historia, 64, 2, november 2019, pp82‐108african architectural record, 25, 9 (september 1940), pp...

Historia,64,2,November2019,pp82‐108

CivilDefenceandProtectiveServicesinSouthAfricaduringWorldWarTwo,1939–1945

FankieL.MonamaAbstractDuring World War Two, South Africa inaugurated the Civilian Protective Servicesorganisation as a civil defence effort to deal with, inter alia, the preventive andprotectivemeasuresindefenceofthecivilianpopulationagainstattackfromtheairand the sea, andagainst thedangers arising fromsabotageandsuddenemergency.Between1940and1945,about80000civiliansvolunteeredforserviceintheairraidprecautions and the civilian guard sections of the Civilian Protective Services, tocontributetowardsanationaldefenceeffortoftheUnionofSouthAfrica.Thisarticleexamines the origin of the Civilian Protective Services and its development duringWorldWarTwo,within the context of SouthAfrica’s political and internal securitychallenges. It contends that the institutionof the CivilianProtective Serviceswas avital element inSouthAfrica’seffort toenhance internal security, toassuagepublicanxieties and to sustain morale as well as to maintain public support for its warpolicy.Keywords:WorldWarTwo;CivilianProtectiveServices;SouthAfrica;propaganda;civildefence;aerialbombardment;H.G.Lawrence.OpsommingTydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, het Suid‐Afrika die BurgerlikeBeskermingsdienste‐organisasieingestelasdeelvan’nbreërburgerlikebeskermingspogingom,ondermeer,dievoorkomendeenbeskermingsmaatreëlsterverdedigingvan die bevolking teen anvalle vanuit die lug en die see te hanteer, asook teen diegevare van sabotasie en skielike noodgevalle. Tussen 1940 en 1945, het ongeveer80000 burgerlike vrywilligers aangemeld vir diens by die BurgerlikeBeskermingsdienste,asdeelvandienasionaleverdedigingspogingvandieUnievanSuid‐Afrika.Tallevrywilligershetdiensgedoenindieburgerlikeveiligheidsafdeling, DrFankieL.MonamaisalecturerintheDepartmentofMilitaryHistoryintheFaculty

ofMilitaryScience,StellenboschUniversity.Heiscurrentlyworkinginthefieldofwarand propaganda in South Africa during World War Two. Special thanks to EvertKleynhansforhisassistanceregardingtheAfrikaansabstract.Appreciationalsogoestothetwoanonymousreviewersforreadingthearticleandprovidingvaluableinputs.

Howtocitethisarticle:F.LMonama,“CivilDefenceandProtectiveServicesinSouthAfricaduringWorldWarTwo,1939–1945”,Historia,64,2,November2019,pp82‐108.http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309‐8392/2019/v64n2a4Copyright:©TheAuthor(s).PublishedunderaCreativeCommonsAttributionLicence.

Monama–CivilDefenceandProtectiveServicesinSouthAfricaduringWW2

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asook die afdeling wat verantwoordelik was vir die implimentering vanvoorsorgmaatreëls teen moontlike lugaanvalle. Hierdie artikel ondersoek dieoorsprong van die Burgerlike Beskermingsdienste, en die ontwikkeling daarvan,tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, veral binne die konteks van Suid‐Afrika sepolitieke‐ en interne veiligheidsuitdagings. Die artikel bevind dat die instelling vandieBurgerlikeBeskermingsdiensteŉbelangrike element van Suid‐Afrika se pogingwas om die interne veiligheid situasie te verbeter, om bevolkingsangs te sus, ommoraalteheponderhou,asookomopenbaresteunvirsyoorlogsbeleidtehandhaaf.Sleutelwoorde:TweedeWêreldoorlog;BurgerlikeBeskermingsdienste;Suid‐Afrika;propaganda,burgerlikeverdediging,lugbombardement;H.G.Lawrence.IntroductionTheproblemofprotectingciviliansintheeventofwarwasasubjectofmuchconcernduringtheinterwaryearsof1919to1939.Withthedevelopmentofmilitaryaviationandairpowerintheearlytwentiethcentury,cities,populationcentresandindustrialareas were targets of aerial assaults.1 This was experienced during the GreatWar(1914–1918) in Europe, when the German Zeppelin airships and Gotha bombersembarked on air raids against Britain and France, subjecting London and Paris tobombingcampaigns.Forprotection, thegeneralpublicsoughtrefuge inplacessuchas underground tunnels and stations, basements, cellars and church crypts.2Consequently,rudimentarypublicairraidsheltersandairraidwarningsystemsforcivildefencepurposeswere implemented.3AftertheGreatWar, itbecameapparentthat the advent of aerial warfare presented a new dimension to modern conflict.Theorists of air power such as the Italian Guilio Douhet, the United States’s BillyMitchellandBritain’sHughTrenchardadvocatedstrategicaerialbombingagainstthecivilian and economic targets behind the enemy frontlines to create panic andcollapsethemoraleofthecivilianpopulationonthehome‐front.4 TheGreatWarhadshownthatthecivilianpopulationwasvulnerabletoaerialbombardment and as a result civil defence emerged. During the inter‐war years,many governments began to contemplate taking civil defence measures against 1. W.MurrayandA.R.Millet,AWartobeWon:FightingtheSecondWorldWar(Harvard

UniversityPress,Cambridge:MassandLondon,2001),pp30–35.2. S.R.Grayzel,AtHomeandUnderFire:AirRaidsandCulture inBritainfromtheGreat

War to theBlitz (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge andNewYork, 2012), pp23–26;J.H.Morrow,“TheWarintheAir”, inH.Strachan(ed.),TheOxfordIllustratedHistoryof theFirstWar (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford, 1998), pp269–272;R.J.C.ThomasandP.Stamper,CivilDefence:FromFirstWorldWartotheColdWar(HistoricEnglandPublishing,Liverpool,2016),pp2–3.

3. ThomasandStamper,CivilDefence,pp2–3.4. MurrayandMillet,AWartobeWon,pp31–33;R.A.Preston,A.RolandandS.F.Wise,

Men in Arms: A History ofWarfare and its Interrelationships withWestern Society(Wadsworth/ThomsonLearning,Belmont,2001),pp252–253.


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airborne assaults on civilians in the event of war.5 The United States flirted withnational preparedness and emergencyprogrammes in the early 1930swhenmajorEuropean powers embarked on arms programmes and tensions escalated. Civildefence programmes were eventually instituted in 1940.6 In 1937, the Britishadoptedtheairraidprecautions(ARP)systemagainstaerialattacks.Itinvolvedthemobilisation of civilians to participate in a range of activities including first aid,evacuation, shelters and warden services for reporting incidents, providinginformation and advice.7 Susan R. Grayzel observes that as aerial bombardmentbrought war to the home‐front “against women and children, against schools andhomes as well as factories”, it was imperative for the wider participation by thecivilianpopulationindefenceoftheirhomesandcommunities.8 TheUnionofSouthAfrica instituted theCivilianProtectiveServices (CPS) inJune1940,asacivildefenceinstrument,aftermonthsofpublicprodding,warnings,anddeputations.9TheSouthAfricanwartimegovernmentofGeneral J.C.Smutswascognisant of the potency of air power as demonstrated during the GreatWar, andsubsequently employed the Air Force internally against miners to suppress theirstrikein1922.10Theauthorities,however,tendedtobelieveinthe“safety”providedbygeography–theremotenessofthecountryfromtheEuropeanwartheatre,locatedatthesoutherntipofAfrica.11Hence,withtheoutbreakofWorldWarTwo(WWII)inSeptember1939,nocivildefenceoreveneffectivesecuritymeasureswereinplace.However, with the entry of Italy into the war on 10 June 1940, siding with NaziGermany, the threat ofwarmoved a little closer to SouthAfrica. The Italian forcesinvadedandoccupiedEthiopia inOctober1935. Suddenly, SouthAfricawaswithinstriking distance of the Italian aircraft from East Africa, making the countryvulnerabletoairraids.12Thereactionwashowever,veryslow.TheschemeforSouth 5. L.DoddandM.Wiggam, “CivilDefenceasaHarbingerofWar inFranceandBritain

duringtheInterwarPeriod”,SynergiesRoyaume‐UnietIrlande,4(2011),pp139–150.6. USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,Report,“CivilDefenseandHomelandSecurity:

AShortHistoryofNationalPreparednessEffort”,September2006,pp4–6.7. L.Noakes,“‘ServetoSave’:Gender,CitizenshipandCivilDefenceinBritain,1937‐41”,

JournalofContemporaryHistory,47,4(2012),pp734–736.8. Grayzel,AtHomeandUnderFire,pp15–16.9. D.S.Haddon,N.HansonandR.Martienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,TheSouth

African Architectural Record, 25, 9 (September 1940), pp 313–354; E.J. Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,SouthAfricanSocietyforCivilEngineers,38(September1940),pp145–169.

10. B.Hirson,“TheGeneralStrikeof1922”,SearchlightSouthAfrica,3,3(October1993),pp 63–94; A. Garcia, “Airpower in the Union of South Africa’s First World WarCampaigninGermanSouthWestAfrica”,Historia,62,2(November2017),pp1–26.

11. I.vanderWaag,“SouthAfricanDefenceintheAgeofTotalWar”,Historia,60,1(May2015),p132.

12. H.J.MartinandN.Orpen,SouthAfricanForcesinWorldWar2,Volume7,SouthAfricaatWar:Military and IndustrialOrganization andOperations in Connectionwith theConductofWar,1939–1945(Purnell,CapeTown,1979),p66;I.vanderWaag,“TheUnionDefenceForcebetweentheTwoWorldWars”,ScientiaMilitaria,30,2(2000),pp214‐215.


