hirose 2009. reconsidering the value of equality ,.,.,.,

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Reconsidering the Value ofEqualityIwao Hirose a ba McGill University ,b The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics,University of Melbourne ,Published online: 06 Jun 2009.

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RECONSIDERING THE VALUE OF EQUALITY

Iwao Hirose

Some people believe that the equality of peoples well-being makes an outcomebetter, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paperI will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it

with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Part [1995] and widelyaccepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation ismore plausible than Parts. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it

shows his Levelling Down Objection does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism.I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarityand dierence between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View.

I. Introduction

Some people believe that the equality of peoples well-being makes anoutcome better, other things being constant. Following Part [1995], I callthis Teleological Egalitarianism, or Telic Egalitarianism for short.1 In thispaper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, andcompare it with Parts interpretation. According to Parts interpretation,equality (or inequality) is good (or bad) in itself, and is a part of states ofaairs. On the other hand, according to my proposed interpretation,equality is good-making, and is a feature of how we aggregate peoples well-being into the goodness of a state of aairs. I will argue that myinterpretation is more plausible than Parts. It has three advantages. First,it shows that Parts Levelling Down Objection does not undermine TelicEgalitarianism (whereas many philosophers believe that it does). Second, itelucidates the similarity and dierence between Telic Egalitarianism and hisproposed Priority View. Third, without imposing an unnecessary restriction,it avoids a further counterintuitive implication that proponents of Partsinterpretation would encounter.The structure of this paper is as follows. In xII, I will rst present Parts

interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and his Levelling Down Objection toit. I will then propose my own interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism. In xIII,I will present Parts Priority View, and clarify what exactly is needed toavoid the Levelling Down Objection. xxIV, V and VI, respectively, aredevoted to explaining the three advantages of my interpretation over

1Some egalitarians understand inequality to be unjust or unfair. This type may be called DeonticEgalitarianism. I do not consider it here.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 301312; June 2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ISSN 0004-8402 print/ISSN 1471-6828 online 2009 Australasian Association of Philosophyhttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/00048400802636395

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Parts. I will also consider what is called conditional egalitarianism, whichis a revised version of Parts interpretation, and argue that myinterpretation is preferable to conditional egalitarianism. xVII summarizesmy conclusions.

II. Two Interpretations of Telic Egalitarianism

According to Part [1995: 4], Telic Egalitarianism holds at least oneprinciple. It is the

Principle of Equality: It is in itself bad if some people are worse o than others.

The Principle of Equality alone, however, would not constitute a plausibledistributive principle. Suppose that a distributive principle considers onlythe disvalue of inequality. According to this distributive principle, thegoodness of states of aairs is a function of the disvalue of inequality. Thatis, the goodness of a state of aairs, G, is given by

G f I ;

where I is some measure of inequality and f ( ) is strictly decreasing in I. Thisdistributive principle would judge that one perfectly equal distribution is justas good as another perfectly equal distribution, even though one is strictlybetter for everyone than the other. To illuminate, compare two distributionsin the two-person case, x (200, 200) and y (100, 100), where the bracketsshow the well-being of two people. If the Principle of Equality is notcombined with another principle, it would be judged that x is equally asgood as y, whereas most people would judge that x is strictly better than y.The Principle of Equality should be combined with another principle,e.g. the

Principle of Utility: It is in itself better if people are better o.

This principle may be understood as the maximization of the total sum, orthe average, of peoples well-being. When the Principle of Equality iscombined with the Principle of Utility, the goodness of a state of aairs, G,is given by

G f 0 W; I ;

where W denotes the total sum, or the average, of peoples well-being, andf 0( ) is strictly increasing in W and strictly decreasing in I. According to thisprinciple, the goodness of a state of aairs is the aggregated value ofpeoples well-being and inequality. Inequality is an argument that is anegative component. Together with the Principle of Utility, the Principle of

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Equality judges that x (200, 200) is strictly better than y (100, 100). ForParts purposes, however, it suces that Telic Egalitarianism holds at leastthe Principle of Equality. According to him, Telic Egalitarianism means aprinciple such that it is in itself worse if some people are worse o thanothers.Part [1995: 1618] raises the Levelling Down Objection (hereafter, the

