superiorit yover Japan. It was expected that b ytaking Okinawa, while at the same tim esubjecting the Home Islands to blockad eand bombardment, Japanese militar yforces and their will to resist would beseverely weakened.

OKINAWA : HISTORY, LAND,AND PEOPLE 4

Before Commodore Matthew C .Perry, USN, visited Okinawa in 1853-54, few Americans had ever heard ofthe island. This state of ignorance didnot change much in nearly a century ,but American preinvasion studies in

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : JICPOA Bul 63-44 ,Nansei Shoto, dtd 15May44 ; CinCPac-CinC-POA Bul 161-44, Okinawa Gunto, dtd 15Nov44 ;EngrSec, FMFPac, Engrintellnfo, OkinawaGunto, n.d . The terrain description presentedin this section is that of Okinawa as it existedat the time of the American invasion an dbefore engineer and Seabee units performe dtheir earth-transforming feats .

1944 soon shed some light on this all-but-unknown area.

The course of Okinawa history—from the Chinese invasions about 60 0

A. D. until Japanese annexation in 1879—was dominated by an amalgamation o fChinese and Japanese cultural an d

political determinants. For many years ,the Chinese influence reigned supreme .After the first Chinese-Okinawan con-tacts had been made, they warre dagainst each other until the islan dpeoples were subdued. Shortly after1368, when the Ming Dynasty came t o

power, China demanded payment oftribute from Satsudo, the King of Oki-nawa. The payment was given alongwith his pledge of fealty as a Chines e

subject .In the midst of incessant Okinawa n

dynastic squabbles, Chinese control re-mained loose and intermittent until1609, when the Japanese overran theisland, devastating all that stood i ntheir way. The king of Okinawa thenreigning was taken prisoner, and aJapanese local government was estab-lished temporarily .

For the next 250 years, the Okinawa nKingdom, as such, was in the unenviabl eposition of having to acknowledge bothChinese and Japanese suzerainty at the

same time. Finally, in May 1875, Japanforbade the islanders to send any moretribute to China, whose right to investthe Okinawan kings was now ended . Inthe face of mounting Okinawan pro-tests against this arbitrary action,Japan followed its decree by dethronin gthe king in March 1879 ; he was reducedin rank, becoming a marquis of Japan .Okinawa and its neighboring islandswere then incorporated within the

34


Japanese political structure as th eOkinawan Prefecture. Over the years ,China remained restive at this obviousencroachment, until the question wasone of many settled in Japan's favor b yits victory in the Sino-Japanese War of1894.

The islands to which the Japanes esuccessfully gained title, the Ryuky uRetto, were in the southernmost of tw ogroups which make up the Nansei Shoto .The shoto is a chain of islands whichstretch in a 790-mile-long arc betwee nKyushu and Formosa, separating th ePacific Ocean from the East China Sea .One of the groups which make up theRyukyu Retto is the Okinawa Gunto . 5The other four major island groups inthe retto are Osumi, Tokara, Amami ,and Sakishima. Okinawa Gunto islocated at the half-way point in the ar cand consists of Okinawa and numerou ssmaller islands. These include KumiShima, Aguni Shima, Ie Shima, and th eKerama Retto in the west ; Iheya Rettoand Yoron Shima in the north ; and agroup of small islands, named theEastern Islands by the Americans ,roughly paralleling the east centra lcoast of Okinawa .

The island of Okinawa is narrow andirregularly shaped throughout its 60 -mile length . (See Map 2 .) In the north,the Motobu Peninsula juts out into th eEast China Sea and extends the islan dto its maximum breadth, 18 miles ; im-mediately to the south is the narrowestpart, the two-mile-wide Ishikawa Isth-mus. The coastline of the island ranges

Gunto, retto, shoto all are Japanese geo-graphic terms for group or chain of islands ;jima or shima is translated as island.

in nature from a precipitous and rockyshore in the north, through a generallyreef-bound lowland belt just below th eisthmus, to an area of sea cliffs an draised beaches in the south . Landingbeaches suitable for large-scale am-phibious operations were neither numer -ous nor good. The most extensive fla tareas and largest beaches on the eas tcoast were found along the shores o fNakagusuku Wan (or bay) and, on th ewest coast, in the area between ZampaMisaki (or point) and Oroku Peninsula .Two major fleet anchorages existed ,both on the eastern side of the island :Nakagusuku Wan (later named BucknerBay by the Americans in honor of theTenth Army Commander) and ChimuWan. The leading port of the Okinaw aGunto was on the west coast at Naha ,the major city of the island group . Portfacilities elsewhere were limited tosmall vessels .

Okinawa is easily divisible into threegeographical parts, each one physicallydifferent from the other . The territorynorth of the Ishikawa Isthmus, consti-tuting about two-thirds of the islandarea, is largely mountainous, heavilywooded, and rimmed with dissecte dterraces—or one-time flatlands whic hbecame deeply ravined by the ravagesof erosion . About 80 percent of th enorth is covered with a dense growth o flive oak and conifers, climbing vines ,and brush. The highlands, rising torugged peaks, 1,000 to 1,500 feet i nheight, dominate the area . Small, swiftstreams drain the clay or sandy-loamtopsoil of the interior which is traffic-able under most conditions . Cross-country movement is limited mainly b ythe steepness of the hills and the lush

THE TARGET AND THE ENEMY

35

IE SHIMA

i fANA

V

ZAMPAMISAKI

OKINAWA SHIM ASNOWING PRINCIPAL GOADS. TOWNS. AND VILLAGES

SCAL E

NILES

MAP 2

310-224 0 - 69 - 4

T. L . RUSSELL

36


vegetation . The few roads that existedin 1945 were mostly along the coast .

The middle division, consisting ofthat area lying between IshikawaIsthmus and an east-west valley run-ning between the cities of Naha andYonabaru, is broadest in its northern -most part . Just south of the isthmus i san area resembling northern Okinawa ,but the rest of the sector is, for the mos tpart, rolling, lightly wooded countryinterrupted by steep cliffs and ravines .The few streams, flowing through hill swhich rarely exceeded a height of 50 0feet, are generally narrow and shallow ,so they could be easily bridged orforded .

The southernmost tip of the island ,triangular in shape, is extremely hill yand was dominated by extensive lime-stone plateaus, some reaching over 500feet in height . At each angle of the bas eof the triangle is a peninsula, Orok uon the west, and Chinen on the east .

The primary roads built by the Jap-anese were little more than coral- o rlimestone-surfaced trails, varying inwidth from 12 to 16 feet, on a sandand clay base . Use of these roads de-pended largely upon the weather, sincerain reduced them to sticky and slow -drying morasses. In the dry season,the slightest movement on the road sthrew up dense clouds of dust. Themajor arteries threaded along the coast-lines, branching off into a few cross -island roads which then broke downinto a capillary system of trails con-necting the small villages, settlements ,and individual farms. The central sec-tor, the densely populated part of th eisland, contains an intricate network o froads . Only one, the broad stone-paved

highway connecting the cities of Shuriand Naha, could support two lanes o ftraffic . In this area, the road net wa saugmented by a narrow gauge railway ,with approximately 30 miles of track .This system provided the major trans-island communications net, runningfrom Naha to Yonabaru on the eastcoast, via the towns of Kobakura andKokuba, while trunk lines linked Koba-kura and Kokuba with the west coas ttowns of Kadena and Itoman, respec-tively.

Okinawa's climate is tropical, withmoderate winters, hot summers, andhigh humidity throughout the year . Theannual temperature range is from aminimum of 40 degrees to a mean maxi -mum of 95 degrees in July. The monthsof May through September are marke dby a heavy and erratic rainfall . Duringthe typhoon season (July-November) ,torrential rains and winds of over 75miles-per-hour have been recorded . 6During the rest of the year, except fo rbrief downpours, good climatic condi-tions generally prevail .

The inhabitants of Okinawa in 1945were heirs to a complex racial mixture .The original population is believed tohave been a branch of the hairy Ain uand Kumaso stock which formerly in-habited Kyushu and other Japanes eislands. A Mongoloid strain was intro-duced when Japanese pirates, who madeOkinawa their headquarters, engaged intheir time-honored habit of kidnappin gwomen from the Chinese mainland .

° A typhoon in late September 1945 recordedwinds of up to 120 miles per hour . LtGenEdward W. Snedeker ltr to Hd, HistBr, G—3Div, HQMC, dtd 150ct65, hereafter Snedekerltr 1965 .


37

Malayan blood was infused into thismelting pot through intermarriage, im-migration, and invasion. This evolutio nproduced a people with the same basi ccharacteristics as those of the Japanese ,but with slight physical differences .The Okinawans are shorter, darker, an dare inclined to have more body hair .

The 1940 census gave an estimate ofslightly over 800,000 people in the

Nansei Shoto as a whole, with nearly ahalf-million of these on Okinawa proper .Farmers constituted the largest singl e

population class, with fishermen form-ing a smaller, but important, group .Approximately 15 percent of the Oki-nawa populace lived in Naha, andwithin this community were most ofthe higher officials, businessmen, andwhite collar workers—most of themJapanese who either had emigrated orbeen assigned from the Home Islands.

During the period of the Okinawanmonarchy, there was an elaboratesocial hierarchy dominated by noblesand court officials . After Japaneseannexation, the major social distinc-tions became those that existed betweengoverning officials and natives, betwee nurban and rural inhabitants, and be-tween the rich and the poor—with th elatter in the majority . Assimilation o fthe Japanese and Okinawan societieswas minimal, a situation that wasfurther irritated by the preferentia ltreatment tendered by the Japanese t otheir fellow-countrymen when the moreimportant administrative and politica lposts were assigned .

Another chasm separating the Jap-anese and Okinawan was the differenc ein languages . Despite a common archai ctongue which had branched into the

language families of both Okinawa an dJapan, there were at least five Ryukyuandialects which rendered the two lan-guages mutually unintelligible. TheJapanese attempted to reduce the lan-guage barrier somewhat by directin gthat standard (Tokyo) Japanese was tobe part of the Okinawan school cur-riculum. Several decades of formal edu-cation, however, failed to remove th einfluence of many generations of Chines eethnic features which shaped the Oki-nawan national characteristics. TheChinese imprint on the island was suchthat one Japanese soldier noted tha t"the houses and customs here resemblethose of China, and remind one of aChinese town." ' The natives retainedtheir own culture, religion, and form ofancestor worship . One outward mani-festation of these cultural consider-ations were the thousands of horseshoe-shaped burial vaults, many of impres-sive size and peculiar beauty, which

were set into the sides of numerou scliffs and hills throughout the island .

The basic Okinawan farm settlemen tconsisted of a group of farmsteads, eac hhaving the main and other buildingssituated on a small plot of land . Thefarmhouses were small, thatch-roofed ,and set off from the invariably windingtrailside by either clay or reed walls .The agricultural communities generall yclustered around their own individua lmarketplaces . Towns, such as Nago an dItoman, were outgrowths of the vil-lages, differing only in the fact thatthese larger settlements had several

modern business and government struc-

'Diary of a Superior Private, 272d IIB, "in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45, Translation sand Interrogations No . 32, dtd 16Jun45, p . 48.

38


tures. The island's cities, Naha andShuri, were conspicuous by their manylarge stone and concrete public struc-tures and the bustle that accompanie san urban setting . Shuri was the ancien tcapital of the Ryukyuan kingdom and itscitadel stood on a high hill in the mids tof a natural fortress area of the island.

The fundamentally agrarian Oki-nawan economy was dependent upo nthree staple crops. About four-fifths ofsouthern Okinawa was arable, and halfof the land here was used for the culti-vation of sweet potatoes, the predomi-nant foodstuff of both men and animals .Sugar cane was the principal commer-cial crop and its cultivation utilized thesecond largest number of acres . Somerice was also grown, but this crop con-sistently produced a yield far belowlocal requirements . Since rice produc-tion was sufficient to satisfy only two -thirds of the population's annual con-sumption needs., more than 10 millionbushels had to be imported annuallyfrom Formosa . 8

Industrial development on the islan dwas rudimentary . The Naha-Shuri areawas the leading manufacturing centerwhere such items as alcoholic beverages ,lacquerware, and silk pongee were pro-duced. Manufacturing was carried outchiefly in small factories or by workersin their homes . The only relatively im-portant industry carried on outside ofthe Naha-Shuri complex was sugar re-fining, in which cattle supplied th epower in very primitive mills . The fish-

e MilHistSec, Japanese Research Div, HQ-USAFFE, Japanese Monograph No . 135 ,Okinawa Operations Record, revised editiondtd Nov49, p . 60, hereafter Okinawa OperationsRecord .

ing trade, of some importance, centeredaround Naha and Itoman . There wer ealso small numbers of fishing craf tbased at all of the other usable harborson the island ; however, lack of refriger-ation, distance to the fishing grounds,and seasonal typhoons all hindered th edevelopment of this industry and pre-vented its becoming a large source ofincome for the Okinawans .

From the very beginnings of the 1879annexation, the Japanese governmentmade intensive efforts to bring theRyukyuan people under complete domi-nation through the means of a closel ycontrolled educational system, militar yconscription, and a carefully supervise dsystem of local government . The pre-fectural governor was answerableonly to the Home Minister in Tokyo .Although the elected prefectural assem-bly acted as the gubernatorial advisorybody, the governor accepted, rejected ,or ignored their suggestions as he sawfit . On a local level, assemblies electedin the cities, towns, and townships i nturn elected a mayor. All local admin-istrative units were, in effect, directlyunder the governor's control, and thei racts or very existence were subject t ohis pleasure .

In every aspect—social, political., andeconomic—the Okinawan was kept in aposition inferior to that of any othe rJapanese citizen residing either on Oki-nawa or elsewhere in the Empire . Thisdid not prevent the government fro mimposing on the Okinawan a period o fobligated military service .° The periodic

° Military conscription was first enforced onOkinawa in 1898, although in Japan proper ,conscription had been in effect since 1873 . WarHistory Office Comments.


39

call-ups of age groups was enforce dequally upon the natives of Okinawaand the Ryukyus as on the male inhabi-tants of Japan proper. This provide dJapan with a reservoir of trained re-servists from which it could draw when -ever necessary .

With the exception of those drafts ofreservists leaving for active duty else -where, Okinawa, for all practical pur-poses, was in the backwash of the earlystages of World War II . The island re-mained in this state until April 1944 ,when Japan activated the Thirty-secondArmy, set up its headquarters on Oki-nawa, and assigned it responsibilityfor the defense of the island chain .

THE JAPANESE FORCES "

Following the massive and devastat-ing United States naval air and surfacebombardment of Truk, 17–18 February1944, and the breaching of the Marianasline shortly thereafter, the Japanes eImperial General Headquarters awak-ened to the obviously weak condition ofthe Ryukyus' defenses. Prior to 1944 ,little attention had been paid to th earming of the Nansei Shoto . The islandgroup boasted two minor naval basesonly, one at Amami 0-Shima and th e

10 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : Tenth Army Intel -Mono, dtd Aug45, pt I, secs A and B, hereafterIntelMono ; Tenth Army G–3 POW Interroga-tion Summaries Nos . 1–19, Jul-Aug45, here -after POW InterSum ; Tenth Army G–2 Inter -rogation Rpt No . 27, Akira Shimada, dt d24Ju145, hereafter Shimada Interrogation;Tenth Army Interrogation Rpt No . 28, ColHiromichi Yahara (Senior Staff Officer ,Thirty-second Army), dtd 6Aug45, hereafterYahara Interrogation ; Hayashi and Coox,Kogun ; Okinawa Operations Record.

other at Naha, and a few small Arm ygarrisons such as the Nakagusuku Wa nFortress Artillery Unit on Okinawa. "

Acting with an alacrity born of dis-tinct necessity, IGHQ took steps to cor-rect this weakness in the Empire's innerdefensive positions by expediting andintensifying :

. . . operational preparations in the areaextending from Formosa to the Nanse iIslands with the view of defending ou rterritory in the Nansei area and securin gour lines of communication with ou rsouthern sector of operations, and thereb ybuild a structure capable first, of resist-ing the enemy's surprise attacks' and ,second, of crushing their attempts to seiz ethe area when conditions [change] in ourfavor . 1 2

In order to improve Japanese de-fenses in the Ryukyus, IGHQ assignedthis mission on 22 March 1944, to th eThirty-second Army, the command ofwhich was assumed formally on 1 Apri lby Lieutenant General Masao Wata-nabe. At Naha, headquarters of thenew army, staff officers hoped thatenough time would be available for ade-quate fortification of the island . Allplanning was tempered by memories o fthe immediate past which indicated that"an army trained to attack on any an devery occasion, irrespective of condi-tions, and with no calculation as to thereal chances of success, could be beatensoundly ." 18 Added stimuli to Japanes e

11 Actually, there were three garrisons lo-cated in Nansei Shoto : one on Amami 0-Shim afounded in 1922 ; and two founded in August1941—Funauki Fortress at Nishi Omote-Jimaand the Nakagusuku Wan Fortress notedabove . War History Office Comments .

12 Okinawa Operations Record, p . 1 ."IntelMono, pt I, sec A, p . 3 .

40


preparations were the American in-vasions of Peleliu and Morotai on 1 5September 1944 . By this time, the Jap-anese high command became quite cer-tain that either Formosa, the Ryukyus ,or the Bonins, or all three, were to beinvaded by the spring of 1945 at thelatest . Initially, Japanese Army andNavy air forces were to blunt theassaults in a major air counteroffensive.The establishment of Allied air superi-ority and demonstrated weaknesses o fJapanese air forces, however, causedthe military leaders in Tokyo to down-grade the aviation role in the comin gstruggle for the defense of the HomeIslands. The ground forces, then, wouldcarry the major burden .

The Thirty-second Army staff plan-ners wasted no time in organizing th eground defenses of Okinawa . They hadlearned by the cruel experiences of Jap-anese forces on islands which had beeninvaded by the Americans that a stan dat the shoreline would only result i ncomplete annihilation and that thei rbeach positions would be torn to piecesin a naval bombardment. It becameapparent, therefore, that the primar ydefensive positions had to be set up in -land. Then, should the invaders escap edestruction at sea under the guns an dtorpedoes of Japanese naval forces, orat the beachhead under the downpou rof artillery shells, the death blow woul dbe administered by the ground forces 'assumption "of the offensive in du ecourse." 14 To steel the troops' determi-nation to fight and to keep their moral eat a high peak, army headquarters de-vised the following battle slogans :

14 Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p. 116.

One Plane for One WarshipOne Boat for One Shi p

One Man for Ten of the Enemyor One Tank . 1 5

The command of the Thirty-secondArmy was assumed by Lieutenant Gen-eral Mitsuru Ushijima in August 1944 ,when General Watanabe was forced toretire because of a continuing illness .Because of the importance of the im-pending Okinawa battle, IGHQ assignedGeneral Ushijima one of the most com-petent officers of the Japanese Army,Major General Isamu Cho, as his chie fof staff. On 21 January, army head-quarters was split into two groups .Ushijima's operations staff moved t oShuri where the general was to direc this army for the major portion of th ecampaign. A "rear headquarters" com-posed of the ordnance, veterinary,judicial, intendance, 16 and the greate rpart of the medical staff set up nearTsukasan, south of Shuri .

Lieutenant Generals Ushijima an dCho 17 complemented each other's mili-tary qualities and personality, an dformed a command team that reflectedmutual trust and respect . They wereably abetted by the only holdover fro m

15 "Thirty-second Army Battle Instructions ,dtd 15Feb45," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 122–45, Translations and Interrogations No . 30, dtd1Jun45 .

18 The intendance service, which had no exac tU. S. military equivalent, controlled clothing,rations, forage, pay, and the upkeep of Arm ybuildings . In effect, it combined the functionsof the U. S. Army Quartermaster Corps andFinance Department . WD, Handbook o nJapanese Military Forces, TM–30–480 (Wash-ington, 10ct44), p. 50 .

1' On 1Mar45, at the age of 51, Cho waspromoted to lieutenant general .


41

the old staff, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara ,who retained his billet as Senior Office rin Charge of Operations,' 8 and MajorTadao Miyake as the logistics oflicer . 1 °

Ushijima, a senior officer slated for pro-motion to general in August 1945, wasreputedly a man of great integrity an dcharacter who demonstrated a quie tcompetence which, in turn, inspire dgreat confidence, loyalty, and respec tfrom his subordinates . Cho, in compari-son, was a fiery, ebullient, and hard -driving individual with a brilliant, in-quiring mind. He spared neither him -self nor his staff . His abounding energ ywas effectively counterbalanced by hi ssenior's calm outward appearance . Thiscombination of personalities was servedby comparatively young and alert staffmembers who were allowed a grea tlatitude of action and independence o fthought .

The new commander of the Thirty-second Army inherited a combat organ-ization which had been specially estab-lished for the expected invasion of Oki-nawa. Many independent artillery,mortar, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) ,antitank (AT), and machine gu ngroups supplemented the fire power o f

the basic infantry units assigned to thearmy. As a result of the IGHQ decision

in June 1944 to reinforce the Okinaw agarrison, nine infantry and three artil-lery battalions were to be sent to aug-

is Colonel Yahara's professional backgroundincluded a preponderence of staff assignments .He had been a military attache in the UnitedStates and Thailand, returning to the lattercountry as a participant in the Burma cam-paign. MIS, HistDiv, GHQ, FEC, Persona l

History Statements, n .d ., p . 56 .10 War History Office Comments .

ment the force already on the island . 2 °

The majority of the reinforcement sarrived from their previous stations i nChina, Manchuria, and Japan betweenJune and August 1944 .

The veteran 9th Infantry Division ,first to arrive, possessed battle honor sdating from the Russo-Japanese War

of 1904-5. Coming directly from Man-churia, and scheduled by the high com-mand as the backbone of the defense

force, the 9th's stay on Okinawa wa sshort-lived . The critical situation onLeyte required the assignment of the9th there, and Ushijima, " . . . in accord-ance with orders of Imperial Genera lHeadquarters, decided on 17 Novemberto redeploy the 9th Division in order tosend an elite unit with a proud and glor-ious war record to a battlefield where

the Imperial Army would engage in a

decisive battle ." 2 1

Probably, the most important of al lof the factors which may have influencedthe course of the coming battle for theJapanese, and favored an Allied vic-

tory, was the loss of this division andthe fact that it was never replaced. Itleft in late December for the Philippine sby way of Formosa where it sat out th erest of the war, prevented by Alliedsubmarines and airplanes—and Mac -Arthur's landing on Luzon in Januar y

—from either continuing on to its desti-nation or returning to Okinawa . 2 2

20 "Empire Defense Operations Plan, dt d15Jun44," in CinCPac—CinCPOA Bul 194—45 ,Special Translation No . 86, dtd 7Aug45, pp .

5—6 .21 Okinawa Operations Record, p . 33 .22 MIS, WD, Order of Battle for the Japanese

Armed Forces, dtd 1Mar45, p . 32 .


THIRTY-SECOND ARMY OFFICERS sit for a formal portrait in February 1945.Numbers identify : (1) Rear Admiral Minoru Ota, Commander, Naval Base Force ;(2) Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, Commanding General, Thirty-second Army ;(3) Lieutenant General Isamu Cho, Army CIS ; (4) Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, ArmySenior Staff Officer. (Photograph courtesy of OCMH, DA)

NORTH BANK of the Bishi Gawa shows the typical integrated tomb-cave-dugoutdefenses which characterized Japanese organization of Okinawan terrain. (USASC183743)


43

Since the 9th Infantry Division wasno longer available to the Thirty-secon dArmy, and in order to carry out his de-fensive plans, Ushijima asked for re -placements . He was notified by IGHQon 23 January 1945 that the 84th Divi-sion in Himeji would be sent to Oki-nawa. This notification was cancelle dthat same day with the explanation thatthe greatest possible supply of muni-tions would be sent, but replacement sneither could nor would be sent to th earmy . 23 This, in effect, put Ushijima onnotice that the means to improve hi ssituation had to be found locally .

In June 1944, the Thirty-second Armywas to have been reinforced by Majo rGeneral Shigeji Suzuki's 44th Inde-pendent Mixed Brigade (IMB), a unitof approximately 6,000 men organize dthat very month on Kyushu . It wasoriginally composed of the 1st and 2dInfantry Units (each essentially of regi-mental size) and attached artillery,engineer, and signal units . While enroute to Okinawa, the Toyama Maru,the ship carrying the brigade, wa storpedoed by an American submarineoff Amami 0-Shima on 29 June . Morethan 5,000 men were lost and onlyabout 600 survivors of the ill-fate dbrigade landed on Okinawa ; these wereused as the nucleus of a reconstitute d2d Infantry Unit . Other replacement swere obtained from Kyushu as well asfrom the ranks of conscripted Okina-wans, but the reorganized unit wasnever fully re-equipped . As a result, thi slack of basic infantry equipment causedthe 2d Infantry Unit to be known amongother soldiers on the island as the Bimb o

23 Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 44-45 .

Tai or "have-nothing-unit ." 24 The 1stInfantry Unit was never rebuilt andexisted merely as a headquarters organ-ization. Instead, the 15th Independen tMixed Regiment (IMR), a unit newlyraised in Narashino, Chiba-ken, wasflown directly to Okinawa during th eperiod 6–11 July and added to the 44thIMB in September, bringing its strengthup to about 5,000 men .

The next unit of importance to arrivewas the 24th Infantry Division whichlanded in August . Since its initial organ-ization as part of the Kwantung Armyin October 1939, the 24th had been re-sponsible for the security of the easter nboundaries of Manchuria . The division ,commanded by Lieutenant GeneralTatsumi Amamiya, was well-equippe dand well-trained, but not battle-proven ,before it joined the Thirty-second Army .The 24th was a triangular divisionwhich had been stripped of its infantrygroup headquarters, one battalion fromeach infantry regiment, an artillerybattalion, and an engineer company, al lof which had been added to expedition-ary units sent from Manchuria to th eCentral Pacific in early 1944. Until ageneral Thirty-second Army reorgani-zation in February 1945, the 24th's in-fantry regiments (22d, 32d, and 89thInfantry) functioned with only twobattalions each . The division set up itsheadquarters at Kadena, and in October ,it assigned 300 Okinawan conscripts ,received from the Thirty-second Army,to each of its infantry regiments fo rtraining and retention later by th etraining unit . The February reorgani-zation brought the 24th nearly up to it s

24 IntelMono, pt I, sec B, chap 3, p . 9 .

44


original strength and made it the largesttactical unit in the Thirty-second Army ,

with more than 14,000 Japanese troop s

and Okinawan draftees assigned to in-fantry, artillery., reconnaissance, engi-neer, and transport regiments, and divi-sional troops .

The final major unit assigned to Gen-eral Ushijima's command was the 62dInfantry Division, commanded by Lieu-tenant General Takeo Fujioka . This wasa brigaded organization which had see naction in China following its activatio nthere in June 1943. Its table of organi-zation, considerably different from th e24th Division's, was similar to that oflike units in the Chinese ExpeditionaryArmy. Both of the 62d's brigades hadserved as independent commands inChina since 1938, while the division a sa whole fought in the April–June 1944campaigns in northern Honan Province .Each brigade had four independent in-fantry battalions (IIBs) ; the 63d Bri-gade had the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14thIIBs, while the 15th, 21st, 22d, and 23dIIBs were assigned to the 64th Brigade .In 1944, two additional IIBs were sent t oOkinawa as reinforcements and attache don 15 December to the division which ,in turn, assigned them to the brigades .The 272d IIB went to the 64th Brigade ,while the 273 JIB went to the 63d .

The 62d Division lacked organic artil-lery and had few other supporting arms .It never attained a strength greate rthan 12,000 troops, the largest propor-tion of whom were infantrymen . Theinfantry battalions of the 62d were thestrongest units of their type on Oki-nawa, as each battalion mustered a totalof 1,200 men organized into five riflecompanies, a machine gun company,

and an infantry gun company armedwith two 75mm guns and two 70m m

howitzers. The 272d and 273d IIBs werereported later as having a strength of

700 men each, but with one or two les s

rifle companies per battalion .

Some variance in strength was foun din the infantry components of the othe rtwo major fighting organizations of th eThirty-second Army . The 2d Infantry

Unit and 15th IMR of the 44th IMB hadin common three rifle battalions, a nantitank company (four 37mm or 47m mAT guns), and a regimental gun com-pany (four 75mm guns) . Each of the

battalions listed a total strength of 70 0men who were assigned to three rifl e

companies, a machine gun company ,and an infantry gun unit (two 70mmhowitzers) . The 24th Division regi-mental organization was similar exceptfor the replacement, in one battalion o f

each regiment, of the 70mm howitzer sby a mortar platoon manning fou r

81mm mortars .Since the Japanese high command

envisioned the coming battle for Oki-nawa as developing into one of fixe dposition defense, the defenders wer enot assigned any appreciably strong

armored force . The entire Japanesetank strength, given to the Thirty-sec-

ond Army in July, consisted of the 27thTank Regiment, organized originally inManchuria in April 1944, from elementsof the 2d Armored Division . It was aregiment in name only, as one of it smedium tank companies was sent to th egarrison at Miyako Jima. What re-mained was an armored task force witha strength of 750 men who filled th eranks of one light and one medium tan kcompany, a tractor-drawn artillery bat-


45

tery, an infantry company, a mainte-nance company, and an engineer pla-toon. The regiment's heavy weapon sincluded 14 medium and 13 light tanks ,4 75mm guns, 2 47mm AT guns, and 1 0machine guns . The heaviest tank-mounted weapon was the 57mm gun onthe medium tanks .

As the Japanese position in thePhilippines became hopeless, shipmentsof weapons to be sent there wer ediverted by IGHQ to Okinawa. The re-sult was that the Thirty-second Armypossessed a heavier concentration o fartillery power, grouped under a singl ecommand, than had been available t oany Japanese force in previous Pacifi ccampaigns . The total artillery strengthon Okinawa, with the exception of th e24th Division's organic 42d Field Artil-lery Regiment, was grouped withinMajor General Kosuke Wada's 5thArtillery Command . Besides the com-paratively weak 7th Heavy ArtilleryRegiment (formerly the NakagusukuWan Fortress Artillery Unit), GeneralWada's command included two mediumregiments, a heavy battalion, and th eartillery units of the 44th IMB and 27thTank Regiment . Combat-tested atBataan in the Philippines, the 1stMedium Artillery Regiment had one ofits two battalions assigned to MiyakoJima upon arrival from Manchuria inJuly. The other medium regiment wasthe 23d which, until its departure forOkinawa in October, had been stationedin eastern Manchuria from the time o fits activation in 1942 . The two mediumartillery regiments together mustereda total of 2,000 troops who manned 36150mm howitzers . The artillery com-mand also contained the 100th Inde -

pendent Heavy Artillery Battalion . Thisunit was formed in June of 1944 i nYokosuka and sent to Okinawa in Julywith 500 men and 8 150mm guns .

Besides artillery units, Genera lWada's troop list included a mortarregiment and two light mortar bat-talions. The 1st Independent HeavyMortar Regiment's 320mm spigot mor-tars were an unusual type of weapon swhich Marines had first encountered onIwo Jima. 25 These awesome weapons,firing a 675-pound shell dubbed a "fly-ing ashcan" by Americans, were th ebasic armament of this unit. Only hal fof its six batteries were on Okinawa ,as the other three had been sent toBurma in mid-1942. Although the 9681mm mortars of the 1st and 2d LightMortar Battalions were nominally underthe command of General Wada, actuallythey were assigned in close support o fthe various infantry units and usuall yoperated under the direction of thei rrespective sector defense commanders .

The infantry was strengthened wit hother types of artillery weapons fromantiaircraft artillery, antitank, andautomatic weapons units which wer eattached to them during most of th ecampaign . A dual air-ground defenserole was performed by the 72 75mmguns and 54 20mm machine cannon i n4 independent antiaircraft artillery, 3field antiaircraft artillery, and 3 ma-chine-cannon battalions. In addition, 4 8lethal, high-velocity, flat trajectory47mm guns (located in 3 independentantitank battalions and 2 independen t

26 LtCol Whitman S . Bartley, Iwo Jima :Amphibious Epic (Washington : HistBr, G–3Div, HQMC, 1954), pp. 13–14, hereafter Bart -ley, Iwo Jima.

46


companies) were added to the defense .

Completing the infantry fire support of

the Thirty-second Army were 4 inde-pendent machine gun battalions whic h

had a total of 96 heavy machine guns .

The rest of General Ushijima's armyconsisted of many diverse units and

supporting elements . The departure ofthe 9th Division created a shortage o finfantry troops which had to be mad eup in as expeditious a manner as pos-sible. The reserve of potential infantryreplacements on the island varied i nquality from good, in the two shippin gengineer regiments, to poor, at best, inthe various rear area service organiza-tions. The 19th Air Sector Command ,whose airfield maintenance and con-struction troops were stationed at theYontan, Kadena, and Ie Shima airstrips ,provided the largest number of replace-ments, 7,000 men .

Another source of troops to fill in-fantry ranks was found in the sea-raid-ing units . These organizations, firs tencountered by American forces in th ePhilippines, were designed for the de-struction of amphibious invasion ship-ping by means of explosive-lade nsuicide boats . There were a total ofseven sea-raiding squadrons in the Oki-nawa Gunto, three of which were base dat Kerama Retto . Each of the squadronshad assigned to it 100 hand-pickedcandidates for suicide and martyrdom ,whose caliber was uniformly high sinceeach man was considered officer mate-rial . When one of these men failed t oreturn, it was presumed that his hadbeen a successful mission and, re-portedly, he was therefore given aposthumous promotion to second lieu -tenant.

Japanese naval base activities on

Okinawa were under the command o fRear Admiral Minoru Ota . Admiral Ot awas commander of the Naval Bas e

Force for the Okinawa area, commander

of the 4th Surface Escort Unit, and alsowas in charge of naval aviation activ-ities in the Nansei Islands. Army-Navyrelations and the chain of command o nOkinawa were based locally on mutua l

agreements between the Thirty-secondArmy and the Naval Base Force . 2 6

Admiral Ota directed the activities o fapproximately 10,000 men, of who m3,500 were Japanese naval personneland the other 6,000–7,000 were civilia nemployees belonging to sub-units of th eNaval Base Force . Of the total numberof uniformed naval troops, only abou t200 were considered to have receivedany kind of infantry training. Upon theactivation of the base force on 15 April1944, a small number of naval officer sand enlisted men, and most of the civil-ians, were formed into maintenance ,supply, and construction units for th elarge airfield on Oroku Peninsula andthe harbor installations at Naha . AtUnten-Ko, on Motobu Peninsula in thenorth, were stationed a torpedo boatsquadron and a midget submarine unit .

In organizing for the defense of theisland, the greater portion of regula rnaval troops were formed into antiair-craft artillery and coastal defense bat -

"Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 57–59 ;for a discussion of the Japanese high comman dsetup, see Henry I . Shaw, Jr. and Maj Dougla sT. Kane, Isolation of Rabaul—History of U . S .Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v .II (Washington : HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC.1963), hereafter Shaw and Kane, Isolation ofRabaul, especially that section in chap I en-titled "Japanese Strategy ."


47

teries. These were broken down intofour battery groups which were em -placed mainly in the Naha-Oroku -Tomigusuku area . The antiaircraft unit smanned 20 120mm guns, 77 machinecannon, and 60 13mm machine guns ,

while the 15 coast defense batteries ,placed in strategic positions on th ecoastline under the control of Armylocal sector commanders, stood read yby their 14cm and 12cm naval guns.Although the total strength in numberswas impressive, the Okinawa NavalBase Force did not have a combat poten-tial commensurate with its size .

Continually seeking means to bolste rhis defenses, General Ushijima receive dpermission to mobilize a home guard onthe island. In July 1944, the Okinaw aBranch of the Imperial Reservists Asso-ciation formed a home guard, whosemembers were called Boeitai . They wer eorganized on a company-sized basis b ytown or village and were mainly com-prised of reservists . Since the Boeitairepresented a voluntarily organize dgroup, it did not come under the Japa-nese Military Service Act, althoug htheir training and equipment camefrom the regular forces into whoseranks they were to be integrated whenthe battle was joined . The total numberof Boeitai thus absorbed by the Thirty -second Army has been estimated be-tween 17,000 and 20,000 men .

On Okinawa there were certain unitswhich have often been confused withthe Boeitai. These were the three Spe-cial Guard Companies (223d, 224th, and225th) and three Special Guard Engi-neer Units (502d, 503d, and 504th)which were special components of th eThirty-second Army. During peacetime,

each unit had a cadre of several com-missioned and noncommissioned officers .When war broke out, certain designate dreservists reported to the above units t owhich they had been previously as-signed . 2 7

Even the youth of the island were notexempt from the mobilization . About1,700 male students, 14 years of age an dolder, from Okinawa's middle schools ,were organized into volunteer youthgroups called the Tekketsu (Blood andIron for the Emperor Duty Units) .These young boys were eventually as-signed to front-line duties and t oguerrilla-type functions for which theyhad been trained . Most, however, wer eassigned to communication units .

It has not been conclusively deter-mined how many native Okinawan swere actually added to the forces of th eThirty-second Army, or to what extentthey influenced the final course of battle .What is known, however, is that thei rgreatest contribution was the labor theyperformed which, in a period of nin emonths, transformed the island land-scape into hornets' nests of death an ddestruction .

THE JAPANESE DEFENSES 2 8

Continuing American successes in

the conduct of amphibious operation s

forced the Japanese to recognize the

increasing difficulties of defending

against assaults from the sea . The loss

"War History Office Comments .28 Unless otherwise noted, the material i n

this section is derived from : IntelMono ; POWInterSum; Shimada Interrogation ; YaharaInterrogation; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun .