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Africa’sversionoftheBritishARPsystem,theCivilianProtectiveServices(CPS),wasonlyintroducedinmid‐1940.13TheimplementationofacivildefencesystembecameavitalelementofSouthAfrica’swarpolicytoenhance internalsecurity, tomitigatepublicapprehensionsandtosustainmorale. Civildefencehasbeenthesubjectofgrowingdebate,analysisandresearch.14DrawingonWorldWarIIexperience,mostresearchershavefocusedoncivildefenceinthecontextof thepost‐warcontingencyprogrammesadoptedbygovernmentstodealwith the threat of nuclear bombs.15 However, in South Africa, studies on civildefencearelimited.OtherthanthepublicationsbytheadvocatesofcivildefencesuchasE.J.Hamlin16andD.S.Haddon,17 there isnoscholarly literatureonthesubject. In1979, H.J. Martin and N. Orpen published their SouthAfrica atWar,18 as part of asemi‐official record in the series of publications compiled on South Africa’sparticipation in theSecondWorldWar.Although thebook reflects brieflyonhomedefenceandinternalsecurityarrangements,thereishardlyanymentionoftheCPS.André de Villiers Smit’s unpublishedmaster’s thesis submitted in 1981, dealswithcivildefenceorganisationintheCapePeninsula,givingbriefattentiontoitsorigininWWII.19 Although it focuses for themost part on natural disasters, this is the firstwork to give concerted scholarly consideration to the subject of civil defence. Inacademicpublications,thereisonlyfleetingreferencetocivildefenceduringWWII.20 ThisarticleseekstofillagapinthehistoricalrecordregardingcivildefenceinSouthAfrica. Itdoessoby investigating thehome‐frontdimensionofSouthAfrica’s 13. UniversityofCapeTown (hereafterUCT) JaggerLibrary,Archives andManuscripts,

H.G. (Harry) Lawrence Papers, BC640, file E.3, 188, “Memorandum on InternalSecurityOrganisation:PartB”,12June1940;Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp145–148.

14. Civildefence,alsoreferredtoascivilprotection,hasexpandedinmeaning.Itnowalsocoversemergencysituationssuchasnaturaldisastersandtechnologicalcalamities.

15. Grayzel, AtHome and under Fire; Noakes, “‘Serve to Save’, pp 734–753; M. Smith,“Architects of Armageddon: The Home Office Scientific Advisors’ Branch and CivilDefence inBritain,1945–1968”,BritishSociety for theHistoryofScience,43,2(June2010),pp149–180;M.Grant,AftertheBomb:CivilDefenceandNuclearWarinBritain,1945–1968 (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010); D. Garrison, Bracing forArmageddon:Why CivilDefenseNeverWorked (Oxford University Press, New York,2006); K. Clymer, “U.S.HomelandDefense in the 1950s: TheOrigins of theGroundObserver Corps”, Journal of Military History, 75, 3 (July 2011), pp 835–859; D.H.McMillen, “Civil Defence in the People’s Republic of China”, Australian Journal ofChineseAffairs,8(July1982),pp35–50.

16. Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp145–148.17. Haddon,HansonandMartienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,pp313–328.18. MartinandOrpen,SouthAfricanForcesinWorldWar2,Volume7.19. A.deVilliersSmit,“SouthAfricanCivilDefenceOrganisationandAdministrationwith

ParticularReferencetotheCapePeninsular”,MPAthesis,UCT,1981.20 K. Fedorowich, “German Espionage and British Counter‐Intelligence in South Africa

andMozambique”,TheHistoricalJournal,48,1(March2005),pp209–230;I.vanderWaag,AMilitaryHistoryofModernSouthAfrica(JonathanBall,CapeTown,2015),p179.


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involvement in WWII, particularly the civil defence efforts made to safeguard thepublic and to preserve internal security. Martin and Orpen suggest that internalsecurity challenges “dominated South Africa’s war effort” due to the prevalence ofpoliticaldivisionsandobjectionstothewarpolicy.21Thisarticlewillfirstlyexaminethepoliticalandsecuritycontextwithinwhichcivildefenceandprotectiveservicesdeveloped. It will focus mainly on the government’s security thinking, threatassessment and defence policy which influenced the development of civil defence.Secondly, itwill analyse the institution of civil defencemeasures, concentrating onthe formation of the Civilian Protective Services (CPS). Thirdly, it will explain theoperationalfunctionsoftheCPSandtheservicesrenderedwithintheframeworkofthegovernment’swartimeinternalsecuritypolicy.Finally,thepaperwillconcludebyreflectingonthesignificanceoftheCPS,notonlyfromacivildefenceperspective,butalso to ascertain the government’s intention to sustain civilian morale and tomaintainpublicsupportforitswarpolicy.22Threatassessment,defencepolicyandcivildefenceOn 7 June 1940, the South African minister of the interior, H.G. Lawrence, whosupervised internal security, accepted a report titled, “National Civilian ProtectionMeasures for SouthAfrica”. Itwasproducedby theCivilDefenceCommittee of theCentralCouncilof the Instituteof SouthAfricanArchitects, urgingandadvising thegovernmentontheneedforanation‐widecivildefencesystemfortheprotectionofthe civilian population against the threat of aerial bombing.23 Until that time, noeffectivesystemofcivildefenceormeasuresforprotectingciviliansagainstthethreatofaerialattacksexisted.Therewasalsonoeffectiveinternalsecuritystrategysuchastheexistenceofintelligence,counter‐intelligenceandcounter‐sabotagemeasures.24

When South Africa entered the war on 6 September 1939, the countrywas

vulnerableinmanyrespectsanditsnationaldefencewasgenerallyweak.TheUnionDefence Force (UDF) was under‐strength, inadequately trained, ill‐equipped andunpreparedforanykindofwar.25Thenavyexistedinnameonly(afewsailors,butnowarships) and the country was relying on the 1922 Anglo‐South African navalagreement throughwhich theRoyalNavyundertook to countermaritime threats.26 21. MartinandOrpen,SouthAfricanForcesinWorldWar2,Volume7,p24.22. ThisarticlemakesuseofarchivalmaterialontheCPShousedattheNationalArchives

ofSouthAfrica,Pretoria(hereafterNASAP),andtheintelligenceandinternalsecurityreportsofthedepartmentsoftheInteriorandDefence.Forthemostpart,secondarysourcesprovidecontextandclarityonSouthAfrica’sparticipationinWWII.

23. Haddon,HansonandMartienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,pp313–328.24. Fedorowich, “GermanEspionageandBritishCounter‐Intelligence”,pp212–213;Van

derWaag,AMilitaryHistoryofModernSouthAfrica,p179.25. NASAP, J.C. SmutsPapers,A.1,vol.132, “Statementon theLocalMilitaryPosition,7

September1939andStepsTakenthereafter”,Report,J.J.Collyer,MilitarySecretarytoJ.C.Smuts;VanderWaag,“SouthAfricanDefenceintheAgeofTotalWar,pp129–155.

26. K. Shear, “Colonel Coetzee’sWar: Loyalty, Subversion and the South African Police,1939–1945”,SouthAfricanHistoricalJournal,65(2013),pp222–248;VanderWaag,AMilitaryHistoryofModernSouthAfrica,p140.


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The South African Air Force (SAAF), which had been established in 1920, lackedmodern aircraft and had no aerial warfare policy.27 This was problematic for thecountry’ssecuritybecausethewholenotionofacivildefencesystemwasdrivenbyfear of bombs and gas attacks from the air. Basically, the country had inadequatepolicy direction and no immediate defence plans at the outbreak of hostilities.According to theSouthAfrican secretary fordefence,BrigadierGeneralC.H.Blaine,theweaknessesofthenationaldefencesystemwerenotdueto“militarypolicy”but“lackofmilitarypolicy”bytheinterwargovernmentofGeneralJ.B.M.Hertzogandhispassiveministerofdefence,OswaldPirow.28 The weak state of South Africa’s national defence infrastructure, militaryassets and defence policy can be attributed to a number of factors. After theGreatWar, many national economies suffered depression, which resulted in seriousreductions of military expenditure in the 1920s and 1930s. Demobilisation,rationalisation and reduction of military forces naturally followed. Because of theeconomicsituation,GeneralJ.B.M.Hertzog,SouthAfrica’sprimeministerfrom1924to 1939, pursued frugal economic policies and curtailed military expenditure.29Another reason was political. The South African leadership could not achieve aconsolidated vision about the country’s defence policy. There was no agreementabout the type of contingencies likely to be encountered and the type of militaryforces required for the country’s defence. Hertzog and his supporters in cabinetadvocated and pursued a conservative defence policy. The primary focus was onlimiting South Africa’s defence objectives to the country’s borders and not foreignmissions. South Africa, they believed, was too remote for its cities, towns and thecivilianpopulationtobethreatenedwithaerialbombardmentofanysignificance.TheRoyal Navy was calculated to be able to combat attacks from the sea. Hertzog’sdefencepolicy favoured a focus on internal unrest (mainly industrial disturbances)and on the threat of a Pan‐African anti‐colonial rebellion in the south and centralregionsofAfrica.30 27. Garcia, “Airpower in theUnion of South Africa’s FirstWorldWar”, p 5; P. Furlong,

“Allies atWar?Britain and the ‘SouthernAfrican Front’ in the SecondWorldWar”,SouthAfricanHistoricalJournal,54,1(2005),p18;VanderWaag,AMilitaryHistoryofModernSouthAfrica,pp186–187.

28. South African Department of Defence Documentation Centre (hereafter DODArchives), Chief of General Staff (CGS),War, Box 42, file 10/4, “The Birth of SouthAfrica’sArmy,1939/40”,6September1940.

29. The poor state of South Africa’smilitary forces and the reasons for this have beeninvestigatedbyIanvanderWaag.SeeVanderWaag,MilitaryHistoryofModernSouthAfrica,chapters4and5;VanderWaag,“TheUnionDefenceForcebetweentheTwoWorldWars”,pp183–219;VanderWaag,“SouthAfricanDefenceintheAgeofTotalWar; and I. van der Waag, “‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’: Anglo‐South AfricanRelations,DominionNationalismandtheFormationoftheSeawardDefenceForcein1939–1940”,ContemporaryBritishHistory,24,4(2010),pp427–449.

