hindu nationalism and regional political culture in india: a study of kerala

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Hindu nationalism andregional political culture inIndia: A study of KeralaJames Chiriyankandath aa London Guildhall University ,Published online: 24 Dec 2007.

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Hindu Nationalism and Regional PoliticalCulture in India: A Study of Kerala

JAMES CHIRIYANKANDATH

Hindu nationalism represents an ambitious attempt to create a subcontinental nationalidentity based upon what is actually a highly pluralistic religious tradition. WhileHindu nationalists have made striking political gains in parts of India, this articleanalyses the relative lack of success of their efforts in the state of Kerala. It argues thatit is their circumscribed vision of Indian culture and society that inhibits the votariesof Hindu nationalism from coming to terms with the variety of distinctive politicalcultures found in India's regions. Their nationalism can sometimes appear exotic in itsclaim to be authentic.

Hindu Nationalism and Regional Political Culture

The past decade has witnessed a transformation in the significance of Hindunationalism. From being just one of the diverse currents in the ebb and flowof Indian politics, its votaries now project it as the wave of the future. In thegeneral elections of 1989 and 1991 its main political expression, theBharatiya Janata Party, tripled its share of the popular vote to 20 per cent tobecome the strongest official opposition to the ruling Congress Party sinceindependence. Yet patterns of political competition in India varyconsiderably and the unevenness of BJP success reflects this plurality.Hindu nationalism has yet to overcome many of the centrifugal trends thatarise from this heterogeneity, based both on vertical (caste and class) andhorizontal (language and region) distinctions.

Between 1990 and 1995 the BJP won power in the National CapitalTerritory of Delhi and six of India's 25 states - four in the Hindi-speakingbelt of north India, where it has historically had greatest success, and twoon the west coast. In 1991, 106 of the 119 BJP members elected to the 545-seat Indian Lok Sabha, or House of the People, were returned from thesestates.1 By contrast, the party won only seven of the 220 parliamentary seatsin eastern and southern India.

Kerala, on the southwestern coast, is one of only two significant states2

- the other is neighbouring Tamil Nadu - where the BJP (and itspredecessor, the Jana Sangh) has not won either a parliamentary or state

James Chiriyankandath, London Guildhall University

Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol.2, No.l, Spring 1996, pp.44-66PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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HINDU NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE 45

assembly seat. This is in spite of more than half a century of activity by theHindu nationalist sangh parivar (organizational family) centred around theRashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Voluntary Service Organization).3

This article seeks to explain this lack of success through situating theactivity of the Hindu nationalists within the regional context.

'Political culture' is an elusive concept. Almond and Verba defined it as'the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards politicalobjects among the members of the nation'(my emphasis).4

In their definition the political nation was taken as given — all the fivecountries they studied had existed as independent states for at least acentury. In India over three millenia of shared civilizational influences, andtwo centuries of administrative unity, have imparted commonalities. But ifnot for the fact that this has been reinforced by participation in a commonpolitical system, it is unlikely that we could refer to a peculiarly Indianpolitical culture in any more, or less, meaningful sense than we could to anall-European political culture, embracing the post-communist east as wellas the member states of the European Union.

The attention devoted to all-India political culture5 has meant thecomparative neglect of the concept at the regional level.6 Yet the greatmajority of citizens in all the countries7 studied by Almond and Verba sharea common language whereas in India the 1956 linguistic reorganization ofstates accorded administrative recognition to different language groups.8 Ifwe understand political culture as forming part of a cultural continuum, 'aparticular way of life' as Raymond Williams described it,9 then the cultural,social and religious characteristics of a region can be seen as factors thathelp shape a distinctive political culture. Empirical studies of Indianpolitical behaviour tend to support this.10

The diversity of political cultures/subcultures found in India's regionsstand in the way of the realization of the vision of 'making a full-fledgednation ... of this great Hindu People'." The plural religious culture ofHinduism - 'the jungles of Indian religions'l2 - render it meaningless to tryto discern any singular religion or 'faith'. Both the nationalist movementand the secularism of the post-independence state have been affected byIndia's peculiarly plural heritage, what I have described before as its'introvert genius - the capacity to accommodate rival cognitive systems atthe periphery rather than to confront, to accept or reject'."

This is why 'Hindu nationalism does not necessarily mean a Hindustate'.14 Given the established Indian variant of secularism, often describedby the Sanskrit phrase sarva dharma sambhava (equal treatment for allreligions), the implication of the success of such nationalism is thereforeless a formal Hindu state and more that the secular features of the existingstate can become attenuated.

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46 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS

Malayali Identity and Religious Plurality

The modern state of Kerala was formed in 1956 by integrating much of theformer princely states of Travancore and Cochin with parts of Madras State- the district of Malabar and Kasaragod in South Canara District. The mainunifying factor was language - 95 per cent of Keralites speak Malayalam(the highest proportion claimed by the dominant language group in anyIndian state).15 This shared linguistic identity is reinforced by the fact thatthe state is the most literate in India (90 per cent of inhabitants over the ageof seven in 1991),16 possessing a vigorous literary tradition and one of thecountry's biggest newspaper-reading publics."

Contrasting with its linguistic homogeneity is Kerala's plural religiouscharacter. Apart from Punjab, Kashmir and the small northeastern states, itis the least 'Hindu' of Indian states with Christians and Muslims eachconstituting about a fifth of its 30 million people, and the remaining three-fifths sharply differentiated along caste lines (see Figure 1). (The 1981 all-India figures for Hindus, Muslims and Christians were 82.6 per cent, 11.4per cent and 2.4 per cent respectively, with Sikhs representing another 2 percent18).

The rise of modern voluntarist associations based upon community canbe traced to the latter half of the nineteenth century. The pace setter wasTravancore where the political articulation of communal identity hadbecome well established by the 1930s with Syrian - and non-Syrian (or'Backward Class') - Christians, caste Hindu Nairs, outcaste Ezhavas andMuslims forming widely recognized groupings. This was the outcome ofelite-led mobilization through churches and caste, or communal,associations like the Ezhava Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalna Yogam(SNDP Yogam) and the Nair Service Society (NSS).19 The position inCochin was broadly similar while, in Malabar, Hindu (especially Nair) -Muslim distrust became particularly important after the Muslim Mappilapeasant rebellion against both their Hindu landlords and the British in1921.20

Closely related to the development of distinct communal identities wereradicalizing social reform movements that also preceded the creation ofKerala State. Especially strong among Kerala's Hindus, these movementshad significant repercussions: the breakdown of one of the most rigorousand oppressive systems of social hierarchy and impurity (untouchability andunapproachability); the breakup of the taravad (the matrilineal joint family),particularly associated with the Nairs; the spread of rationalist andegalitarian ideas; and the related development of class-based trade union andpeasant movements. All these factors sustained the rise of the communistmovement, producing Kerala's amalgam of communal and class politics.

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Yet transcending such complex diversity are both the linguistic heritageand regional traditions that express a distinct Malayali identity. To mentionjust a couple of instances of cultural commensality, one of the giants ofmodern Malayalam literature, whose appeal went far beyond the MappilaMuslim community, was Vaikom Muhammad Bashir (1910-1994); andamong the current superstars of the thriving Malayalam film industry isanother Mappila, Mammooty.