48


of some islands in 1944 reportedly

caused Japanese garrison units at othe r

Imperial bases in the Pacific to lose con-fidence in themselves and their abilityto withstand an American seaborne in-vasion. The Japanese high commandhastily published the "Essentials ofIsland Defense," a document whichcredited Americans with overwhelmin gnaval and air power, and emphasizedthat the garrisons should "lay out an dequip positions which can withstandheavy naval and aerial bombardment ,and which are suitable for protracte ddelaying action . . . diminish the fightin geffectiveness of landing units . . . seizeopportunities to try to annihilate th eforce in one fell swoop ." 2 9

This document may have influence d

General Ushijima's decisions when h e

settled on a final defense plan, although

his particular situation was governed

primarily by the strength of the Thirty-

second Army and the nature of the are a

it was to defend . Captured on Okinaw a

were a set of instructions for the de-

fense of Iwo Jima, which were appar-ently a blueprint also for the defense of

critical areas on the coasts of the

islands of Japan. It is assumed that

Ushijima may have seen these instruc-tions, for they bore directly on hisproblem :

In situations where island garrisonscannot expect reinforcements of troopsfrom rear echelons, but must carry on thebattle themselves from start to finish, the yshould exhaust every means for securinga favorable outcome, disrupting the ene-my's plans by inflicting maximum losse son him, and, even when the situation i s

29 Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp . 115–116 .

hopeless, holding out in strong position s

for as long as possible . 3 0

In order to deceive the assaulting

forces as to Japanese intentions, a

Thirty-second Army battle instructionwarned the troops to "guard against

opening fire prematurely." 31 A later

battle instruction explained that "th e

most effective and certain way of [th eAmericans'] ascertaining the existence

and organization of our firepower sys-tem is to have us open fire prematurel yon a powerful force where it can

maneuver." 3 2

These instructions were a forewarn-ing that, rather than forcing the issueon the beaches, "the Japanese soldier

would dig and construct in a way and t oan extent that an American soldier ha snever been known to do ." 33 Japaneseorganization of the ground paralleled

that which assault troops had discov-ered on Biak, Saipan, and Peleliu i n

1944 and Iwo Jima in 1945 . 34 GeneralCho, a strong advocate of undergroundand cave fortifications, took an active

""Land Defense Doctrine (Provisional) ,dtd 1Dec44," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147–45 ,Translations and Interrogations No. 32, dtd16Jun45, p . 4 .

""Thirty-second Army Battle Instruction sNo. 3, dtd 15Feb45," in CinCPac-CinCPO ABul 122–45, Translations and Interrogation sNo. 30, dtd 1Jun45, p. 2 .

""Thirty-second Army Battle InstructionNo. 8, dtd 8Mar45," in Ibid ., p . 7 .

IntelMono, pt I, sec A, p . 5.

For a discussion of Japanese defenses onthese islands, see Robert R. Smith, The Ap-proach to the Philippines—U. S. Army inWorld War II (Washington : OCMH, DA,

1953), pp. 300–302 ; Maj Frank O. Hough, Th e

Assault on Peleliu (Washington : HistDiv ,

HQMC, 1950), pp . 192–197 ; Bartley, Iwo Jima,

pp . 5–18 .


49

part in designating where defensivepositions were to be placed. The mostfavorable terrain for the defense wasoccupied and honeycombed with mutu-ally supporting gun positions and pro-tected connecting tunnels . Natural andman-made barriers were effectively in-corporated to channel attackers int oprepared fire lanes and pre-registere dimpact areas . The reverse as well as theforward slopes of hills were fortified,while artillery, mortars, and automati cweapons were emplaced in cave mouths ,with their employment completely inte-grated within the final protective fir eplan .

Each unit commander., from brigadedown to company level, was made re-sponsible for the organization of theground and fortification of the sectorassigned to him. The need for heavyconstruction was lessened, in somecases, by the abundance of large cave son Okinawa which required but slightreinforcement to enable them to with -stand even the heaviest bombardment .Once improvements were made, thesenatural fortresses served either as hos-pitals, barracks, command posts, or al lof these combined when the size of thecave permitted. There were generallytwo or more entrances to the caves ,which sometimes had more than on elevel if time and manpower was avail -able for the extensive digging neces-sary. Tunnels led from the caves t oautomatic weapons and light artillerypositions which, in conjunction with thepillboxes and rifle pits in the area, domi-nated each defense zone . The approachesand entryway to each cave were in-variably guarded by machine guns and,

in addition, by covering fire from posi-tions outside the cave.

Integrated within the whole Japanesedefensive system, these cave strong -holds were, in turn, centers of smal lunit positions . Item Pocket, one of th emost vigorously defended sectors o nOkinawa, was typical of the ones Ameri-can forces ran into . (See Map I, MapSection .) The area encompassed by thisposition, roughly 2,500 by 4,500 yards i nsize, was in the vicinity of Machinat oAirfield. Both the 1st Marine and 27thInfantry Divisions fought bitterly t ogain it . Disposed within the caves andbunkers of the pocket was a reinforcedinfantry battalion which manned ap-proximately 16 grenade launchers, 83light machine guns, 41 heavy machineguns, 7 47mm antitank guns, 2 81m mmortars, 2 70mm howitzers, and 675mm guns. A minefield and an anti -tank trench system completed the de-fenses. This sector was so organize dthat there were no weak points visibl eto the attacker . Any area not swept byautomatic weapons fire could be reache dby either artillery or mortars . These de-fensive positions formed a vital link inthe chain of the tough outer defense sguarding Shuri .

Based on the dictum that "the islan dmust be divided into sectors accordingto the defense plan so that commandwill be simplified," 35 each combat ele-ment of the Thirty-second Army wasassigned a sector to develop and defen das it arrived on Okinawa. By August1944, the 44th IMB's 2d Infantry Unit(400 troops) under Colonel Takehiko

""Combat Regulations for Japanese Gar-rison Units," n .d ., in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bu l115-44, dtd 18Aug44 .

50


Udo had occupied its assigned area ,Kunigami Gun (County), and had as-sumed responsibility for all of theisland north of the Ishikawa Isthmus ,and also for Ie Shima and its airfields .Upon its arrival on Okinawa, the

24th Division had begun to constructfield fortifications around Yontan an d

Kadena airfields in an area bounded

by Ishikawa Isthmus in the north an da line from Sunabe to Ozato in thesouth . Below the 24th's zone of defense,

the 62d Division was unflagging in it sefforts to alter the ridges, ravines, an dhillsides north of Shuri . Responsibilit yfor the entire southern portion of Oki-nawa below Shuri had been assumed bythe 9th Division commander .

The receipt of orders in Novembe rfor the transfer of the 9th Division

forced a redeployment of Thirty-secondArmy troops and strained a defens e

that was already dangerously weak.The 24th Division began moving sout hto take over some 9th Division position swhile the 44th IMB, leaving two rein -forced battalions of the 2d InfantryUnit behind on Ie Shima and MotobuPeninsula, occupied an area whichreached from Kadena airfield south -ward to Chatan . The 62d Division posi-tions were likewise affected by the with-drawal of the 9th's 14,000 combattroops, as the northern divisionalboundary of the 62d dropped to theChatan-Futema line . In the south, th e62d zone of responsibility was increase dtremendously to include all of Naha ,Shuri, Yonabaru, and the entire ChinenPeninsula .

Although the construction of fortifi -cations, underground positions, andcave sites had been going on since the

spring of 1944, the urgency of the wa r

situation and the expectance of an im-minent invasion compelled the defender sto reevaluate their plans of deploymen tfor blunting the assault . The exact dat e

of the new Thirty-second Army plan i snot known, but a reasonable assumptio n

is that the loss of the 9th Division inNovember which triggered the shuffling

of units also forced a decision on a fina l

defense plan . At the end of the month ,General Ushijima and his staff ponderedthe following alternatives before set-tling on the one which they believedwould guarantee the success of thei r

mission :

Plan I : To defend, from extensive under-ground positions, the Shimajiri sector, th emain zone of defenses being north of Naha ,Shuri, and Yonabaru . Landings north ofthese defenses were not to be opposed ;landings south of the line would be me tat the beaches. Since it was impossible todefend Kadena airfield [with availabletroops], 15cm guns were to be emplace dso as to bring fire on the airfield and den ythe invaders its use .

Plan II : To defend from prepared posi-tions the central portion of the island ,including the Kadena and Yontan airfields .

Plan III : To dispose one division aroun dthe Kadena area, one division in the south -ern end of the island, and one brigad ebetween the two divisions. To meet th eenemy wherever he lands and attempt t oannihilate him on the beaches .

Plan IV : To defend the northern par tof the island, with Army Headquarters a tNago, and the main line of defense base don Hill 220, northeast of Yontan airfield . 3 6

Realistically appraising the manyfactors which might effect each one ofthe alternate plans, the Japanese settle don Plan I. Plan III was abandone dsimply because the Thirty-second Army

38 IntelMono, pt I sec A, pp . 1-2 .


51

did not have the strength adequate t orealize all that the plan encompassed .Plan IV was rejected because it con-ceded the loss of the militarily im-portant south even before the battle ha dbeen joined. Plan II, the one whic hAmerican staff planners feared as offer-ing the greatest threat to a successfu linvasion, was regretfully relinquishe dby the Japanese . Ushijima, recognizinghis troops' capabilities and limitations ,realized that his forces, in the main, ha dnot been trained to fight this type ofdelaying action which would prolon gthe battle, bloody the invaders, and per-mit the bulk of his army to withdrawto the more heavily fortified souther nportion of Okinawa. Yet, in effect, thi sis exactly the strategy he was forced t oemploy after the initial American land-ings .

Placing Plan I into effect, the Japa-nese centered the main battle positio nin the Shuri area, where the ruggedterrain surrounding the ancient capita lwas developed with the strongest instal-lations oriented north toward theHagushi beaches . (See Map 3.) TheHagushi region, coincidentally, evolve das a secondary target to the Japaneseand a primary target to American staffplanners. In addition, "handicapped b ytheir lack of ability to make a logisticsestimate for a landing operation," 37 theJapanese believed that the major effortwould be made in the southeast with anassault across the Minatogawa beaches .Overlooking both the Minatogawa an dNakagusuku Wan beaches, Chine nPeninsula heights presented the de -fenders with the most favorable ter -

37 Ibid., p . 3 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 5

rain of its type on Okinawa and, assuch, it was hoped that the invaderscould be met and defeated here . Since,from the standpoint of actual man-power, the Chinen sector was the weak-est area in the final defense plan, agoodly portion of the artillery and in-fantry strength of the Thirty-secon dArmy—which could have been bette remployed in reinforcing Shuri position s—was diverted to the peninsula, re-maining there out of action during th efirst weeks of the campaign . 3 S

Among Ushijima 's most pressin gneeds were additional troops and tim ein which to train them. Extra time wasneeded also to provide for expandin gand strengthening existing fortifica-tions as well as the communications net .With the exception of a drastic fuelshortage, the army was in good logisti-cal shape. Although the Thirty-secondArmy itself had no provisions in re-serve, enough had been distributed t osubordinate units, and stored by themin caves near troop dispositions, to las tuntil September 1945. This system wassatisfactory in that the strain on th eoverworked transportation facilities wasremoved, but when an area was overru nby Americans and the Japanese were

aB In the Thirty-second Army staff there wa ssharp disagreement as to the probability of thi sadditional landing . Colonel Yahara, senior staffofficer, insisted that a diversionary landing ,possibly the principle one, would be made inthe Minatoga region . Major Yakamaru, the in-telligence officer, held that the only America nlanding would be in the Hagushi area . Prestigeand seniority won the argument . `Yakamaru ,bitterly disappointed at the final decision, wentoff the next few days to inundate his sorrowsin prolonged draughts of expensive sake . 'Shimada Interrogation .


53

forced to withdraw, the supplies werelost .

Unable to halt the inexorable pressof time, General Ushijima now found i timperative to beef-up his infantry com-ponent from sources on the island, forhe knew that he could expect no outsid ehelp. In addition to the mobilizedBoeitai and a continuing stream of Oki-nawan conscriptees, the Japanese com-mander attempted to free his uniforme dlabor and service personnel for front -line duty by replacing them with able-bodied males from the large populatio nof the island . In February 1945, morethan 39,000 Okinawans were assigne dto Japanese Army units on the island .The natives were placed into such cate-gories as Main Labor (22,383), Auxil-iary Labor (14,415) , and Student Labo r(2,944) . 39 The Japanese attempted toevacuate to the northern part of th eisland all of the rest of the populatio nwho were incapable of aiding the wa reffort or who were potential obstacles inthe battle zone . 4 0

General Ushijima found the addi-tional infantry troops he required in th eranks of Thirty-second Army specia land service units. The first elementsaffected by an army-wide reorganiza-tion at this time were seven sea-raidin gbase battalions . Each suicide squadronwas supported by a base battalion of900 men, and since they had completed

""Thirty-second Army Assignment of Con -script Labor, dtd Feb45," in CinCPac-CinC-POA Bul 161-45, Translations and Interroga-tions No . 34, dtd 27Jun45 .

40 "Standards for the Establishment of Nan-sei Shoto Garrison Plans, dtd 1Jan45," i nCICAS Trans No. 83 ; Okinawa OperationsRecord, pp. 59-60.

their basic assignment of cave an dsuicide boat site construction, the armydecided to utilize these men in an are awhere they were critically needed . Be-ginning 13 February 1945, these bat-talions, although retaining their origi-nal numerical designations, were re -assigned as the 1st, 2d, 3d, 26th, 27th ,28th, and 29th Independent Battalions(each averaging about 600 men) to the24th and 44th IMB for thorough train-ing and subsequent absorption . 41 Onlythe maintenance company of each bat-talion was to remain with its respectiv esea-raiding suicide unit . In comparisonwith the regular infantry of the Japa-nese Army, the new battalions werepoorly trained and equipped, but these4,500—5,000 men invested enemy force swith an additional source of strength .

During the next month, March, a fina larmy reorganization took place, atwhich time the Thirty-second Armydirected "the various shipping, air, an drear echelon forces [to] set up organi-zations and dispositions for land com-bat." 42 Besides their basic missions ,these units now had to give infantr ytraining and field fortification construc-tion priority in their schedules . TheMarch reorganization supplied the armywith two brigades and a regiment whichappeared more significant on paper thanactually was the case . These lightlyequipped and untrained service troop scould serve only as combat replacementswith slight tactical value .

' l IntelMono, pt I sec A p . 10 .

42 "Thirty-second Army OpOrd A-113, Re-organization of Service Units into Comba tTroops, dtd 21Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPO ABul 107-45, Translations and Interrogation sNo. 28, dtd 14May45, p . 15 .

54


Units from the 19th Air Sector Head-quarters were funneled into the 1stSpecially Established Regiment which ,under 62d Division control, was respon-sible for the defense of the areas in thevicinity of Kadena and Yontan airfields .Support positions in the Naha-Yonabaruvalley were assumed by the 1st Spe-cially Established Brigade, composed ofthree regiments and formed fromThirty-second Army transport, ord-nance, construction, and supply troop sformerly within the 49th Line of Com-munications Headquarters command . A2d Specially Established Brigade ofthree regiments, culled from the 11thShipping Group Headquarters shipping ,sea transport, and engineer rosters, wa sdeployed in support of the 24th Divisionmission—the defense of southernmos tOkinawa. "Army rear echelon agencie snot included in this order and their per-sonnel will be under command of th efront line unit in the vicinity wher etheir duties are carried on, and wil lreinforce it in combat," stated the all -inclusive 21 March order which put th eentire Thirty-second Army in a statusof general mobilization for combat . 4 3

By 26 March, Okinawa Base Forc enaval and civilian personnel had beenformed into the same type of jerry-built ,poorly equipped, and undertrained de-fense units as had been the servic etroops of the Thirty-second Army . OnOroku Peninsula, naval lieutenant scommanded those units designated a sbattalions while lieutenants (junio rgrade) became company commanders .Admiral Ota's 13mm and 25mm anti -aircraft batteries were re-equipped an d

43 Ibid.

transformed into an 81mm mortar bat-tery and two independent machine gu nbattalions and, thus armed, were th eonly adequately weaponed units in th enaval garrison .

In less than two months after thefirst reorganization order had been pub-lished, General Ushijima had nearl ydoubled the potential combat strengthof his army by the addition of approxi-mately 20,000 Boeitai, naval, and serv-ice troops. Hurriedly, the concerte defforts of this determined Japaneseforce converted the Shuri area intowhat was to be an almost impregnabl ebastion, for the final defensive plan wasstrengthened by the defenders' deter-mination to hold Shuri to the last man .

Concurrent with the February armyreorganization, the troops were de-ployed in their final positions . GeneralUshijima's main battle force was with -drawn to an outpost zone just north o fFutema, while elements of the 1stSpecially Established Regiment wereloosely disposed in the area immediatelybehind the Hagushi beaches . Althoughthis was the least likely place where th eAmericans were expected to land, th eJapanese troops defending this areawere to fight a delaying action in anysuch eventuality, and then, after de-stroying the Yontan and Kadena air -fields, were to beat a hasty retreat to theShuri lines .

In the suspected invasion area, th eMinatogawa beaches, the bulk of theJapanese infantry and artillery force swere positioned to oppose the landings .The 5th Artillery Command observationpost was established near Itokazu incontrol of all of its major components ,which had been emplaced in defense of


55

the Minatogawa sector . Since landing sfurther north on Chinen Peninsul awould give the invaders a relatively un-opposed, direct route into the heart o fthe major Japanese defense system, the44th IMB was assigned control of therugged heights of the peninsula. The24th Division, taking over the defens eworks begun by the 9th Division, oc-cupied the southern portion of Okinaw afrom Kiyan Point to an area just northof Tsukasan. The whole of OrokuPeninsula was assigned to Admira lOta's forces, who were prepared to figh tthe "Navy Way," contesting the inva-sion at the beaches in a manner remi-niscent of the Japanese defense ofTarawa . 4 4

Since the heart and soul of the Jap-anese defenses were located at Shuri ,the most valuable and only battle-testedorganization on the island, the 62d Divi-sion, was charged with the protection ofthis vital area. The Japanese had

shrewdly and industriously constructe da stronghold centered in a series of con -centric rings, each of which bristle dwith well dug-in, expertly sited weap-ons. Regardless of where the American slanded, either at Hagushi or Mina-togawa or both, the plans called fo rdelaying actions and, finally, a with-drawal into the hard shell of these well -disguised positions .

" Although the Base Force was under com-mand of the Thirty-second Army and Admira lOta sincerely attempted to cooperate with thearmy, classic interservice rivalry apparent inmany Japanese Pacific operations, on a lowe rechelon in the case of Okinawa, hampered th enaval commander's desires . "Naval Units onOkinawa," in POW InterSum No . 16, dtd28Ju145.

The isolated north was defended bythe Udo Force, so-called after its leaderand commanding officer of the 2dInfantry Unit—Colonel Takehiko Udo .Its mission was twofold, defense of bot hMotobu Peninsula and Ie Shima . Thereinforced battalion on Ie Shima wasassigned secondary missions of destroy-ing the island's airfield and assisting i nthe transfer of aviation materiel to th emain island . Upon completion of thes eduties, the unit was then to return toOkinawa where it would be assigned tothe control of the 62d Division . Udo's

battalion on Motobu Peninsula, in ex-pectation of an invasion of Ie Shimafollowed by a landing on the peninsula ,was disposed with its few artiller ypieces so placed as to make its positionsand positions on Ie Shima mutually sup -porting. As a result of its detachmen tearlier from the larger portion of th eThirty-second Army, Udo's comman dwas destined to fulfill a hopeless under -

taking to the very end .

Air defense was not included in the

Thirty-second Army plan, nor was any

great aviation force available t o

Ushijima. He had expected that ap-proximately 300 airplanes would be sen t

to Okinawa, but feared that their pro-

jected time of arrival, April, would b e

too late to influence the local situation .

The American preinvasion air and

naval bombardments in March, com-bined with planned Japanese destruc-tion efforts, had rendered the Ie Shima ,Yontan, Kadena, and Oroku airfield s

unusable.

The army did expect, however, that

its exertions would be complemented by

56


the combat activity of its organic sui-cide sea units . The sea-raiding squad-rons located at positions in Keram aRetto and along the Okinawa coast ,would "blast to pieces the enemy trans-port groups with a whirlwind attack i nthe vicinity of their anchorages ."'"Unfortunately for the Japanese, thei rmidget submarines and motor torped oboats at Unten-Ko could not join thi soffensive endeavor, for, by the day ofthe American invasion, they had al lbeen destroyed by American carrierstrikes or scattered in the aftermath o fan unsuccessful attack on the destroye rTolman of Task Force 52 . 4 6

The significance of Thirty-secon dArmy deployments and redeployments,the frenzied last-minute preparations,and the general air of expectancy werenot lost upon even the lowest ranks . Oneprivate wrote as early as February, "i tappears that the army has finally de-

cided to wage a decisive battle on Oki-nawa." 47 Another soldier noted tha t

""Thirty-second Army OpOrd A 115, dt d23Mar45," in CICAS Trans No. 321 .

40"Naval Units on Okinawa," in POW Inter-

Sum No. 16, dtd 28Ju145 ; CTF 52 AR, OkinawaGunto, 21Mar-20Apr45, dtd 1May45, chap III ,p . 9, hereafter CTF 52 AR.

""Diary of a superior private, 272d IIB,"in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45, Translation sand Interrogations No . 32, dtd 16Jun45, p. 48 .

"it's like a frog meeting a snake, justwaiting for the snake to eat him ." 4 8

Between 20 and 23 March 1945, theJapanese command on Okinawa madean even more realistic estimate than hadthe troops of what the future held fo rthe garrison. The Japanese reacted t onews of a conference held in Washingtonbetween Admirals King and Nimitz inearly March by placing a general aler tinto effect "for the end of March an dearly April," since statistics demon-strated "that new operations occurfrom 20 days to one month afte r[American] conferences on strategy ar eheld." 49 This estimate of when theAmericans were expected was reduce dthree days after its publication follow-ing receipt of reports of increased ship -ping in the Marianas, and when repeate dsubmarine sightings and contacts wer emade. All of this enabled the Japanes eintelligence officers to predict withouthesitation that the target was to b e"Formosa or the Nansei Shoto, espe-cially Okinawa ." 5 0

40 "Diary of a radioman, 5th Harbor Bas eUnit," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 161-45 ,Translations and Interrogations No . 34, dtd27Jun45, p . 50 .

48 "Thirty-second Army Estimate of the Sit-uation, dtd 20Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPOABul 140-45, Translations and Interrogation sNo. 31, dtd 7Jun45, p . 5 .

50 "62d Division IntelRpt on Findings Sincethe 2OMar Rpt, dtd 23Mar45," in Ibid., p . 6 .

CHAPTER 2

Project ICEBERG

THE TASK DEFINED '

Three weeks after receipt of theJoint Chiefs of Staff directive orderingthe Okinawa invasion, Admiral Nimitz 'headquarters published and distribute dthe ICEBERG Joint Staff Study . Thisstudy served as a planning guideline forthe units assigned to the campaign an ddefined for them the objectives, the al-lotment of forces, and roughly outlinedthe scheme of maneuver ashore .

Although Operation CAUSEWAY ,the invasion of Formosa, had been can -celled in favor of ICEBERG, the princi-pal commanders for CAUSEWAY wereretained for the Okinawa landing an dredirected their staffs' efforts towardsplanning for the assault on the newl yassigned target . Admiral Raymond A .Spruance, whose Task Force 50 (TF50) contained the Fifth Fleet and theCentral Pacific Task Forces, was mad eresponsible for the Ryukyus operation .His staff, previously charged with pre -paring plans for the Iwo Jima invasion

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : ICEBERG Study ;CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 14–44, dtd 31Dec44 ,hereafter CinCPOA OPlan 14–44 ; USAFMid-Pac G–5 Hist ; ComFifthFlt OPlan 1–45, dtd3Jan45, hereafter ComFifthFlt OPlan 1–45 ;CG, Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1–45, ICEBERG ,dtd 6Jan45, hereafter Tenth Army TntvOPlan1–45 ; Samuel Eliot Morison, Victory in th ePacific, 1945—History of United States Nava lOperations in World War II, v . XIV, (Boston :Little, Brown and Company, 1960), hereafterMorison, Victory in the Pacific.

scheduled for 20 January 1945, was no wgiven the concurrent assignment ofplanning for Okinawa .

Certain assumptions governed task

planning and the assignment of assaultand garrison forces for ICEBERG. Ad-herence to the scheduled 1 March 194 5invasion date (L-Day) for Okinaw awas based on the presupposed seizure ofIwo Jima at a date early enough to per-mit release of naval gunfire and ai rsupport units for the second operation .It was further assumed that ICEBER Gcommanders would be able to secure th eprompt release from General MacArthu rof assault shipping, support shipping ,

supporting naval forces, and Armytroops assigned to the Philippines opera-tion which had been earmarked for us e

later at Okinawa. Finally, before Oki-nawa was invaded, Allied air and sur-face superiority had to be gained in th etarget area .

This last point was one of the mostimportant in the overall concept of theoperation, for it was believed that airattacks on Japan, together with the con -quest of Iwo Jima, would force a concen -tration of Japanese air strength on thebases which ringed the Home Islands . Itwould be necessary, therefore, to destro yenemy air installations at Japanese stag -ing areas in Kyushu and Formosa, andneutralize those at Okinawa, since it wa sa basic assumption that enemy aircraftwould vigorously oppose any invasio nattempt . For this reason, the scheme o fmaneuver ashore included plans for th e

57

58


early securing of airfields on Okinaw aand their equally early use by Alliedland-based aircraft . Japanese sea com-munications in the Ryukyus area were t obe severed before the operation by sur-face and air attacks on enemy shippingand by a maximum effort mounted b yAmerican submarines .

According to the ICEBERG staff study ,operations ashore were to be conductedin three phases. To be accomplished i nthe first phase were the capture of th esouthern portion of Okinawa and smal ladjacent islands and the initial develop-ment of base facilities. In Phase II, I eShima and the remainder of Okinawawere to be seized and the base build-upcontinued with the construction of in-stallations in favorable locations desig-nated in the development plan . PhaseIII required the exploitation of Alliedpositions in the Nansei Shoto and, whe nAdmiral Nimitz directed, the seizure an ddevelopment of additional position swith forces then locally available . (SeeMap 4. )

It was envisoned that an army of twocorps, each composed of three reinforce dinfantry divisions, would be required i nthe initial assault . In addition, two di -visions were to be assigned as areareserve. Okinawa's proximity to th eheart of the Empire as well as to othermajor Japanese bases, and the expecta-tion of fanatic resistance by enemytroops on a battleground of such largedimensions, presaged a prolonged perio dof fierce combat . For these reasons, anew command relationship was estab-lished for the Okinawa operation differ-ing, in some respects, from that whic hhad been effective in previous Pacificcampaigns .

As strategic commander of the in-vasion forces, Admiral Nimitz directedthat the chain of command woul ddescend to Admiral Spruance, thence toVice Admiral Richmond K . Turner whowould command Task Force 51 (JointExpeditionary Force), and then to Lieu-tenant General Simon B . Buckner, Jr. ,USA, who would command the Army ,Navy, and Marine units comprising theExpeditionary Troops . When Spruancehad determined that the amphibiou sphase of the invasion had ended, hewould pass the command of all force sashore to Buckner . As Commandin gGeneral of the Tenth Army, Buckne rwould assume responsibility for the de-fense and development of positions cap-tured on the island . When the situatio npermitted, he would also relieve Admira lSpruance of the responsibility for thedefense and development of the Ryukyusas a whole and, at that time, he woul dbe directly responsible to CinCPOA fo rthe captured island positions and fo r

the waters within a 25-mile radius . Con -currently, responsibility for the estab-lishment of an Island Command and amilitary government on Okinawa woul dbe General Buckner's also .

ALLIED COMMANDERS ANDFORCES 2

Many units of Admiral Nimitz' com-mand not directly assigned Task Forc e50 were to support the Okinawa landin g

2 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from : ICEBERG Study ;CinCPOA OPlan 14-44 ; USAFMidPac G- 5Hist ; ComFifthFlt OPlan 1-45 ; Tenth ArmyTntvOPlan 1-45 ; Morison, Victory in th ePacific .

60


from bases widespread in the Pacifi cOcean Areas . Additionally, from thei rairdromes in China and the SouthwestPacific, Army Air Forces elements wereto assist the ICEBERG effort, both priorto and during the course of the cam-paign. In all, about 548,000 men of theMarine Corps, Army, and Navy, to-gether with 318 combatant and 1,13 9auxiliary vessels—exclusive of numer-ous small personnel craft of all types 3—and a profusion of strategic and tacti-cal aircraft were to strike some of thelast blows dooming the Japanese at-tempts to gain supremacy in Asia an dthe Pacific .

In the Fifth Fleet were the Coverin gForces and Special Groups which in-cluded the Fast Carrier Force (TF 58 ,Vice Admiral Marc A . Mitscher) and th eBritish Carrier Force (TF 57, Vice Ad-miral Sir H. Bernard Rawlings, RN) .These two forces were to conduct ai rstrikes and neutralize Japanese ai rpower prior to the landing, and preven tenemy air and surface interference wit hthe Allied landing and subsequent occu-pation of Okinawa .

The units more directly concernedwith the landing were components ofTurner's Task Force 51. Its complexcomposition reflected its many assign-ments incident to the capture, occupa-tion, and defense of Okinawa. Anyenemy attempt to disrupt the movemen tto the target or landing on the beachwould be handled by the force's supportelements . These naval units would als oundertake air support and minesweep-ing operations once the beachhead ha dbeen gained. Assignments for these

3 War Reports, p . 664 .

tasks were allocated, in turn, to theAmphibious Support Force (TF 52 ,Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy)which provided direct air and navalsupport, and to the Gunfire and Cover-ing Force (TF 54, Rear Admiral Morto nL. Deyo) . 4 The Northern Attack Force(TF 53, Rear Admiral Lawrence F .Reifsnider) and the Southern AttackForce (TF 55, Rear Admiral John L.Hall, Jr.,) contained the transportswhich were to lift the assault troopsto the objective and the tractor unit swhich were to land them on L-Day .

The assault of Okinawa and its sur-rounding islands was to be accomplishedby the landing forces of Buckner's Ex-peditionary Troops (TF 56) . The as-sault force of the Northern AttackForce was Major General Roy S .Geiger's III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) ,composed of the 1st Marine Division(Major General Pedro A. del Valle )and the 6th Marine Division (MajorGeneral Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr .) . TheArmy XXIV Corps (Major GeneralJohn R. Hodge) would be lifted by th eSouthern Attack Force and would con-sist of the 7th Infantry Division (Majo rGeneral Archibald V. Arnold) and the96th Infantry Division (Major Genera lJames L. Bradley) .

One other major Marine echelon inthe Tenth Army was Major GeneralFrancis P. Mulcahy's joint air task

4 Vice Admiral Jesse B . Oldendorf, originall ythe commander of TF 54, was injured atUlithi shortly before the operation. "Fortu-nately, Rear Admiral Morton L . Deyo, veterangunfire support commander in OperationOVERLORD [Normandy invasion] and DRA-GOON [invasion of southern France], wa savailable to relieve Admiral Oldendorf . "Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 109 .

PROJECT ICEBERG

61

command, Tactical Air Force (TAF) ,

which was to provide land-based ai r

support for the operation once its squad-rons were ashore . The elements ini-tially assigned to TAF were to comeprimarily from the 2d Marine Aircraft

Wing (2d MAW) . Although TAF wa sestablished under the Tenth Army on21 November 1944, its staff was notreally organized until late in December .By that time, much of the earlier, basic ,and important preinvasion planning hadbeen completed without TAF participa-tion. As a matter of fact, the last ofthe personnel assigned to TAF staff didnot even report until after the assault

echelon had already left for the target . 5Although he had not taken part in ICE -BERG planning, General Mulcahy waskept fully abreast of Tenth Army activ-ities and decisions by his chief of staff ,Colonel Perry O. Parmelee, who dail y

visited Buckner's headquarters and at -tended briefings and conferences there . 6

A most important element of TAFwas its fighter arm, the Air DefenseCommand (ADC), headed by Brigadie r

General William J . Wallace who ha d

'Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec IV, pp . 2–3 ;TAF WarDs, 290ct44-31Jan45 ; Tactical AirForce, Tenth Army, AR, Ph I, Nansei Shoto ,8Dec44-30Jun45, dtd 12Ju145, pt I, chap 3, p . 2 ,

hereafter TAF AR.a MajGen Ford O . Rogers interview with

HistBr, HQMC, dtd 14Apr66, (Oral Histor yCollection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Rogersinterview. General, then Colonel, Rogers, wh owas the Air Defense Command Chief of Staff ,did not arrive at Pearl Harbor to take over hi snew job until early January 1945. In comment-ing on the fact that TAF and the Air Defens eCommand had not participated in planning fo rthe invasion, General Rogers said that it hadno serious or visible effect on the conduct ofMarine air operations at Okinawa .

formerly been AirFMFPac Chief of

Staff . Wallace's squadrons were to be -gin operations from previously desig-nated airfields on Okinawa as soon a sthey had been captured by the groundtroops. Initially, General Wallace's com-mand consisted of a headquarterssquadron and a service squadron, andthree MAGs with a total complementof nine fighter, two night fighter, andfour air warning squadrons . The radarinstallations of the units last namedwould give early warning of enemy ai rattacks. An Army Air Forces fighter

wing was also part of ADC, but onlyone group was to join TAF before thecampaign was brought to a close.

General Mulcahy's Bomber Commandwas made up wholly of AAF flight andsupport elements, none of which arrivedon Okinawa before the beginning ofJune. Photographic coverage of enemyinstallations, interpretation of the pic-tures thus obtained, and an aerial photo -graphic survey of the island for map-ping purposes were to be the mission sof an AAF photo-reconnaissance squad-ron which was also part of the TAF

organization.Rounding out the Tenth Army ai r

force were two Marine torpedo-bombersquadrons which were to conduct anti -submarine warfare operations togetherwith the carrier-based naval aircraft a tthe target . The Marine squadrons wer ealso prepared to conduct bombing at-tacks on ground targets and any othe rmissions when the need for them arose .

Marine aviation, other than thatwhich was organic to TAF, was to pla yan important part in the invasion .Artillery spotting was the assignedmission of Marine observation squad-

62


rons attached to the Marine division sand corps . Scheduled to control all air-craft in support of the ground force swere Colonel Vernon E. Megee's Land-ing Force Air Support Control Units(LFASCUs) . When directed by Ad-miral Turner, LFASCUs, set up ashor eat the headquarters of Tenth Army an dits two corps, would take over contro lfrom their shipboard naval counter-parts .

In addition to the tactical units as-signed to the Tenth Army for the assaultand consolidation phases of the opera-tion, General Buckner was to have di-rect command of the defense and servicetroops assigned for the garrison phase .Major General Fred C . Wallace, USA,was designated Island Commander, Oki-nawa, 7 while the Naval Forces, Ryu-kyus, were to be commanded by Rea rAdmiral Calvin H . Cobb, who would as-sume his command upon completion ofthe amphibious phase of the operation .Although strategic air force and nava lsearch squadrons were to be based o nOkinawa, they would remain under th eoperational control of the CommandingGeneral, Army Air Forces, Pacifi cOcean Area, and Commander, FifthFleet, respectively.

Infantry units were assigned also tothe Western Islands Attack Group (T G51.1, Rear Admiral Ingolf N . Kiland)which had the 77th Infantry Division(Major General Andrew D . Bruce) a sits landing force ; the Demonstratio nGroup (TG 51 .2, Rear Admiral JerauldWright) whose landing force was th e

' This command also was to include the IeShima garrison, and, on Okinawa, the NavalOperating Base and the Naval Air Bases .

2d Marine Division (Major GeneralThomas E . Watson) ; and the FloatingReserve Group (TG 51 .3, CommodoreJohn B. McGovern) which carried 27thInfantry Division (Major Genera lGeorge W. Griner, Jr .) .

JOINT PREPARATIONS ANDPLANNING 8

Intensive joint planning attested t othe immensity of the future operation .Smooth Army, Navy, and Marine Corpscoordination of operational, logistical ,and administrative matters was impera-tive. Since the Tenth Army, underCinCPOA, would consist of an Arm ycorps and a Marine amphibious corps ,and a large naval contingent, GeneralBuckner believed that it was importantfor him to have a joint staff. He there-fore requested Admiral Nimitz to au-thorize a Marine and naval augmenta-tion of his staff . When this request wasgranted, approximately 30 Marine an d30 Navy officers, and enlisted assistantsfrom each of these services, were as -signed and integrated within the Tent hArmy staff . "There was no Marine ornaval section of the staff ." 9 One of theMarine officers was Brigadier Genera lOliver P . Smith, who became the Marin eDeputy Chief of Staff ; he had been theAssistant Division Commander of th e

Unless otherwise noted the material in thi ssection is derived from : Tenth Army AR ; 1stMarDiv SAR, Nansei Shoto, lApr-31Jun45 ,dtd 1Jul, hereafter 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6thMarDiv SAR, Okinawa Operation, Phases Iand II, dtd 30Apr45, hereafter 6th MarDivSAR, PhI&II.

s Gen Oliver P . Smith, Personal Narrative ,n . d., p. 4, hereafter Smith, Personal Narrative .

PROJECT ICEBERG

63

1st Marine Division in the Peleliu cam-paign. His counterpart on the TenthArmy staff was Brigadier GeneralLawrence E . Schick, who filled the billetof Army Deputy Chief of Staff .

When General Smith arrived at Tenth

Army headquarters, he found that Cin -CPOA had already approved the Marineaugmentation for the Army staff. TheMarine general believed that this aug-mentation was overly large, for :

This padding would result in Marin eofficers doing clerical duty at Army Head-quarters as there were manifestly no tenough bona fide billets to take care of al lthe Army officers on the staff as well asthe Marine and naval officers. l o

After considerable discussion with theArmy officer responsible for the assign-ment of staff billets, General Smithmanaged to have the number of Marin eofficers on the Tenth Army staff reduce dby nearly 30 percent . 1 1

A tactical concept based upon thedirective stated in the ICEBERG join tstaff study, and later incorporated inthe TF 50 operation plan, required"early use of sufficient airdrome capac-ity in Okinawa, together with unloadingfacilities adequate to support its devel-opment and to maintain positive contro lof the air in the area ." 12 In a study ofall landing beach areas in southern Oki-nawa, those beaches on the west coastwhich lay north and south of Hagush iwere deemed to be best suited to sup -

10 Ibid., p . 25 .11 A list of the names of Marine officers on

the Tenth Army staff when ICEBERG force slanded on Okinawa is located in Ibid., pp .25-26 .

13 ComFif thFlt OPlan 1-45, Anx B, p . 2 .

port the ICEBERG landing . AdmiralTurner's operation plan assumed tha t

there would be bitter Japanese air re -action to the Okinawa invasion ; thatenemy submarines would be very activein the target area ; that the Japanes esurface fleet might possibly sortie outfrom its bases in Japan ; and, that at-tempts might be made to reinforce thegarrison on Okinawa. The first thre eassumptions proved correct ; the fourthwas not tested because, in accordancewith the JCS directive ordering the in-vasion of Okinawa, Allied air and sur-face superiority had been gained priorto L-Day.

