hemisphere a magazine of the americas volume 17 •...

The New Old Cuba

HemisphereVOLUME 17 • FALL 2006 • HTTP://LACC.FIU.EDUA MAGAZINE OF THE AMERICAS

FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

The New Old Cuba Damián J. Fernández 3

REPORTS

Changes From Below Katrin Hansing 4

The New Politics of Opposition Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat 8

Cuba and China Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson 12

Young Blood Frank O. Mora 16

FEATURES

Poverty and Inequality in Cuba Lorena G. Barberia 20

Cuba’s New Daddy Javier Corrales 24

The End of Rationing? Carmelo Mesa-Lago 30

PHOTO ESSAY

Everything Old Is New Again Uva de Aragón 36

REVIEW FORUM

Plus ça change... Anthony P. Maingot 42

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

Cuba’s New Society Marian Goslinga 46

COVER: Ismael Gómez Peralta, “El fénix” de la Serie Iluminaciones, 2006 Mixed media on canvas, 69 x 59 inches. Photograph by Pedro Portal.The artist is represented exclusively by Cernuda Arte, Coral Gables, Florida.

HemisphereVOLUME 17 • FALL 2006 • HTTP://LACC.FIU.EDU

I N T H I S I S S U E

EDITORIAL STAFF

Founding Editor Anthony P. MaingotEditor Eduardo A. Gamarra

Associate Editors Mark B. RosenbergRichard TardanicoPatricia Price

Managing Editor Pedro D. BottaBook Review Editor Ivelaw Griffith

Bibliographer Marian Goslinga

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Uva de Aragón Sarah MahlerAna María Bidegain Félix E. Martín

David Bray Lisandro PérezJanet M. Chernela Timothy J. PowerMichael W. Collier Ana Roca

Carol Damian Andrea Mantell SeidelDamián J. Fernández Victor Uribe

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Don Bohning Guido PennanoEttore Botta Alejandro Portes

Wolf Grabendorff Sally PriceAlistair Hennessy David Ronfeldt

Harry Hoetnik Selwyn RyanFranklin W. Knight Steven E. Sanderson

Vaughan Lewis Saskia SassenLarissa A. Lomnitz Andrés Serbín

Abraham F. Lowenthal Carol A. SmithTerry L. McCoy Lourdes Sola

Andrés Oppenheimer Yolande Van EeuwenRobert A. Pastor Arturo Villar

Anthony J. Payne Juan Yañes

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published twice a year by the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University.Copyright © 2006 by the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University. All rights reserved. Printed in the UnitedStates of America.

Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initiatives and achievements of the Americas. Responsibility for the views expressedlies solely with the authors. Editorial, Circulation and Advertising Offices: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida InternationalUniversity, University Park, DM 353, Miami, Florida, 33199, Tel.: (305) 348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593, E-mail: [email protected].

Hemisphere

Is there a new Cuba? The traditional perspective suggests that Cuba is frozen in time, based on a view from thetop: a political system that has remained quite unchanged if not atrophied. But, if one looks deep into themacro-structures of power, one will find that things have dramatically changed among political institutionsand leaders outside the inner circle. Particularly at the grassroots level, these changes will have a decisiveimpact on the island’s future. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 years of the Special Period, and

significant demographic changes, there is a new Cuba emerging. This new Cuba has become clearer with the recentnews that Fidel Castro’s illness has caused him to cede power to his brother, Raúl Castro. We will now see the con-tours of newness even sharper.

Despite the dynamics of social change, the island of Cuba is often perceived to be suspended outside real space andtime, beyond the parameters of global social life. Such a portrayal highlights the tendency to feature and magnifyCuba’s uniqueness. As this issue of Hemisphere reveals, transnational norms, capital, identities, and mass culture havenot stopped short of Cuban shores. Moreover, within Cuban society, economics, and politics, significant sources ofchange will perhaps play out in unexpected, but important ways.

In “Poverty and Inequality in Cuba,” Lorena Barberia reveals that new trends in consumption, income generation,and social mobility represent significant challenges for the egalitarianism embraced by Cuban leaders for nearly half acentury. Without a critical reassessment of social policy, Barberia maintains, the stratification of society will continueto widen the gap between Cubans with and without access to remittances and sectors of the economy driven by for-eign direct investment.

In examining the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship, Javier Corrales writes that while the island’s alliance with itsSouth American neighbor offers enormous material benefits without the obligation to modify domestic policies,Cuba will eventually pay the price for its new dependence, just as the country paid for its dependence on the formerSoviet Union.

In “Cuba and China,” Dan Erikson and Adam Minson explore how China represents a new lifeline for the island’seconomy. Yet, while Cuban leaders perceive relations with China as an example of social solidarity, the two countriesare separated by an increasing ideological divide regarding the benefits of economic liberalization.

The increasing ideological divide, however, transcends elite politics and foreign affairs. In “The New Politics ofOpposition,” Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat analyzes changes in the island’s dissident movement, and concludes that aresurgent sense of citizen solidarity noted among some sectors of Cuban society may indicate that a new phase in thestruggle for nonviolent change has begun.

A nuanced view of everyday resistance and accommodation is offered by Katrin Hansing in “Changes from Below.”Hansing reflects on the transformations experienced by all levels of Cuban society since the Special Period. By seek-ing new ways of connecting to the outside world and creating alternative spaces, Cubans are increasingly demonstrat-ing an independent attitude that may prove to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the state.

Another continuing challenge for state leaders is Cuba’s economy. In “The End Rationing?,” Carmelo Mesa-Lagoexplores the inception and evolution of rationing, and assesses the feasibility of five strategies to fulfill Castro’s prom-ise made in November 2005 that the island’s 43-year old rationing system would soon be terminated. Mesa-Lagoconcludes that this promise may be yet another symbolic ingredient of the official discourse designed to assureCubans that a bright future lies ahead.

Whether that future is bright or cloudy, will depend in part on the role of the armed forces—arguably thestrongest institution on the island—and the subtle transformations taking place deep in ranks of the FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias. In “Young Blood,” Frank Mora examines whether the armed forces are an agent of changeor continuity. In the meantime, we will continue to see the contours of a new old Cuba emerge ever so clearly.

DAMIÁN J. FERNÁNDEZ

Hemisphere Volume 17 3

F R O M T H E G U E S T E D I T O R

The New Old Cuba

Walking throughthe streets ofHavana, one isimmediatelystruck by a

myriad of contradictory images,sounds, and sensations. Five-starhotels, fancy cafés, bars and shopsoffering imported foods, modernappliances, mountain bikes, andperfumes from Paris stand side byside dilapidated and decayingapartment blocks, empty pesoshops, and local bodegas, whereCubans can be seen standing inlong lines waiting for their month-ly food rations. Flashy MercedesBenz, Toyota, and funny egg-shaped taxis bustle through thestreets next to overcrowdedguaguas, camellos, and particulares(different types of local publictransport). Churches, new andold, Catholic, Protestant, and espe-cially Pentecostal are being rebuilt,restored, and revived, while Afro-Cuban religions have become sopopular that many foreigners arenow flocking to the island tobecome initiated. In many of thecity’s tourist areas more and morepeople, especially the elderly andchildren, can be seen begging formoney, clothes, toiletries, or justasking for chicle (chewing gum),while tourists and members of thenewly emerging Cuban nouveauriche class can be seen loungingaround one of the five-star hotelpools or bars. Although Havana isnot Cuba, these contradictions areemblematic of many of the changesthe island is currently undergoing.Cuba is no longer the isolatedisland, cut off from the rest of the

R E P O R T S

Changes From Belowby Katrin Hansing

Hemisphere Volume 174

world’s political, economic andsocial events, popular culturalinfluences, and consumer culture.Since the Special Period, and par-ticularly in the past decade, Cubahas experienced fundamental andenormous changes on all levels ofsociety. In this article I will reflecton some of these transformationsand their consequences, particular-ly those that have and continue tooccur at the grassroots social level.

It is 9 am and Dalia is anxiouslywaiting for Carlos, a local streetvendor, to pick up her freshlymade croquetas. Over the past fewmonths, Dalia has stayed up everynight making around 200 cheese,fish, and/or chicken croquetas,which Carlos then tries to sell tohungry habaneros during the day.Dalia is an accountant by trainingand until recently worked for aCuban state-owned company.Although she enjoyed her work,she could no longer survive on hermeager income and had to leaveher profession. “I had no choice,”she says, “I only earned 280 pesosand could not feed my mother,daughter, and myself on that wage.I now make croquetas but at leastwe can get by.”

Juan, an accomplished neurosur-geon, who has served as a doctoron several internationalist missionsto Africa, has a different yet similarsituation: He can no longer pro-vide for his family of five on hismonthly peso income. Havingearned the right to buy a car afterhis first mission to Zambia, Juan,like many other Cubans who arelucky enough to own a car, hasbecome a taxi driver. Due to the

high cost and difficulties in acquir-ing a taxi license, Juan, however,works illegally. Despite the risks ofa high fine if caught, Juan never-theless drives his old Lada aroundtown every day and night lookingfor potential clients, preferably for-eigners, who will pay in hard cur-rency. “What can I do?,” he asks.“We need to live. I don’t like work-ing illegally but the state has liter-ally pushed me into being dishon-est.”

