history in institutional research: what, why, and how? brian s. silverman university of toronto...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How?
Brian S. SilvermanUniversity of Toronto
presented at the ESNIE WorkshopMay 20, 2015
![Page 2: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
The next 90 minutes
History and Institutional Research (75 minutes or so)
– What is distinct about historical research in the social sciences?
– Why do historical research on institutions?
– How do historical research on institutions? Analytic narratives Contextualized institutional studies
![Page 3: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3
The next 90 minutes
History and Institutional Research (75 minutes or so)
– What is distinct about historical research in the social sciences?
– Why do historical research on institutions?
– How do historical research on institutions? Analytic narratives Contextualized institutional studies
Sustained applause (15 minutes or so)
– Standing is optional…
![Page 4: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4
The next 90 minutes
History and Institutional Research (75 minutes or so)
– What is distinct about historical research in the social sciences?
– Why do historical research on institutions?
– How do historical research on institutions? Analytic narratives Contextualized institutional studies
Sustained applause (15 minutes or so)
– Standing is optional… …but recommended
![Page 5: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
The next 90 minutes
Examples:
– Bates (1998): Why did the international coffee cartel rise and fall when it did?
– Hansen & Libecap (2004): Why did the Dust Bowl occur in the 1930s drought, but not in the 1950s drought?
– Silverman & Ingram (2015): How did shipowners solve the agency problem vis-à-vis ship captains?
– Ingram & Silverman (2015): What (or who) determines whether a shipowner engages in the “morally contested” business of slave trading?
![Page 6: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6
The next 90 minutes
Examples:
– Bates (1998): Why did the international coffee cartel rise and fall when it did?
– Hansen & Libecap (2004): Why did the Dust Bowl occur in the 1930s drought, but not in the 1950s drought?
– Silverman & Ingram (2015): How did shipowners solve the agency problem vis-à-vis ship captains?
– Ingram & Silverman (2015): What (or who) determines whether a shipowner engages in the “morally contested” business of slave trading?
![Page 7: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
The next 90 minutes
Examples:
– Bates (1998): Why did the international coffee cartel rise and fall when it did?
– Hansen & Libecap (2004): Why did the Dust Bowl occur in the 1930s drought, but not in the 1950s drought?
– Silverman & Ingram (2015): How did shipowners solve the agency problem vis-à-vis ship captains?
– Ingram & Silverman (2015): What (or who) determines whether a shipowner engages in the “morally contested” business of slave trading?
![Page 8: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
The next 90 minutes
Examples:
– Bates (1998): Why did the international coffee cartel rise and fall when it did?
– Hansen & Libecap (2004): Why did the Dust Bowl occur in the 1930s drought, but not in the 1950s drought?
– Silverman & Ingram (2015): How did shipowners solve the agency problem vis-à-vis ship captains?
– Ingram & Silverman (2015): What (or who) determines whether a shipowner engages in the “morally contested” business of slave trading?
![Page 9: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
Standing on the shoulders of giants…
![Page 10: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
Standing on the shoulders of giants…
![Page 11: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11
Standing on the shoulders of giants…
![Page 12: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12
Standing on the shoulders of giants…
The same shirt?
![Page 13: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13
Organizations and Institutions
Coase, Simon, March, Barnard, Williamson, Alchian, Demsetz, Klein, …….
North, Weingast, Wallis, Eichengreen, Spiller, McCubbins, Spitzer, …..
![Page 14: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14
Organizations and Institutions
Coase, Simon, March, Barnard, Williamson, Alchian, Demsetz, Klein, …….
North, Weingast, Wallis, Eichengreen, Spiller, McCubbins, Spitzer, …..
Greater prevalence of history-based
research;often an analytic-
narrative approach
Relatively little history-based
research
![Page 15: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15
What is distinct about historical research?
Reductionism Contextualism
Direct observation Experimentalism Ethnography
Remote sensing Multivariate statistics History
Source: Ingram, Rao & Silverman 2012
![Page 16: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16
What is distinct about historical institutional research?
Reductionism Contextualism
Direct observation Experimentalism Ethnography
Remote sensing Multivariate statistics History
Source: Ingram, Rao & Silverman 2012
![Page 17: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17
Why do historical institutional research?
Perspective
Implications for current phenomena
A route to think carefully about alternative modes of inference, outliers, significance
![Page 18: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18
How do historical institutional research?
