Although the unification of Germany as a nation-state for principally a political act forged largely through war, yet it was not solely those who held political power that formed the new state. The idea of a united German nation-state and a united German people struck chord with many and concerned all levels of society. The task of creating the German nation-state was one that required the belief in a German people who transcended separate territories and different cultural norms. The primary tool for creating this identity was nationalism, and some of the great carriers of nationalistic ideas were academics, particularly historians. Those who embraced the idea of a unified German culture relied heavily upon the celebration of the study of German history

Two of these Historians like Heinrich von Treitschke and Heinrich von Sybel, both members of what was known as the small German school of historiography in the nineteenth century, were romantics who wrote histories of the events of nineteenth century German history for the purpose of promoting the German nation-state, its government's actions, and the nationalist pride that they believed should accompany such support. They were very much products of their time, and as such, worked within the Hegelian academic tradition.

Historians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries sought to understand the powerful and complex events of the nineteenth century including the roles that the historians of the nineteenth century played. Historians that have examined and analyzed the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke and Heinrich von Sybel have primarily concluded that the enormous bias of these historians towards support of Germany as a unified nation-state before and after the unification makes them far better rhetoricians than historians. Furthermore, examinations of what Treitschke and Sybel were specifically arguing have often been overshadowed by the argument that their works are so biased that they are hardly history at all and therefore should not be studied when attempting to attain an accurate picture of what nineteenth century Germany was like. Smith's German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, and Politics, 1870- 1914 and Green's Fatherlands: State-building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany are both works that take this stance on Treitschke and Sybel.

One of the biggest trends in modern historiography when examining the nineteenth century has been to point to the events that caused and surrounded unification as being directly traceable sources of National Socialism and the Third Reich. This is decidedly problematic, as in order to do this the historian must examine first Germany's history in the 1930s and 1940s before looking into Germany's history in the nineteenth century, coming to the subject with strongly fixed preconceptions of which similarities between the two eras to look for in order to argue that the rise of Nazism was the natural evolution of the German nation-state. Arguments such as this can be found in Hughes' National Socialism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 and in Geoff Eley's From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past.

Another trend that has arisen in historiography when examining nineteenth century German history, particularly German unification, is that of focusing on a specific aspect of the events surrounding unification as being its primary cause. These theses point to the political and military actions of the Prussian government as being deliberate motions intended to bring about unification, an autocratic monarchy acting to create a German Empire with minimal influence from the larger German society. Despite taking into account religious and sociocultural factors, these arguments focus primarily on Germany as an imperial, expanionisitc polity, very often focusing on the personality and actions of Otto von Bismarck as being the man without whose deeds unification could not have been achieved. Mommsen's Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in and Authoritarian State, Abrams’ Bismarck and the German Empire, 1871-1918, and Feuchtwanger's Bismarck, are examples of this method of examining and analyzing German unification.

A final historiographical trend is to reverse this emphasis, arguing that although it was indeed political action that officially created the country of Germany for the first time, the sociocultural and religious factors that contributed to that unification were more significant than the political unification itself. The argument from this approach is that the cause of unification was due to either an imagined or desired sociocultural German identity which was finally able to coincide with the intentions of the political realm in 1871. Schulze's The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867, Blackbourn's The Long Nineteenth Century: A

History of Germany, 1780-1918, and Berger's Inventing the Nation: Germany, are works that focus heavily on sociocultural factors as being the primary igniters that sparked German unification.

None of these approaches can be counted as being incorrect. All have added to the historical conversation in an attempt to understand a people and an era which have been marked by nationalism and fierce competition at nearly every turn.

The 1815 Congress of Vienna had established five Great Powers in Europe— Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which were nearly equal in strength. Beginning in 1815, 39 German states formed a loose grouping called the German Confederation as a result of the declaration of the congress of Vienna. The Austrian Empire dominated the confederation. However, Prussia was ready to unify all the German states. It enjoyed several advantages that would eventually help it forge a strong German state. Add Meryman. First of all, unlike the Austro -Hungarian Empire, Prussia had a mainly German population. As a result, nationalism actually unified Prussia. In contrast, ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary tore the empire apart. Moreover, Prussia’s army was by far the most powerful in central Europe

The first broadly popular expression of the impulse for German national unification came during the revolutions of 1848. These revolutions, happening nearly simultaneously in Western and Central Europe, were driven by liberal and national ideals, which were both seen as forces of liberation. Liberalism sought to overthrow the constraints of the traditional order dominated by the nobility while introducing constitutional government; nationalism sought to allow people bound together by common language and culture to form national states reflecting those commonalities. Thus, proponents of German nationalism, lacking a common political experience, defined the nation by its cultural and ethnic dimensions-a common people, divided into separate states and principalities, seeking a common national state. In 1848, Berlin rioters forced a constitutional convention to write up a liberal constitution for the kingdom, paving the way for unification. But the revolutions of 1848 failed in Germany partly because of the conflict between the national claims of Germans and those of other nationalities within the boundaries of the German states. Monarchical rule recovered.

