History ofThe Association

ofLegal AidAttorneys

UAW Local 2325(Revised August 1999)

IntroductionBackground To NYCLegal Aid SocietyALAA's Early Years:1968-1972Mid-70s: Two StrikesWin ContinuityEconomic Recovery,Stability In Late '70s1982 StrikePercolation In The '80sEruption In The Early'90s1994 StrikeSince 1994

Introduction(1)

The history of the Association ofLegal Aid Attorneys/UAW Local2325 (ALAA)--the first significantunion of lawyers in the UnitedStates--reflects the accumulatedsweat and tears shed by generationsof New York City Legal Aid

attorneys, each seeking to exercisecontrol over their conditions ofwork. Like workers elsewhere, theyhave found that these conditions canbe affected only through collectiveaction--union action. What makesALAA unique is that its membershave consciously and repeatedlyseen their own interests asinextricably intertwined with thoseof their clients. This theme has found expressionin the union's fight for a broadvariety of improvements rangingfrom continuity of representation,workload limits, adequate training,and more aggressive affirmativeaction, to better salaries, and healthand safety protection. This samevision has ultimately drawn ALAAinto broader battles for social justiceand labor solidarity, into alliancewith Legal Aid support staffmembers of 1199 National Healthand Human Services Workers Union,SEIU, and, ultimately, into theUAW. While the union's tactics havevaried, its commitment to theseprinciples has remained firm, despitefrequently terrible odds. This brand of unionism is due notto the inherent saintliness of LegalAid lawyers--although some surelyqualify. Rather ALAA's birth dateand particular character is dueprimarily to the Supreme Court's1963 decision in Gideon v.Wainwright, which dramaticallyexpanded the number of indigentcriminal defendants who are entitledto counsel. As a result, by the late1960s, The Legal Aid Society ofNew York (LAS)--founded in 1876to provide free legal services toGerman immigrants--was soontransformed from a largely volunteer

charity into the city's primary publicdefender organization. Almostovernight, hundreds of younglawyers flooded the Society's ranks,bringing with them an idealismheavily influenced by the civil rights,student, and anti-war movements. This spirit quickly clashed withassemblyline conditions in thecriminal justice system, which manyof ALAA's members and leaders--frequently members of the NationalLawyers Guild--placed within thebroader context of institutionalracism and injustice. The egalitarianethos of the period also contributedto an unusually high level of directmembership participation anddemocratic control, which, indeed,has characterized ALAA to this veryday. However imperfect, the attempt toelevate quality over quantity, torealize the promise of Gideon, and toextend its spirit into civil andjuvenile representation, has been thedriving force of ALAA's history. Itremains so in 1999, no less than in1969.

Background To TheNew York Legal AidSociety With some 300,000 cases a year,The Legal Aid Society is the world'slargest public interest law firm,public defender or civil legalservices organization. The Society'sseven divisions--Civil, CapitalDefender, Criminal Appeals (CAB),Criminal Defense (CDD), FederalDefender, Juvenile (JRD) andVolunteer/Community Law Office--work out of some 25 offices aroundthe City. The Society is managed by

a President/Chief Executive Officerand is overseen by the Legal AidBoard of Directors, headed by aChair and composed primarily ofpartners at New York's largest lawfirms. The Civil and Volunteer divisionsare funded by private donations andgovernment funds, but the Societycurrently rejects about $1 millionfrom the Legal Services Corporation(LSC) because of Congressionally-imposed restrictions on its use. Criminal representation provided byCDD and CAB is funded almostentirely by a City contract to providepublic defender representationconstitutionally mandated byGideon, for which some additionalfunds are provided by the State. TheCapital Defender and FederalDefense divisions are funded by thestate and the federal government,respectively. JRD is funded entirelyby the state.

ALAA's Early Years: 1968-1972 1968-1972 was a key periodduring which ALAA was firstestablished. Following recognition inDecember 1969, and a brief strike in1970, the union won its firstcontract. The wave of new attorneys hiredby Legal Aid in the yearsimmediately following Gideon wasshocked by the poor quality ofrepresentation they found. In 1967,recalls one of these lawyers, JerryLefcourt, Society policy required aplea bargain whenever a client hadadmitted guilt to their lawyer:

Once that defendant "admitted" atarraignment, he was going to get

pled. You were instructed when youdid calendars . . . to frighten thedefendants. . . . The deal was workedout [with the assistant districtattorney] and the defendant was pledalmost instantaneously. Right then,without any discussion between theattorney and client. When I wasdoing that I could not sleep at nights. Preparation and resources werevirtually nonexistent:I had no training at all. There was noorientation. . . . There were no mocktrials. We did arraignments for amonth, and then we were thrown intobattle. I had no clue as to what theright thing was to do. We had noresearch tools. There was no realoffices, no telephones. We couldn'tcall witnesses. There were noanything. I never interviewed adefendant except in the prison or onthe floor of the hallway right beforea hearing or trial. In the back of mymind, I knew that I should do aninvestigation, but there were onlyone or two investigators operatingout of Manhattan for the wholeSociety. Moreover, a client saw a differentSociety lawyer (nearly all of whomwere white and male) at each courtappearance. In response to these conditions,Lefcourt envisioned a union of StaffAttorneys in which "we shouldapproach things in an organized way,citywide, to improve the position ofour clients." In response toorganizing efforts by Lefcourt andothers,[s]ome guys at 120 Schermerhorn[Brooklyn Criminal Court] were sortof on board. This is early '68, and Iremember pounding the union into[future CDD attorney-in-charge] Bill

Gallagher. . . . Finally, in April 1968we called a meeting in the HotelDiplomat. I'd say that no more thanforty percent of the [total 175] staffcitywide turned out. . . . It was easywithin the Criminal Division becausewe all knew people. Civil was thehardest to get; the Criminal Appealspeople were pretty easy. At thesecond Hotel Diplomat meeting inMay 1968, we had a much largernumber, like 75%. Staff Attorneys, however, were farfrom united on how to proceed, andmany rejected the idea that lawyersshould unionize:I was one of the few staff people thatwas supporting the idea that this wasa union . . . . Some people wouldknock the notion that lawyers couldever be in a union. They said thatyou couldn't use typical union tacticsbecause you're assigned to representsomebody. . . . Most people weremore comfortable with the word"Association." The early meetingsfocused only on winning the mostbasic tools of representation (offices,phones, training, vertical[(2)]representation), on involving moreStaff Attorneys, what form theorganization would take, andwhether to affiliate with anybody. These initial discussions, however,only took off when Lefcourt wasfired:Everybody knew it was because ofthe organizing meetings, and that Irefused to do what the supervisorswanted me to do at a few calendarcalls. . . . [At] the third and finalorganizing meeting in June of '68,the union demanded a due processhearing on the allegations againstme. Sam Dawson--who was inBrooklyn, our hotbed of organizing--

became the first president. Ultimately, however, the federaldistrict court opinion in Lefcourt v.Legal Aid Society ruled that, absentof state action or a union, the Societycould fire at will. "We might havehad a different ruling," observesLefcourt, "if we had brought theaction under the National LaborRelations Act, rather than the FirstAmendment. But many attorneysdidn't want to think union." Yet, Lefcourt's firing galvanizedthe organizing effort, and onDecember 30, 1969, following anelection, ALAA was certified by thestate Labor Relations Board asexclusive bargaining representativefor all Staff Attorneys. The impact,says Lefcourt, was soon apparent:[A]lmost immediately, [the union's]effects were profound. Services toclients started to change drastically. .. . [There were] . . . more lawyers,offices, telephones, largerinvestigative staff. . . . Now the tonewas "why shouldn't they [indigentdefendants] have the absolute best,why shouldn't Legal Aid lawyers beon an equal footing with the privatebar?". And, says Lefcourt, collectivebargaining certification also helpedALAA to resolve its identity crisis:For many years there was no formaldeclaration that it had become aunion, but that was clearly what itwas becoming. I mean, when youstart bargaining as a group--that'swhat unions do. It looked like one, itsmelled like one, and then it becameone.1970 Strike But it took more than recognitionto get a contract, particularly sincethe Society resisted ALAA's first

efforts to improve the quality ofcriminal representation. Thus, whencity jail inmates rebelled in thespring of 1970, one of their maindemands was for better Legal Aidrepresentation; the Societyresponded by threatening toterminate its criminal contract withthe city unless it received morefunding. After briefly toying with theidea of a public defender system, thecity provided a small amount ofadditional money. In subsequent contractnegotiations, however, ALAAcharged that little had reallychanged: "[I]nsufficient staff, avirtually nonexistent training andeducation program, lack of adequateoffice facilities, inadequate clericaland investigative staffs, inadequateresearch tools and no time forpreparation" made it "virtuallyimpossible for us to providemeaningful representation for ourclients and forced us to daily violateour professional responsibilities."Without continuity of representation,argued ALAA, "no attorney-clientrelationship is possible." Again, it took larger events tobreak the Society's resistance. Inearly May 1970, the country wasshaken by Nixon's secret invasion ofCambodia and by the murders offour white antiwar protesters at KentState University in Ohio and twoAfrican-American student protestorsat Jackson State University inMississippi. Across the country,student strikes closed down collegesand universities, while massdemonstrations took place in everymajor city. On May 3-6, 1970, amidst thisrising revolt, Legal Aid Staff

Attorneys struck, the first suchaction by American lawyers. Thelegal establishment wasunsympathetic. The New York LawJournal cited "authoritative sources"who "blame[d] the strike on theincreasing number of so-called'militant' attorneys who have joinedthe society in recent years . . . [andwhose] attitude . . . is that onlythrough action can change beaccomplished." The 1970 strike yielded mixedresults. The first, two-year contractestablished a 12-step salary scaleessential to combating favoritismand to ensuring annual raises formost lawyers. Client representation,however, was not significantlyimproved. Thus, when future ALAApresident Karen Faraguna first joinedManhattan CDD in September 1971,there was no supervision in thecourts. Rather, more senior stafftaught the ropes to junior attorneys. .. . The staff turnover was amazing.People would quit in a very shorttime, and a person was senior after ayear! The second contract, in 1972,brought raises for the most seniorattorneys, but, as Faraguna explains,improvements were limited:For the first time, office spaceimproved. But attorneys still shareddesks. Books were purchased and thestaff was given access to the courtlibrary. Our demand for privateinterview facilities, however, wasnot met for another decade or more.

Mid-70s: Two StrikesWin ContinuityRepresentation The 1973 and 1974 strikes deservethe credit for breaking down the

Society's obstruction of continuity ofrepresentation. Both strikes,however, brought heavy judicialretaliation against the ALAA and itsmembers. The union was furtherweakened by uneven membershipsupport for the 1974 strike and bydeep municipal fiscal crisis in 1975.

1973 Strike In 1973, a combination ofmanagement intransigence, advanceplanning by the union, and whatFaraguna describes as a "furtherinfusion of new attorneys prepared tofight for a stronger public defender,"set the stage for the union's secondstrike. Prior to the strike, which wasdeemed inevitable, contact was madewith the media, in order tofamiliarize them with the issues.Reporters came to court, saw our"office space," and talked with staff.Unions were contacted for theiradvice; all supported us, hoping thatwe would join their organization.Upper Management tookindefensible positions. To announcethat the poor man's attorney did notneed a library or a desk of her ownproved destructive to its publicimage. To take a philosophicalposition opposed to the principle of"one client, one attorney" (continuityof representation) was foolish. In May 1973, the union's moralhigh ground was furtherstrengthened by the decision inWallace v. Kern, a federal classaction brought by the Center forConstitutional Rights (CCR), withALAA's support, on behalf of allfelony defendants incarcerated in theBrooklyn House of Detention. Thecourt's decision painted anunflattering portrait of conditions at

Legal Aid. "Legal Aid attorneys,"wrote the court, "compare favorablywith private attorneys both in qualityof their work and in their results,"but their workloads were simplyoverwhelming:

The active caseload of [felony-certified] Legal Aid attorneys. . . .[averages] 94 total cases, or 56 casesif those awaiting grand jury action orsentences are excluded. . . . [N]o trialattorney could handle more than 40cases and cover assignments andconferences. Attorney training and longevityremained in short supply:The average Legal Aid attorney isemployed by the Society when hegraduates from law school, attends a21-day training course, serves anapprenticeship of a few months inthe Criminal Court, then beginstrying felony cases in the SupremeCourt, and leaves after about twoyears for other employment. Moreover, found the court, therewas little continuity ofrepresentation, and lawyers wereforced to confer with their clients inabysmal, non-confidential, interviewspace:[T]he third floor pen where she [aLegal Aid lawyer] would meet adefendant for the first time (fourfloors below the courtroom wherethe plea negotiations take place) is a"horrendous situation, physically" an"absolutely unbearable situation forLegal Aid" and "a humiliatingexperience for the defendant," with40 people listening to the defendant'sconversation with his counsel. The court pointed out that theSociety's failure to reform thesepractices had been the subject ofseveral highly critical recent reports.

A June 17, 1971 report of theSubcommittee on LegalRepresentation of the Indigentappointed by the Appellate Divisionsof the First and Second Departmentshad recommended continuity ofrepresentation, finding thatThe Society's practice offragmenting its representation so thatone defendant may have as many as5 or 6 different attorneys during thecourse of his case is mostundesirable and should be stopped . .. . Insofar as the Society is notmeeting that standard, itsperformance is, we believeinevitably deficient. In regard to caseload, theSubcommittee found that:It would then, in our view, beappropriate for Legal Aid to declineto accept assignments over thenumber which it could treat in thecomprehensive way here proposed. .. . the alternative is a continuation ofa type of representation grosslyoverburdening to the Society, andwhich all, including the Society'sattorneys, recognize as inadequate. Another report, issued by Board ofCorrection Chair William J. vandenHeuvel in March 1973 found poorinterview conditions andrecommended "that maximum activecaseloads be established by LegalAid, beyond which it will refuse toaccept cases," noting that "[t]hisproposal is not new." And in April 1973, the CityCriminal Justice CoordinatingCouncil Executive Committeecriticized the Society for lack ofcontinuity, finding that:An acceptable one-to-onerelationship between client andattorney has yet to be developed. At

present attorneys are assigned tocourt parts rather than to individualcases. Although this is a necessarybudget-saving device, it hampers theintimate attorney-client relationshipavailable to those who can retainprivate counsel. Moreover attorneysare unfamiliar with a case until it isassigned to them in court. There isno time to order investigations or tofully prepare case arguments.Valuable court time is lost in thismanner for all parties--judges,prosecution, attorney and client.Clients are reinterviewed as theypass from court part to part, fromone attorney to another. The rapportbetween attorney and client suffersin this process, impinging adverselyon plea-bargaining, trial strategy andsentencing decisions. Taking into account both its ownfindings and those of these threereports, the court ruled that, "theoverburdened, fragmented systemused by Legal Aid does not measureup to the constitutionally requiredlevel." It was precisely on account ofsuch conditions, the 1968 KernerCommission found, that poor peopleof color had developed a cynicalattitude toward the criminal justicesystem: "[t]he belief is pervasiveamong ghetto residents that lowercourts in our urban communitiesdispense 'assemblyline' justice; thatfrom arrest to sentencing, the poorand uneducated are denied equaljustice with the affluent. . ." Thus, the court issued anunprecedented injunction pursuant towhich "Legal Aid should not bepermitted to accept assignments inany additional cases . . . until theaverage caseload of its attorneysassigned to trial parts is below 40 . .