Analytic narratives (Bates et al. 1998)
– Formal economic model
– Confront model with institutional detail; edit model
– Repeat as necessary
Contextualized institutional studies
– Analytic narratives with less obvious iteration; natural-language models
Aside: Comparative historical analysis (Mahoney 2004, 2010)
– Quantitative case analysis (Ragan 1987 etc.)
![Page 19: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
![Page 20: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
![Page 21: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
21
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
Conventional cartel models don’t explain this
![Page 22: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
22
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
Conventional cartel models don’t explain this
“Chain store” models of entry deterrence don’t
explain this
![Page 23: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
23
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
Conventional cartel models don’t explain this
“Chain store” models of entry deterrence don’t
explain this“Chicago School” models of third-
party enforcement don’t explain this
![Page 24: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
24
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
Conventional cartel models don’t explain this
“Chain store” models of entry deterrence don’t
explain this“Chicago School” models of third-
party enforcement don’t explain this “Realist” models of
third-party enforcement don’t
explain this
![Page 25: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
25
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
The narrative of the ICO is best described by a combination of two models: --PPT model of domestic politics--model of raising rivals’ costs
![Page 26: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
26
Analytic narrative example:
Bates (1998) studies the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
The ICO was a cartel that regulated coffee exports from 1962 until 1989
– At first glance, appears to be a classic cartel
– But, several puzzles:
– Why start in 1962?
– Why collapse in 1989?
– Why was the U.S. a member? (US = chief importer of coffee)
History of the coffee industry - many attempts to cartelize
– 1900: Brazil dominates sets monopoly price attracts entry
– 1920s-1950s: efforts to regulate output and price; less successful after WWII
– 1962: ICO set up; US is member; very effective
– Brazil etc. frame the ICO as a bulwark against Communism
– 1962: State Dept.; Congress; General Foods haggle and agree to join
– 1989: Berlin Wall falls
The narrative of the ICO is best described by a combination of two models: --PPT model of domestic politics--model of raising rivals’ costs
Key Features of Approach:--formal models--self-consciously iterative
![Page 27: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
27
Contextualized institutional study example:
Hansen & Libecap (2004) study the U.S. Dust Bowl, 1930s
“One of the most severe environmental crises in 20th-century North America”
– Result of severe droughts/wind erosion; destroyed farmland in U.S. Midwest
– Conventional explanation: lack of investment in anti-erosion practices
– But two anti-erosion techniques were well known at the time: – Strip-fallow farming– Planting trees or bushes as “windbreaks”
– Why did farmers fail to use these?
![Page 28: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
28
Contextualized institutional study example:
Hansen & Libecap (2004) study the U.S. Dust Bowl, 1930s
“One of the most severe environmental crises in 20th-century North America”
– Result of severe droughts/wind erosion; destroyed farmland in U.S. Midwest
– Conventional explanation: lack of investment in anti-erosion practices
– But two anti-erosion techniques were well known at the time: – Strip-fallow farming– Planting trees or bushes as “windbreaks”
– Why did farmers fail to use these?
Hansen & Libecap combine deep historical insight with collective action lens
– How does wind erosion affect soil? Who gets hurt?
– Lack of investment = problem of externalities– Prediction: Smaller farms less investment in anti-erosion, and more erosion
![Page 29: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
29
Contextualized institutional study example:
Hansen & Libecap (2004) study the U.S. Dust Bowl, 1930s
“One of the most severe environmental crises in 20th-century North America”
– Result of severe droughts/wind erosion; destroyed farmland in U.S. Midwest
– Conventional explanation: lack of investment in anti-erosion practices
– But two anti-erosion techniques were well known at the time: – Strip-fallow farming– Planting trees or bushes as “windbreaks”
– Why did farmers fail to use these?
Hansen & Libecap combine deep historical insight with collective action lens
– How does wind erosion affect soil? Who gets hurt?