Based on Admiral Turner's plan, th eTenth Army staff drew up Plan Fox ,which committed the assault forces toa landing on the west coast. Plan Foxalso included the pre-L-Day capture o fKeise Shima, since a study of this smallisland indicated the feasibility of its us eas a fixed emplacement for artiller ywhich would first augment the navaland air bombardment of the main ob-jective before the landing, and after-wards provide support during the lan dcampaign. This plan, approved by

Buckner, was presented to Turner a tthe initial joint conference held at Pear lHarbor on 1 November 1944.

Following this presentation, Turner

stated his views of the operation andoutlined what would be the require-ments of the Navy during the course o fICEBERG. He believed that, prior to

the landings on Okinawa, the adjacent

islands had to be neutralized . Once thishad been done, the major landings onOkinawa would be more secure and th efleet could be replenished in a safe an-

64


chorage without danger from enemysurface vessels or submarines .

Two provisions of Plan Fox particu-larly concerned the Fifth Fleet com-mander. Because of the suspected pres-ence of Japanese mines and submarine simmediately west of Okinawa, shoul dthe Hagushi beaches be used for the in-vasion, the landings here would perforcerequire the fleet to steam into a hazard-ous area. The second apprehensionarose because 1 March had been sched-uled as L-Day . He feared that unfavor-able weather conditions, which generall yprevailed in March, might possibl yaffect the conduct of the landings an dunduly prolong the unloading of sup-plies on exposed beaches. Availablemeteorological data justified this con-cern, for from October to March th eRyukyus experienced strong northerl ywinds with a mean velocity of 17-1 9miles-per-hour as well as frequent gales .A generally moderate wind, averagin g11 miles-per-hour, marked the begin-ning of the summer monsoon period an dcharacterized the weather of Okinaw ain April, which was a more suitable tim efor the invasion . 13 In any case, Turne rrequested that the possibility of landingsalong the east coast be restudied .At the same time, he suggested that th evalue of a feint landing be determinedand, if valid, should be incorporated i nthe plan finally adopted for ICEBERG .

After a lengthy discussion of the prob-lems inherent in the proposed plan, theconferees concluded that a landing onthe western beaches on 1 March wa sfraught with considerable risk. The al-ternatives were either a 30-day delay

13 HQUSAFPOA Study, sec XX, p . 1 .

of the operation or a landing on thesoutheast coast on the. date originallyscheduled for the assault . All other pos-sible courses of action were re-examined ,with the result that the Hagushi beache swere recommended again as the site fo rthe landings. Final approval was with-held by Turner because he retaineddoubts as to the practicality of landingand supporting the proposed assaul tforce of four divisions over the Hagush ibeachhead . In spite of the objections ofAdmiral Turner, the Plan Fox estimat ewas distributed on 5 November. 14 Whencompleted on 9 November, another de-tailed study upheld the original conten-tion that Hagushi held the only beache sin southern Okinawa adequate to re-ceive four divisions abreast and, sub-sequently, to handle sufficient logisticalsupport for the operation.

In the face of these convincing argu-ments, Admiral Turner accepted th eplan with the proviso that both Keram aRetto and Keise Shima were to be cap-tured prior to the main landing . Withminor exceptions, General Buckner con-curred with these modifications, and th erevised plan was forwarded to Turne ron 11 November . The original targetdate of 1 March was changed twicewithin the next month, first to 15 Marc hand finally to 1 April . The first chang ewas made on 19 November in anticipa-tion of bad weather at the target at th ebeginning of March. On 7 December,Admiral Nimitz advanced L-Day twomore weeks when doubts arose as t owhether the shipping assigned to Gen-eral MacArthur's Lingayen Gulf opera-

1' Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 13 .

PROJECT ICEBERG

65

tions could be returned in time to permitits reemployment at Okinawa. 1 5

Since the naval planning staff rec-ommended a sustained seven- or eight -day bombardment of the assaul tbeaches, the resulting expenditure o fNavy supplies and ammunition woul dforce the bombardment group to eithe rwithdraw from the area for resuppl yand refueling or to conduct these opera-tions under dangerous conditions in theopen sea offshore of the objective .Basically, it was this consideration thatprompted Turner's insistence on th epre-L-Day capture of the entire Keramagroup. At first, these islands appeare dto be only worthy as targets for am-phibious raids in which the raiding

USAFMidPac G–5 Hist, pp . 183, 201 . "Thedeferment of the target date to April 1 wa smost fortunate from the logistic angle . UnderCinCPOA procedures, all maintenance supplie sfor Okinawa were to be shipped from the WestCoast to the control point at Ulithi (3d andsubsequent echelons were staged throughEniwetok) for call forward as required . Requi-sitions for these supplies had to be in thehands of West Coast supply agencies 60 daysprior to sailing date of the shipment . Due t othe sailing time required, requisitions for th efirst maintenance shipment to support a 1March target date had to be on the West Coas tby 20 November. With no firm tactical pla nuntil after the conference with Admiral Turne ron 9 November, and lacking a firm troop basis ,the determination of supply requirements hadto be based on very rough estimates . The 30-daydelay in target date enabled supply agencie sto make a more careful estimate of the suppl yrequirements of the assault force. This delayalso enabled critical supplies and augmentationpersonnel, required for the assault, to beshipped to mounting points of the division s(some had to be shipped by air) prior t omounting date." BGen David H. Blakelock,USA ltr to CMC, dtd 30ct54, hereafterBlakelock ltr .

parties would retire after destroyingenemy coastal artillery . Later plans fortheir capture grew out of AdmiralTurner's proposal that, once taken, theKeramas provide a protected anchoragefor the establishment of a small-boa tpool and a seaplane base.

Because the Kerama assault was no wto be a full-scale invasion instead of araid., the assignment of a larger forcewas indicated and Major GeneralThomas E. Watson's 2d Marine Divisio nwas chosen initially . This unit, desig-nated IIIAC Reserve, had been slate dfor early commitment in support ofoperations on Okinawa, and so the tas kof capturing the Keramas was given in -

stead to the 77th Infantry Divisio nwhile the Marine division was assigne dtentatively to a feint landing off south-

eastern Okinawa ."As the scope and importance of pre-

liminary operations grew, the reserve swhich had been made available to Gen-eral Buckner originally decreased i nnumber, and it was found necessary t osecure from CinCPOA release of thearea reserve division (27th Infantry

Division) . This unit was then desig-nated as the Tenth Army floating re-serve and was replaced by the 81st In-fantry Division which remained in NewCaledonia under Admiral Nimitz' con-trol .

The alternate plan for the operation ,Plan Baker, was approved on 3 Januar y1945. It envisioned first the capture o f

"Tenth Army AR, chap 3, pp . 11–12 . Theoriginal concept of the operation anticipatedthat the 2d Marine Division would come outof army reserve, pass through the 1st Division ,and take the Katchin Peninsula to the south-east of the latter's zone . 1st MarDiv SAR, chapIII, OperAnx, p . 1 .

66


Kerama Retto, followed by a sweep o fthe Eastern Islands by General Wat-son's Marines . Both of these actionswere to be conducted prior to the assaul tof Okinawa itself . A mixed Marineand Army corps artillery group was tosupport both the XXIV and III Am-phibious Corps assault of the east coast .

On L-Day, General Geiger's Marine swould land between Chinen Point andMinatoga, secure the high ground be-hind the beaches, and, following theArmy landing two days later, tie-in withXXIV Corps at Yonabaru . After effect-ing this juncture, both corps were t omake a rapid advance across the islandduring which time the Marines were totake the airfield on Oroku Peninsula an dthe Army was to capture the unfinishe dfield at Yonabaru . Included in the alter-nate plan were provisions for the cap-ture of Ie Shima, feints against ChimuWan on L plus 3 or 4, and, overall, th emaintenance of flexibility of action inthe commitment of Army reserves t oeither of the corps zones or for the pro-tection of XXIV Corps' northern flank.

Although the principal advantages ofPlan Baker were that the approach t othe east coast of Okinawa was more di-rect and the weather here was vastlysuperior to that of the west coast, theywere outweighed by the disadvantages .These included : (1) the difficulty ofproviding optimum naval gunfire sup-port because of the interposition of th eEastern Islands and off-shore islets, (2 )the paucity of good beaches, (3) th elength of time it would take to uncove rairfields, located, for the most part, onthe west coast, and, (4) because o fPlan Baker landing zone assignments ,the possibility that Japanese forces

might be able to concentrate consider-able strength against IIIAC troops be-fore they could even contact the XXI VCorps. General Smith was convinced a tthis time that "in the advent of badweather on the west coast, landingswould have been delayed rather than re -sort to the east coast landing as providedin the alternate plan." 1 7

General Geiger became involved i nthe planning for ICEBERG in Novem-ber 1944, when he was directed to re-port to General Buckner for plannin gpurposes . Upon receipt of this order,the IIIAC commander immediately re-ported by dispatch . Shortly thereafter ,IIIAC headquarters received a copy o fthe tentative Plan Fox together with allavailable intelligence on the prospectivetarget, and a request that Geiger pre-pare a tentative corps operation plan .

When the IIIAC plan was completed ,and at the request of Buckner, Geiger ,accompanied by his chief of staff, Colo-nel Merwin H . Silverthorn, 18 his G-2 ,Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S . Wade, hi sG-3, Colonel Walter A . Wachtler, hi sG-4, Colonel Francis B . Loomis, Jr ., andother members of his staff, departe dGuadalcanal for Pearl Harbor, arrivingat Schofield Barracks on 9 December .After personally contacting their oppo-site numbers on the Tenth Army staff ,the IIIAC staff officers prepared to pre-sent their plan to General Buckner .

Geiger planned to employ the 1st and6th Marine Divisions in the assault ,with General del Valle's division on th eright or south flank. The choice of thes e

17 Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 30 .1s Silverthorn was promoted to the rank of

brigadier general on 19 December while stil lin Hawaii .

PROJECT ICEBERG

67

divisions was logical since they wer eboth located in the Solomons and ther ewould be no problem in establishingliaison. The 2d Division, based onSaipan, would be the floating reserve of

the army, according to the IIIAC plan.The question then arose regarding wha tsteps would be taken if the Japanes ewere encountered in strength as IIIA Cadvanced eastward across Okinawa, forthere was no doubt that an additionaldivision would have to be inserted inthe line before the east coast wasreached. General Smith took this ques-tion up with the Tenth Army com-mander, who agreed that IIIAC woul dhave first call on the 2d Marine Divi-sion . l a

General Watson's division was sched-uled to make the feint landings on th esoutheast coast of Okinawa on L-Dayand L plus 1, and it was not contem-plated that Geiger would need it beforethe third day of the operation . The

IIIAC staff presented their plan orall yto General Buckner on 19 December ,

when it was approved . According toGeneral Smith, who was present on thi soccasion, Geiger's staff members "did a

very creditable job . . . ." 2 0

SCHEME OF MANEUVER 2 1

Basically, the scheme of maneuverashore was designed to attain early use

t0 Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 28 .20 Ibid."1 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi s

section is derived from : Tenth Army TntvO-Plan 1—45 ; IIIAC OPlan 1—45, dtd 1Feb45 ,hereafter IIIAC OPlan 1—45 ; 1st MarDivOPlan 1—45, ICEBERG, dtd 10Feb45, here -

after 1st MarDiv OPlan 1—45 ; 6th MarDi vOPlan 1—45, dtd 10Feb45, hereafter 6th Mar-Div OPlan 1—45 .

910-229 0 - 69 - 6

of the airfields so that land-based ai rsupremacy over the target could b egained and held. An additional divi-dend derived from the capture of th eairfields would be their use as stagingbases for continuing mass air raids o nboth Japan and those areas within fly-ing range of Okinawa under enem ycontrol. As in the case of earlier am-phibious landings in the Pacific, certainpreliminary softening-up steps had t obe taken before the main assault waslaunched.

Kerama Retto was to be seized by the77th Infantry Division (Reinforced) o n26 March 1945, or six days before L -

Day. Following the first day of opera-tions in the Kerama Retto and begin-ning the night of the 26th, Marines o fthe FMF Amphibious Reconnaissanc eBattalion were to reconnoiter the reefislets of the island group . First theywere to investigate Keise Shima for th e

presence of enemy troops, and in th efollowing days and nights prior to L-

Day, they were to land on Aware Shima ,Mae Shima, and Kuro Shima . To sup-

port the landing on Okinawa, a fieldartillery group of XXIV Corps Artillery

was to land and be emplaced on Keis eShima prior to L-Day . While theseoperations were underway, Okinawawould receive increased air and nava l

gunfire bombardment which wouldmount in intensity until the first assaultwaves neared the beaches . At this time ,the fire would lift from the beach area

and continue inland .The Army and Marine divisions were

to land on the Hagushi beaches, General

Geiger's corps on the left. The mouthof the Bishi Gawa marked the begin-ning of the corps boundary, which

68


roughly followed the course of the rive rto a point just north of Kadena ; here ,the line headed almost due east to bisec tthe island. (See Map 4 . )

Once landed north of Hagushi town ,the Marine assault divisions were tomove rapidly inland, coordinating thei radvance with that of XXIV Corps . Onthe Marine left flank was the 6th Divi-sion ; the 22d Marines on the left an dthe 4th Marines, less its 2d Battalion i ndivision reserve, on the right . The 29thMarines, the third infantry regimen tof the 6th Division, was corps reserveand was to be ready to land on an yof the beaches. It was also to beprepared to revert one battalion landin gteam to the 6th Division on order .General Shepherd's initial mission wasthe capture of Yontan airfield whil eprotecting the northern flank of theTenth Army .

General del Valle's division, landin gto the right of the 6th, was to assist i nthe capture of Yontan by quickly seiz-ing the high ground northeast of China.The attack was then to continue, wit hmajor emphasis placed on maintainin gcontact with General Hodge's corps an dassisting his advance . The 1st MarineDivision scheme of maneuver placed th e5th and 7th Marines in the assault, 7thon the left, and the 1st Marines in divi-sion reserve .

Adjoining the 1st Marine Divisio nwas to be the 7th Infantry Division ,with one regiment in division reservebut under the operational control ofXXIV Corps. The other Army assaul tdivision was to be 96th, which was toland with two regiments abreast anda third in corps reserve .

Artillery support for the Marines wasto come from IIIAC Corps Artillery andthose artillery units organic to the di -

visions. General Geiger's guns were toland on his order to support the attackand, once ashore, corps artillery woul dcoordinate all supporting arms in theMarine sector . XXIV Corps Artillery ,less the group on Keise Shima, wouldland on General Hodge's order and sup -port the attack with long-range inter -diction, counterbattery, and harassin gfires . 2 2

Following the initial landing, opera-tions were designed to isolate thePhase I objective, which consisted ofthat part of the island lying south o fa general line drawn across the Ichi-kawa Isthmus, through Chimu, and in-cluding the Eastern Islands. In orderto prevent enemy reinforcement fromthe north and to fulfill its assignmen tin Phase I, IIIAC was to gain contro lof the isthmus as swiftly as possible .To seal off the Japanese in the south ,General Hodge's troops were to driveacross the island, his right flank unitsholding a line that ran through Futem ato Kuba Saki. Once the central portionof the island had been captured an dsecured, the direction of attack would befaced to the south and continued unti lall of the objectives of the first phasehad been achieved .

Phase II, the seizure of northern Oki-nawa and the capture of Ie Shima, wa sto be executed with Tenth Army troop slocally available when Buckner was sat-isfied that Phase I had been accom-plished. The first major military objec-

' 2 XXIV Corps F1dOrd 45, dtd 8Feb45, pp .4-8 .

PROJECT ICEBERG

69

tive in the north was Motobu Peninsula ,which was to be taken by means o fsimultaneously launched attacks fromsea and land . Once the peninsula ha dbeen gained, a shore-to-shore assaultwould be made against Ie Shima . Theend of Phase II would be signalled whenthe rest of northern Okinawa had beencaptured .

While higher echelon air planning for

ICEBERG detailed both strategic an dtactical missions, the Tenth Army wa smore immediately concerned with th elatter . Carrier-based tactical aviation,aboard the TF 52 escort carrier group(TG 52.1, Rear Admiral Calvin T .Durgin), was to provide the invasionforce with air support until Genera lMulcahy's squadrons were establishe dashore and could take over. At this time ,TAF would also be responsible fo roverall air defense .

When this responsibility was as-sumed, TAF operations would be base don the following order of priority : (1)attainment of air superiority by anni-hilation of enemy aircraft in the ai rand on the ground, and destruction ofenemy air installations ; (2) interdic-tion and destruction of enemy troop andsupply movements immediately withi nor heading towards the target area ;and (3) execution of combined air -ground attacks on specific frontline ob-jectives. The importance of the first

priority lay in Tenth Army recognition

of the yet-existing Japanese air strengthand the threat it posed to the invasion

force .

As soon as Air Defense Commandfighter squadrons were establishedashore on captured airfields, they were

to begin fulfilling their assigned mis-sions. From these fields, ADC was t oprovide air defense to ground units onthe island and naval forces in its en-virons. Combat air patrols, close airsupport, and other related flight mis-sions were considered the means bywhich the defense was to be maintained .Although it was a function of ADC ,

close air support is not normally a part

of air defense ; it is more closely asso-

ciated with a ground offensive concept.

Despite this fact, however, Okinawa' sterrain and the nature of the Japanesedefenses were to provide Marine avia-tors of the Air Defense Command withample opportunities to display close ai rsupport techniques born of experienceaccumulated in earlier Pacific cam-

paigns .

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING 2 3

Fortunately for those preparing ICE-

BERG, much in the logistical plans for

the cancelled Formosa operation coul d

23 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi ssection is derived from : ICEBERG Study ;CTF 51 OPlan Al—45, dtd 16Feb45, hereafte r

CTF 51 OPlan A1—45 ; CTF 51 General ActionReport, Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases Iand II, 17Feb-17May45, dtd 25Ju145, hereafte r

CTF 51 AR; CinCPOA OPlan 14—44; TenthArmy TntvOPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR;USAFMidPac G—5 Hist ; IIIAC, AR, Ryukyu sOperation, Phases I and II (Okinawa), dt d1Ju145, hereafter IIIAC AR ; Tactical AirForce, Tenth Army, OPlan 1—45, dtd 10Feb45 ,hereafter TAF OPLAN 1—45; TAF AR ;

IsCom OPlan No . 1, LEGUMINOUS [codename assigned to island of Okinawa], dtd1Feb45, hereafter IsComOPlan No. 1 ;IsCom, Okinawa, AR, 13Dec44-30Jun45, dtd

30Jun45, hereafter IsComAR ; War Reports ;1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I & II .

70


be salvaged and adapted for the inva-sion of Okinawa with but few changes .Without competent logistics planningof the highest order, and utilization ofa resupply and shipping support sched-ule designed to function with clockworkprecision, the target date for the Oki-nawa operation could not have been met .This would have caused all relatedplanned strategy to have been eithernullified or advanced to a later date .

The logistics plan for Okinawa "wa sthe most elaborate one of its kind de-veloped during World War II, involvingprearranged movement of both assaul tand cargo shipping over vast ocean dis-tances ."24 The plan required establish-ment of a 6,000-mile-long supply line,stretching across the Pacific, with 1 1different ports-of-call, 25 to support th emounting of 182,821 troops encumbere dwith some 746,850 measurement tons 2 6

of cargo loaded into 434 assault trans -ports and landing ships .

A great limitation imposed upon pre -invasion logistical planning was th eshortage of shipping and the delay inthe return from the Philippines of th evessels which were to be used for Oki-nawa. Seeking a solution to lift andtimetable problems was not the onlyconcern of the Tenth Army logistics

°4 Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leigh -ton, "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–194 5—U. S. Army in World War II" (unpublishedMS, OCMH), pt VI, "Shift to a One-Fron tWar," chap XXIV, p . 26.

2E Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, New Georgia ,Makin, Kwajalein, Saipan, Ulithi, Manus ,Milne Bay, Finschhafen, and Hollandia .

2e Measurement ton is defined as a unit o fcarrying capacity of a ship, usually equal t o40 cubic feet; it is sometimes designated afreight ton .

staff, "for the mere loading of mor eships led only to congestion at the re-ceiving end unless the development o funloading facilities kept pace." 2 7

It had been decided that the Hagushibeaches were sufficiently large to handl ethe supply tonnage required by the as-sault echelon of two corps and their sup -port troops ; however, it was impossibleto prophesy exactly how soon after thelandings the beachhead would be secure dand the advance continued inland, or ho wsoon thereafter base development couldbegin and the supplies for this aspec tof Phase I would be required andavailable. Nor was it possible to fore -cast the possibility that Phase II wouldbe completed before the accomplishmen tof Phase I. Nonetheless, estimates o ftroop progress had to be made in orderto prepare a logistics plan at all .

The main features of the ICEBER Glogistics plan required an initial suppl ylevel to be taken to Okinawa by the as-sault troops who were mounted at suchdistantly scattered points as Leyte ,Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, Banika ,Pavuvu, Saipan, Eniwetok, Oahu, andthe west coast of the United States .Upon completion of the assault phas eof the landing, a staggered series o fsupply shipments would replenish th eTenth Army in accordance with a sched-ule established earlier. This timetablehad been based on the estimated timerequired to conduct combat operation sashore and, in turn, on how quickly thebeach and port capacity could be ex-panded .

27 Coakley and Leighton, op . cit., pt V, "TheWar Against Japan, 1943–1944," chap XVIII ,p. 3.

PROJECT ICEBERG

71

Beginning on 20 February 1945, ICE -BERG replenishments were to leave th ewest coast every 10 days for regulatin gpoints at Ulithi, Eniwetok, and Saipan ,the first shipments to arrive at eachplace on L minus 5 (27 March) . Thesupplies would remain at these pointsuntil they were called-up by Genera lBuckner. It was planned to continuethese automatic resupply shipments fora period of 210 days beyond L-Day. TheTenth Army was also to have emer-gency reserves located at Saipan, Ti-nian, and Guam.

The prediction of supply require-ments depended upon completed tactica lplans, a firm troop basis, and othernecessary items of information whic heither were nonexistent or had not ye tbeen made available to the logistic splanners. Adding to the logistics di-lemma was the factor of time, for i tlook 120 days for supplies to be requisi-tioned, procured, and shipped from th ePacific Coast of the United States t othe objective .

To facilitate the preparation and ship-ment of resupply items in accordancewith the scheduling of the various in-vasion echelons, Army commanders es-tablished a standard unit of supply, o r"block requisitions," tailored specifi-cally to the organization of each of th esupport and assault elements. Thecomposition of the individual blockrequisition was determined by estimat-ing the logistic support required by aparticular unit for a given number ofdays regardless of the combat situation .

In contrast to this approach, Marinesupply agencies, drawing on their ex-perience, felt that the combat situation

as envisioned in the planning stage sshould govern the nature of the supplie srequisitioned, and the number, types ,and frequency of shipments . TenthArmy considered the Marine system tobe more flexible than the Army's be-cause the requisitioning agencies werebetter able to make the several auto-matic resupply shipments conform t otheir view of how the campaign wouldprogress .

Each service was responsible for ini-tial support of its own elements in th eOkinawa task force, with the exceptio nof troops mounting in the South andSouthwest Pacific. Area commandersthere would be charged with logistica lsupport of units assigned to ICEBERG .After the landing had been accom-plished, and when directed by Admira lTurner, Island Command would tak eover as the Tenth Army central suppor tagency charged with funneling supplie sto all of the assault forces .

Early in January 28 it became obviousthat ICEBERG had been allocated in -sufficient shipping to accomplish thetactical mission, to support base devel-opment, and to lift to the target thos eair units which were to be committedearly in the campaign . An inadequatetransport quota for engineer units ,whose services would be needed in th e

" Actually, questions regarding the alloca-tion of shipping had appeared earlier, for o n24 November 1944, Colonel Francis B . Loomis ,Jr., the G—4 of IIIAC, reported in at the TenthArmy headquarters for a short tour of tem-porary duty . General Geiger apparently wasconcerned about the shipping problem andbelieved it necessary to have a G—4 representa-tive with the army . Smith, Personal Narrative ,p . 9 .

72


early development of airfields, roads,and waterfront facilities, was improve dslightly by scheduling the immediatereturn of assault LSTs to Saipan afte rthe initial landings to shuttle eight navalconstruction battalions (Seabees) to th etarget. In the same manner, other LST swould be sent to Leyte to pick up an yXXIV Corps equipment not carried i nassault shipping . 2 9

Of the overall inadequate shippingsituation and its effect on the combatdivisions, the former G–4 of the Tent hArmy recalled that, if needed, ICE -BERG was to get all shipping availabl ein the Pacific, because :

the amount of assault shipping assignedfor the operation was far below that re-quired to properly lift the assault elementsof the Tenth Army . This resulted in [th eTenth Army being given] authority t omodify Combat Loading Doctrine so thatthe most essential equipment and supplie scould accompany the assault echelon . Ad-ditional items that should have been inthe assault echelon were loaded in a sub-sequent shipping echelon . 3 0

The overall assault lift was aug-mented by other means also. Vessels t obe used for the Luzon and Iwo Jimalandings were made available later forOkinawa through adherence to a strin-gently monitored and thoroughly regu-lated shipping schedule . Additiona lspace for Tenth Army troops was gainedby reducing the tonnage requirementsof IIIAC, substantially at the expens eof the 2d Marine Division . It was rea-

=° Blakelock ltr .

'° BGen David H. Blakelock, USA, ltr toAsst G-3, HQMC, dtd 6Nov65, hereafterBlakelock ltr 1965 .

soned that since the division was no tgoing to be committed immediately, i tcould acquire whatever additional ship -ping it needed within a short timefollowing the initial assault . Furtherlift capacity was gained by loadinglanding ships to their rated limits, bythe addition to the invasion flotilla ofnewly constructed attack transports(APAs) with greater cargo-carryin gcharacteristics, and by an increased al -location of landing ships, tank, (LSTs )and landing ships, medium (LSMs) .

The shipping allocation for the garri-son forces was governed by the esti-mated capacity of Okinawan beach andport unloading facilities. Past experi-ence, however, resolved the size of thelift necessary to transport an assaultechelon of three reinforced Marine di -visions, three reinforced Army divisions ,a Marine amphibious corps headquar-ters and corps troops, and an Armycorps headquarters and corps troops .Thus, the required assault tonnage wa sa firm figure from the beginning andwas deducted from that allotted to theICEBERG forces overall . The remainderwas assigned as the lift for Tenth Armysupport troops, which included air ,naval, and airfield construction units .

After the Marianas and Palau opera-tions, it was found that one transpor tgroup (12 APAs and 3 cargo ships,attack (AKAs) ), made up of thre etransport divisions, had sufficient liftcapacity for a combat-loaded reinforce dinfantry division . For the ICEBER Glift, however, a new shipping echelon,the transport squadron (transron) wasformed to carry a proportionate shar eof assault forces, corps troops, and ele-

PROJECT ICEBERG

73

ments from corps and army headquar-ters. The transron was nothing but th eold transport group augmented by thre eAPAs and three AKAs .

Each transron was to be accompanie dby one APH, which was a troop trans -port specially rigged as a hospital an dequipped to treat casualties and thenevacuate them from the battle zone . 3 1

There were to be six hospital ships(AHs) assigned to ICEBERG ; one wasto be on station L minus 5 with theKerama Retto invasion group, threewere assigned to the main attack forcesand were to arrive off Hagushi on L plus1, while the other two were scheduledto reach Okinawa three days later .

Improved casualty evacuation wa s

planned for this invasion by assigning

four hospital landing ships (LST (H) s )

to each of the two naval attack force s

in the major assault . Assigned to each

vessel was a naval medical officer who

functioned as an evacuation control

officer and, as such, was responsible for

screening the wounded as they arrived ,

giving treatment and classifying them

with reference to their estimated recov-ery time, and transferring the casualtie sin accordance with the provisions of asystem related to their recovery classi-

fication. Accordingly, hospital ship swould evacuate those men wounde dseriously enough to require hospitaliza-

tion for two months or more . Casualtie srequiring treatment for a minimum o f

a1 The APH should not be confused with th ebetter-known hospital ship (AH), which i sunarmed and protected only by internationa lrecognition of the provisions of the Genev aConvention.

two and a maximum of eight weekswould be evacuated in APHs during theinitial assault phase and, after that ,would receive further treatment i nhospitals established on Okinawa . Thosemen who could be returned to dutywithin two weeks after being wounde d

would be treated and held in the hospita l

transports or landing ships until the yhad fully recovered or until the land-based hospitals had been established .

The LST (H) s were to remain on sta-tion until released by Admiral Turner ,

at which time the medical officers aboard

would land and assign casualties directl y

to the ships from aid stations set up o n

the beaches . When General Buckner as-

sumed command ashore, he would

become responsible for the establishmen t

and administration of medical services

on the island, and for air evacuatio n

of casualties, when airfields becam e

operational .

The equipment and supplies to be

taken to Okinawa by the corps and the

divisions had been specifically desig-

nated by Tenth Army order . After carg o

space in assigned shipping had been allo -

cated to this material, any other avail -

able space would be filled by additional

items which the corps and division com-

manders had decided the troops coul d

carry. Logistical planning on the di -

vision level was influenced by the suppo-

sition that the beaches would be heavil y

defended and that the inland advance

stubbornly resisted. As a result, only"hot cargo," predetermined blocks of

high-priority supplies, was to be lande d

on L-Day . Included in a block of cargo

74


were one CinCPOA unit of fire 32 forall weapons and rations and water forone day. Moreover, all organic divisionmotor transport would be taken to th etarget in available shipping space be-cause the prospect of prolonged opera-tions over a relatively large land mas senvisioned wide-spread use of vehicles . 3 3

To assist in Marine logistical plannin gand preparations, Fleet Marine Force ,Pacific, established the 2d Field ServiceCommand on Guadalcanal . Here rela-tively close liaison could be maintainedwith Marine ICEBERG elements mount-ing from the Solomons. This servicecommand was empowered to coordinatethe efforts of the supply agencies ofboth the 1st and 6th Marine Divisionsand to deal with Army and Navy sourcesof supply directly. In the same manner,the Marianas-based 1st Field ServiceCommand assisted the 2d Marine Divi-sion. Re-equipment of General del Valle' sdivision on Pavuvu was relatively simpl esince its primary supply source, the 4thBase Depot, under the 2d Field Servic eCommand, was on the other majorisland in the Russells, Banika. Genera lShepherd's division experienced somedifficulties, however, because its suppl ysource was a transfer rather than a

"' CinCPOA Unit of Fire Table, dtd 6Dec44 ,included in Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45, Anx13, App B, was based on the successful criteri aestablished by use during the Central Pacificlandings . Allocation of ammunition for variousordnance was, for example : 100 rounds foreach M—1 ; 1,500 rounds for .30 caliber and 60 0rounds for .50 caliber machine guns ; 275rounds for 60mm and 81mm mortars ; 250rounds for 105mm howitzers ; 150 rounds fo r155mm howitzers .

"1st MarDiv SAR, pp . 1-2 .

stocking agency and had to obtain it srequisitioned items from the 4th Bas eDepot . As a result of the cumbersomeand time-consuming administrative pro-cedures involved in processing requisi-tions through the several serviceechelons in the area, the 6th Divisio nexperienced many delays in the deliveryof much of its needed equipment an dsupplies . 34 Both assault divisions, how -ever, embarked for the target with bu tfew shortages, none of which affectedcombat readiness and efficiency .

By the time that the TAF logistics sec-tion had been activated, AirFMFPac

had already issued warning orders an d

was in the process of preparing subordi-nate units for the impending campaign .

The basis for logistic support of Marin eaviation units was different, in certai n

ways, from that of Marine ground ele-ments . While items peculiar to the Ma-

rine Corps were drawn by both groundand air units from the same sources, al l

technical aviation materiel was receive d

through Navy supply channels or, i nsome cases, from the Army . Since thi swas the case, the TAF logistics staff

established liaison with representative sof Commander., Aircraft, Pacific Flee t(ComAirPac) , the agency responsible

for fulfilling the fuel and installationrequirements at the Okinawa air field sthe TAF units were to occupy . The sup-

ply section of Commander, Naval Ai r

Bases, Okinawa (ComNABS) was made

"° 6th MarDiv SAR, Okinawa Op, Ph III, dt d30Jun45, pp . 5-6, hereafter 6th MarDiv SAR ,Ph III, and including the SARs of the followingunits : 4th, 15th, 22d, and 29th Marines, here-after (unit) SAR, Ph III .

PROJECT ICEBERG

75

the ComAirPac type command logisticsrepresentative for these matters .

All other supply requirements wer eto be handled by the supply section o fthe Navy's Pacific service command .Liaison was also established with Arm yAir Forces logistics representatives todetermine the nature and extent of sup-port required by Army elements in Gen-eral Mulcahy's command . Arrangement swere then made to obtain special comba tclothing and equipment for the AA Fpersonnel to be assigned to TAF . Basedupon the latter's recommendations, auto-matic resupply shipments for the Arm ysquadrons were adjusted to coincid ewith the schedule established for theMarines .

The organization and general admin-istration of the supply system on Oki-nawa was to be an Island Commandfunction, in which it would receive anddistribute Tenth Army supplies . TheMarine groups in TAF, however, woul dsupport their own squadrons and woul ddraw Marine Corps supplies from the2d Wing or other designated Marinesources. Air base commanders wouldprovide aviation fuel and lubricants t osquadrons operating from their strips ;all technical aviation supplies were tobe requisitioned through ComNABS ,Okinawa .

Service units organic to the AAFfighter and bombardment groups woul dsupport the flying squadrons of each . Al l

supplies other than the technical itemspeculiar to AAF planes would be requisi-tioned from sources designated by theIsland Commander. Until an Air Servic eCommand Depot was established on Oki-nawa, the one at Guam would supply th eremainder.

BASE DEVELOPMENT ANDMILITARY GOVERNMENTPLANNING 3 5

A second logistic mission given toICEBERG, separate yet related to theassault effort, was the immediate de-velopment of Okinawa as an advancedair and fleet base . In order to support al lof the aircraft assigned to the invasion ,eight airfields and one seaplane basewere to be built almost immediatelyand during the later phases of the opera-tion this number would be increased .Also, two ports were to be developed—one, Nakagusuku Wan, by the Navy an dthe other, Naha harbor, by the Army .Since Okinawa was to serve merely as astaging base for final operations agains tJapan, it was not contemplated that th einstallations on the island were to b eof permanent construction . Ie Shimawas included in the base developmen tprogram as the island was to hold fou rairfields and to garrison ground andantiaircraft artillery defense troops .

Base development would proceed righton the heels of the assault troops as tw oof Okinawa's airfields were to be seized ,

improved, and made operational by Lplus 5, while two more fields were to beavailable by L plus 20. The preparationof Okinawa as a mounting and stagin gpoint was to be undertaken concurrently .First priority was given the early de-velopment and activation of airfields ;next in order of importance was th econstruction of bulk fuel storage facili-ties ; and the third most important mat -

35 Unless otherwise noted the material in thi ssection is derived from : ICEBERG Study ;USAFMidPac G—5 Hist ; War Reports ; TenthArmy AR ; IsCom OPlan No. 1 ; IsCom AR.

76


ter was the development of waterfrontinstallations . Reflecting the urgency ofthese tasks, every effort was made toschedule the shipments of supplies re-quired to support base improvement sothat they would arrive at the islandwhen they were needed . Accordingly ,garrison troops and the materials whic hthey were to employ were to arrive i n17 successive echelons . The timing oftheir arrival was governed not only b ythe preplanned work schedule but alsoby the projected unloading capacity ofthe captured beaches .

To establish this schedule, a series ofechelonment conferences were heldbetween the staffs of the Tenth Armyand the different type commanders wh owere furnishing troops for the opera-tion. In any large amphibious operation ,it is neither possible nor feasible, be -cause of shipping limitations, to trans -port to the target in the assault convoyboth those troops required to undertakethe campaign to its end and the troops ,equipment, and supplies required to de-velop the captured base . Even if all re-quired shipping had been made availabl efor an operation of the size of Okinawa ,it would have been patently undesirabl eto schedule the simultaneous arrival a tthe target of both assault and . garrisontroops. Until the assault forces ha dlanded, unloaded their shipping, andgained enough room on the beaches forthe landing of the garrison elements andequipment, the shipping in which garri-son troops were embarked would havehad to lie off Okinawa, where it wouldhave been vulnerable to enemy subma-rines and aircraft . For these reasons, i twas imperative that echelonment planscovering the movement of thousands of

assault, service, and construction troop shad to be precise .

In addition to its other functions ,Island Command was also to establish amilitary government on Okinawa . Sincethis was to be the first Pacific operation inwhich large numbers of enemy civilian swould be encountered by combat troops ,it was expected that the island wouldserve as a valuable testing ground ofcivil affairs and military governmentprocedures which would be appliedlater when Japan itself was occupied .

In 1943, the JCS gave the Navy basi cresponsibility for establishing militarygovernment on certain outlying islandsof the Japanese Empire, once they hadbeen captured . Included in this groupwere the Ryukyus . Because the TenthArmy would be in overall control of th eOkinawa land campaign, Admira lNimitz believed that General Bucknershould be responsible for military gov-ernment on the island . Accordingly, oncethe War Department concurred in thi stransfer of authority, CinCPOA wa sable to get the 1943 JCS order reversed .

Because of its European commitments ,the Army was unable to furnish all ofthe civil affairs personnel needed t oround out the entire Tenth Army mili-tary government component. Therefore ,the Navy supplied Brigadier Genera lWilliam E. Crist's command with navalofficer and enlisted personnel so thatMilitary Government would have well -balanced teams.

Direct naval participation in militar ygovernment planning for Okinawa be-gan in July 1944, when work was begunin New York City by the research staffof the Chief of Naval Operations' mili-tary government section . The pooled

PROJECT ICEBERG

77

efforts of the staff resulted in the Civi lAffairs Handbook for the RyukyuIslands, a publication which proved to b eof inestimable value to Tenth Army civi laffairs administrators during both th eICEBERG planning phase and the reha-bilitation period after Okinawa had bee nsecured . 3 6

The ICEBERG joint staff study origi-nally anticipated that, within the Oki-nawan population to come under Tenth

Army control, a small element would be

"antipathetic" and would have to be

"placed under detainment pending

screening and probable internment ." No

figures were available to determine ho w

many mainland Japanese civilians onOkinawa might possibly be captured ,

but preparations had to be made for the

construction of an internment camp

whose facilities were flexible enough toprovide for upwards of 10,000 island

natives and Japanese civilian internees .It was expected that by L plus 40 thi s

number would skyrocket to an approxi-mate total of 306,000 captured civilians ,

whose food, clothing, and housing woul dhave to come from captured stocks o f

salvagable material, since there was n oroom aboard assault ships for supplie s

of this nature . By the time ICEBER G

had reached the garrison phase, 12 mili-tary government camps were to bein operation, each unit staffe dand equipped to handle 2,500—10,00 0

civilians .

a9 Deputy Commander for MilGovt ltr t oComNOB, Okinawa, and Chief MilGovt Officer,Ryukyus, dtd 1Ju145, Subj : Rpt of MilGovtActivities for Period from 1Apr45 to 1Ju146 ,hereafter MilGovt AR .