Objection) to Telic Egalitarianism thus construed.2 Levelling-down occurswhen the well-being of a better o person is lowered to the level of a worseo person without beneting any person. According to Part, TelicEgalitarianism holds that a levelling-down is, at least in one respect, better.This is because the levelling-down makes the outcome more equal. However,those who raise the Objection hold that it is not better in any respect, andthat this implication of Telic Egalitarianism is absurd.It should be noted that the Objection is not concerned with the all-things-

considered judgment about the relative goodness of states of aairs. It doesnot object to Telic Egalitarianism that the distribution is made, all thingsconsidered, better by the levelling-down. It only objects that the state ofaairs after the levelling-down is, at least in one respect, better than the stateof aairs before the levelling-down. The Objection highlights one respectwith regard to which the levelling-down is better, not the overall goodness ofstates of aairs.It is easy to see how the Objection works when we look at the formal

presentation of Parts Telic Egalitarianism. It is the disvalue of inequality Ithat oers the respect with regard to which the levelling-down is judged tobe better. According to Part, Telic Egalitarianism holds at least thePrinciple of Equality. As far as the goodness of a state of aairs is given by afunction that takes the disvalue of inequality in its argument, there is alwaysone respect with regard to which the levelling-down is better. I believe thatthe Objection is derived from this particular interpretation of TelicEgalitarianism that he has in mind, and that the Objection does not workfor the interpretation that I will propose.Here is my proposed interpretation. Inequality is not an object of

aggregation for estimating the goodness of a state of aairs, but a feature ofan aggregative process for estimating the goodness of a state of aairs. Thatis, I does not appear as an argument of the function. It is only W thatappears as an argument. Equality is integrated as a feature of the function.To use the formal expression, on my interpretation, the goodness of a stateof aairs is given by

G f 00 W

where f 00( ) is some strictly increasing, egalitarian function. According tothis formula, the disvalue of inequality does not appear as an argument.This interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism takes the list of peoples

2For other discussions on the Levelling Down Objection, see Brown [2003], Holtug [1998], Mason [2001], andTemkin [2000].

Reconsidering the Value of Equality 303

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well-being as the informational basis of distributive judgments, andaggregates peoples well-being in such a way that a more equal distributionis strictly better than a less equal one, other things being constant. Since thedisvalue of inequality, I, does not appear as an argument of the function, asI argue in xIV, my interpretation does not have the respect with regard towhich the levelling-down is better, and thus it is not susceptible to theObjection.Consider the following simple formula as an example of Parts

interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism. Suppose that there are two people,and that the goodness of a state of aairs is given by the average ofpeoples well-being and the disvalue of inequality. Suppose further that thedisvalue of inequality is measured by the absolute dierence betweentwo peoples well-being, normalized twice by the number of people (I willexplain why this is so later). Then, the goodness of the state of aairs isgiven by:

g w1;w2 1=2 w1 w2 1=4 w1 w2j j: 1

This formula represents Parts interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism. Thedisvalue of inequality, jw1 w2j, represents what he calls the Principle ofEquality. The average of peoples well-being represents the Principle ofUtility. Therefore, equation (1) is clearly a typical combination of these twoprinciples. But there is another way to look at Telic Egalitarianism.3 By asimple rearrangement, equation (1) is written as the following equation thatbest represents my proposed interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism.

gw1;w2 1=4w1 3=4w2 if w1 w23=4w1 1=4w2 if w1 w2

2

The dierent mathematical formulations represent the dierent interpreta-tions of Telic Egalitarianism. Parts interpretation, represented by equation(1), considers the value of peoples well-being and the disvalue of inequality,and judges the relative goodness of states of aairs by the aggregated valueof these two considerations. On his interpretation, inequality is one of theobjects in estimating the goodness of a state of aairs. On the other hand,my interpretation, represented by equation (2), considers only peoples well-being, and aggregates peoples well-being in such a way that the relativeposition of two people determines the moral importance of each personswell-being. On this interpretation, inequality is a feature of the aggregativeprocess.Notice that these two mathematical formulations merely represent two

dierent interpretations of the same distributive principle. I am not

3I beneted here from discussion with John Broome. See Blackorby and Donaldson [1980: 115]. Equations(1) and (2) are known as the Gini social welfare function in economic theory. The general form of equation (2)is given by:

1=n2 wi 3wj 5wk 2n 1 wn

; for wi wj wn:

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proposing a new distributive principle. Telic Egalitarianism is a distributiveprinciple about the relative goodness of states of aairs. It determines therelative goodness of, and the ranking of, the states of aairs. Given thatequation (1) and (2) are mathematically equivalent, these two interpreta-tions refer to the same distributive principle. Two equations that representtwo interpretations of Telic Egalitarianism make the same distributivejudgements for any pair of states of aairs, and rank the states of aairs inexactly the same way. Therefore, as far as the distributive judgments areconcerned, there is no dierence between the two equations. The onlydierence between Part and me lies in interpretation. In what follows, I willargue that my interpretation is more plausible than Parts interpretationfor three reasons. However, before I outline these reasons, I need to explainhis Priority View in order to clarify what exactly is needed to avoid theObjection.

III. Parts Priority View

The Objection motivates Part to propose an alternative distributiveprinciple, which has become known as the Priority View. Telic Egalitarian-ism is concerned, at least to some extent, with the relation between dierentpeoples well-being. Its concern about the relation between dierent peopleswell-being oers the respect with regard to which the levelling-down isbetter. Part [1995: 23] attempts to eliminate the relational elements fromhis proposed principle. That is, the Priority View does not hold that it is initself bad if someone is worse o than others. However, it does hold that weshould give priority to a person who is at a lower absolute level: it isconcerned with the absolute level of each persons well-being, not therelation between dierent people. It maintains that how much each personswell-being counts in the goodness of a state of aairs should be determinedindependently of other peoples well-being. Part calls this claim non-relational [1995: 245].Instead of claiming that inequality is bad in itself, the Priority View

contends that the moral goodness derived from giving a certain benet to aperson at a lower absolute level is greater than that derived from giving thesame benet to another person at a higher absolute level. That is, the moralgoodness of a persons well-being diminishes as the absolute level of his well-being gets higher regardless of how well o others are. This is what Partcalls the law of diminishing moral goodness [1995: 19].Given non-relationality and the law of diminishing moral goodness, Part

presents the Priority View as follows:

The Priority View (informal): Beneting people matters more the worse othese people are.

[1995: 19]

Let me explain why the Priority View is believed to avoid the Objection,using a more formal expression of it.


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The Priority View (formal): a state of aairs x w1;w2; . . . ;wn is at leastas good as another state of aairs y w01;w02; . . .w0n

if and only

if g w1 g w2 g wn g w01 g w02 g w0n ; where g ( )

is some strictly increasing, strictly concave function.4

An increasing, strictly concave function is one whose graph slopes upwardsbut bends downwards. The shape of the graph is given independently of thespread of peoples well-being, and determines how much each persons well-being counts in the overall goodness of a state of aairs.It is believed that the Priority View is not susceptible to the Objection.

This is clear when we look at the formal presentation of the Priority View.The Priority View avoids the Objection because the goodness of a state ofaairs is given by the weighted sum of peoples well-being, and there is norespect with regard to which the levelling-down is better. Admittedly,according to the formal presentation above, if we lower the level of a bettero persons well-being to the level of a worse o person without benetingany person, it is just worse for the better o person, and it is not better inany respect. If the goodness of state of aairs is given by the weighted sumof peoples well-being, it would be claimed that this distributive principle isnot susceptible to the Objection.

IV. The First Advantage

Now I will argue that the Objection applies only to Parts interpretation. Iwill show that, according to my interpretation, Telic Egalitarianism can berepresented by the weighted sum of peoples well-being like the formula ofthe Priority View, thus avoiding the Objection.Observe equation (1), which represents Parts interpretation. It would be