." On June 27, 1973, however, theSecond Circuit vacated thisinjunction on the grounds that"[a]lthough the members of thiscourt's panel were entirelysympathetic with the purposes whichthe district judge sought toaccomplish by his order. . . . thecourt has no jurisdiction underSection 1983 since the Society wasnot acting under color of state law. .." On July 2, 1973 therefore, withhopes for judicial interventiondashed, Staff Attorneys voted 178-79to take matters into their own handsby striking for lower caseloads,private client interview facilities,stenographic help, more time forresearch, better salaries and--aboveall--continuity of representation. The judiciary lost no time inattacking the strikers. Presidingjustices of both the First and SecondDepartments of the AppellateDivision lined up private attorneys tostaff the Criminal and Family courts,denounced the strikers for"abandoning the responsibility to theindigent which [ALAA] membersassumed upon their employment,"and threatened that, if the strike didnot end, "we will be compelled totake such action as is warranted bythe circumstances." Union president Faraguna retortedthat the Society's poor representationhad been "abandoning [clients] foryears," and that "[w]e are on strike toimplement the very [continuity]recommendations made by theAppellate Divisions' owncommittee." She explained that "[i]nthe next five years we will representone million indigent clients. We aredetermined to create conditions

under which they can be representedjustly and effectively." She vowedthat "[t]his strike will be won whenno longer will you hear a judge ask adefendant: 'Do you want a lawyer ordo you want legal aid?'" Many "abandoned" criminaldefendants agreed. Forty-one of 129inmates scheduled for sentencing atthe Brooklyn Men's House ofDetention supported the strike byrefusing to leave their cells. TheManhattan Tombs Inmate LiaisonCommittee issued the statement that:[Y]our strike has brought to publicview the quality of legalrepresentation the city provides to itspoor and shows these services to beextremely inadequate . . . . Thereisn't any such thing as love betweenthe men here at the Tombs and theLegal Aid Society as you mayalready know; but we would like togo on record as being in support ofyour actions and ask if there isanything at all that we can do to helpmatters along in any way. The broader legal community wassplit. The New York Times reportedthat "from the Wall Street firms andthe Association of the Bar of the Cityof New York--publicly at least--came not a word of support for theiroverburdened brethren." However, ina July 2 New York Law Journaladvertisement, the National LawyersGuild and National Conference ofBlack Lawyers asked private lawyersto refuse reassignment of theSociety's struck work, pointing outthat "[y]our acceptance of [thestrikers'] assignments will decreasethe effectiveness of the strike. Weask you to consider seriously theimplications of the present crisis andto join us in supporting the

Association's action." An ad run byprofessors at Hofstra Law Schooland New York Law School "urge[d]members of the private Bar tosupport this important [strike] . . ."The New York Civil Liberties Union(NYCLU) and the Puerto RicanLegal Defense and Education Fund(PRLDEF) issued similar statementsof support. The strike ended just six dayslater, on July 9. ALAA won"horizontal" continuity within thesame court, to "the maximum extentfeasible." If a 60-lawyerexperimental program for verticalcontinuity between Criminal andSupreme courts was deemedsuccessful, the Society would berequired either to obtain funding forits full implementation or toterminate its criminal defensecontract with the city. Faraguna observes that byagreeing to initiate even this limitedcontinuity of representation, the1973 contract represented "a totalreversal of the Society's initialposition." New York Times columnistTom Wicker agreed, writing that"[t]he net effect . . . should be to treata client's case more nearly as his orher case rather than as a file folder.That is what the constitutional rightto legal counsel is all about." The 1973 contract also establishedworkload grievance mechanisms,badly-needed salary increases,eventual "substantial parity" withADAs' salaries, shorter probationaryperiods, the right to be relieved whenin disagreement with a supervisorabout how to handle a particularcase, Spanish language training,confidential interview conditions,greater office space, and such basic

equipment as desks, chairs andtelephones. In September, another federalcourt shed light on problems withLegal Aid representation inoverturning the conviction and ten-year sentence of Louis Testamark.Testamark had been represented innineteen calendar calls by tendifferent Legal Aid attorneys.Moreover, the Society hadreassigned his case to a lawyer whohad not met him before trial, whohad failed to interview witnesses,who had not consulted him aboutpossible defenses, who had notsought a bill of particulars, who hadnot addressed the jury, and who hadnot questioned or presentedwitnesses. As Testamark hadexplained to the state trial courtjudge when he asked for a newattorney:I haven't seen this legal aid in hereever-since the case has been. . . .Every time I appeared in court, therehas always been someone else here.And when I come to court, all theydo is adjourn it. . . . And I have beenhere for ten months now, and thingsare getting worse, and nobody seemsto understand anything, nobodywants to understand anything. Incredibly, the state court haddenied Testamark's request on thegrounds that[i]f he [the attorney] spoke to youonce, he's familiar with [your case]. .. . He doesn't have to speak to youevery day. That doesn't make himany more familiar with it. He speaksto the district attorney. That's whatmakes him familiar with it, withwhat's going to be the testimonyhere.Direct Response To Judicial

Abuse As it turned out, fewrepresentational improvementsfollowed the 1973 contract and theTestamark decision. Although CDDhad tripled in size since 1970, itremained starved for adequate cityfunding. The Society had notprovided staff with offices, interviewspace or workload relief. Brooklynjudges undermined the contractually-mandated experiment in continuity,and judges generally displayedgreater hostility toward CDDattorneys than they had before thestrike. In the fall of 1973, for example,Judge Bernard Moldow heldManhattan CDD Staff AttorneyElliott Wilk in contempt for beingtoo aggressive in making anapplication for bail. In response,every Legal Aid lawyer in theCriminal Court building at 100Centre Street stopped work, therebyinitiating a tradition of direct,immediate union response to judicialabuse of a colleague that hascontinued to this day. WhenAdministrative Judge Irving Langvisited the holding pen to ask thatWilk "allow" the other attorneys toreturn to work, the lawyerresponded, "What can I do? I'm injail." In early June 1974, StaffAttorneys Donald Zuckerman andJames Block were held in contemptand jailed by a night court judge forinsisting that they had not finishedinterviewing defendants' relatives inpreparation for a bail application.Colleague Mark Weinstein was citedfor refusing to process cases whileZuckerman and Block remainedunder threat of contempt. The two

were released only when Courtofficers took up a bail collection. On July 9, 1974, Staff AttorneyDouglas Colbert was cited forcontempt and jailed by ManhattanCriminal Court Judge MiltonSamorodin for arguing that the judgeshould stay issuance of a client'sbench warrant. Staff Attorneysimmediately boycotted the 100Centre Street courthouse, andrefused to return until Colbert--whowas held in a cell adjacent to thecourtroom for two and a half hours--was released. Thereafter, no LegalAid lawyers entered the judge'scourtroom until the contempthearing, eight days later. At thattime, Guild attorney Marty Stolar,appearing for Colbert, easilyoverwhelmed the beleagueredCriminal Court judge, who was notrenowned for his scholarship andwas, in any event, mainly concernedwith trying to preserve his dignitybefore a courtroom audience packedwith Legal Aid lawyers. At the endof the hearing, the judge hurriedlyimposed a $100 fine and, gatheringhis robes about him, fled the bench.Judge Samorodin had not, of course,ever actually held Staff AttorneyColbert in contempt; and the fine, ashis Honor surely anticipated, wasnever paid. On August 13, 1974, BrooklynCDD attorneys refused to appear inCriminal Court after Staff AttorneyJoe Kaplan was inexplicably held incontempt and sentenced to a fine of$50 or five days in jail, even thoughhe had already acquiesced to thejudge's denial of a motion tointroduce preliminary hearingminutes at trial.

1974 Strike

Angered by these judicial attacksand encouraged by their risingmilitancy, ALAA members set a1974 strike deadline for September11. When Management equivocatedon continuity and blamed the Cityfor the Society's refusal to offermeaningful raises, attorneys voted193-144 to walk out. Unionpresident Joel Gorham emphasizedthat the strike was related to bothissues. As for continuity, said Gorham,"management is perfectly willing tolet things go another 100 years. It'sone thing this year, another nextyear. We work in the courts everyday, and we're impatient." Withrespect to salaries, he argued thatincreases won in the 1973 contractmeant that "[f]or the first time, theaverage length of experience of aLegal Aid Society staff attorney isover two years. This trend must notbe reversed." Echoing their 1973 attack on theunion, the Presiding Justicesharumphed that the strikers "areattorneys, professionals, not daylaborers, and should actaccordingly," and threateneddisciplinary charges,recommendations of dismissal andreplacement by attorneys appointedfrom the 18-B panel, privatepractitioners who, under the city'sindigent defense plan, were supposedto handle homicides, co-defendantcases, or defendants whoserepresentation by the Society wouldotherwise present a conflict. Again, the union replied that "[w]eare striking today because thejudiciary and the management of TheLegal Aid Society have continued toignore their responsibility to indigent

defendants in this state. . . . ThePresiding Justices' statementamounts to the ancient practice ofstrikebreaking." Or, as one strikingattorney put it, "[w]e're not out justfor money, but we are out for theright to be out for money." Theunion filed charges at the NationalLabor Relations Board (NLRB)against the Presiding Justices andrepeatedly offered to end the strikein exchange for binding arbitration, aproposal rejected by the Society. So obviously just was the strikers'cause that it even found favor withUnited States Representative EdwardI. Koch, who told a strike rally that"[t]o threaten a man--any man--be helawyer or laborer, with loss ofemployment, loss of the right to earnhis living at his chosen occupationfor speaking his mind, for striking toimprove his lot, is not only uncalledfor but repugnant to our law." Unlike 1973, however, StaffAttorney support was uneven; by theend of the 19-day strike, about one-third had crossed the picket line.Faraguna concludes that this wasbecause "many people did not wantanother strike when improvementswere in progress." In any case, theremaining strikers had little choicebut to accept terms under whichManagement remained free tomodify, or even to abandon,continuity in order to handle morecases. As the New York State BarJournal later explained,

[w]hen it was over, the strikersreturned to work with a lot less thanthey had at the beginning. They wereout 20 days' pay. The future of theirfive-year-old union--called withproper professional dignity TheAssociation of Legal Aid Attorneys

of the City of New York--was injeopardy. And the two issues overwhich they walked out in the firstplace--cost-of-living increases andthe right to represent their clientsfrom the start to finish of each case--were still unresolved. . . There was more negative fallout inJune 1975, when the New YorkCounty Lawyers AssociationCommittee on Professional Ethicsissued an opinion--withoutidentifying by whom it had beenrequested--that the strike hadviolated professional ethics. ALAAcounsel noted that the opinionconflicted with NLRB rulings, andunion president Lee Ginsburgcriticized it as a "poorly reasoned . . .example of legal double talk,"vowing that union members "will notbe inhibited from pursuing theirobligations and rights as employeesand as lawyers."

Impact Of Mid-'70s FiscalCrisis Still more bad news loomed.Negotiations in 1975 convenedamidst tremendous pressure fromfinance, insurance and real estateinterests to slash services in responseto New York City's first majormunicipal fiscal crisis. On July 1, theSociety threatened to layoff 60-65Staff Attorneys. ALAA offered tosurrender $1 million in scheduledsalary step increases; to substitutecompensatory time for night andweekend pay; and to defer theSociety's pension fund contribution. In early August, however, theSociety laid-off 25 attorneys and 46support staff. Although all affectedstaff were recalled before year's end,by February 1976, these layoffscreated a wave of fear that convinced

union members to ratify a contractthat waived the Society's 1975pension contribution, froze the salaryscale, and deferred the issue of stepincreases. Thus did ALAA approach 1976negotiations. Membershipconfidence had been weakened bythe 1974 strike and by the 1975layoffs; for two years there had beenno wage or step increases, and nopension contributions. Members,therefore, rejected the BargainingCommittee's recommendation tostrike, and accepted a poor salaryoffer. Salary at the newly-establishedStep 13 was barely higher than theold Step 12. The union's first seriousattempt to win greater affirmativeaction was referred to a powerlessjoint committee. The one significantvictory was management's finalagreement to full vertical continuityof representation.

1976 Caroline Kearney FiringRevives Attorney Militancy Staff Attorneys were againgalvanized, however, when, onOctober 26, 1976, Management firedCaroline Kearney, a youngManhattan CDD attorney andalternate Union delegate, on theground that she had arrived late toarraignments. In a November 17,1976 New York Law Journaladvertisement, ALAA charged thatKearney was actually fired forhaving joined other junior attorneysin charging that "Staff attorneys arenot receiving adequate supervisionor help from our supervisors . . .While this problem affects every oneof us, unfortunately the greatestburden falls on the newer attorneys,particularly those hired within the

last year." Many union members sawKearney's firing as an example of abroader conservative retrenchment atthe Society. Staff Attorney (andfuture NLG/New York City chapterpresident) Hal Mayerson, writing atthe time, argued that

[t]his increased repression [reflectedin the Kearney firing] . . . flowsdirectly from management's viewthat the staff attorneys whenconfronted with the choice betweenretaining their job or giving theirclients quality representation, willalways choose their own needs overtheir clients . . . While the rights ofall the citizens of this city are beingattacked in an unprecedented mannerby the bankers and financiers whonow run the city government, theprimary attacks are taking placeagainst poor people, black andhispanic poor people. The criminaljustice system is a primary center forthese attacks . . . the state makescertain that institutions like TheLegal Aid Society are underfunded .. . Management's response to the so-called fiscal crisis has been speed-up, harassment and intimidation. As a result of a one-day proteststrike, Kearney was reinstated.