Assigned to General Crist's jointlystaffed military government sectionwere such varied Army and Navy unit sas a military police battalion, a truckcompany, 20 Navy dispensaries, and 6Navy hospital units . In addition to theseand some purely administrative ele-ments, 350 officer and 890 enlisted civi laffairs personnel were organized int ofour types of teams, each of which ha dbeen tailored for specific functions . Oneof the teams was assigned to each of th eassault divisions and, after landing, wasto conduct preliminary reconnaissanc emissions relating to military govern-ment as the attack advanced . Teams inanother group, attached to the two corp sand all divisions also, were to takecharge of civil affairs behind the frontlines as civilians were encountered b ythe combat forces . A third type of teamwas made up of refugee camp adminis-trators, while in the fourth categorythere were six teams, each of which wa sto take charge of one of the six militarygovernment districts into which Oki-nawa was to be divided .

The Chief Military Government Offi-cer was to be directly subordinate to theIsland Commander and would functionas his deputy. The importance of thi sclose relationship and the emphasi splaced on intensive civil affairs plannin gwas justified later during the campaign ,when, by 30 April, there were approxi-mately 125,000 civilians under militar ygovernment jurisdiction on Okinawa .This figure climbed steadily followingthis date, reached 147,829 by 31 May,172,670 by 15 June, and totaled 261,11 5

on 30 June . 3 7

34 Tenth Army AR, chap 11, sec XXVII, p . 4 .

78


INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 3 8

In October 1944, the statement that"information as to enemy defensive in-stallations on Okinawa Jima i smeager," 39 was indisputable. Despit ethe early lack of information concernin gthe island, the various intelligence gath-ering and processing agencies in thePacific, as well as those in the UnitedStates, began to sift through availabl ematerial and soon were able to clarif ythe enemy situation for ICEBER Gforces. In keeping with the establishe dprinciple of coordinated planning, th ecorporate activities of all intelligenceagencies in the various Pacific com-mands quickly resulted in the productio nof urgently needed basic intelligence .

Currently valid military informationof the Japanese situation was difficul tto obtain because of the location of Oki-nawa within the Empire's well-pro-tected, strategic, inner defense line .For the most part, captured documents ,interrogations of prisoners as well as o fformer island inhabitants, and old Jap-anese publications provided the basi sfor the intelligence estimates initiall yissued . 40 In addition, the Navy was abl eto make use of both captured and pre-viously available hydrographic chart s

39 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : ICEBERG Study ;CTF 51 OPlan A1—45 ; CTF 51 AR ; TenthArmy TntvOPlan 1—45 ; Tenth Army AR ;ILIAC OPlan 1—45 ; ILIAC AR ; 1st MarDivOPlan 1—45 ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 6th MarDi vSAR, PhI&II .

' B ICEBERG Study, App A (Enemy Strengthand Capabilities), p . 19 .

40 Admiral Turner's intelligence staff dis-covered the existence in the United States ofan American civilian who, having spent manyyears in Japan and Okinawa, was able to

for navigational studies of the water s

surrounding Okinawa .For a terrain study, a determinatio n

of the location and nature of enemy de-fenses, and an estimate of enemystrength, most of the data at hand wasinadequate and an aerial photographi cmission over the target had to be lai don. In conjunction with other informa-tion of the enemy received right up toL-Day, the thorough interpretation an devaluation of these photographs enable dTenth Army to issue detailed intelli-gence studies which contained an ac -curate estimate of the Japanese situ-ation .

Aerial photos were required also fo ruse in the production of a map of thetarget. It was difficult to obtain ade-quate photographic coverage at first be -cause of the distance of Okinawa fromthe closest Allied air base, some 1,20 0nautical miles . This factor limited theconduct of such missions to either car-rier aircraft, whose ships could carrythem close to the target, or B-29s .Other obstacles to the amassing of acomplete intelligence picture of Oki-nawa were the notoriously poor weathe rover the target, the vastness of the lan dmass to be photographed, and theschedule of carrier strikes against th etarget—few of which were timed tocoincide with immediate Tenth Armyintelligence requirements.

On 29 September 1944, the first ICE -BERG photographic mission was flownby B-29s . While they covered all ofOkinawa, and the outlying islands to adegree, the results of this flight were

divulge much valuable information . "He worke dwith this section and later worked with boththe Army and the Navy at the objective ." CTF51 AR, pt V, sec A, p . 1 .

PROJECT ICEBERG

79

limited by clouds which obscured abou thalf of the area photographed, mainlythe northern portion of the majorisland . Because of this inadequate photocoverage, the first map produced an ddistributed had many blank portions i nwhich there was little or no topographi cdetailing . Modifications of this first ma pwere made later in the campaign, whencaptured Japanese maps provided morethorough contouring information .

During the first fast-carrier strikeson Okinawa Gunto of 10 October 1944,large scale vertical and oblique aeria lphotographs were acquired, giving 9 0percent coverage of the area . From 29September 1944 to 28 March 1945, atotal of 224 photo-reconnaissancesorties were flown over the target. In-formation gained from these photo-graphs was collated and analyzed, an dthe resultant intelligence summarieswere distributed to Tenth Army units .

In the week preceding L-Day, escortcarrier-based photographic aircraftflew daily missions over the island .Careful interpretation of the photo sthus obtained permitted bomb damageassessments and, at the same time, com-parison of these photos with ones take nearlier enabled the interpreters to locatemany enemy installations previouslyconcealed by effective camouflage . Froma close study of successive sorties, it wa spossible to determine each displacementof the enemy's defensive positions, tohazard guesses of his relative strength ,and to compile a preliminary target in-formation list for distribution to artil-lery units. 4 1

41 IIIAC Artillery Action Report, Phase I ,Nansei Shoto, lApr-30Jun45, dtd 25Ju145, p . 7 ,hereafter IIIAC Arty AR .

After L-Day and while the fightingwas still in progress, the island was com-pletely rephotographed, the results o fwhich enabled a more accurate map t obe printed and distributed . 42 A scale of1 :25,000 was used for the basic maporiginally issued from which maps o fthe initial zones of action, scaled at1 :10,000., were produced for the use ofthe lower echelon assault units . At thesame time, smaller scale maps were re -produced for use as road maps in trafficcontrol planning .

The Tenth Army made rubber relief

maps on a scale of 1 :10,000, which wer eissued to General Geiger's troops i n

sufficient quantity to permit distribu-tion down to and including assault bat-

talions . The mapping sections of IIIAC ,and the 1st and 6th Marine Division s

worked together to produce plastic ter -

rain models of the corps zone of action .

Made to a scale of 1 :5,000 and con-structed with a 2 :1 vertical exagger-

ation, these models facilitated the brief-ing of commanders and their troops for

the prospective operation . Wholesale

distribution of these relief models wa s

made soon after the troops embarkedfor the target, at which time some 60 0

copies of a 1 :5,000 map of the landin g

beaches, specially prepared by the 1st

42 " . . . the absence of an adequate one overtwenty five thousand map during the planningphase, and even during the early phases of theoperation, served greatly in influencing every -thing the landing force did. It was often acritical impediment. As a matter of fact, thearea in which the 6th Division operated a searly as L-plus 4 had large blank segments onthe map." CMC [Gen. Lemuel C . Shepherd ,Jr.] Memo to G-3, dtd 18Jan55, hereafte rShepherd memo I.

80


Marine Division., were issued to its as-sault units .

To supplement aerial photographs ,the USS Swordfish, a specially equippe dsubmarine, was dispatched to Okinawafrom Pearl Harbor on 22 Decembe r1944 with the mission of photographin gOkinawa's beaches and Japanese defen-sive installations on the island coasts .After making her last known radi otransmission on 3 January 1945, th esubmarine was never heard from agai nand was reported missing. As a result,no beach photographs were taken be-fore L-Day for, as succinctly stated inthe TF 51 AR, "no information fromsubmarine reconnaissance was avail -able." 4 3

In October 1944, enemy strength onOkinawa was set at 48,600 . It was esti-mated that two well-trained and experi-enced infantry divisions, and a tankregiment, comprised the major defenseforce on the island . At this time, it wasrecognized that an additional threat tothe landings was posed by the size o fthe civilian population located in south -ern Okinawa. This manpower potentialof more than 300,000 individuals woul dswell the enemy strength figure if theywere used to form a home guard ormilitia, or to conduct guerrilla activ-ities. In January 1945, the Tenth Armyestimate assumed that the Japanesereinforcement capability could increasethe regular force figure to 66,000 byL-Day, at which time enemy defenseforces on Okinawa would be two and ahalf infantry divisions . If the enemy

'g Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarin eOperations in World War II (Annapolis :United States Naval Institute, 1949), pp .446—447 ; CTF 51 AR, pt V, sec A, p . 1 .

exerted his maximum reinforcementcapability, he could then oppose the

landing with four infantry divisionsconstituting the principal combat ele-ments of the defense . Total Japanesestrength would then be 87,000 men .

All possible Japanese courses ofaction were considered, and troop dis-positions for each course were ana-lyzed in light of what was known o fcurrent Japanese tactical doctrine and

its evolution to date. All indicationspointed to the fact that the enemy woul dmost likely organize the southern thirdof Okinawa for a defense in dept hwhile the bulk of his troops were with-held as a mobile reserve . This course ofaction would present a potentially mor edangerous situation to the landing forc ethan would the more commonly experi-enced alternative of a determined de-fense of the beaches .

An interpretation of aerial photo-graphs in February revealed that th eenemy force on Okinawa comprised twoinfantry divisions and an independentmixed brigade, service and supporttroop reinforcements for the infantry,all totaling an estimated 56,000–58,00 0men. It also appeared that, while th efar northern sector was defended by asingle battalion only, the main forc ewas disposed in the south in the pro-jected XXIV Corps area .. In the IIIAmphibious Corps zone of action, it wasestimated that two infantry regiment sdefended . Conceivably, these six orseven thousand men could be reinforcedby local auxiliaries .

While the small garrison in the northwas given the capability of mountingcounterattacks against the invader leftflank, it was expected that the most

PROJECT ICEBERG

81

violent enemy reaction would come fro mthe heavily defended south, on theXXIV Corps' right flank, where th eJapanese mobile reserve would be main-tained in considerable strength . It wasanticipated that, as soon as the Japa-nese had appraised the landing force' sdispositions, a counteroffensive in forcewould be mounted by the enemy reserve .

The estimate of Japanese strengthwas again revised in mid-February, thi stime downwards to 37,500—39,500, whe ninformation was received that a fulldivision had been withdrawn from Oki-nawa. In view of this reduction, andsupplemented by indications that th eenemy was concentrating in the Naka ,gusuku Bay area, it was presumed thatthe two Marine divisions would be op -posed in their zones by no more thanone infantry regiment deployed in posi-tion, and that the total number of Japa-nese troops in the overall sector woul dbe more than 10,000 .

This numbers guessing game con-tinued when, a month later, the esti-mate of Japanese defense forces wasrevised upwards to 64,000 . It appearedthat the enemy had been able to rein-force the garrison with an under -strength infantry division as well a swith some miscellaneous units of un-known origin, in all about 20,000 men .It was believed that an additional forceof 4,000—6,000 men had arrived inMarch, having been lifted by shippin gwhich successfully evaded the Allie dblockade. The Tenth Army assume dthat, if the March enemy reinforce-ments were the advance elements o fanother division, it was reasonable toassume further that by 1 April the land-ing force would be opposed by at least

75,000 men. In the week precedingL-Day, while the assault elements sortie dfor the target, still another estimate o fenemy strength in the IIIAC zone wa sissued. In this supplementary revision.,it was stated that the principal Japa-nese opposition now would come fro mtwo reinforced infantry regiments wit ha strength of 16,000 men .

Air and naval capabilities assigne dto the Japanese remained relatively un-changed all during the planning phase sof ICEBERG. At all times it was ex-pected that the enemy would be capableof mounting heavy and repeated airattacks against invasion shipping . Itwas expected that this vigorous ai reffort would include continued employ-ment and intensification of the suicidebombing tactics which first had appearedduring the invasion of Leyte in October1944. The Japanese were credited withan air strength of approximately 3,00 0planes which were based within rangeand capable of blunting the Okinaw alanding. Along with this air capability ,the enemy was believed able to moun tan airborne counterattack, for "as airaction is practically the only assistanc ehe can give the Okinawa garrison fromoutside [the island], he may expendconsiderable aircraft and endeavor t oland several thousand troops within ou rbeachhead." 4 4

It was known that the Japanese hadsuicide motor torpedo boat units at Oki-nawa and it was assumed that midge tsubmarines were based there also .Added to the possible tactical employ-ment of these suicide organizations wasthe potential use of suicide swimmer s

"Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45, anx 3, secV, p . 14 .

82


whose mission was also disruption o fthe invasion fleet at anchor off the ob-jective. Although the Japanese Nav ywas a mere shadow of its former self ,it still retained operational forcesstrong enough to pose a threat to th elanding's success . For that reason, i twas deemed necessary to maintain astrong surface cover at the objective .

While the southern part of Okinawawas ideally suited for the tactical use oftanks, the enemy was not given anarmored capability . This was becausethe relation of estimated tank strengthto the total estimated garrison strengthwas too low, and it was not felt that thi ssupport arm would offer any greatopposition .

Three months after Admiral Nimitzhad received the JCS directive for Oki-nawa's invasion, General Buckner

issued the initial operation order set-ting the ICEBERG juggernaut's wheel sinto motion. During the course of thi s

planning period., each Tenth Army gen-eral and special staff section prepare dthat portion of the operation order fo rwhich it was responsible while main-taining liaison with the subordinat eunits which were preparing to putwords into action. Although most of th eICEBERG assault, support, and garri-son forces did not issue their own oper-ation orders until January 1945, warn-ing orders had already alerted them tothe impending invasion .

CHAPTER 3

Assault Preparations

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS '

The Pacific-wide dispersion of troop s

and shipping assigned to ICEBER Gprevented the Tenth Army from con -

ducting either training or rehearsals as

a cohesive unit . Because of the vast dis-

tances separating General Buckner an d

his corps and division commanders, th e

latter were invested with the responsi-

bility for training their respective

organizations along the lines of Tenth

Army directives . With these orders as a

guide, all Marine units committed to th e

operation were trained under the super -

vision of FMFPac .

Assault preparations of ICEBER GArmy divisions were hindered by th e

limited time available for their rehabil-itation, reorganization, and training.

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thi ssection is derived from : CTF 51 AR; TenthArmy AR ; TAF AR; XXIV Corps AR ,Ryukyus, lApr-30Jun45, n .d., hereafter XXIVCorps AR ; ILIAC AR ; ILIAC Arty AR ; IsComAR ; MilGovt AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2 dMarDiv AR, Phase I, Nansei Shoto, dt d15Apr45, hereafter 2d MarDiv AR ; 6th MarDivSAR, Ph I & II ; 7th InfDiv OpRpt, Ryukyu sCampaign, dtd 30Ju145, hereafter 7th Inf DivOpRpt ; 27th InfDiv OpRpt, Phase I, Nanse iShoto, 1 Jan-30Jun45, dtd 19Ju145, hereafte r27th InfDiv OpRpt ; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, Phas eI (in 3 parts—Kerama Retto, Keise Shima ;Ie Shima ; Okinawa), n.d., hereafter 77thInfDiv OpRpt and appropriate part ; 96thInfDiv AR, Ryukyus Campaign, dtd 28Ju145 ,hereafter 96th InfDiv AR .

310-224 0 - 69 - 7

This was especially true in the case of

XXIV Corps units already in combat i n

the Philippines . Many of the garrison

and service units which were to be

attached to the various assault forces

were also handicapped by the time fac-

tor because they, too, were either fight-ing or heavily committed in support o f

operations in the Philippines. In order

that Tenth Army staff planners coul d

better evaluate the combat readiness of

all organizations within the command ,

each of General Buckner's commanders

submitted a monthly training status re-port to ICEBERG headquarters on

Oahu.`-' Since the reports lacked what an

inspection at first-hand could provide,

Buckner and some of his principal staff

officers made a series of flying trips t o

each of the corps and divisions . These

personal visits at the end of January

1945 "did much to weld the far-flun g

The voluminous training status report swere in reality check-off lists for newly forme ddivisions . When the Marine Deputy Chief ofStaff of the Tenth Army learned that th eIIIAC assault divisions, whose troops hadrecently been in combat and were in an ad-vanced state of training, had to submit thes ereports, he pointed out that preparation "o fthese reports merely harassed the divisions an dserved no useful purpose." Once Genera lBuckner "saw the training being engaged inby the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions . . . theword was passed to [Brigadier General] Silver-thorn to forget about the submission of theStatus Reports ." Smith, Personal Narrative ,p . 43 .

83

84


units of the Tenth Army into a unifiedwhole ." s

One determinant forcing the post-

ponement of the Formosa-South Chin ainvasion in favor of the Okinawa assaul t

had been the shortage of service and

support troops, a shortage that stil l

existed when the Tenth Army began it s

final training and rehearsal phases . 4Many of these specialist units were

slated to reinforce corps and division sfor the assault and then to augmen t

Island Command during the initial bas edevelopment . Because they were to o

deeply involved otherwise, often with

primary missions related to the buildu pfor the operation, the support troop s

could not train with the assault unit sthey were to reinforce. The time bor-rowed for training would seriously dis-

rupt the mounting and staging efforts

Blakelock ltr . Of Buckner's visit to hi sMarine units in the Solomons, General Geigerwrote : "General Buckner and five of his staffspent about three days with us the latter partof January. You know how difficult it is tomake a very favorable impressiart in the mu ddown here, especially in cleanliness of equip-ment ; but I believe he and his staff were satis-fied with what they saw. They spent a day witheach division observing training. We took themover to the 1st Division in a PBY-5A ." MajGenRoy S. Geiger Itr to LtGen Alexander A.Vandegrift, dtd 2Feb45 (Vandegrift Persona lCorrespondence File, HistBr, HQMC) .

' General Oliver P . Smith recalled that inorder to obtain at least a minimum of addi-tional service troops, the Tenth Army "had t ocomb the entire Pacific Ocean Area and resortto considerable improvisation . For example, aveteran tank battalion was broken up to makeQuartermaster Truck Companies . I happenedto talk to the battalion commander of thi stank battalion, who was heartbroken over th ematter . . . ." Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 12 .

for ICEBERG. Nevertheless, suppor tunit commanders carried out adequateindividual weapons' qualification an dphysical conditioning programs whic hmet Tenth Army training requirements .Although they were released to Genera lBuckner's control only a few days be-fore mounting for the target, a numbe rof garrison organizations were able t oconduct limited training with the com-bat outfit to which they were attached .

The major assault components of theTenth Army were battle-experienced forthe most part, but they needed to under-take an intensive training schedule i norder to bring veterans and newly ab-sorbed replacements alike to peak com-bat efficiency. To accomplish this task,Army and Marine Corps units in th eSouth Pacific, and the 2d Marine Divi-sion on Saipan, conducted extensiv eprograms which fulfilled the trainingrequirements stipulated by Genera lBuckner's directives . General Hodge' sXXIV Corps, however, was engaged inoperations on Leyte, and his division swere not released to Tenth Army byGeneral MacArthur until 10 February1945, 5 just two months before L-Day .

After the extended period of bitterfighting in the Philippines, however, thecombat units slated for ICEBERG wereunderstrength . General Hodge's prob-lems were further aggravated when hi sinfantry divisions were required to fur-

5 In 1944 when the JCS approved the recom-mended invasion of Leyte, the XXIV Corps wasfully combat loaded, already at sea, and e nroute for the invasion of Yap. As a result ofthe decision to land at Leyte, the Yap landingwas cancelled and the XXIV Corps was re -assigned to General MacArthur, who orderedit to invade Leyte on 20 October 1944 .

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS

85

nish the Leyte Base Command 6 withlarge working parties as soon as thetroops returned from mopping-up oper-ations at the front . The servicing, crat-ing, and loading of organic divisionequipment siphoned off the services o fother infantrymen as well as making i timpossible to impose a major trainin gprogram on any of the divisions .Finally, as one command reported, th e"deterioration of the physical an dmental condition of combat personne lafter 110 days of continuous contactwith the enemy made it plain tha trigorous field training in the wet an dmuddy terrain would prove more detri-mental than beneficial ." '

Besides undertaking the many othe rincidental duties preparatory to mount-ing for Okinawa from Leyte, some Armyunits had to construct their own camp sand make their own billeting arrange-ments as soon as they arrived in therear area from the front lines . Whatlittle time was available to the Souther n

Landing Force before L-Day wa sdivided between training in small-uni ttactics and practice for breaching andscaling operations, in anticipation of

the conditions to be found at Okinaw abeaches . Because of the large influx o fraw replacements into the divisions ,great emphasis was placed on develop-ing the teamwork of riflemen and thei r

supporting weapons .

Of the three divisions in XXIV Corps,the 96th was the most fortunate in that

° This logistical organization suffered fro ma chronic shortage of service troops whichthreatened the dual mission of the commandof supporting both the Luzon and Okinaw ainvasions.

7 7th Inf Div OpRpt, p . 28 .

some of its new troops arrived duringmopping-up stages on Leyte . At thattime, the replacements were given a nopportunity to take an "active part i ncombat and reconnaissance patrols ,gaining valuable battle indoctrinationthrough physical contact and skirmishe swith small isolated groups of Japa-nese ." 8

According to the Tenth Army Marin eDeputy Chief of Staff, General Smith :

The conditions of the Army division son Leyte gave General Buckner considera-ble concern. This was not the fault of thedivisions ; they were excellent divisions .However, they had been in action on Leytefor three months and two of the divisionswere still engaged in active operations . Th edivisions were understrength and adequatereplacements were not in sight . There wer e[numerous men suffering from] dysenter yand skin infections . Living conditions wer every bad . A considerable number of combattroops had been diverted to Luzon an d

converted into service troops . There wa ssome doubt as to whether reequipment

could be effected in time . 9

The fighting record of the XXIVCorps on Okinawa indicates how well i tovercame great obstacles in preparin g

for its ordeal. Once they had reconsti-tuted their combat organizations,trained their fresh replacements, andattended to the many details incident t omounting for the target, the vetera nunits of this corps were able to givegood accounts of themselves against th e

enemy.In the South Pacific and the Mar-

ianas, Tenth Army units were not a sheavily committed as the units of theSouthern Landing Force, and completeda more comprehensive training pro -

e 96th Inf Div AR, chap V, p . 1 .

° Smith, Personal Narrative, p. 47 .

86


gram. The 27th Infantry Division, ICE -BERG floating reserve, arrived atEspiritu Santo in the New Hebridesfrom Saipan during September andOctober 1944. The division was un-divided in its opinion that this base wa sa "hellhole," unfitted for the division'srehabilitation and training because o fthe island's torrid climate, its topog-raphy, and lush, tropical vegetation ."

Upon receipt of advance informationthat it was to take part in the Okinawaassault, the 27th instituted an acceler-ated combat training program whichwas calculated to qualify it, by 30January 1945, for a period of prolonge doperations against the enemy . Launchedon 23 October, the level of the programadvanced progressively from individua lschooling to combined company and bat -talion exercises and, finally, to a two-week stretch of regimental combat team(RCT) 11 maneuvers. During this stag-ing period, in which 2,700 replacement sarrived and were assigned, the divisionstressed training for offensive and de-fensive night operations .

Most Marines in IIIAC assault divi-sions had recently been in combat, ye ttheir training programs were stringentand comprehensive. Like all otherveteran ICEBERG forces, the Marin edivisions were confronted with the needto obtain, integrate, and train replace-

10 Capt Edmund G . Love, The 27th Infantr yDivision in World War II (Washington : Infan-try Journal Press, 1949), p. 521, hereafte rLove, 27th Inf Div Hist .

11 An RCT in an amphibious operation wa san infantry regiment reinforced by supportin garms, i.e ., artillery, tanks, engineers, etc .,which made up a balanced team for specifi cmissions and whose services were required forinitial operations ashore.

ments. Marine training overall empha-sized the development of a tank-infantry-artillery team and focuse dattention on tactical innovations such asthe use of the armored amphibian's75mm howitzer for supplementary artil-lery support. While other Tenth Arm yunits were required to undertake am-phibious training, General Geiger'stroops did not have to, since GeneralBuckner considered his Marine divi-sions eminently qualified in this aspectof warfare .

Following the Peleliu campaign, Gen-eral del Valle's 1st Marine Division hadreturned to Pavuvu for rest and re-habilitation. The division was firs tbased on the island in April 1944,arriving there after completion of th eNew Britain operation . At that time,and with some difficulty, the Guadal-canal and Cape Gloucester veterans con-verted the overrun coconut groves int osome semblance of a habitable canton-ment. Because of its small size, Pavuv uwas not particularly suited for trainingas large a unit as a division ; its terrainlimited the widespread construction ofmachine gun and mortar firing ranges . 1 2All artillery firing had to be conducte don Guadalcanal .

12 During the division training phase, physi-cal conditioning hikes were made on the shor eroad which encircled only that part of th eisland occupied by the division . Both sides ofthe road were used as units followed on eanother, the group on the inside track march-ing in a clockwise direction, while the oute rgroup hiked counterclockwise—both groupspassing each other several times as the ycrowded the limited road net . At mealtime, th eunmistakable smell of New Zealand-grow nsheep being cooked filled the air, and theMarines, as if one, would curse, "Mutton again ,dammit."


87

After its return from the Palaus, theranks of the 1st held some 246 officer sand 5,600 enlisted Marines who ha dalready served overseas nearly 30months. Within that time, the divisionhad made three assault landings and itwas now to make a fourth . If the divi-sion was to go ashore at full strength,it appeared, at first, that it would b enecessary for the veterans of Guadal-canal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu tofight at Okinawa too. A potentiall yserious morale problem was alleviate dwhen the division received four replace-ment drafts by 1 January . These drafts,plus a steady flow of individual replace-ments, brought officer strength toslightly above the authorized figureand exceeded the authorized enliste dstrength figure by more than 10 per -cent . As a consequence, all eligible en-listed Marines were able to return t othe States .

At the same time, an extensive leav eprogram was established for officerswho, though eligible, could not be spare dfor rotation. Fifty-three of them wer epermitted to take 30 days leave in theUnited States, after which they were t oreturn to Pavuvu . "In addition, six wentto Australia and one to New Zealand .Some fifty key enlisted men [eligiblefor rotation] also elected to take leavein Australia in order that they couldcontinue to serve in the First MarineDivision." 13 By the time the divisionembarked for Okinawa, approximatelyone-third of its Marines had been in tw oinvasions, one-third had faced theenemy once, and the remainder weremen who had seen no combat whatso -

13 1st MarDiv SAR, chap III (PersonnelAnx), pp . 2-3 .

ever. The majority of the latter werereplacements who had arrived atPavuvu while the 1st was at Peleliu .

As soon as the training cycle of Gen-eral del Valle's infantry units reached

the regimental level and outgrewPavuvu's facilities, each RCT was

rotated to Guadalcanal, about 65 mile sto the southeast, for two weeks of more

intensive combined-arms training . Spe-cial emphasis was given to preparingthe division for warfare of a type andon a scale differing in almost every re-spect from that which it experienced i n

the tropical jungles of Guadalcanal andNew Britain, and on the coral ridges of

equatorial Peleliu . As an integral partof a much larger force, this division wa s

to invade, for the first time, a land mass"which contained extensive road nets ,large inhabited areas, cities and vil-lages, large numbers of enemy civilians ,

and types of terrain" 14 not found in theSouth Pacific. Besides being schooled tofight under the conditions anticipated atOkinawa, the troops were trained to de-fend against paratroop attack and in-doctrinated in the techniques of dealingwith hostile civilians .

In commenting on the personnel situ-ation of his regiment during its trainin gperiod, the former commanding office rof the 11th Marines stated :

The heavy casualties suffered a tPeleliu, plus the rotation without imme-diate replacement of all officers and menwith 30 months' service in the Pacific afterthat battle, posed a severe problem . Onlyone battalion commander remained of thefour who went to Peleliu . There were onl yeight field officers in the regiment includ-ing myself and the [naval gunfire] officer .Fourteen captains with 24 months' Pacifi c

14 1st MarDiv SAR, chap IV, p . 1 .

88


service were allowed a month's leave plu stravel time in the United States, and the yleft Pavuvu at the end of November andwere not available for the trainingmaneuver at first. I recall that the 4thBattalion (LtCol L. F . Chapman, Jr .) hadonly 18 officers present including himself .He had no captains whatever. The otherbattalions and [regimental headquarters ]were in very similar shape . The 3d Bat-talion had to be completely reorganized du eto heavy casualties on Peleliu and was th eonly one with two field [grade] officers .But it had only about 20 officers of al lranks present. 1 5

General Shepherd's 6th Marine Divi-sion was activated on Guadalcanal inSeptember 1944, and was formed essen-tially around the 1st Provisional Marin eBrigade. This unit had taken part in th eGuam invasion and had been with -drawn from that island late in August .The infantry components of this newdivision were, with a few exceptions ,veterans of the Pacific fighting . The 4thMarines was made up of the disbandedMarine raider battalions, whose troop shad fought on Guadalcanal, NewGeorgia, and Bougainville ; the infantryregiment as a whole had landed o nEmirau and Guam. The 22d Marineshad participated in the Eniwetok andGuam campaigns, and the 1st Battalion ,29th Marines had augmented the 2 dMarine Division for the Saipan assault.After its relief on Saipan, 1/29 was sen tto Guadalcanal to await the arrival fromthe United States of its two sister bat-talions, and eventual assignment to the6th Division .

At the time of the 6th Marine Divi-sion activation, the division was som e1,800 men understrength and, as was

15 MajGen Wilburt S . Brown ltr to CMC, dt d10Oct54, hereafter Brown ltr.

the case with other IIIAC units, in veryfew instances did the classification o fthe replacements received by Genera lShepherd correspond to his actualneeds. Paralleling other instances,where the composition of stateside -formed replacement drafts did notsatisfy critical shortages in specific spe-cialist fields, the 15th Marines wa sassigned and forced to retrain antiair-craft artillerymen from disbanded de-fense battalions whose previous experi-ence and training was not considere dthe same as that needed by field artil-lerymen.

Most of the men in the 6th Divisio nhad fought in at least one campaign ,while others were Pacific combat vet-erans who were now beginning a secon dtour of overseas duty . The division wasbased on Guadalcanal, where kuna igrass and steaming tropical jungle pro-vided an excellent environment in whichGeneral Shepherd's men could fulfill arugged training schedule . The programbegan on 1 October and proceeded fromsmall-unit exercises through large-scal ecombined-arms problems employing bat-talion landing teams (BLTs) 16 andRCTs ; all training culminated in aneight-day division exercise in January1945 . Anticipating how the division wa sto be employed on Okinawa, Genera lShepherd emphasized the execution oflarge-unit maneuvers, swift movement,and rapid troop deployment .

The IIIAC Artillery faced the samereplacement retraining problems thatplagued the 15th Marines . When the 6th155mm Howitzer Battalion and th e

10 The BLT was reinforced for the assault i na manner similar to that of an RCT, but on alesser scale.


89

Headquarters Battery, 2d Provisional

Field Artillery Group, were formed inOctober and November 1944, thei rcadres were withdrawn from existin g

units of corps artillery . The latter wasfurther drained when 500 combat vet-erans, mostly valuable noncommis-sioned officers, were rotated home inNovember. There were few experience dartillerymen in the group replacing

them.

At the same time that rehearsal swere being conducted for the comin g

operations, Brigadier General David I .Nimmer's Corps Artillery battalionswere forced to conduct training sessions(retraining classes in the case of rada r

technicians and antiaircraft artillery-men coming from disbanded defensebattalions) in order to ensure that al lfiring battery personnel would be com-pletely familiar with the weapons towhich they were newly assigned .Another matter adversely affecting th e

artillery training program was the de -lay, until 15 November and 10 Decem-ber respectively, in the return of the 3 d155mm Howitzer and the 8th 155mmGun Battalions from the Palaus oper-ation. General Nimmer's organizationaland personnel problems were compli-cated further by the fact that approxi-mately 10 percent of his unit strengthjoined after active training ended inFebruary, while 78 communicators and92 field artillerymen did not join unti lafter Corps Artillery had embarked forOkinawa .

VMO-7, the Marine observationsquadron assigned to Corps Artillery ,did not arrive before General Nimmer'sunits mounted out, but joined them laterat the target. Three days before em -

barkation, the commanding officer ofthe 2d Provisional Field ArtilleryGroup joined . Despite these hitches t oIIIAC Corps Artillery pre-combat prep-arations, General Nimmer consideredall of his embarked artillery unitsready, although "both individual andunit proficiency were not up to th estandards that could have been obtaine dunder more favorable circumstances ." 1 4

As soon as General Geiger's staff be-gan planning for the Marine Corps rol ein ICEBERG, the commanders of th e

IIIAC Corps Artillery and the 11th an d15th Marines established liaison withone another in order to coordinate theirunit training programs. These seniorMarine artillery officers "resolved thatin this operation we would take ad -vantage of all previous experience, goodand bad, and give a superior perform-ance. Accordingly, great care was givento . . . the ability to rapidly mass firesof all available guns at any critica l

point ." 1 8

Artillery training was directed to-ward attaining this capability . Genera lNimmer's staff devised and wrote th estandard operating procedures to beused by all Marine artillery units as-signed to ICEBERG. These proceduresestablished the techniques to be used forrequesting and the subsequent deliver yof reinforcing fires . During the trainingperiod, firing batteries constantly putthe new doctrine into practice .

With the exception of the 12thMarines, the 2d Marine Division artil-lery regiment, all other Marine artilleryunits in the Tenth Army conducted a

" IIIAC Arty AR, p . 10.

' 8 Col Frederick P . Henderson ltr to CMC ,dtd 11Mar55, hereafter Henderson ltr .

90


combined problem on Guadalcanal, 11 –13 January . A majority of the firin gmissions were spotted by aerial ob-servers. Conditions anticipated on. Oki-nawa were simulated as closely as pos-sible, although the large militarypopulation and the consequent pro-fusion of various installations onGuadalcanal necessarily limited the siz eof the artillery ranges available for thebig guns . By the end of the combine dproblem, when a firing mission wascalled in, the Marines "were able tohave all artillery present, laid and readyto fire in an average of five minute sfrom the time it was reported." 1 9

General Watson's 2d Marine Division,reserve for IIIAC and its third majorelement, was in garrison on Saipa nwhere a division-wide training programwas effectively integrated with mop-ping-up operations against enemyforces remaining at large on the island .More than 8,000 Marine replacement sreceived valuable on-the-job experiencerouting Japanese holdouts during th efirst months of the division trainin gprogram which began 15 September .Saipan's rapid build-up as a supplycenter and an air base restricted thetraining efforts of the division, how -ever, and maneuver room and impactareas were soon at a premium .

10 Henderson ltr . After the 11th Marinesarrived on Guadalcanal, 15 December 1944, i tjoined the 15th Marines to train with IIIA CArtillery for seven straight weeks with onl yone break, Christmas Day. In this joint train-ing effort, great stress was placed on suc hartillery tactics as proper conduct of fire, withthe battalions registering, firing missions, anddisplacing several times a day "to overcom ethe improvised jungle methods heretofore use dby the division in previous campaigns ." Brownltr .

In the course of his inspection trip t oTenth Army units, General Buckne rvisited the 2d Marine Division . On themorning of 3 February, he trooped th eline of the 8th Marines and then in-spected the regimental quarters an dgalleys . It seemed to General Smith tha tthe men of the 2d Division looked ver yfit, and that they had made a tre-mendous impression on the Tenth Arm ycommander . Buckner was particularl yimpressed with the battalion com-manders, and told his deputy chief o fstaff that "he had never before had th eprivilege of meeting such an alertgroup . . . ." 2 0

A lack of suitable beaches on Saipanconfined final division rehearsals tosimulated landings only. Because of th eindefinite nature of its employment onceit had made the feint landings on L-Dayand L plus 1, the 2d Division had toselect an arbitrary landing scheme o ftwo RCTs abreast for the rehearsa lpattern. Bad weather prevented LVTlaunchings on two days, neither air no rnaval gunfire support was available ,and, finally, on 19 March—the last dayof the exercises—only the naval por-tion of TG 51 .2 (Demonstration Group )was able to participate in the demon-stration rehearsal .

On Espiritu Santo, the Tenth Army' sother relatively isolated unit—the 27thInfantry Division—conducted rehears-als from 20 to 25 March while its trans -port squadron was being loaded. Thisdivision was in the same position a sGeneral Watson's in that it faced a pro -fusion of potential missions . The re-hearsals of both reserve divisions were

20 Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 52 .


91

based, therefore, on a number of hypo-thetical landing assignments .

Satisfactory practice landings weremade by all of the other Tenth Arm yasault divisions . IIIAC rehearsals tookplace off the Cape Esperance-DomaCove beaches on Guadalcanal from 2through 7 March . Although reefs donot exist here, a transfer line was simu-lated 200 yards from the shore in a nattempt to duplicate actual landin gconditions in the corps zone on Okinawa .During the six days of rehearsals, Rea rAdmiral Reifsnider's staff officers madecertain that assault wave control wa semphasized and that the training o fcommunications elements was intensi-fied at all command levels .

Because naval gunfire and air-suppor tunits assigned to ICEBERG were com-mitted elsewhere at this time, the toke nprelanding bombardment furnished byvessels in the area, and the air suppor tsupplied by F6Fs (Hellcats) and TBMs(Avengers), flying in from Henderso nField and nearby carriers, only approxi-mated the tremendous volume of fire t obe laid on the Hagushi beaches. Prac-tice landings were made by IIIAC unitson 3 March, followed the next day by acritique aboard the TF 53 flagship, US SPanamint . Other preliminary landingson the 5th preceded the landing of th eentire IIIAC assault echelon on 6March. Corps and division comman dposts were set up ashore, a primarycommunications net was established ,and some equipment was unloaded. On7 March, the reserve regiments—th e1st Marines for the 1st Division andthe 29th Marines for the IIIAC—climbed down the nets into invasioncraft, which were formed into boat

waves, and then landed on the beaches .