claimed that this representation of Telic Egalitarianism encounters theObjection. Suppose that person 1 is strictly better o than person 2, namelythat w14w2. If w1 is reduced to the level of w2, the value of (w1 w2) isreduced to nil, and hence the disvalue of inequality is reduced. It seems thatthe levelling-down of w1 is better in terms of the inequality reduction. On theface of it, Telic Egalitarianism as equation (1) seems to be susceptible to theObjection. However, according to equation (2), which represents myinterpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, the levelling-down is not better inany respect. Suppose again that w14w2. According to equation (2), thelevelling-down of w1 is not better for person 2. It is just worse for person 1.There is no respect with regard to which the levelling-down of w1 is better.No wonder, Telic Egalitarianism as equation (2) is represented by theweighted sum of peoples well-being just like the formula of the PriorityView. If it is claimed that the Priority View avoids the Objection, it wouldalso be claimed that my interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism avoids theObjection. When we look at Telic Egalitarianism represented as equation(1), there is a sense according to which the levelling-down is better at least in

4The same formula appears in Broome [1993: 216], Jensen [1996: 121] and Rabinowicz [2002: 8].

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one respect. However, when we look at exactly the same principlerepresented in a dierent way, the levelling-down is not better in anyrespect. The Objection merely suggests that one interpretation of TelicEgalitarianism appears absurd. It does not establish that Telic Egalitarian-ism itself is absurd. An analogous example may help to illustrate my point.Suppose that the morning star appears dull. This does not mean that theplanet Venus itself is dull, as the evening star may well appear beautiful.Thus, my proposed interpretation shows that the Objection does notundermine Telic Egalitarianism itself as a distributive principle. I take this tobe one of the advantages in my interpretation.Before I move on to explaining the second advantage, let me make a quick

remark. It might be asked why the coecient should be in equation (1). Ifthe coecient is large enough (i.e. if it is strictly greater than ), thelevelling-down is better in some respect according to equation (2) as well asequation (1). Here is a reason why it should be strictly smaller than .Suppose that the coecient is . Then, my interpretation of TelicEgalitarianism is represented by:

gw1;w2 w2 if w1 w2w1 if w1 w2:

3

This means that if one person is worse o than the other, the well-being ofthe better o person does not count at all. In which case, TelicEgalitarianism violates the Principle of Utility. It is easy to generalize thisto cases where the coecient is strictly greater than . If the coecient isstrictly greater than , the well-being of the better o person countsnegatively. In which case, again, Telic Egalitarianism violates the Principleof Utility. This is why the coecient must be smaller than . Myinterpretation explains that the weight for our egalitarian concern should beconstrained.5

On the other hand, from Parts interpretation, we cannot tell anythingabout the constraint on the weight of equality. Proponents of Partsinterpretation would believe that we can choose the degree of egalitarianconcern by choosing some weight for the Principle of Equality. That is, theywould believe that if we choose a greater weight for the disvalue ofinequality, say greater than , we can make Telic Egalitarianism moreegalitarian without violating the Principle of Utility, because we stillconsider peoples average well-being to some extent (i.e. in so far as Wappears in G f 0 (W, I)). However, my interpretation shows that this beliefis clearly false. Parts interpretation leads us to the false belief such that we

5There is a reason to choose a quarter in the two-person case that economists could oer. In the literature ofinequality measurement, it is widely believed that the disvalue of inequality should be normalized twice bythe number of people. This is because of what economists call the condition of population invariance.Consider two states of aairs with dierent population sizes: x (5, 10) and y (5, 5, 10, 10). Thedistributional pattern in x is the same as that in y, but the population is duplicated in y. Populationinvariance claims that x is just as unequal as y. To satisfy this population invariance condition, the disvalueof inequality is normalized twice by the number of people.


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can have a stronger version of Telic Egalitarianism without violating thePrinciple of Utility.

V. The Second Advantage

The second advantage in my interpretation is that it better explains theimportant similarity and dierence between Telic Egalitarianism and thePriority View. On Parts interpretation, we cannot see the similarity anddierence that I discuss in this section.Observe equation (2) again. It is easy to understand that the well-being of

the better o receives the weight of and the well-being of the worse oreceives the weight of 3=4. That is to say, when some benet is available, wecan obtain a greater amount of good if we give it to the worse o. Thismeans that, just like the Priority View, Telic Egalitarianism gives priority tothe worse o; both Telic Egalitarianism and the Priority View agreeconcerning the claim of giving priority to the worse o. From Partsinterpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, it is dicult to notice this similarity.Thus, my interpretation better demonstrates the similarity between the twoprinciples.My interpretation better explains also the precise dierence between Telic