– Lack of investment = problem of externalities– Prediction: Smaller farms less investment in anti-erosion, and more erosion
– Detailed narrative of government efforts to encourage adoption of anti-erosion techniques in late 1930s (Erosion Control Work Group)
– Larger farms agreed to cooperate; smaller farms dragged their feet
– Compare 1930s drought to 1950s drought
![Page 30: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
30
Contextualized institutional study example:
Hansen & Libecap (2004) study the U.S. Dust Bowl, 1930s
“One of the most severe environmental crises in 20th-century North America”
– Result of severe droughts/wind erosion; destroyed farmland in U.S. Midwest
– Conventional explanation: lack of investment in anti-erosion practices
– But two anti-erosion techniques were well known at the time: – Strip-fallow farming– Planting trees or bushes as “windbreaks”
– Why did farmers fail to use these?
Hansen & Libecap combine deep historical insight with collective action lens
– How does wind erosion affect soil? Who gets hurt?
– Lack of investment = problem of externalities– Prediction: Smaller farms less investment in anti-erosion, and more erosion
– Detailed narrative of government efforts to encourage adoption of anti-erosion techniques in late 1930s (Erosion Control Work Group)
– Larger farms agreed to cooperate; smaller farms dragged their feet
– Compare 1930s drought to 1950s drought
Underlying cause of under-investment:Classic collective-action problem due to negative externatlities
![Page 31: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
31
Okay, I’m convinced! How do I do this type of research?
Select a case– Usually, start with theory and then find cases
Construct or adapt a model (to attempt to explain the case)– Reasonably parsimonious; the choice of variables is important, and driven by the model
Collect and appraise source materials (primary and/or secondary)– Good historians do not stop when they find evidence in line with their expectations
Engage iteratively in analysis and narrative– Outliers matter!
Evaluate the results– Is the interpretation logical?
– Has the interpretation been confirmed by the data?
– Does it generate any generalizable insight?
![Page 32: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
32
Managing Agency Problems in Early Shareholder Capitalism:An Exploration of Liverpool Shipping in the 18th Century
Brian S. SilvermanUniversity of Toronto
Paul IngramColumbia University
![Page 33: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
33
Motivation for this study
Problem: Separation of ownership and control
Related research: asset ownership and incentives of economic actors
Our contribution: Study equity ownership in unusually “clean” setting– Vessel = “floating corporation” – Monitoring was difficult – Captain = CEO – Stakes were high!
Great variation in hazards across types of voyages– Would likely lead to different incentive-alignment mechanisms
![Page 34: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
34
Liverpool and Transatlantic Trade
West Indies trade(textiles/rice/salt/Irish immigrants to WI andcolonies; sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
Slave trade(textiles/guns/jewels to Africa; human slaves to WI andcolonies; either empty or sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
![Page 35: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
35
Liverpool in the 1700s: Timeline of Significant Shipping-Related Events
British restoration
1660 1680 1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800
pop.: 1000
pop.: 5000
pop.: 25000
pop.: 77000
end ofRAC Africamonopoly
end ofroyaltiesfor RAC
Liverpooldock opens
Canals/turnpikes link Liverpool toManchester etc.
war war war war war
Slave Trade SlaveRegulation Trade
Act Outlawed
![Page 36: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
36
Liverpool in the 1700s: Timeline of Significant Shipping-Related Events
British restoration
1660 1680 1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800
pop.: 1000
pop.: 5000
pop.: 25000
pop.: 77000
end ofRAC Africamonopoly
end ofroyaltiesfor RAC
Liverpooldock opens
Canals/turnpikes link Liverpool toManchester etc.
war war war war war
Slave Trade SlaveRegulation Trade
Act Outlawed
![Page 37: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
37
“Fitting Out” a Transatlantic Voyage
Purchase vessel (or repair vessel)
Hire captain
Advertise for 3rd-party cargo
Hire crew
Load goods
Sail vessel to N.Amer. destination
Arrive; deliver goods
Pick up goods for return haul
Sail vessel to origin
Arrive; deliver goods; pay captain and crew; receive payment from 3rd-party cargo-shippers
Purchase vessel (or repair vessel)
Hire captain
Assemble cargo
Hire crew
Load goods
Sail vessel to Afr. destination(s)
Arrive; trade goods for slaves
Sail vessel to N.Amer. destination(s)
Arrive; sell slaves; sometimes pick up goods
Sail vessel to origin (often without goods)
Arrive; pay captain and crew; receive goods and/or deposit letters of credit
Non-slave voyage – 8-10 months Slave voyage – 12+ months
![Page 38: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
38
Captain’s compensation
Typical Liverpool-West Indies voyage:
Wage: £50 – £5/month * 10 months
Primage: £50-£100
– 1%-2% of cargo value– conditional on successful delivery
of cargo– sensitive to cargo price
Total: £100-£150($25,000
today)
Typical Liverpool-Biafra-West Indies voyage:
Wage: £70 – £5/month * 14 months
Commission: £200-£500– 4%-6% of sales revenue if captain
negotiates purchase as well as sale– 2%-3% otherwise
“Privilege” slaves: £70-£150– 100% of revenue from sale of 2-4
slaves– conditional on keeping slave mortality
below a specified ceiling
Total: £350-£650
($100,000 today)
![Page 39: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
39
Liverpool in the 1700s: Timeline of Significant Shipping-Related Events
British restoration
1660 1680 1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800
pop.: 1000
pop.: 5000
pop.: 25000
pop.: 77000
end ofRAC Africamonopoly
end ofroyaltiesfor RAC
Liverpooldock opens
Canals/turnpikes link Liverpool toManchester etc.