General Geiger's corps artillery unit sdid not participate in these final re-hearsal exercises except to land bat-talion, corps, and group headquartersreconnaissance parties . The shortage oftime prevented the landing of any ofthe artillery pieces which were to goashore at the target.

Nearly 3,000 miles away fromGuadalcanal, in the Philippines, assaultelements of XXIV Corps conducted re-hearsals in Leyte Gulf from the 15th tothe 19th of March under the watchfuleyes of Admiral Hall and his attackforce staff officers . Because the missionsassigned XXIV Corps divisions varie dso widely, the nature and conduct o ftheir rehearsals tended to reflect thi svariance.

The 77th Infantry Division was tomake the initial ICEBERG assault, th elanding on Kerama Retto . In order tofamiliarize the troops with condition sat their impending target, practicelandings were made in southeaster nLeyte's Hinunangan Bay on islands thatclosely resembled some of those in theKeramas. For two days, 14 and 15March, adverse weather conditions andheavy swells prevented any landings a tall, but adherence to any firm rehearsa lschedule was not considered necessarysince the mission of the 77th involve dseveral landings independent of eachother .

Poor weather on the 15th forced thecancellation of a planned rehearsal fo rthe Ie Shima invasion, while only thedivision reserve (307th Infantry) mad eany practice landings on the 16th .Although General Bruce was satisfiedwith the rehearsals since "all elements

92


scheduled for a specific mission satis-factorily executed a close approximatio nof their mission," 21 Admiral Kilandwas not so confident. The WesternIslands Attack Group Commander feltthat "considering the complexity of theoperation and the relative inexperienceof naval personnel involved, the curtail-ment of these exercises by weather con-ditions made the training provide dentirely inadequate ." 2 2

On 16 March, the 7th and 96th Divi-sions landed under perfect weather con-ditions and on the 18th held unitcritiques, in which certain basic dis-crepancies and difficulties discovered i nthe first exercise were ironed out . Thefollowing day, the two divisions lande dagain. A high-level critique was held onthe 21st for the major Army and Nav ycommanders on Admiral Hall's flagship ,USS Teton. Also present were AdmiralTurner and General Buckner. At thistime, all of the XXIV Corps rehearsal swere evaluated, and efforts were madeto ensure that the actual landing woul dbe better coordinated .

As the normal duties of most of theflying squadrons assigned to TAF con-stituted their combat training, and sincethey would not begin operations atOkinawa until after the landing, whe nthe airfields were ready, they were no trequired to conduct rehearsals for ICE -BERG. TAF ground personnel sched-uled to travel to the target with theassault echelon, participated in th elanding rehearsals that were held at

=' 77th Inf Div OpRpt, Kerama Retto, KeiseShima, p . 20 .

== CTG 51 .5 AR, Capture of Okinawa Gunto ,Phases 1 and 2, 9Mar-2Apr45, dtd 26May45 ,chap II, p . 2, hereafter CTG 51 .1 AR .

Guadalcanal and Leyte. Their trooptraining, for the most part, was con -ducted aboard ship en route to the stag-ing areas, and consisted of familiariza-tion lectures about the enemy, hi stactics, and his equipment.

Like the other Okinawa-bound TenthArmy units mounting from PearlHarbor., Island Command troops con -ducted individual and unit trainingprograms which consisted of specialistas well as combat subjects . The IslandCommand assault echelon was com-posed chiefly of headquarters person-nel who were to initiate the base devel-opment plan as soon as practicable afte rthe landing. Within this echelon alsowere shore party, ordnance, ammunition ,supply, signal, quartermaster, truck,and water transportation units, whos esupport services would be required im-mediately after the initial assault.

At Fort Ord, California, officers tostaff military government teams beganassembling in late December 1944 . Anumber of these officers had already re-ceived approximately three months ofmilitary government training at eithe rPrinceton or Columbia Universities. InCalifornia and at the staging area swhere they joined the assault forces,these Army and Navy officers receivedinstructions pertinent to the ICEBERGmilitary government plan . Many in theNavy enlisted component in the mili-tary government section had never re-ceived any specialized civil affairs train-ing before they arrived at Fort Ord ,where they were assembled just in timeto embark with the teams to which the ywere assigned . 2 "

MilGovt AR, p . 3 .


93

By 1945, the roll-up of enemy posi-tions in the Pacific had progressed t othe point where some Tenth Army unit swere able to mount and stage on th ethreshold of Japan . XXIV Corps pre-pared for Okinawa in the Leyte Gul farea, only 1,000 miles from the Ryu-kyus, while in the Marianas, just slightl yfarther away from the target, otherICEBERG forces made ready for th eattack. Northern Attack Force units,however, had a considerably longerjourney to the Ryukyus as they pre-

pared in the Solomons .

MOUNTING AND STAGING THEASSAULT 2 4

Each attack force of the Joint Ex-peditionary Force was organized differ-ently for loading, movement, and un-loading at the target . The nine transportdivisions in the three transrons o fAdmiral Hall's Southern Attack Forc ewere reorganized and expanded to num-ber 11 transport divisions (transdivs) .Assigned to these two additional trans-divs were those ships slated to liftXXIV Corps troops at Leyte and those

which were to load Tenth Army an dIsland Command forces waiting o nOahu. The Northern Attack Force ,which was to carry IIIAC troops, wasnot so augmented . General Geiger wa sso impressed with how well the reorgan-ization of Admiral Hall's transpor tforce had eased movement control and

24 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ;Tenth Army AR ; TAF AR ; IIIAC AR; XXIVCorps AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ; 2d MarDiv AR ;6th, MarDiv SAR ; 7th InfDiv OpRpt ; 27thInfDiv OpRpt; 77th InfDiv OpRpt, KeramaRetto, Keise Shima ; 96th InfDiv AR .

increased the efficiency of loading andunloading operations, that he requestedthe formation of a similar corps ship -ping group for future IIIAC oper-ations . 2 5

The commanding generals of the 1stand 6th Marine Divisions were maderesponsible for the loading and em-barkation of their respective organicand attached units, while IIIAC itsel fsupervised the loading of corps troops .In addition, General Geiger was respon-sible for embarking Marine Air Group33 (MAG–33) of TAF, which was base don Espiritu Santo., 555 miles southeastof Guadalcanal.

Although some Northern Attac kForce vessels were partially combat -loaded before the rehearsal period, al lrequired additional time off the Guadal-canal, Banika, and Pavuvu beaches t otake on vital cargo and to top-off wate rand fuel tanks . The Northern TractorFlotilla was the first increment of TF 53to leave the Solomons for the stagin garea at Ulithi . Departing on 12 March,the holds and above decks of the landin gships in the convoy were solidly packedwith amphibious vehicles, tanks, artil-lery, and various other combat gear .For this invasion, IIIAC wanted toavoid subjecting assault troops to th ecrowded conditions and debilitatingeffects of prolonged confinement aboardLSTs and LSMs .

While APAs were hardly luxurious ,their accommodations were far betterthan those of the landing ships . To easethe first leg of the journey to Okinawa ,

=G CNO, Amphibious Operations—Capture o fOkinawa, 27Mar-21Jun45 (OpNav 34-P-0700) ,dtd 22Jan46, chap 7, p . 20, hereafter CNORecord .

94


many assault wave Marines were em -barked on the faster attack transportswhich, together with the rest of theNorthern Attack Force transportgroups, left from the mounting area on15 March to join the ICEBERG forc egathering at Ulithi .

The immense lagoon at Ulithi Atol lwas the westernmost American fleetanchorage, staging base, and repairdepot in the Pacific. Midway betwee nthe Marianas and the Palaus, Ulithi wascaptured without opposition in Septem-ber 1944, and was developed immedi-ately to support naval operations in th ewestern Pacific as well as to serve asan advance base for the Philippines in-vasion. Once occupied and built up, th eislets of the atoll served also as limite drecreation areas where personnel of al lservices could regain their landlegs an dparticipate in a somewhat restricte dphysical conditioning program .

On 21 March, both the transportgroup and the tractor flotilla of TF 5 3arrived at Ulithi, anchored, and on thefollowing day, APA-borne assaulttroops were transferred to the landingships which were to carry them the re-maining 1,400 miles to Okinawa. Oncethe transfer was completed, small boat sbegan ferrying recreation partiesashore. Here the rigors of shipboar dconfinement were forgotten by a com-bination of organized athletics and anissue of not-too-cool cokes and beer .

For many of the troops, this stopoveron the long voyage towards the un-known was made exciting by the fasci-nating sight of the constantly shiftin gfleet groupment whose makeup change dfrom day-to-day and hour-to-hour ascarriers, battleships, cruisers, and

smaller combat vessels departed fo rstrikes against the enemy or returnedfrom completed missions . In the mids tof this activity, the scattered elementsof the Expeditionary Troops filtered into join those forces which had arrivedearlier .

Despite the relaxing effect of sun ,sand, and surf at Ulithi, the nightlyalerts to the presence of Japanes esnooper planes was a continual re -minder that a war still .existed . Thi sgrim fact was brought home to manymen in the invasion force on the gloomy ,fog-bound Saturday afternoon of 2 4March when the battered carrierFranklin limped into the anchorageshepherded by the USS Santa Fe .

On the next day, a brilliantly sunli tSunday, the bruised and batteredFranklin could be seen more clearly asshe lay at anchor . Her top rigging,aerials, and radar towers were gone o rtwisted completely out of shape . Herflight deck was buckled and undulating .These were the external damage swrought by the internal explosions o fbombs that had penetrated to lowerdecks when Japanese suicide planesfuriously attacked the carrier on 1 9March, during TF 38 strikes againstenemy shipping at Kure and Kobe . Asthe most heavily damaged carrier to b esaved in the war, the Franklin was ableto make the 12,000-mile trip to NewYork for repairs under her own power ,stopping only at Pearl Harbor on th eway.

The Northern Tractor Flotilla sortiedfrom the Ulithi anchorage for Okinaw aon 25 March and, two days later, th eremainder of the assault echelon se tforth in its wake . Saipan was the scene,


95

on the same dates., of the Demonstratio nGroup departure .

Loading operations of the 2d Marin eDivision were eased by the fact that it slift, Transron 15, had laid over brieflyat Saipan in February while en rout eto Iwo Jima. At that time, divisio ntransport quartermasters (TQMs) ob-tained ships' characteristics data whichproved more accurate than the infor-mation provided earlier by FMFPac .As a result, the TQMs were better abl e

to plan for a more efficient use of cargoand personnel space .

In addition to the responsibility fo rloading his reinforced division, GeneralWatson was given the duty of coordi-nating the loading of all ICEBER GMarine assault and first echelon force selsewhere in the Marianas and at Ro iin the Marshalls . 2 6

In preparing for Okinawa, the onlyreal problem confronting General Mul-cahy's Marine air units was the coordi-nated loading of ground and flight ele-ments . According to the logistical plan-ning, planes and pilots were to be lifte dto the target on board escort carriers ,while ground crews and nonflying unit swere to make the trip in assault andfirst echelon shipping. As the organi-zations comprising the Tactical AirForce were widely dispersed, their load-ing and embarkation was supervised, ofnecessity, by local commanders of th eareas where the air groups and squad-rons were based .

Mounting from Oahu in the TA F

=8 Units involved were : MAG—31 at Roi ; 1stSepEngrBn and 16th AAA Bn at Tinian ;Corps EvacHosp No . 2 and 2d AAA Bn atGuam ; and 7th F1dDep, 1st Prov MP Bn, andLFASCU—1 at Saipan .

assault echelon were the headquarterssquadrons of the 2d Marine AircraftWing and MAG-43, and Air WarningSquadrons (AWSs) 7 and 8 . Head-quarters Squadrons 2 and 43 became theheadquarters commands of TAF an dGeneral Wallace's Air Defense Com-mand, respectively . The TAF transportquartermaster coordinated the mount-ing out of the Oahu-based units with hi sopposite numbers on the staffs of th eTenth Army and the 2d MAW . TheMarines from AWS–8 and the forwar dechelons of Mulcahy's and Wallace' sheadquarters commands left Pearl Har-bor on 22 February, while AWS–7 de -parted Pearl the same month in twoincrements, one on the 10th and the sec -ond on the 21st .

Colonel John C . Munn's MAG–31 em -barked from Roi and Namur in theMarshall Islands. The group servicesquadron and ground personnel ofMarine Fighter Squadrons 224, 311 ,and 441 boarded transport and cargovessels which, in turn, joined the ICE -BERG convoy forming at Saipan .Flight personnel and their planes wentaboard the escort carriers Breton on thenight of 22–23 March, Sitkoh Bay on 24March and were staged through Ulith iwhere they were joined by MarineNight Fighter Squadron 542 .

MAG–33 (Colonel Ward E . Dickey)mounted from Espiritu Santo in theNew Hebrides . While IIIAC was re-sponsible for the embarkation of th eMAG, the group itself supervised th eloading of its ground and service ele-ments which joined the Northern

Attack Force off Guadalcanal. Thepilots of VMF–312, -322, and -323 flewtheir F4Us (Corsairs) to Manus via

96


Guadalcanal and Green Island. Therethey boarded the escort carriers WhitePlains and Hollandia. Already on boardthe latter was VMF (N) -543 which hadboarded the vessel at Pearl Harbor o n11 March. Its ground personnel had de -parted from the same port three week searlier .

Outside of the TAF chain of com-mand, but closely related to its combatfunctions, were Landing Force Air Sup-port Control Units 1, 2, and 3 . Twoweeks after returning to its Saipanbase from the Iwo Jima operation ,LFASCU–1 loaded aboard ship for animmediate return engagement with th eenemy at Okinawa . The other twoLFASCUs were based at Ewa, T . H. ,where they trained for ICEBERG, andmounted for the invasion in Februar y1945, later staging for the targetthrough Leyte .

As it had no need for an intermediatestaging area, the XXIV Corps departedfor Okinawa directly from Leyte . Gen-eral Bruce's 77th Infantry Division ,which was to open the Ryukyus oper-ation with the assault on Kerama Retto ,finished loading its landing ships on 1 8March and its transports on the 20th ,each echelon leaving for the target onthe day following . The 7th and 96thDivisions conducted their own loadingunder the supervision of XXIV CorpsTQMs, who spotted Southern LandingForce shipping at the most satisfactorypoint on the landing beaches. TheSouthern Tractor Flotilla departedLeyte during the morning hours of 2 4March ; the transport groups followedthree days later .

By the evening of 27 March, all ICE-BERG assault elements were at sea,

converging on Okinawa . Soldiers andMarines aboard the transports andlanding vessels had already made them -selves as comfortable as possible underthe crowded conditions and had settleddown to shipboard routine . Officers andkey NCOs reviewed their unit operatio nplans, examined maps and terrai nmodels of the landing area, and helddaily briefing sessions with their men .At the same time they squared awaytheir combat gear for the invasion, mos tof the men of Hebrew and Christia nfaiths also prepared themselves for re-ligious observances of Passover o rGood Friday and Easter, all three holi-days falling within a few days of eac hother in 1945 .

NEUTRALIZING THE ENEMY 27

After the first carrier strike of 1 0October 1944, Naha's fire- and explo-sion-gutted ruins furnished the Japa-nese defenders with visual evidence o fthe effectiveness of American naval ai rpower and served as an ominous portentof the future. One observer, a Japanesesoldier, complained in his diary that ,"the enemy is brazenly planning to com-pletely destroy every last ship, cut ou rsupply lines, and attack us ." 2 8

Okinawa was not visited again b yVice Admiral John S . McCain's FastCarrier Force (TF 38) until 3 and 4

=7 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CinCPac WarDsJan-Mar45 ; CTF 52 AR ; Tenth Army AR ;War Reports ; Okinawa Operations Record ;Morison, Victory in the Pacific .

""Diary of a radioman, 5th Harbor BaseUnit," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bul 147-45 ,Translations and Interrogations No . 32, dtd16Jun45, p . 50 .


97

January 1945, when, in conjunctio nwith a heavy attack on Formosa, theRyukyu and Sakashima Islands werealso struck. Commenting on this raid, aJapanese replacement confided in hi sdiary that "seeing enemy planes for thefirst time since coming to Okinaw asomehow or other gave me the feelingof being in a combat zone ." 29 The re-turn of the Navy planes on 22 Januaryreinforced his first impression andfurther shook his seeming complacency ,as that day's diary entry implied resent-ment. "While some fly around overhea dand strafe, the big bastards fly over th e

airfield and drop bombs . The ferocity o f

the bombing is terrific . It really make sme furious. It is past 1500 and the rai dis still on. At 1800 the last two plane sbrought the raid to a close . What the

hell kind of bastards are they? Bombfrom 0600 to 1800!" 3 °

During January, TF 38 struck For-mosa and the Ryukyus twice, and mad e

some uninvited calls on South China

coastal ports, all while covering th e

Luzon landings. After its last attack,

the force retired to Ulithi where rein -

forcing carriers were waiting to join .

On 27 January, the same day that Ad-miral Nimitz arrived at his new ad-

vance headquarters on Guam,31 the

command of the Pacific fleet's strikin g

2° "Diary of an unidentified superior private ,273d IIB," in Ibid ., p . 70 .

3° Ibid .31 Because Pearl Harbor was too far fro m

the war area, the recently promoted FleetAdmiral Nimitz transferred his flag to Guamon 2 January in order to direct the Pacific wareffort from a vantage point closer to the scen eof' the fighting.

force was changed and Admiral sSpruance and Mitscher relieved Halse yand McCain . When Mitscher's carrier sdeparted Ulithi on 10 February, it wasin the guise of Task Force 58, which wasdestined to continue the work that T F38 had begun .

As a diversion for the 19 Februar yMarine landing on Iwo Jima, and toreduce the Japanese capability fo rlaunching air attacks against the ex-peditionary force, Mitscher's Fast Car-rier Force struck at the Tokyo area on16–17 February and again on the 25th .In between these attacks, Mitscher'splanes and ships supported the Iwoassault from D-Day until the 23d, a twhich time they sortied for the 2 5February Tokyo strike . As TF 58 re-tired to Ulithi on 1 March, planes ofTask Units 58.1, 58.2, and 58.3 photo -graphed Okinawa, Kerama Retto ,Minami Daito, and Amami 0 Shima ,and bombed and strafed targets of op-portunity. These three units returnedto Ulithi on the 5th .

At the same time that the fast car-riers were making their forays, Ameri-can submarines and naval patrolbombers ranged the western Pacifi ctaking a steadily increasing toll of Japa-nese shipping . The bottom of the ChinaSea was littered with the broken hull sand loads of enemy transports an dcargo ships which never reached thei rdestinations . Almost complete isolationof the Okinawa garrison was accom-plished by mid-February 1945 throughthe combined efforts of Navy air andsubmarine forces . It soon became ap-parent to General Ushijima that hisRyukyus command stood alone since"communications between the mainland

98


of Japan and Formosa had been prac-tically severed ." 3 2

The neutralization and isolation o fOkinawa was furthered by the con-tinuous series of strategic air strikes onthe Japanese industrial network byArmy Air Forces bombers, whichmounted attacks from bases in China,India, the Philippines, the Marianas ,and the Palaus . Massive raids on th efactories of the main islands as well a son outlying sources of raw materialshindered Japan's ability and will to con-tinue the war. Giant super-fortresse salso rose from airfields in the southernMarianas in steadily increasing num-bers to hit Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, an dKobe, widening the fire-swept circl earound the expanse of previously devas-tated areas . During the interludes be-tween carrier-plane attacks on theRyukyus, B–29 appearances over Oki-nawa became so commonplace that th eJapanese defenders referred to thei rvisits as "regular runs." 3 3

With the approach of L-Day, th etempo of covering operations was ac-celerated throughout the Pacific . For itsfinal strike on Japan prior to the Oki-nawa landing. TF 58 steamed out of th eUlithi anchorage on 14 March . Fourdays later, carrier-launched planes in-terdicted Kyushu's heavily-laden air-fields, and attacked installations o nShikoku and Honshu islands on th e19th. The task force did not escape un-scathed this time, however, for th eenemy was ready and retaliated withheavy counterstrikes during which theJapanese pilots displayed reckless

"Okinawa Operations Record, p . 62.33 "Diary of an unidentified superior private ,

273d IIB," op . cit ., p . 49 .

abandon and a wanton disregard fortheir lives . Five carriers and other shipsin the task force were hit hard . A tem-porary task group composed of th edamaged carriers Wasp, Franklin, andEnterprise, the cruiser Santa Fe, andDestroyer Squadron 52 returned toUlithi for necessary repairs . The shipsremaining in TF 58, the carriers, thebattleship force, and the protectivescreen, were reorganized into three taskgroups of relatively equal strength on22 March. With this force, AdmiralMitscher then began the final run onOkinawa for the beginning of the pre -invasion bombardments .

PREINVASION PREPARATIONSAND THE KERAMA RETTOLANDING 3 4

The first elements of the ICEBER Gforce to appear at the target were thedoughty sweepers of Mine Group One ,which began operations off KeramaRetto and the southeastern coast ofOkinawa on 24 March, just two daysbefore the 77th Infantry Division wasto land in the Keramas . After the mine-craft cleared a channel outside the 100-fathom curve off the Minatoga beaches ,part of Admiral Mitscher's battleshi pforce, temporarily organized as TF 59 ,steamed through the swept area andbombarded Okinawa while TF 58 planescovered and neutralized enemy shore

31 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CinCPOA OPla n14—44 ; CTF 51 OPlan AI—45 ; CTF 51 AR ;CTF 52 AR ; CTG 51 .1 AR; Tenth Army AR ;77th Inf Div OpRpt ; PhibReconBn, FMFPac ,AR, Phase I and II, Nansei Shoto Operation ,n.d ., hereafter PhibReconBn AR ; War Re-ports ; Morison, Victory in the Pacific .


99

installations . By late afternoon, as T F59 withdrew to rejoin the carrier force ,the mine vessels finished that day' splanned program of preliminary sweeps .

During these operations, the Amphib-ious Support Force, with elements ofthe Gunfire and Covering Force (Ad-miral Deyo serving as Officer in Tactica lCommand), had completed the run fromUlithi and deployed into approach for-mation. Two fire support units left TF54 to begin their respective assignment s—one unit to cover the sweep conducte dbetween Tonachi Shima and KeramaRetto, and the other to cover the min esweepers off Okinawa and to beginbombarding the demonstration beaches .

An important TF 52 element was th eUnderwater Demolition Flotilla, con-sisting of 10 underwater demolitionteams (UDTs) organized into tw ogroups, Able and Baker . On the after -noon of 24 March, the high spee ddestroyer transports (APDs) of Grou pAble and destroyers of TF 54 forme dfor the next day's UDT and NGF oper-ations at Kerama . The remainder ofAdmiral Deyo's force was concentrate dand ready to repulse all Japanese sur-face or air attacks . 3 5

A carefully planned feature of th eICEBERG operation was this concen -

,5 The command relationship between Ad-mirals Blandy (CTF 52) and Deyo (CTF 54 )requires clarification . Blandy, as a Senior Offi-cer Present Afloat (SOPA), was responsibl efor the execution of all operations at the targetwhile Deyo, although Blandy's senior, was re-sponsible for the TF 54 movement and ap-proach to the target (and for any TF 52 shipsmoving with TF 54), for the conduct of sur-face actions should there be any, and for th enight deployments . CNO Record, chap 1, pp .33-34 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 8

tration of naval strength . With amplesea room and sufficient fighting powe rto eliminate any or all of the remnant sof the Japanese Navy, TF 58 lay to theeast of the Ryukyus in the PacificOcean. In the East China Sea, to thewest of Okinawa, the majority of thecombat ships of the Amphibious Sup -port Force was concentrated, ready t ostop any attempt to reinforce or evac-uate the garrison. At night, the ship sassigned to the bombardment of Oki-nawa's southeastern coast retired to-gether so that their mission could b eresumed without delay the followingmorning . In the event of any surfaceaction, each of these task groups wasable to operate and support itself inde-pendently .

As vaster areas surrounding Okinaw awere swept clear of mines, destroyer sand gunboats began patrol operationsand made the beleaguered enemy's iso-lation a certainty . Shipborne radarpicket stations, disposed from 15 to 100miles offshore, encircled the island t oprotect the invasion force from the con-stant threat of surprise enemy airattacks. Aboard the destroyers an ddestroyer minesweepers serving aspicket vessels were fighter-directo rteams which controlled the combat ai rpatrols (CAPs) of carrier planes whichorbited overhead during the hours ofdaylight . When Japanese flights weredetected on picket radar screens, th eCAP was vectored out to intercept anddestroy the enemy. The bulk of theheavy losses incurred by the Navy dur-ing the battle for Okinawa was born eby the vessels comprising the radarpicket fleet . The value of their servicesin protecting the vulnerable transport

100


and service areas is measured by thelarge number of Japanese planes shotdown before they had reached their ob-jectives .

Although the destructive TF 58 raidson Kyushu had temporarily disruptedenemy plans for air attacks from the

home islands, the Japanese managed tomount an increasing number of raidsfrom fields in the Formosa area . Once itbecame apparent that Okinawa was tobe invaded and that Okinawa water sheld lucrative targets, forward ele-ments of the 8th Air Division rose fromtheir fields in the Sakashimas to maketheir first Kamikaze attack on shipsstanding off Kerama Retto at dawn o n26 March . 3 6

Beginning with this first, hour-longenemy air raid, the loss of lives anddamage to ships mounted as Japanesebombers and suiciders made sneakattacks on the amphibious force in th edawn and dusk twilight hours. 37 As par tof its planned schedule of preliminaryoperations supporting ICEBERG, ViceAdmiral Sir H. Bernard Rawling' sBritish Carrier Force (TF 57) struckSakashima Gunto on the 26th and 27th .Since the carriers had blocked the us eof Sakashima and Kyushu, the Japanesehad to use Okinawa-based planes t oattack the American invasion forces .The employment in three suicidal foray sof all available aircraft, including

" Okinawa Operations Record, "Record ofthe 8th AirDiv," Chart 1 .

" More correctly known as morning andevening nautical twilights, these are the brie fperiods preceding sunrise and following sunse twhen general outlines may be visible, althoughthe horizon cannot be distinguished, and ap-proaching aircraft are virtually invisible .

trainers, liaison craft, and planes of aSpecial Attack Unit which managed tofly in from Kyushu, led to the completeelimination of the air strength of theOkinawa garrison by 29 March . 3 8

Claims of enemy airmen who sur-vived to return to home bases wer egrossly exaggerated, but their destruc-tiveness was extensive . A summary ofdamages to American forces for theperiod 26 to 31 March reveals that si xships, including Admiral Spruance' sflagship Indianapolis, were crashed bysuicide-bent enemy pilots . Near missesaccounted for damage to 10 other ves-sels, while floating mines sank 2 shipsand an encounter with a Japanes etorpedo boat gave another Americanship minor damage.

Despite costly harassment from Japa-nese air attacks, Admiral Blandy's forceproceeded with its primary task of pre -paring the target for the assault . FourGroup Able UDTs cleared beach ap-proaches in Kerama Retto on 26 Marchand began blowing Keise Shima reefsthe next day . Because Okinawa's offshor ewaters had not been completely clearedof mines, the reconnaissance and demoli -tion work scheduled for the 28th wasdelayed a day. Elements of Group Ablescouted the demonstration beaches o nthe 29th, while Group Baker teams re-connoitered the Hagushi beaches .

During this reconnaissance of thewest coast landing area, Group Bakerswimmers discovered approximately2,900 wooden posts embedded in thereef near its seaward edge and stretch-ing for some distance on either side ofthe Bishi Gawa. These posts, whichwere on the average six inches in

' 8 Okinawa Operations Record, pp . 65-66 .


LANDING CRAFT form up for the run to Kerama Retto beaches on 26 March 1945 .Viewed from USS Minneapolis . (USN 80-G-816830)

155MM GUNS of the 420th Field Artillery Group are set up on Keise Shima to shellenemy main defenses prior to the Tenth Army assault landing . (USA SC205503)

101

102


diameter and from four to eight feet i nheight, were generally aligned five fee tapart in rows of three or four . Althoughsome of these obstacles were loose, afew were set in concrete and the res twedged into the coral . On 30 March the ywere blown up with hand-placedcharges . All but 200 posts were de-stroyed by L-Day and it was believedthat the landing would not be hindere dby those that remained . 3 °

Accompanying the UDTs during thebeach reconnaissance and initial demoli-tions operations were assault troop ob-servers, who acted as liaison and recon-naissance personnel . 40 Their primaryfunction was to brief the UDTs on th eschemes of maneuver and location ofthe landing areas of their respectiv eassault units, to make certain that spe-cific beaches were cleared, and to ob-tain current intelligence concerning th ebeaches and surrounding terrain . Assoon as these preinvasion operationshad been completed (29 and 30 March) ,the observers were returned by ship tojoin their parent organizations in th eapproaching attack groups . In general ,the intelligence reports submitted b ythe observers favored a successful land-ing across the entire Tenth Army front .

Because the waters surrounding Oki-nawa had been heavily mined, 41 the

'° CTF 52 AR, pt V, sec G, p . 3 ." ° The allocation of Tenth Army observer s

to the UDTs was based on the assignment o fone officer for each battalion in the assault ,one for each RCT, division, and corps, and onefor the army . Tenth Army TntvOPlan 1-45 ,Anx 4, App A, p . 1 .

" TF 52 estimated that its minecraft sweptand reswept over 3,000 square miles in the si xdays before L-Day. In this period, 257 mineswere destroyed .

scheduled NGF bombardment did notbegin until 25 March (L minus 7) whe nTF 54 fire support vessels were able t oclose to ranges of maximum effective-ness. Carrier air was able to pound Oki-nawa repeatedly, however, and was me tby only ineffectual and desultory fir efrom enemy antiaircraft defenses . Inthe course of the 3,095 sorties that th eTF 52 Combat Air Support Control Uni t(CASCU) directed against Okinaw aprior to L-Day, special attention wa sgiven to the destruction of submarinepens, airfields, suicide boat installations ,bridges over the roads leading into thelanding area, and gun positions . Afterthe pilots were debriefed, each day' sstrike results were evaluated by th eCASCU on board Admiral Blandy' sflagship, USS Estes, and considered to-gether with damage estimates of ships'guns . The schedule of air missions andthe NGF plans were revised and co -ordinated, and plans for the next day' ssorties and shoots were then issued .

Initial target lists compiled by theTenth Army artillery section and TF 5 4intelligence section were constantly re-vised as analyses, based on aerial ob-servation and photo reconnaissance ,were received . As new evaluations weremade of the destruction of enemy posi-tions and installations, and new targetstabulated, cards listing the correcte ddata were delivered to the target infor-mation centers (TICs) of IIIAC an dXXIV Corps. From the time that thebombardment of Okinawa began unti lL-Day, General Nimmer's TIC receive dcopies of all dispatches sent from th eobjective by CTF 54. From these re-ports., all information relative to thediscovery, attack, damage, and destruc-


103

tion of targets in the IIIAC landin gzone was excerpted and used to brin gthe target map and target file up-to-date . 4 2

Although Admiral Blandy's bombard-ment force expended 27,226 rounds o f5-inch or larger-caliber ammunition o nOkinawa, extensive damage was don eonly to surface installations, especiall ythose in the vicinity of the airfields. Asthe ground forces were to discove rlater, the Japanese sustained little de-struction of well dug-in defenses, andfew losses among the men who mannedthem. On the day before the landing, asa result of his evaluation of the effect ofair and NGF bombardment, CTF 5 2could report that "the preparation wa ssufficient for a successful landing." 4 3

Admiral Biandy also stated that "we di dnot conclude from [the enemy's silence ]that all defense installations had beendestroyed . . . . " 4 4

A prerequisite which Admiral Turnerfelt would guarantee the success of ICE -BERG was the seizure of Kerama Rettoand Keise Shima prior to L-Day. Be-cause of the advantages to be gained b yall ICEBERG assault and support ele-ments., the taking of these islands wasmade an essential feature of the TenthArmy operation plan. Naval units, par-ticularly, would benefit since th e

42 "At H-Hour on D-Day it is estimated thatthe TIC files showed about 500 active target ssuitable for attack by artillery, naval gunfire ,and support aircraft, all located in the III PhibCorps zone of action for Phase One of theoperations." LtCol John G . Bouker ltr to CMC ,dtd 9Jan48, Subj : Operations of III Amphibi-ous Corps Target Information Center on Oki-nawa, hereafter Bouker ltr .

43 CTF 52 AR, pt V, sec C, p . 5 .44 Ibid.

Keramas provided a sheltered flee tanchorage in the objective area wher eemergency repairs, refueling, and re -arming operations could be accom-plished. Once the envisioned seaplan ebase was established, Navy patrolbombers could range from Korea toIndochina in search and rescue mission sand antisubmarine warfare operations .With the emplacement of XXIV CorpsArtillery guns on Keise Shima and thei rregistry on Okinawa, preliminaries forthe main assault would be complete .

Even if the Keramas had had novalue as an advanced logistics base, theywould have been taken . The suspectedpresence of suicide sea raiding squad-rons in the island chain was confirme dwhen the 77th Infantry Division landed ,and captured and destroyed 350 of th esquadrons' suicide boats . Their threatto the Okinawa landing was undeniable ,for these small craft were to spee dfrom their hideouts in the Keramas 'small islands to the American anchor-ages. Here, "The objective of the attac kwill be transports, loaded with essentia lsupplies and material and person-nel . . .," ordered General Ushijima ."The attack will be carried out by con-centrating maximum strength immedi-ately upon the enemy's landing." 45 Thesurprise thrust into the Keramas frus-trated the Japanese plan and undoubt-edly eased initial ICEBERG operation sat the Hagushi beaches . At the timethat the 77th was poised to strike th eKeramas, the islands were defended byapproximately 975 Japanese troops, ofwhom only the some 300 boat operator s

""Thirty-second Army OperO No . 115, dtd23Mar45," in Tenth Army Trans No . 231, dt d6Ju145 .

104


of the sea raiding squadrons had an ycombat value . The rest of the defensewas comprised of about 600 Korea nlaborers and nearly 100 base troops .

On 26 March, the day following th esweep of Kerama waters by the mine-craft and reconnaissance of its beache sby UDT personnel, Admiral Kiland' sWestern Islands Attack Group movedinto position for the assault. A battle -ship, two large cruisers, and fourdestroyers had been assigned to provid eNGF support for the landing, but onlythe 5-inch guns of the destroyers wereused extensively . The capital ships werenot called on to fire but remained onstandby. As LSTs disgorged their cargoof armored amphibians and troop-ladenassault tractors for the run to thebeaches, carrier planes orbited thetransport area to ward off Japanesesuicide planes which were beginning t ofilter through the outer fighter screen .Aircraft bombed the beaches as th eassault waves were guided toward th etarget by LCIs assigned to give close-i nsupport. 46 (See Map 5 . )

At 0801, the first of the four assaul tbattalions of the 77th hit its target andin a little over an hour's time the otherthree had attacked their own objectives.Before noon, General Bruce saw tha tthe rapid progress of his landing teamsashore would permit yet another land-ing that day, so he directed the 2d Bat-talion, 307th Infantry, a reserve unit,to take Yakabi Shima . Since this island' s

9e The Support Craft Flotilla was compose dof two mortar, three rocket, and four gunboa tdivisions . The 42 LCIs and 54 LSMs in thi sunit were organized into teams of various type sand assigned to a specific beach and landing.PhibGru 7 AR, dtd 26May45 .

defenders offered little resistance, itwas secured by 1341 . By the end of theday the 77th had done quite well, hav-ing seized three Kerama islands out -right and established a firm foothold o ntwo others .

Within a six-day period, 26–31 March ,at a cost of 31 killed and 81 wounded ,the 77th Infantry Division completelyfulfilled its mission as the vanguard ofICEBERG Expeditionary Troops. Inthe process of removing. the threatposed by the Japanese to operations inthe Kerama anchorage, General Bruce' stroops killed 530 of the enemy, captured121 more, and rounded up some 1,19 5civilians. All of the enemy were not dis-posed of, however, for scattered Japa-nese soldiers remained hidden in thehills of the various Kerama islands an deven occasionally communicated withunits on Okinawa. 4 7

Marine participation in pre-L-Da yactivities was confined to the operation sof Major James L. Jones' FMF Amphib-ious Reconnaissance Battalion . For theKeramas invasion, it was split into twotactical groups, one under the battalioncommander and the other under hi sexecutive officer . Only two companies ofthe battalion were available for antic-ipated missions, since Company B hadbeen assigned to the V Amphibiou sCorps for the Iwo Jima landing and didnot return to its parent organizationuntil after L-Day .

On the night of 26–27 March, whilethe 77th consolidated its conquests an dprepared for the next day's battles ,Major Jones' men landed on and recon-noitered the reef islets comprising

" Okinawa Operations Record, p . 66.

106


Keise Shima . 49 When reconnaissance ofthe small group revealed no trace of th eenemy., the Marines reboarded thei rAPDs with information of reef, beach,and terrain conditions . Their findingswere then forwarded to the 77th Divi-sion intelligence officer for evaluationand distribution to the units which wer eto land on Keise Shima.

During the night of 27–28 March ,scouts from Company A landed o nAware Saki, a small island off thesouthern tip of Tokashiki Shima . Againthere was no evidence of the enemy . Theonly encounter with the Japanese oc-

curred on 29 March, during early morn-ing landings on Mae and Kuro Shima ,two small islands which lie between th eKerama Retto and Keise Shima. At0630, a suicide boat, apparently mannedby only one soldier, was observed head-ing at high speed for Mae Shima's beac hfrom Tokashiki Shima . The one-ma nregatta was brought to a speedy an dspectacular end as the explosive-lade ncraft disintegrated under a hail o fmachine gun fire . A reconnaissance o fKure Shima shortly thereafter indi-cated no troops or civilians, nor an yinstallations .