Cuba’s economic crisis over thepast 15 years has brought abouttremendous social and economicchanges, which, among other fac-tors, include: the legalization andincreasing dependence on the US$dollar (now CUC or Cuban con-vertible peso); the partial officialopening of certain economic sec-tors such as tourism; a majorincrease in living expenses but stag-nation of people’s salaries; the for-mation of a double economy; theincreasing dependence on remit-tances and formation of new socialclasses; the demise in the quality ofsocial services; and the continuingcontrol and repression of any inde-pendent activity and thought,which was most visibly witnessedin the March 2003 crackdown of75 dissidents.

As the examples of Dalia andJuan show, these changes have notonly altered Cubans’ lives in verypractical, everyday kinds of ways,but also provoked major changes inpeople’s attitudes and actionstoward their lives, their futures,and the state.

Before the economic crisis, mostCubans relied on the government

New spaces, attitudes, and actions in contemporary Cuba

and, arguably, many still had faithin the system. The stagnating econ-omy, eroding quality of health careand education, growing corrup-tion, and continuing repressivegovernment policies have led moreand more people to no longercount on the state to help themsolve their problems. Weariness,skepticism, and distrust haveinstead kicked in, forcing manypeople to look for alternatives.Although apathy, depression, andleaving the country are some of themore drastic and dramatic meas-ures people have resorted to, many,if not most Cubans are respondingby creating and carving out theirown spaces, networks, and mecha-nisms—whether economic, social,or cultural in nature—independ-ently from the state.

Like every Sunday morning, theSalvación Pentecostal Church’s 11am service in Boyeros, on the out-skirts of central Havana, is packed.Most congregants have alreadyattended Sunday school or Biblestudy classes since 9 am and manywill spend the rest of the day onthe church grounds taking part inone of the many recreational activi-ties or meals offered by the church.“The church has become my sec-ond home,” says María, who hasbeen a member of the congregationfor three years. “I come herealmost every other day. Sometimesto eat, to see my friends, watch afilm, and of course to pray.” Insearch of community, food, medi-cine, and entertainment, but alsoto fill their spiritual void, more andmore Cubans, like María, are seek-ing out religious communities.Whether Catholic, Protestant,


Reports

A man drives a bicycle-taxi through the streets of Santa Clara, Cuba. Cubans havefound creative ways to survive the economic hardships that afflict the island and,in so doing, are fostering a growing sense of indepedence and self-reliance.

Pentecostal, Afro-Cuban, Jewish,Buddhist, Hindu, Masonic, orMuslim, many of these and otherfaith-based organizations haveturned into important alternativespaces of spiritual refuge and socialupliftment, as well as material sup-port based on self aid and solidari-ty.

Increasing numbers of Cubanyouth, which make up more thanhalf of the island’s current popula-tion, are also searching for alterna-tives. Despite having been broughtup to be like Comrade Che, manyhave a strong craving to be them-selves. There is among many agrowing sense of wanting to be dif-ferent and a curiosity about differ-ent lifestyles and values; in short, adesire for options. One of themore visible signs of this is thegrowing presence of a number ofboth older and newer youth cul-tures, which include expressionssuch as the hippie, freakie, roquero,rapero, as well as Rastafari move-ments. Through their alternativelifestyles, body cultures, and out-looks on life, these subculturesoffer many young people the possi-bility to question and explore whothey are and what they want.

These examples represent someof the more institutionalized orsemiorganized forms in which peo-ple are searching for and findingalternative answers and spaces tothe official state rhetoric and sys-tem. The search for news, infor-mation, and knowledge beyondthat provided by the state hasbecome particularly important.While contact with family mem-bers abroad, interacting with for-eigners, involvement in grassrootsorganizations, and listening toRadio Martí are among the moreestablished forms of doing so,increasing numbers of individualsare finding new ways of connectingto the outside world.

Reports

A few months ago I was standingat a street corner stall having a cof-fee, when I overheard a group ofpeople talking about a special newsprogram on the current situation inVenezuela. I assumed that theywere making reference to the mesaredonda session, a daily news pro-gram on Cuban television, when Isuddenly realized that they were infact talking about a program thathad been aired on Miami’s Channel51, which all of them had watched.When I asked one of the menabout the program, I learned that acertain individual in the neighbor-hood has a cable TV antenna towhich about three dozen or morehouseholds are connected. Eachindividual household pays theowner of the antenna $5 a month,which helps him make a living,while the others get to watch highlysought out foreign movies, telenove-las, and news programs.

Although highly illegal and thusvery risky, activities such as con-necting to cable television and theinternet are becoming more andmore common. Besides offeringdifferent types of news, informa-tion, and entertainment, thesemedia allow people to connect withthe outside world and, in so doing,experience a completely differentreality, however momentarily.

So what do these examples showus? For one, they demonstrate howmore and more people are carvingout and creating alternative spacesand parallel mechanisms to thestate. In so doing, they are actingindependently. This not only showsthat many are taking initiatives butalso responsibility for themselves—i.e., people are taking their ownlives into their own hands, which,after decades of depending on acradle-to-grave system, is a hugestep.

Given that many of the activitiesand mechanisms involved in doing

so are deemed illegal, people haveto be very creative in outwitting thesystem and must constantly be ontheir toes not to be caught. Theseare skills that can and should notbe underestimated, let alone theenergy and determination that gointo them. Moreover, these activi-ties are acts of defiance—defianceagainst a system that prohibits peo-ple from making an honest, decentliving. And that takes courage.

In short, a qualitative differencein the way many people think andact has emerged and is growingmore and more each day. Despitethe crackdowns on dissidents andthe Varela Project, as well as thecontinuing everyday repression andrestrictions people live under, manyno longer are afraid to speak theirmind among each other, engage inillicit activities, or find new andcreative ways of forging their ownspaces. It is this independent atti-tude and its accompanying actionsthat I would argue are among themost important social changes thathave occurred on the island in thelast 10 years. Cubans may not yetbe turning to the streets to expresstheir frustrations and discontent,but it is this newfound and growingindependence among many thatmay just turn out to be one of thegreatest challenges to the state.

Katrin Hansing is currently directorof a research project on Cuba’s socialcollaboration ties to Africa, based atthe University of Bayreuth inGermany and funded by the GermanResearch Council. She has worked asa consultant for think tanks and poli-cy institutes on numerous Cuba-relat-ed issues and is an associate fellow ofthe Cuban Research Institute atFlorida International University.


Founded in 1979, LACC is a leader in the field of Latin American andCaribbean studies. As a federally funded Title VI National Resource Centerfor Language and Area studies, LACC has a mandate to promote graduateand undergraduate education, faculty research, and public education onLatin American and Caribbean affairs.

Florida International University has one of the largest concentrations ofLatin American and Caribbean studies scholars of any university in theUnited States. LACC’s faculty associates range across many fields and haveproduced important works on such topics as migration, US-Latin Americanrelations, trade and integration in the Americas, indigenous cultures, eco-nomic stabilization and democratization, sustainable development, and envi-ronmental technology. FIU Latin Americanists include highly regardedsocial scientists, humanists, artists, business experts, and engineers.

LACC’s base in Miami also provides the center with certain unique assets. Asits programs have grown, LACC has become in many ways a microcosm ofthe city itself: a mosaic of Caribbean, Mexican, Central American, and SouthAmerican influences. This inter-American setting provides an ideal field-likeenvironment for research and study. LACC’s partnerships with a long list ofuniversities and research centers in the Americas also bring the region closerto home. Through these networks, LACC co-sponsors research projects,major conferences, and faculty and student exchanges.

For more information, please visit http://lacc.fiu.edu or call 305-348-2894.

Latin American and Caribbean CenterFlorida International University

A Patchwork of UnrestThe international community has

recognized Cuban dissident leaderssuch as the Ladies in White,Oswaldo Payá, Vladimiro Roca,Marta Beatriz Roque, Oscar ElíasBiscet, Gustavo Arcos, and ElizardoSánchez Santacruz, offering themhonors and awards. These well-known men and women, however,do not constitute the “body” of theCuban opposition. The pillars ofcivil resistance to the Castro regimelie deep within the island’s popula-tion, spread out across the provinces:among disaffected youth and blacks,Catholics and Protestants, and,increasingly, former Communistsdisenchanted with the regime’s rejec-tion of economic and politicalreform. In 1997, the Steps toFreedom report counted 44 civicresistance actions across the island;in 2004, the number was 1,805.Intensely active, fueled by risingsocial discontent and increased inter-national support from abroad, theCuban civic movement itself is apatchwork of individuals, families,groups, and religious denominationsspreading across regions and sectorswhere opposition to Castroism hastraditionally been high.