30. J.Ellis, “OswaldPirow’sFiveYearPlan for theReorganisationof theUnionDefenceForce,1933‐1939”,ScientiaMilitaria,30,2(2000),pp221–235;VanderWaag,“TheUnionDefenceForcebetweentheTwoWorldWars”,pp202–213.


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Hertzog’s political opponent, General J.C. Smuts, believed differently. Afterlosingthe1924electionstoHertzog,heoftencriticisedthegovernmentforitsnarrowdefence policy. Smuts and his supporters believed that South Africa’s defenceobjectivesshouldfocusbeyondthecountry’simmediateborders.Smutsadvocatedamore modernised and sophisticated military force capable of deployment at least“anywhereinAfrica”,andthatimperiallinkswithBritain,regardedasessentialtothesecurityofSouthAfrica,shouldbemaintained.31WhenSmutsandHertzogformedacoalition government from 1933 to deal jointly with the problems of economicdepression, they failedtoreconciletheiropposingviewspertainingtothecountry’sdefence policy. Oswald Pirow, who succeeded F.P.H. Cresswell as the minister ofdefence in the Smuts‐Hertzog coalition government, attempted a five‐yearmilitaryimprovement programme.32 He was criticised for making bold statements aboutupgradingthemilitaryforces,butdeliveringverylittleonthepromisedobjectives.33He was constrained by the conservative economic policy and limited defenceobjectivespursuedbyHertzog.

Theinternationalsecurityenvironmentchangedinthe1930s,withtheriseofauthoritarian states such as Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan, whichdisplayedaggressiveexpansionisttendencies.AftertheItalianinvasionofEthiopiain1935, the South African defence policy was reviewed. The focus of the possiblemilitary deployment was extended to East Africa.34 Nevertheless, Hertzog’sgovernment downplayed the implications for South Africa of the deterioratinginternationalpolitical situation.Theproximityof the Italianairbases inEastAfricadidnotseemtobeamajorconcern.Thecountry’sgeographicalpositionappearedtorenderthepossibilityofairborneorseaborneattackremote,andtheauthoritiesdidnotbelievethecivilianpopulationwasvulnerable.35 However, thegovernment’sviewwasnot sharedby thewiderSouthAfricanpublic.Therewereconcernsaboutgrowinginternalsecuritythreats.Duringthemid‐1930s, South Africawas subjected to a torrent of Nazi propaganda and subversiveactivities that was conducted through the German‐based Zeesen Radio broadcastservice in the Afrikaans language and by secret agents who had infiltrated thecountry.36 They encouraged exclusive ethnic‐nationalism among Afrikaners, 31. VanderWaag,“SouthAfricanDefenceintheAgeofTotalWar”,pp146–147.32. Ellis, “Oswald Pirow’s Five Year Plan”, pp 221–235; F.A. Mouton, “Fascist or

Opportunist?TheMilitaryCareerofOswaldPirow”,Historia,63,2(November2018),pp93–111.

33. NASAP, Smuts Papers, vol. 132, “Statement of the Local Military Position”; Ellis,“OswaldPirow’sFiveYearPlan”,pp233–234.

34. VanderWaag,“TheUnionDefenceForcebetweentheTwoWorldWars”,p210.35. Haddon,HansonandMartienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,p316.36. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, file E3.262, “Otto von Strahl Report: Protect your

Home Country”, 18 July 1941; O. von Strahl,SevenYearsasaNaziConsul (Redout,Cape Town, 1942), p 96; C. Marx, “‘Dear Listeners in South Africa’: GermanPropaganda Broadcasts to South Africa”, South African Historical Journal, 27(November1992),pp148–172.


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promoted a pro‐German sentiment and stimulated an anti‐British feeling.37 Thepublicwasconcernedabouttheemergentthreatofsubversionintheformofthefifthcolumn, the rise of the German National Socialism (Nazi) in the country and theproliferationofthepro‐NazimovementssuchastheGreyshirtsandtheBlackshirts.38Another concern emanated from the agitation of the extra‐parliamentaryorganisationcalledtheOssewabrandwag(OB)(OxwagonSentinels)whichadoptedamilitantpostureandmadecontactwiththeNaziagentssuchasDrLuitpoldtWerz.39TheOBwasfoundedin1938toperpetuatethespiritofthesymbolicAfrikanerGreatTrek and to promote Afrikaner culture. In 1939, it developed rapidly into a massmovement which was considered “dangerous and subversive” by Smuts.40 The OBgrewintoapoliticalforcewhichthreatenedtounderminestateauthorityandinternalstability.41 The Hertzog administration observed these organisations and theiractivities,butdidnotactagainstthem.SmutskeptsilentuntilhetookoverthereinsinSeptember1939.42

37. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, file E.5, “Official White Book on Nazi and Nazi

PropagandainSouthAfrica,vols.1‐5,1945”;F.L.Monama,“SouthAfricanPropagandaAgencies and the Battle for Public Opinion during the Second World War, 1939–1945”,ScientiaMilitaria, 44,1 (2016),pp145–167;Marx, “‘DearListeners in SouthAfrica’, pp 148–172; Fedorowich, “German Espionage and British Counter‐Intelligence”, pp 209–230. For an overview see P.J. Furlong, Between Crown andSwastika:TheImpactoftheRadicalRightontheAfrikanerNationalistMovementintheFascistEra(WitsUniversityPress,Johannesburg,1991).

38. The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (NSDAP) (National SocialistGermanWorkers’ Party orNazi Party)was founded in SouthAfrica in1932by theUCT academic, ProfessorHermanBohle. SeeUCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, file E5.47,“G.C.Visser,StrictlyConfidentialReportontheAffidavitofDrLuitpoldWerz,SAPSpecial Investigator, Union War Prosecutions”, 25 November 1946. See also UCT,Morris Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, file 24, “Memorandum on anti‐JewishMovements in South Africa”, 1935; and G. Saron, “‘It did HappenHere: The “Shirt”MovementsasLinksintheWorldNaziChain”,CommonSense,1,8(February1940),pp8–9.

39. University of KwaZulu‐Natal (hereafter UKZN), Killie Campbell Archives andManuscripts(hereafterKCM),Durban,E.G.MalherbePapers, file444/7,KCM56975(87‐100), “SecretMilitary IntelligenceReportson theOssewabrandwag,c.1940–5”;UCT,LawrencePapers,BC640,fileE5.83,“Interview(extract)ofJ.S.Harris,a‘specialassistant’intheUSOfficeofWarInformationinSouthAfrica,withJ.F.J.vanRensburg,Kommandant‐GeneraaloftheOssewabrandwag”,5June1944.Forabroaderanalysisof theOssewabrandwag (OB), seeC.Marx,TheOxwagonSentinel:RadicalAfrikanerNationalismandtheHistoryoftheOssewabrandwag(UnisaPress,Pretoria,2008).

40. UKZN,MalherbePapers,file444/7,KCM56975(87‐100),“SecretMilitaryIntelligenceReports on the Ossewabrandwag, c 1940–5”; Van der Waag, AMilitary History ofModernSouthAfrica,pp174–177.

41. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, file E5. 47, “Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz”; UKZN,MalherbePapers,444/7,KCM56975(87‐100),“SecretMilitaryIntelligenceReports”.

42. J.C.Smuts, JanChristianSmuts(HeinemannandCassell,CapeTown,1952),pp370–371.


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In March 1939, South Africa’s military chief of the general Staff (CGS), SirPierre van Ryneveld, produced a confidential memorandum urging theimplementation of precautionary measures for internal security. He requested thetightening up of police protection to preserve internal order; advised that policereservesbeplacedonstandby;andurgedthattheDepartmentofInformationshouldbring censorship into operation and make arrangements for the protection ofvulnerable points against sabotage.43 The CGS’s memorandum was followed by asecret document entitled “Emergency Measures”, outlining a 17‐stage process forsecuring vulnerable civil andmilitary points. The different directors‐general in themilitary, the commissioner of police and railway police, and the chairman of theboardoftradeandindustrieswereforewarnedabouttheirexpectedrolesandactionsintheeventofanemergency.44

The government was alarmed by the possibility of sabotage of the national

economic infrastructure. InMay 1939, theminister ofmines, C.F. Stallardwrote toPirow,proposingaschemeforprecautionarymeasurestopreservethekeyindustrialactivitiessuchas transportation,waterandpowersupplysystems, communicationsand the smooth production of gold, steel and weapons. Stallard urged Pirow toapprovethemeasurescontainedinthememorandumandproposedfurtherstepstotake in the event of an emergency.45Whilst themilitary officials attempted to pre‐empt the internal security situation, however, Pirow displayed passivity andindifference to the proposals. Few practical stepswere undertaken.46 Civil defenceplanningfortheprotectionofthepublicwasnotseriouslyconsidered. Anxious about the government’s inaction, prominentmembers of the publicappealedtotheauthoritiestoprovidemeasuresforprotectingciviliansintheeventofwar.InApril1939,theGeneralCommitteeoftheCapeTownCityCouncilissuedamemorandumtitled,“ProtectionoftheCivilianPopulationintheEventofWar”,totheministeroftheinterior,RichardStuttaford,todeterminetheresponsibleauthorityforcivilian protection, prevention of sabotage, and for establishing cooperation andcoordinationofeffortsbetweenthecivilianandmilitaryauthoritiesforemergencies.The memorandum was taken to be a matter for discussion in the cabinet.47 TheJohannesburg City Council supported the recommendation of the Cape Town CityCouncil to establish a voluntary organisation todealwith emergencies “whichmayarise in theeventofwar”.Theywrotea letterurging thegovernment todeclare itspolicyandtotaketheleadintheprovisionofthenecessaryprecautionarymeasuresfor protecting the civilian population. Furthermore, it was deemed urgent to 43. DOD Archives, Chief of General Staff (hereafter CGS) (War), Box 223, file 49/3,

“UrgentPrecautionaryMeasures”,17March1939.44. DOD Archives, CGS (War) Box 223, file 49/1, “Defence Headquarters, Emergency

Measures”(E.M.1),8June1939.45. DODArchives,CGS(War)Box223,file49/1,“InternalSecurityMeasures”,Stallardto

Pirow,1August1939.46. MartinandOrpen,SouthAfricanForcesinWorldWar2,Volume7,p33.47. NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, “Memorandum on the Protection of Civilian

PopulationintheEventofWar”,MinisterofInteriortoPrimeMinister,27April1939.