Economic Recovery,Stability In Late '70s Kearney's victory and municipaleconomic recovery helped ALAA torebound in the late 1970s. Duringthis period, the union madeimportant economic improvements,won confidential client interviewconditions, conducted its firstcoordinated negotiations withsupport staff members of 1199,began to seriously raise the issue of

more aggressive affirmative action,affiliated with parent union District65 and became increasingly engagedin political activity.

Late '70s Contracts And EarlyBattles For Racial Diversity In a May 1977 New York LawJournal ad, ALAA criticizedmanagement for being an"increasingly . . . top-heavybureaucracy that stands as animpediment to the real needs of ourclients," and for rejecting the union'sdemands for greater affirmativeaction, higher salaries, bettertraining, office and interview space.On June 22, three hundred StaffAttorneys rallied for these demandsat Legal Aid's 15 Park Rowheadquarters. Speaking to the attorneys, BruceWright, one of the City's fewAfrican-American judges--and afavorite target of Mayor Koch andthe tabloid press for his evenhandedtreatment of criminal defendants--accused the Society of institutionalracism for maintaining anoverwhelmingly white attorney staff--scarcely seven percent of LegalAid's lawyers were people of color. ALAA president Mike Russekattributed the Society's position onthis issue to the "class point of view"of the Legal Aid Board of Directors,noting that 35 of its 39 memberswere corporate Wall Street lawyers.As Russek put it, "[t]hey don't evenlike the fact that we are organized." The 1977 contract increasedhealth benefit contributions by theSociety, raised salaries by an average11 percent, and restored annual stepincreases. The Society, however,refused to discuss the union's

principal non-economic demands: ajoint hiring committee to implementaffirmative action; higher attorney-to-support-staff ratios; and regularevaluation of supervisors, and, wherewarranted, their dismissal. In January 1978, ALAA membersoverwhelmingly adopted a resolutionthat accused management of"institutional racism" for dismissingfive attorneys of color who hadfailed the bar, even though it hadretained four white attorneys in thesame position. Overall, attorneys ofcolor made up only 8.73 percent ofStaff Attorneys and were even morepoorly represented withinmanagement. The union, supportedby PRLDEF, minority barassociations, and Deputy MayorBasil Paterson, forced managementto rescind the terminations; all fivepassed the next bar exam. This battleled to establishment of a short-livedMinority Caucus and an interracialALAA Affirmative ActionCommittee. The 1978 contract included anaverage 10.6 percent salary increaseand a new pension plan that reducedthe vesting period from twenty yearsto the current five. In the same year,the union helped to organize NassauCounty Legal Aid Attorneys,reestablished an ALAA legislativecommittee; pressed for improvedCDD training, and successfullycampaigned for confidential clientinterviews in Manhattan CriminalCourt.

District 65 Affiliation Of particular importance was theMarch 1978 vote to affiliate ALAAwith District 65, DistributiveWorkers of America (later a local the

United Auto Workers). Arguing foraffiliation, outgoing ALAA presidentMichael Russek appealed to themembers' social conscience byobserving that "District 65 . . . hasbeen in the forefront of the civilrights movement and was the firstsignificant opponent of the VietnamWar within the American labormovement." He also emphasized District 65'spolitical strength; its ability toprovide financial assistance; itsproven record of support for theUnion's campaign on behalf of thefired attorneys of color; itscommitment to "organizing . . . legaland defender services attorneys andlegal workers nationally"; and itsagreement to grant ALAA broadautonomy, including the right tosecede.

1979 And 1980 Contracts In 1979, ALAA conducted itscontract negotiations in coordinationwith 1199 support staff at Legal Aidand with the Legal Services StaffAssociation (LSSA)--both of whomshared ALAA's October 1 contractexpiration. The resulting ALAAcontract established health andpension plans jointly administeredby union and management, andrequired the Society to hire anaffirmative action officer. Less,however, was achieved in regard tosalaries, where inflation had eateninto earlier wage gains. In the same year, the unionprosecuted a partially-successfulworkload grievance in the Brooklynoffice of JRD; campaigned for thereelection of Civil Court JudgeBruce Wright; and criticized theSociety's Executive Director,

Archibald Murray, who, in hiscapacity as a member of the Healthand Hospitals Corporation Board,voted to cut indigent patient services. When bargaining resumed in1980, the union-managementrelationship was badly frayed.Management refused to offer morethan a 6.6 percent salary increase anddemanded cuts in attorney healthbenefits. As in previous years, theSociety announced that it wouldoffer no more than that expresslyprovided for increased compensationby the City. Management also statedthat it was "philosophically opposed"to flex-time, job sharing, and part-time work--all of which ALAA haddemanded on behalf of an increasingnumber of members with childcareresponsibilities. Attorneys sought to generatepressure for their demands with arally at Society headquarters, a masssickout, and a picket line at theOctober 28 annual meeting of theLegal Aid Board of Directors. In theend, however, members accepted theBargaining Committee'srecommendation to accept the offerof improved health benefits and a 7percent raise, while preparing for astrike in the following year.

1981 Contract And 1199Support Staff Strike During contract negotiations in thespring of 1981, management made a4.3 percent salary offer, whichArchibald Murray defended on theground that the city had demandedwage restraints for municipalemployees and contractors. On July20, ALAA members responded witha strike authorization vote,establishment of strike committees

and publication of a weeklybargaining newsletter. For the firsttime, ALAA and 1199--both ofwhich were without a contract--exchanged mutual pledges to supporteach other's contract objectives. In addition to seeking highersalaries, ALAA charged that "[t]heconditions under which we work atLAS have deteriorated over the yearsto a point where many staff attorneysquestion the ability of the Society toprovide adequate representation inall cases," examples of whichincluded a major "shortage ofattorneys. . . [and] support staff, thelack of decent office conditions andequipment and the inadequate initialand continuing training ofattorneys." In response, the union proposedguaranteed minimal staffing levelsfor CDD, CAB and JRD, whereattrition saddled staff with highercaseloads and with more institutionalresponsibilities, such as arraignmentsand "catch" assignments (day-longstaffing of one all-purposecourtroom by the same lawyerhandling Legal Aid cases on whichthe assigned attorney is unable toappear.) Management remainedunresponsive. On October 1,however, ALAA members--manyexpressing the fear that a strikewould end The Legal Aid Society--again accepted the offer despite thenegative recommendation of bothBargaining and ExecutiveCommittees.(3) On October 7, 1199support staff rejected management'soffer of a $20 weekly raise and an 8percent annual increase in each oftwo years. ALAA asked its members to "lend

any and all support they can," buttreated observance of the 1199picketlines as a matter of individualconscience. Civil Division StaffAttorneys who honored the picketlines were docked. Other ALAAmembers expressed their support bygoing to their offices only whenpicket lines were down, and by fund-raising. After six weeks, 1199members ratified a contractproviding for a wage increase of thehigher of $24 a week or 8 percent inthe first year, and $22 a week or 8percent in the second.

1982 Strike The 1982 strike, during ten coldwinter weeks, served to fullyreestablish the strength that ALAAhad lost in the unsuccessful 1974strike and the 1975 fiscal crisis--allin the face of great resistance andretaliation from management, thecity elite, Edward I. Koch (by thenthe mayor), and the courts. Over thelong-term, however, the Societyresponded by seeking permanentstrike-breaking capacity throughbloating the number of Legal Aidsupervisors, while the city pursuedthe same objective through adramatic increase in 18-Brepresentation.

Initial Negotiations Negotiations over a contract wagereopener began during the summerof 1982, when the union soughtsalary increases to make StaffAttorneys more comparable to theADAs. At the same time, harshermandatory sentencing laws enactedin the 1970s had exerted growingpressure on Legal Aid workload andcontinuity. Between 1980 and 1982,

the number of criminal trials hadgrown by 41 percent. Institutionalassignments had multiplied. InSeptember 1982, this trend wascompounded by the Society'ssurrender to the Manhattan DistrictAttorney's demand for a lobster shift(overnight arraignments)--withouteven consulting the union. Underthese rising pressures, illness andemotional stress pushed annual staffturnover to 15 percent. In contract negotiations, therefore,ALAA proposed that the Societyaddress the severe attorney shortage;reduce the number of CDD attorneyson extended probation, which hadrisen to about one-third, and "actaffirmatively to affect legislation andprocedures which impact on ourclients and our ability to do our job." But instead of taking measures toease the crisis, managementincreasingly penalized individualStaff Attorneys. Manhattan CDDStaff Attorney Steven Leventhal wassuspended for two weeks for askinga judge to relieve him from severalcases due to an excessive workload.In October, LAS labor counselRobert Batterman(4) alleged that theSociety's 4.3 percent salary offer wasfair because Staff Attorneys wereallegedly "comparable" toprosecutors.

Brewer Firing Lights Fire The next day, the Society firedBrooklyn CDD attorney WeldonBrewer for telling a judge that he hadbeen unable to file a motion becausehis workload was too high: 65 cases,including 36 felonies--a 50 percentincrease since 1978. As Brewerexplained,

[o]n September 10, I had 10 cases in

four different courtrooms. Now howcan I instill confidence in thoseclients when some aren't going to seeme at all? Or when some will getonly a hurried conversation, where Iwon't have any time to answerquestions? And let's suppose one ofthose 10 clients has to decidewhether to plead guilty that day. It'sa serious undermining of therelationship between attorney andclient. Brewer was not atypical; all 18members of his complex (the CDDoffice sub-unit) had declaredthemselves unable to take additionalcases and that their caseloads made amockery of continuity. Brewer's firing quickly became asymbol for everything that waswrong with Legal Aidrepresentation. Hofstra Law Schoolethics specialist Monroe H.Freedman said that Brewer "hastaken up the fight where Mr. Gideonleft off," and former U.S. AttorneyGeneral Ramsey Clark agreed torepresent Brewer. On October 22,enraged by the firing, ALAAmembers rejected management'ssalary offer and voted by a 2-1margin to strike. In regard to salary, the unioncriticized management's refusal toapply comparability with ADAs pastthe first five Legal Aid steps. Asstriker Charles S. Bobis put it, "[i]fthey can come up with an assistantdistrict attorney who after 10 yearsearns only $37,000, I will go back towork posthaste. There is no suchanimal." The union also made clearthat ADA salaries were a floor forLegal Aid compensation, rather thana ceiling, especially since Societyfunding had dramatically increased,

while salary offers since 1978 haddropped by 50 percent.

Solidarity--Within AndWithout Staff Attorney support for thestrike was strong; by the fifth week,only five percent of the members hadcrossed the line, compared with 30percent by the third week of the 1974strike. Scabs were dealt with harshly,according to union spokespersonGary Sloman, "because the basicview is that people who are workingare stabbing us in the back." Thissupport for the strike was evident inmembership rejection of foursuccessive management offers.Chelsea Civil attorney CandiceCarpenter, who had originally votedagainst the strike, later explained:

The more I see of what they[management] are trying to do, inwhat are obviously attempts to breakthe union, the more angry I get atthem. I'm totally flabbergasted by thestrength of the union, of stayingtogether. It's amazing power. It'sopened my eyes to so many things.Who would have thought in lawschool that I'd be in a union and havethese big teamsters come up to littleol' me on the picket line and say,"Okay, I'm not crossing." In a subsequent analysis, two ofthe strike leaders, Steve Banks and(future ALAA president) JeanSchneider, explained how the Unionquickly harnessed this momentuminto organized activity:[The strike] began with little or noprior preparation . . . almostovernight city-wide picket lines wereorganized . . . a dailycommunications network wasestablished [and] [f]rom scratch an

impressive fund-raising apparatuswas developed and a program ofoutreach to and solicitation ofsupport from members of LegalAid's Board of Directors, bar groups,political organizations andpoliticians, judges, labororganizations, client organizationand other constituency groups, wasinitiated and forcefully carried out. Support staff members of 1199continued to work, but supported thestrike in a wide variety of ways. Thestrike was endorsed by the countycriminal courts bar associations,including the New York CriminalBar Association, which "urge[d] ourmembers, and other private lawyers,not to accept court assignments toindigent defendants now representedby a striking Legal Aid attorney." In the strike's fifth week, nearly athousand strikers and supportersrallied at City Hall Park. RamseyClark told a November 22 rally of300 strikers and supporters in CityHall Park that the strike represented"a struggle for equal justice" in asystem which permitted millions ofdollars for defense of the rich, butprovided only "pennies for [defenseof] the poor." On November 26, 81city judges issued a statement citingthe crucial role of Society attorneysin both civil and criminal cases andcalled for the quickest possibleresolution of the strike. Visitors to the picket line includedLt. Governor Mario Cuomo, CityClerk David Dinkins, City Councilmember Ruth Messinger, JudgeBruce Wright, contingents of courtofficers and other unionized courtemployees, and delegations of laborand community leaders. Teamstersemployed by United Parcel Service

and by heating oil companies refusedto cross ALAA's picket lines atSociety offices and at courthouses.In a message to the strikers, CorettaScott King wrote:Martin Luther King, Jr. [who wasassassinated in 1968 while visitingMemphis to support strikingsanitation workers] gave his life in atrade union struggle, and if he werewith us today, I believe he wouldalso be among your strongestsupporters. . . . Together we shallovercome. Society supervisors, meanwhile,appeared on pending criminal caseswithout files, and were soon unableto accept new criminal cases atarraignments. The refusal of 18-Battorneys to cross the lines to takestruck Legal Aid cases--and theinexperience of many of those whodid--caused numerous criminaldefendants to be arraigned withoutcounsel. As long trial and sentencingdelays piled up, the jails becameovercrowded. Commenting on thislogjam, the union made clear that[n]one of us gloats over the impactof our strike on our clients--we allwork at Legal Aid because webelieve in our clients' rights toquality representation . . . Yet wemust recognize that our strongestleverage with management is ourability to close down the courts andthis necessarily means putting asidethe short term needs of our clientsfor their long term need forexperienced, conscientious lawyers.It is management's refusal to agree toour demand for a decent wageincrease, and indeed its refusal tobargain at all, which has prolongedthe strike, not any action by theunion.