If culture is a repertoire,21 then the selection of myths and symbolsmatters greatly. The selective adaptation of tradition has been indispensableto pan-Hindu nationalism.22 The decade-long campaign to construct atemple upon the site of a mosque at the supposed birthplace of the deityRam in Ayodhya has had a dramatic influence upon the pattern of politicsof some Indian states (for example, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat) but not others.21

Reference to popular regional religious and cultural traditions might helpexplain such a differential response to the contemporary Hindu nationalistevocation of tradition.

Two of the principal foci of the religious culture of present-day Keralaare the 'national festival'24 of Onam, celebrating the main harvest and theyearly return of the legendary good King Mahabali, and the annualpilgrimage to the shrine of Ayyappan, a popular Kerala deity. Both areambiguously Hindu in character, allowing space for the participation oflocal Christians and Muslims.

Versions of the Onam story vary. In the all-India rendition the godVishnu was born as a dwarf, Vamana, to thwart the boundless ambition ofthe asura (demon) King Bali that threatened even the celestial kingdom ofthe devas (gods). Vamana begged Bali for the land he could cover in threepaces for his abode. Bali granted the request, only to find the dwarf growingto measure more than the three worlds - heaven, earth and sky. Accused ofnot having kept his promise, Bali was then cast down to the nether regions.25

In the Kerala version, Vishnu is prompted by jealousy at the well-beingof Mahabali's kingdom but concedes the latter's request that he should beallowed to return once a year to see how his beloved people are faring. Afamiliar Kerala folk song celebrating Onam begins and ends with thecouplet, 'Maveli [Mahabali] nadu vanitum kalum, manushar ellarum onnupolay' (Maveli reined over a happy realm in which all people were treatedequally).

Under the Kulasekhara dynasty (ninth to twelfth centuries AD), Onamwas celebrated at the Vishnu temple at Trikkakara, near Cochin in centralKerala. It was under the Kulasekharas that many of the principalconstituents of a distinct Malayali identity emerged.26 While the religiousculture of Brahminical Hinduism became dominant, Malayalam evolved asa language separate from Tamil. Also during this period Islam established

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itself on the Malabar coast, following ancient maritime trade links betweenKerala and Arabia.27 Significantly, in contrast to the Muslim record ofconquest in north India, their advent in Kerala was peaceful, as that of theSyrian Christians28 and Jews had been, possibly as early as in the firstcentury AD.29 For centuries thereafter, until the arrival of the Portuguese in1498, all these non-Hindu groups lived under the rule of local Hinduprinces, often taking on caste-like characteristics.30

While Onam has traditionally been celebrated with greatest enthusiasmin central Kerala, and by Nairs in particular, all sections of Kerala societyhave long participated. For instance, a Syrian Christian priest and a Muslimthangal (reputed descendant of the Prophet) are among those who figure inthe Athachamayam procession in Thrippunithura in central Kerala. Thiscross-communal character of Onam facilitated the state government'sadoption of it as the national festival in 1961 (when I witnessed theAthachamayam, which marks the beginning of the period of preparation forOnam, in September 1992 the festival flag was hoisted by the Christian stateminister of cultural affairs).

If Onam is an important symbol of the catholicity of Malayali identity,the myth of Cheraman Perumal is another story that has left its mark on thecollective memory of Keralites. The last of the legendary Perumal kings,there are various accounts of him converting to Islam, Christianity,Buddhism or Jainism." He is significant as an instance of how differentreligious groups have been integrated into accounts of Kerala's past."

In recent decades the annual winter pilgrimage to the shrine ofAyyappan, set deep in the forests and hills of south central Kerala, hasachieved phenomenal popularity (in 1992-3 it attracted 25 million pilgrims,including many from outside the state"). The shrine is open to males of allcastes and creeds, though not to pre-menopausal women.

Ayyappan, probably an aboriginal deity, is widely regarded as an avatar(incarnation), the product of an unusual union between Vishnu and Siva,two of the prominent (male) deities in Hinduism.14 A source of good fortuneand protection from evil, according to legend he had a Muslim Arablieutenant, Vavar, for whom he built a mosque en route to Sabarimala.Today it is visited by Hindu pilgrims while Muslims present offeringsduring the Makaravilakku festival at the Ayyappan temple."

Live regional traditions such as those considered here are not peculiar toKerala.16 Their persistence poses problems for Hindu nationalism becausethey represent an alternative mythic past, encompassing in this case adistinctive heritage of religious coexistence. It is not easy to reconcile thiswith attempts to promote hegemonic all-India myths as in the focus uponRam in the Ayodhya campaign. The tele-serializations of the Ramayana andMahabharata epics in 1987-90 were widely held to have contributed to a

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'nationalization' of Hindu culture." Yet there were significant regionalvariations in their popularity. For instance, in Kerala the viewers for theMahabharat were exceeded by those for the weekly Malayalam featurefilm.38

Politics - Kerala Style

An aspect of Indian politics that attracted considerable attention from theearly 1960s was the distinctive character being imparted to it by ageneration of leaders emerging from the state and district levels. RajniKothari identified their style of communication and organization,particularly their use of religious and caste symbols, as what made them'natural interpreters of the national political culture'.'9

In Kerala, the people of the erstwhile princely states, who constitutedtwo-thirds of the population, had already been exposed to such a style.Politicians inducted into public life through communal associations hadbecome habituated to resolving conflict through engaging in the mundanebusiness of bargaining and constantly cutting deals with the stateadministration and with each other.40 Apart from aspects of the regionalculture, and the latitude afforded by operating under the rule of relativelybenevolent and progressive princes, the realities of communal demographyassisted this process.

The balance of communities (see Figure I) remains an important factorin shaping Kerala politics. The merger of Malabar with Travancore-Cochinin 1956 meant both the augmentation of Communist support, since the partywas especially strong in the area, and the addition of a large Muslimpopulation concentrated in the north of the state (see Table 1). This socialplurality, and splits in the state's Congress and Communist parties in 1964,resulted in political competition being conducted through rival fronts after1970. Led by the Congress (Indira) and the Communist Party of India(Marxist) (CPIM), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the LeftDemocratic Front (LDF) have alternated in power for the past fifteen years.

Historically, the Communists have drawn their supportdisproportionately from the traditionally 'inferior' Hindu castes, especiallythe Ezhavas,41 and the LDF has provided a majority of the Hindu membersof the state Legislative Assembly since 1980. In 1991 the latter won at leasthalf the seats in six of the seven districts in which the proportion of Hindusexceeded 60 per cent (the exception was Trivandrum) but lost in theremaining seven. By contrast, Christians account for a third of the C(I)legislative party, outnumbering Christian Assembly members belonging torival factions of the breakaway Kerala Congress by two to one.42

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FIGURE ICASTES AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN KERALA

nutua <BC> cia.eK)

BC Chr. (S.OSO

Brahaln CZ.Ov.t

rtalr (15.Ox)

Syrian Chr. C16.OX)

Schodulod TrlbOT Cl.SXl

3chBduled Ctts-tea <8.Ox>

Other- Hindu (a.«»)

CBC> CZZ.OX>

O-thei* Qutcuts Hindu (BC) C4.OX>

Afo/e: BC = Backward Class; Chr. = Christian.Source: A caste classification of the population was abandoned in census reports afterindependence. These 1968 figures are based on the estimates used in the Backward ClassesReservation Committee Report, Trivandrum: Government Press, 1970, Vol.2, App.14.