war war war war war
Slave Trade SlaveRegulation Trade
Act Outlawed
![Page 40: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
40
Liverpool and Transatlantic Trade
West Indies trade(textiles/rice/salt/Irish immigrants to WI andcolonies; sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
Slave trade(textiles/guns/jewels to Africa; human slaves to WI andcolonies; either empty or sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
Bonjour, mes amis…
![Page 41: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
41
Motivation for this study
Problem: Separation of ownership and control
Related research: asset ownership and incentives of economic actors
Our contribution: Study equity ownership in unusually “clean” setting– Vessel = “floating corporation” – Monitoring was difficult – Captain = CEO – Stakes were high!
Great variation in hazards across types of voyages– Would likely lead to different incentive-alignment mechanisms
Key hazard: threat of capture by enemy privateers during wartime– Difficult to contract for resistance to (or avoidance of) capture– Variation in risk across time and across routes
![Page 42: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
42
Liverpool and Transatlantic Trade
West Indies trade(textiles/rice/salt/Irish immigrants to WI andcolonies; sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
Slave trade(textiles/guns/jewels to Africa; human slaves to WI andcolonies; either empty or sugar/cotton/tobacco back)
Bonjour, mes amis…
Asides:InsuranceConvoysPrivateer stories
![Page 43: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
43
Fig 4: Capture of Liverpool transatlantic vessels, 1744-1785
![Page 44: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
44
Fig 5: Captain-ownership of Liverpool transatlantic vessels, 1744-1785
![Page 45: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
45
Data – main sources
LIVERPOOL SHIPPING AND TRADE 1744-1786: A COMPUTERISED EDITION OF THE LIVERPOOL PLANTATION REGISTERS.
– Ship name –List/description of voyages
– Date of registration –Name of captain for each voyage
– Owners’ names as of registration –Voyage outcome [sank; captured;
– Owners’ occupations [spotty data] successfully completed mission]
– Ship’s physical characteristics
3,830 ship registrations between 1744 and 1784; 7,300 voyages
![Page 46: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
46
Data – Liverpool Plantation Register
VesselName: Ann and LucyStern: SquareType: SnowTonnage: 90Place built: HullYear built: 1738
OwnersJohn BloomEdward Bigland
MasterJohn Bloom
![Page 47: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
47
Variables
![Page 48: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
48
Captain ownership as function of voyage, vessel, and captain features
(errors clustered on captain; *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10)---------- linear probability ---------- ---------- Logit ----------
Captains are more likely to be part-owners of their vessels during wartime, on triangle-trade routes.
![Page 49: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
49
Performance – identification strategy
Focus on wartime triangle-trade voyages only
Key: these voyages take more than one year to complete Many ships depart during peacetime and are at sea when war breaks out
Question: is war a surprise?
![Page 50: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
50
Performance after war “shock”: (difference of means test; *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10)
![Page 51: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
51
Performance results: Taken as a function of Captain Ownership, cutoff #3
(logit; *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10)
Captain-owned vessels are less likely to be captured than non-captain-owned vessels...although the statistical significance is low.
![Page 52: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
52
So why not always have the captain be a part-owner?
![Page 53: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
53
So why not always have the captain be a part-owner?