In 1861, Wilhelm I succeeded Frederick William to the throne. The liberal parliament refused him money for reforms that would double the strength of the army. Wilhelm saw the parliament’s refusal as a major challenge to his authority. He was supported in his view by the Junkers, strongly conservative members of Prussia’s wealthy landowning class. In 1862,Wilhelm chose a conservative Junker named Otto von Bismarck as his prime minister. Bismarck was a master of what came to be known as realpolitik. This German term means “the politics of reality.” The term is used to describe tough power politics with no room for idealism.

It was Bismarck's genius to recognize that nationalism was not inherently connected to liberalism, that it could be detached from its alliance with liberalism and be put to the service of conservative ends.

With realpolitik as his style, Bismarck would become one of the commanding figures of German history. With the king’s approval, Bismarck declared that he would rule without the consent of parliament and without a legal budget. Those actions were in direct violation of the constitution. In his first speech as prime minister, he defiantly told members of the Prussian parliament, “It is not by means of speeches and majority resolutions that the great issues of the day will be decided—that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron.”

In 1864, Bismarck took the first step toward molding an empire. Prussia and Austria formed an alliance and went to war against Denmark to win two border provinces, Schleswig and Holstein. A quick victory increased national pride among Prussians. It also won new respect from other Germans and lent support for Prussia as head of a unified Germany. After the victory, Prussia governed Schleswig, while Austria controlled Holstein.

Bismarck purposely stirred up border conflicts with Austria over Schleswig and Holstein. The tensions provoked Austria into declaring war on Prussia in 1866. This conflict was known as the Seven Weeks’ War. The Prussians used their superior training and equipment to win a devastating victory. They humiliated Austria. The Austrians lost the region of Venetia, which was given to Italy. They had to accept Prussian annexation of more German territory.

With its victory in the Seven Weeks’War, Prussia took control of northern Germany. For the first time, the eastern and western parts of the Prussian kingdom were joined. In 1867, the remaining states of the north joined the North German Confederation, which Prussia dominated completely.

By 1867, a few southern German states remained independent of Prussian control. The majority of southern Germans were Catholics. Many in the region resisted domination by a Protestant Prussia. However, Bismarck felt he could win the support of southerners if they faced a threat from outside. He reasoned that a war with France would rally the south.

Bismarck was an expert at manufacturing “incidents” to gain his ends. For example, he created the impression that the French ambassador had insulted the Prussian king. The French reacted to Bismarck’s deception by declaring war on Prussia on July 19, 1870.The Prussian army immediately poured into northern France. In September 1870, the Prussian army surrounded the main French force at Sedan. Among the 83,000 French prisoners taken was Napoleon III himself. Parisians withstood a German siege until hunger forced them to surrender.

The Franco-Prussian War was the final stage in German unification. Now the nationalistic fever also seized people in southern Germany. They finally accepted Prussian leadership. On January 18, 1871, at the captured French palace of Versailles, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was crowned kaiser, or emperor.Germans called their empire the Second Reich. (The Holy Roman Empire was the first.) Bismarck had achieved Prussian dominance over Germany and Europe “by blood and iron.”

By 1871, Britain and Germany were clearly the most powerful, both militarily and economically. Austria and Russia lagged far behind. France struggled along somewhere in the middle. The European balance of power had broken down. This shift also found expression in the art of the period.In three successful wars, 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, Bismark united Germany under Prussian domination, forcing liberal nationalists to choose between their liberal ideals and their national ideals. They accepted national unifications at the expense of a liberal constitutional government, acceding to a Germany united under Prussian monarchical authority. The German constitution provided a

parliament, but the Chancellor and other ministers remained responsible only to the Emperor.

The Nineteenth Century unification of Germany may consequently be described as a revolution from above. It was based on a combination of an authoritarian monarchy, illiberal constitutionalism, German nationalism, and Prussian militarism. As a result, Germany entered the modern industrial era and became the dominant economic and military force in Europe with a social structure that retained a dominant aristocracy and military caste.