Many Legal Aid criminal clientsagreed. A petition from 416 RikersIsland inmates stated that[t]he striking attorneys are balking atthe very idea of "Assembly Linejustice". Underlying the demand forsalary increase is the less publicizeddemand for lighter caseloads and aless hectic pace. . . . We, asdetainee/defendants, should allsupport this strike! It is imperativethat they win, because in the longrun, we win! One criminal defendant's mothersaid that "[t]hey [the strikers] aredefinitely underpaid, andoverworked . . . I know what's rightand what's wrong--and they're right."

Antiunion Counterattack,ALAA Resistance However, a sinister alliance ofmanagement, city government, courtadministration and the press soonlaunched a counter-attack designedto break the strike and the unionitself. Before the strike was even aday old, management threatened tocut off Staff Attorney health benefitsand to discipline attorneys,particularly probationers, for"abandoning" clients. The Society's Board called thestrike "indefensible economicallyand incompatible with the Society'smission of providing legalrepresentation to the poor of NewYork City." Management counselRobert Batterman threatened to seeklegislation prohibiting strikes byLegal Aid attorneys and sought anorder restraining union disciplinaryproceedings against scabs--who weregiven free representation by the WallStreet firm of Board member RobertPatterson. In late October, the unionresponded by filing an unfair labor

practice charge against management,and in early November filed afederal lawsuit to enjoinadministrative judges from coercingstrikers into returning to work. Mayor Koch, however, raised theante by denouncing the strikers as"unethical" and instructing CityCriminal Justice Coordinator JohnKeenan (who had already statedpublicly that "I don't think they[Legal Aid attorneys] should havethe right to strike") to study"replacing" the Society with agovernmental public defenderagency. New York Times editorialslabeled the strike "foolish" and urgedKoch to "maintain the pressure bygetting standby legislation thatpermits him to replace the societywith a public defender system at anytime." ALAA publicly challengedthis plan to replace the unionizedLegal Aid Society, asking:

What, then, distinguishes any Cityattempt to replace Legal Aid with,for example, the closing of a factoryand moving of it to another statesolely to avoid unionization? This isthe classic runaway shop situationand is illegal under current labor law. Striker Kevin O'Connell attackedthe accusation that striking wasunethical: "Quite frankly, I get veryupset when I hear managementmaking the statements about clientsbeing hurt. They don't have clients.They sit in their office and pushpapers. Not one of them knows whatit's like to come into court and do thework."(5) Similarly, Hofstra LawSchool ethics Professor MonroeFreedman wrote that the Timeseditorial "was erroneous insuggesting that New York City'sLegal Aid attorneys are violating

their ethical obligations by striking. .. . No contract can override the LegalAid lawyers' constitutional andethical obligations to assure that theirclients are receiving effectiveassistance of counsel." On December 13, 1982, ALAAproposed "open arbitration," underwhich, explained the union, "thearbitrator [would be] free to reach adecision which is fair and reasonableunder the totality of thecircumstances." Managementcountered with "baseballarbitration," in which the arbitrator"would have been able to chooseonly between the last offers made bythe management and the union." TheSociety also refused to include theissue of Brewer's dismissal or othernon-compensation issues. OnDecember 16, the members voted321-141 to reject management'sarbitration proposal. On December 21, Koch's "KeenanCommission" released its report.Although designed to help break thestrike, the report was forced toconcede thatcreation of a public defender systemwith simultaneous abandonment ofLegal Aid is not the course to take. Itinvolves numerous startup costs andon-going expenses . . . There wouldseem to be little point in jettisoningan established organization, wellqualified to perform the desiredfunction, equipped as it is with ablepersonnel and fortified by longexperience. . . . [and] known for itsvigorous independent representationof indigents. The report also found the Societyto be of higher quality and morecost-effective than 18-Brepresentation. The commission,

however, called for replacement ofALAA's right to strike witharbitration binding on the Societyand the union, but not on the city.

Victory And Backlash On January 3, 1983--ten weeksinto a strike that had paralyzed thecriminal courts--a settlement wasfinally reached. It included an 11.2percent salary increase over twoyears (compared with management's4.31 percent pre-strike offer),establishment of a joint union-management working conditionscommittee, and selection of caseloadarbitrators. Weldon Brewer wouldremain suspended with pay pendingan arbitrator's decision (whichultimately held that his"insubordination" merited dismissal). These improved terms reflectedthe indisputable fact that ALAAmembers had stood together, despiteintense pressure, for ten long,difficult weeks. Democraticallycontrolled by the rank-and-file, andorganized by a broad and dedicatedleadership, only 46 (or 8.5 percent)of ALAA's 540 members hadcrossed the line; the Civil Division,Volunteer Division and BrooklynCDD could each boast of not havinghad a single scab. Notwithstandingconcerted efforts at intimidation, nostriker was disciplined bymanagement, the city, the courts orthe bar. Thus, despite the loss to eachstriker of thousands of dollars insalary, ALAA members emergedfrom the strike prouder, more activeand more confident in their union.As Jean Schneider wrote a year later,"[o]ur most significant successes . . .have come from a new awareness,born during the strike, of what we

can achieve through collectiveaction." Over the next year, forexample, union members wonwithdrawal of management's threatto fire a Queens CDD probationer;compelled rejection of the city'sdemand for Saturday criminalhearings in Manhattan; and"convinced management that it isworth their while to communicatewith us about working conditionsissues that affect us and to try towork with us to arrive at solutions." The settlement, however, did notend attacks on the union. Shortlyafter the strike, the Ethics Committeeof the Association of the Bar of theCity of New York issued an opinion--at Koch's instigation--suggestingthat striking Legal Aid attorneyswere ethically obliged to continue torepresent their current criminalclients and might even have to pickup new clients. In 1987, theAssociation's Ethics Committee--then chaired by a partner atBatterman's firm--refused toreconsider that opinion, despite athree-year effort for its modificationby both union and managementlawyers on the Association's LaborCommittee.

Percolation In The '80s The balance of the 1980s werecharacterized by ALAA's renewedpolitical activism, by risingcaseloads generated by the "crackcrisis," by relatively favorableeconomic settlements and by agrowing union focus on non-economic demands, particularlyaffirmative action.

Immediate Aftermath Of 1982Strike

In April 1984, realizing that theKoch administration's threats tocancel the Society's contract wouldnot guarantee ALAA's submission,the Board, under its new president,Arthur Liman, commissioned a"Quality of Work Life Study" whichultimately recommended sweepingchanges in management style,including a far greater role forALAA. In the end, however, few of theserecommendations wereimplemented. More promising wasthe 1984 contract, which raisedsalaries by five percent in each oftwo years; sped up caseloadgrievances; broadened unioninvolvement in affirmative action;established a half-time workexperiment for attorneys rearingchildren; lengthened parental leavefrom three to ten months; created ahealth and safety committee; andestablished more reasonable criteriafor certifying lawyers to handlefelony cases.

"War on Drugs" SpawnsSpeedup In the summer of 1985, however,this newfound calm was disruptedwhen NYU Law School professorsChester Mirsky and MichaelMcConville issued a report onindigent criminal defense in NewYork City. Although focusedprimarily on the poor quality of 18-Brepresentation, the "Mirsky-McConville Report" also assertedthat Legal Aid frequently avoided("shed") difficult cases atarraignment, failed to provideconsistently conscientiousrepresentation, and had become "aguilty-plea misdemeanor workshop."

Both the Society and ALAA stronglychallenged the report as an unfairportrayal of Legal Aidrepresentation. Without question, however, LegalAid attorneys were beingoverwhelmed by the escalating "drugwar" against crack cocaine. In thespring of 1986, union workloadgrievances compelled the Society topull CDD attorneys out of somearraignment shifts in Manhattan andBrooklyn, and to retract BoardPresident Maurice Nessen'sunilateral decision to extend theManhattan CDD lobster shift.

1986 Contract and RenewedMilitancy Strain again returned to thecollective bargaining process.Although the 1986 contract providedacross-the-board salary increases andcreated greater half-time workopportunities, Staff Attorneys wereangered by the Society's refusal tooffer more than a one-time bonus tostep 13 senior attorneys, a positionwhich was widely perceived toreflect Nessen's contemporaneousremark that working for Legal Aidwas a "young man's job" to be gotten"out of your system" before movingon. Similarly provocative was theSociety's claim that affirmativeaction was solely a managementresponsibility and that Legal Aid didnot have a "race-related retentionproblem"; the Society, however,ultimately agreed to a new--albeittoothless--union-managementaffirmative action task force. Following the 1986 contract,ALAA became increasinglyconcerned with affirmative action. In1987, the union elected its first

president of color, John Yong.(6) OnMay 28, 1987, hundreds of ALAAmembers attended a uniondemonstration protesting thedismissal of 17 law graduates--including 15 attorneys of color--whohad failed the bar examination forthe second time. In response to theunion's charge that the Society hadbreached its "commitment toaffirmative action," managementultimately agreed to provide greatersupport for those attorneys whofailed their first bar exam. On August 25, 1987, one hundredManhattan CDD Staff Attorneys lefttheir courtrooms to come to the aidof colleague Tom Klein, who hadbeen held in contempt and jailed forthree hours --"by force if necessary"--after having accused ActingSupreme Court Justice Frank J.Blangiardo, a notoriously anti-LegalAid judge, of unfairly favoring theprosecutor during a robbery trial.Led by ALAA member JeremySchneider, the lawyers packed thecontempt hearing and refused tohandle night court arraignments untilKlein was released on the order ofAppellate Division Justice JohnCarro. In late November 1987, as a resultof similar direct action, BrooklynCDD attorneys won improvedconditions in the Criminal Courtholding pens after issuing acollective threat to boycottarraignments unless the courtadministration rid the pens of rats,roaches and filth.

Speedup And GrowingReliance On Assigned (18-B)Counsel The highly-politicized "drug

wars" led the courts and city to usethe threat of greater 18-Brepresentation to speedup CDDattorneys. By the end of 1987,therefore, Legal Aid--the designated"primary defender"--representedonly 29 percent of felony defendants,compared with the 18-B panel's 40percent. In response to the city'scontinuing pressure to have StaffAttorneys sacrifice quality for speed,management finally echoed ALAA'sposition. CDD division chief Caesar D.Cirigliano stated that"[u]nfortunately, the courts wantonly one thing now--move the bodiesthrough the system. . . . We're notmaking widgets. We're representingpeople, and that takes time."Archibald Murray said that "[i]t's asif they [the city and judges] believethat the function of the lawyer is togrease the way of his client intoprison." Board Chair AlexanderForger emphasized that "[i]t's thelawyer's responsibility not toacquiesce to that--not to obstruct, butat least to try to get a couple minutesof justice."

1988 Contract On May 19, 1988, meanwhile, 250lawyers rallied in support of ALAA'sbargaining proposals. On August 15,the bargaining climate wasdramatically inflamed whenBrooklyn CDD attorneys andsupport staff held a joint wildcatstrike over the lack of office airconditioning and ventilation on thehottest day of the summer. OnAugust 25, 500 ALAA membersfrom around the City marched onLAS Park Row headquarters toprotest the resulting dockings and

warning letters. Just two weeks after the 1988contract expired, and in the face ofrising membership militancy,management agreed to an aggregate13 percent two-year wage increase,including an immediate 14.3 percentraise for first-year lawyers and abase-rate increase for those at Step13. Outraged, the City refused toreimburse $1 million of the cost, inresponse to which the Board vowednever again to make an offer forwhich it did not have advance Cityapproval. Many ALAA members,however, remained frustrated thatmanagement had rebuffed theunion's demands for strongeraffirmative action and equal benefitsfor lesbian and gay attorneys.

Racial Justice Battles BirthNew Leadership Throughout the mid- and late-80s,ALAA's Affirmative ActionCommittee became increasinglyactive. In the Civil Division itinitiated a long-term and ultimatelysuccessful campaign over the failureof Attorney-in-Charge KalmanFinkel to recruit, retain and promoteattorneys of color. Committees inBrooklyn and Manhattan CDD gavesupport to attorneys of color. Thesame period saw establishment of anALAA Lesbian and Gay Caucus. In 1987, the Brooklyn CDDAffirmative Action Committeebegan to address broader issues bypublicly criticizing the acquittal ofBernhard Goetz, who had repeatedlyshot several young black men in asubway car. In 1988, Brooklyn CDDdelegate Michael Letwin testifiedbefore the State Judicial Commissionon Minorities that "the entire

relationship between the criminal-justice system and the minoritycommunities is based oninstitutionalized racism of the mostprofound sort," and that "The LegalAid Society . . . must begin torecognize and correct its institutionalracism, an effort that the Associationof Legal Aid Attorneys has all toooften found the Society'smanagement unwilling to do." Between 1987-1989, the Brooklyncommittee's members participated inprotests against racist murders inHoward Beach, Staten Island, andBensonhurst. In September 1989, itpublicly contrasted the "preferentialtreatment" accorded white teenagerscharged with murdering Blackteenager Yusef Hawkins with thedemonization of African-Americanteenagers accused of attacking awhite Central Park jogger. InALAA's first New York Times op-edpiece, Letwin charged that, "[t]helenient treatment of the defendantscharged in the [Bensonhurst] killing .. . is further proof that it pays to bewhite when you go to court." In1989, ALAA also supported longand difficult strikes at EasternAirlines and at the Pittson, WestVirginia mines, and becameincreasingly involved in abortionrights, and endorsed the first mayoralcandidacy of David Dinkins. In the December 1989 unionelections, Brooklyn CDD and theCivil Division served as a launch padfor the "Action and Democracy"slate, a cross-divisional coalition tore-energize ALAA based on themesgenerated in Legal Aid officesthroughout the city: direct, militantgrassroots decision-making andaction; collective, professional and

pro-active leadership; the centralityof affirmative action; andcommitment to a deeper alliancewith 1199 support staff. Letwinbecame union president on thisplatform in January 1990.