Year after year, a greater percent-age of actions occur outside Havana.In 2004, 81.5% of civic resistanceactivities took place in the country’sinterior. Of the 75 civic leadersarrested in March 2003, 43 werefrom the provinces. After Havana,the provinces with the highest levelof activity were Villa Clara andMatanzas, the sites of deep-rootedcampesino rebellions against theCastro regime in the 1960s.

Berta Antúnez and her familyfrom Placetas, Villa Clara, are exam-ples of the role played by provincialdissidents in mobilizing protestsagainst the government. Berta’sbrother, Jorge Luis García Pérez“Antúnez,” has been imprisonedsince 1990 for speaking out in favorof glasnost and perestroika. His tena-cious struggle from behind bars hasturned him into an icon of the pro-democracy movement and a leaderof the political prisoners. Berta’suncle, Omar Pernet, is also in jail,one of the 75 civic activists arrestedin March 2003.

Berta has organized family mem-bers of political prisoners in theprovinces to support their impris-oned relatives. They have publishedand circulated newsletters, carriedout sit-ins in front of prisons, heldweekly prayer vigils, and collectedsignatures for the Varela Project ref-erendum drive.

Berta has paid a high price for heractivities. In addition to the pro-longed incarceration of her brotherand uncle, Berta’s daughter,Damaris, has been expelled fromschool and barred from further pur-suing her education. Government-organized mobs have demonstratedoutside the family’s home.

The Sigler family in Matanzasprovince is another example of anucleus of democratic resistance. OfGloria Sigler’s four sons, two are inprison and one is in exile.Communist Party officials have ran-sacked the Siglers’ house and Gloriaherself, a frail 76-year-old, washurled to the floor and beaten in herown home by government thugs.This aggression hasn’t deterred the


On July 26, 2005, FidelCastro addressed aclosed-door gatheringof hand-picked fol-lowers. Half of his

two-hour speech was dedicated toattacking an internal pro-democracymovement which he described as an“illusion,” orchestrated from abroad.The Revolution, he promised, “willnot concede a millimeter of ground”to these individuals. The streetsbelong to the Revolution and willstay that way, he concluded. In thecavalcade of violence following thesewords, government-organized mobsacross the island heckled, spit upon,and sometimes even beat peacefuldissidents outside their homes.

Some observers claim to be per-plexed by Castro’s recurrence tostreet violence against a pro-democ-racy movement that they do not seeas a serious threat to the communistregime’s 47-year old hold on power.Others argue that Castro’s resort topublic violence against a movementthat the government has repeatedlypronounced dead demonstrates theresiliency of Cuba’s embryonicopposition.

The Cuban case is perhaps bestunderstood in the context of thedynamics of nonviolent, grassrootssocial struggle. Throughout history,lone dissidents manage to coalesceinto increasingly effective commit-tees, coalitions, and movements.These articulated channels of socialpower reshape civil society, which, inturn, becomes the platform for sus-tained and ultimately successful civicdefiance. Cuban dissidents are onthis path, and the Cuban govern-ment is bent on stopping them.

The New Politics of Oppositionby Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat

Reports

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Siglers from carrying on with theiractivities. They have organized pub-lic demonstrations, set up independ-ent libraries, and collected signaturesfor the Varela Project’s referendumdrive. Their defiance of the regimein Matanzas has turned them intonational opposition leaders.

It is difficult to calculate howmany dissidents like the Antúnez orSigler families are active in theprovinces. Some observers, such as


Civil resistance to the Castro regime

human rights activist ElizardoSánchez Santacruz, estimate thatthere may be 5,000 activists acrossthe island. Oswaldo Payá agrees,describing the movement as “severalthousand strong.”

In 2001, the Cuban DemocraticDirectorate, together with theUniversity of Miami’s CubaTransition Project, conducted a cen-sus of the internal opposition inCuba. Working closely with activists

inside the island, it counted 283 dis-sident groups. Of these, 86 are inde-pendent libraries, 29 are independentpress agencies, 107 are groupsengaged directly in some type ofpolitical activity, and 61 are laborgroups, think tanks or civic institu-tions. The census further showedthat some type of dissident organiza-tion exists in all of the island’s majorcities, all of its provinces, and inmost municipalities.

A group of Cuban demonstrators are harassed by pro-government thugs during a march in Havana on July 13, 2005. Thedemonstrators were marching to commemorate the anniversary of the sinking by the Cuban Navy of a tug with 43 people onboard who were attempting to reach Florida.

attempts at incorporation into theEU’s Lomé Accord, which wouldhave meant millions of dollars inloans and credits. However, someinformed observers, such as authorand journalist Carlos AlbertoMontaner, have argued that Castrodoesn’t really care about normalizingpolitical and economic ties with theUnited States and the EuropeanUnion because of the possible politi-cal consequences. In this totalitarianpolitical scenario, the pro-democracymovement holds out the potentialfor an alternative democratic futurefor Cubans.

A factor adversely affecting thedevelopment of the movement is thewidespread perception, inside andoutside the island, that change willnot take place until Fidel Castro’sdeath, and that once this has hap-pened, change will be inevitable.

Many analysts have pointed out thatthis may not be the case, givenambitious plans implemented by thedictatorship to guarantee totalitariancontinuity. The listlessness causedby the waiting game over Castro’sdeath hurts the dissidents in theirefforts to mobilize citizen participa-tion in social change. To overcomethis problem, the movement mustdo more to reach out and connectwith the basic social grievances andaspirations of Cubans on the street.“Our hope does not lie in the bio-logical finality of any one man, butin the fact that we are struggling,”Oswaldo Payá has said.

Something of this sort may havealready begun. As acts of sanctionedviolence against dissidents have esca-lated, their neighbors have come outof their homes to defend them.Berta Antúnez is proud that no onefrom her neighborhood participatedin the demonstrations against herfamily. “They had to bring them infrom the outside, people who didn’tknow us,” she says smiling.

On his way to his version of cul-tural revolution, Castro may havestumbled upon a resurgent sense ofcitizen solidarity in Cuba. It maymark a new phase in the struggle fornonviolent change on the island.

Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat teachescourses in political science andinternational studies at FloridaInternational University and BarryUniversity. He is co-founder andNational Secretary of the CubanDemocratic Directorate (DirectorioDemocrático Cubano), and theauthor of La República Invisible(“The Invisible Republic”), a book-long collection of essays on Cubannational identity, exile politics, andthe civic movement on the island.

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Strategy and ProspectsThe Castro dictatorship has been

forced into a tense tug of war withthe internal pro-democracy move-ment. The regime has tried to bal-ance its need to repress social dis-content with its desire to grow closereconomically to the United Statesand the European Union.Dissidents have used the latitudeafforded by this juggling act to reachout to the general population.

The regime has proven adept atblocking the growth of the pro-democracy movement at criticaljunctures, but it has paid a highpolitical cost for doing so. The1996 repression of the ConcilioCubano meeting and the murder ofthe Brothers to the Rescue pilotsresulted in the enactment of theHelms-Burton bill. The 2003crackdown doomed the regime’s


Members of the Cuban dissident group, Ladies in White, walk through Havanaon March 18, 2006, to protest against the government and demand amnesty forimprisoned dissidents. Despite the international recognition that the group andother Cuban dissidents have attained, the pillars of the Cuban opposition arefound within the disaffected segments of the island’s population.

FORTHCOMING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PRESS

A comprehensive analysis of corruption in Cuba and prescriptions for minimizing it in the post-Castro era

CORRUPTION IN CUBA: Castro and BeyondBY SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS AND JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ

Although Fidel Castro maintains his longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts have turned theirattention to life after Castro. Among the many questions to be answered is how the new government will deal with thecorruption that has become endemic in Cuba. While combating corruption cannot be the central aim of post-Castro pol-icy, Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López suggest that, without a strong plan to thwart it, corruption will under-mine the new economy, erode support for the new government, and encourage organized crime. In short, unless meas-ures are taken to stem corruption, the new Cuba could be as messy as the old Cuba.

Fidel Castro did not bring corruption to Cuba; he merely institutionalized it. Official corruption has crippled Cuba sincethe colonial period, but Castro's state-run monopolies, cronyism, and lack of accountability have made Cuba one of theworld's most corrupt states. The former communist countries in Eastern Europe were also extremely corrupt, and analy-ses of their transitional periods suggest that those who have taken measures to control corruption have had more suc-cessful transitions, regardless of whether the leadership tilted toward socialism or democracy. To that end, Díaz-Briquetsand Pérez-López, both Cuban Americans, do not advocate any particular system for Cuba's next government, but insteadprescribe uniquely Cuban policies to minimized corruption whatever direction the country takes after Castro.

SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS is Senior Vice President of the international management consulting firm Casals and Associates inAlexandria, Virginia, which provides anticorruption advice to governments and organizations throughout the world.

JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ is Director of Monitoring at the Fair Labor Association, a collaborative effort among companies, civilsociety organizations, and universities to improve working conditions in factories around the world.

October 2006 • 6 x 9 in., 272 pp. • ISBN: 0-292-71482-3, $21.95, paperback • ISBN 0-292-71321-5, $55.00, hardcover

A collection of original essays on ten modern Latin American heroes, their legacies, and the societies that produced them

HEROES AND HERO CULTS IN LATIN AMERICAEDITED BY SAMUEL BRUNK AND BEN FALLAW

Latin American history traditionally has been defined by larger-than-life heroes such as Símon Bolívar, Emiliano Zapata,and Evita Perón. Recent scholarship, however, tends to emphasize social and cultural factors rather than great leaders.In this new collection, Samuel Brunk and Ben Fallaw bring heroes back to the center of the debate, arguing that heroesnot only shape history, they also "tell us a great deal about the places from which they come."

The original essays in this collection examine ten modern Latin American heroes whose charisma derived from the qual-ity of their relationship with admirers, rather than their innate personal qualities. The rise of mass media, for instance,helped pave the way for populists such as radio actress-turned-hero Evita Perón. On the other hand, heroes who becomepresident often watch their images crumble, as policies replace personality in the eye of citizens. In the end, the editorsargue, there is no formula for Latin American heroes, who both forge, and are forged by, unique national events. Theenduring (or, in some cases, fading) influence of those discussed in this volume validates the central placement of heroesin Latin American history.

SAMUEL BRUNK is Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at El Paso.

BEN FALLAW is Assistant Professor of History and Latin American Studies at Colby College in Maine.

December 2006 • 6 x 9 in., 350 pp. • ISBN: 0-292-71481-5, $22.95, paperback • ISBN: 0-292-71437-8, $55.00, hardcover

Cuba’s internationalrelations have changedremarkably in recentyears, with oldalliances unraveling

and new partnerships emerging.Since 2001, Cuba has experiencedits most important realignment offoreign relations since the collapseof the Soviet Union in the early1990s. The European Unionremains an important economicpartner, but diplomatic relationssoured following Cuba’s crackdownon dissidents in 2003. WhenEuropean embassies responded byinviting opposition leaders toimportant embassy receptions, theCuban government cut all contactswith European ambassadors andrefused EU aid. Only days after anofficial rapprochement wasannounced in January 2005, FidelCastro told reporters that “Cubadoes not need Europe.”

Cuba’s relations in Latin Americaare also in flux. Governments inArgentina, Brazil, and Uruguayhave moved left-of-center andincreased diplomatic engagementwith Havana. The election of left-wing indigenous leader EvoMorales in Bolivia continues thistrend. Meanwhile, Cuba’s oncestaunch alliance with Mexico hasverged on total breakdown duringthe term of President Vicente Fox,who has backed successive UN res-olutions condemning the state ofhuman rights in Cuba. Withoutquestion, the rise of Venezuela’sHugo Chávez led to the most dra-matic change in Cuba’s hemisphericrelations. Chávez and Castro haveforged a strong political alliance

Cuba and Chinaby Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson

Reports

that has sparked anxiety in somequarters. More than 30,000Cuban medical and other highly-trained specialists have been dis-patched to Venezuela in exchangefor 90,000 barrels per day of pref-erentially-financed petroleum. Theefforts of the two leaders to counterUS influence in the region haveensured that simmering tensionwith Washington will not abateanytime soon.

Against this backdrop of shiftinggeopolitical alliances, China’srenewed interest in Cuba has beenthe subject of considerable intrigue.Of course, Cuba’s relations with thePeople’s Republic of China arehardly novel; the two countries firstestablished diplomatic ties morethan 45 years ago. In recent years,however, China’s stunning econom-ic growth and increasing globalpower have cast a new light on thishistoric bond. Since 2001, Chinahas emerged as an increasingly rele-vant actor in Latin America, andCuba is an important part of thispanorama. Beijing’s renewed inter-est in Cuba has produced more fre-quent high-level meetings, rapidlyexpanding levels of economic coop-eration, and numerous exchangesin the areas of science, technology,and defense. Most critically forCuba, China represents a vital newlifeline for the island’s flaggingeconomy. Trade between the twocountries has surged to the pointthat China is now Cuba’s secondlargest trading partner afterVenezuela. The Chinese have alsopledged hundreds of millions ofdollars in investments in nickel,petroleum exploration, and agricul-

ture. If those investments material-ize, China could become Cuba’stop foreign investor.

Early TiesOn September 1, 1960, Fidel

Castro severed diplomatic ties withTaiwan in favor of a relationshipwith the People’s Republic ofChina. The two countries formallyestablished relations on September28, 1960, making Cuba the firstLatin American country to recog-nize Mao’s China. However,Cuba’s close alliance with the SovietUnion took shape against the back-drop of the Moscow-Beijing rivalry,which stymied any deeper alliancewith China. In fact, Castrobecame openly critical of Mao’sChina in the 1960s, and con-demned the country’s invasion ofVietnam in 1978. Relations beganto improve in the 1980s, as theChinese and Soviet governmentsinched closer to a détente and anew generation of leadership tookthe helm in Beijing.

In December 1984, China dis-patched resident military attachésto Cuba, initiating a series offriendly military contacts. Fouryears later, China and Cuba ceasedto require passport visas of citizenstraveling between the countries.The two countries signed a tradeprotocol in 1988 under whichChina would buy nearly 100,000tons of Cuban sugar largely onbarter for Chinese products. By1990, annual Cuba-China tradetopped $600 million, and Chinabecame second only to the SovietUnion in trade with the island.Among the bartered goods were the


famous Chinese bicycles thatreplaced many of Cuba’s automo-biles during the country’s post-Soviet economic crisis, known asthe “Special Period.”

Havana was one of the few capi-tals to express support for Beijing’sbrutal repression of protestors inTiananmen Square in 1989, whenthe Cuban foreign minister com-mended Chinese authorities for“defeating the counterrevolutionaryacts.” The response signaled

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increasing closeness between thegovernments. State relationsreached a milestone in 1993 whenPresident Jiang Zemin became thefirst Chinese head of state to visitCuba. Two years later, Castroreciprocated with his first visit toChina. While his itinerary includ-ed perfunctory stops at the GreatWall of China and Mao’s Tomb, healso visited Shanghai andGuangzhou, two cities at the epi-center of China’s capitalist experi-

ment. At the time, Castro wasreported to be quite taken withChina’s “market socialism,” andspeculation abounded that theincreasing trade and diplomatic tieswould lead to a Chinese-style open-ing in Cuba. But the island wasentering a severe recession causedby the end of Soviet subsidies, andtrade with China dwindled, in partdue to the collapse of Cuba’s sugarindustry. Trade relations began aslow rebound in 1996, when China


The new face of an old relationship

Cuban President Fidel Castro salutes an honor guard as he walks with then Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Palace ofthe Revolution in Havana on April 12, 2001.

agreed to begin paying for Cubangoods with hard currency, butCuba’s conservative central plannersincreasingly distanced themselvesfrom the Chinese economic model.

The Wonder YearsA 2001 visit to Cuba by Chinese

President Jiang Zemin played acrucial role in reinvigorating thecommercial links. During this trip,the two countries signed an eco-nomic and technical cooperationagreement, which granted Havanaa $6.5 million line of interest-freecredit and an additional $200 mil-lion loan to modernize and expandCuba’s telecommunications at thelocal level. Another $150 millioncredit was given for Cuba toimport Chinese televisions.

In 2003, China made Cuba itsfirst approved tourist destination inthe Western Hemisphere. TheWorld Tourism Organization pro-jected that China would be theworld’s fourth-largest supplier oftourists by 2020. However, Chinahas since added nearly 40 newapproved destinations, includingseveral other Caribbean islands andSouth American countries.Although some visitors from main-land China can be spotted inHavana nightclubs, the island hasnot yet seen any large influx ofChinese tourists and the specialdesignation remains largely symbol-ic. That may change if the much-discussed direct flights from Beijingto Havana become a reality.

The first joint venture betweenCuba and China was a plastic slip-per factory in Cuba that opened in1997. By last year, the two coun-tries shared 10 operative joint ven-tures and three “cooperative pro-duction contracts,” many withhigher-value production like phar-maceuticals and biotechnology.Sixteen cooperation agreements innickel and mineral processing and

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exploration were signed duringPresident Hu Jintao’s visit to Cubain 2004. In addition, Chinapledged to invest over $500 millionin a new Cuban nickel plant inMoa, based in the Holguínprovince. This would make Chinathe largest investor in Cuba’s flour-ishing nickel market. With thehelp of Chinese investment, Cubacould double its nickel and cobaltoutput, which is already the fourthhighest in the world. Hu alsooffered credit for 1 million moreChinese “Panda” brand televisions,known in Cuba to be rewards forCommunist Party loyalists. In2005, collaboration between Chinaand Cuba even reached into theisland’s oil sector with a major con-tract for production with petrole-um giant Sinopec.