TABLE IDISTRIBUTION OF THE MAIN RELIGIONS IN KERALA (%)

District Hindu Muslim

COCHINKERALA 58.1 21.2

Christian

KasaragodCannanoreWayanadKozhikodeMalappuramPalghatMALABARTrichurErnakulamIdukkiKottayamAlleppeyPathanamthitta (FiguresQuilonTrivandrumTRAVANCORE-

64.065.150.661.232.173.157.160.046.350.347.565.5

included63.369.858.8

29.524.024.633.965.523.136.514.913.46.55.07.4

in Alleppey and Quilon)14.012.511.3

6.510.924.54.82.43.76.425.140.243.147.527.0

22.717.729.8

20.6

Note: Kasaragod and Pathanamthitta districts were created after the 1981 census.Source: The figures are derived from Census of India, 1981. Series 1 - India, Paper 4 of 1984:Household Population by Religion of Head of Household, New Delhi, pp. 296-324, 829-1062,and Series 10 - Kerala, Paper 1 of 1985, pp.14-19, 26-29, 42^15.

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All but one of Kerala's governments since 1967 have relied upon thesupport of parties either avowedly communally-based or identified closelywith a particular community - such parties have usually claimed at least afifth of the Assembly seats. The pattern was set in the wake of theVimochana Samaram (liberation struggle) that ousted the first Communistministry in 1959. The Congress-dominated government that wassubsequently formed initially enjoyed the support of the Christian churches,the Nair Service Society and the Muslim League. Twice shifting itsallegiance in the course of the 1960s, the League formally enteredgovernment as part of the CPIM-led United Front in 1967 and has sinceparticipated in every administration except for the LDF government of1987-91 (a splinter group participated in the previous LDF ministry of1980-81).41

While the League traces its origins to the pre-partition Muslim League,the other sizable communally identified political grouping, the KeralaCongress, was the product of the 1964 split in the state Congress.Determined partly by ideology, the division was also affected by communalfeeling - Nair and Syrian Christian Congressmen resented the behaviour ofan Ezhava chief minister.44 The Kerala Congress draws much of its supportfrom the Syrian Christian-dominated areas of central Kerala - ten of theeleven Assembly seats currently held by the three party factions areoccupied by Christians. Like the NSS-sponsored National Democratic Partyand the Ezhava SNDP Yogam-backed Socialist Republican Partyestablished in the 1970s, it reflected the unhappiness of elements of theestablished communal organizations, whether churches or associations,with the transformation the Congress Party underwent in the 1960s and1970s.

The 'liberation struggle' had drawn a new generation into politics - theradical student activists of the Youth Congress. Having gained control of thestate Congress organization by the 1970s, they opposed communal vestedinterests in areas like education, and supported the land reform measuresimplemented by the ruling front in 1971-77.45 This forms the background tothe longstanding conflict between supporters of the former Youth Congresspresident, A.K. Antony, and K. Karunakaran, the pragmatic septuagenerianwho led the Congress legislature party from 1967 to 1995.

Karunakaran became Kerala's longest serving chief minister - he heldthe position four times after 1977 - partly owing to his skill in balancing andexploiting differences between his 'communal' partners in government. Theimperative of accommodating the powerful interest groups represented bythe 'communal' parties has dominated the conduct of UDF administrations(when Karunakaran was finally replaced by Antony in March 1995, it wasthe withdrawal of support by the Muslim League and Kerala Congress that

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proved crucial46). This can be seen with reference to two important policyareas - education and plantation agriculture.

Education in Kerala is big business but has been viewed not only as asource of profit but as important in enhancing the socio-economic positionof the members of a community. It accounted for 42 per cent of thegovernment's developmental expenditure in 1992-9347 with the staff ofgrant-in-aid institutions, mainly run by Christian churches and communalbodies like the NSS, paid out of state funds. Pointing to the fact thatMuslims lagged behind their Hindu and Christian compatriots ineducational achievement, the Muslim League insisted on retaining theeducation portfolio under a series of administrations (1967-79, 1991—). Itsucceeded in getting Kerala's second university established to serve theMalabar area, where 70 per cent of Muslims live, and increased the numberof Muslim-run colleges affiliated to it from seven to fifteen.'18

Another strong defender of private education, a field in which thechurches have been prominent since the first decades of the nineteenthcentury, has been the mainly Syrian Christian-led Kerala Congress. Ingovernment almost continously from 1975 to 1987 (and again after 1991),it has also sought to protect the interests of the rubber planters and largerpaddy cultivators of central Kerala, many of whom are Syrian Christians.The Kerala Congress Finance Minister in the mid-1970s, and again in the1982-87 UDF government, was criticized for his laxity in enforcing landrevenue assessments and granting rubber planters tax concessions,49 and in1979 the party played a crucial role in ensuring that pro-landlord land giftlegislation was passed.50

Such solicitousness of particular communal interests has not beenlimited to the UDF. It was the Marxist-led front that approved the creationin 1969 of one of the only two Muslim-majority districts in India outsideKashmir. And although the CPIM spurned alignments with 'communal'parties in the late 1980s, in the 1991 election it accepted a faction of theKerala Congress into the LDF. As the former chief minister, and doyen ofKerala communism, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, has acknowledged

The consciousness of one's caste, sub-caste or religious community isstill a strong force ... no political party being free to dismiss thisparticular factor in selecting candidates for election, in makingappointments and so on."

'Political accommodation in democratic societies is an art not a system'.52 Itis the outcome of skilful politicking that enables communal identities andclass interests to be subsumed in the give and take of transactional politics.In the case of Kerala, the 'artists' concerned have been able to use three setsof favourable circumstances to develop a particular style of politics.

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First, regional traditions that emphasize coexistence and a sharedMalayali identity. Second, the balance in numbers that exists between themain communal groupings, a factor reinforced by the electorally significantconcentration of Muslims in northern - and Christians in central - Kerala.Added to this is a rough balance of material influence - the traditionalstrength of Nairs in administration and the liberal professions has beencomplemented by that of Christians in commerce and education, and ofMuslims and Ezhavas in commerce and industry. Such a balance has madeintercommunal business and professional relationships commonplace. Andthird, a high degree of political awareness on the part of the public -'Politics is the national sport'" - the product of a combination ofwidespread education and radical social reform and class movements. Thishas impelled politicians towards developing patterns of communalaccommodation that are also sensitive to the - sometimes overlapping -pressures of class politics, thus lessening the danger of a communal free-for-all.

The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism

Outside Malabar, where the Mappila Rebellion of 1921 embitteredHindu-Muslim relations, the political lines in pre-independence Keralawere largely drawn on the basis of caste, sect and class rather than 'Hindu'and 'non-Hindu'.

Organized Hindu nationalism was introduced to Kerala in 1942 by threeMaharashtrian pracharaks (celibate full-time, and usually lifelong,volunteers) despatched by the RSS headquarters in Nagpur to work in themain cities of Trivandrum, Ernakulam and Calicut. Initially working amongsecondary school students, using English as their medium ofcommunication before they became conversant with Malayalam, theysucceeded in forming a nucleus of young caste Hindu recruits attracted bythe pracharaks 'patriotic fervour'.54 In 1946 the first batch of Malayalipracharaks emerged and by the mid-1950s there were none being assignedto Kerala from outside the state.