Eruption In The Early'90s The 1990s immediately saw there-emergence of highly combativerelations within the Society asmanagement took advantage ofrising health insurance costs and asense of municipal fiscal crisis toundermine attorney compensation,while continuing to resist ALAA'sdemands for more aggressiveaffirmative action. Meanwhile, stateand city government sought tofurther counter the union's influenceby funding small nonunionorganizations to represent indigentclients without being subject toALAA's demands for qualityrepresentation. During 1990-1992,the new union leadership organizedto confront these challenges byattempting to put into practice thethemes upon which it had beenelected. While economic gains werelimited, ALAA won major non-economic improvements.

Speedup And The JRD Crisis Pressure from governmentalfunders to increase Staff Attorneyworkloads and undermine ALAAprotections significantly increased inearly 1990. On March 9, StaffAttorneys picketed in protest overwork quotas in CAB, where, said theunion, attorneys were "drowning in aflood of cases generated by the crackcrisis." Beginning in February,

meanwhile, a three-way conflict hademerged between ALAA, theSociety, and the state's Office ofCourt Administration (OCA). Theyear before, management had settleda major JRD workload grievance byreducing caseloads and demandingthat the state either pay for morelawyers or face suspension of JRD'sintake. Now, the state not onlyrefused to provide the additionalfunds, but threatened to replaceJRD's Manhattan office with anonunion contractor, Lawyers forChildren. Citing OCA's refusal toprovide the necessary funds,management announced the layoff ofsix JRD attorneys who had just beenhired as part of the grievancesettlement. ALAA and 1199 promptlyresponded with a joint publiccampaign against these twin threats.Characterizing OCA's request forproposal (RFP) as union-busting,ALAA argued that: "The union hasbeen the only organization in the citywith the power to challengeunreasonable caseloads. They'll[Lawyers for Children] handlewhatever caseload they're told. Afterall, the only reason they're gettingthe contract is so the OCA doesn'thave to deal with a union." On March 26, 1990, 300 StaffAttorneys and support staff gatheredat Park Row to picket against thelayoffs. On May 30, the unionspicketed OCA offices, where theyheld a press conference with leadersof other unions. By the end of June,ALAA later recounted, thesedemonstrations, intensive lobbyingat the city and state levels, and itspublic accusation that Lawyers forChildren lacked the affirmative

action plan required by state law,"made it politically too costly for theOCA to stick by its initial decision toterminate the JRD contract." Thecampaign also forced management toguarantee jobs for the six threatenedlawyers, if necessary by transfer toother Society divisions. Just as the JRD crisis wasresolved, ALAA was confrontedwith the city's decision to fund anonunion "model program,"Neighborhood Defender Services ofHarlem, to represent members ofCDD's client population. ALAAresponded by carefullydistinguishing itself from Legal Aidmanagement's smug dismissal ofNDS' innovative "early intervention"approach. But it voiced concernabout the program's potential toundermine the union:

We believe that [NDS] deservescredit for pioneering ways to betterserve indigent defendants, and thatLegal Aid management should createan atmosphere that encourages suchexperimentation within the Society.However . . . we are concerned thatthis project has come about in thecontext of an attack on the unionrepresentation that exists at LegalAid. . . . because the union, often onits own, has been the most ardentadvocate for quality representationof indigent clients in New YorkCity.(7)

Fighting for Diversity AndCompensation In 1990Negotiations These threats from nonunioncontractors, however, soon paledbefore the most contentious andprotracted contract negotiations since1982. In early July 1990, amidst anatmosphere of renewed municipal

fiscal crisis, ALAA sought wageincreases to match the ADA salaries,explaining that "quality legalrepresentation to poor people canonly be maintained when those whorepresent them are fairlycompensated." As in previous years, the union'smost prominent non-economicdemand was stronger affirmativeaction, a proposal that wasstrengthened by the creation of theAttorneys of Color of Legal Aid(ACLA), a caucus formed earlier inthe year with the union's strongsupport and initially co-chaired bySallie Manzanet (Bronx CDD),Millie Pinott (Volunteer Division)and Magda Rosa-Ríos (VolunteerDivision). Since people of color made upmore than 90 percent of the Society'sclients, but only 18 percent of LegalAid Staff Attorneys and 9 percent ofthe managing attorneys, ACLArepresentative Azalia Torres told thepress that, "[e]specially in thisclimate of racial tension, Legal Aidmust begin to reflect the diversity ofour communities," while Letwinreiterated that "[t]he Legal AidSociety simply cannot afford to sendthe message to its clients that it ispart of a judicial system that iswidely perceived as being raciallyunbalanced and unfair." Management, however, remainedintransigent on affirmative action,and refused, even after the contractexpired on October 1, 1990, to makeany economic offer. ALAAresponded with public rallies onOctober 1, informational pickets, aninvasion of the Society's October 23,1990 annual meeting and disruptionof Management's Christmas party at

Park Row. In early October, theunion warned that "[i]f managementrefuses . . . to consider our proposals,they will force us to strike," aprospect that gained particularprominence on October 4, whenSupreme Court Judge GeorgeRoberts expelled Staff AttorneysTroy Yancey and Robin Frankelfrom his Manhattan courtroom fordisplaying "Ready to Strike" buttons.Across the city, Staff Attorneysdefiantly wore the buttons to theirown courtrooms.(8)

In December 1990, two monthsafter contract expiration, the Societyfinally made its economic offer:reduced attorney health benefits andno wage increase--the equivalent of anet three percent union give-back.Management claimed poverty, but,as in the past, refused to reveal howthe Society allocated its $120 millionannual budget. On January 29, 1991,union members counterattacked witha one-day strike, the date of whichwas kept secret until the nightbefore. Striking Queens CDDattorney Chandra Gomes told theDaily News, "I love this job. I wantto do something to help people. All Iwant is to be treated fairly, likeeveryone else." Sonja White, ofManhattan CDD, told the Times,"[i]n a nutshell, it's about respect." The Society answered bythreatening to terminate healthcoverage for any attorney whorefused to authorize payrolldeductions toward the cost ofinsurance premiums. When, in late-February, attorneys voted 515-138 toreject this ultimatum, the Societyunilaterally cut the benefits. ALAAwas now faced with a dilemma. Itsmembers regarded health give-backs

as unacceptable. Most attorneys,however, were understandablyreluctant to strike. By early spring,therefore, the union implemented analternative strategy of resistancebased on "inside"(9) and corporatecampaigns that included picketingthe law firms of Legal Aid Boardofficers and bombarding Boardmembers' clients with a mass letter-writing campaign. Ironically, the city itselfunintentionally helped to break thislogjam. In early March, DeputyMayor Milton Mollen had offered tofund salary increases if ALAAwould agree to an "arraignmentbureau" that would surrender thecontinuity of representation won inALAA's 1973 and 1974 strikes. "It'sreprehensible," answered ALAA,"that anyone in the cityadministration is trying to diminishour clients' rights by trying toblackmail us during a labor dispute." Having failed to buy off the union,Mollen suggested then that theSociety compromise on ALAA'seconomic demands, thusundercutting management'sinsistence that the city would notpermit it to exceed the pattern ofmunicipal labor contracts. When theSociety hemmed and hawed, theunion vowed to disrupt Legal Aid'sApril 24 fund-raising dinner at theWaldorf-Astoria Hotel. Under this threat, the Societyoffered to restore essential healthbenefits, rescind unilateral employeedeductions and, for the first timeever, guarantee existing benefitlevels for the life of the contract.Except for a small increase at Step13, however, salaries were frozen. Inother areas, the Society agreed to

landmark improvements in jobsecurity, equal benefits for lesbianand gay attorneys, and health andsafety. When compelled bymanagement's terms to "recommend"the offer as a condition of allowingthe membership to consider it, theBargaining Committeee achievedratification by 267-162--but only ona basis that unilaterally repelled theSociety's last-minute attempt torenege on its economic offer and tocoerce ALAA into dropping a CivilDivision affirmative actiongrievance. Although the union hadsuccessfully endured, these difficultcontract negotiations served toundermine members' morale. Deeplyconcerned about health benefits,salaries and other workingconditions, and without a preparedstrategy, ALAA had ended updivided about how--or even whether--to resist Management, a schismreflected within the BargainingCommittee. On the other hand,contract negotiations had generatedgreater membership activism andbroad agreement on the need forunified strategy in 1992.

Political Action Throughout these early 1990scrises, ALAA continued to addresslarger social-justice issues. OnFebruary 1, 1990, a uniondemonstration focused mediaattention on the police-instigatedbeating in the Brooklyn court pens ofa defendant charged with childsexual abuse. On August 15, 1990,front-page press coverage reportedALAA's charge that guards onRikers Island had inflicted a "secretmass beating" in which "[t]he walls

were covered with the inmates'blood" and one inmate was fatallyinjured. "There was," chargedALAA, "no resistance, there was noprovocation. It was like declaringopen season on inmates." Theserevelations caused Mayor Dinkins toorder an investigation. ALAA alsotook an increasingly public stanceagainst the "war on drugs," which itcharacterized as a reflection of"institutional racism." In January 1991, a contingent ofALAA and 1199 members joined inactivities against the Gulf War. In1991, ALAA strongly supported asuccessful 16-week strike by itssister unionists at Legal Services forNew York, opposed ClarenceThomas's Supreme Courtnomination, criticized the provisionof Glock automatic pistols to theNYPD, and organized against theepidemic of police abuse.

Defending Members AgainstManagement and Judiciary Following the lengthy 1990contract negotiations, ALAA againturned to immediate issues. In earlyJune 1991, 75 Manhattan CDDattorneys protested the terminationof Steven Hoffner, a well-regardedprobationary attorney, by picketingPark Row and forcing Managementto explain its actions at two massmeetings. On December 9, 1991, theunion called on the Society to protectstaff and clients against a risingepidemic of drug-resistant TB, andpublicized the risk of exposure tocriminal defendants held in courtpens, telling the New York Times that"[i]t was always inhumane to keeppeople like that. But now [suchconditions] pose . . . a threat to the

entire city." On December 3, 1991, judicialabuse of Staff Attorneys resurfacedwhen Staff Attorney Michelle Myerswas handcuffed for alleged latenessand for "smiling" at Criminal CourtJudge Bernadette Bayne; Myers hadasked that her client, charged with amisdemeanor, be unshackled for apre-trial hearing. On December 12,Brooklyn CDD union membersprotested by walking off the job andpicketing Criminal Court. Severaldays later, 100 Brooklyn CDDattorneys voted to boycott Bayne'scourtroom to protest both Myers'streatment and the contempt citationsissued by judges against four otherStaff Attorneys--all of whom wereeither incarcerated or handcuffed forperiods ranging from a few minutesto two hours for "being late." When, in February 1992, the StateCommission on Judicial Misconductdismissed the Society's complaintagainst Bayne regarding thisincident, ALAA told the New YorkLaw Journal that "[u]ntil there existsa genuine remedy 1,000 Legal Aidattorneys facing judicial abuse in thefuture will remain compelled todefend our rights--and those of ourclients--with immediate, directaction.(10)" A few days later, ALAAmobilized more than one hundredattorneys and support staff to picketLegal Aid HQ over the firing ofDuane Williamson, an African-American attorney whosetermination reflected a pattern ofdiscrimination against attorneys ofcolor in JRD.

Solidarity Yields 1992 Gains Soon, however, ALAA becamebogged down in eight months of

fruitless mid-contract salarynegotiations regarding paycomparability with ADAs, causing150 ALAA and 1199 members topicket Park Row on April 1, 1992.Frustrated both by their experiencein 1990 contract negotiations and bythe illusory wage reopener, unionmembers told the 1992 BargainingCommittee that--in sharp contrast tothe previous settlement--they wanteda significant wage increase, tocontinue existing health benefitswithout employee premiumcontributions or an HMO, andsettlement of the contract by itsOctober 1, 1992 expiration date.These and other proposals werereflected in ALAA's bargainingdemands. To achieve these objectives, theBargaining Committee proposed atwo-part strategy designed to forgebroad Staff Attorney consensus. Thefirst was a "no contract, no work"October 1 strike deadline--backed bydevelopment of finances, strikecommittees and creative striketactics--to give the union "somemuscle at the bargaining table fromthe moment negotiations begin." Thesecond was an "inside strategy" priorto October 1, conducted in alliancewith Local 1199 support staff (whichhad been working without a contractsince September 1991), that offeredvarious ways for members to buildmomentum for either an acceptablesettlement or a strike. The viability of this deepeninginter-union alliance was due largelyto the leadership of senior 1199delegate Akil Al-Jundi (1940-1997),a Manhattan CDD staff member andAttica Brother; Brooklyn CDD 1199delegate Bernette Carway-Spruiell;

1199 vice-president Angela Doyleand 1199 organizer Cynthia Wolff. On June 17, 1992, ALAAmembers endorsed this approach bya 266-180 vote and immediatelyadjourned to form office-based strikecommittees. The strategy took immediateeffect. On June 22, 1992, severalhundred ALAA, 1199 support staffand Criminal Justice Agencyworkers (who were also without acontract)(11) picketed the Society'sannual dinner at the Waldorf-AstoriaHotel, bearing buttons that decided"1199 and ALAA--United in Spirit,United in Action." On July 15, the three units held aone-day strike. The strike flyerrefuted management's claim thatonly the city could provide funds forsalary increases, pointing out that"Legal Aid isn't broke; despite thefiscal crisis, its revenues have risenfrom $101 million to $130 million injust four years and its managers havereceived a 5-percent wage increasesince 1990." Chairing the rally, Al-Jundi notedthe historic nature of the joint strike:

Many of us waited and worked foryears to unite our unions and tomake a day where Legal Aidattorneys and support staff wouldcome together . . . . [A]fter years ofallowing ourselves to be divided,today we have broken a barrier andproved them wrong. . . . [A]nd itmeans a hell of a lot. 1199 President Dennis Riverapledged his union's full support forboth unions, promising that[i]f you are prepared to build a newrelationship with [management],based on being a fighting union. . . .we will spend every dime, we will

put every resource behind you.That's the commitment that we maketo you. And the only one thing weask in return is that you remainunited, that you make your decisionsin a democratic way, with your ownrank-and-file leadership. Once again, the Society respondedby playing hardball. On August 26, itannounced that Staff Attorneysmight lose their health benefitsaltogether unless the contract wassettled by October 1. "Is this athreat?" mused management counselBob Batterman. "I don't know. It's astatement of alternatives in a veryunpleasant set of facts." The LegalAid Board, meanwhile, sought toavoid responsibility, claiming that"[t]his is basically a negotiationbetween management and the staffand the city." ALAA answered that threateninghealth benefits was tantamount to"insidiously playing on people'sfears. The question is whether [theBoard] will have the will to stop thisunion-bashing. They are in adifferent world. They are partners inthese big firms . . . but they don'tknow what it's like to representindigent clients. As far as they'reconcerned, we're another species."The union defused this threat bysecuring the UAW's agreement toprovide emergency health coverageif management cut off attorneybenefits. In a final push, all 28Manhattan CDD attorneys assignedto weekend arraignments boycottedwork on September 12-13, 1992during which Manhattan CDD StaffAttorney Maquita Moody spokemovingly at a union rally:I just finished a trial--I want toremind you what kind of work you

do. . . . My client was a predicate[felony defendant]. . . . He hadn't hadan arrest for nine-and- half years.And he was accused of telling anundercover buy and bust to go acrossthe street and buy a vial of crackfrom somebody else. He was out [onbail], he got five years to life. He'sgot kidney problems, he's ondialysis. And a jury after 24 and ahalf hours found him guilty. Nowhow do you think I feel and how doyou feel when that happens to you?We work so hard, and they don't payus any money, and the mental andemotional strain we go through. . . .They don't want us to be able to gothe doctor, they don't want us to beable to see a psychiatrist, we can'tpay our rent . . . On September 19, 200 unionmembers attended demonstrationsand 400 turned out on September 23.On September 30, just beforecontract expiration, reform-orientedLegal Aid President MichaelIovenko convinced the Board tomake a new offer, which ALAAratified by 536-268 on October 2. For the first time, the Societyagreed to expand the concept of"substantial comparability" withADA salaries through the tenth step,thus generating 6.35 percent in newmoney, far better than the 1990contract's 2.5 percent and superior toNYC municipal union settlements ofthe same period. The agreement alsoprovided for protection from TB,mandatory racial diversity training,and health benefits for lesbian andgay domestic partners. Thesepositive results, and themembership's direct role inachieving them, left union moraleand credibility far higher than in the

previous negotiations. Incensed, the city's Office ofManagement and Budget refused toreimburse Legal Aid for about $2million of the contract's cost. It alsobarred Staff Attorneys fromparticipating in the municipalworkers' health plan, making itnecessary for individuals who choseto retain full "indemnity" (non-HMO) coverage to pay heavy healthinsurance premium contributions.

1994 Strike The momentum generated byALAA and 1199 during 1990-1992carried forward toward the 1994contract. What the unions could notknow, however, was that RudolphW. Giuliani's election as Mayor inFall 1993 foreshadowed the greatestattack on poor people, people ofcolor, unions, and dissenters of anystripe in New York City since 1950sMcCarthyism--and that one elementof this attack would be to provokeALAA into an unwanted andunsuccessful strike in which it and1199 support staff would standvirtually alone.

Background Between 1992 and 1994, ALAAactivism continued to grow, as did itsalliance with 1199. On March 8,1993, 100 Brooklyn CDD attorneyspicketed Supreme Court and packedthe courtroom of Justice CarolynDemarest after she had imposed a$50 fine on Staff Attorney SonyaZoghlin for appearing 15 minuteslate. ALAA told the press that "thisdemonstration is about principle, notabout money," pointing out that"many judges show less respect forLegal Aid lawyers than for private

attorneys, partially because of thetype of clients they represent [andbecause] . . . Legal Aid attorneys arevery tenacious when it comes todefending their clients, and thissometimes tends to slow courtproceedings." On March 29, 1993, following themurder of a woman by her paroleofficer husband, 40 ALAA and 1199members picketed Brooklyn FamilyCourt to demand that off-duty lawenforcement officers be prohibitedfrom bringing guns into thecourthouse. On December 3, 1993,ALAA honored picket lines set upby strikers at Legal Services of NewYork (LSNY). On May 6, 1994, 130 BrooklynCDD attorneys held a sickout aftercolleague Monica Sheehan wasdisciplined on the unsubstantiatedcharge that she was "rude,discourteous and inappropriate." On July 20, 1994, ALAAmembers in the Civil Division'sBrooklyn Neighborhood Officepicketed over unmanageable housingcaseloads and brought a relatedNLRB complaint. Union delegateMichael Williams told the press that"[w]hen clients have significantviolations--like lead paint, or heat orhot-water problems--we simplywon't be able to go back to court twoor three times to force the landlord toget repairs done." ALAA accompanied this activismby strengthening and expanding itsleadership structure. For the firsttime, each major office or divisionwould elect its own vice-president.Collective leadership would bebolstered by supplementing theExecutive Committee with astanding Bargaining/Advisory

Committee made up of officers andsix issue and caucus representatives.Management's longtime attempt toblock continuity within ALAA'sleadership was countered by makingexplicit that the membership had theright to elect officersnotwithstanding the Society's limitson the duration of union leave. Despite--or perhaps because of--this ferment, a strike appearedunlikely in 1994, particularly giventhe clear determination displayed byALAA and 1199 in 1992. In June, moreover, the city hadaccepted the Society's proposal toreduce costly and unreliable 18-Bassigned counsel representation. Thisplan, which followed the scathingexposÄ of 18-B fraud and its poorquality representation that hadappeared in the New York Times,gave Legal Aid control of "thebasket" of incoming cases inManhattan arraignments, therebyincreasing Legal Aid's share ofindigent criminal representation tothe 75 percent rate prevalent in theBronx and Queens. Taking its leadfrom Manhattan CDD StaffAttorneys, ALAA supported thisplan as a means of strengtheningsuch principles as vertical continuity. At the same time, Board presidentMichael Iovekno welcomed ALAA'ssuggestions for more productivenegotiations, thereby generatinguncommonly good will early in 1994contract bargaining. Substantively,the Society agreed to remove theartificial ten-step limit on seniorattorney salary comparability withADAs. For the first time, bilateralsubcommittees quickly reachedagreement on ALAA's proposals forgreater affirmative action, health and

safety, and quality of representation.In this context, settlement of 1199'scontract was expected to follow soonthereafter. In mid-September, however, theGiuliani administration began toderail this process by declaring thatit would not fund even a modestALAA settlement. On September 13, seeking togenerate counter-pressure on theSociety, hundreds of ALAA and1199 members held a lunchtimepicket at courthouses and officesaround the city. That evening,following extensive membershipdiscussion, the ALAA ExecutiveCommittee reaffirmed the union's1992 "no contract, no work" policy,effective October 1. On September27, ALAA warned the press that"[t]he likelihood of a strike is veryreal," a point punctuated in aSeptember 29 rally of hundreds ofunion members at Park Row Behind the scenes, however,ALAA urgently sought to avert astrike. On September 30, the uniondropped its demand for the same 4.5percent salary increase givensupervisors in July, and substituted atwo percent bonus in each of twocontract years--barely enough tooffset the rising cost of healthbenefits. When the Society notifiedthe administration that Legal Aidwould be able to absorb thisinsignificant cost without additionalcity funds, the Mayor demanded thatthe Society reject ALAA's proposedcompromise as inconsistent with itsno-increase policy for upcomingmunicipal labor negotiations. Hefurther vowed dire retaliation werethe Society to disobey, or the unionto strike. Fearful of retribution, the

Society rejected ALAA's proposal.

Weekend Strike AndGiuliani's Threats Since October 1 fell on aSaturday, ALAA sought to use theweekend as a final opportunity toconvince management thatsettlement, even against Giuliani'swishes, was far better than thealternative. At midnight Friday,September 30, 150 ALAA and 1199members chanting "strike" marchedinto Manhattan Criminal Courtarraignments and escorted theirworking colleagues out to acandlelight vigil that continued lateinto the night. On Saturday and Sunday, unionmembers from across the city joinedthe Manhattan picket line. Likeearlier generations of Legal Aidlawyers, the mood was grave butdefiant. ALAA told the press:

If you cannot attract and retainexperienced attorneys to representindigent clients, then the experiencedlawyers will be working only forthose who can pay--and that's not thekind of equal justice we believe in.Poor people deserve no less than theMenendez brothers or O.J. Simpsonwhen it comes to quality legalrepresentation. Until Legal Aidlawyers are treated fairly, the highestquality legal representation isreserved for the rich. Susan Roche of Queens CDD saidshe was on strike to "get the respectfor the work I'm doing and theclients I'm representing." Young RanRa of Manhattan CDD said, "Wewalked out so we would be able tokeep attorneys with experience whocould provide the best representationto our clients."

The administration replied bythreatening to wipe out both LegalAid and the union. City CriminalJustice Coordinator Katie Lappprivately warned that Giuliani wouldcancel the Society's contracts ifALAA members voted Monday foran all-out strike. She stressed theMayor's determination by recountinghis prominent part in breaking the1981 PATCO air traffic controllerstrike. Giuliani uttered the samethreats publicly, vowing that "[w]hatmy administration will do . . . if theyrefuse to go to work . . . is to cancelthe [Legal Aid] contract."

May 3 Strike Vote It was in these circumstances thatALAA members convened at NewYork University on the morning ofMonday, October 3. While thesubsequent strike vote may, inretrospect, appear hard to fathom, thedecision facing ALAA members wasfar from obvious. Indeed, for nearlytwo hours, the members freely andopenly debated the choices. After repeatedly conveyingGiuliani's threats, the BargainingCommittee expressed the view that"the offer before us is simplyunacceptable. . . . [A]lthough we arequite aware of the risks involved--and we must take the Giuliani threatsseriously--we simply are at a pointnow that for us to accept an offerlike this is far worse a threat. . ." Some members argued that astrike would be catastrophic.Manhattan JRD attorney Tom Curtissaid that "the strike is an obsoleteweapon and in the case of this strikeit would be stupid to be brought backto this floor by the 18-Bs and theother people who would walk in anddo the cases without us."

David Lewis of the FederalDefender Division said, "I do notwish to see [Legal Aid] commitsuicide. I believe that is a genuinepossibility." Many of those opposinga strike advocated continuation ofthe "inside" strategy. Underscoring the concernsexpressed by Lewis, Letwincautioned that, when voting,members should take into accountthat "all the things he said might . . .be true." Most members, however,agreed with the BargainingCommittee that the union couldneither accept a net cut incompensation nor buckle under thesame threats of replacement madeever since the first ALAA strike in1970. With lingering memories ofextended 1990-1991 contractnegotiations, few memberssupported the middle road of aprolonged guerilla warfare. Thus,Bob Massi, the Brooklyn CDD vice-president, argued that "[i]f you voteto send us back to the table, evenwith a [delayed] self-executing strikedate . . . your Bargaining Committeewill have absolutely no leverage atall." Moreover, strike proponentsargued that management wouldcapitulate before Giuliani couldactually carry out his threat. AsBronx CDD attorney Chuck Ippolitopredicted, "We take a strike vote,you guys take a walk with me thisafternoon, and sometime tonight ouremployers are going to call ourlawyer and they're going to say whatthe best offer is." Similarly, Manhattan CDDattorney Len Egert argued that"[w]e're going to have an agreement,if we vote to strike, way before

anything like that [cancellation of theSociety's contract] happens. . . . Andwhen we vote to strike, they're goingto come back with that real offer--quick." Volunteer division vice-presidentJudy Whiting reported that "[w]e'vemade major efforts" to contactleading political figures. As a result,if Giuliani acted before a settlement,said Letwin, "we at least hope thatthose [municipal] unions . . . willstand by us because they understandthat it is a test too." For many members, however,repeated insults and attacks bymanagement over the previous fouryears had simply broken the camel'sback, regardless of a strike'simmediate outcome. RichardArmstrong, Manhattan CDD vice-president, warned that "you willnever, ever, get any respect fromyour managers, and from this LegalAid Society, if you accept thiscontract today." Manhattan JRD attorney CarolFegan, a former flight attendant whohad gone through the 1989 EasternAirlines strike and resultingbankruptcy, said that "I can matchmy mortgages against anybody's inthis room, and I am a middle-agedperson who gets more scared as theyears go by about my future, [but] . .. I would vote yes for this strike. . . .Because [management] won't stop. . .. [E]ach contract gets worse." Evenshould the worst come to pass, saidsenior 1199 delegate Akil Al-Jundi,"we would have taken a stand. . . .[S]ometimes, you come to theconclusion that enough is enough isenough. . . . [Y]ou're not in it onlyfor yourselves. You're in it for thosewho led the struggle before you, and

for those who will come afterwards." Manhattan CDD attorney MaquitaMoody told her fellow members that,like an innocent client, "you're notguilty. . . . because you want a livingwage. . . . because you want healthcare benefits. . . . . [a]nd because yourepresent the poor." For DonnaLewis of Queens CDD, "deep downin my gut something tells me there'sno other way to go. And when thereis no other way to go, you simplyhave to go ahead." Thus, armed with coverage by theUnited Auto Workers (UAW) strikefund, members voted 482-304 on thefirst ballot, and 681-56 on thesecond, to extend the strike into theregular work week. The immediatemood was spirited, but sober. Steve Wasserman, of the CDDSpecial Litigation Unit said, "I'm justvery, very proud to be part of thisdemocracy. I have more faith in itthan any other democracy I've everbeen associated with. . . . And I willbe with this group till the end." Maggie Kay, a senior attorney inBronx CDD, said, "It's about time.We've taken nothing for too long.I'm tired of it. It is time. God blessthe union." Quickly adjourning after the strikevote, 800 Staff Attorneys--surrounded by TV cameras--marcheddown the middle of Broadway, pastCity Hall, to Manhattan CriminalCourt, where they joined 1199support staff already staffing thepicket lines.