Beyond trade ties, China andCuba are close diplomatic allies.China has consistently opposed USsanctions on Cuba at the UnitedNations. In October 2004, China’sdeputy representative to the UNZhang Yishan rebuked the US forits decision to maintain the embar-go and, in so doing, “obstinatelystick to the wrong position andignore the just demand of theinternational community.” InApril 2005, China reiterated itslongstanding opposition to US-ledefforts to condemn Cuba for itsrepression of civil and political lib-erties. For its part, Cuba hasstrongly backed China’s goal ofeventually reclaiming its “renegadeprovince” of Taiwan under the“One China” policy. During a visitto Beijing in March 2005, Cuba’sMinister of Government RicardoCabrisas Ruiz vowed support forChina’s widely condemned Anti-Secession Law, which contemplatedmilitary action against Taiwan.Some analysts even suspect thatChina is using its telecommunica-tions involvement in Cuba as cover

for espionage against the US.Indeed, there has been speculationthat Beijing has taken over theLourdes spy base after Russia endedits lease in 2001 and is operatinganother base, Bejucal, nearSantiago de Cuba.

China and Cuba’s Future Perhaps the most intriguing

aspect of the Cuba-China allianceconcerns the potential impact onCuba’s eventual transition processonce Fidel Castro leaves power.For many years, the United Stateshas positioned itself as the singlemost important actor shapingCuba’s post-Castro politics. Whileother countries – especiallyCanada, Spain, and others inEurope - conducted business inCuba, they basically agreed withthe U.S. objective of supportingthe island’s evolution towards amarket-oriented democracy, eventhough they disagreed with a sanc-tions-based approach. With thenotable exception of Venezuela(and now Bolivia), Latin Americancountries have generally distancedthemselves from the Cuban modelsince the 1990s. After the collapseof the Soviet Union, Cuba founditself with trading partners but notrue allies interested in supportingCuba’s communist system.

China, the emerging superpower,has now undertaken significantinvestments in Cuba and may havean interest in maintaining theisland’s current political order onceFidel Castro leaves the stage.Chinese diplomatic engagement inCuba is a consensus policy forChina’s Communist Party. It suitstwo of China’s most important for-eign policy goals: securing naturalresources for a rapidly growingeconomy, and rewarding countriesthat uphold a “One China” policy,which precludes diplomatic sup-port for Taiwan. History has


shown that trade and commercialrelations between China and Cubaebb and flow in response to chang-ing economic circumstances.China’s support of the Cuban econ-omy could quickly diminish if itsinvestments do not yield dividendsor if China’s own growth slows, assome analysts have predicted.Although Cuba’s diplomatic rela-tions with China are firmly rooted,its commercial ties have been cycli-cal, and this newest peak of tradeand investment is by no meansirreversible.

The Cuban leadership toutsChina’s friendship as an example ofsocialist solidarity, but the twocountries are separated by anincreasing ideological divide.China has progressively liberalizedits economy, while Fidel Castro has

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condemned market forces at everyturn. In his 2003 visit to Beijing, abemused Castro told the head ofthe Chinese legislature, that “I can’treally be sure just now what kind ofChina I am visiting, because thefirst time I visited, your countryappeared one way and now when Ivisit it appears another way.” Bycontrast, Cuba has resisted embrac-ing the type of change that hasfueled China’s enormous growth.In fact, as Chinese trade, aid, andinvestment have grown, Havana hasrecentralized control over its econo-my. Unfettered by concerns overfree markets or human rights,China’s burgeoning ties with Cubahave helped to breathe new life intothe most retrograde tendencies ofFidel Castro’s aging revolution.

Daniel P. Erikson is senior associatefor US policy and director ofCaribbean programs at the Inter-American Dialogue. He is the authorof more than 20 articles on Cubanand hemispheric affairs, which haveappeared in such publications as TheMiami Herald, National Interest,and World Policy Journal. He isthe co-editor of TransformingSocialist Economies: Lessons forCuba and Beyond. His recent workhas focused on China’s relations withLatin America and the Caribbean.

Adam Minson is program assistantfor the Caribbean at the Inter-American Dialogue. His writings andinterviews on the Caribbeanhave appeared in the Baltimore Sun,Boston Globe, and Journal ofDemocracy.


New from the University of North Carolina Press...

CUBA AND THE TEMPESTLITERATURE AND CINEMA IN THE TIME OF DIASPORA

by Eduardo González

In a unique analysis of Cuban literature inside and outside the country’s borders, Eduardo González looks closely at thework of three important contemporary Cuban authors: Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929-2005), who left Cuba for good in1965 and established himself in London; Antonio Benítez-Rojo (1931-2005), who settled in the United States; and LeonardoPadura Fuentes (b. 1955), who still lives and writes in Cuba. Through the positive experiences of exile and wandering thatappear in their work, these three writers exhibit what González calls “Romantic authorship,” a deep connection to theRomantic spirit of irony and complex sublimity crafted in literature by Lord Byron, Thomas De Quincey and Samuel TaylorColeridge. In González’s view, a writer becomes a belated Romantic by dint of exile adopted creatively with comic or trag-ic irony. González weaves into his analysis related cinematic elements of myth, folktale and the grotesque that appear in thework of filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar. Placing the three Cuban writers in conversation withartists and thinkers from British and American literature, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis and cinema, Gonzálezultimately provides a space in which Cuba and its literature, inside and outside its borders, are deprovincialized.

“A major work of scholarship and reflection by a uniquely talented critic in his prime. Employing an eclecticapproach that blends myth criticism and psychoanalysis, González, at his best, is nothing short of dazzling.”-Gustavo Pérez Firmat, Columbia University

Eduardo González teaches literature and cinema at The Johns Hopkins University. He is author of three other books,including The Monstered Self: Narratives of Death and Performance in Latin American Fiction.

Perhaps no other institu-tion of the Cuban regimehas undergone such fun-damental changes in itsmission, structure, and

personnel in the last decade-and-a-half than the Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias (FAR). The Cubanarmed forces shifted its focus fromproletarian internationalism toassuming responsibility for reform-ing and managing the economy inan effort to survive the SpecialPeriod. It is the institution respon-sible for introducing and imple-menting the sistema de perfec-cionamiento empresarial (SPE), a sys-tem that introduces principles ofcapitalist organization and manage-ment as a means of making theeconomy more efficient and com-petitive. Troop strength declinedsignificantly after 1990 from over200,000 to approximately 45,000active soldiers in 2004, and itsbudget was equally slashed by nearly50 percent over a period of almost adecade. Finally, since the early1990s new generations of FAR offi-cers have been promoted to generalofficer rank, holding key positionsin the military high command andin state-controlled economic indus-tries. Such change in what isarguably the Cuban Revolution’smost important and powerful insti-tution—key to its consolidation andsurvival—is worthy of careful analy-sis. Yet, despite the restructuringand the reformist economic outlookof many of its leaders, the Cubanmilitary remains very much an insti-tution loyal to the regime and to itssuccession strategy when FidelCastro passes from the scene. It

Young Bloodby Frank O. Mora

Reports

begs the question, is the FAR anagent of change or continuity?Answering this question can helpshed light on future prospects fordemocracy and market economy ina post-Fidel Cuba.

An illustrative way of addressingthis question is by focusing on thedramatic changes that have takenplace in the leadership of the FAR’smilitary command structure. Newgenerations of general officers withvery unique experiences and out-looks have assumed critical positionsin the general staff, regional com-mands, and key economic industriesmanaged by the Ministry of theFAR (Minfar). Since the mid-1990s, a number of generals, withstrong credentials as históricos, diedor retired, and were replaced by gen-eral officers (promoted in 1992 and1998) that were all born betweenthe mid-1940s and 1952. Membersof this group where either tooyoung to have been in the RebelArmy or, as in the case of BrigadierGeneral Rafael Borjas Ortega, onlytoddlers when Fidel Castro and hismen departed for Cuba on theGranma. Only some were oldenough to have served as milicianosor members of other paramilitarygroups that fought against domesticcounterrevolutionary forces in the1960s.

Raúl Castro—defense ministerand heir apparent—worked to bringin younger officers with special skillsto help reform the economy andensure stability and institutionalcohesion within the FAR, keyrequirements of any succession strat-egy. Many of these camilitos, (thename given to graduates of the pre-

cadet Camilo Cienfuegos MilitarySchools located in each province) intheir mid to late 40s, replaced thehistóricos, and since then have con-solidated their position as the futurepower brokers of Cuba. RaúlCastro acknowledged in 2000 thatfrom their positions of commandand political influence within theFAR, economy, party, and govern-ment, these officers “have theopportunity, according to theirexperiences and interests, to rethinktheir own formulas of continuityand change in Cuba.” In late 2001,Raúl elaborated “there are alreadycamilitos that are generals andcolonels commanding importantcombat units and in a majority ofkey positions in the general staffs ofthe regional commands.” This gen-erational shift in the general officercorps over a span of less than adecade-and-a-half has led to a num-ber of public policy changes—albeitat times vacillating because of FidelCastro’s resistance to reform—thatcan be described by an axiom oftenrepeated by some in the militaryleadership: “the more things change,the greater the chance of continu-ity.” In other words, peacefulchange and continuity (i.e., preserv-ing the Revolution’s accomplish-ments) depends on implementingand consolidating some key reforms.