Despite this the first quarter-century of RSS activity in Kerala producedmeagre political results. Operating on the periphery of society and politics,the RSS and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), the forerunner of the BJP,sought to establish links with the major caste associations." They alsoparticipated in the anti-communist Vimochana Samaram in 1959 but madescarcely any headway in electoral politics.

Prior to the 1980s, RSS leaders point to two phases of significantorganizational growth - around the period of the Marxist-led United Frontministry of 1967-69, and during and after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's

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authoritarian Emergency rule (1975-77). Between 1967 and 1982 thenumber of RSS shakhas (branches) and members quadrupled to 2613 and45,900 respectively.56

In the view of P. Parameswaran, a senior pracharak and the chieftheoretician of the RSS in Kerala, the expansion of the late 1960s wasproduced by a combination of factors.57 First, the natural maturation of twodecades of activity. Second, the hostile reaction provoked by the influencebeing wielded in government by 'communal' parties. And third,overlapping controversies relating to a dilapidated temple and the creationof the Muslim majority district of Malappuram.

In November 1968 the RSS and BJS took the lead in conducting asuccessful agitation to force the United Front government to permit arecently formed Temple Protection Council to restore the Thali temple,allegedly destroyed by Tippu Sultan, the Muslim ruler of Mysore, in the lateeighteenth century. The Council won support that went far beyond theHindu nationalists but another, year-long, agitation failed to prevent theformation of Malappuram, the district within which the Thali temple lay.58

The circumspect restraint shown by local Muslims helped defuse tensionsstirred by Hindu nationalist references to 'Moplastan' and the MappilaRebellion.59

A second phase of comparatively rapid growth in Hindu nationaliststrength followed the imposition of Emergency rule in 1975. With a martialethos that emphasized tight discipline and obedience, the RSS found itselfwell placed to cope with being driven underground.60 And after the 1977general election erstwhile BJS members found the scope for their politicalactivity widened as members of the new Janata coalition that had wonpower at the centre. For instance, K.G. Marar, an RSS pracharak andformer BJS State Secretary became a Janata Party District President andenjoyed the backing of the CPIM-led front in the 1977 Assembly election,and of the Congress(I)-led UDF in 1980.61

Many of the subsidiary organizations that belong to the RSSorganizational family, came into being or entrenched themselves in Keraladuring this period. Among the more significant are those in the fields ofreligion (Vishwa Hindu Parishad - the World Council of Hindus - and theKerala Temple Protection Council), labour, education, students, socialservice, children's welfare, tribal development and the press (including adaily, Janma Bhoomi or 'Land of One's Birth', and a weekly, Kesari or'Lion').62

Pracharaks are often deputed to oversee these organs, all of which aredominated by onetime RSS swayamsevaks (volunteers). Their relationshipto the RSS is compared by H.V. Seshadri, its Sarkaryawah (national generalsecretary) to that of children who 'carry the imprint of fsic] mother's

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wholesome training in their conduct and norms of life'."The image of the family is a recurring one in RSS discourse. It even

finds physical expression in the clustering of sangh parivar facilities,typically found close to temples. In Ernakulam the RSS state headquarters,next to which is a Bharatiya Vidya Niketan school, is on the same road asthe provincial headquarters of the VHP, itself adjacent to a VHP women'shostel and located within the compound of a temple dedicated to Sri Rama.

The impact of the expansion of sangh parivar activities in Kerala shouldnot be exaggerated -joining the RSS or BJP still represents a departure fromthe norm. However, the breadth of such activity has exposed a wide cross-section of Malayalis to the Sangh's influence. The odd erstwhile Marxistwriter or journalist has joined the RSS-sponsored art and literary forum,Thapasya, and a former vice-chancellor of Kerala University not only tookpart in the activities of the Bharatiya Vichar Kendra (Indian Thought Centre)established by P. Parameswaran,64 but also inaugurated an RSS camp.65

The grass roots of political life have also been affected. One reason forthe clashes between RSS and Marxist party workers when the LDF was inpower in 1980-81, in which 46 people died,66 was the growth of the RSS-sponsored labour federation, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh. Its rise has beenassisted by the poor image of unions affiliated to the dominant MarxistCentre of Indian Trade Unions and the tacit encouragement of manywealthy businessmen, including Christians, who prefer the former'semphasis on harmonious labour relations to the latter's reputation forheavy-handed militancy."

The vision underlying all this activity, and sustaining the dedicated,austere lifestyle of the two hundred or so pracharaks™ who in Kerala, aselsewhere, form the sinews of the RSS, is for the Sangh

to become the radiating centre of all the age-old cherished ideals ofour society .... Then, the political power which draws its life from thatsource ... will ... reflect the same radiance.69

(The portrait of M.S. Golwalkar, who led the organization for 33 yearsbefore his death in 1973, hangs in every karyalaya, or RSS office).

The Politics of Hindu Nationalism

In April 1982 a Vishal Hindu Sammelan (VHS) was formed at a conventionin Ernakulam that brought together a wide range of Hindu organizations.While the active constituents belonged to the sangh parivar, the participantsincluded caste associations and influential religious bodies like the Bombay-based Chinmaya Mission, whose Malayali founder Swami Chinmayanandahad played a prominent role in establishing the VHP in 1964.™

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A distinctive feature of the proceedings was the deliberate effort madeto project an image that was not caste-bound. Ezhavas, as well as Brahmins,officiated in the religious ceremonies and the Shankaracharya (chief priest)of Kanchi presided over the closing public function in an Ezhava-ownedAyyappan temple." The Shankaracharya is the custodian of one of at leastfour maths (monastic centres) reputedly founded across India by Shankara,the eighth century Kerala-born Brahmin philosopher credited with initiatingthe post-Buddhist renewal of Vedic Hinduism. These maths have becomefocal points for the expression of Hindu religiousity and their custodians arethe nearest equivalent Brahminic Hinduism possesses to an ecclesiasticalleadership.

The Sammelan marked the beginning of a more ambitious phase inHindu nationalist activity in Kerala, that paralleled the new activism of theVHP at the national level. While the latter culminated in the launch of thecampaign to liberate the supposed birthplace of Sri Rama at Ayodhya in1984,72 in Kerala the early focus was on local issues. In December 1982 anunprecedented outbreak of Hindu-Muslim violence in the state capital thatleft one person dead allowed RSS members to pose as the defenders of theHindus (the UDF government restrained the police from taking vigorousaction in deference to the sensitivities of the Muslim League)." Four monthslater controversy erupted over the alleged discovery of an ancient cross atNilakkal on the route to the Ayyappan temple at Sabarimala. A decision bythe UDF government, under pressure from local Christian legislators, tosanction the construction of a church on the site was strongly opposed by anaction council convened by the VHS and including a score of other Hindubodies.