Egalitarianism and the Priority View. Part notices the dierence, but it isdicult to capture it from his interpretation. Let me explain. The PriorityView gives priority to people who are at a lower absolute level regardless ofhow well o others are. On this view, if some benet is available, we shouldgive it to the worse o person. But this view has a further implication. It isthat, given a total well-being constant, a transfer of some benet from abetter o person to a worse o person makes the outcome strictly better.This is because the increase of one unit in the well-being for the better o isless important than the increase of one unit in well-being for the worse oand, in turn, the decrease of one unit in well-being for the better o is strictlyless important than the increase of one unit in well-being for the worse o.By transferring the benets from the better o to the worse o, the outcomeis made strictly better in so far as the total well-being is not altered. Thisprocess of transfer continues up to the point where the absolute level of theworse o becomes the same as the absolute level of the better o. Thismeans that, given a total well-being constant, the goodness of the state ofaairs is maximized when people are at the same absolute level of well-being. There is a built-in eect that the Priority View produces more equaloutcomes. Part himself acknowledges this [1995: 25]:

But, since this view has a built-in bias towards equality, it could be calledEgalitarian in a second, looser sense. We might say that, if we take this view,we are Non-Relational Egalitarians.6

6Broome [unpublished ms.] argues that in so far as the Priority View is egalitarian in some way, it is alsosusceptible to the Objection. On the Priority View, if peoples well-being is equalized, the goodness of thestate of aairs is maximized. To put this another way, if there is inequality, there is some wasted good, whichcould have been obtained under perfect equality. On the Priority View, the levelling-down is better at least in

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The Priority View is thus egalitarian in this non-relational sense.Presumably, Part would claim that Telic Egalitarianism is Relationalegalitarian. However, from his interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, it isdicult to see what exactly is meant by the dierence between Non-Relational and Relational. On the other hand, my interpretation explainsthe precise meaning of the dierence. Yet again, observe equation (2). TelicEgalitarianism gives the weight of to the better o person and the weightof 3=4 to the worse o person. The weights are determined by the rank-orderposition of the person in the ranking by well-being level. The weights aredetermined by the relative positions of dierent people. Therefore, myinterpretation shows that the relation between dierent people determineshow much priority (or moral importance) we give to each persons well-being.On the other hand, on the Priority View, the weight of a persons well-

being is determined independently of other peoples well-being. It is given bysome strictly concave function that I elucidated in xIII. Thus, the dierencebetween Relational and Non-Relational lies in the ways in which wedetermine the weights of peoples well-being. This is made clear when welook at equation (2). But it is not clear if we only look at equation (1). Thus,my interpretation better explains both similarity and dierence betweenTelic Egalitarianism and the Priority View.

VI. The Third Advantage

The third advantage in my interpretation is that it avoids anothercounterintuitive implication that Parts would encounter. In order torecap Parifts interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, let us revisit how theObjection proceeds. He claims that Telic Egalitarianism holds at least thePrinciple of Equality, according to which it is in itself bad if some people areworse o than others. On this interpretation, the Principle of Equality issucient for a distributive principle to be Telic Egalitarianism, although itshould be combined with other principles such as the Principle of Utility.Given this interpretation, we are led to detach the value of equality fromother values such as the value of peoples well-being, and to focus on thevalue of equality in isolation from other values. Part then proceeds to pointout that the Principle of Equality provides the respect with regard to whichthe levelling-down seems better. By saying that equality is good in itself, wehave the impression that the disvalue of inequality can be detached from theother values. The Objection takes advantage of this impression. Thus, theforce of the Objection is derived from the use of the Principle of Equality ininterpreting Telic Egalitarianism.Can we consider equality in isolation from other considerations such as

the Principle of Utility? No, we cannot. Equality is intimately related to thevalue of peoples well-being. It is easy to see why this is so. First, equality

one respect because it reduces the disvalue of wasted goodness. Thus, Broome concludes, the Priority View issusceptible to the Objection.