There is a slightly older genera-tion of general officers that foughtas young combatants in the July 26movement and are today between60 and 65 years of age. They arenot the camilitos that Raúl referredto, nor are they agents of retrench-ment. Their formative experience inthe Sierra and their close bonds with


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the históricos is what defines theseso-called “Young Rebels.” The bet-ter known officers in this group areRogelio Acevedo (president of theCivil Aviation Institute), AbelardoColomé Ibarra (Minister of Interiorand First Deputy Minister ofMinfar), Leopoldo Cintra Frías(commander of Western Army),Joaquín Quintas Solá (commanderof Central Army), and RamónEspinosa Martín (commander ofEastern Army). As heads of com-mands and key ministries, thesegenerals see their primary role asdefense of the Revolution andnation against armed aggressionfrom abroad. These officers fullyrecognize that defense of the home-land is tied to economic revitaliza-tion. Their outlook and focus is onissues related to the military anddefense, but within their strategicunderstanding of regime survivaland orderly succession is the needfor economic restructuring.

The next two generations—pro-moted in 1992 and 1998 tobrigadier general—have a distinctoutlook and responsibility. Theirloyalty to the Revolution and itsleadership is unequivocal. Those inthe 1992 generation—Álvaro LópezMiera (chief of the general staff andfirst deputy minister of Minfar),Leonardo Andollo Valdés (deputychief of the general staff ), PedroMediondo Gómez (head of the Air


Continuity and change within Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces

Defense Minister Raúl Castro hasbrought in young officers with specialskills to reform the economy and main-tain stability within the FAR, and,ultimately, ensure regime continuity.

Defense and Air Force, DAAFAR),and José Antonio Carrillo Gómez(chief of Minfar’s political direc-torate)—are very close to RaúlCastro and his succession project,which involves expanding and deep-ening economic reforms andengagement with the internationaleconomic system. Since 1998 manyof these officers have been promotedto the rank of division generals.Because of their age and close bondsto Raúl, they are likely to remain inpositions of military and politicalinfluence for the next seven to 12years.

Like the previous generation,those promoted to flag officer rankin 1992 are quite enthusiastic aboutadapting the Chinese andVietnamese model to Cuba. Again,the central tenet of the model is thatby expanding and deepening eco-nomic reforms, the regime is able toimprove the standard of living ofCubans and thus, establish newbases of legitimacy for the regime ina post-Fidel Cuba. This core ofmilitary leaders have always beenless interested in the Soviet militaryeconomic model, preferring thestructures of China and Vietnam,particularly in terms of the military’srole in economic reform and reorga-nization. They experienced first-hand the material difficulties anddisappointments of the late 1980sand early 1990s. They suffered upclose the intensity and the magni-tude of the hardships associatedwith this period. As a result, these“technocrats” (many of them engi-neers and logistic experts) are morepragmatic and receptive to the needfor economic reforms as a means ofnot only mitigating the impact ofthe Special Period on themselvesand the FAR, but, more important-ly, on society and the future of theregime.

In addition to the transformativeexperiences of the Special Period,

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this generation’s outlook is shapedby the education they received inbusiness management programs inEurope, Asia, and Latin America.These “technocrat-soldiers” are man-agers and administrators, in addi-tion to being soldiers. Through theapplication of Western businesstechniques (i.e. SPE), they areattempting to enhance the efficiencyand productivity of military andcivilian industries during a period ofcrisis and change for the regime.Not all of these officers participatein the military’s economic endeav-ors, however. Some like BG ErmioHernández Rodríguez (chief of staffWestern Army), BG Miguel Abud(Eastern Army), and Navy CAPTJosé Rosello Pérez hold key positionsin the regional commands; however,the technocrats—the most visiblegroup—manage enterprises or headministries. Some of the morenotable of this promotion include;BG Luis Pérez Rospide (Gaviota,S.A.), BG Eladio Fernández Cívico(Grupo Empresarial Geocuba), BGLuis Bernal León (MilitaryIndustrial Union), BG Moisés SioWong (former president of Instituteof State Reserves), and BG SilvanoColas Sánchez (former Minister ofCommunications).

Below in rank and age lies aninfluential cohort of colonels andlieutenant colonels, most of thembetween 40 and 45 years old, whohave very similar backgrounds andexperiences to their superiors. Inthe last 12 years they, too, wereexposed to a considerable number ofexchanges and interactions with mil-itary institutions and officers inChina and Vietnam, as well as tak-ing courses on business managementmethods in Latin America andEurope. The socioeconomic hard-ships associated with the SpecialPeriod of the 1990s—particularlythe downsizing of the FAR—had aprofound and lasting impact on this

group of senior officers. But despitethis experience and their predilec-tion for military-led economicreform, these colonels—such asColonel Oscar Basulto Torres(Habanos, S.A.), Colonel JoseManuel Vivo (Aero Gaviota),Colonel Manuel Marrero Cruz(Minister of Tourism), and Lt.Colonel Rene Rojas Rodríguez(Tecnotext)—have not necessarilyturned against Fidel, his retrench-ment, or the Revolution. Quite thecontrary. Perhaps more than anyother generation, these senior offi-cers are convinced and committedto the notion that the survival andcontinuity of the regime depends oneconomic reform, albeit withoutpolitical liberalization. The lessonthat these and the previous two gen-erations draw from the Chinese andVietnamese cases is that unless thematerial well-being of the Cubanpeople is improved, the legitimacyand popular support of the regimeare likely to wane.

Liberalization and reform is notviewed as a betrayal to the principlesof the Revolution. The pragmatismof these officers is, in fact, perceivedas evidence of their steadfast com-mitment to finding alternative andeffective means of defending andstrengthening the Revolution in thepost-Soviet era and, inevitably, in apost-Fidel Cuba. The survival andcontinuity of the regime hinges onthe ability to reform and make nec-essary adjustments. The technocratsof the FAR and many of their supe-riors understand that Fidelismowithout Fidel is a guarantee thatsuccession or continuity will fail.

Frank O. Mora is professor of nationalsecurity strategy at the National WarCollege, National Defense University.He is the author of several studies onthe Cuban military.


New from Penn State University Press...

Out of the Shadows Political Action and the Informal Economyin Latin America

EDITED BY PATRICIA FERNANDEZ-KELLYAND JON SHEFNER

“With few exceptions, scholars from Left to Right have pre-sented simplistic accounts of the political ramifications ofeconomic informality in the underdeveloped world. Suchdepictions have been curiously out of synch with the salu-tary influence of the 'bringing the state back in' scholarshipof the last couple of decades or so. This volume makes acrucial contribution to the scholarly and policy literaturesby emphasizing the embeddedness of informal economiesin state-society arrangements that cut across local, nation-al, and transnational terrains of the Latin American andglobal political economies. The volume represents essen-tial reading for scholars, policy specialists, students, andothers who seek to make sense of the politico-social con-sequences of deepening inequality and poverty in the con-temporary world.”

--Richard Tardanico, Florida International University

Since the beginning of scholarly writing about the informaleconomy in the mid-1970s, the debate has evolved fromaddressing survival strategies of the poor to consideringthe implications for national development and the globaleconomy. Simultaneously, research on informal politicshas ranged from neighborhood clientelism to contentioussocial movements basing their claims on a variety of socialidentities in their quest for social justice. Despite relatedempirical and theoretical concerns, these research tradi-tions have seldom engaged in dialogue with one another.Out of the Shadows brings leading scholars of the informaleconomy and informal politics together to address howglobalization has influenced local efforts to resolve politicaland economic needs-and how these seemingly separateissues are indeed deeply related.

In addition to the editor, contributors are Javier Auyero,Miguel Angel Centeno, Sylvia Chant, Robert Gay,Mercedes González de la Rocha, José Itzigsohn,Alejandro Portes, and Juan Manuel Ramírez Sáiz.

Patricia Fernandez-Kelly is Senior Lecturer inSociology at Princeton University, where she also holds anappointment with the Office of Population Research.

Jon Shefner is Associate Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of Tennessee.

272 pages | 6 x 9 | April 2006ISBN 0-271-02750-9 | cloth: $75.00ISBN 0-271-02751-7 | paper: $25.00

New in PaperbackRethinking Development in Latin America EDITED BY CHARLES H. WOOD AND BRYAN R. ROBERTS

“At no point in recent memory are we more in need of freshthinking about development strategies for Latin Americathan today. The distinguished authors in this volume chal-lenge existing paradigms and offer provocative insights tostimulate renewed debate about how Latin America mightmove ahead and, indeed, once again provide a develop-ment model for other regions in the world.”