The affair evoked strong communal passions - sanyasins (holy men) leddemonstrations by thousands of protesters and Chief Minister Karunakaranwas mobbed by women protesters seeking to prevent him from worshippingat the famous Vishnu temple at Guruvayur.74 After three months aninterdenominational council of Christian bishops resolved to 'accommodateHindu sentiments' and opted for a chapel to be built on an uncontestednearby site.75 Since described as an unnecessary controversy by oneChristian prelate,76 it was hailed as a Hindu triumph.77 Ironically, given theirinflexibility on the Ayodhya issue, it has also been pointed to by RSSleaders as a model of how such disputes should be resolved.78

Building on their success at Nilakkal, VHS leaders launched an overtlypolitical Hindu Munnani (Front) on the eve of the 1984 Lok Sabhaelections. Significantly, while retaining the association of many of theHindu groups that had formed part of the Sammelan, the Munnani failed toget the backing of the Nair and Ezhava caste associations which had theirown political parties. Its platform, while echoing many of the recurring

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themes in BJP manifestoes, included demands that had a particularrelevance to Kerala's Hindus, such as the creation of an autonomous state-wide Devaswom Board to run Hindu temples (in place of the existingTravancore and Cochin boards constituted of political appointees).7''

The nexus between various Hindu groupings is reflected in thebackground of Hindu nationalist activists. For instance, the BJP's districtpresident in Trivandrum in 1992 became a RSS swayamsevak while beingeducated at a Chinmaya Mission school. Drawn into politics during theNilakkal agitation as the General Secretary of the Mission in Trivandrum,he directed the publicity for the Munnani's candidate in Trivandrum in the1984 Lok Sabha election, moving on to the BJP when it absorbed theMunnani.110

The BJP contested both the 1984 general election and the 1987 stateAssembly poll in conjunction with the Munnani, registering the best resultsever achieved by the Hindu nationalists in Kerala. The fruits of their newactivism were especially evident in the Travancore-Cochin region. Even in1982 when the BJP fought 68 of the 140 Assembly seats, nearly three timesas many as the pre-1977 Jana Sangh had ever done, it had contested two-thirds of the constitutencies in Malabar- with its concentration of Muslims- but only a little over a third of those in Travancore-Cochin. Yet in 1984the Munnani candidate in Trivandrum claimed a fifth of the vote. Using itsown symbols - officially the locally ubiquitous coconut palm, though manyof its posters carried the representation of a Kerala temple - the Munnanisucceeded in attracting many people who had never before voted JanaSangh or BJP81 (both had suffered from the perception that they wereessentially north Indian parties representing Hindi-speaking Hindus).

The Hindu nationalist vote quadrupled to over a million between 1982and the 1991 district council elections (see Table 2). But much of this newsupport was thinly spread, its importance mainly lying in how it affected theoutcome of the contest between candidates representing the LDF and theUDF. The BJP has consistently won over a tenth of the vote in only one ofKerala's fourteen districts, Kasaragod on the northern border withKarnataka, though it did also attain this modest level of support inTrivandrum in 1987. Significantly, the two other districts in which it hasconsistently done better than in the state overall are Malappuram andKozhikode - the two with the highest proportion of Muslims (see Table 1).

Hindu nationalism's relative strength at either end of Kerala can beexplained mainly with reference to local factors, many of which highlightsub-regional cultural differences. An area that formed part of the SouthCanara District of Madras until 1956, non-Malayali Tulu, Kannada, Konkanand Marathi speakers constitute two-fifths of the population of theKasaragod taluk of the district bearing the same name.*2 The district was

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UDFContestedWon% Vote

LDFContestedWon% Vote

BJP/HMContestedWon% Vote

TOTAL SEATS

1407748.2

1406347.2

6802.7

140


created in 1984, partly in response to longstanding local demands for themerger of the area with Karnataka,1" and partly in recognition of its historyof relative underdevelopment - it has the second highest proportion ofilliterates of any district in the state.*4

TABLE 2ELECTIONS IN KERALA, 1982 TO 1991

Front 1982 1987 1991* 1991

138 474 14060 148 9243.6 43.3 48.1

140 474 14078 323 4845.0 47.7 45.9

127 447 1370 2 06.5 7.3 4.7

140 474 140

*: District council elections (all others to Assembly).Abbs.: UDF - United Democratic Front; LDF - Left Democratic Front; BJP/HM - BharatiyaJanata Party/Hindu Munnani (the Munnani only had a separate existence in 1987).

Source: Assembly Elections Since 1951 and District Council Elections Reportage, Department ofPublic Relations, Government of Kerala, Trivandrum, n.d.; the 1991 Assembly election figuresare based on data provided by the Government Information Centre, Trivandrum.

The BJP's strength is mainly among the non-Malayalis, who representthe majority of the Hindus in Kasaragod taluk, and local RSS shakhas arecontrolled by the Karnataka Provincial Committee. Underlining theimportance of cultural differences, the Kerala Provincial Pracharak, askedabout this seeming anomaly, made the point that in the area it was thefestivals of Divali, Dussehra (one of the few festivals officiallycommemorated by the RSS) and Ganesh puja that were celebrated ratherthan Onam.*5 Politically, neighbouring Karnataka is the only state in southIndia where the BJP has made significant inroads — it emerged as the secondbiggest party in the 1994 state assembly elections, doing best in the districtadjoining Kasaragod.*6

The only three panchayats (rural councils) in Kerala that the BJPcontrols are in Kasaragod as is one of the two district council seats it holds(the other is in Palghat, on the border with Tamil Nadu - the other district

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with a substantial number of non-Malayalis87). It represents the mainopposition to the dominant Muslim League in the north of the district andthe present BJP State President, a Malayali who only narrowly lost aKasaragod Assembly seat to the League in 1991, has charged stategovernments with being more concerned with placating religious ratherthan linguistic minorities.88 (For instance, one of the reasons for Kannadigastudents shunning a new local college and travelling across the border toMangalore for their education is because Calicut University refuses to letthem take examinations in their mother tongue).

Local circumstances also come into focus in Trivandrum. Among themost important of these, according to the RSS district pracharak, is itstradition of 'Hindu consciousness', a legacy of its past as the capital of theTravancore rulers whose chief title was Sri Padmanabha Dasa (servant ofPadmanabha, an incarnation of the deity Vishnu).89 The Hindu Munnani LokSabha candidate who did so well in 1984 was a relative of the last Maharaja,and the local offices of sangh parivar institutions are found in the mainlyNair and Brahmin inhabited environs of the Sri Padmanabhaswami temple.In the 1988 elections to the City Corporation, all six seats (out of 50) theBJP won were in preponderantly caste Hindu wards, a fact stressed by theparty's district president.90

It is not just tradition that lies behind why Trivandrum Districtaccounted for one in six of the 4300-odd RSS shakhas in Kerala in 1992.91

There is also the pent up frustration felt by many caste Hindus who belongto families that have long depended for their livelihood on governmentservice in the state capital. They have seen lower caste people and Muslims(also classified as a 'backward class') taking advantage of educationalconcessions and the reservation of half of all appointments for them,92 withMuslims also benefiting disproportionately from the post-1970s boom inemployment in the oil-rich Gulf.1"

The Hindu Munnani was wound down after the 1987 election, most ofits leaders being absorbed into the BJP. This coincided with the nationalBJP's increasing identification with the VHP-led Ram Janmabhoomicampaign centred on Ayodhya and a corresponding shift of emphasis on thepart of Kerala Hindu nationalists. In October 1990, as BJP nationalPresident L.K. Advani's rath yatra wound its way to Ayodhya, the stateparty president conducted his own jana shakti (people's power) processionthrough Kerala. Ram jyothi (lamp) processions were also held and severalthousand kar sevaks (volunteers pledged to construct the Ram temple) fromKerala travelled to Ayodhya.94 Fourteen months later Advani's successor asBJP president, Murli Manohar Joshi, began the second stage of his EktaYatra, national unity march across India to Kashmir, from the SriPadmanabhaswami temple in Trivandrum.95

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The passions generated by such events contributed to a marked increasein clashes provoked by communal issues. Between October 1990 andDecember 1992 thirty people died in six such outbreaks - compared to justfive in the previous three decades.96 While the toll was insignificant whencompared to the far larger scale communal violence experienced in manyother states, it is the fact that it was exceptional that is important.