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(or inequality) itself cannot exist in isolation from peoples well-being. Ifthere were no people, there would be no inequality in the rst place. Thevalue of equality, or the disvalue of inequality, assumes that there are two ormore people. Equality or inequality exists only when there are two or morepeople. Thus, we cannot isolate equality from other values such as peopleswell-being.Second, inequality cannot be measured without considering the overall

distributional pattern of peoples well-being. That is, to measure inequality,we need to see the well-being of all people. For example, we cannot measureinequality looking only at the absolute dierence between a better o personand a worse o person. Suppose that there are two people, and compare twostates of aairs, x (10, 5) and y (110, 105). The absolute dierencebetween the better o person and the worse o person is the same in x and y.But the degree of inequality would be quite dierent. Needless to say, thetotal well-being, or the average well-being, is dierent in x and y: it is greaterin y than x. To measure the overall goodness of the state of aairs and theinequality, we need to look at both the level of each persons well-being andthe distributional pattern of peoples well-being.7 We cannot consider thedisvalue of inequality in isolation from other values such as the Principle ofUtility, as Part does.Nonetheless, some philosophers would stick to Parts interpretation, and

bite the bullet. That is, proponents of Parts interpretation would hold thatthe value of equality (or the disvalue of inequality) can be separated outfrom other values, and that the levelling-down is at least in one respectbetter. This is the rst counterintuitive implication that they must accept.Then they must accept another. For the sake of argument, let us agree withproponents of Parts interpretation that the levelling-down is at least in onerespect better. In many cases, the levelling-down would be, all thingsconsidered, worse, because the loss in peoples average well-being wouldoutweigh the gain in the reduction of inequality. However, there must besome cases where the levelling-down is, all things considered, better.Proponents of Parts interpretation cannot rule out this possibility. Theynot only admit that the levelling-down is, at least in one respect, better, butalso that the levelling-down is, all things considered, better in some cases.Thus, they must bite another bullet.On the other hand, my interpretation does not need to bite either bullet.

As I explained in xIV, my interpretation shows that Telic Egalitarianismavoids the Objection. Furthermore, equation (2) clearly shows that thelevelling-down always makes the outcome, all things considered, strictlyworse, because the levelling-down is strictly worse for the better o and isnot better in any respect. By switching the interpretation from Parts tomine, we can easily avoid two counterintuitive implications. Why dont weadopt my interpretation, given that the two interpretations refer to exactlythe same distributive principle? I see no reason not to adopt mine.

7As I understand it, this point is the main motivation of Atkinsons [1970] social welfare approach to themeasurement of inequality.

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Before I conclude this paper, let me consider the last possibility thatproponents of Parts interpretation might take. On Parts originalinterpretation, Telic Egalitarianism holds that equality is always good. Inother words, on this interpretation, equality is good even if it does notbenet any person. The last possible version of Telic Egalitarianism limitsthe cases where equality is good, and holds that equality is not good insome cases. More precisely, it holds that equality is good only when itbenets some people. This possibility was mentioned by Temkin [2000: 157,n. 4] as conditional non-instrumental egalitarianism, and put forward byMason [2001] as conditional egalitarianism.8 If this restriction on equality isadded, then the levelling-down is not seen to be better in any respect,because the levelling-down does not benet any person. Therefore, on thisview, equality is not taken as a relevant consideration in the levelling-downcases. I agree that conditional egalitarianism thus construed can avoid theObjection.I believe, however, that my interpretation has two advantages over

conditional egalitarianism. First, my interpretation does not impose anyrestriction on our egalitarian concern. On my interpretation, equality isalways good-making. It is, say, unconditional egalitarianism. Without anyrestriction on the scope of equality, my interpretation shows that TelicEgalitarianism avoids the Objection. It seems to me that such a restrictionon the scope of equality is unnecessary.Second, in conditional egalitarianism, it is not clear how we measure the

goodness of equality. Conditional egalitarianism only shows that it avoidsthe Objection. It does not tell how equality and other values are related inestimating the overall goodness of a state of aairs. Mason, for example, isfully aware of this, saying his conditional egalitarianism is counter-intuitivein some respects because it regards equality to be valuable even when thealternative is an inequality which would make all but one individualmassively better o and that individual only marginally worse o [2001:252]. On the other hand, my interpretation clearly addresses how weaggregate dierent peoples well-being into the overall goodness of states ofaairs. Given these two advantages, I believe that my interpretation is stillpreferable to conditional egalitarianism.