In order to remove some of the

"eKeise Shima or Keisan Sho (sho, i n

Japanese, is shoal or reef) is five miles WN Wof Naha and consists of three sand-and pebble -islands ; Kuefu Shima, Naganna Shima, an dKamiyama Shima, the last-named being tw olow sandy islands separated by a 100-yard-widestrait. For simplicity, and in keeping with th eusage established by action reports and previ-ously written histories of the Okinawa cam-paign, this small island grouping will be re-ferred to as Keise Shima in this account also .

obstacles to the landing of XXIV Corp sArtillery units on Keise Shima on 3 1March., UDTs blasted a path throughthe off-shore coral reefs early thatmorning, and this completed the workthey had begun on the 27th . Then, after2/306 landed unopposed and determine dthat no enemy had slipped back toKeise after the Marine reconnaissance ,men and equipment of the 420th FieldArtillery Group went ashore and im-mediately set up to fire. By 1935, th egroup's 155mm guns ("Long Toms") be-gan registering on preselected targetsin southern Okinawa . There, the Japa-nese later reported, they "incessantl yobstructed our movements by laying anabundant quantity of fire inside ou rpositions, the fire being directed mainl yto cut off our communications ." 40 Alsolanding on Keise were part of a tea mfrom an Army air warning squadronand an AAA (automatic weapons)platoon which, when ashore and set up ,became part of the area antiaircraft de-fense system.

Already beset by American carrier-based strikes and by ships' gunfir ewhich blasted Okinawa in a precise andbusinesslike manner, the Japanese fel tthat the artillery fire from Keise wa soverdoing it a bit . A special attack unitwas formed to raid the island artiller yemplacements., and the 5th ArtilleryCommand's 15cm guns were ordered toconduct counterbattery fire in anattempt to destroy the American LongToms. Neither measure attained suc-cess, and the Thirty-second Army wasnever able to enforce its order to "stop

" Okinawa Operations Record, pp. 66-67 .


107

the use of enemy artillery on Keis eShima." 5 0

Before L-Day, the floating naval bas e

in the Kerama Retto was functioningat a high pitch . From watery take-off

lanes, seaplanes rose to harass enem y

submarines and shipping in the Chin a

Sea. Kamikaze-damaged vessels wer esalvaged and repaired on an around-the-

clock schedule, while the rearming, re-

fueling, and revictualling of health y

ships kept pace. Without this frontlin e

logistical facility, "many more ships an d

personnel of the service force than wer e

available in the Okinawa area wouldhave been required at sea to make re-

plenishment an accomplished fact fo rall fleet forces." 5 1

In contrast to the conspicuous pre-

landing operations of ICEBERG force sin the target area, the Thirty-second

Army was able to surround its tactical

dispositions with a greater degree of

secrecy. Not until after the landing onOkinawa and relentless probing by th e

assault forces did the Tenth Army learnwhat the strength of the enemy was an d

where his positions were . BeforeL-Day, American knowledge of enem y

dispositions was sketchy, and as late asL minus 1 (31 March), the G–3 of th e

""32d Army OperO A #127, dtd 6Apr45, "in CICAS Trans No . 266. Although this orderdirected the CO of the shipping engineers toorganize a raiding unit and attack Keise onthe night of 6 April 1945, no contemporaryrecords show that this operation was carriedthrough .

RAdm Worrall R . Carter, Beans, Bullets ,and Black Oil (Washington : GPO, 1953), p .353, hereafter Carter, Beans, Bullets, an dBlack Oil .

6th Marine Division was told that "th eHagushi beaches were held in grea t

strength ." 5 2

The factor which tipped the scales i n

favor of an unopposed Allied landing o nthe Hagushi beaches was General

Ushijima's decision to defend the south-

east coast of Okinawa in strength .

When the 2d Marine Division made itsfeint landings on D-Day and D plus 1 ,

the Japanese commander's staff believe d

its earlier estimate that "powerful ele-ments might attempt a landing [on the

Minatoga beaches]" was fully justi-fied . J3 Consequently, a substantial por-

tion of the artillery and infantry

strength of the Thirty-second Army wasimmobilized in face of a threat in th e

southeast that never materialized .

Although Ushijima's command had

prepared for an American landing else -where, from the Japanese point of view

the Hagushi beaches remained the most

obvious target . Even while propagand a

reports—mostly untrue—of successfu l

Kamikaze attacks against the invasion

fleet bolstered Japanese morale, th e

commander of a scratch force formedfrom airfield personnel on the islan dwarned his men not "to draw the hastyconclusion that we had been able to

destroy the enemy's plan of landing on

Okinawa Jima." 54 The commander of

52 Capt Edward F . Townley, Jr., ltr to AsstG-3, HQMC, dtd 4Dec65 .

'" Okinawa Operations Record, p . 67 .

'1st Specially Established Regt Oper ONo. 1, dtd 30Mar45," in CinCPac-CinCPO ABul 107-45, Translations and InterrogationsNo. 28 dtd 14May45 .

108


the 1st Specially Established Regiment, been distributed, the Northern an dLieutenant Colonel Tokio Aoyangai, Southern Attack Forces were movingproved himself clairvoyant, for in less into their transport areas ready tothan 24 hours after his message had launch the assault .

CHAPTER 4

The First Days Ashore

SEIZURE OF THE BEACHHEAD '

Optimum weather conditions for a namphibious landing prevailed at th etarget on L-Day when the Central

Pacific Task Forces launched the attac kagainst Okinawa on 1 April 1945 ,Easter Sunday. The coming of dawn

revealed cloudy to clear skies and a cal msea with but a negligible surf at theshore . Moderate easterly to northeast-erly winds were blowing offshore, jus tenough to carry the smoke away fro mthe beaches. To the many veteranjungle fighters among the invadin gtroops, the 75-degree temperatureseemed comfortably cool.

At the target, the major naval liftand support elements moved into thei rassigned areas off the Hagushi beaches .Once in position, the ships prepared to

Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ;Tenth Army AR ; XXIV Corps AR ; ILIAC AR ;1st MarDiv SAR ; 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 28Feb -13Ju145, hereafter 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, withappropriate date ; 1st Mar SAR, Nansei Shoto ,dtd 25Ju145, hereafter 1st Mar SAR ; 5th MarS—3 Jnl, 15Jan-26Ju145, hereafter 5th Mar S—3Jnl, with appropriate date ; 7th Mar SAR ,Phase I and II, dtd 1May45, and Phase III ,dtd 11Ju145, hereafter 7th Mar SAR; 6thMarDiv SAR, Ph 1&II; 6th MarDiv Unit Jnl ,Phase I and II, 1-22Apr45, hereafter 6th Mar -Div Jnl, Ph I&II, with appropriate date . Theaction reports of the major component unit sof the 6th Marine Division are included a sannexes to the division SAR and will be citedseparately as 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II ; 1/4 SAR ,Ph I&II ; 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II ; etc.

debark troops. Off the Minatoga beache son the other side of the island, the samepreparations were conducted concur-rently by the shipping that carried the2d Marine Division .

Admiral Turner unleashed his force sat 0406 with the traditional order ,"Land the Landing Force," 2 and Oki-nawa's ordeal began with a percussiv eoverture of naval gunfire . (See Map 6 . )The enemy reacted to the landingshortly after dawn as he mounted scat-tered air attacks on the convoys . In thecontinuing belief that the main effortwas directed at the Minatoga area, th efew Japanese aircraft not destroyed byAmerican carrier air or ships' antiair-craft guns disregarded the more lucra-tive targets off Hagushi and con-centrated on Demonstration Groupshipping. Kamikazes struck the trans-port Hinsdale and LST 884 as troops ,mostly from the 3d Battalion, 2d Ma-rines 3 and its reinforcing elements ,were disembarking for the feint run int othe beaches . Reported killed were 8 Ma-rines ; 37 were wounded, and 8 were

2 CTF 53 AR, pt III, p . 12 .

Throughout this campaign narrative, th edesignation "3d Battalion, 1st Marines" will beused interchangeably with "3/1" or "BLT3/1," the latter number depending upon whichregimental unit is involved . Also, 4th Marinesor 5th Marines is synonymous with RCT 4 o rRCT 5 . Reinforcing troops which make aninfantry regiment an RCT are considered to b eincluded in the RCT designation. A BLT'sreinforcement is likewise to be included in theBLT designation .

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MAIN BATTERIES of USS Tennessee hurl tons of high explosives at Okinawa asassault amtracs head for the beachhead . (USN 80-G-319325)

AERIAL VIEW of the Hagushi anchorage and Yontan airfield on L plus 2, lookingsoutheast from Zampa Misaki. (USN 80-G-3392.42)

THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE

111

listed as missing in action . 4 It is some-what ironic that units not even sched-uled to land on Okinawa on L-Day sus-tained the first troop casualties.

Air support arrived over the targetin force at 0650 5 and the assault forcesbegan to debark ten minutes later . Thetransport areas became the scenes ofpurposeful activity as troops climbeddown landing nets into waiting landingcraft, while armored amphibians, andamphibian tractors preloaded withtroops and equipment, spewed forthfrom the open jaws of LSTs . At thesame time, tank-carrying LCMs (land-ing craft, mechanized) floated from theflooded well decks of LSDs (landingships, dock) . Other tanks, rigged withT–6 flotation equipment, debarked fromLSTs to form up into waves and maketheir own way onto the beaches . °

In reply to the murderous poundingof the Hagushi beaches by 10 battle -ships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 17 7gunboats, the Japanese returned onlydesultory and light artillery and morta rfire. Even though the assault wave sformed up in assembly areas withi n

4 2d MarDiv AR, Anx A–N. In the sameattack, ships' crews sustained casualties of 1killed, 34 wounded and 10 missing.

e More than 500 planes of the Fifth Fleetwere engaged in troop support missions be-tween 0700 and 1000 on L-Day.

e Medium tanks fitted with T–6 flotation de -vices were able to proceed to the beach undertheir own power, utilizing their tracks fo rpropulsion . The equipment consisted of flotatio ntanks welded to the outside of the armore dvehicle, an improvised steering device, elec-trical bilge pumps, and electrically detonate dcharges to jettison the flotation tanks whe nthey were no longer required and once th ebeach was reached . 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II ,pp . 39-41 .

range of this fire, neither troops nor in-vasion craft were hit . During the earlymorning hours, the two battalions of th e420th Field Artillery Group on Keis eShima received heavy enemy counter-battery fire, which stopped America nunloading operations on the reef fo rfour hours but caused no damage .

Lying off each Okinawa invasionbeach were control vessels marking th elines of departure (LD) . Landing ve-hicles quickly formed into waves behin dthe LD and at 0800, when the signa lpennants fluttering from the masts o fthe control vessels were hauled down ,the first wave, composed of LVT (A) s(landing vehicle, tracked (armored) ) ,moved forward to the beaches in anorderly manner behind a line of supportcraft. Following on schedule, hundred sof troop-carrying LVTs, disposed infive to seven waves, crossed the lines o fdeparture at regular intervals andmoved determinedly towards the shore .

Despite the ferocity of the prelandingbombardment, enemy artillery an dmortars continued scattered but ineffec-tual fire on the invasion waves as theymade the 4,000-yard run to the beach .On approaching the shoreline, theLVT (A) s fired upon suspected targets ,while naval gunfire lifted from th ebeach area to hit inland targets . Carrierfighters that had been orbiting lazilyover the two flanks of the beachhea dbegan diving over the landing area andneutralized it with repeated strafing ,bombing, and napalming runs .

As the assault waves hit the beaches ,smoke was laid down on the hills east o fYontan to prevent enemy observationof the landing zone. On the other sid eof the island, Demonstration Group

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landing craft raced toward the Mina -toga beaches only to reverse thei rcourse and retire to the transport are abehind a smoke screen as the fourthwave crossed the line of departure.

Neither the reef fringing the beache snor enemy mortar fire on the beachesthemselves interfered with the success-ful XXIV Corps landing south of th eBishi Gawa. The eight Army assaultbattalions were landed by six successivewaves of LVTs and moved forwardwithout opposition .

The sea wall, which had caused som econcern to XXIV Corps planners, ha dbeen breached by naval gunfire. Inanticipation of the early build-upashore, engineers, landing in the firstwaves, blasted additional beach exitsin those portions of the wall whichremained standing. Upon landing,the LVT(A)s poured through thes ebreaches, hard on the heels of the in-fantry, and moved to protect the flanks ,while amphibious trucks (DUKWs) ,preloaded with 4 .2-inch mortars, an dtanks rolled inland .

Off the Marine landing zone, north ofthe Bishi Gawa, the reef was raggedl yfissured and became smoother only as itneared the beach . A rising tide floate dthe landing vehicles over a large por-tion of the reef and the boulders whichfringed it. On the northern flank of the1st Marine Division, however, the largecircular section of the reef off the BlueBeaches presented difficulties to thetractors attempting to cross at thatpoint, and delayed their arrival at th ebeach .

During the approach of IIIAC assaul twaves to assigned beaches, several in-stances occurred when inexperienced

wave guide officers failed to follow cor-rect compass courses or when they di dnot guide by clearly recognizable terrai nfeatures on the shore . Some troops wer ethus landed out of position . For ex-ample, Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A.Hochmuth's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines—assigned to Red Beach 1—was lande don the right half of Green 2 in the zon eof the 22d Marines (Colonel Merlin F.Schneider), and on the rocky coast lin ebetween Green 2 and Red 1 . (See Map6.)

Elements of Colonel Edward W .Snedeker's 7th Marines were landed i nrelatively insignificant numbers on th ebeach of the 4th Marines (Colonel AlanShapley) . On the extreme right flankof the 1st Marine Division, however, thefourth wave of RCT–5 was diverte dacross the corps boundary and lande don the right flank of the 7th InfantryDivision. The Marine wave consistedprincipally of Lieutenant ColonelCharles W. Shelburne's 1/5 reserve —Company B—and part of the battalioncommand post group. By 0930, a suffi-cient number of LVTs had been sent t opick up all but one lieutenant and tw osquads, who did not rejoin their paren tunit until . L plus 3 . 7 The fifth and sixthwaves of the 5th Marines landed on

7 1/5 SAR, Ph I&II, dtd 29Apr45, p . 5, andPh III, dtd 9Ju145, hereafter 1/5 SAR. Re-lating to this mixup in landing beaches, the 1s tDivision Shore Party Officer wrote, "there is apoint here which should not be missed . 1stMarDiv beaches were designated Blue an dYellow and 7th Div's were Purple and Orangefrom left to right as you came in from th esea . Some of the ships mounting out the 7thDiv did not have Purple and Orange buntin gand substituted Blue and Yellow ." Col RobertG. Ballance ltr to CMC, dtd 22Mar55, here -after Ballance ltr .

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their assigned beaches after the guideofficers of these waves corrected th efaulty course heading followed by thefourth wave .

Despite these unexpected deviationsfrom the landing plan, all the LVT (A) sspearheading the IIIAC attack reachedthe beach by 0830 and all eight assaul tbattalions were ashore by 0900 . Thebeaches had not been mined and opposi-tion to the landing consisted only ofsporadic mortar and small arms fire .This resulted in but few casualties andcaused no damage to the LVTs . "Withutter consternation and bewildermentand with a great deal of relief the as-sault wave landed against practicallyno opposition . " 8

As the assault troops surged up theterraced slopes behind the beaches andsped inland, the center of invasion activ-ity shifted from the line of departure tothe transfer line at the edge of the reef.There, small boat, LVT, and DUKWcontrol was established to unload sup -port troops and artillery units on call .Supporting units continued to pourashore during the morning as the attackprogressed against only slight resist-ance. At the transfer line, reserve in-fantry elements shifted from ships 'boats into the LVTs which ha dlanded assault troops earlier . Flotation-equipped tanks made the beaches undertheir own power., others were landed athigh tide from LCMs, and the re-mainder were discharged directly ont othe reef from LSMs and LSTs. DUKWsbrought the 75mm and 105mm how-itzers of the light field artillery bat-talions directly ashore .

4th. Mar SAR, Ph I&II, pp . 6-7.

All tanks in the 1st , Division assaultwave, landing from LCMs and LCTs ,were on the beach by noon . One excep-tion was a tank that foundered in a reefpothole . The captain of LST 628, carry-ing the six T—6 flotation-equipped tank sof the 1st Tank Battalion (LieutenantColonel Arthur J . Stuart), disregardedthe operation plan and refused to allo wthem to launch until H plus 60 minutes . 'At that time, he set them in the wate r10 miles off the landing beaches. Thesetanks finally reached shore after beingafloat for more than five hours, but twoof them were hung up on the reef be-cause of the ebbing tide . Because theLSMs carrying Lieutenant ColonelStuart's reserve tanks had great diffi-culty in grounding on the reef on L-Day ,the first tracked vehicle off the ramp ofone was lost in an unseen pothole . Ofthe four LSMs employed, two finall ylanded their cargo late on L-Day ,another at noon on L plus 1, and the laston 3 April .

Tanks were landed early in the 6thDivision zone, where each of the thre ecompanies of the 6th Tank Battalion(Lieutenant Colonel Robert L . Denig ,Jr.) employed a different landing pro-cedure. Tanks equipped with flotationgear swam to the reef, easily negotiatedthe rugged coral, continued on to thebeaches, where they jettisoned theirpontoons and became operational by Hplus 29 minutes . The company in LCM s

° In his action report, the LST captai nstated that he did not hold a complete copy o fthe basic Fifth Fleet plan . He also commentedthat the plans held aboard his ship were dis-tributed so late that there was insufficient tim efor "`adequate planning, preparation an dtraining .' " Dir, Naval Hist ltr I.


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came in at high tide (0930) and landed

without incident. The third compan y

successfully landed directly from th eLSMs grounded on the reef but forde dthe deep water between the groundingpoint and the shore with difficulty . l o

Soon after landing, the acceleratedpace of the 6th Division assault to thenorth overextended Colonel Schneider' s22d Marines. Troops were taken fro mhis left battalion, 2/22 (LieutenantColonel Horatio W . Woodhouse, Jr .) ,to guard the exposed flank. This, in turn ,weakened the 22d attack echelon andgave it a larger front than it could ade-quately cover . Consequently, a consider -

able gap developed between the 2d Bat-talion and the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant

Colonel Malcolm "0" Donohoo), ad-vancing on the right. In less than 20minutes after the landing, Colone lSchneider ordered his reserve, 1/2 2(Major Thomas J . Myers), ashore . Uponlanding, the 1st Battalion (less Com-pany C, remaining afloat as regimenta lreserve) was committed in the cente rof the regimental zone .

Still meeting no opposition while i tcontinued the rapid move inland, b y1000 the 22d Marines found its leftflank unit stretched dangerously thin .As he pressed the division attack to ex-ploit initial success, General Shepherdanticipated Schneider's request for re-inforcements to cover the exposed flank ,and asked corps to release one BLT o fthe 29th Marines .

During the unopposed 22d Marine sadvance on Hanza, the 4th Marinesmoved on Yontan airfield against ligh tto moderate resistance. Isolated enemy

10 6th TkBn SAR, Ph I&II, pp . 15-16, 39-41 .

310-224 0 - 69 - 9

pockets, built around light machine guns ,slowed the regiment only slightly as i tpenetrated several hundred yards in -land and made contact on its right withthe 7th Marines at the division bound-ary. By midmorning, the 4th reachedthe airfield and found it unguarded .

Only intermittent sniper fire comingfrom beyond the field opposed the 4thMarines as it swept across the air facil-ity and secured its objective by 1300 .The airfield was found to be essentiallyintact, but all buildings had beenstripped and the antiaircraft emplace-ments contained only dummy guns .

As this rush carried Colonel Shapley' sregiment beyond adjacent units, a wid egap developed between its left flank andthe right of the 22d Marines, then in th evicinity of Hanza . Shapley's regimentjumped off again at 1330 against onl y

light resistance on its left . Tanks werecalled in to reduce several cave position s

in this area . After these positions wer eneutralized, the attack continued slowl ythrough rugged, wooded terrain . Inorder to maintain contact with the 7thMarines and to rectify the overextende dcondition of the 4th, 2/4 was release dfrom division reserve at 1500 and im-mediately committed on the regiment ' sleft to establish contact with the 22dMarines .

Because the division left flank wa sstill dangerously exposed, Genera lShepherd regained 1/29 (LieutenantColonel Jean W. Moreau) from corps .Released by IIIAC at 1300, the battalio nlanded at 1500 and, with its left flankanchored on Green Beach 1, completedtying in with 22d Marines at 1700 .

The 1st Marine Division, to thesouth of the 6th, met with the same sur-

116


prising lack of resistance . By 0945 onthe division left, Colonel Snedeker's 7t hMarines had advanced through the vil-lage of Sobe, a first priority objective ,and the 5th Marines (Colonel John H .Griebel) was 1,000 yards inland stand-ing up. With the beaches clear, and inorder to avoid losing any troops as aresult of anticipated enemy air attack sagainst the congested transport area, th edivision reserve was then orderedashore. Colonel Kenneth B . Chappell' s1st Marines embarked two BLTs, andthe third was to land as soon as trans-portation became available .

Reserve battalions of both assaultregiments were picked up by LVTs atthe transfer line and shuttled to th ebeach before noon . The 3d Battalion, 7thMarines (Lieutenant Colonel EdwardH. Hurst), landed in the center of theregimental zone of action and the nmoved to the rear of Lieutenant Colone lSpencer S. Berger's 2/7, the left flankunit. At 1400, 3/5 was positioned 40 0yards behind 1/5 on the division rightboundary. When the 5th Marines re -serve was moved up behind the assaul tbattalions, the commanding officer of3/5, Major John A. Gustafson, wentforward to reconnoiter . An hour later,at 1500, his group was fired on by asmall bypassed enemy pocket an dGustafson was wounded and evacuated.His executive officer, Major Martin C .Roth, took over temporarily until 4April, when Lieutenant Colonel John C .Miller, Jr ., assumed command . 1 1

Thus disposed in depth with its re-serve elements echeloned to guard th e

11 3d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 1-21Apr45, dtd30Apr45, and 22Apr-22Jun45, dtd 10Ju145 ,hereafter 3/5 SAR.

flanks, the 1st Division continued it ssteady advance over the rolling checker-board terrain . In addition to having de-veloped the numerous caves that honey-combed the many hillsides in the zone ,the Japanese had begun to organiz eother positions throughout the area an dthe Marines encountered innumerabl efield fortifications in varying stages ofdevelopment . These defenses, however ,were only held by small, scatteredgroups of service troops and hom eguards. According to a postwar Japa-nese source, these troops comprise d" . . . a hastily organized motley unit . . .facing extreme hardship in trying toachieve an orderly formation ." 1 2

The principal bridge over the Bish iGawa below Hiza was undamaged andstanding, 13 and local defense forces hadmade little or no effort to destroy thenarrow bridges that spanned lesserstreams. What proved a greater hin-drance to the advance than the desultoryenemy attempts at halting it was wha tone observer described as "an excellen tnetwork of very poor roads ." 1 4

By 1530, the majority of IIIAC sup -porting troops and artillery was ashore .One howitzer of Colonel Robert B .Luckey's 15th Marines and three of th e11th Marines (Colonel Wilburt S .Brown) were lost when the DUKW scarrying them foundered on the reef,but the remaining divisional artillery ofIIIAC was landed successfully . Even

12 Okinawa Operations Record, p . 69 ."

In commenting on this section, BrigadierGeneral Robert G . Ballance, the shore part yofficer of the 1st Marine Division, noted tha tthe "bridge was a stone arch affair, datingback around 1200 A .D." Ballance ltr.

14 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, pp. 1-2 .


117

though the artillery arrived early, acombination of the rapid infantr yadvance and the resulting strain on com -munications made it difficult for for -ward observers to register their bat-talions . Corps artillery reconnaissanc eparties began landing at 1300, andfound that "selection of position area sfrom map and photo study proved suit-able in every case ."1 5

The advance was halted between 1600and 1700, and the attacking infantr ydug in, established contact all along th eIIIAC line, and carried out extensiv epatrolling to the front . To maintain theimpetus of the attack of his division o nL-Day, General Shepherd had com-mitted his entire reserve early. The 6thMarine Division remained in good shap eand was well disposed to resume the ad-vance on the 2d. Both the 4th and 22dMarines still maintained a company inreserve, while the corps reserve (29thMarines, less 1/29) was located north-west of Yontan airfield, in the vicinityof Hanza, after its landing at 1535 .

General del Valle's division was un-

able to close the gap on the corpsboundary before dark and halted some600 yards to the rear of the 7th In-

fantry Division on the right . 16 A com-

pany was taken from the reserve bat-talion of the 5th Marines and put into a

15 Henderson ltr . The same source stated :"The [Japanese] failure to fight for the beach -head never gave us a chance to see how wellthe artillery would have performed in th eassault phase. I am convinced however that i twould have been the best field artillery suppor tof the war . "

le LtCol John D. Muncie ltr to CMC, dt d27Mar47 .

blocking position to close the open flank .Two 1st Marines battalions, 1/1 and2/1 (commanded by Lieutenant Colo-nels James C. Murray, Jr., and JamesC. Magee, Jr ., respectively) , landed at1757. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V.Sabol's 3d Battalion was on the transferline at 1800 but, unable to obtain LVTs,remained in the boats all night. The 1stBattalion was attached to the 5thMarines for administrative control an dmoved inland to Furugen, while 2/1 ,similarly attached to the 7th Marines ,dug in east of Sobe by 1845 . 1 7

Artillery support for the Marine in-fantry was readily available by night -fall . The 15th Marines had establishedits fire direction center (FDC) by 1700,and its batteries were registered by1830. All of Colonel Brown's artillerybattalions were prepared to fire nigh tdefensive missions, though two of the11th Marines battalions did not com-plete their registration because of thelate arrival of spotter planes . Sinceenemy action was confined to unsuccess -ful attempts at infiltration of the line sand to intermittent mortar and machinegun fire in the 4th Marines sector, therewere relatively few requirements forartillery support that first night onOkinawa .

ICEBERG's L-Day had been success-ful beyond all expectations . In conjunc-tion with the extended initial advanceof IIIAC, XXIV Corps had capture dKadena airfield by 1000, driven inlandto an average depth of 3,500 yards, an dadvanced south along the east coast tothe vicinity of Chatan . On 1 April, th e

17 Col Russell E . Honsowetz ltr to CMC, dt d90ct54, hereafter Honsowetz ltr .

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Tenth Army had landed an estimated50,000 troops in less than eight hour sand established a beachhead that was15,000 yards wide and varied from4,000-5,000 yards in depth . (See Map7.) For the entire day's operations byfour assault divisions, casualties werereported to Admiral Turner as 28killed, 104 wounded, and 27 missing .

PROGRESS INLAND

Following a relatively quiet night ,which was punctuated only by sporadi csniper, machine gun, and mortar fire,Tenth Army units resumed the attackon L plus 1 at 0730 . Perfect weatheragain prevailed, as the early morningwas cool and a bright sun soon dispelle dthe ground fog and haze to provide un-limited visibility . While no artillerypreparation preceded the jump off onthe second day, all guns were availabl eon call for support fires, and registra-tion of all battalions, including those o fthe 11th Marines, had been completed .Carrier planes were on station at 0600before the attack began .

With the resumption of the advance,

the 6th Marine Division continued tothe east, while its left flank unit, 1/29 ,began clearing operations to Zamp aMisaki . Admiral Turner wanted th epoint captured as a site for a radar sta-tion. He also wanted the Black Beache suncovered so that unloading operation scould begin. Throughout the day, the

22d Marines and 1/29 advanced rapidlyagainst light resistance . By 1025, thelatter unit had seized Zampa Misaki an dfound that the beaches there were un-suitable for use by IIIAC .

Major Anthony Walker's 6th Recon-naissance Company was then ordere dto reconnoiter the beaches on the northcoast of Zampa and the villages ofNagahama and Maeta Saki . Walker'sscouts accomplished this mission befor enoon without opposition, and whil edoing so, encountered 50 civilians, whowere taken into custody and transferre dto stockades. The Nagahama beach wasreported satisfactory for landing sup -plies .

On the 6th Division right, the 4thMarines advanced through rugged ter -

rain, meeting intermittent enemy re -action. As the day wore on, however ,pockets of stiff resistance were increas-

ingly encountered, and at 1100, 3/4 cameup against strong enemy positions, con-

sisting of mutually supporting caves on

both sides of a steep ravine . When theleading platoon entered the draw, it wasmet by a hail of small arms fire so heavythat the Marines could not bring outtheir 12 wounded until four hours later ."Every means of painlessly destroyingthe strongpoint was unsuccessfullytried and it was finally taken by a typi-

cal `Banzai' charge with one platoo nentering the mouth of the draw and on eplatoon coming down one side of th etwo noses that formed the pocket ." 1 8

The speed of the second day's advanceagain caused the assault units to becomeoverextended. About midmorning, Colo-

nel Shapley reported that there was agap between his regiment and the 7t hMarines, which he believed to be som e1,000 yards south of the division bound-

4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 8.

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ary,19 and an adjustment was requestedby Shepherd . The 7th was ordered tocover the gap, a movement that place dit ahead of 1/4. In sideslipping back toits own zone, 1/4 met with stiff opposi-tion from strongly entrenched enemyforces similar to those that had held u p3/4. With the aid of a platoon of tanks ,this position was finally reduced . Thetwo battalions killed some 250 Japanes ein the course of the day's operations be-fore the 4th Marines attack ceased at1830, some 1,000 yards ahead of the Lplus 3 line .

During the day, Major Paul F .Sackett's 6th Engineer Battalion re -paired the strips on Yontan and place done taxiway in good enough conditionto permit a VMO–6 spotter plane to lan dat 1500. By 4 April, all three Yontan

""Lack of readily identifiable terrain fea-tures made it impossible to quickly identify th eboundaries of zones of action in the rapid ad-vance. Maps at this time were also poor an ddifficult to follow. Hill 165 [3,600 yards westof Yontan airfield] and certain towns, how -ever, were unmistakable . [The] 7th Marine sZA was approximately 2,000 yards wide. Whilethere was some slippage to the right all alongthe front, I know that 2/7 on the left and1/7 on the right substantially covered thei r[zone of action] . My opinion is that the leftflank of the 7th was not over 400 yards fro mthe division boundary at any time. The slantdistance from the actual right flank of th e4th Marines and the left flank of the 7t hMarines may have been greater as the attack sof the two regiments were not at an evenrate ." BGen Edward W . Snedeker ltr to CMC ,dtd 180ct54, hereafter Snedeker ltr I . "Themaps were not accurate . The 7th felt that the ywere on the boundary and so did the 4th . Whowas right was never determined ." Honsowetzltr. "There was a gap, but it never was de-termined how much or in what area . In anycase it was not a serious gap for a maneuverin gassault." Snedeker ltr 1965.

runways were ready for emergenc ylandings .

Spearheaded by extensive advancepatrolling, the 1st Marine Divisionmoved out on L plus 1 unopposed excep tfor the slight interference presented b ylocal defense units, which were part ofa force officially designated the 1stSpecially Established Regiment . Acti-vated by the Thirty-second Army on Lminus 4, it was composed of 3,473 air-field service troops and Boeitai, lessthan half of whom were armed withrifles. In addition, the equipment of thisregiment consisted of 55 light machineguns, and 18 grenade launchers. Theheaviest weapons of this unit were 1 0heavy machine guns and 5 20m mdual-purpose machine cannon . For themost part, the troops were completelyuntrained, and even the regular Armyservice troops had not been given suchbasic infantry training as firing amachine gun.

When Ushijima pulled his combattroops south, the 1st Specially Estab-lished Regiment had been assigned themission of servicing final air traffic o nthe Yontan and Kadena fields . The regi-ment was to destroy those fields on orderafter the Americans had landed an dthen to retire to positions from which itcould deny their use to the invaders .The 1st Battalion was located in the6th Division zone ; the 2d and part ofthe 3d Battalion in the 1st Marine Divi-sion area ; the remainder of the 3d Bat-talion faced the 7th Infantry Division ;and the 5th Company of the 12th Inde-pendent Infantry Battalion was assem-bled in regimental reserve at Hanza.Uniquely enough, upon interrogation ofsome troops captured from these organ-


121

izations, it was found that not one knewthat he was in this paper organization ,and only one had ever heard of it . With-out exception, the prisoners gave astheir unit the service or home guardelement with which they had served a tthe airfields .

Despite their motley makeup, thei rcommanding officer, Lieutenant Colone lTokio Aoyanagi, determined to emplo ythem in slowing the advance of the in-vaders . At 1400 on L-Day, he issued anorder directing all of his battalions tohold every strongpoint, to carry outnight raids, to destroy all bridges, andto construct tank obstacles . The colonelpleaded for "each and every one [to ]carry out his duty with the convictionof certain victory." 2 0

His men were poorly armed andmostly leaderless . Moreover, they lacke dcommunications . When the escaperoutes to the organized forces in thesouth were cut off, therefore, this hap-hazardly organized group collapsed.The greater portion of these troop sapparently fled to the northern hills ,while a few, undoubtedly, escaped to thesouth ; 26 were captured and 663 killedby the 1st Marine Division alone . Mostof those who remained in the combatarea quickly divorced themselves fromthe military, but other operated a ssnipers or guerrillas dressed in civilianattire .

Reliable intelligence was meager an dhard to come by owing to the lack o fcontact with the enemy regular forces .As tactical operations developed rapidly

2° "1st Specially Established Regiment Oper OA2, dtd 1Apr45," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bu l107-45, Translations and Interrogations No.28, dtd 14May45, pp. 12-13 .

against light opposition, hundreds ofdazed civilians filtered through the line sand into the paths of the assault forces .When the Marines met these Oki-nawans, they interrogated, screened ,and sent natives back to division stock-ades. Attempts to obtain information o fthe enemy from the older inhabitant swere stymied because of the difficultie simposed in translating the Okinawandialect . Younger natives of high schoolage, who had been forced to learn Japa-nese by the Nipponese overlords, provedto be a lucrative source of information,however .

Even though most civilians were co-operative with the Americans, theycould provide very little information ofimmediate tactical importance. None-theless, the Okinawans confirmed th epicture of the Japanese withdrawal tothe south., clarified the presence or ab-sence of units suspected of being in th earea, aided in establishing an order ofbattle, and revealed the general andspecific areas to which the rest of thecivilian population had fled .

Military government personnel soondiscovered that local inhabitants hadmoved with all their belongings to cavesdug near their homes to escape from th epath of war. Although interpreters rov-ing the area in trucks mounted wit hloudspeakers assured the natives thatthey would be saved and induced themto leave their refuges voluntarily, otherOkinawans continued to believe Japa-nese propaganda and viewed the Ameri-can "devils" as barbarians and cut-throats . In many cases, particularly inisolated regions, it was necessary fo rlanguage and civil affairs personnel "toenter the caves and verbally pry the

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dwellers loose ." 21 Sometimes this re-sulted in troops coming upon a tragi cscene of self-destruction, where a father ,fearing for the lives of his family an dhimself at the hands of the invaders ,had killed his wife and children an dthen had committed suicide . Fortu-nately, there were no instances of masssuicide as there had been on Saipan o rin the Keramas . 2 2

Specifically organized patrols wer edispatched to round up civilians andtransfer them to stockades in areas pre-designated in military governmentplans. These patrols were often accom-panied by language officers searchin gfor documents, but most of the materia lfound was of no military value . When arewarding find was made, pertinent in -formation was orally translated t othe regimental S-2, who took down mat-ters of local significance . The paper wasthen sent to the division G–2 languagesection .

The 1st Division learned from docu-ments captured in its zone that theJapanese authorities had actively con-scripted Okinawan males between theages of 17 and 45 since the bombings of10 October 1944. After their induction ,these men were placed into three type sof organizations ; regular Thirty-SecondArmy units, specially organized engi-neer units, and labor forces . In order t oneutralize the effects that might resul tfrom the presence of such a large hostil egroup in its midst, the Tenth Army de-

'1 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VIII, p . 2 .22 For examples of Japanese-induced mass

hysteria among civilians see : Appleman, et . at. ,Okinawa Battle, p. 58; Maj Carl W . Hoffman ,Saipan: The Beginning of the End (Washing -ton : HistDiv, HQMC, 1950), p . 245 .

creed that all able-bodied males betwee nthe ages of 15 and 45 years were to b edetained for further screening togethe rwith bona fide prisoners of war . 2 3

Special agents from Army Counter -intelligence Corps detachments as -signed the division assisted the Marinesin interrogating and screening each mal eOkinawan detainee . Eventually, aftertheir clearance by the American agents ,cooperative and intelligent natives wereenlisted to aid in the interrogations.Specially qualified Okinawans weremoved to liberated villages and dis-tricts to serve as informants for theIsland Command .

Even more of a problem than the in -ability of the Marines to come to gripswith the enemy or their difficulty in ob-taining usable intelligence was the dis-location of the logistical plan and thesubsequent strain on supporting unitsthat resulted from the unopposed andrapid troop advance . The logistics annexof the operation plan had been based o nthe premise that the landings would b estubbornly contested, and unloadingpriorities were assigned accordingly .When the uncontested landing permittedthe immediate debarkation of troopswho had not been scheduled ashore unti l2 or 3 April, landing craft originallyallocated to move cargo were divertedfor this troop movement. As a result ,the unloading of supplies was delayedon L-Day.

Because the road net ranged in degreefrom primitive to nonexistent and in

""The wisdom of these precautions wa sillustrated by several incidents which confirme dour suspicions. Many a Kimono hid a uniform ,and a number of civilians were found to b earmed." 1st MarDiv SAR, pt VIII, p . 7.


123

order to prevent traffic congestion ,LVTs were not sent too far inland . Thefront lines were supplied, therefore, byindividual jeeps, jeep trailers, weasels ,and carrying parties, or a combinationof all four. As forward assault elementsmoved farther inland, the motor trans-port requirement became critical and arealignment of unloading priorities wasnecessary . As a consequence, the unload -ing of trucks from AKAs and APAs wa sgiven the highest priority.

By the night of L plus 1, all of theunits supported by the 11th Marine shad moved beyond artillery range, an dColonel Brown's regiment had to dis-place forward. The movement of 1/1 1(Lieutenant Colonel Richard W . Wal-lace), in particular, was long overdue .Artillery displacements were not yetpossible, however, since organic regi-mental transportation had not lande dand no other prime movers were avail -able. Two battalions were moved for -ward on L plus 2 by shuttle movementsand an increased transportation capa-bility, which resulted when more truckscame ashore and were made available .The other two battalions moved up o nthe 4th. Although it had been planne dto have the bulk of Corps Artillery onthe island by the end of L plus 1, an dall by the end of L plus 2, it was no tuntil 10 April that General Nimmer' sforce was completely unloaded . "Thismelee resulted from the drastic changein unloading priorities ." 24 Fortunately ,unloading operations were improved byL plus 2 .