Some of the worse clashes followed the emergence of a militant IslamicSevak Sangh formed with the express aim of protecting Muslims against theRSS.97 Six people died after RSS volunteers were stoned in Trivandrum inJuly 1992, and four more died in and around Cochin in central Kerala afterthe ISS Chairman Abdul Nazar Madani was released from hospital inOctober 1992 (he had been injured in a bomb attack).98 Two months later,following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by Hindunationalists, twelve more people were killed as both the RSS and the ISSwere banned (the ban on the RSS was revoked by a judicial tribunal in June1993).

Unlike other parts of India, where Hindu nationalists have often madestriking electoral gains in the aftermath of communal tension and violence,99

this has not been the experience in Kerala. While the BJP increased its votemarginally in the January 1991 district elections (see Table 2), this obscureda post-1987 pattern of declining or stagnating support in the two districtswhere it had been especially strong - down from 16.4 per cent to 14.3 percent in Kasaragod, and from 11.9 to 7.6 in Trivandrum. This trend wasconfirmed in the Assembly and Lok Sabha polls five months later when theparty's decline was especially marked in constituencies gained by the UDF.'00

BJP leaders, while rejecting suggestions of collusion, acknowledge thatan understanding by which they supported a UDF-backed independent LokSabha candidate in return for UDF backing for a RSS-linked independentAssembly candidate (both lost), may have disillusioned some erstwhile BJPvoters. However, they insist that the main reason for the decline was thenationwide pro-Congress(I) trend that followed the assassination of formerpremier Rajiv Gandhi"" - despite the fact that in India as a whole this didnot prevent Hindu nationalism registering its greatest electoral advance.Probably more important was the commonly expressed perception that theHindu nationalist emphasis on communal confrontation was both alien andirrelevant to local concerns. (BJP leaders stressed pan-Hindu themes suchas Ayodhya and the sinister activities of Pakistani intelligence102).

Kerala and the Culture of Hindu Nationalism

The frustrating paradox for Kerala's Hindu nationalists is that in spite of theRSS's long record of activity and growth, without parallel in south India,

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they remain peripheral actors. Why has their attempt to adapt the all-Indiaevocation of one Hindu nation inhabiting a common motherland failed toproduce a political breakthrough?

The answer lies in the culture of Hindu nationalist politics, a culture theorigin of which owes more to 'nationalism [as] a form of culture'"" than tothe heritage of Hinduism. For instance, contrast this statement, taken fromits constitution, of the aims and objects of the RSS:

to weld together the diverse groups within the Hindu Samaj [society]and to revitalize and rejuvenate the same on the basis of its Dharma[religion] and Sanskriti [culture]104

with national poet Rabindranath Tagore's view of India as 'being naturallymany, yet adventitiously one'.105

In Kerala, as elsewhere, Hindu nationalism remains ill at ease withdiversity. Four important areas in which this is apparent are culture,religious plurality, caste and political style.

RSS members throughout India observe six festivals106 but even the fourthat are religious in origin do not figure largely in the Kerala calendar;Onam is not marked at all by the Sangh. And while the Ayyappan temple atSabarimala was the focus of the Nilakkal agitation, its subdued denoumenthad a Kerala flavour that Hindu nationalists had difficulty in accepting.When in February 1995 the melshanti (chief priest) of the temple visited theecumenical church that had been constructed at Nilakkal, one of the leadersof the 1983 agitation, senior Sangh pracharak P. Parameswaran described itas 'an unpardonable mistake'. Among those defending the melshanthi,suspended by the Travancore Devaswom Board, was one of the state'sleading literary figures, Sukumaran Azhikode - he holds that communalcoexistence forms part of a distinct Kerala 'way of life' and has expressedconcern at the spread of the influence of the VHP in religiousestablishments in the state.107

Though non-Hindus are not barred from the BJP or RSS, they are mainlynotable in both by their absence. In 1991 none of the BJP's parliamentary -and only five of its Assembly - candidates were Christians (none wereMuslims). The handful who have figured as BJP candidates or party officersare isolated political nonentities with idiosyncratic views.108 That Christianor Muslim swayamsevaks should be even rarer is not surprising given theattitude of RSS leaders. Speaking at an RSS camp in September 1992, theorganization's national general secretary, H.V. Seshadri, warned againstreligious conversions, claiming that Kerala's 'Hindu community was indanger of being swamped by Christians and Muslims'.109

While the RSS seeks to downplay caste distinctions — members areenjoined to subordinate any involvement they may have in caste

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associations - the leadership of sangh parivar organizations isoverwhelmingly caste Hindu (that is, mainly Brahmin or Nair). And thoughthe RSS's social service activities have enabled it to gain a foothold amonggroups such as impoverished Hindu fishermen and forest tribals, this alsoremains true of the bulk of the membership. Despite the efforts of local RSSpublicists,"0 the Hindu nationalist stress on an all-India pan-Hindu identitycontinues to be widely perceived as antipathetic both to non-Brahfninicallocal traditions, and to the legacy of the powerful movements against casteoppression that have helped shape modern Kerala.

The dominant characteristic of Kerala's politics has been the mediationand accommodation of demands articulated in the language of bothcommunity and class. The recent salience of Hindu nationalism has exposedKeralites to an alternative language and style of politics, one thatemphasizes a pan-Hindu identity, glossing over regional and castedifferences and stressing those between 'Indian' and 'non-Indian' religioustraditions. The failure of Hindu nationalists to build on their limitedsuccesses in the 1980s is suggestive. It indicates that far from beingmobilized by issues such as Ayodhya, Kerala's Hindus were, if anything,apprehensive of the disruption they seemed to bring in their wake.

This is not to suggest that Kerala has been somehow immune to thepowerful centripetal influences reshaping modern India, among them thegrowth of consumerism, the spread of television and the existence of anoverarching national political culture. It is to draw attention to thelimitations of the ideology of Hindutva (Hindu-ness) in coming to termswith firmly embedded regional political culture. The Hindu nationalist lackof success in other states such as Tamil Nadu, where Tamil culture hasserved to underpin Dravidian politics, and West Bengal, with itscombination of a powerful sense of Bengali identity and communism,provide further backing for this contention."1 The Achilles heel of religiousnationalism may well be that in laying claim to authenticity it cansometimes appear exotic.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on 'PoliticalCulture and Religion in the Third World', Bordeaux, April - May 1995.1 would like to thank theBritish Academy for supporting the research, and B. Thankamma (Information Officer,Government of Kerala) and M.K. Das (Resident Editor, Indian Express, Cochin) for theirassistance.