PATCO Revisited: GiulianiCancels Legal Aid Contracts Within minutes, Giuliani boastedto live television news that "[t]hecanon of ethics says that you can't

abandon cases, so I don't knowwhere lawyers come off striking.And here they are abandoning casesfor an entire city. I'm not going to letthem do that." He then announcedboth termination of all the Society'scity contracts--criminal and civil--and his decision to issue requests forproposal (RFPs) for the Society'scriminal work. "Hopefully," saidGiuliani, "this will be the last timelawyers strike against the publicinterest." Joining in the attack was PaulCrotty, a recently-departed LegalAid Board officer who had remainedbitter that the 1992 ALAA contracthad been too generous. NowGiuliani's Corporation Counsel,Crotty publicly demanded that theBoard "fire those lawyers for goingout on strike." While he "concededthat the courts would facedisruption" if the city proceeded withRFPs, Crotty "insisted uponpunishing the Legal Aid Society." Blocked by police from enteringGiuliani's evening press conference,Letwin told reporters that theMayor's announcement was

not only an attack on us and ourclients, but it's an attack on qualityservices for poor people in NewYork City. This mayor is destroyingthe institutions that poor people relyon, whether it's the hospitals or theschools or, now, legal representation. . . This is strike-breaking at itsworst. I think this is going tobackfire. We are the first ones tostand up to this bully and we hopeNew Yorkers will stand up and say,'Enough.' The broader issue iswhether we're going to have equaljustice in this country . . . NewYorkers deserve the best quality

representation. Someone has to standup and say the war on the poor isover. He then put these accusationsdirectly to Giuliani, who hadappeared on the City Hall steps. ALAA members bravelywithstood the Giulianiadministration's initial barrage.Brooklyn CDD Staff Attorney BobMassi replied that "[w]e are the onlyones who represent the poor anddowntrodden in New York and. . .Giuliani does not consider thesepeople to be a part of his New York.. . . You can't terminate a contractwith an organization because it'shaving a labor problem. That's likesaying you don't have a right tostrike." Manhattan CDD attorney SusanLight said "[t]his is what we do,stand up for people's rights, and toexpect us not to stand up for ourown, that would be ridiculous." CABattorney Mitch Briskey said thatGiuliani "is not the King of NewYork City. He does not have theright to order us back to work. Allwe're asking for is a fair contract." As in the past, some press reportstreated the strikers sympathetically,while the city elite lined up with theMayor. Paul Weiss partner ArthurLiman, a former LAS president andonetime Iran-Contra prosecutor,announced that Giuliani "had aresponsibility" to end the walkout. The Daily News editorialized that"[w]hile [strikers] have every right tobargain and demand higher wages,their ability to shut down somethingas vital as the courts gives them toomuch power . . . they must be held tothe same no-strike law as other keycity employees. . . . They must never

again be permitted to hold the cityhostage."

May 4 Blacklist UltimatumAnd Contract Settlement The next day, Tuesday, October 4,ALAA sought to generate counter-momentum by bringing strikers andtheir allies to a press conference onthe City Hall steps. Foreshadowingsubsequent Giuliani administrationattempts to repress First Amendmentexpression, hundreds of policephysically blocked the media fromcontact with the strikers, whodefiantly chanted "Rudy, Rudy is hisname, union-busting is his game."Letwin told the press:

New Yorkers deserve the bestrepresentation possible, and that'swhy people come to [work at] LegalAid. We don't come here for themoney. People who work at LegalAid can be making $85,000 a year asfirst year associates on Wall Street.We take pay cuts because we believein this work. We are the conscienceof this city in terms of standing upfor the rights of all New Yorkers,and that's really the issue at stakehere. He also emphasized that, contraryto Giuliani's claims, existing LegalAid funds were quite sufficient tomeet ALAA's modest demands: "TheSociety, using its existing budget,can match the increase it gave to itsown supervisors, 4.5 percent just asrecently as July, without going to thecity for additional funding." Speaking for CWA Local 1180, aunion representing municipalemployees, Ed Ott stated that "[w]ein the labor movement have todecide whether or not there is abottom line we won't go past. This is

a Mayor who's asking us to give upour health benefits, no wageincreases, our jobs, and all forabsolutely nothing in return." Manhattan Boro President RuthMessinger said that "[t]his is not1981 and this is not Patco. And theMayor of this city must understandthat New Yorkers will not tolerateunion-busting." State SenatorCatherine Abate, City Councilmembers Sal Albanese and KenFisher and others also showed up todefend the union. Notably absent, however, were themajor city unions that Giuliani'sattack on ALAA was designed tointimidate. Publicly, DC 37Executive Director Stanley Hilladvised "[b]oth sides [to] go back tothe bargaining table." Privately, DC37 and the United Federation ofTeachers (UFT)--the two largestmunicipal unions--conveyed toGiuliani their "neutrality,"presumably hoping to earn his favorin upcoming negotiations on hisdemands for $200 million savings intheir members' healthcarebenefits.(12)

Sonny Hall, president of TransportWorkers Union Local 100 (subwayand bus workers), said "The LegalAid lawyers' strike was indeed acareless act, although they had anexcellent case for their demands . . .Our concern is not why the mayorsaid no, but how he said it." As the New York Times explained,the municipal union leaders wereunwilling to antagonize theadministration:Whether the Legal Aid workersrealized it, they had walked off theirjobs at a critical point in the city'srelationship with its work force. Mr.

Giuliani, having just completed around of budget cuts and staffreductions, has now gone back to theworkers, seeking more job cuts andasking them to start contributingtoward their health-care benefits. . . .Until now, the municipal unionshave worked unexpectedly well withthe Republican Mayor, recognizingboth the city's fiscal difficulties andtheir own shortage of politicalsupport among the general public.But hard times and pent-up wagedemands can be a volatile mix forlabor leaders to handle unless theyconvince their members that the painis shared and no one has a choice.The Giuliani administration seemedto fear that by striking, the lawyersthreatened the spirit of collectivesacrifice. Or, as CUNY professor StanleyAronowitz pointed out, "[l]abor'sstrategy has become Giuliani'sstrategy. The big fry make theirdeals." Also notably silent were CityCouncil Speaker Peter Vallone andGovernor Mario Cuomo--bothDemocrats.(13)

The strikers received support insome corners of the organized bar.NYCLU director Norman Siegelappeared at ALAA's October 4 pressconference. The National Lawyers Guild/NYCChapter offered its "support for yourdecision to strike over wages,"denouced "Giuliani's decision tocancel the [LAS] contract" as being"designed to disenfranchise the city'slegal indigent defendant populationand also cripple some of the mostprogressive elements in the NewYork City Bar," and offered to co-sponsor a press conference with theNational Conference of Black

Lawyers to back the ALAA. Leonard J. Levenson, an 18-Battorney and elected officer of theNew York Criminal Bar Association,offered his support by "applaud[ingALAA's] strike action," and byvowing that "I will not serve as astrike breaker and will not acceptany increased case load occasionedby your strike." Many private lawyers, however,regarded the 1994 strike as anopportunity for enrichment, ratherthan solidarity. "I've got to make aliving," offered Brooklyn attorneyWilliam Blasi, who made a point ofarriving in court to pick up struckcases. Manhattan private attorneyMitchell Salloway celebrated: "Morecases. More money. More food onthe table." Rather than rally attorneys to thestrike, Joyce David, Kings CountyCriminal Bar Association presidentand a former ALAA member,rationalized that "[i]t's a shame, buttimes are tough and people have tomake a living." Late that afternoon, emboldenedby this alignment of forces, Giulianiissued the public ultimatum that anystriking attorney who did not returnto work by the following morningwould be permanently blacklistedfrom all future city-fundedrepresentation:If you want to show us that you'lllive up to your ethical obligations ofnot walking out on your clients, youhave until tomorrow to do that. Ifyou don't then you're not part of aresponsible workforce that we couldrely on in the future . . . There aremany lawyers in the city looking forwork. Privately, he demanded that the

Society's Board avoid settlement inorder to have the chance to makegood on this threat. While most ALAA memberscontinued to respond courageously,ALAA's leadership realized theunion could not put its veryexistence at the mercy of Giuliani'sescalating--albeit illegal--threats. OnTuesday evening, after learning thatthe Board leadership was similarlyconcerned for the Society's future,ALAA met Society at the offices ofNew York Assembly SpeakerSheldon Silver, where theynegotiated a slightly better packagethan that rejected by union membersa day earlier. Pursuant to this tentativeagreement, the ALAA BargainingCommittee directed members toreport to work the next morning,hoping thereby to deprive Giuliani ofan excuse to blacklist ALAAstrikers. On the evening of October5, ALAA members convened at1199's auditorium and ratified theagreement by a vote of 544-150-3,after which Letwin told the press that"[t]he mayor used the strike for hisown political purposes. . . .Nonetheless we stood up for whatwe believed in, and we got a bettercontract." Many members, however, reactedbitterly at being forced to capitulate.Queens CDD Staff Attorney YoungRan Ra said that "When I took thisjob I knew I wouldn't be paid well,but there may come a time when Ican't work here. A lot of people arecontemplating leaving because ofwhat has happened." Bronx CDDattorney Luis Roman said, "[i]f I'mback here tomorrow, the sign on mydoor will read 'Dump Rudy

Headquarters.'" Mary BethMullaney, a new Manhattan CDDattorney, voiced the mixture of prideand sadness felt by many ALAAmembers:Seven months ago I left my familyand friends in Irmo, S.C. . . . to workas a staff attorney for the Legal AidSociety in New York. It is the job Ihad most wanted. On Oct. 1, I wenton strike with about 800 of mycolleagues. . . . I was asking LegalAid Society management toredistribute funds already within thesociety. I struck becausemanagement gave itself a 4.5%salary increase, while giving stafflawyers nothing and cutting ourhealth benefits. . . . There wasnothing unethical about the strike.The lawyers work for a private firmthat continued to represent clientsduring the strike. I also question theMayor's moral authority to accuse usof abandoning our clients. . . . I amridiculed by my family and friendsfor the work I do. But I am proud ofit because I am fighting to upholdindividual rights for everyone, notjust those who can afford it. But Giuliani, now robbed of anexcuse for mass firings, asserted thatALAA's settlement meant nothingwithout his approval, that "[t]hey[Legal Aid attorneys] have a hope,not a reality of keeping their jobs,"and that any "new [contract] betweenthe Society and the city . . . [must]prohibit strikes in the future." Askedabout the likelihood of issuing RFPsfor the Society's work despite thestrike's brief duration, Giulianireplied, "[i]t's very likely."

Public Analysis Giuliani's "victory" over thestrikers was the subject of

widespread comment. The New YorkTimes praised the Mayor for his"firm foundation in fiscal reality . . . .The [strike] was a foolish challenge."Ed Koch, who had supported the1974 strike, before unsuccessfullytrying to break the 1982 strike, nowcelebrated Giuliani's "courage intaking on the striking Legal Aidattorneys." Lawrence Kudlow, economicseditor of the far-right NationalReview and a chief budgeteconomist during the Reaganadministration, gleefully predictedthat "Giuliani's action on the LegalAid lawyers was a very significantdevelopment; to some extent it's aNew York City version of Reagan'sPATCO confrontation . . . I'm sure ithas sent a lot of public unionofficials scurrying." Writer and former public defenderJames S. Kunen came to ALAA'sdefense in the Times: "The strike wasfated to fail because these advocatesfor the indigent were demanding theone form of compensation theirfellow citizens are unwilling to givethem: respect." Labor analyst RobertFitch concluded that

what's surprising is not that Giulianibroke the [ALAA] strike bythreatening to fire everybody and isnow picking his teeth today with theattorneys' bones. It's that the rest ofthe city's municipal labor movement--once regarded as the most militantand powerful in America--mostlylooked on while the mayor gnawedaway on the carcasses of their fellowtrade unionists.

Since 1994 As unforeseen as the 1994 strikeand the Mayor's viciousness was that

a significant number of Legal Aidstaff--including some former ALAAactivists--would legitimize Giuliani'sattack on the union by becomingbidders for large portions of theSociety's funding. Equallyunforeseeable, however, was theestablishment of a reformadministration within the Societywhose presence would openopportunities for empowerment ofALAA and its members far beyondthat which had existed at any othertime in its history. In the wake of thestrike, ALAA became a UAW local,an affiliation that has provedextremely beneficial.

Quality Representation UnderIncreased Attack In the days, weeks and years thatfollowed the strike, the Giulianiadministration has pressed its attackon Legal Aid and its unions. Its planto use the strike as a cover withwhich to undermine indigentcriminal representation was laid outin an internal memo of October 5,1994, the day that the strikersreturned to work. These includedending ALAA's right to strike,breaking continuity of representationthrough an "arraignment bureau" andreplacing annual salary increaseswith "merit" pay. Blocked by anNLRB investigation from pursuing apermanent no-strike clause, Giulianirelentlessly pursued these objectivesby other means. Within days of the strike, Giulianiannounced his demand for animmediate $13 million cut in theSociety's $79 million city criminalfunding. The Mayor specified thatLegal Aid achieve this by drasticallyreducing the number of CDD andCAB supervising attorneys, thus

creating a pool of experiencedcriminal defense lawyers, most ofwhom chose to blame theirpredicament on the Society andALAA, rather than on theadministration. While ALAA and1199 lobbied fiercely against thiscut, a fearful Legal Aid Boardoffered only mild resistance.Organized bar reaction was similarlymeek. Faced with this fait accompli, theunion was forced to renegotiate theOctober 5 contract settlement; onJanuary 23, 1995, members voted by369-88 that each CDD and CABStaff Attorney would surrender aweek's compensation in order toprotect 1199 support staff and juniorStaff Attorneys from involuntarylayoff. On January 30, support stafffinally voted 311-59 to ratify theircontract, which provided for a twopercent salary increase and a $300bonus. And in early February, theSociety signed a new city criminalcontract that reduced its funding by16.5 percent, from $79 million to$66.4 million. The New York Timesapplauded these cuts for promising"cheaper, more efficient defenseservices." ALAA stepped into thevacuum caused by these cuts byagreeing that its members would takeon additional responsibility fortraining, hiring and other non-disciplinary work previouslyperformed by managers. Immediately thereafter, theadministration of Governor GeorgePataki compounded this cut bythreatening $10 million in theSociety's "Aid to Defense" funds,thus causing Legal Aid to issue pinkslips to 84 attorneys in early April.Faced with the threatened layoffs, 22

recently-demoted supervisors suedthe Society and the union foragreeing that demoted supervisorswould have to accept less layoffseniority than bargaining unitmembers in the event of additionallayoffs. When state funds wererestored in April, all layoff noticeswere rescinded; the formersupervisors' suit was subsequentlydismissed on the merits. By July 1998, the Giulianiadministration had slashed Legal Aidcriminal funding to $53 million,without any significant decrease inthe Society's overall workload. Someof these funds have gone to 18-Bassigned counsel, whose cost hasincreased since 1994 from $49million to $62 million.