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undertaketheorganisationandtrainingofauxiliaryservicesforemergenciesbeforeandnotafterthenecessityoftheirservicesarose.

The municipal councils of other major cities in South Africa also receivedrequests from the Johannesburg and Cape Town councils to support therecommendationsas theyunderstood that theprimary responsibility for theactualimplementationofprecautionarymeasureshadtobebornebythelocalauthorities.Afterall,itwastheseurbancentresthatwouldbemostdirectlyaffectedbythekindofattacksenvisagedinthewar.48TheDepartmentofDefenceacknowledgedreceiptof the letter fromtheJohannesburgtowncouncilandnotedthat itexpectedfurtherdetailsof the scheme for civiliandefence tobe furnished (by the council) at a laterstage. 49 However, the office of the defence secretary, led by A.H. Broeksma,consideredthemattertoberelatedtotheARPsystemandthusnottheconcernoftheDepartment of Defence. On this basis, no actionwas deemed necessary from theirside.50 After the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the South African publicurgedthegovernmenttoprovideplansfortheprotectionofcivilians.H.Wilson,theeditoroftheCapeTimes,wrotetothenewlyappointeddefencesecretary,C.H.Blaine,proposing the establishment of a voluntary organisationof the “CivilianGuards” inthe larger towns and coastal ports to assist the government in preserving internalsecurity.TheproposedCivilianGuardswouldbe anoutlet for thegeneralpublic tolendtheirsupporttothegovernment’swarpolicy,especiallythosewhodesiredtobeinvolvedin“somekindofdefence”.51BlainesupportedWilson’sproposal,butraisedconcernsaboutaciviliandefenceschemewhichcouldinterferewiththerecruitmentfor theUDF’s fighting forces, especially for citizensbetween the agesof 17and45.Wilsonwas commended for “performing a public service” and Smuts also gave hisblessingforthedevelopmentoftheciviliandefenceorganisation,butitwasonlytobecomposedof thecitizenswhowereabove themilitaryageof45years, soasnot tointerferewiththerecruitmentforactivemilitaryservice.52 The military officials, on the other hand, were not oblivious to aerial andseabornethreats.Whilethethreatofa largescale intensiveairassaultorsustainedseaborne bombardment by enemy vesselswas considered remote, sporadic enemy 48. DOD Archives, Secretary for Defence (hereafter DC), Box 3156, file 1651/6,

“PreparationforCivilianDefence”,JohannesburgTownClerktoSecretaryforDefence,2June1939.

49. DODArchives,DC,Box3156, file1651/6,“Measures forCivilianDefence”,SecretaryforDefencetoJohannesburgTownClerk,9June1939.

50. DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/6,AssistantSecretaryforDefencetoSecretaryforDefence,nodate.

51. DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/7,“CivilianProtectiveServices:CivicGuards”,WilsontoBlaine,20September1939.

52. DODArchives,DC,Box3156, file1651/7,Blaine toWilson,20October1939.SouthAfricamodelled its Civil Defence system on the British Air Raid Precautions. OtherdominionssuchasAustralia,institutedtheirownmeasuresunderdifferentnames.


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raidsonthecountry’sportsandcoastaltownswasstillsomethingofapossibility.Theeffect onmoraleof such raidswouldbe considerable if noprecautionarymeasureshadbeen taken toguideandassist thecivilpopulation.TheSouthAfricandirector‐generalofoperations(DGO)requestedofficerscommanding(O’sC)ofvariouscoastalmilitaryunitstodrawupappropriateschemesforcivildefence.Itwasrecommendedthatsuchschemesshouldinclude,interalia,ablack‐outsystemwherebylightsweretobeextinguishedordimmed;firstaidarrangements;dressingstations;fire‐fightingarrangements; auxiliary ambulances; transport organisation; communication, andcivildefenceheadquarters.53

Therewas no official decision for instituting civilian defence and protectivemeasures.Nonetheless,themilitaryofficialsrecognisedandanticipatedthepossiblethreat of air raids from the Germans; such air raids were already taking place inBritain.Theyissuedprecautionaryinstructionsforplanningandpreparationsuntiladefinite government policy was declared. It took a further six months before thegovernment decided to initiate plans for the institution of a national civilianorganisation for the protection of the population and to facilitate the efficientcoordinationofmeasurestodealwithanyinternalemergencyarisingoutofthewarconditions.54 This was long overdue because the intelligence reports werehighlighting the fact that the loyal supportersof the government’swarpolicywerelosingpatienceandfeelingneglected.Itwasimperativetoassuagetheiranxietiesandtoreassurethemthat,“theGovernmenthaditsfingersonthepulseofthesituationintheUnion”,andthatactionwasbeingtaken.55Theintroductionoftheciviliandefenceorganisationwasmeanttoinspirepublicconfidenceinthegovernmentand,inaway,alsotoprovidethemwithanopportunityto“participate”inanationaldefenceeffort.TheformationoftheCivilianProtectiveServicesThenecessityofinstitutingcivildefenceandprotectivemeasuresduringthewarwasconveyed by the minister of the interior, H.G. Lawrence, through the Inter‐departmentalCommitteeoninternalsecuritywhichwassetupaftertheoutbreakofthe war.56 On 31 May 1940, Lawrence announced the special measures for themaintenance of internal security. The government had already taken steps tosafeguard vital points such as power stations, railway bridges, waterworks,aerodromes and other key economic infrastructure, by establishing a semi‐militaryunit of retired servicemen called the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC) in 53. DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/6,“CivilDefenceinCoastalTowns”,Directorof

GeneralofOperationstoO’CCommands,18December1939.54. NASAP,CivilianProtectiveServicesArchives(hereafterCPS),Box1,fileCPS8,Minute,

DirectorCivilianProtectiveServicestoAllMunicipalities,13August1940.55. DODArchives,UnionWarHistories(hereafterUWH),Box265,fileB.I.20,Intelligence

Summaries,12October1940.56. The Internal Security Committee was a strategic inter‐departmental committee

comprising the interiorminister, the justiceminister, the police commissioner, thedirector of intelligence and the chief control officer (censorship), with additionaldepartmentalheadsoperatingatinter‐departmentalandsub‐committeelevel.


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October 1939.57 It was deemed necessary to develop plans to mobilise all civilianresources to safeguard internal security, to protect the homes, villages, towns andcities against organised attacks and to provide intelligence. This effort was to beundertaken by “loyal citizens of the Union”.58 To this end, civilian resources weremobilisedintheformofanetworkofvigilancecommittees.Theirtasksincluded:

a. Toobserveespionage,sabotage,andhostileactionbygroups.b. Topromptlyreportonallcasesofintimidation,tamperingwithnatives[sic],

subversivespeechoraction,andparachutists,shouldthelatterarise.c. To immediatelyreportall casesofhardship fromwhatevercausearisingas

affectingthewivesandfamiliesofthoseawayonactiveservice,withaviewtopromptexaminationand,wherenecessary,earlyredress.

d. Generally towatch for anymovement or actionwhichmay tend to impairinternalsecurity.59

A series of vigilance committeeswould operate in the Transvaal, OFS, Natal

and the Eastern Province. However, Lawrence did notwant to entrust intelligencework to untrained civilians, fearing a “disconcerting embarrassment” for thegovernmentshouldthingsgowrong.Tothisend,herecommendedthatthevigilancecommittees should not enjoy official government recognition but should rather berunindependentlythroughlocalsecurityliaisons.Theauthoritieswouldbenefitfromgood“unofficial” intelligenceprovidedby thevigilancecommittees,whowouldalsobe useful in facilitating the spread of government propaganda to shape and directpublicopinioninlinewithstatepolicy.60 In addition to providing measures designed to preserve internal securityagainstorganisedattacks, itwas imperativetoconsiderprotectionagainstpotentialthreatsfromtheairandthesea.TheInstituteofSouthAfricanArchitectssubmittedareporttoLawrenceon7June1940,regardingcivildefencemeasuresforSouthAfrica.It advised thegovernmenton the scheme foranationwidecivildefence system forthe protection of the civilian population against the threat of aerial bombing.Countermeasures proposed in the report entailed the establishment of acomprehensive civil defence capability mainly involving two features: first, themilitarydefencebymeansofairassets,andsecond,thecivilianprotectionmeasuresincluding the provision of air raid shelters, evacuation facilities, fire‐fighting andrescueservices.61With this inmind,LawrencesuggestedtheestablishmentofwhathecalledtheInternalSecurityCorpsconsistingofpersonswhowerenotfullyfitforactive military service, to deal with enemy attacks from the air, the arrival of 57. DODArchives, CGS (War) Box 224, file 49/13, “The Story of the Essential Services

ProtectionCorps”,S.Varney,ESPCStaffOfficer,2December1941.58. NASAP,CPS,Box19,fileCPS11,“StatementbyMinisterofInterior,H.G.Lawrence”,31

May1940.SeealsoF.L.Monama,“WartimePropagandaintheUnionofSouthAfrica”,PhDdissertation,StellenboschUniversity,2014.

59. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC 640, file E.3, 188, “Memorandum on Internal Security,SuggestedScheme”,LawrencetoSmuts,12June1940.

60. UCT,LawrencePapers,BC640,fileE.3,188,“MemorandumonInternalSecurity”.61. Haddon,HansonandMartienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,pp324–328.


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parachutists, acts of sabotage and internal revolts. A warden for civilian defencewould be in charge of controllingmunicipal services and performing several taskssuch as preventing the spread of fire caused by bombardments; the demolition ofdamagedbuildings; firstaidservices;andtheremovalofwomenandchildren fromdangerous areas. The suggested scheme would apply to large cities and, withmodifications,alsoappliedtosmallertownsandvillages.62 On12June1940,thegovernmentinauguratedtheCivilianProtectiveServices(CPS)officially.ThroughProclamationNo.105of1940,theCPSbecameanapprovedcivilian organisationunder theDepartment of Interior, authorised to coordinate alleffortsregardingtheprotectionoftheSouthAfricanpublic.63LieutenantColonelT.B.Clapham, an UDF officer from the Active Citizen Force (ACF) was seconded to theministeroftheinteriortoorganisetheCPSasitsdirectoron17June1940.64UnderRegulations 36 and 37 of the National Emergency Regulations, promulgated byProclamationNo.35of1940, theministerofdefenceconfirmedtheappointmentoftheCPSdirectorandappointedthemayorsofinlandcitiesandcoastaltownsaschiefarea commandants, to facilitate civil defence and protective efforts in their localmunicipalities.65 The CPS director and the chief area commandants were giveninstructions to the effect that the defence authorities retained over‐ridingresponsibility and thus all activities pertaining to the CPS should be conducted inclose cooperation with the military and naval officials.66 The CPS directoratehighlightedtheimperativeofthecivildefenceorganisation:

Todeal,interalia,withthepreventiveandprotectivemeasuresindefenceofthecivilian population against attack from the air and the sea, and against thedangers arising from sabotage and sudden emergency. The chief object is toorganise local civic resources (personal and mechanical) to deal with anyemergency arising from conditions such as incendiarism, havoc, panic and airraids,causingdamagetopropertyandlife,ordisruptionofcivilianservices.67

62. NASAP,CPS,Box19,fileCPS11,“Statement‐InteriorMinister”;UCT,LawrencePapers,

BC640,fileE.3,188,“MemorandumonInternalSecurity”.63. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 7, “Proclamation No. 105 of 1940: Declaration of

Approval”, Secretary forDefence toDirector CivilianProtective Services, 16August1940.

64. NASAP,CPS,Box23, fileCPS39, “NotesofConference regardingCivilianProtectiveServices”,26 June1940;DODArchives,DC,Box3156, file1651/9, “AppointmentofDirector,CivilianProtectiveServices”,Adjutant‐General toSecretary forDefence,13November1941.

65. NASAP,CPS,Box1,fileCPS7,“CivilianProtectiveServices:DelegationofAuthority”,Circular,MinisterofDefence (J.C. Smuts) toDirectorofCivilProtectiveServices, 20July1940.Themayorsof strategic cities and towns includedA.B. Sidney (Pretoria),J.F. Fotheringham (Johannesburg), A.T. Allison (Pietermaritzburg), V.G. Lewis (EastLondon),W.Brinton (CapeTown), J.McLean (PortElizabeth),R.E.Brown (Durban)andR.M.Scholtz(MosselBay).

66. DODArchives, CGS (War),Box224, file 49/1,AdjutantGeneral toOCs andHeadofSections,17October1940.

67. NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CivilianProtectiveServices:InstructionsNo.1”,17July1940.


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Althoughenemyraidsfromtheseaandtheairwereconsideredaremotepossibility,theauthoritiesstillemphasised that reasonableprecautionswere imperative.68Theimmediateresponsibilityfellonthelocalauthoritieswhowererequiredtomaintaincontact with the CPS director to “coordinate and direct all measures for theprotectionofcivilianintowns”.69 The CPS organisational structurewas based on the scheme designed by theJohannesburgCityCouncil,whichwasintendedforlocalcivildefenceattheoutbreakof thewar. The council’s scheme, derived from the British ARP system,70was alsosharedwithothercitiestoadapttotheirlocalconditions.71Themayor,whowasthechief area commandant, worked through special sub‐committees responsible forcoordinatingvariousservicessuchasmedical,wardens, firefightingandrescue.Thecitywassubdividedintomunicipalareasunderthecontrolofthewardens.72Theareawarden,inparticular,wasacriticalpositionbecausetheincumbenthadtopossessathorough knowledge of the area under his command and then establish a controlcentrefromwhichtodirectoperations.Furthermore,areawardenswereexpectedtoorganise civilian volunteers, enforce control orders and report to the chief areacommandantabouteventswithintheirsector.Thechiefwarden,whowasinchargeofall theareawardens,wasrequiredtocollaboratewiththe localpoliceandtrafficchiefs to coordinate their services. All wardens were required to wear distinctivearmletswith “C.P.S.” letters in black onwhite for identification and also to carry acertificate of appointment to authenticate themselves to householders or to otherpersonstheyvisitedinthecourseoftheirduties.73 TheCPSorganisationconsistedoftwomainsections,namelytheARPandtheCivilian Guard. The ARP section was responsible for providing and appointingwardens,medicalservices,mechanicalservices,firefighting,streettrafficcontrolandforproviding information services to thegeneral public.TheCivilianGuard sectionwasresponsibleforcoordinatingstreetpatrolsandassistingtheSouthAfricanPolice(SAP)inthegeneralmaintenanceoflawandorder.74Allciviliansbetweentheagesof45 and 65 years and thosewhowere not eligible for activemilitary service couldapplytoserveintheARPorCivilianGuard.TheCPSvolunteerswererequiredtotakeanoathofserviceatattestation75andcouldiftheysowished,tendertheirresignation 68. NASAP,CPS,Box23, fileCPS39, “NotesofConference regardingCivilianProtective

Services”,26June1940.69. NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“CPSPolicyandInstructions”,25August1940.70. Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp145–169.71. NASAP,CPS,Box23, fileCPS39, “NotesofConference regardingCivilianProtective

Services”,26June1940.72. NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“MinutesoftheSpecialCommitteeofJohannesburg

CityCouncil”,18June1940.73. NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CivilianProtectiveServices:InstructionsNo.1”,17

July1940.74 NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,“CPSBroadcasts”,26August1941.75 Attestation implies the signing of an official document formally declaring and

confirmingacceptanceofmilitaryservice.


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bygiving24‐hours’noticeattheirrespectivemagisterialdistrict.76Thefinancialcostsof theCPSwereborneby the local authorities concerned, except in the caseof thecontrolandadministrativecostsofitsdirectorandforthechiefareacommanders.77The government undertook to finance uniforms for the Civilian Guard, to fundtraining courses for CPS personnel and to supply a limited number of firearms,whistles,batons,tinhatsandbadges.78 To stimulate recruitment and to provide publicity for the CPS, Claphamarranged for five‐minute weekly radio broadcast talks by different mayors andfortnightly talks conductedby thegovernment’s informationofficer,ArthurWilson,who was also the director of the state’s propaganda institution, the Bureau ofInformation (BOI).79 TheCPSwas regarded as a national scheme for homedefencewhichwasfocusedonsafeguardingcivilianpropertyandprotectingcivilianlife.80TheCPSdirectorateissuedacircularletter,claimingthattherewas“noagelimit,noclass,creed,politicalorracialdistinction”intheCPS.81Thiswasmerelyapropagandaefforttoattractasmanyvolunteersaspossible.Inpractice,therewereracialdistinctionsinstate institutionswhichconformedtotheexistingpoliciesof thecountry.82TheCPSmembershipwasbetween50000and60000,withtheCivilianGuardbeing10000strongbySeptember1941.83TheinstitutionoftheCPSwasconsideredasignificantstepinreinforcingthemoraleoftheUDFtroopsonthefrontlineandthosemembers

76. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 8, Directorate Civilian Protection Services to All

Municipalities, 13 August 1940; NASAP, Department of Justice (hereafter JUS), Box1526, file 1/57.40, “Volunteer Application Form and Attestation Form”, D.I. 241,undated.

77. NASAP,CPS,Box23, fileCPS39, “NotesofConferenceRegardingCivilianProtectiveServices”, 26 June 1940; DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13,“Memorandum, Financial Expenses for the Civilian Protective Services”, 16 March1942.

78. NASAP, CPS,Box24, file CPS46, InteriorMinister toEditor,Women’sAuxiliary, 26August1941;DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224,file49/13,“Memorandum,FinancialExpensesfortheCivilianProtectiveServices”,16March1942.

79. NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,DirectorCPStoAssistantDirectorCPS(W.Brinton),23June1941;SeealsoMonama,“SouthAfricanPropagandaAgenciesandtheBattleforPublicOpinion”,pp145–167.

80. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 8, Directorate Civilian Protection Services to AllMunicipalities,13August1940.

81. NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“CPSPolicy”,26August1940.82 “Non‐Europeans” were recruited separately and served in segregated institutions

such the police and themilitary. See provisions for special actions to organise andprovide necessary CPS services to servants and residents on railway premises,NASAP,CPS,Box21, fileCPS21, “CPSPolicy”,26August1940;NASAP,CPS,Box19,fileCPS11, “NativesasSpecialConstables”,CommissionerofPolicetoCPSDirector,27September1941.

83. DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224, file49/13,“ExtractofBroadcastbyColonelT.B.Clapham”,9September1941.