NOTES

1. Uttar Pradesh (50), Gujarat (20), Madhya Pradesh (12), Rajasthan (12), Maharashtra (5),Delhi (5) and Himachal Pradesh (2). J. Chiriyankandath, 'Tricolour and Saffron: Congress

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and the Neo-Hindu Challenge' in S.K. Mitra and J. Chiriyankandath (eds.). ElectoralPolitics in India. A Changing Landscape (Delhi: Segment, 1992), pp.64-5.

2. The seventeen states that recorded a population of over five million in the 1991 census (thatis, excluding the 'mini-states' of the northeast and Goa).

3. For the general development of the RSS, the Jana Sangh and the BJP see W.K. Andersenand S.D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh andHindu Revivalism (Boulder: Westview, 1987) and C. Jaffrelot. The Hindu NationalistMovement and Indian Politics, J925-J990s (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1995).

4. G.A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in FiveNations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.14-15.

5. See W.H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson &Co., 1964); M. Weiner, 'India: Two Political Cultures' in L. Pye and S. Verba (eds.),Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965);L.I. and S.H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.1967); R. Kothari, Politics in India (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1970); A. Nandy, At the Edgeof Psychology. Essays in Politics and Culture (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980).

6. Though it is implicit in some of the literature on regional patterns of politics. See, forinstance, J. Gokhale-Turner, 'Regions and Regionalism in the Study of Indian Politics: TheCase of Maharashtra' in N.K. Wagle (ed.), Images of Maharashtra. A Regional Profile ofIndia (London: Curzon Press, 1980), pp.88-10I.

7. The United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico.8. Sixteen states have their own official languages, six others are Hindi-speaking and three

small northeastern states use English for official purposes.9. R. Williams, The Long Revolution (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), p.41.

10. S.J. Eldersveld and B. Ahmed, Citizens and Politics. Mass Political Behaviour in India(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.58.

11. M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Jagarana Prakashana, 2nd ed., 1980),p. 165.

12. F. Hardy, The Religious Culture of India. Power, Love and Wisdom (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.553.

13. J. Chiriyankandath, 'The Politics of Religious Identity: A Comparison of HinduNationalism and Sudanese Islamism', The Journal of Commonwealth and ComparativePolitics, Vol.33, No.1 (1994), p.37.

14. A. Vanaik, The Painful Transition. Bourgeois Democracy in India (London: Verso, 1990),p.108.

15. Census of India, 1981, Series 10 - Kerala, Paper 1 of 1987: Households and HouseholdPopulation by Language mainly spoken in the Household (Delhi).

16. Census of India, 1991, Series 12 - Kerala, Paper 1 of 1991: Provisional Population Totals(Delhi, 1991), p.33.

17. The Malayala Manorama daily (multi-edition) and weekly are the largest selling daily andweekly in India (Audit Bureau of Circulation figures for January-June 1994). ManoramaYearbook 1995 (Kottayam: Malayala Manorama Co., 1995), p.605.

18. Census of India, 1981, Series-1: India, Paper 3 of 1984: Household Population by Religionof Head of Household (Delhi).

19. J. Chiriyankandath, '"Communities at the Polls": Electoral Politics and the Mobilization ofCommunal Groups in Travancore', Modern Asian Studies, Vol.27, No.3 (1993), pp.643-65.

20. R.E. Miller, Mappila Muslims of Kerala. A Study in Islamic Trends (Madras: OrientLongman, 2nd ed., 1992), pp. 121-61.

21. A. Nandy, 'Culture of Politics and Politics of Cultures', The Journal of Commonwealth andComparative Politics, Vol.22, No.3 (1984), p.271.

22. See E. Hellman, Political Hinduism. The Challenge of the Visva Hindu Parisad (Uppsala:Uppsala University, 1993) and Jaffrelot for the activity of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad inthis regard.

23. Chiriyankandath, 'Tricolour and Saffron', pp.67-73.24. A.S. Menon, Social and Cultural History of Kerala (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979),

p.165.

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6 4 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS

25. P. Thomas, Epics, Myths and Legends of India (Bombay: D.B. Taraporevala & Sons, 14thed., 1980), p.18.

26. A.S. Menon, A Survey of Kerala History (Madras: S. Viswanathan, 6th ed., 1991),pp. 118-34.

27. Miller, pp.39-51.28. Their name derives from their traditional use of Syriac for liturgical purposes. In physical

appearance there is little to obviously distinguish Christians and Muslims from MalayaliHindus, and differences in dress between castes and communities have also diminished.

29. Menon, Kerala History, pp.84-7.30. For instance, Syrian Christians remained socially and religiously distinct from post-

sixteenth century converts made by Catholic and Protestant missionaries. See S. Bayly,Saints, Goddesses and Kings. Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700-1900(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.249-53.

31. A.K.K.R. Nair, Kerala State Gazetteer, Vol. II, Pt. I (Trivandrum: Government of Kerala,1986), pp.194-195; Miller, pp.46-9.

32. In a fairly typical reaction, Abdul Gafar Maulavi, the Imam of the Jama Masjid, the mainmosque in the state capital, Trivandrum, when asked about communal relations in Kerala,prefaced his response with the welcome accorded by Cheraman Perumal to the firstMuslims (interview, 2 September 1992).

33. The Hindu (International Ed.), Madras, 23 January 1993.34. Hardy, p.41.35. Miller, pp.22-3, 249-50.36. See, for example, A. Eschman, H. Kulke and G.C. Tripathi, The Cult of Jagannath and the

Regional Tradition of Orissa (Delhi: Manohar, 1986) and C. Ryerson, Regionalism andReligion. The Tamil Renaissance and Popular Hinduism (Madras: Christian LiteratureSociety, 1988).

37. L.I. Rudolph, 'The Media and Cultural Politics' in Mitra and Chiriyankandath, pp.92-94;R. Thapar, 'Epic and History: Tradition, Dissent and Politics in India', Past and Present,No.l25(1989),pp.22-6.

38. Trivandrum relay area; in Madras in neighbouring Tamil Nadu the Mahabharat came ninth(Indian Market Research Bureau, The Hindu, 29 April 1990).

39. Kothari, p.282.40. Chiriyankandath, 'Communities at the Polls'.41. T.J. Nossiter, Marxist State Governments in India. Politics, Economics and Society

(London: Pinter, 1988), p.191.42. See Table 2 for source on which analysis is based.43. J. Chiriyankandath, 'Changing Muslim Politics in Kerala: Identity, Interests and Political

Strategies' (forthcoming in Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs).44. K.S. Nayar, Congress and Kerala Politics (Trivandrum: College Book House, 1984),

p.206.45. G. Gopa Kumar, The Congress Party and State Politics. Emergence of New Style Politics

(Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1984), pp.231-51.46. 'Exit Karunakaran', Frontline (Madras), 7 April 1995, pp. 120-22.47. The Hindu (Coimbatore ed.), 27 August 1992, p.24.48. Chiriyankandath, 'Changing Muslim Politics'.49. Nossiter, p.269.50. Nayar, pp.278-83.51. E.M.S. Namboodiripad, 'Castes, Classes and Parties in Modern Political Development

with Special Reference to Kerala', Social Scientist, No.64 (1977).52. P.R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison (Delhi: Sage, 1991), p.334.53. T.J. Nossiter, Communism in Kerala. A Study in Political Adaptation (Delhi: Oxford

University Press, 1982), p.38.54. Interview with R.Hari (b.1930), Ernakulam, 28 August 1992. Hari became the first

Malayali Provincial Pracharak in 1983.55. K. Jayaprasad, RSS and Hindu Nationalism. Inroads in a Leftist Stronghold (Delhi: Deep

& Deep, 1991), pp. 152-3.