VII. Conclusion

In this paper, I proposed a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism,according to which equality is a feature of how we aggregate the well-beingof dierent individuals, rather than an argument in a function that gives usthe value of states of aairs. Telic Egalitarianism is a distributive principle.It is concerned with the relative goodness of, or the ranking of, states of

8Mason proposed two versions of Conditional Egalitarianism, CE1 and CE2. CE1 says that equality isextrinsically but non-instrumentally valuable, whereas CE2 says that equality is intrinsically and non-instrumentally valuable. The two are dierent only in the character of the value of equality. Both agree on thecondition under which equality is valuable: equality is valuable only when it benets at least someone. SinceMason claims this condition allows Telic Egalitarianism to avoid the Objection, I shall focus on the conditionshared by the two versions, and ignore the distinction of the character of the value of equality.


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aairs in a particular way. The task of Telic Egalitarianism is to rankthe states of aairs. A state of aairs is the list (more precisely, thevector) of peoples well-being, not the list of peoples well-being andequality. More precisely, Telic Egalitarianism ranks x w1;w2; . . . ;wn and y w01;w02; . . . ;w0n

, not x w1;w2; . . . ;wn; equality and y

w01;w02; . . . ;w0n; equality). Equality is not an impersonal, non-personaecting value, which counts in with peoples well-being. Rather, TelicEgalitarianism is concerned with how we aggregate dierent peoples well-being into the real-value of a state of aairs. More precisely, TelicEgalitarianism is a distributive principle with a particular feature of functionf ( ) such that x w1;w2; . . . ;wn is at least as good as y w01;w02; . . . ;w0n

if and only if f w1;w2; . . . ;wn f w01;w02; . . . ;w0n

. In Telic Egalitarianism,

equality is a feature of an aggregative function, not an argument of thatfunction. The relevant feature is that equality is good-making in aparticular way. It is misleading to interpret Telic Egalitarianism in the waythat Part does. Moreover, Parts interpretation does not capture thenature of Telic Egalitarianism, or help us to capture the similarity anddierence between Telic Egalitarianism and the Priority View. Myinterpretation shows (a) that the Levelling Down Objection does notundermine Telic Egalitarianism, (b) the similarity and dierence betweentwo principles, and (c) that Telic Egalitarianism never judges the levelling-down to be, all things considered, better. Thus, I conclude that myinterpretation is preferable to Parts.9

McGill UniversityThe Centre for Applied Philosophy andPublic Ethics, University of Melbourne

Received: July 2007Revised: January 2008

References

Atkinson, A. B. 1970. On the Measurement of Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory 2/3: 24463.Blackorby, Charles and David Donaldson 1980. A Theoretical Treatment of Indices of Absolute Equality,

International Economics Review 21/1: 10736.Broome, John 1993. Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Broome, John unpublished ms. Respects and Levelling Down.Brown, Campbell 2003. Giving up Levelling Down, Economics and Philosophy 19/1: 11134.Clayton, Matthew and Andrew Williams, eds, 2000. The Ideal of Equality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Dasgupta, Partha., Amartya K. Sen, and David Starrett 1973. Notes on the Measurement of Inequality,

Journal of Economic Theory 6/2: 1807.Holtug, Nils 1998. Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, Analysis 58/2: 16674.Jensen, Karsten Klint 1996. Measuring the Size of the Benet and its Moral Weight: on the Signicance of

John Broomes Interpersonal Addition Theorem, in Wlodek Rabinowicz, ed., Preference and Value,Lund: Lund University.

Mason, Andrew 2001. Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, Analysis 61/271: 24654.Part, Derek 1995. Equality or Priority? University of Kansas: Lindley Lecture. Reprinted in Clayton and

Williams [2000: 81125].Rabinowicz, Wlodek 2002. Prioritarianism for Prospects, Utilitas 14/1: 220.Temkin, Larry 2000. Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, in Clayton and Williams [2000:

20322].

9I wish to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their detailed comments and suggestions.

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hirose 2009. reconsidering the value of equality ,.,.,.,

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