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of the public who had complained about the need for civilian defence.84 The CPSexisted throughout the war, easing public fears, although its work was oftenfrustrated by the difficult service conditions, operational challenges and legaluncertainties.CPSoperations,activitiesandserviceconditionsInitially,theCPSseemedtolackaclearoperationalmandateandfocus.Asindicatedabove,LawrencehadenvisionedanInternalSecurityCorpsformaintaininginternalsecurity and for counter‐propaganda.85At the same time, local authorities in largercities like Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, had embarked on sporadicindividualanduncoordinatedinitiativestodealwithattacksfromtheairandthesea.With the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Clapham, the CPS began to develop aunified direction and operational focus.86 Dr E.J. Hamlin, a member of theJohannesburgCityCouncil’scivildefencecommitteeelaboratedonthemaintasksofthe CPS for the city, and recommended them to theDepartment of the Interior foradoption.87 The scheme elaborated on the measures within the scope of the localauthorities,includingthoseactivitiesassociatedwiththeARPsectionandtheroleofthe Civilian Guard section of the CPS.88 The Civilian Guard had been introducedduringtheGreatWar,duetotheunrestontheWitwatersrandatthattime,toassistwithpolicework. Itwas then incorporated into theCPSduringWWII toperformasimilarrolewhenmostofthepolicepersonnelwentonactivemilitaryservice.89 Atitsinception,theoperationalfunctionsoftheCPScomprisedsixcategories,namely,i)warningsignals, ii)medicalservicesandfirefighting,iii)policeandtrafficcontrol, iv) mechanical services, supplies and maintenance (including transport,sirens, black‐outs, rescue parties and shelters), v) non‐Europeans (patrols in blackareas) and vi) information, instruction and propaganda (reports, notices,literature).90 Each area under the control of the chief warden was required tocoordinate and control the siren warning system; black‐out system; firefighting; 84. DODArchives,UWH,Box265, fileB.I.20, IntelligenceSummaries,12October1940;

DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224, file49/13,“ExtractofBroadcastbyColonelT.B.Clapham”,9September1941.

85 NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,“CPSBroadcasts”,26August1941.86. NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,“CPSBroadcasts”,26August1941.87. NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“MinutesoftheSpecialCommitteeofJohannesburg

CityCouncil”,18June1940;Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp145–169.TheCivilDefenceCommitteeof JohannesburgCityCouncilprovidedaCPSoperationalschemewithdutiesandresponsibilitiesoftherespectiveauthorities.Thiswas adopted by the directorate of CPS and circulated to all municipalities asinstructionsforimplementationalongthegeneralguidelines.

88. Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp145–148.89. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 8, Directorate Civilian Protection Services to All

Municipalities,13August1940.90. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 138, “Circular, Civilian Protective Services

InstructionNo.1”,17July1940,amended23June1942;NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“CPSPolicy”,26August1940.


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rescue operations; traffic and panic control; demolition of damaged buildings anddebris clearance; operating mobile and stationary medical and first aid posts andclearing stations; ambulance services; emergency communications and transportservices.91

Incaseofanemergency,thewarningsystemwouldbeintheformofasirenoranothersoundsystemlikeawhistleorahand‐bell,dependingonthearea.92Thechiefareacommandanttookinstructionsfromthemilitaryauthorities,thenissuedordersforwarningsignalstothepublicregardingenemydanger.Thewarningsignalsweresoundedaccordingto the levelof theperceivedthreat, forexample, foursuccessiveblastsofoneminuteeachseparatedbyabriefpausefor“alert”andacontinuousevennotefor“allclear”.93ThewardensoperatedthesignalsystemsandtheCPSmembersmonitoredthesituationandenforcedciviliancompliancewiththeorderswithintheirjurisdiction. The commitment required from the CPSwas not particularly onerous. Theyweremainlyexpectedtobeproficientintheservicesoutlinedabove.Theauthoritiesemphasisedthatitwascrucialtobepreparedandtomaintainastateofefficiencyandreadiness to dealwithpotential emergencies emanating from thewar conditions.94TheCPSalsoenforcedblack‐outsincoastalandinlandcities.Thesystemofblacking‐out premises, street lights and vehicleswas considered an essential element of thecountry’sdefenceagainstenemyaircraft.95Authoritiesissuedinstructionsstipulatingthe lighting restrictions and the provisions of material or appropriate fittingsrequired tocomplywithblack‐outs.TheCPSmemberswereauthorised tomonitor,superviseandcheckthebuildingsandvehiclestoenforcecompliancewiththeblack‐out orders.96 Enforcement of black‐outs was a daunting task for the CPS becausesomeciviliansoftenignoredthem.97

The CPS were initially considered unnecessary and some people remarked

that, “we are too far away from the enemy to be bombed and nothingwould everhappeninthiscountry”.98WhenJapanenteredthewar,itposedathreatintheIndianOcean,and,alongwith thedeteriorating internal securitysituation(duetoariseof 91. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 138, “Circular, Civilian Protective Services

InstructionNo.1”,17July1940,amended23June1942.92. UCT, Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 138, “Circular, Civilian Protective Services

InstructionNo.1”,17July1940,amended23June1942.93. Union of South Africa, Government Gazette Extraordinary, No. 3071, “Civilian

ProtectiveServices:BlackoutOrders”,6July1942.94. NASAP,CPS,Box24, fileCPS46, “‘WeMustBePrepared’:BroadcastbyColonelT.B.

Clapham”,9September1941.95. NASAP, CPS, Box 22, file CPS 35, “Instruction No. 3, Civilian Protective Services,

Blackouts”,6August1940.96. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 7, “Black‐out Orders: Imposition of Responsibility for

Observance”,undated.97. “Black‐outsatthePorts”,TheStar,20February1943;“CapeTown’sBlack‐out”,Cape

Argus,23March1943.98. NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,“‘WeMustBePrepared’”,9September1941.


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bombexplosions,telephoneandtelegraphwire‐cuttingandothersabotageincidentsperpetuated by themilitant anti‐war elements in the country),99 the CPS presencewasappreciatedandmorememberswereneededforciviliandefenceandtomitigatepublicfears.100

Lawrence indicated that the CPS personnel were trained for ARP against

bombardments, however, their serviceswere on occasion called upon to dealwith“emergenciesnotcausedthroughenemyaction”.101Hewasreferringtotheincidentshighlighted above, which created civilian panic and insecurity in the country. TheCivilianGuardsinparticular,performedpolicework,conductednightlystreetpatrols,assisted the police in themaintenance of law and order and facilitated arrests andprosecutionofoffenders.102Thisalsogeneratedfundsforthetreasurythroughfinescollectedbythecourts.103In1942,theCPStookoverthecivilianandmilitaryguardresponsibilitiespreviouslyperformedbythepolicereservists,whowererequiredforactivemilitaryservice.104ThestatusoftheCPSwasthusenhanced. OtheractivitiesoftheCPSinvolvedinformationandpropagandaservices. J.S.Fotheringham,mayorandchiefareacommandantofJohannesburgexplained:

There is abundant evidence in existence that to prove that there still exists inSouthAfricaadangerousattitudeofcompleteindifferencetoprecautions…itisthecommonsensedutyofeverycitizento learnhowtoprotecthisownpeopleand himself from the effects of high explosive bombs, incendiary bombs andpoisongas.ItistheobjectoftheCivilianProtectiveServicestoprovideessentialknowledge and information to the public – to bring an adequate nucleus ofpeoplefullytrainedinAirRaidPrecautions.105

Aseriesofcircularsandinstructionswerepublishedtoenlightenthepublic,developtheirconfidenceandtoreducepanic.Theywereconcernedwithmatterssuchasair 99. DODArchives,ArmyIntelligence,Box24,“IntelligenceRecordsBureauSummary”,7

February 1942; “Sabotage Plot in TVL”, Cape Argus, 29 January 1942; “LocalIncendiarism andBombOutrages”,TheFriend, 18 June 1942. Formore details, seeG.C.Visser,OB:TraitorsorPatriots?(Macmillan,Johannesburg,1976).

100. DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224,file49/13,“C.P.S.andDefence”,P.vanRyneveldtoH.G. Lawrence, 13March1942; “C.P.SWorkGoesOn”,TheStar, 20February1942;“MoreC.P.S.RecruitsWanted”,TheFriend,18June1942.

101. NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechbyMinisterofInterior”,27April1943.

102. DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13, “Civilian Protection Services”,LawrencetoSmuts,16March1942;NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechbyMinisterofInterior”,27April1943.

103. DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13, “Civilian Protection Services”,LawrencetoSmuts,16March1942.

104. DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224,file49/13,“CivilianProtectiveServicesandGuardDuties:MinutesoftheConferenceheldintheOfficeoftheChiefoftheGeneralStaff,CapeTown”,13January1942.

105. NASAP, CPS,Box24, file CPS46, “NationalBroadcast byRegional Commandant, J.S.Fotheringham”,18August1941.


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raid warnings; advice about incendiary bombs and how to deal with them;information on Japanese incendiary bombs; methods and consequences of attacksfromtheair,aswellasprotectivemeasuresandanti‐airraiddevices.106 TheCPSoperationalsystemwasinstitutedbyvarioussectorsandwasadaptedtosuit local conditions.Therailwayandharbourauthorities, forexample,arrangedfor the implementation of the local siren system throughout the railway areas, theblack‐out system and the rescue serviceswithin their domain. The first aid squadsweretrainedintheRailwayandHarbourDivisionsoftheStJohnsAmbulanceBrigadeand the local authorities assisted with training the auxiliary fire squads.107 Largebusinessesorganised their staffmembers into firefighting and first aid squadswhowere trained by the CPS experts. Government departments were also required toprepareadequateprotectivemeasuresandtoorganisetheirmembersforCPSdutiestodealwithemergenciesaffectingthebuildingstheyoccupiedorutilised.108

TheInstituteofSouthAfricanArchitectsplaceditsservicesatthedisposalof

the CPS with regard to providing advice and developing plans for bomb sheltersthroughoutSouthAfrica.109However,despitetheelaboratedesignsandplansofferedtotheCPSandlocalauthorities,noshelterswereconsideredorerected.110Nodoubt,financialconsiderationsandtheapparentlackofairraidthreatsduetoAlliedmilitarysuccessinAfrica,influencedthedecisionnottoconstructshelters. CPS members volunteered in accordance with their preference (ARP orCivilianGuard)andintermsoftheirprofession,trade,expertiseorpriortraining,forexample, in the medical services or fire‐fighting.111 In addition, training for CPSpersonnel, principally thewardenswho served as officers, took place at the SouthAfrican Military College in Pretoria from 1941. The training programme entailedcourses in passive air defence, air raid precautions, anti‐gas measures and fire‐

106. NASAP, CPS, Box 22, file CPS 35, “InstructionNo. 6: IncendiaryBombs andHow to

DealwithThem”,1November1940;NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.19,JapaneseIncendiaryBombs”,24April1942.

107. NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“CivilianProtectiveServices”,GeneralManager,CPSRailwayandHarbours,26August1940.

108. NASAP, JUS, Box 1526, file 1/57/40, Secretary for Public Works to Secretary forJustice, 18 September 1941; DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13,“Emergency Protection of Public Buildings against Enemy Action or Sabotage”,SecretaryforPublicWorkstoAllDistrictRepresentatives,January1942.

109. UCT,LawrencePapers,BC640,E3.138, “CivilianProtectiveServices InstructionNo.1”,17July1940,amended23June1942;NASAP,CPS,Box21,fileCPS21,“CPSPolicy”,26August1940;Haddon,HansonandMartienssen,“CivilDefenceinSouthAfrica”,pp328–354;Hamlin,“CivilianProtectiveServicesinSouthAfrica”,pp170–171.

110. NASAP, CPS,Box24, file CPS46, “NationalBroadcast byRegional Commandant, J.S.Fotheringham”,18August1941.

111. CPSAttestationFormsposedquestions on theexpertise or tradeof volunteers, e.g.medicine,firstaid,fire‐fighting,andARP,whichhadtobecompletedbyrecruits.


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fighting.112TheCivilianGuardsectionwastrainedinwardens’duties,highexplosiveand incendiary bomb control, rescue and demolitionwork aswell as police patrolwork.113 The defence authorities facilitated a twelve‐day CPS training programmeuntil1942,wheretheCPSwasevenraisedtobecomethe“fourthservice”,alongwiththe army, air force and navy, like the British civil defence. After completion, thegraduateswereauthorisedtotrainotherCPSvolunteersintheirrespectiveareas.114 ThedemandfortheCPSgrewconsistentlyacrossthecountry.Inmanytownsandcities, the local citizensapproached localmilitarycommands forextendingCPSoperations.115 Despite of the huge demand, the CPS organisation was not withoutproblems, however. Funding was insufficient. The CPSmembers volunteered theirserviceswithoutanypayment,116whilemostof theCPSorganisationalandrunningcostswerecarriedbythemunicipalities.117Thedefenceauthoritiesmadeitclearthatthe country’s resources were mobilised for military requirements and necessitiessuchasthemedicalandsurgicalequipmentfortheCPSshouldbesourcedbythelocalauthorities.118A limitednumber of uniformswere paid for by the government, butthesewereonlyfortheCivilianGuards.ThepolicecommissionerofferedtoequiptheCivilian Guards with uniforms, pistols and rifles where necessary. However, theministerofdefencerejectedrequeststoprovideuniformsfortheCPS,citingfinancialconstraints.119Wherepossible,somelocalmunicipalitiesofferedtopurchasesecond‐handuniformsfortheirCPSmembers.120ThelocalauthoritieswerealsoexpectedtoprovideplastichelmetsfortheARPsectionasthesteelhelmetswerereservedforthemilitarypersonnel.121 112. DOD Archives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/1, Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary for

Interior,17December1941.113. NASAP,CPS,Box19, fileCPS11,TownClerk JohannesburgtoMinisterofInterior,1

April1941.114. DOD Archives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/5, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director CPS, 2

October1942;“C.P.S.Raisedto‘FourthService’”,TheFriend,18June1942.115. DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13, “Minutes of conference, Civilian

ProtectiveServices”,13January1942;DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224,file49/13,Henry Hope, Bureau of Information to Blaine, Secretary for Defence, 28 February1942.

116. NASAP, CPS, Box 24, file CPS 46, “CPS Broadcast, H.G. Lawrence”, 26 August 1941;NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechbyMinisterofInterior”,27April1943.

117. UCT,LawrencePapers,BC640,E3.138, “CivilianProtectiveServices InstructionNo.1”,17July1940,amended23June1942.

118. DOD Archives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/5, “Medical and surgical requirements forCPS”,SecretaryforDefencetoSecretaryforInterior,5November1940.

119. DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/8,“CivilianProtectiveServices:CivilianGuardsUnits”,SecretaryforInteriortoSecretaryforDefence,18March1941;DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/8,BlainetoLawrence,21March1941.

120. DODArchives,DC,Box3156, file1651/8, “SaleofSecond‐handUniformClothing toCPSatEastLondon”,Quartermaster‐GeneraltoSecretaryforFinance,1July1942.

121. NASAP,CPS,Box23,fileCPS38,“IssueofC.P.S.Equipment”,DirectorCPStoSecretaryofInterior,22September1942.


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Some of the CPS volunteers complained about the apparent lack of support

fromthegovernment. Insmall towns likeSpringsandBenoni intheWitwatersrandarea,theunpaidvolunteersoftheCivilianGuardscarriedoutpatrolsinwetandcoldconditionswithoutgreatcoatsorraincoats.Theyalsosuppliedtheirownboots,shirtsandovercoats,andhadtowaitformonthsbeforetheirclaimsondamageduniformscouldbecompensated.122TheycomplainedthattheCivilianGuardsweredoingpolicework, yet, they did not enjoy better privileges such as the provision of petrol formembersusing their ownvehicles and the constructionof protective facilities. Themunicipalities also protested about the large sums ofmoney expended on the CPSorganisation and operations without government support, although, the statetreasurywas benefiting from the fines derived from court prosecutions. They alsocomplained that the government was not taking interest in the CPS.123 Themunicipalities imploredthegovernmenttomakesomedirectcontributionstothemwith respect to theCPSwork.124Thegovernmentwasnot swift indealingwith theproblems,however,thisdidnothamperrecruitmentefforts.Itwasonlyin1943,thatthe government established a committee to allocate subsidies to defray the costsbornebythelocalauthoritiesinCPSwork.125TheworkoftheCPSwasgivenpublicityinthepressanditwasevencontemplatedthatitshouldberetainedafterthewar.126 Apart from difficult service conditions, the CPS also experienced some legalproblems.Theministerofdefencedividedthemilitarycommandsofthecountryintotwobroadareasofcontrol:theInlandAreaunderMajorGeneralG.E.Brink,andtheCoastalAreaunderMajorGeneralI.P.deVilliers.Themilitarycommandersassumedoperational control and the authority of the CPS’s chief area commandants wasrestrictedtoadministrativecontrol,disciplineandtraining.127Itwasunclearwhowasultimately accountable for and the main authority to issue black‐out orders. Thematter was clarified after consultation with the defence legal advisor, that“operational control” was restricted to the actual conduct of operationswhere themilitary commanders retained overriding authority to issue orders. The CPSmembers would be required to execute those orders as prescribed.128 Anotherchallengewas the refusal of the government attorney to representmembersof theCPS in court cases – suchas assault charges– that arose fromactions taken in the 122. “NeedsofSpringsCivilianGuards”,TheStar, 27May1942; “ReefTownswantState

Lead”,SundayTimes,31May1942.123. “ReefTownswantStateLead”,SundayTimes,31May1942.124. DODArchives,CGS(War),Box224,file49/13,LawrencetoSmuts,16March1942.125. NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechofMinisterofInterior”,27

April1943;“CommitteetoAllocateStateC.P.SSubsidy”,CapeTimes,6April1943.126. “FutureofPretoriaCPS”,PretoriaNews,6April1943;“CPSaftertheWar”,CapeArgus,

7April1943.RecruitmentandplacementoftheCPSmemberswasgeneric,however,thosewithbackgrounds inspecificprofessionsandtradeshadanoptiontoserve inthosecapacitiessuchasfire‐fightingorambulanceservices.

127. DODArchives,DC, Box 3156, file 1651/1, “National EmergencyRegulations 36 and37:DelegationofAuthority”,22June1942.

128. DODArchives,DC,Box3156,file1651/1,“PowersoftheChiefAreaCommandantsoftheCPS”,SecretaryforJusticetoDirectorCPS,21October1942.


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course of carrying out their duties, for example, in effecting an arrest.129 TheDepartment of Justicewas not sympathetic and indicated that no special courts ortribunals,asproposedbythechiefareacommandantofSprings,wouldbeapproved.CPSmembershadtoabidebytheexistingjudicialprocesses.130 On12 June1942, theCPSDisciplinaryCodewaspublished,which regulatedthe conduct of the CPS volunteers.131 The code prescribed the rules for the CPSmembersandpenaltiesagainstthemiftheycommittedanyoftheeighteenlistedactsofmisconduct, forexample,derelictionofduty, insubordination, fightingandabsentwithout leave.132 The code provided the CPS with improved status. However, themembers did not enjoy the same privileges as the police or the UDF. They wereunpaid volunteers and in most cases had to cater for themselves. There weredeficiencies in the supply of equipment, unequal distribution of the workload andfinancial burdens as some municipalities could not afford to support the CPS.Whereascivilianprotectionwastheresponsibilityofthegovernment,itshirkedthatobligationandtheCPSoperatedthroughthe“generosity”ofthetowncouncils,andofprivatefirms.133Infact,thetowncouncilstooktheleadinCPSorganisationandthegovernmentprovidedoversight.