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HINDU NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE 6 5

56. Ibid., pp. 155, 163.57. Interview, Ernakulam, 17 August 1992. Parameswaran (b.1927), like Hari and the rest of

the senior state leadership of the RSS, joined the organization during the 1940s, becomingthe first Organizing Secretary of the Kerala Jana Sangh in 1958. He is the Director of theBharatiya Vichar Kendra in Trivandrum.

58. Jayaprasad, pp. 188-90.59. Miller, pp. 183-4.60. Andersen and Damle, pp.212-13. The RSS has been banned thrice - in 1948-4 (following

the assassination of Gandhi by a former member), in 1975-7 and 1992-3 (after thedestruction of the Babri Masjid).

61. He subsequently became the BJP State President (interview, Trivandrum, 4 September1992).

62. Jayaprasad, pp.209-31.63. H.V. Seshadri, RSS. A Vision in Action (Bangalore: Jagarana Prakashana, 1988), p.315.64. Ibid., pp. 115-16, 239, 254.65. The political scientist V.K. Sukumaran Nair. See Indian Express (Cochin ed.), 27 April

1983, p.5.66. Jayaprasad, p. 193.67. Interviews with Jayakumar, Trivandrum District Pracharak (Trivandrum, 1 September

1992) and Poulose Mar Poulose, Bishop of the Chaldean Syrian Church of the East(Trichur, 19 September 1992).

68. Interview with State Pracharak R. Hari, 28 August 1992.69. Golwalkar, p.103.70. Hellman, p.71.71. Seshadri, p.127.72. Hellman, pp.82-7.73. Anon, 'Political Backdrop to Trivandrum Riots', Economic and Political Weekly

(Bombay), 12 February 1983, pp.209-11.74. Reports in the Malayala Manorama (Kottayam ed.), April-May 1983.75. Indian Express (Cochin ed.), 22 July 1983, p. 1.76. Interview with Poulose Mar Poulose, 19 September 1992.77. Seshadri, p.90.78. Interview with P. Parameswaran, 17 August 1992.79. Jayaprasad, pp.238-39.80. Interview with P. Asok Kumar, Trivandrum, 4 September 1992.81. Ibid.. The BJP symbol is a lotus.82. Census of India, 1981. Series 10 - Kerala, Paper 1 of 1987: Households and Household

Population by Language mainly spoken (Delhi), Table HH-16.83. G. Gopa Kumar, Regional Political Parties and State Politics (Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1986),

pp. 102-3.84. Census of India, 1991. Series 12 - Kerala, Paper 2 of 1991: Provisional Population Totals

(Delhi), Table 1.1.85. Interview with R. Hari, 28 August 1992.86. The Hindu (International Ed.), 17 December 1994, p. 2.87. The twelve per cent Tamil- and Telugu-speaking minority is concentrated in the city of

Palghat where the BJP registered its victory.88. Interview with K.G. Marar, 4 September 1992.89. Interviews with district pracharak Jayakumar and Anathalavattom Anandan, a member of

the CPIM State Committee who represented a Trivandrum District constituency in the1987-91 Assembly (Trivandrum, 1 and 5 September 1992). See also Menon, KeralaHistory, p. 239.

90. Interview with P. Asok Kumar, 4 September 1992.91. Interview with R. Hari, 28 August 1992.92. Nossiter, Communism in Kerala, p.290.93. Chiriyankandath, 'Changing Muslim Polities'.94. Reports in Malayala Manorama (Cochin ed.), 4 and 12 October 1990.

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6 6 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS

95. Indian Express (Cochin ed.), 13 December 1991, p.5.96. Reports for two years to October 1992 collated from the Malayala Manorama and Indian

Express (Cochin) and The Hindu (Coimbatore); see India Today, 31 December 1992 (p. 43)for December 1992, and Jayaprasad (p. 321) for the pre-1990 period.

97. Interview with ISS Chairman Abdul Nazar Madani, Trivandrum, 3 September 1992.98. For statement by acting Chief Minister C.V. Padmarajan see The Hindu (Coimbatore ed.),

4 August 1992; also see The Week (Cochin), 25 October 1992, pp.23-4.99. Chiriyankandath, 'Tricolour and Saffron", pp.68-9, 73.

100. In fifteen of the twenty seats gained by the UDF, the decline from the BJP's 1987 vote wasbetween twice and four times as much as the state-wide average of 19 per cent. (For thesource of the data from which these figures are derived see Table 2).

101. Interviews with then BJP State President K. Raman Pillai, and current President, K.G.Marar, Trivandrum, 31 August and 4 September 1992.

102. O. Rajagopal, Keralalhine Kashmir akan anvadhiykila (Kerala will not be allowed tobecome a Kashmir), (Trivandrum: BJP, n.d.); K. Raman Pillai, Ayodhyum Sri Ramanum(Ayodhya and Lord Rama) (Trivandrum: BJP, 1992). Rajagopal is a BJP national vice-president and Pillai was the state president (1987-92).

103. A.D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), p.91. The emphasis is his.104. Text in Jayaprasad, p.352.105. R. Tagore, Nationalism (Calcutta: Rupa & Co.,1992, first published 1917), p.89.106. Andersen and Damle, pp.92-3.107. The Hindu (International Ed.), 11 March 1995, p. 16, and 29 April 1995, p. 16; interview

with Sukumaran Azhikode, Trichur, 18 September 1992.108. For instance, Raichal Mathai (currently one of two Christian special invitees on the BJP's

National Executive) is a sixtyish spinster from a wealthy Syrian Christian family whoworked for many years as a medical practitioner in Ceylon and England. Having twicestood as a BJP Assembly candidate in Trivandrum, she felt that many Christians had'closed minds' and conceded that her views were atypical of the community (interview,Trivandrum, 1 September 1992).

109. The Hindu (Coimbatore ed.), 21 September 1992.110. For instance, P.Parameswaran published a biography of the Ezhava social reformer who

founded the SNDP Yogam (Sree Narayana Guru, the Prophet of Renaissance, New Delhi,1979).

111. In this respect, Maharashtra, where the BJP only gained office in 1995 through its alliancewith the regional Hindu chauvinist Shiv Sena, appears to be the exception that proves therule. See T.B. Hansen, 'The Maratha'ization of Hindutva: Shiv Sena and BJP in RuralMaharashtra' (paper given at the 13th European Conference of South Asian Studies,Toulouse, September 1994) and 'Democratisation, Mass-politics and Hindu Identity: TheCommunalisation of Bombay' (paper prepared for the European Consortium for PoliticalResearch Workshop on 'Political Culture and Religion in the Third World', Bordeaux,April-May 1995).

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hindu nationalism and regional political culture in india: a study of kerala

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