Maybe asset-ownership increases the captain’s incentive to protect the vessel, but reduces his incentive to do other important things
Duration of voyage: Captain-owned vessels take longer to complete their voyage
Trying to sail safely to protect the vessel?
“Under-engaging” in cargo: Captain-owned vessels load fewer slaves relative to non-owned vessels
“Excessively” concerned with risk to vessel while parked along West African coast?
![Page 54: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
54
Summary of results
Captain ownership is significantly more prevalent for triangle-wartime voyages than for other types of voyages
Consistent with incentive-alignment-based prediction concerning alignment of captain’s incentives with those of land-lubber shipowners
Vessels with a captain owner are significantly less likely to be captured than those with a non-owner captain
Also consistent with incentive-alignment-based prediction
Vessels with a captain owner underperform on other aspects of voyage
Consistent with multi-task principal-agent prediction
![Page 55: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
55
The Cultural Contingency of Structure Evidence from Entry to the Slave Trade in and Around the Abolition Movement
Ingram & Silverman
![Page 56: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
56
Why Study Georgian Liverpool?
1. Why study history at all?
2. Dirty Business
3. Theory: Culture * Network Structure * Status
Network & Status effects = f(Culture)
[Social movements influence Culture]
![Page 57: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
57
![Page 58: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
58
“What! You hiss me? Hiss George Frederick Cooke? You contemptible money-getters! I banish you! There is not a brick in your damn town but what has been cemented by the blood of a negro! “
![Page 59: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
59
Operationalizing the Anti-Slaving Norm
Years Identified by Drescher (1988) as “hot” for the abolition movement
Key variables for testing effect of abolition sentiment:--# articles discussing abolition of slave trade,, by year--# articles discussing nastiness of slave trade, by year--Drescher’s categorization of “hot” and “cold” years
![Page 60: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
60
Key independent vars:--Gentleman dummy--Merchant dummy--Other will be the omitted category
![Page 61: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
61
5920 Traders in Our Data
Number% of Traders
% that were Slavers
Other 2669 45% 24.5%
Merchants 3048 51.5% 33.6%
Gentlemen 207 3.5% 39.1%
![Page 62: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
62
.
The Trader Co-Investment Network
1001
1100
0010
3
2
1
4321
trd
trd
trd
voyvoyvoyvoy
110
010
001
100
4
3
2
1
321
voy
voy
voy
voy
trdtrdtrd
Tt = Xt∙XtT
Tt is a symmetric trader x trader matrix where cell cijt indicates how many voyages two traders have co-invested in in the past.
XtXt
T
210
120
001
3
2
1
321
trd
trd
trd
trdtrdtrd
Tt
![Page 63: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/63.jpg)
63
Key independent vars:--# shipowning ties to slavers--# shipowning ties to non-slavers
![Page 64: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/64.jpg)
64
![Page 65: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/65.jpg)
65
Key independent vars:--# Sephton Corp ties to slavers--# Sephton Corp ties to non-slavers
![Page 66: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/66.jpg)
66
![Page 67: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/67.jpg)
67
![Page 68: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/68.jpg)
68
Aside: Were the Quakers Slavers?
Non- Quakers Quakers
Number 5272 648
% Slavers 28% 38%
% Sephton Club
Members
4.2% 10.6%
% Gentlemen/ Esquire 3.2% 5.1%
% Merchants 51.0% 54.3%
% Other Status 45.8% 40.6%
Network at the End of Trading Career
Number of Ties 7.1 13.2
% Ties to Quakers 17% 20%
![Page 69: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/69.jpg)
69
Two final benefits of historical institutional research:
New research extensions pop up like weeds!
– Diffusion of captain-ownership as a mechanism (organizational innovation)
– Development of the shipowner “identity” and professionalization of vessel operation
– Response to a declining industry – what do slave traders do when the slave trade is prohibited?
![Page 70: History in Institutional Research: What, Why, and How? Brian S. Silverman University of Toronto presented at the ESNIE Workshop May 20, 2015](https://reader036.vdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022081516/56649e185503460f94b046a1/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
70
Two final benefits of historical institutional research:
New research extensions pop up like weeds!
– Diffusion of captain-ownership as a mechanism (organizational innovation)
– Development of the shipowner “identity” and professionalization of vessel operation
– Response to a declining industry – what do slave traders do when the slave trade is prohibited?
You will have great stories to tell at cocktail parties