Engineer battalions organic to theMarine divisions were generally re -

24 Henderson ltr .

lieved of mine removal tasks by the un-finished state of Japanese defenses, butthere was no Ietup in their workload.Owing to the accelerated movement for -ward, the "narrow and impassabl estretches of roads [and] lack of road sleading into areas in which operation sagainst the enemy were being con -ducted, the engineers were called uponmore than any other supportin gunit ." 25 A priority mission assigned tothe engineers was the rehabilitation o fthe airfields after they had been cap-tured. Their early seizure permittedwork to begin almost immediately, an dafter the engineers had reconditione dYontan airfield beyond merely emer-gency requirements, the first four -engine transports arrived from Guamon 8 April to begin evacuating th ewounded . 2 5

The only real problem facing Gen-eral del Valle's units during the secon dday ashore, and one that tended to checka more rapid advance, was "the diffi-culty of supply created by the speed withwhich our units were moving and bylack of good roads into the increasingrough terrain." 27 In viewing the lac kof any formidable resistance to eithe rone of his assault divisions, GeneralGeiger gave both of them permission toadvance beyond the L plus 5 line with -out further orders from him .

25 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 29 .26 Blakelock ltr . This source continues :

"These planes were required to make the re -turn flight to Guam without refueling at Oki-nawa due to the shortage of AvGas ashore t orefuel the planes . Okinawa had five flightsdaily from Guam on a nonfueling basis unti l12 April, when 500 gal/plane was furnishe dfor the return flight . "

27 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p . 4.


BEWILDERED CIVILIANS wait to be taken to military government camps in thewake of the swift American advance across the island . (USMC 117288)

TWO MARINES of the 6th Division safeguard a young Okinawan until he can bereunited with his family. (USMC 118933)


125

By 1500 of L plus 1, the progress of

the 5th Marines had caused its zone ofaction to become wider, and in order t osecure the division right flank and main-tain contact with the 7th Infantry Divi-sion, the 1st and 2d Battalions of th e1st Marines were echeloned one behin dthe other on the corps boundary. Upon

landing that morning, 3/1 moved inlandto a point east of Sobe and remainedthere in division reserve .

As the 1st Marine Division had notyet located the center of the enemy de-fenses or determined his strength, "th e

weakness of the resistance . . . [re-mained] a source of astonishment" to

General del Valle . 28 During the day ,attempts at infiltration and the occa-sional ambushing of patrols by smal l

hostile groups had little effect on th e

tactical situation. When the troops du gin at 1600, the division position wa s

stabilized for the night on a line gen-erally conforming to the L plus 5 line in

the 7th Marines zone, while the 5th wa s

slightly short of it .

To search out enemy positions, the 1s t

Reconnaissance Company (1st Lieuten-ant Robert J . Powell) was ordered to

scout the division zone on 3 April, tak-ing a route that followed along th ecorps boundary to the base of th eKatchin Peninsula on the east coast . Onthis same day, the assault regimentswere to continue the attack with an ad-vance to the L plus 10 line. Becausethere had been only slight activity onthe 1st Division front during L plus 1 ,the 11th Marines fired only five mis-sions. While night defensive fires were

28 LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to CMC, dt d29Sep54, hereafter del Valle ltr.

planned for the second night ashore ,they were not called for .

On this day in the XXIV Corps zone ,the Army divisions also were able t oexploit unexpectedly light resistance .The 7th Infantry Division had reached

the east coast at Tobaru overlookin gKatsuren Wan (Bay), effectively cut-ting the island in half and severing th eenemy line of communications . Units ofthe 96th Division had advanced to theeast and south, and succeeded in pene-trating irregularly defended positions,some of which consisted merely of roadmines and booby-trapped obstacles . Atthe end of L plus 1, General Bradley' sfront lines extended from the vicinityof Futema on the west coast to approxi-mately one mile west of Unjo in the

east .By the close of 2 April, all assault

division command posts had been estab -lished ashore, and the beachhead andthe bulk of the high ground behind th e

landing beaches firmly secured . Enemyobservation of Tenth Army movemen tand dispositions was thus limited, an dany land-based threat to unloadingoperations removed .

Commenting on the conduct ofMarine operations for the two days ,General Buckner signalled GeneralGeiger :

I congratulate you and your commandon a splendidly executed landing and sub-stantial gains in enemy territory. I havefull confidence that your fighting Marine swill meet every requirement of this cam-paign with characteristic courage, spirit ,and efficiency . 2 9

During the night of 2—3 April, enemyactivity was confined to sporadic sniper,

29 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 3Apr45 .

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machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire ,and intermittent infiltration attempt sby individuals and small groups. Unde-terred by this harassment, GeneralGeiger's corps jumped off at 0730 on the3d and again found slight opposition t othe attack.

The 6th Marine Division resumed theoffense in the same lineup with whichit had ended the previous day . (See Map7.) Both the 4th and 22d Marines ad-vanced an average of more than 7,00 0yards through difficult and heavil ybroken terrain to seize the dominatingYontan hill mass and the division objec-tive beyond. While the 22d Marinesmoved forward, 1/29 patrols covere dthe entire Zampa Misaki without dis-covering any enemy troops on thepeninsula. There was no repetition o fthe fierce clashes experienced by the 4thMarines the preceding two days.Throughout the day, the division wa ssupported by tanks, which operatedalong the hazardous narrow trails exist-ing on the precipitous ridge tops to th efront.

By midmorning, the axis of advanc eof the 6th Division began to swing tothe north as the towns of Kurawa andTerabaru were gained. Scattered rear-guard action from withdrawing enem ytroops was the only resistance en -countered by the 22d Marines advanc-ing on Nakadomori . In order to developthe situation on the division front andto determine the nature of Japanesedefenses in the Ishikawa Isthmus, Gen-eral Shepherd ordered his reconnais-sance company to scout the coastal roadfrom Kurawa to Nakadomori, and, a tthat point, to cross the isthmus toIshikawa. Supported and transported

by a reinforced platoon from the 6thTank Battalion, the tank-infantry re-connaissance force completed the as-signment and returned to its lines be -fore nightfall . In the course of thepatrol, the Marines made no enemy con-tacts and were fired upon only oncefrom the vicinity of Ishikawa .

While 1/4, the right battalion, hadrelatively easy going most of the day,3/4 on the left lagged behind because ofthe increasingly difficult terrain . Whenthe division attack ceased at 1700, Gen-eral Shepherd's troops were tied in withthe 1st Division nearly a mile northeas tof Kubo .

Following its sweep of Zampa Misaki ,Lieutenant Colonel Moreau's 1/29 oc-cupied new reserve positions east ofYontan airfield from which it could sup -port either division assault regiment .At 2000, when IIIAC warned of an im-minent enemy airborne attack, Moreauwas reinforced with a tank company ,which was deployed to defend the air -field by 2300 ; no Japanese paratroopsor airborne infantry landed that night .

The only notable enemy activity ex-perienced by the 1st Division during thehours of darkness, 2–3 April, occurre din the 7th Marines sector where th eJapanese attempted extensive infiltra-tion. In the fire fight that ensued, 7Marines were killed and 7 wounded ,while approximately 20–25 of th ewould-be infiltrators perished .

This brief flurry was not an indica-tion of an imminent major engagement,for when del Valle's three combat teamspushed forward on 3 April they metonly light opposition on the left andvirtually none on the right . "Our ever-widening zone of action prohibited the


127

`hand-in-hand' advance of some smallisland operations and our units wereable to maintain contact and clear theirareas only by patrolling to the flanksand front." 30 With the resumption o fthe advance, motorized units of the 1stReconnaissance Company began a seriesof patrols which were to encompas salmost all of the division zone of action .

In the morning, the Ikebaru-Napunjaarea was reconnoitered, after which th ecompany was ordered to proceed downthe Katchin Peninsula. Completing thi s

mission by 1300, Lieutenant Powell' s

scouts were ordered up the east coastto Hizaonna and to return to divisio n

lines before dark . During the entiretrip the only sign of enemy activity wa sa lightly held tank trap .

All units of the division were ordere dto halt at 1700 on ground most favor-able for defense . On the left, the 7th

Marines had pushed forward agains tmoderate opposition over increasingl y

difficult terrain . As the regimenta lcommander later stated :

The movement from the west coast land-ing beaches of Okinawa across the islan dto the east coast was most difficult becaus eof the rugged terrain crossed. It was phys-ically exhausting for personnel who hadbeen on transports for a long time . It als opresented initially an almost impossibl esupply problem in the Seventh's zone ofaction because of the lack of roads. 3 1

Despite these hardships, Snedeker' stroops gained 2,700 yards of enemyterritory and dug in for the night afte roverrunning a strongpoint from whichheavy mortar, 20mm, and small arms

30 1st MarDiv SAR, chap VII, OpAnx, p . 5 .31 Col Edward W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, dtd

27Mar47, hereafter Snedeker ltr 1947 .

fire had been received . Shortly there-after, Colonel Snedeker received per -mission to exploit what appeared to bean apparent enemy weakness and tocontinue the attack after the rest of thedivision had ended it for the day. Hethen ordered his reserve battalion topass between 1/7 and 2/7 and advanc etowards the village of Hizaonna, on th ehigh ground overlooking the eas tcoast . 3 2

The major fighting in this advanceoccurred when the 81mm mortarplatoon was unable to keep up with th erest of 3/7. Company K, following themortars, became separated from themain body upon reaching a road forknear Inubi after night had fallen . Whenhe became aware of the situation, Lieu -tenant Colonel Hurst radioed the com-pany to remain where it was and to di gin after its repeated attempts to rejointhe battalion were defeated by darknes sand unfamiliar terrain. An estimatedplatoon-sized enemy group then en-gaged the Marines in a heavy fire fight ,which continued through the night as

32 1st MarDiv G—3 Jnl, 3Apr45 ; Col Edwar dH. Hurst, interview with HistBr, G—3 Div ,HQMC', dtd 3Mar55 . "The forced march of overthree miles of the Third Battalion, SeventhMarines to Hizaonna, late on 3 April is note -worthy. Orders for the march were not issueduntil about 1430 on that date . Information re-ceived from the Division Reconnaissance Com-pany indicated no substantial enemy strengthon the east coast in the Seventh's zone . Whatmight be encountered from the front line tothe east coast was unknown. The march wasmade over rugged unfamiliar terrain, with theprobable expectancy of meeting enemy forcesat any time, and it resulted in advance ele-ments, including the battalion CO reachin gHizaonna at 1830, 3 April . Hizaonna was atthat time well beyond our front lines . . . . "Snedeker ltr 1947.

128


the Japanese effectively employedmortars, machine guns, and grenadesagainst the isolated unit . By noon on 4April, a rescue team from 3/7 was abl e

to bring the situation under control an dthe company was withdrawn after hav-ing sustained 3 killed and 24 wounded . 3 3

With its right flank anchored o nNakagusuku Wan, 1/1 held a line seal-ing off two-thirds of the Katchi nPeninsula . The 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, meeting negligible resistancefrom armed civilians., occupied the highground immediately west of Gushikawa ,where the eastern shore could be cov-ered by fire . During the day's gains ,"supply had been almost nonexistentand the troops were without water an dstill depending on the food they landedwith." 3 4

The advance of the 5th Marine sgained momentum throughout the day ,the troops having met only a four-manenemy patrol . The 1st Battalion reachedAgina, where 3/5 was committed on theright to contact 2/1 . One thousandyards away, on the left of the regiment2/5 occupied the village of Tengan andthen advanced to the east coast of Oki-nawa. 3

" Hurst interview, op . cit. ; 1st MarDiv Inter-views, Co K, 7th Mar . This last source consistsof a series of interviews conducted by Ser-geants Kenneth A . Shutts and Paul Trilling,historians assigned to the 1st Marine Divisio nfor the Okinawa operation . These interviewsform a valuable record of the importan tactions of the campaign at the small-unit level .

'* 1st Mar SAR, p . 6.""This was accomplished by 1700 on 3

April . 2/5, commanded by LtCol W . E. Bene-dict, had marched approximately eight milesover hilly country since 0800 when they lef ttheir 2 April position near Ishimine ." Col JohnH. Griebel ltr to CMC, dtd 18Oct54 .

By the end of L plus 2, the 1st Marin eDivision had driven to the coast, ad-vancing 3,000—5,000 yards, and thu splaced its lines 8—13 days ahead of theICEBERG schedule . The 6th Division ,meanwhile, had moved through difficultand heavily broken terrain honey-combed with numerous caves to gain3,500—7,000 yards of enemy ground inits zone .

At dark on 3 April, the 6th Divisionleft flank was anchored at the base ofthe Ishikawa Isthmus, thereby placin gthe Tenth Army 12 days ahead ofschedule in this area. During this sameday, the XXIV Corps had reached th eeastern coast in force and its units ha dbegun reorganizing and regrouping fo rthe attack to the south . The 7th InfantryDivision had secured the Awashi Pen-insula, and pivoting southward in a co -ordinated move with the 96th Division ,secured an additional 3,000 yards befor ethe end of the day. In the vicinity ofKuba-saki, the 32d Infantry came upagainst its first real opposition on Oki-nawa, when it made contact with anenemy force estimated at 385 men. Theregiment overran the enemy positio nand finally took Kuba-saki . After com-pleting the wheel to the right, the 96t hDivision reorganized its front lines ,putting its units in position for thesoutherly drive .

While observation planes, OYs (Con-solidated-Vultee Sentinels), operate dfrom Yontan airfield during the day,the 6th Engineer Battalion and the 58thSeabees continued working on the field .An F6F (Grumman Hellcat) from th ecarrier Hancock made an emergencylanding at 1110, and the pilot reportedthat, in his opinion, the runway could


129

satisfactorily accommodate all types o fcarrier planes . The other runways wer eexpected to be operational for fighter -type aircraft by noon on the 4th .

Because of the very favorable situ-ation that had developed during the day ,General Buckner removed all restric-tions he had placed on movement pas tthe L plus 10 line and ordered IIIAC toseize the L plus 25 line at the earliestpossible time. Geiger then ordered the6th Marine Division to continue theattack on 4 April and to take the L plus15 line, prepared to continue the ad-vance to the L plus 20 line. General de lValle's division was ordered to advanceto the L plus 20 line . (See Map 7 . )

The continuing cool and clear weatheron 4 April again served as a welcomechange from the torrid humidity of th ePhilippines and the Solomons. Follow-ing a quiet night, broken only by th efighting in the Inubi area, the IIIACjumped off on schedule at 0730 on Lplus 3 .

As the 6th Division pushed forward,no enemy hindered the 4th and 22dMarines advance to the L plus 15 line .General Geiger's reserve, the 29thMarines (Colonel Victor F . Bleasdale) ,less its 1st Battalion, had reverted todivision control earlier, and Shepherdassigned it as his reserve . When it be-came apparent that the day's objectiveswould be reached by noon, the assaultregiments were ordered to continue be-yond the L plus 15 line to additionallyassigned division objectives .

With all three battalions in the as-sault, the 22d Marines reached theirPhase I objective at 1250 . Organized a sa fast tank-infantry column, LieutenantColonel Woodhouse's 2/22 sped up the

west coastal road . All the while, he sentpatrols inland along the route to main-tain contact with 1/22 patrol columnsin the interior of the regimental attackzone. On the right, the 3d Battalionreached Ishikawa before noon, havinggradually pinched out the 4th Marine swhen that regiment reached the coas tat about the same time . Colonel Shapleywas then ordered to reconsolidate hisunit in the Ishikawa area, and to pre -pare to support either division flankunit in the attack northward. In thecourse of the morning operations, ex-ceedingly rough terrain, and the logisti-cal support problems it posed, createdgreater obstacles to the advance thandid the enemy .

At 1300, the attack up the IshikawaIsthmus was resumed, with RCT–22 and1/29 attached 36 taking over the entir edivision front from the west to the eastcoast . Advance was rapid in the after -noon as patrols met only scattered re-sistance until 1730, when a Japanes estrongpoint, built around several heav ymachine guns, fired upon a 3/22 patro lnorth of Yaka . Night defenses were nottaken up until after this obstacle wa sreduced by units of Donohoo's 3/22 an dMoreau's 1/29, the latter having as-sumed the 1/22 sector when Majo rMyers' unit was placed in regimenta lreserve .

When the 6th halted for the day, itsMarines had advanced over 7,500 yardsand held a line that stretched across theisthmus from a point just south o fYakada on the west coast to Yaka o n

ae After being relieved of its Yontan airfiel ddefense mission, 1/29 moved to Nakadomariin the morning and was attached to the 22 dMarines at 1155, when it moved up to the lines.

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the east. In this day's fighting, the in-creasingly rugged terrain forecast th edifficulties to be faced during the marchnorthward . Supply lines were strainedalmost to their limit as they were ex-tended across numerous ravines andsteep valleys in the mountainous in-terior. Despite this, the troops were fe dand logistical replenishment continuedas the division prepared to continue theadvance the next day .

With the exception of the few enem ypositions encountered in its push to th eeast coast, the 1st Marine Division stil ldid not have a clear picture of whatJapanese defenses lay ahead on 4 April .As on the day before, the attack jumpedoff without artillery preparation. Rapidprogress with little resistance was th egeneral order, except on the left wherethe 7th Marines was still busy with theenemy in the vicinity of Inubi . The 2dBattalion reached the east coast by 113 0and, shortly thereafter, made firm con -tact with the 4th Marines . On the ex-treme right of the regiment, light bu tstubborn enemy fire enfiladed the 1/ 7right flank, and delayed its arrival a tthe coast until 1700 . Because of th erapid advance of the regiment over aroadless terrain, Colonel Snedeker re-quested supply airdrops during the day.The first drop was made at Hizaonna at1400, about the same time that Genera ldel Valle's new CP was opening at apoint between Ikebaru and Napunja .

After dark, when the 7th Marineswas consolidating its positions on the Lplus 15 line, the enemy began numerou sattempts at infiltrating American lines .Although 45 Japanese were killed asthey probed the regimental positions, itwas difficult to obtain any information

regarding the units represented bythese men, who employed rifles, gre-nades, bayonets, and sharply pointe dbamboo spears, which the Marinespromptly dubbed "idiot sticks ." 3 7

In the center of the division line, th e5th Marines reached the shores ofKimmu Wan by early afternoon, whenthe battalions consolidated their posi-tions and established firm contact withall flanking units . The same day, the 1stMarines occupied Katchin Peninsula inorderly fashion by noon and set up it sdefenses. Once these two regiments werein position on the L plus 15 line, theyinitiated patrolling to the rear to elimi-nate bypassed positions, a task in whichthe reconnaissance company and the di -vision reserve (3/1) also participated .

That evening, 3/1 was ordered to takeover the defense of Yontan airfield fro mthe 29th Marines on 5 April . Tentativeplans were formulated to release the 7thMarines to IIIAC in order to assist th e6th Division in its drive north . The nextday, the 7th Marines (less Hurst's 3/7 ,which was attached to the 5th Marines )went into IIIAC reserve with orders t ooccupy and defend the village ofIshikawa, pending further tactical de-velopments . 3 8

In the course of its four-day driveacross Okinawa, the 1st Marine Divi-sion found only negligible resistance ,and this from Japanese units of unde-termined strength employing delayingor rearguard tactics . The question re-mained : Where was the enemy? Thedivision had killed 79 Japanese, cap-

3 ' 1st MarDiv SAR, chap. VII, p . 6 .

" "A History of the 7th Marines on OkinawaShima," p . 7, end A to Snedeker ltr 1947 ,hereafter 7th Mar Hist.


131

tured 2 prisoners of war (POWs), an dencountered 500–600 civilians, wh owere quickly interned .

To the south of the 1st Division, th etactical situation in the XXIV Corpszone had been undergoing radica lchange. (See Map 7.) Army assaultdivisions had aggressively exploitedthe initial lack of enemy resistance.During the same time, they wer ehampered less by supply difficultie sthan the Marine divisions had been .Once General Hodge's divisions ha dwheeled to the right on 3 April for thedrive southward, the lines were reorgan-ized and preparations made for freshassault units to effect passage of thelines the next day. The corps was nowready for the Phase I southern drive.

The 7th Division pushed forward on4 April only to meet stiffening re-sistance from hostile artillery-sup-ported infantry at Hill 165. 39 After aday's fighting, the division drove th eJapanese from this dominant piece o fterrain and continued forward to netapproximately 1,000 yards for the day .Meanwhile, in the 96th Division zone ,Army infantry battalions were held upby reinforced enemy company strong -points several times during the day .Heavy Japanese machine gun, mortar,and artillery fire impeded the advance ,but by the night of 4 April, the XXIVCorps had seized the L plus 10 line ,which had been originally designate dthe southernmost limit of the TenthArmy beachhead .

ae The reader should keep in mind the factthat elevation was expressed in meters on thebasic 1 :25,000 map used for Okinawa. WhenHill 165's metric height is converted to feet ,544, it becomes a sizable hill .

310-224 0 - 69 - 10

An increasing volume of enemy de-fensive fires was placed on the Arm ydivisions as they moved out for theirfifth day of ground action. On the XXIVCorps left flank, resistance came mainl yfrom small, scattered enemy groups i nthe hills and ridges bordering the eas tcoast. In the 96th Division zone to theright, both assault regiments becameheavily engaged with Japanese outpoststrongpoints during L plus 4 . Aboutnoon, an enemy counterattack wa sbroken up by tank-artillery supportedinfantry action just when the rightflank regiment of the 96th, the 383d In-fantry, drove unsuccessfully against thefirst of a series of prepared ridge posi-tions guarding the approaches toKakazu. Four tanks were lost duringthe day's fighting, one to a mine andthe others to enemy antitank fire . Com-pared to the long advances of the previ-ous four days of ground action, the 96thDivision was able to take only 400 yardson L plus 4 .

THE SWING NORTH 4 0

Although the Japanese forces in thesouth offered an increasingly stiff de-fense as their positions were uncovered ,the exact whereabouts of the mainenemy strength in the northern part o fthe island remained as clouded as wa shis order of battle. Even though PhaseI of the ICEBERG plan did not specifyany action beyond isolation of the are a

40 Unless otherwise noted, the material i nthis section is derived from : CTF 51 AR ;Tenth Army AR ; ILIAC AR ; 1st MarDiv SAR ;1st MarDiv G–3 Jnl; 1st Mar SAR ; 6th Mar-Div SAR, Ph I&II ; 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II ;4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II ; 22d Mar SAR, PhI&II ; 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II .

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above the Ishikawa Isthmus for theIIIAC, General Buckner believed thatit would be profitable to exploit initia lMarine successes . As a result, on 5April he ordered IIIAC to reconnoiterYabuchi Shima, to conduct a vigorousreconnaissance northwards to th eMotobu Peninsula, and to initiate prep-arations for the early completion ofPhase II . (See Map II, Map Section . )

At the same time that the 6th Divi-sion conducted its reconnaissance upthe isthmus, the 1st Division entered aperiod devoted primarily to defensiveactivity . Supplies were brought upfrom the rear, positions were improvedand camouflaged, and all units beganheavy patrolling to the rear . At noon onL plus 4., a 1st Marines patrol wadedacross the reef to Yabuchi Shima fro mthe Katchin Peninsula, captured fiv eBoeitai, and reported the presence ofsome 350 civilians .

The nearly perfect weather whichhad prevailed since L-Day, deteriorate dwith light rain over scattered areas inthe early evening of the 5th . Althoughthere was no evidence that it was organ-ized, enemy activity behind the line sincreased during the day but only fromsmall separated groups apparently oper-ating independently of each other. Ofthis period, a regimental commandernoted :

There [were] almost daily patrol con-tacts with well-armed enemy groups . . . .Some of these groups were wanderin gaimlessly about while others occupied wel ldefended, organized, and concealed posi-tions . These patrol operations were ex-tremely valuable in giving to the officer sand men of the regiment added confidenc ein each other and helped all to reach a peakof physical perfection . . . independent

patrols . . . often under fire, added greatl yto the ability of the leaders of smal lunits . 4 1

Because it was necessary to mov esupplies forward to support the ad-vance, the 6th Division delayed H-Houron the 5th until 0900. At that time,armor-supported infantry columns wer edispatched on deep reconnaissances upboth sides of the isthmus, the 6th Recon-naissance Company on the left (west )flank and Company F, 4th Marines onthe right. The latter advanced 14 milesbefore turning back in the late after-noon. During the day, the patrol hadbeen delayed three times by undefendedroadblocks but met no opposition unti lthe tanks entered Chimu., where two ofthe enemy encountered were killed anda Japanese fuel truck was destroyed .The drive up the other side of the islan dwas unopposed, but the tanks could notbypass a destroyed bridge at Onna. Thereconnaissance company, forced to con-tinue on to Nakama by foot, returned tothe lines that evening.

While 6th Division mobile coverin gforces searched out routes of advance ,the assault battalions rapidly move dforward, detaching companies as neces-sary to reduce bypassed enemy pocketsof resistance inland . Although the ter-rain had become more difficult to nego-tiate and the enemy increasingly active ,the division gained another 7,000 yards .The 22d Marines held the general lin eAtsutabaru-Chimu, with the 4th Ma-rines (less 1/4 bivouacked at Ishi-kawa) 42 located in assembly areas justbehind the front line, prepared to pas sthrough early the next day. At 1000 on

41 Snedeker ltr 1947 ." 1/4 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 7.


HEAVY UNDERGROWTH on the Zshikawa Isthmus hinders the progress of a 4th Marines patrol advancing to the north of Okinawa. (USMC 116527)

GRINNING TROOPS of the 29th Marines in M-7s heading for Chuta in their drive towards Motobu Peninsula. (USMC 117507)

134


the 5th, the 29th Marines were release dto parent control by IIIAC and moved t oan assembly area in the vicinity of Onna .

As the 6th Division began its dashup the isthmus on 6 April, the 7thMarines in corps reserve patrolled thedivision zone south of the Nakadomari -Ishikawa line 43 while the 6th Recon-naissance Company mopped up enemyremnants from this boundary north t othe Yakada-Yaka line . After its lines hadbeen passed by the 29th Marines on th eleft and the 4th Marines on the right,the 22d reverted to division reserve an dbegan patrolling back to the area ofresponsibility of the reconnaissanc ecompany.

Because there were only a few road sinland, Colonel Shapley planned to moverapidly up the main road along theshore, detaching patrols from the ad-vance guard to reconnoiter to thei rsource all roads and trails into themountainous and generally uninhabitedinterior. In order to maintain contro lduring the anticipated rapid advance ,the regimental march CP moved out i na jeep convoy at the head of the mainbody. By 1300, 2/4 had been used u pby the detachment of small patrols, an dthe 3d Battalion then passed through i naccordance with the prearranged planof leapfrogging the battalions . When theregiment halted for the day at 1600, ithad advanced seven miles, encounterin gonly scattered enemy stragglers . Thesupply operations of the 4th Marineson L plus 5 were hampered more tha n

43 Effective at 0600 on 7 April, the rea rboundary of the 6th Division was readjusted toexclude the area south of this line. IIIACOperO 2-45, dtd 6Apr45 .

usual by the fact that three bridgesalong the route had 'been bombed outearlier by friendly air .

The 4th Marines resumed operationsthe next morning deployed in the samemanner in which it had halted the nightbefore-3/4, 1/4, and 2/4 in that order .The advance on L plus 6 was virtuall ya repeat of the previous day as theregiment continued the push up the eastcoast, the lead battalion dissipating it sstrength with the dispatch of patrol sinto the interior . As a result, the 1stBattalion (Major Bernard W . Green )passed the 3d at noon and led the wayto the regimental objective, opposedonly by the difficult terrain, poor roads ,and fumbling enemy defense measures .

Nearly all such efforts failed, how-ever, for in very few instances was the6th Division drive slowed . Enemy de-fensive engineering efforts were almostamateurish, for abatis, with neithermines nor booby traps attached or wire din place, were pushed aside easily bytank-dozers or bulldozers . Even basicdefensive combat engineering principle swere violated by the Japanese, who di dnot distribute their mines in roads an ddefiles in depth. They even failed tocover with either infantry fire or wir ewhat they had placed . On the whole, themines were little more than a nuisanc eand caused but few casualties . 44 Bridgeswere often incompletely destroyed byJapanese demolitions, and Marine engi-neers were able to save valuable timeby utilizing the remaining structuralmembers as foundations for new span sin hasty bridge construction .

44 6th EngrBn SAR, Ph I&II, chap VIII, p . 3 .


135

When the 6th Division drive toward sthe north began, each assault regimentwas assigned one company of the 6thEngineer Battalion in direct support . Aplatoon from each of these companie swas attached to advance guards to clearroadblocks, remove mines, and build by-passes for combat vehicles aroun ddemolished bridges . The remainder ofeach company followed up the advance ,repairing and replacing bridges an dwidening narrow thoroughfares wher-ever possible to accommodate two-waytraffic . Following closely in the wake ofthe assault regiments, the third com-pany of the engineer battalion furtherimproved roads and bridges .

At the end of the Ishikawa Isthmus ,where the mountains came down to thesea, engineer services were in eve ngreater demand as they were requiredto widen roads that were little more tha ntrails . 45 The infantry advance wasslowed by the terrain as well as by thenear-physical exhaustion of the patroll-ing Marines, who had been going u pand down the thickly covered broke nground. Despite this tortuous journey,the 4th Marines had made another seve nmiles by the late afternoon of 7 April .Then, just north of Ora, the 1st Bat-talion set up a perimeter defense withits flanks secured on the coast . Colone lShapley's CP and weapons company

were located in the village itself, whil e3/4 and 2/4 were deployed in defensiveperimeters at 1,000-yard intervals dow nthe road .

On the west coast, the 29th Marine shad seized its next objective on 7

46 Ibid., pp . 3-4 .

April, again with little difficulty . Ad-vance armored reconnaissance elementsreached Nago at noon to find the townleveled by naval gunfire, air, and artil-lery. Before dark, the regiment hadcleared the ruins and organized posi-tions on its outskirts .

As the advance northwards continued ,the difficult road situation had made i timperative to locate forward unloadingbeaches from which the 6th Divisio ncould be supplied . (See Map II, MapSection .) When Nago was uncovered, itwas found suitable for this purpose, andIIIAC requested the dispatch to thi spoint of Marine maintenance shippin gfrom the Hagushi anchorage. On 9April, cargo was discharged for the firsttime at Nago, relieving the traffic con-gestion on the supply route up the coastfrom Hagushi . 4 6

When planning for ICEBERG, Gen-eral Shepherd had determined that

Major Walker's company would be em-

ployed only in the reconnaissance mis-sion for which it was best fitted an d

trained. In effect, the unit was intendedto serve as the commanding general' s

mobile information agency . Pursuant tothis decision, the reconnaissance com-pany, supported and transported bytanks, was dispatched up the west coast

road ahead of the 29th Marines in an

effort to ascertain the character ofJapanese strength on Motobu . After thecompany scouted Nago, it swung up the

coastal road to Awa, and then, after re -

tracing its steps to Nago, crossed th ebase of the peninsula in a northeasterl y

4e Blakelock ltr 1965 .

136


direction to Nakaoshi . 47 Before return-ing to Nago for the night, the patrol un-covered much more enemy activity tha nhad been previously revealed in thedivision zone of action and had me tseveral enemy groups that were eithe rdestroyed or scattered .

From the very beginning of the driveto the base of the Motobu Peninsula, th e15th Marines was employed so that eachassault regiment had . one artillery bat-talion in direct support and one in gen-eral support . The rapidity of the 6thDivision advance during this phase o fthe campaign forced the artillery regi-ment to displace frequently, averagingone move a day for each battalion andthe regimental headquarters . To keepup with the fast moving infantry, theartillerymen were forced to strip thei rcombat equipment to a bare minimum ;they substituted radio for wire com-munications and by leapfrogging units ,managed to keep at least one artillerybattalion in direct support of each as-sault infantry regiment throughout theadvance up the isthmus . 4 8

Augmenting the 15th Marines, 6t hDivision artillery support was rein-forced by the 2d Provisional Field Artil-lery Group (Lieutenant Colonel Custi sBurton, Jr .) which displaced to posi-tions north of Nakadomari on the ev e

" It was later revealed that, as the 6thReconnaissance Company moved westwardtoward Awa, the Japanese were close on thecompany's northern flank, observing its move-ment, and holding fire . CMC [Gen Lemuel C .Shepherd . Jr.] memo to Head, HistBr, G- 3Div, HQMC, dtd 2Mar55, hereafter Shepherdmemo II ; LtCol Anthony Walker ltr to CMC ,dtd 3Jun55 .

" 15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, n .p .

of the drive up the Ishikawa Isthmus .Four days later, when resistance onMotobu Peninsula began to stiffen, the15th Marines was reinforced further bythe attachment of the 1st ArmoredAmphibian Battalion as artillery. Thefollowing day, the corps artillery sup-porting the advance was moved toBesena Misaki, a promontory at thesouthern extremity of Nago Wan, wher eit remained throughout the period ofMarine operations in the north . 4 8

MOTOBU UNCOVERED

Owing to the lack of intelligence aboutthe location of the enemy, and a Tent hArmy order to avoid unwarranted de-struction of civilian installations unles sthere was a clear indication or confirma -tion of enemy presence, naval gunfiresupport was not used extensively in thedrive up the Ishikawa Isthmus . After5 April, however, all IIIAC naval fir esupport was diverted to the 6th Divisionzone of action. As the Marines movednorth, these ships kept pace, firing u pthe numerous ravines leading down t othe beach. Each assault battalion wasfurnished a call-fire ship during the day ,and each regiment was furnished a shi pto fire illumination at night . 5 °

The Tenth Army gained land-base dair support when TAF squadrons fro mMAG–31 and -33 arrived ashore on 7

'° IIIAC Arty AR, pp . 20-21. At this time ,LtCol Burton's group consisted of only th eHeadquarters Battery and the 7th 155mm Gu nBattalion, as the remainder of the IIIA CArtillery gun and howitzer battalions ha dpassed to XXIV Ccrps control on 7 April . Ibid . ,p . 19 .

'° Ibid., p . 39 .


JAPANESE 105MM GUN captured .in the heart of Mount Yae Take had previouslycommanded the entire coastal road along southern Motobu Peninsula . (USMC 122207)

SUICIDE BOATS found at Unten Ko on 10 April by Marines of 2129 . Note warningthat boats had been booby trapped . (USMC 127905)

137

138


and 9 April . 51 The 6th Division did notneed them immediately during the firsttwo weeks in the north, however, for th edivision advance had been rapid an dsuitable targets scarce . Daylight com-bat air patrols were flown almost as soo nas the squadrons landed, but strikes i nsupport of ground operations did no tbegin until L plus 12, and then they weredirected at Japanese targets in theXXIV Corps zone in the south . As enemyresistance stiffened on Motobu Penin-sula, Marine air was called upon todestroy emplacements, observatio nposts, and troop concentrations . 5 -

After the division had gained the bas eof the Motobu Peninsula and had ,begu nextending reconnaissance operations t othe west on 8 April, aerial observationand photo studies confirmed the factthat the enemy had chosen to make hi sfinal stand in the rugged mountains ofthe peninsula. In order to reduce thi sJapanese bastion, and at the same tim emaintain flank security and continue th edrive to the northernmost tip of Oki-nawa, General Shepherd needed to re -orient the axis of operations and re -deploy his forces . Consequently, the 22 dMarines was taken out of division re -serve and set up on a line across theisland from Nakaoshi to Ora to coverthe right and rear of the 29th Marinesattacking to the west . Assembled nea rOra, also, was the 4th Marines, whic hwas positioned to support either the29th Marines on Motobu or the 22d i nthe north .

" TAF WarD, Apr45 .52 6th MarDiv SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, p . 14 .

The 6th Division received its first TAF supportmissions of the campaign on L plus 16. TAFPeriodic Rpt No . 2, dtd 20Apr45, p. 3 .

During the next five days, the 4th an d22d Marines combed the interior andpatrolled in the north, while the 29thprobed westward to uncover the enemydefense . 53 On L plus 7, 2/29 move dnortheast from Nago to occupy the smal lvillage of Gagusuku . The 1st Battalion ,initially in reserve, was ordered to sendone company to secure the village ofYamadadobaru, a mission accomplishedby Company C at 0900. An hour later ,

the battalion as a whole was ordered t othe aid of Company H, 3/29, 54 whichhad encountered heavy resistance in th e

vicinity of Narashido . By 1500, 1/29had converged on this point and, despit eheavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire ,

had reduced two strongpoints, after

^' In this five-day sparring period "the 29t hhad a platoon of war dogs attached. These dogsgave an excellent account of themselves .Twenty-nine alerts were noted by the regi-mental S—3 section . All [alerts] enabled theMarine patrol involved to avoid a Japaneseambush . In one instance a patrol leader chos eto ignore the dogs and was badly wounded . "LtCol Angus M. Fraser Ur to CMC, dtd24Mar55, hereafter Fraser ltr . 2/29 SAR, Ph

I&II, p . 4 .

" "Prior to a reorganization of Marine divi-sions in the spring of 1944, each infantr ybattalion had five companies : headquarters,weapons, and three rifle companies . When theweapons companies (D, H, and M) were ab-sorbed [by their respective battalions], therifle companies retained their original alpha-betical designations, so that the three bat-talions of a regiment had companies lettered :1st Bn, A, B, and C ; 2d Bn, E, F, and G ; 3dBn, I, K, and L. The 2d and 3d Bns of the 29thMar, formed after this reorganization too kplace, were lettered straight through in se-quence after 1/29 . Therefore, the rifle com-panies of the 29th Mar were A, B, and C i nthe 1st Bn, D, E, and F in the 2d Bn, and G ,H, and I in the 3d Bn ." Nichols and Shaw ,Okinawa Victory, p . 94n .


139

which Lieutenant Colonel Moreau's me ndug in for the night .

Intending to locate the main enemyforce on Motobu, the 29th Marines move dout on 9 April in three columns ; the 3dBattalion (Lieutenant Colonel Erma A .Wright) on the left flank, the 2d Bat-talion (Lieutenant Colonel William G .Robb) on the right flank, and Moreau' s1st Battalion up the mountainous centerof the peninsula. All three columns en -countered opposition almost immedi-ately. This was an indication that thedivision may have at last hit the majo renemy resistance in the north, and itwas located in the area from Itomi west

to Toguchi .