A senseofpublic apathyand resentment crept in.134Authorities accordingly

worked harder to stimulate interest. Through the radio broadcasts, it becameincreasingly apparentwhy the government had instituted the CPS: to reassure thepublic that thegovernmentwasdoingsomething, toboost theirmoraleand togivethema senseof “public service” as an “anarmyof civilians”mobilised towards thenational war effort and contributing to the security and defence of their homecountry.135 It is interesting that despite the challenges, themembership of the CPS

129. NASAP, JUS, Box 1526, file 1/57/40, “Civilian Guards”, Chief Area Commandant,

Springs,toSecretaryforJustice,30March1942.130. NASAP, JUS,Box1526, file1/57/40, “CivilianGuards”, Secretary for Justice toChief

AreaCommandant,Springs,20May1942.131. DOD Archives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/1, “Members of UDF serving with CPS”,

Adjutant‐General to Secretary for Defence, 28 December 1942; “More CPS RecruitsWanted”,TheFriend,18June1942.

132. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 7, “Legal Matters”, 16 September 1943; “More CPSRecruitsWanted”,TheFriend,18June1942.

133. “NeedsofSpringsCivilianGuards”,TheStar, 27May1942; “ReefTownswantStateLead”,SundayTimes,31May1942;“TheProtectionofBloemfontein”,TheFriend,18June1942.

134. DOD Archives, CGS (War), Box 224, file 49/13, “Minutes of Conference, CPS”, 13January1942.

135. NASAP,CPS,Box24, fileCPS46, “CPSBroadcasts,”9September1941;NASAP,CPS,Box24,fileCPS46,“CPSBroadcast,H.G.Lawrence”,26August1941;NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechbyMinisterofInterior”,27April1943.


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wasestimatedtobe80000,with167branchesacrossthecountry,asreportedbytheministeroftheinterior.136 TheactivitiesoftheCPSbegantodeclineduring1943,duetothediminishingsecuritythreatsaftertheAlliedforcesbegantorollbackGermany,andtheslackeningoffofanti‐waractivism.Thegovernmentinitiatedtheprocessofdisbandingsectionsof theCPS in the inlandareas,but retained those incoastal areaswhereblack‐outswere still enforced. Essential services such as medical, firefighting and demolitionwerealsoretained.137AuthoritieswerecautiousnottodispensecompletelywiththeCPS,especiallytheCivilianGuards,becausethewarwasnotyetoverandmanyareasremainedwithoutpoliceprotection.138TransferanddisbandmentIn September 1943, the directorate CPS was transferred from the Department ofInterior to the Department of Justice. The new arrangements also involved T.B.Clapham,whorelinquishedhispositionasCPSdirector.HewassucceededbyRobertA. Meston on 27 August 1943.139 But the new arrangements came with problems.WhereasClaphamwassecondedto theCPSpost fromtheUDFasamilitaryofficer,Meston was not. He had previously served as the deputy police commissioner ofSouth Africa. Although he exercised similar powers as Clapham in the CPS, thedefenceauthoritiesrefusedtogranthimthemilitaryrankoflieutenantcolonelandhewas requested by the adjutant‐general to seek approval from the policecommissionertowearapoliceuniform.140MestonappealedthedecisiontotheCGS(Van Ryneveld) for reconsideration, but it was not approved.141 No reasons werefurnished, but it could well have been because he did not serve in any militarycapacityeitherintheACFortheUDF. TheCPScontinued to functionnormallywithin theDepartmentof Justice. InDecember1943, itwasrecommendedthat theCivilianGuardsbereorganisedasanauxiliarypoliceforceandbesworninasspecialconstablesforthedurationofthewar 136. NASAP,CPS,Box22,fileCPS35,“CircularNo.45,SpeechbyMinisterofInterior”,27

April 1943; “CPSWorkGoesOn”,TheStar, 20February1943; “CPS after theWar”,CapeArgus,7April1943.

137. “5000CPSWardenstobereleasedinJohannesburg”,RandDailyMail,20March1943;“Ministerthanks5000disbandedCPSWardens”,RandDailyMail,23April1943.

138. NASAP,CPS,Box1,fileCPS7,“CivilianProtectiveServices:CivilianGuards”,DirectorCPStoSecretaryforJustice,11November1943;“5000CPSWardenstobeReleasedinJohannesburg”,RandDailyMail,20March1943.

139. NASAP, Department of Interior (hereafter BNS), Box 254, file 150/72, “Transfer toDepartment of Justice of all Records of CPS and Internment Camps”, 2 September1943;NASAP,CPS,Box19,fileCPS11,“CircularNo.48”,CPSDirectorytoAllAssistantDirectorsandChiefAreaCommandants,3September1943.

140. DOD Archives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/9, “Director: Civilian Protective Services”,Adjutant‐GeneraltoDirectorCPS,10December1943.

141. DODArchives, DC, Box 3156, file 1651/9, “Lt. Col. R.A.Meston, Director of CivilianProtectiveServices”,Adjutant‐GeneraltoSecretaryforDefence,7March1944.


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oruntilterminationofservicesbasedonthe24hours’noticeprinciple.142Fromlate1943to1944,theCPSactivitiesintheinlandregionsweresuspended.AlthoughtherewerecallstoretaintheservicesoftheCPSafterthewar,on14April1945,towardsthe conclusionof thewar inEurope, theDepartment of Justice announced that theCPS was to be disbanded throughout South Africa, except the Civilian Guards andthose who protected the oil sites.143 Interestingly, Meston continued to use themilitaryrankoflieutenantcolonelinallhiscorrespondencesuntilthedisbandmentoftheCPSin1945.

TheefficiencyoftheCPSduringthewarwasnevertestedbecauseSouthAfricawasnotsubjectedtoanyaerialattacksorseabornebombardment.Henceitbecameeasier towinddown its serviceswithoutanymajor incidentsordisruptionsbeforethe termination of hostilities. It had served its purpose as a wartime measure tosafeguardpublic safety, as an instrument to sustain thepopulation’smorale and tomobilisepublicsupportforthegovernment’swarpolicy.HencetheCPSwasretaineduntil theendof thewarwhenAlliedvictorywasassuredand thepotential internalsecurity threat had diminished. The CPS mainly assisted in providing auxiliaryservicestothenationalpolice,whodealtdirectlywithsubversiveelementsinSouthAfricaduringthewar.144ConclusionCivildefencedevelopedasaresultofthedevelopmentofmilitaryaviationintheearlytwentieth century, and the fear of aerial bombing of civilians which was firstexperienced during the Great War. It involved the provision of measures such asshelters,black‐outs,emergencyservices,warningsystemsandinformationtoensurecivilian protection against aerial attacks. Countries such as Britain, the USA andFrance,developedcivildefenceprovisionssuchastheARPsystemduringtheinter‐war period in anticipation of aerial bombing in future conflict. However, in SouthAfrica, civil defence preparations during the inter‐war years were virtually non‐existent.Despitepublicoutcriesandanxious letters fromconcernedcitizensurginggovernment action, authorities did not believe that the country was vulnerable toaerial attacks because it was too distant from the potential theatres of war. TheauthoritiesinstitutedtheCivilianProtectiveServices(CPS)inJune1940,whenItalyenteredthewaronthesideofNaziGermany.Authoritiesrealised thatSouthAfricawaswithinreachoftheenemyairraids,andmeasureswerenecessarytoprotectthecivilians.TheCPSconsistedof theair raidprecaution (ARP)and theCivilianGuardsections,whichrequiredthevoluntaryparticipationofthecivilianpopulationforittowork. 142. NASAP, CPS, Box 1, file CPS 7, “Circular No. 53”, Director CPS to All Chief Area

Commandants,9December1943.143. NASAP,CPS,Box21, fileCPS21, “DisbandmentofCivilianProtectiveServices”,CPS

DirectortoAllChiefAreaCommandants,14April1945.144 Fedorowich, “German Espionage and British Counter‐Intelligence”, pp 209–230;

Shear, “Colonel Coetzee’sWar”, pp 222–248. See also Furlong,Between Crown andSwastika.


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Ashighlightedabove,thedevelopmentofcivildefenceinSouthAfricawasnotagovernment initiative. Itwas thecivilians in larger localmunicipalities,motivatedbyfearofbombardmentfromtheairandfromthesea,whodesignedindividualcivildefenceschemestoprotectthemselvesastheyweremostlikelytobearthebruntofsuchattacks.TheauthoritiesseizedtheopportunitytoinstitutetheCPSandjustifieditasa“preventiveandprotective”measureaimedatdealingwithemergenciesarisingoutofwarconditions.GovernmentinvolvementinestablishingtheCPSwasintendedtoprovideacoherentand“unified”nationalapproachforhomedefence.Inessence,the authorities relied on themeasuresdesignedby themunicipalities to define theCPSoperationalpurposeandfunctions.ThegovernmentprovidedlimitedsupportfortheCPS,exceptgivingitofficialstatus,trainingandbelatedsubsidies.It leftmostofits financing and operations to the municipalities. This presented a challenge toinstitute efficientprotective servicesdue topoor service conditions andequipmentdeficiency. However, through publicity in the press, radio broadcasts, generalcircularsandappealsbylocalauthorities,theSouthAfricanpopulationwasbesoughttoparticipateintheCPSasa“civicduty”inanationaldefenceeffort,andameanstopreservethemoraleofthetroopsinthefield,toenablethemtofocusonwinningthewarabroad.Thepopulation,especiallylocalauthorities,wereconcernedabouttheirown security, thus they persevered and supported the CPS. Hence 80000 civilianmembers volunteered for service. It is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of theCPSbecauseSouthAfricaneverexperiencedanyaerialattacks.However,itsvaluecanbededucedfromcallstoretainsomeoftheservicesafterthewar,inordertoprovidecapacitytodealwithotherpotentialcivilemergencies.145REFERENCESAlexander, D., “From Civil Defence to Civil Protection – and back again”, Disaster

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