--Gary Gereffi, Duke University

“A dozen very accomplished social scientists herereassess the theories that have informed the study of LatinAmerican societies over the past forty years or so. Theauthors also consider analytic revisions that may be need-ed to address new social issues or paradigmatic gaps.The text conveys a subtle picture of contemporary societaland political dilemmas in Latin America, stressing the inter-play among social issues, public policies, and evolvinganalytic models.”

--Christopher Mitchell, New York University

Understanding development in Latin America todayrequires both an awareness of the major political and eco-nomic changes that have produced a new agenda forsocial policy in the region and an appreciation of the needto devise better conceptual and methodological tools foranalyzing the social impacts of these changes. Using as areference point the issues and theories that dominatedsocial science research on Latin America in the period1960-80, this volume contributes to " rethinking develop-ment" by examining the historical events that accountedfor the erosion or demise of once-dominant paradigms andby assessing the new directions of research that haveemerged in their place.

In addition to the editors, contributors are Marina Ariza andOrlandina de Oliveira, Diane Davis, Vilmar Faria, JoeFoweraker, Elizabeth Jelin, Alejandro Portes, Joe Potterand Rudolfo Tuirán, Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, OsvaldoSunkel, and Peter Ward.

Charles H. Wood is Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of Florida.

Bryan R. Roberts is C. B. Smith Centennial Chair inU.S.-Mexican Relations and Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of Texas.

384 pages | 6 x 9 | Available nowISBN 0-271-02894-7 | paper: $25.00

As Cuba’s labored emer-gence from the eco-nomic crisis of the1990s continues,important new trends

in household consumption andsocioeconomic mobility haveemerged. For many households withaccess to remittances from abroad orto tourism and other sectors of theeconomy driven by foreign directinvestment, the past decade has cre-ated new opportunities for incomegeneration and social mobility. Yet,for those whose economic fortunesare tied more closely to the cash-strapped state, real income hasdeclined and mobility prospects havenarrowed. There is an evolving spa-tial dimension to these divergent for-tunes as well: poorer and more eco-nomically isolated households tendto concentrate in particular regions,such as the rural eastern areas of theisland, and even in particular neigh-borhoods, such as those on theperiphery of metropolitan Havana.Combined with lackluster economicgrowth and fiscal over-extension forthe nation as a whole, these strikingnew patterns represent challenges forCuba’s economic and social policy,for its political life, and for the egali-tarianism that Cuba’s leaders haveendeavored to defend for almost halfa century.

Social Mobility, Poverty, andInequality since the 1990s

In spite of its status as a low-income developing country, Cuba’ssocial policy has been recognized forits conquest of significant gains insocial indicators. In the 1990s, con-trary to what happened in many

F E A T U R E S

Poverty and Inequality in Cubaby Lorena G. Barberia

Latin American countries that expe-rienced severe economic contractionsin the last two decades and duringwhich gains in social reforms werereversed or halted, Cuban social poli-cy was responsive. The Cuban statecountered economic shocks based ona three-pronged strategy: the reallo-cation of government resources, theadoption of innovative social poli-cies, and the increase in social expen-ditures to reinforce the social safetynet. In the aftermath of the crisissparked by the collapse of the SovietUnion in 1989, strong political willand the proactive role of the statehave continued to guarantee mini-mum levels of welfare and social pro-tection. As CEPAL highlights, Cubaspends 32% of its GDP in socialprograms, the highest investment inLatin America.

Yet, evidence has also emergedshowing that the restructuring of theCuban economy has increasedincome inequality and altered thepathways to social mobility in Cubansociety, creating new pockets ofpoverty and fewer options for mobil-ity. While it is clear that incomeinequality has undoubtedly risen, theexact scope of poverty remains anissue of significant debate.Measurements of the impact of themultifaceted changes taking place arecomplicated by the need to accountfor new patterns, such as the markeddifferences in formal and informalearnings, the changes in social mobil-

ity and economic opportunities, anddifficulties in capturing the adequacyof the state’s provision of universalsocial policies. These factors are fur-ther complicated by emerging differ-ences among individuals in their sub-jective perceptions of needs and thecultural and political norms of equal-ity embedded in Cuba’s social fabricover the course of the last fourdecades.

In light of these changes, the ques-tion of whether lower real incomes(or expenditures) and limitedprogress on social mobility for signif-icant portions of the population, sep-arately or combined, have con-tributed to increased poverty inCuba since 1989 has become central.There are some signs that formalwage income and market segmenta-tion have limited the coverage ofconsumption needs for the popula-tion. Relative to pre-1989 levels,consumption fell dramaticallybetween 1990 and 1993, with amodest decline in social and govern-ment spending and a much largerdrop in private spending. In subse-quent years, although total expendi-tures have risen, consumption byCuban households continues toremain below pre-1989 levels. Theavailable evidence also indicates thatCuba’s recovery in household con-sumption, but not householdincome, has been largely driven bysocial and government expenditures.For some, there are significant con-


Confronting the challenges ofsocial and economic change

cerns that official income estimatesmay be understating the real level ofunmet needs and inequality.

The scope and magnitude of thesetransformations, however, are muchmore difficult to measure today thanthey were prior to 1989. Not only isthere a general shortage of publiclyavailable data, but the emergence ofdiversified survival strategies hascomplicated data gathering andanalysis due to the increase in nonof-ficial sources of income included inmeasures of the population’s realincome and expenditures (GDP,household budget surveys andmacroeconomic wage and incomedata). These factors present a chal-lenge to measuring income, poverty,and inequality among Cuban house-holds.

In addition to difficulties associat-ed with the measurement of thesetrends, challenges also exist withrespect to what paradigms should beused to measure development andprogress. Increasingly, povertyresearch worldwide has sought tomove beyond traditional economicmeasures of GDP and householdconsumption toward alternative indi-cators, such as the HumanDevelopment Index, that capturemultiple aspects of human well-being, many of which are not cap-tured by economic indicators.Scholars have also sought to captureother critical dimensions, includingsocial exclusion and capabilities,thus, broadening what constitutesdevelopment. The Cuban experiencecontinues to speak to long-standingdebates about the inadequacies ofpoverty rates, which compares house-hold incomes to a market basket ofbasic needs, as an appropriate meas-urement tool.

The Fundamental ChallengesAs Cuba continues to seek to con-

solidate its development with prioritygiven to social policy, three essential

Features

(and related) challenges stand out.First, in the long run, unless eco-nomic growth is enhanced, it isunlikely that the state will have theresources and ability to continue itsexpenditures and financing of socialservices at current levels. Coupledwith multiple natural and politicaladversities pounding the island,Cuba has struggled to sustain its eco-nomic recovery. While social spend-ing investments have continued togrow, GDP growth has remainedlackluster. With the state being theonly social program provider, therisks of a collapse in the safety netare even greater as individuals haveno other options for education,health care, and other needs.Sustainability is also clearly essentialfor political reasons as the state’slegitimacy is undoubtedly tied to theconditions of these services.

Second, large-scale initiatives,designed centrally, have been thehallmark of Cuban social policy andhave helped it swiftly address long-standing social problems. While rec-ognizing the state’s fundamental roleas the architect and guarantor, somequestion the effectiveness of thisstrategy as Cuba surges ahead, with amore complex economy and a rapid-ly differentiating population. Asincome inequality translates intounequal distribution of social prob-lems—as it does all over the world—there will be diversified demand forsocial services: social assistance, med-ical care, education and programs foradolescents, workforce developmentand re-training. Can universal pro-grams hope to address the prolifera-tion and diversification of needs?

In recent years, Cuban policy hasbegun to increase investment in uni-versal programs while adding target-ed interventions for the neediest.First education and then health haveexperienced large investments. Ineducation, classes were reduced,schools were refurbished and outfit-

ted with televisions and computers,and the salaries of teachers wereincreased. In health care, policlinicsand family doctor’s offices were reno-vated and some clinics were outfittedwith high technology medical equip-ment, bringing high-tech medicinecloser to local communities. At thesame time, targeted interventionshave been introduced and aimed ataddressing the needs of the most vul-nerable. Some examples include thedeployment of social workers in vul-nerable barrios and new workforcetraining initiatives.

Central to these strategies is therole of government, which remainsthe sole actor in the field of socialpolicy. By examining social policyinnovations that have been strength-ened and tracking policy effective-ness, debates are surfacing onwhether social policy should be uni-versal or targeted, and whether cen-tralized or decentralized models ofsocial service delivery would be mosteffective in the new economic con-text. On the one hand, the central-ized character of social policy hasassured access to minimum levels ofcertain consumption goods, such asfood. Moreover, the government hasbeen able to mobilize the preparationand response to natural disasters, aswitnessed during the active 2005Atlantic hurricane season, throughcentralized planning.