In the 3/29 zone on the left, roadswere found to be virtually impassable asa result of effective enemy use of road -blocks, mines, and demolitions . The 6thEngineer Battalion reported that fromNago westward on the Motobu Penin-sula the enemy had been even moredestructive . They had demolished everybridge and blasted numerous tank trapsin the roads. The Japanese had beencareful to place these obstacles at pointswhere no tank bypass could be con-structed. Traps that had been made i nthe narrow coastal roads were put at th efoot of cliffs where back fill was unavail-able. Those in the valleys were alway slocated where the road passed through

rice paddies. When the crater was in acliff road, trucks had to travel long dis-tances to obtain fill for the hole . 5 5

In the center, 1/29 was to occupy an ddefend Itomi before nightfall ; about600 yards short of the objective, how -ever, the battalion was met by a strong

^' 6th EngrBn SAR, Ph I&II, pt VII, p . 4 .

enemy force and compelled to dig in fo rthe night in place . The north coast waspatrolled as far as Nakasoni by Robb' s2d Battalion, which destroyed suppl ydumps and vehicles and dispersed smallenemy groups . The battalion also scoutedYagachi Shima with negative results .

The next day, L plus 9, Robb's me nseized Unten and its harbor, where theJapanese had established a midget sub -marine and torpedo boat base . The basehad been abandoned and large amount sof equipment and supplies were left be -hind by approximately 150 Japanesenaval personnel, who were reported tohave fled inland to the mountains .Toguchi, on the other side of the penin-sula, was captured by 3/29, which sentpatrols inland to Manna. On 10 April ,

1/29 pushed forward through Itomi, an don the high ground north of the town i tuncovered numerous well-prepared posi-

tions from which the enemy had fled .During the first two days of the drive

to clear Motobu Peninsula, frequent en-emy contacts were made in the difficul tterrain northwest and southwest of

Itomi . Night counterattacks increased i n

intensity ; one particularly strong attack ,

supported by artillery, mortars, machineguns, and 20mm dual-purpose cannon ,struck the 1/29 defense perimeter on the

night of 10-11 April and was not broke n

up until dawn .Patrols from 2/29 were sent out o n

11 April to make contact with 1/29 nea r

Itomi. They met little opposition but

substantiated previous intelligence esti-mates locating the main Japanese battl eposition in an area between Itomi and

Toguchi. As a result of this verification,

2/29 (less Company F) was recalle dfrom the north coast and ordered to set

140


up defensive installations and tie themin with 1/29 on the high ground nearItomi. Company F continued patrolling .During the day, 1/29 patrols scoutedjust to the north and northeast of Itom iand met only light resistance. On theother hand, 3/29, moving inland to con -tact the 1st Battalion, ran into heavilydefended enemy positions at Manna andwas forced to withdraw under fire toToguchi .

In compliance with Admiral Turner' sexpressed desire that Bise Saki was to becaptured early for use as a radar site,the 6th Reconnaissance Company wasordered to explore the cape area on12 April, and to seize and hold the poin tunless opposed by overwhelming force .As anticipated, resistance was light, an dthe area was captured and held . Thatevening, Company F, 29th Marines, re-inforced the division scouts. Overallcommand of this provisional force wasthen assumed by the reconnaissancecompany commander. 6 6

In order to fix more definitely thehostile battle position, the 29th Marinescontinued probing operations. On the12th, the 1st and 2d Battalions were dis-posed in positions near Itomi, and 3/2 9was located in the vicinity of Toguchi .(See Map 8 .) Company G was sentnorth to contact the reinforced divisio nreconnaissance company and to mee t2/29 at Imadomari . Company H wasordered east to meet 1/29 at Manna ,and Company I was ordered to patrolto the high ground south and eastof Toguchi and to remain there over -night. As these last two companies pro-

fie 6th MarDiv Jrtl, Ph I&II, 12Apr45 .

ceeded on their missions, they cameunder intense fire that prevented thecompletion of their assignments unlessthey were to risk sustaining unaccept-able casualties . Under cover of promptcall fires from the destroyer Preston,LVT (A) fire, and an 81mm mortar bar -rage, Company I was withdrawn whil eCompany H served as rear guard. Bothcompanies had organized a perimeterdefense at Toguchi by midafternoo nwhen the battalion CP received con-siderable artillery and mortar fire . Theday's action cost the battalion 9 kille dand 34 wounded . 5 7

Because of this significant enemy re -action in the Toguchi area, Company G,upon its arrival at Imadomari at 1415,was recalled by the battalion. WhenCompany H had been hit in the morning,3/22 was alerted for possible commit-ment, and in the afternoon it wasordered to assemble in division reserveat Awa. Battalion headquarters andCompanies I and K completed the motor-ized move after 1700, and L arrived a t0900 the following morning .

By the night of 12 April, GeneralShepherd's division was confronted witha fourfold task : to continue occupation

and defense of the Bise area ; to securethe line Kawada Wan-Shana Wan an dprevent enemy movement through thatarea ; to seize, occupy, and defend Hed oMisaki, the northernmost tip of Oki-nawa ; and to destroy the Japaneseforces on Motobu Peninsula . 58 On 10April, 1/22 had established a perimete r

defense at Shana Wan from which i t

5T 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 4 .

58 IIIAC OperO 4-45, dtd 12 Apr45 .


141

conducted vigorous patrolling eastwar dto the coast and north towards Hed oMisaki . By the 12th, battalion patrol shad contacted the 4th Marines on th eeast coast ; 3/4 was ordered to move toKawada the next day .

During the period 8–12 April, the 4thMarines, located near Ora, patrolled al lareas within a 3,000-yard radius of th eregimental bivouac. On the 10th, Com-pany K was sent north along the eas tcoast on extended patrol after which i twas to rejoin its battalion at Kawada .While in the field, the company relied o nLVTs for daily support and evacuation .In a week's time, the patrol had travelle d28 miles up the coast .

Assigned the capture and defense o fHedo Misaki, Woodhouse's 2/22 move drapidly up the west coast on 13 April i na tank- and truck-mounted infantrycolumn, "beating down scattered andineffective resistance ." 59 At 2110, the2/22 commander reported that a patro lhad entered Hedo by way of the coasta lroad and that the entry had been oppose donly by 10 Boeitai. 60 As soon as the restof the battalion arrived, a base was setup and patrols were sent out to makecontact with the 4th Marines advancingup the east coast .

At the end of the second week on Oki-nawa, on Friday, 13 April (12 April i n

the States), ICEBERG forces learne d

of the death that day of PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt . Memorial serv-

5B Cass, 6th MarDivHist, p. 57. General Buck-ner wanted this area captured early to gain aradar and fighter-director site . CTF 51 AR, ptIII, p . 37.

e0 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 .

ices were held on board American ves-sels and behind Tenth Army lines ; thosewho could attend these services did so ifthe fighting permitted . One senior officerof the 1st Marine Division said later :

It was amazing and very striking howthe men reacted. We held services, butservices did not seem enough. The menwere peculiarly sober and quiet all thatday and the next. Plainly each of themwas carrying an intimate sorrow of th edeepest kind, for they paid it their highesttribute, the tribute of being unwilling t otalk about it, of leaving how they feltunsaid. 6 1

THE BATTLE FOR YAE TAKE

While three of its four assigned mis-sions in the north were being accom-plished by extensive patrolling againstlittle or no opposition, the 6th MarineDivision found that destroying th efirmly entrenched bulk of the enemy wa sbecoming an increasingly difficult prob-lem. Company I had apparently toucheda sensitive nerve during its probingsnear Toguchi, judging by the immediateenemy reaction. This assumption wasconfirmed on the night of 12–13 April ,

when the 29th Marines encounteredsome English-speaking Okinawans, wh ohad at one time lived in Hawaii .

The Marines were told that there wasa concentration of 1,000 Japanese on thehigh ground overlooking the Manna-Toguchi road south of the Manna River .The civilians said further that the enem yforce was commanded by a Colonel Udo ,and that it contained an artillery uni tunder a Captain Kiruyama . 82 Previous

81 Quoted in McMillan, The Old Breed, p . 368.ez 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 .

142


reports of enemy order of battle werecorroborated by the operations of stron gcombat patrols ; the 6th Division no wfirmly fixed the Japanese defenses in a narea some six by eight miles surround-ing the rugged and dominating MountYae Take . 63 (See Map 8 . )

The ground around this towering1,200-foot-high peak prohibited exten-sive manuevering and completely fav-

ored the defense . Yae Take was the

peninsula's key terrain feature and it s

heights commanded the nearby land-scape, the outlying islands, and all ofNago Wan. The steep and broken ap-proaches to the mountain would den yan attacker any armor support . Infantrywas sure to find the going difficult ove rthe nearly impassable terrain. The Japa-

nese defenses had been intelligentl yselected and thoroughly organized overan obviously long period. All natural orlikely avenues of approach were heavil y

mined and covered by fire .

It was soon concluded that approxi-

mately 1,500 men were defending th e

area and that the garrison, named theUdo Force after its commander, wa sbuilt around elements of the 44th Inde-pendent Mixed Brigade . Included in thisgroup were infantry, machine gun units ,light and medium artillery, Okinawa nconscripts, and naval personnel fromUnten Ko. In addition to 75mm and150mm artillery pieces, there were tw o6-inch naval guns capable of bearing o nthe coastal road for 10 miles south of

" Since "take" translated is mountain, MountYae Take is redundant, but was commonlyused by participants of the battle.

Motobu, on Ie Shima, and all of Nag oWan . 64

General Shepherd's estimate of th esituation indicated that reduction of th eYae Take redoubt was beyond the capa-bilities of a single reinforced infantr yregiment . In face of this conclusion, the4th Marines (less 3/4) was ordered tomove from the east coast to Yofuke .The 29th Marines was ordered to con-tinue developing the enemy positions byvigorous patrolling on 13 April and t odeploy for an early morning attack onthe next day. 6 5

Complying with General Shepherd' sorders, Colonel Bleasdale again at -tempted to clear the Itomi-Toguch iroad 66 and join his 1st and 3d Bat-talions . As elements of 1/29 moved ou tof Itomi towards Manna, they were am -bushed and hit hard again by the 20mmcannon fire coming from the command-ing heights. Probing north from Awa ,3/22 patrols also came under fire . Beforethese patrols could withdraw under th ecover of their battalion 81mm mortars ,an hour-long fire fight ensued . Addingto the general harassment from the en-emy, artillery fire was placed on 3/22positions in the afternoon.

At this same time, Japanese counter -battery fire was delivered against the

84 "The 77th Infantry Division on le Shimawas pleased when 'Mt . Yae Take' was capturedwith its two 6-inch naval guns ." LtGen AndrewD. Bruce ltr to Asst G-3, HQMC, dtd 280ct65 ,hereafter Bruce ltr 1965 . At the time that thebattle for Yae Take was shaping up, the 77thwas fully involved with landing operations o nIe Shima .

65 6th MarDiv Jnl, Ph I&II, 13Apr45 .99 MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr ., memo

for the OIC, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 30ct47 .

144


emplaced artillery of 2/15 (Major NatM. Pace) . This heavy bombardment in-flicted 32 casualties, including two bat-tery commanders and the executiv eofficer of a third battery, and destroye dthe battalion ammunition dump and tw o105mm howitzers . 07 Air strikes werecalled in on the suspected sources of thefire and 3/22 dispatched patrols in anattempt to locate the enemy mortar bat-teries . Fires and exploding ammunitionmade the Marine artillery position un-tenable, so Pace's men withdrew t oalternate positions . 6 8

Earlier in the day, the 4th Marines(less 3/4) began its move to Yofuke wit hHayden's 2d Battalion in the lead . Thewest coast was gained after a difficul thike over primitive roads, but Haydenwas ordered to continue the march to apoint on the southwest corner of th epeninsula just below Toguchi, and th ebattalion arrived there at 1700 . Green's1st Battalion arrived at Yofuke at 1630and, while digging in for the night, wa sordered to move to a position just westof Awa. This displacement was accom-plished just prior to darkness by shut-tling the battalion by truck, a companyat a time. When nightfall came, the 4thMarines was disposed with the 1st an d2d Battalions in perimeter defense, alittle less than three miles apart on thesouthwest coast of Motobu ; the 3d Bat-talion was 20 miles away on the eas tcoast ; and regimental headquarters wa sset up at Yofuke with the WeaponsCompany. 6 9

"15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap X, n .p . ;LtCol Nat M . Pace ltr to CMC, dtd 22Mar55 .

°B Ibid.80 Maj Orville V . Bergren ltr to CMC, dtd

6Feb48, hereafter Bergren ltr.

Based on his original estimate of th esituation, General Shepherd planned acoordinated attack for 14 April whe nthe 4th Marines, with 3/29 attached ,would advance inland to the east . At thesame time, the 29th Marines (less 3/29 )would drive to the west and southwestfrom the center of the peninsula . In ef-fect, this was a situation where twoassault regiments attacked a targetfrom directly opposing positions . Thedanger of overlapping supporting fire swas lessened, in this case, by the inter-vention of the high Yae Take mass .Nevertheless, success of this rare ma-neuver required close and careful coordi-nation of all supporting arms . (SeeMap 8 . )

In the 4th Marines zone of action ,Colonel Shapley's troops were ordere dinitially to seize a 700-foot-high ridgeabout 1,200 yards inland and dominatin gthe west coast and its road . It was im-mediately behind this ridge that Com-pany I of 3/29 had been mauled on th e12th. Intermittent machine gun fire ha dbeen received from this area since thattime.

The attack jumped off at 0830 on the14th with 3/29 on the left, 2/4 on theright, and 1/4 initially in regimentalreserve. Preceded by an intense artil-lery, aerial, and naval bombardment ,the Marines advanced against surpris-ingly light resistance. Disregardingscattered Japanese machine gun, mor-tar, and light artillery fire, the Marine sgained the ridge before noon with theleft flank of 3/29 anchored to a verysteep slope . 7 0

7 °4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 12 ; 2/4 SAR ,Ph I&II, p . 7 ; 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 4 .


145

In order to protect his open righ tflank, Colonel Shapley moved 1/4 up t oan assembly area to the right rear of 2/4 .Company C was ordered to take adominating ridge 1,000 yards to theright front of the 2d Battalion . By noonthe company made contact with smal l

enemy groups and soon thereafter beganreceiving mortar and machine gun fire.Company A was then committed on theleft of Company C and the advance was

continued .At the same time, 2/4 and 3/29 re-

sumed the attack to seize the next ob-jective, another ridge 1,000 yards t othe front . As the troops headed into thelow ground approaching the height,enemy resistance began to stiffen ap-preciably even though the advance wasagain preceded by heavy naval gunfireand artillery barrages, and two air

strikes . The ground, ideally suited fordefense, consisted of broken terrai n

covered with scrub conifers and tangledunderbrush, and the Japanese exploitedthis advantage to the utmost.

The enemy defense was comprised o f

small, concealed groups which formed

covering screens to the main positions .

The Japanese employed every possibl estratagem to delay and disorganize th eadvance, and to mislead the attackers

as to the location of the main battle

position . Enemy soldiers would lie in a

concealed position with their weapon szeroed in on a portion of the trail ove rwhich the Marines would have to pass .

After allowing a sizable force to pas s

without interference, the enemy woul d

open up on what they considered a

choice target. When a company com-mander passed the ambush point with

his headquarters section, the machin eguns opened up, killing him and severa lother nearby Marines . There were man yofficer casualties . It was in this manne rthat the commander of 1/4 was killed i nan area where there had been no firin gfor over half an hour. No one else washurt, though Major Green's operationsand intelligence officers were standin gon either side of him. Lieutenant Colo-nel Fred D. Beans, regimental executiv eofficer, assumed command of the bat-talion.

Although the hills and ravines wereapparently swarming with Japanese, i twas difficult to close with them. "It waslike fighting a phantom enemy," state done Marine officer . 71 The small enemygroups, usually armed with a heav yHotchkiss machine gun and severallight Nambu machine guns, frequentl ychanged positions in the dense under -growth. When fired upon, furiousMarines raked the area from where th evolleys had come. After laboriousl yworking their way to the suspecte denemy position, the Marines came upononly an occasional bloodstain on the

ground ; they found neither live nordead Japanese .

Company G of 2/4 made the firs t

strong contact with the enemy at 1350

when it came under rifle, machine gun,

mortar, and artillery fire . Less than five

minutes later, Company E began re-ceiving similar treatment . After beingspotted, a Japanese artillery piece wa ssilenced by naval gunfire and artillery

" Maj Orville V. Bergren, "School Solution son Motobu," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29, no .12 (Dec45), p . 3, hereafter Bergren, "SchoolSolutions ."

146


brought to bear on it . 72 Despite heavycasualties in Company G and stubbornenemy delaying tactics, Hayden's bat-talion drove the covering forces backand took the ridge with a frontal attackcombined with an envelopment from theright. By 1630, the attack had halte dwith both 3/29 and 2/4 on the regi-mental objective and 1/4 on the highground to the right. Contact was thenestablished all along the line .

East of Yae Take, the 29th Marinesjumped off from Itomi in a column o fbattalions to clear the Itomi-Toguchiroad and to eliminate the strongpointsthat patrols had discovered the previousfour days. (See Map 8 .) As the attackdeveloped, it became apparent that anadvance in a westerly direction woul dbe both difficult and costly . The axis ofthe attack was reoriented, therefore, tothe southwest in order to take advantag eof the high ground. With LieutenantColonel Moreau's 1st Battalion leading ,the 29th Marines advanced 800 yardsup steep slopes against determinedenemy resistance. By late afternoon,1/29 had become pinned down by over-whelming fire from the high ground toits front. The 2d Battalion was com-mitted on the left flank to strengthenthe defense and the troops dug in for thenight.

When it was relieved during the dayby 1/22, 3/4 made a motor march fromits east coast position to relieve 3/22 i ndivision reserve . The latter then re -

" The piece, however, was not destroyed a sthe Japanese had employed their familiar tacti cof firing three or four rounds from a positionat the mouth of a cave, and then withdrawin gthe weapon back into the tunnel, where counter -battery fire could not reach it . 2/4 SAR, PhI&II, p . 5.

turned to its patrol base at Majiya .The following day, L plus 14, Colone l

William J. Whaling assumed comman dof the 29th Marines from Colonel Bleas-dale, and the regimental CP displace dto Itomi . 73 During the day, the regimentconsolidated its position and organize ddefensive positions on the high ground.(See Map 9 .) Constant pressure in th erear of Yae Take was maintained b yvigorous patrolling which assisted th e4th Marines on the other side of th emountain. At 1600, heavy 20mm cannonfire began raining down on the battalioncommand posts 74 and, about the sametime, enemy forces unsuccessfull yattempted to infiltrate 2/29 lines unde rthe cover of grenade, rifle, and morta rfire . By 1700, 2/29 had tied in with th e1st Battalion, and shortly after was abl eto stem the forces of the attack, but notbefore 35 Marines had become casual-ties . 75 Artillery and mortar fire, an dnaval gunfire from the main and sec-ondary batteries of the Colorado wereplaced on the suspected 20mm cannonemplacements and silenced them for atime . 7 6

When the 4th Marines began itsattack at 0700 on the 15th, it was in th esame formation in which it had halte dthe previous night. The advance wasresisted by small scattered groups suchas those that opposed the Marines th eday before. At noon, as the regimentapproached the half-way mark to thatday's objective, Japanese resistance be -

" Col William J . Whaling ltr to CMC, dtd16Dec47, hereafter Whaling ltr .

" 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 2 .

" Ibid.

Se CO, USS Colorado (BB—45) Rpt, ser 002 ,dtd 6Jun45, p . 29 (OAB, NHD) .

148


came markedly stiffer . From caves andpillboxes emplaced in dominating ter -rain, the enemy poured down effectivefire as the assaulting units climbed th esteep mountainside . (See Map 9. )

As 3/29 pushed forward some 900yards to the east and south, it engage din numerous fire fights while it receive dintense machine gun, mortar, and artil-lery fire. An enemy strongpoint on Hill210, 500 yards to the battalion rightfront, held up the advance. In additionto well-dug-in machine guns and mor-tars, the position also contained themountain gun that had been pinpointe dthe day before . For the second day ,attempts were made to destroy thi sdevastating weapon with naval gunfireand artillery, as well as air strikes whic hemployed 500-pound bombs and napalm .Despite these efforts, the piece continue dfunctioning and causing considerabledamage .

All along the line, bitter fighting en -sued as 2/4 again bore the brunt of th erugged going in attempting to capturethe high ground dominating the rightflank. Although it jumped off with threecompanies abreast (less one platoon i nbattalion reserve), 2/4 was able to mak eonly small gains against intense smal larms fire. After a day's fighting, th ebattalion managed to place two com-panies on Hill 200, while the third one ,despite severe casualties (65, includin g3 company commanders), eventuallyadvanced three-fourths of the way upa hill to the right of 200. In order toestablish a better position, Company Gwithdrew partway down the hill whereit tied in with Company F. On the rightof the regimental line, a 200-yard gapbetween the 2d and 1st Battalions was

covered by fire. In the late afternoon, inthe area immediately southwest of Ya eTake, 1/4 finally seized a key hill massfrom which it had been driven backearlier in the day .

When the attack ceased at 1630, thecenter and right battalions were o ntheir objectives and 3/29 was slightlybehind them, organizing ground favor-able for defense . During the day, re-supply operations and the evacuation ofthe mounting number of casualties overthe tortuous terrain became more an dmore difficult, and the troops had be -come very tired. Nonetheless, manycaves had been sealed and there were1,120 enemy dead counted . Colonel Ud oapparently foresaw defeat ; that nighthe decided to resort to guerrilla oper-ations and also to move his command t othe mountain strongholds of northernOkinawa by way of Itomi . 7 7

The 4th Marines knew by this timethat it was attacking a force of at leas ttwo companies which had organized th eterrain to their best possible advantage .Moreover, it became apparent that th eJapanese had oriented their defenses toface the anticipated direction of theattack. Owing to these circumstances ,and since the advance was still towardfriendly troops and artillery, it was de-cided to contain Udo's mountain forceand envelop his defenses by a flanking

" Okinawa Operations Record, p . 138 . "Dur-ing the period 16-19 April while pressure wa sbeing applied to the Udo force on Mt. Yae Takea considerable number of the enemy either wer edirected to disband and directed to infiltratethrough our lines or were cut off by ourcolumns. They followed the natural line ofdrift, were engaged by our CP at Itomi, par-ticularly at night. Many were killed at ou rperimeter defenses ." Whaling ltr .


149

action from the south ; this shifted th edirection of the main Marine effort tothe north. Implementing these deci-sions, 3/4 reverted to regimental con-trol and was to be committed in th eattack the next day, and 1/22 wa sordered into division reserve at Awa .

On 16 April, the 6th Marine Divisionwas deployed to wage a full-scale attackon the enemy from three sides . (SeeMap 9.) As the 29th Marines continue dpressuring in from the east, the 4th

Marines with 3/29 would complete thesqueeze play from the west and south -west . A juncture between the 4th and29th Marines would be effected when1/22 sent strong patrols north into thegap between the two regiments . Each ofthese three principal assault elementswas assigned an artillery battalion in

direct support. The artillery was so de-ployed that the fires of two battalionsof the 15th Marines, one company of

the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion ,and a battery of the 7th 155mm Gun

Battalion could be placed in any of th e

three zones of action . 7 8

In the 4th Marines zone, 3/29 was t oseize the high ground 500 yards to itsfront, including the redoubtable Hil l210. To the right of this battalion, 2/4was to remain in position and supportthe attacks of Wright's 3/29 and Beans '1/4 by fire, while units on the rightflank of 1/4 wheeled to the north . The3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was to attackto seize the division objective, establishcontact with 1/4 on the left, and to pro-tect the right flank until 1/22 drew

abreast of the line . Weapons Company ,4th Marines, organized as an infantry

' e 15th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, chap VII, n .p .

company,70 was ordered to patrol thor-oughly the right rear of Beans' an dWright's battalions, since 1/22 was notscheduled to start from Majiya unti lfirst light.

Because of resupply difficulties, 80 theattack did not resume until 0900 on the16th. By 1200, 3/29 had seized its ob-jective with a perfectly executed basicmaneuver, a single envelopment . As theattack began, Company H, on the 3/2 9right flank, faced Hill 210 frontally.Company G in the center was orderedto break contact with Company I on itsleft and to make an end-around playassaulting the enemy from the south. ACompany H support platoon moved intothe gap left by G and supported thatcompany by fire, as did 2/4 from itscommanding position on the right .

Supporting fires effectively neutral-ized the Japanese defenders and kep ttheir heads down until Company GMarines had gained the top of 210 andswarmed over the forward slope .Grenades and demolitions blasted th eshocked enemy from their caves and

40 4th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, p . 14 .

80 "Supply and evacuation soon became a dif-ficult problem . The road net was far fromadequate, and engineers were working fever-ishly to build new roads where necessary . How-ever, the rugged terrain prevented them fro mcatching up with the infantry, and usually thelast 500 to 1,500 yards of the trip of the chow ,ammunition, and water from the forwar ddumps to the front lines could be negotiate dby no other means than manpower . For thenext three days this was the case . Divisionsent up as many replacements from the divi-sion pool as could be spared . Battalion head-quarters companies were used . Support pla-toons were used . Evacuation of wounded menwas equally difficult if not more so ." 4th MarSAR, Ph I&II, p . 13 .

150


they retreated hastily, pursued all th e

while by effective fire from both theassault and support units . In capturingthis objective, the Marines had silence dthe troublesome mountain gun an dkilled 147 of the enemy . The positionsof Companies H and G were now in-verted, with Company H in the cente rof the line and G on the right flankfirmly holding Hill 210.

While 3/29 was securing its objec-tive, 1/4 completed its pivot northwardsand had established contact with 3/4 .Well to the rear, Myers' 1/22 advance dto cover the open 4th Marines flank.With 3/29 and 2/4 solidly established a slandlords of the high ground facingeast, 1/4 and 3/4 looked north in posi-tions at a right angle to the other twobattalions . When the attack resumed ahalf-hour later, 3/29 and 2/4 remaine din position providing fire support to th eadvancing 1/4 and 3/4. At this time, theformidable Mount Yae Take was in th e1/4 zone.

The 1st Battalion moved out withCompany A on the left attackingfrontally up one nose, and Company Cworking up a draw on the right . Prog-ress up the steep slope was arduous andnot helped by enemy small arms fire,light and scattered though it was . AsCompany A reached the crest, the Japa-nese met it with withering fire at veryclose range . In the face of the rifle ,machine gun, grenade, and knee mor-tar 81 drumfire, the Marines withdrewbelow the summit, and in turn, employedtheir own 60mm mortars and grenade sagainst the enemy entrenched on the

81 "Knee mortar" was a misnomer American scommonly applied to the Japanese grenadelauncher .

reverse (north) slope. The battle wagedfiercely at close quarters as neither sid ewas able to hold the height for long. Atlast the tide turned in the Marines 'favor, helped mainly by supporting fire sof 2/4 coming from the high groundoverlooking the enemy.

The victory was not bought cheaply ;even though the two companies pos-sessed Yae Take, the situation was criti-cal . Over 50 Marine casualties had bee nsustained in the assault and the am-munition supply was nearly spent . Italso appeared that the Japanese wereregrouping for a counterattack . Fortu-nately, effective 15th Marines artilleryfire and the excellent mortar an dmachine gun support of 2/4 held th eenemy in check until ammunition couldbe brought up .

Recalling this phase of the battle forMount Yae Take, the operations office rof the 4th Marines wrote :

If the supply problem was difficult be -fore, it was a killer now. That 1 .200-foo thill looked like Pike's Peak to the tired ,sweaty men who started packing up am-munition and water on their backs . Prac-tically everyone in the 1st Bn headquarterscompany grabbed as much ammunition ashe could carry. A man would walk bycarrying a five-gallon water can on hisshoulder and the battalion commanderwould throw a couple of bandoleers ofammunition over the other! . . . The Bat-talion commander, on his way up to th efront lines to get a closer look at the sit-uation, packed a water can on his way up .Stretchers also had to be carried up, andall hands coming down the hill wereemployed as stretcher bearers . 8 2

Additional assistance in resupply an devacuation was afforded the 1st Bat-

82 Bergren, "School Solutions," p . 6.

151THE FIRST DAYS ASHORE

talion when Company K, coming upfrom the rear in late afternoon to revertto the control of 3/4, took out the 1/ 4wounded and returned with water an dammunition . The resupply of the 1stBattalion occurred just in time, for at1830, an hour after Yae Take had beenseized, the enemy reacted with a fanati cBanzai charge across the battalio n

front. An estimated 75 Japanese mad eup the wildly attacking group, but againthe supporting fires of artillery and 2/ 4stemmed the rush and virtually annihi-lated the force . As the Marines dug i nfor the night, Mount Yae Take was hel d

securely .Lieutenant Colonel Beans' battalion

consolidated its holdings in the after -noon while receiving small arms andmortar fire . On the left, Company B wascommitted to tie in 3/4 with the 1stBattalion. Because its progress wasslowed more by the terrain than th eenemy, 1/22 on the right was unable togain contact with either the 4th or th e29th and established a defense perim-eter for the night.

While the 4th Marines was stormin gYae Take, Colonel Whaling's regiment

maintained unrelenting pressure againstthe enemy's rear positions. As theattack rolled forward, the Japanese re-sisted stubbornly from log-revetted

bunkers and occasional concrete em -placements, and from machine gun ,mortar, and artillery positions con-cealed in ravines and in caves on th e

heights .

In this phase of the 6th Division' snorthern campaign, the Japanese ex-hibited their well-known ability to ex-ploit the terrain and gain maximumbenefit from weapons emplaced in caves

and pits and concealed by natural

camouflage . Of all the weapons that th eenemy employed effectively, his use ofthe 20mm dual-purpose cannon wasmost noteworthy . Marine battalion CP sreceived a daily ration of fire from thes eweapons, and all roads and natural ave-nues of approach were covered . AnyMarine attempt to move over theseeasier routes often proved disastrous .

Since there was no alternative, "themethod of reducing the enemy position sfollowed a pattern of `ridge-hopping'," 8 3in which all supporting arms coveredthe attacking force as it enveloped hos-tile defenses and reduced them in detail .In some cases, the 29th discoveredabandoned positions and weapons, sug-gesting that the Japanese determinationto resist was considerably diminishe dwhen attacked on the flank . The actionin the 29th Marines zone was character-

ized by simultaneous attacks which, i neffect, consisted of a series of localpatrol actions to seize critical positions,followed by mopping-up activity withinthe area .

A heavier-than-usual artillery prep-aration was laid down before the jumpoff on the morning of 17 April . (See

Map 10.) At 0800, the 29th Marinesbegan an advance to join up with th e4th Marines along the Itomi-Toguchi

road. From here, the two regimentswould then sweep northward abreast ofeach other . Moving out over difficul tterrain against light resistance, 1/2 9made slow progress, but by 1300 hadsecured its objective, the highest hill i n

its area .The enemy positions which confronte d

1/29 were on the crest and face of thi s

83 29th Mar SAR, Ph I&II, pt VII, p . 5.

152


hill and presented a problem in preci-sion naval gunnery to the Tennessee,

whose line of supporting fire was almos tparallel to the target . As troops rapidlyadvanced, the ship's main and second-ary batteries delivered such an intens ebombardment that the hill was take nwithout Marine casualties . On the wayto the top, the infantry killed 8 Japa-nese and 32 more on the crest itself, bu tthe huge craters produced by the Ten-nessee's guns contained in excess of 10 0more enemy dead . 8 4

Within an hour after 2/29 had re-sumed its attack, some 50 enemy troopshad been flushed out and were observedfleeing to the northwest . Shortly after,the battalion was able to move forwardagainst negligible opposition, stoppingonly to destroy large enemy stores ofequipment, ammunition, and supplies .Before noon, physical contact had beenestablished with 1/22, which had re-duced the positions met in its zone an dhad captured a considerable amount o fenemy clothing and ammunition . Afterhaving made contact with the 4thMarines on its left, 1/22 was pinchedout of the line and withdrew to Awa,where it set up defenses for the night .

The first missions flown by TAFsquadrons in support of Marine groun dforces during the Motobu campaignstruck enemy targets early in the morn-ing of the 17th. At 1000, eight VMF –322 aircraft attacked and destroye d

" In appreciation of this naval gunfire sup-port, General Shepherd sent to the Commander ,Northern Attack Force, a message, whic hstated in part : " . . . the effectiveness of you rgunfire support was measured by the largenumber of Japanese encountered . Dead ones . "Quoted in VAdm Lawrence F . Reifsnider ltr toCMC, dtd 21Mar55 .

Manna. Upon completion of that mis-sion, the flight was radioed by theground commander that "the town wa swiped out . One hundred per cent o fbombs and rockets hit target area ." 8 5VMF–312, -322, and -323 flew a tota lof 47 sorties during the day. In theafternoon, one mission of eight planeswas cancelled when the assigned targetwas overrun by Marine infantry . "

As it still faced a critical suppl yshortage on the 17th, the 4th Marinesdid not launch its attack until 1200,after replenishment . Then the advanc etoward the Itomi-Toguchi road was re-sumed with the 1st and 3d Battalion son the right. In reverse of the previousday's situation, 2/4 and 3/29 on the leftfaced east at a right angle to the frontof the other two battalions in assault .They were, therefore, ordered to remainin place and to support the assault frompresent positions until the attackingunits masked their fires .

The attacking element made rapidprogress as their downhill path wasblocked only by isolated enemy strag-glers. Without too great an effort, th eMarines overran elaborately fortifie dpositions, intricate communications sys-tems, and bivouac areas. The hastil ydeparting enemy left behind a scene ofan undisciplined retreat—for deadbodies and military paraphernalia werestrewn all over the area. Large storesof equipment, food, weapons, andclothing were either captured or de-stroyed. As 1/4 swept across the 3/29front, 2 8-inch naval guns, 5 artiller y

" ADC Daily Intel Sum, 161800 to 171800 ,dtd 17Apr45, hereafter ADC IntelSum withdate .

"e Ibid .

154


pieces, 8 caves full of ammunition, an dover 300 dead Japanese were found be -fore the Company G position on Hil l210 . 8 Although the 1st Battalion metbut few of the enemy during the day,Hochmuth's 3d Battalion killed 56without losing a Marine . S 8

After their attack axes had shifte dnorthward, the 4th and 29th Marinesmade contact with each other in lateafternoon on the high ground overlook-ing the Itomi-Toguchi road . At thattime, 2/29 was withdrawn from the lineto clear out any bypassed enemy pocket sIn the regimental zone. By the end of17 April, a review of that day's oper-ations indicated that the enemy wasunable to maintain his position and was ,in fact, attempting to retreat in orderto escape annihilation. There was littledoubt that the 6th Marine Division ha dbroken the back of enemy resistance o nthe peninsula, an assumption that wa sconfirmed when an enemy map capturedby the 4th Marines showed that the YaeTake position was the only organizedJapanese defense on Motobu .

After four days of vigorous fighting,activities on the 18th were confined t oreorganizing, resupplying, and consoli-dating the gains of the previous day,and patrolling the Itomi-Toguchi road .(See Map 10.) In an attempt to preventthe further escape of any of the enem yand to destroy his trenches and camou-flaged emplacements in front of thelines, at 0750, four VMF–312 plane sattacked targets with general purpose(GP) and napalm bombs, rockets, andthen strafed the smoking positions . The

81 3/29 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 4 .88 1/4 SAR, Ph I&II, p . 6 ; 3/4 SAR, Ph I&17,

p . 7.

ground troops later reported that all o fthe hits were in the target area and theenemy trenches were completely de-stroyed. During the rest of the day ,VMF–312 and -322 flew 12 additionalsorties in support of General Shep-herd's troops . 8 9

The now-bypassed 3/29 was detachedfrom the 4th Marines and movedaround the base of the peninsula bytruck to rejoin its parent organizatio nat Itomi. In the same way, 1/22 rejoine dits regiment at Majiya. In the 4thMarines area, the 1st Battalion wentinto reserve, bivouacking near Manna.Upon its reversion to regimental con-trol, 3/29 took up blocking positions onthe right flank, north of Itomi, to pre -vent any enemy escaping to the east .The 29th Marines left flank was pushednorthward to straighten out the divisio nlines. As 3/4 conducted local patrols ,the 2d Battalion patrolled the areathrough which the 1st and 3d Battalion shad attacked the previous day. Resup-plying the assault regiments continuedto be difficult for the enemy had thor-oughly mined the area now held by th edivision and had denied the Marines useof the Itomi-Toguchi road by diggingtank traps there. In addition, manytrees had been felled across the road,which was pockmarked with numerousshell craters .

On L plus 18, the final drive to th enorthern coast of the peninsula beganwith the 4th and 29th Marines abreast .(See Map 10.) Preceding the 0800 jumpoff, four Corsairs from VMF–312 struckat a hillside containing gun emplace-ments and strongpoints that oppose dthe ground attack. Again napalm, GP

88 ADC IntelSum, 18Apr45 .


155

bombs, rockets, and strafing attack s

were employed to ease the infantry ad-

vance. When the Marines pushed for -

ward against negligible resistance, they

came across elaborate cave and trench

systems filled with numerous enemy

dead, undoubtedly the victims of the

artillery, naval gunfire, and air bom-

bardments. All organized resistance

ended on Motobu Peninsula when the

4th and 29th Marines gained the north

coast on 20 April. General Shepherd

assigned garrison and patrol sectors t o

his units on Motobu ; 00 at the same time,

mopping-up operations continued in the

rest of the IIIAC zone .

In the course of the fighting for the

peninsula, the 6th Marine Division had

sustained casualties amounting to 20 7

90 6th MarDiv OperO 41-45, dtd 20Apr45 .

killed, 757 wounded, and 6 missing in

action. The Marines counted over 2,00 0Japanese dead, men who had forfeite d

their lives while defending their posi-

tions with a tenacity that was character -

istic .

Of the 6th Division drive up the

isthmus and into the peninsula, Brig-

adier General Oliver P . Smith noted :

The campaign in the north should dispelthe belief held by some that Marines ar ebeach-bound and are not capable of rapi dmovement . Troops moved rapidly ove rrugged terrain, repaired roads and blow nbridges, successively opened new unload-ing points, and reached the northern ti pof the island, some 55 miles from theoriginal landing beaches, in 14 days. Thi swas followed by a mountain campaign o f7 days' duration to clear the Motob uPeninsula.9 1

B ` Smith, Personal Narrative, p . 82 .


USS ENTERPRISE is hit on 14 May 1945 by a Kamikaze which dove out of lowcloud cover . (USN 80-G-331011)

TRACERS fill the sky as AAA gunners repulse a Japanese raid over Yontan Airfield .(USMC 118775)