Giuliani Establishes Runaway(Nonunion) Defenders The bulk, however, has gone torunaway (nonunion) contractorsspecifically established to bid forSociety work pursuant to Giulianiadministration RFPs first issued onOctober 19, 1995 for 25 percent ofthe Society's criminal funding.Although the administration claimedthat the RFPs introduced "healthycompetition" into indigent defenserepresentation, it explicitly barredLegal Aid from bidding. Morecandidly, Giuliani reiterated thattheir underlying purpose was togenerate permanent strikebreakers sothat the city would "no longer be atthe mercy of one group that coulddecide in the future to go out onstrike, and then all of a sudden youhave a massive backup in thecriminal justice system." Lurking behind administrationpolicy was the Manhattan Institute, a

Giuliani think-tank. In an article inthe Institute's City Journal, ex-radical Sol Stern argued that the RFPwas a key device to weaken "theLegal Aid Society . . . [by] mov[ing]immediately to bid a separatecontract for each [Society] function."This was necessary, explained Stern,because the Society was allegedlydominated by ALAA and a "leftist"poverty law ideology:

There is an implication that the poorare being screwed by the "system,"but I say that they're being screwedby crime and violence and lack ofaccountability and the inability tointegrate into mainstream society.This is a bunch of left-wing kooklawyers intent on playing out asocialist ideology that hurts thepeople they claim to represent. Stern further complained that LAShad won undeserved due processrights for public housing tenantsfaced with eviction, had unfairlyforced the city to house thehomeless, and had opposed harshertreatment of juvenile offenders--allof which undermined the Giulianiadministration's efforts "to improvethe city's quality of life." But, saidStern, "[w]ith Legal Aid cut down toa more appropriate size," theadministration could "undertake abroad legal and politicalcounterattack against the perniciousconsent decrees and court mandates .. . [and] campaign more effectivelyin the Legislature for needed reformsin such areas as juvenile justice andhomeless policy." Although the mainstream barreacted to this attack with cowardice,others came forward to oppose theGiuliani/Manhattan Institute's RFPagenda. El Diario/La Prensa

denounced the RFPs, which "canonly be interpreted as an attackagainst our society's vulnerablesegments." Gary Abramson, chief attorney ofthe Orange County Legal AidSociety, pointed out that Giuliani"appears to be acting more out ofanimosity toward Legal Aid thanfrom a point of fiscal responsibilityor honest interest in uninterruptedcourt operation." In early November 1995, CityCouncil hearings on the RFPs,Councilmember Adam ClaytonPowell IV, representing East Harlemand the Bronx, characterized theRFPs as "another vicious attack in along line of vicious attacks on thepoor, the African-Americans andHispanics who get caught up in thissystem. For you [the Giulianiadministration] to be taking this typeof action simply as retribution for thestrike that they undertook last year isreally appalling." Columbia Law School dean LanceLeibman stated thatExperts around the country havestudied the best way to supply legalservices to the poor, and thoseexperts have always concluded thatthe methods used in New York byThe Legal Aid Society supplyoutstanding services and quality atthe right price to the taxpayer. Thisis a system that is working, and itwould be a great mistake to change itin this way. Maryland Law School Professorand former ALAA member DouglasL. Colbert wrote that "the lawyers'decision to strike was intended tohold onto their most senior lawyers.Like prior Legal Aid lawyer strikes,which were necessary to accomplish

reasonable caseload limitations andcontinuous representation by thesame lawyer, last year's strike wastied to maintaining adequate clientrepresentation." On November 30, 1995, astatement issued by 47 Supreme,Criminal, Civil, and Court of Claimsjudges said that "[w]e believe itwould be a mistake for the city tofragment the representation ofcriminal defendants, and that suchfragmentation would adversely affectthe effective administration of justicefor several reasons." Similarstatements were issued by formerMayor David Dinkins, the CentralLabor Council. The AmsterdamNews wrote:Giuliani has been more cruel thanhuman, on the cutting edge of thekind of psychosis that he regardspoor whites, Blacks and Hispanics asbutterflies, whose wings he can tearoff with impunity while has thetemporary power of the bully . . .The Legal Aid Society has taken abold step [of opposing the RFPs]. Itis imperative that they be supported. The bluntest statement, jointlyissued by the Center forConstitutional Rights, the NationalConference of Black Lawyers,National Emergency Civil LibertiesCommittee, and the NationalLawyers Guild, "reaffirm[ed] oursupport for The Legal Aid Societyand its unions in reversing MayorGiuliani's attacks, in particular, callfor attorneys to withhold any and allaid and comfort to new strikebreakerindigent defense agencies." To neutralize such opposition, theadministration awarded the RFPcontracts to runaway shops managedand staffed by former LAS

personnel, many of them well-regarded attorneys,(14) includingthree out of four of ALAA's 1988-89officers.(15)

In exchange for these contracts,the beneficiaries named themselvesas collaborators willing to bestowlegitimacy on the dismemberment ofLAS by embracing theadministration's violation ofcontinuity of representation, and tofalsely accuse Society staff of"inefficiency" and strike-related"disruption." Their very participationproved invaluable in confusing theloyalties and perceptions of manywho would otherwise haveinstinctively understood and resistedthe administration's objectives. Having obtained contracts, therunaways have acquired an urgentand independent need to elevate their"legitimacy," particularly within thecourts and the broader legalcommunity, in order to survivebeyond Giuliani's possible year 2000Senate Race or 2001 mayoral term-limit, whichever comes first. Not surprisingly, theadministration's policies haveinflicted severe damage on thequality of indigent criminalrepresentation, as reflected in reportsby independent agencies. In 1998,for example, the Indigent OversightPanel of the Appellate Division, FirstDepartment, reported that theSociety "is obligated to representalmost the same number of clientsfor substantially fewer dollars,"while the runaway defenders areabundantly funded to handle alimited caseload, therebyoverwhelming Legal Aid attorneyswith impossible caseloads,arraignments and other work.

Impact On Legal Aid This asphyxiation of Legal Aidhas seriously weakened verticalcontinuity and other essentialelements of high-qualityrepresentation. Staff Attorneys'ability to resist has been furtherundermined by the runawaydefenders' willingness to curry favorwith the administration byabandoning vertical continuity;participating in arraignment bodycount contests; pandering to judges,court administration and even districtattorneys; replacing seniority with"merit"-based salaries unilaterally setby management; and, in someoffices, permitting part-time privatepractice. Ironically, this same period ofrelentless attack has witnessed adramatic improvement in theSociety's labor-managementrelations. In the immediate post-strike period, the Legal Aid Boardnamed Daniel Greenberg, a longtimelegal services attorney and formerpresident of the New York CityChapter of the National LawyersGuild, to lead the Society. Thisdecision reflected a deliberaterejection by the Board of theadministration's demand that it try tobreak ALAA. As the AmericanLawyer put it in April 1995,

the October 3 vote by Legal Aidattorneys to strike signaled how bad .. . [Society labor relations] hadgotten. . . . Though short-lived, thestrike helped convince the board thatthe new executive director should bevery different--most importantly, itshould be someone able to improverelations with staff attorneys . . . The52-member board voted in

Greenberg unanimously at itsNovember [1994] meeting. . . . Today, both the Society and theunions have lawsuits pending againstthe administration for its interferencewith 1994 collective bargaining andfor its subsequent RFPs. During theterm of its 1994-1998 contract,ALAA also achieved significantimprovements in health and dentalbenefits; the first significant midterm"comparability" increases for seniorStaff Attorneys; and participation innumerous joint union-managementcommittees to hire, promote,improve legal practice, budget andaddress other important issues. Inshort, even under the brutalconditions inflicted by the Giulianiadministration, Legal Aid attorneysand support staff have had, throughtheir unions, the opportunity forgreater empowerment than everbefore.

UAW Affiliation and PoliticalAction A year after the strike, ALAAmembers, increasingly aware of theneed to play a more active role in thelabor movement, voted by 221-56 toaffiliate with the United AutoWorkers (UAW), which, due largelyto efforts of Region 9A Director PhilWheeler, had provided consistentand essential political support for theSociety and ALAA members. AsUAW local 2325, ALAA has playedan increasingly active role inpolitics, ranging from efforts to helpestablish the Labor and WorkingFamilies parties, to support effortsby workfare participants to unionize,to assist Detroit newspaper strikers,and to help build coalitions for lawreform and against police abuse. Inthe Fall of 1997, ALAA and 1199

organized the Campaign to DefendLegal Aid, a grassroots membershipmobilization assisted by the UAW,which successfully won additionalrestoration of Society criminal fundscut by the Giuliani administration.

• • •

Conclusion Thirty years after its birth, ALAAremains a work in progress.Throughout, however, it hasremained faithful to the principles ofequal justice, labor solidarity, andsocial justice. Moreover, thisdirection, and the strategy and tacticsof pursuing it, have always beendemocratically determined by itsmembership. Whatever mistakes itmay have produced, the union'shighly democratic internal life hasserved as the indispensablelaboratory from which ALAAmembers draw lessons from the pastwith which to better face the future.

Endnotes [Convert tofootnotes] 1. This history draws uponcontemporary documents and newsaccounts and the contributions ofnumerous current and former ALAAmembers, including George Albro,Steve Banks, Karen Faraguna, CarolGerstl, Gerald Lefcourt, JeanSchneider, Elliott Wilk, Bob Zussand many others. It also draws on anearlier summary of ALAA contractbargaining written by Jane Friedson.Pat Bath, Legal Aid Society PublicInformation Officer, providedvaluable background materials. Thearticle was researched and written byMichael Letwin; Rosa Borensteinand John Lewis assisted in itspreparation.

2. "Vertical" continuity ofrepresentation begins at a client'sfirst arraignment in Criminal Courtand continues, in felony cases,through transfer to state Supreme(felony trial) Court.

3. Although the details of ALAA'sstructure have varied over the years,its fundamentally grass-roots,democratic character has remainedconstant. Currently, the membershipis the highest body and convenesaproximately once a year or asotherwise necessary to elect officersand to vote on such issues ascollective bargaining agreements.The Executive Committee (EC),made up of about 75 officers anddelegates (or their alternates),governs the Union betweenmembeship meetings. All membersare invited to attend andn participate(but as a representative body, onlyEC members may vote). TheBargaining/Advisory Committee(BC) is a standing coordinating bodymade up of the officers (and theiralternates) and seven additionalmembers who represent key Unioncaucuses or issues.

4. From the early 1970s through1994, the LAS Board of Directorsretained Batterman, a partner atProskauer Rose Goetz &Mendelsohn to negotiate its laborcontracts, during which hisaggressive style made him alightening rod for staffdissatisfaction.

5. Ironically, in 1996, O'Connell,by then a Legal Aid supervisor,helped establish one of runawaynonunion agencies called intoexistence by Giuliani to break the

Union.

6. Unfortunately, Yong latercollaborated in the Giulianiadministration establishment ofrunaway defenders to undermineALAA after the 1994 strike.

7. In 1997, NDS fulfilled this roleby bidding for Legal Aid's workunder Giuliani's post-strike RFPs.

8. In April 1991, the AppellateDivision, First Department,overturned Roberts, ruling that "themere act of wearing a button whichhas some expression of politicalimport, under the circumstancesherein, is an exercise of speechprotected under the FirstAmendment to the United StatesConstitution dn Article 1, Section 8of the New York State Constitution."

9. Coined in the late '80s, an"inside strategy" refers to a contractcampaign in which workers conductdisruptive, militant action whileremaining on the job.

10. In January 1995, Bayne wasdenied reappointment uponexpiration opf her term; in 1998,ALAA helped secure defeat ofBayne's bid for Civil Court.

11. CJA workers prepare the pre-arraignment reports used indetermining bail for criminaldefendants. Like Legal Aid, CJA is anonprofit city contractor.

12. Ray Markey, president of DC37 Local 1930, recalls that when herushed to the executive director'soffice to seek support for strikingALAA and 1199 members, he foundRandy Levine, Giuliani's labor chief,

already enlisting Hill's support. Inthe end, members of DC 37, the UFTand numerous other municipalunions ended up with a two-yearwage freeze and replacement ofunion jobs with workfareparticipants. Collaboration withGiuliani finally caught up with Hillin November 1998, when,surrounded by the indictment of hiscronies for stealing DC 37 funds, hewas forced to admit that hisadministration had stuffed ballotboxes to ensure ratification of thisunpopular contract. DC 37 is now intrusteeship and Hill has resigned.

13. In November 1994,Republican George Pataki defeatedCuomo, despite Giuliani's support. In1998, Democratic gubernatorialcandidate Vallone restored $2.5million more to the Society than theadministration had proposed.

14. The seven runaway shops are:"Appellate Advocates" in the SecondDepartment (ex-CAB deputy chiefLynn Fahey); "Bronx Defenders"(ex-Legal Aid attorney Dan Arshackand Neighborhood DefenderServices deputy chief RobinSteinberg); "Brooklyn DefenderServices" (ex-Brooklyn CDDsupervisor Lisa Schreibersdorf);"Center for Appellate Litigation" inthe First Department (Fahey'shusband and ex-CAB manager BobDean); "Queens Law Associates"(ex-Queens CDD supervisor LaurieZeno); "New York CountyDefenders Association" (ex-Brooklyn CDD supervisors MichaelColeman, Carolyn Wilson and KevinMcConnell); and "Battiste,Aronowsky & Suchow" in StatenIsland.

15. These were: John Yong(president), Alan Rosenberg(Secretary) and Steve Dean(Treasurer). Fortunately, few otherrepresentatives--current or former--defected.

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