On the other hand, centralizedplanning, as successful as it has beenin addressing some social problems,has proven inflexible in addressingthe specific needs of communities orsectors of the population. “One sizefits all” interventions have only suc-ceeded in reproducing inequality.For those who raise these concerns,targeted interventions that protectand support the individuals mostaffected by the decade-long econom-ic crisis are urgently needed. Forsome, social policy must be linked tonew definitions of inequality and the


construction of a new policy ofequality. What level of equality—not egalitarianism—is desirable andunder what conditions can it beattained? It also requires recogni-tion that economic differences aretoday an organizing factor of Cubansocial structure and, therefore, mustbe at the center of the design ofsocial policy.

Finally, after decades of attentionto the economic, social, and culturalconsequences of uneven develop-ment, new spatial inequalities havemade themselves felt with consider-able force once again. Cuba’s limitedreinsertion into international tourismand other economic growth sectors isdistributing investment and jobs indistinct territorial patterns. To besure, the tourism industry is drawnto localities with certain assets, suchas historical treasures, beaches, ornature preserves, that are difficult or,in some cases, impossible to dupli-cate from one place to the next.Similarly, there is some evidence tosuggest that access to the other mainsource of US dollars in Cuba’s dualeconomy—remittances fromabroad—also follows a spatial pat-tern. With higher historic migrationfrom urban areas, particularlyHavana, and with geographic mobil-ity very limited on the island since1959, it is reasonable to expect thatreceipt of remittance dollars and theconsumer networks generated fromthese flows are concentrated inHavana and a small number of othercities. Furthermore, a racial skew inthe population of Cubans abroadmay be contributing to unequalremittance income by race on theisland.

The market driven investment intourism and ancillary industries hasmeant that some areas of the countryhave obtained great economic benefitwhile others have lagged behind.Studies have documented the grow-ing gap in human development indi-

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cators between provinces and munic-ipalities more integrated into thenew economy and those furtherremoved from the stream of invest-ment dollars. The easternmostprovinces are clearly the most disad-vantaged.

The dynamics within Cuba’s citiesare also marked and perhaps this ismore so in the case of the country’scapital. A closer look at Havanareveals an interesting story becausethe usual assumptions about povertyand place miss the reality of the situ-ation in this city. The absence ofinvestment in the nation’s capital as aresult of decades of policies thatfavored development in the country-side may lead one to think thatpoverty is extremely widespread inHavana. Despite the extreme physi-cal deterioration of Havana’s build-ings, streets, and homes, the city’sresidents have a quality of life thatone would not expect. It is not justthe urban poor that live in the city’sdilapidated neighborhoods; doctors,engineers, and other professionalsmake their homes here as well, giv-ing Havana’s communities a remark-able mix of human capital.Conversely, some old housing of theupper and middle class, who nolonger live in Cuba, are now occu-pied by persons from the humblestof extractions, as many peasantsoccupied that housing early on in therevolution.

There is a clear disjuncturebetween income/status and housing.This is a reflection of the tremen-dous social mobility that universallyavailable education, access to healthcare (and other benefits), and policiesof nondiscrimination in employmentand housing have made possible forthose who were poor prior to 1959.Havana’s housing paradox is also theresult of policies that have fordecades discouraged the sale of hous-ing and even the use of income toimprove housing conditions. The

latter has resulted in many familiesremaining in the same “place”although their status and their lifechances have changed substantially.Place did not necessarily represent abarrier to mobility and status insocialist Cuba. But what role will itplay as new socioeconomic structuresemerge in the country?

And what about race or class back-ground? Is it possible that the poli-cies of “equal treatment” that havebeen in place for decades today arereproducing inequality? As newsocioeconomic patterns emerge,should more individualized attentionbe given to the most disadvantaged?As these questions suggest, there is apressing need to take a deeper lookat the concepts that drive and theprocess that distribute the benefits ofsocial policy. Addressing incomeinequality and poverty, and itsuneven distribution across the island,will require finely tuned interven-tions that rely on the intimate under-standing of the local political econo-my and the conditions it spawns,and the active participation of thoseaffected by them. In order to notreproduce inequality, solutions willhave to go beyond the palliative andaddress structural conditions.Without a critical reassessment ofsocial policy, the process of stratifica-tion taking place in Cuba will con-tinue.

Lorena G. Barberia is a program asso-ciate at the David Rockefeller Centerfor Latin American Studies at HarvardUniversity. She is co-editor of TheCuban Economy at the Start of theTwenty-First Century (with Jorge I.Domínguez and Omar Everleny PérezVillanueva). She wishes to thankXavier de Souza Briggs and MirenUriarte, co-authors of “The End ofEgalitarianism?: Economic Inequalityand the Future of Social Policy inCuba,” an earlier and extended versionof this article.

Ever since the collapse ofthe Soviet bloc in theearly 1990s, Cuba hasbeen desperately seekinga new “daddy,” an exter-

nal patron willing to provide mate-rial resources with few stringsattached. The Soviet Union playedthis role beautifully for Cuba byoffering trade subsidies and otheraid with few conditions on how torun domestic political affairs. Afterthe demise of the USSR, Cubalooked to the European Union(EU) as a potential replacementpatron. In the interest of making apolitical statement against the USpolicy of isolating Cuba, the EUadopted a policy of economic anddiplomatic constructive engage-ment, which Cuba hoped to exploitto its advantage. But Cuba’s dreamnever fully materialized: Europe’slevel of material support was gener-ous in the 1990s, but never as mas-sive or as unconditional as the sup-port delivered by the Soviet Union,And starting in 2000, the EU evenbegan to impose some sanctions onCuba for human rights violations.

Around the same time that theinternational environment was start-ing to look dark for Cuba again,along came Venezuela, eager toserve as Cuba’s new “daddy.” Whatbegan as a seemingly innocuous setof agreements between both coun-tries is today a major allianceinvolving the exchange of strategicassets, including energy resources,large financial operations, informa-tion technology, development aid,intelligence services, highly trainedpersonnel, military assets, and jointbusiness ventures. For Cuba, the

Cuba’s New Daddyby Javier Corrales

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alliance with Venezuela representsan enviable political accomplish-ment. The deal offers the Cubangovernment enormous materialbenefits without the obligation tomodify domestic policies. But inthe medium term, the Cuban state,whether headed by Fidel Castro orhis successor, will have to pay dear-ly for its new dependence onVenezuela, just as it paid dearly forits dependence on the SovietUnion.

The Nature of the Exchange:Cheap Contributions, ValuableGifts

Cuba and Venezuela have signedthree rounds of cooperative agree-ments: in 2000, shortly after theelection of Hugo Chávez Frías(1999-present); in September 2004;and in April 2005. Very little isknown about the content of theseagreements, but this much is clear:The agreements benefit both coun-tries by enabling them to exchangeassets that are inexpensive for thesender but of enormous strategicvalue to the recipient, with oil asthe most important component forCuba.

Venezuela sends approximately92,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oilto Cuba. For Venezuela, a countrywith enormous oil reserves, this isfar from an onerous contribution.Table 1 on page 26 provides somereference points. Venezuela’s oilcontribution to Cuba in 2005 rep-resented less than 3.5% of its totaloil production (which is currentlyfar below actual capacity). ForVenezuela, this is an easily afford-able subsidy.

For Cuba, on the other hand,92,000 bpd represents an invaluablelifeline. It allows Cuba to satisfy itsrather unusual, surplus-maximizingenergy policy. Most oil-importingcountries have a straightforwardenergy policy: They use interna-tional trade agreements to acquirethe energy that they need domesti-cally; and this need is, in turn,determined by the pace of economicdevelopment and the energy effi-ciency of its industrial and trans-portation sectors. Cuba follows adifferent approach. More than satis-fying its domestic energy needs,Cuba seeks to maximize energy sur-pluses—i.e., acquire far more oilthan is domestically needed so as tore-export surpluses in exchange forhard currency. To achieve this,Cuba represses industrial and trans-portation development (so as tokeep domestic energy needs low)while simultaneously trying to findvast quantities of oil abroad.

During the Cold War, the USSRprovided this excess oil, which Cubare-exported for a profit. But forCuba, this Soviet gift was notenough; the more oil it couldsecure, the more it could re-export.This surplus-seeking energy policyexplains many of Cuba’s boldest for-eign policies. As exiled Cuban gen-eral Rafael del Pino y Díazexplained, it is the reason that Cubafinanced an armed insurrection inoil-rich Venezuela in the 1960s, andwhen that failed, tried to keep a 15-year, heavy-handed military pres-ence of 40,000 troops or more inoil-rich Angola (while disregardingMozambique’s request for similarlevels of support).


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Venezuelan-Cuban relations since 2000

The main benefit of Cuba’s newdeals with Venezuela is that it allowsCuba to fulfill again its surplus-maximizing energy policy. Cubaproduces approximately 80,000 bpdof oil, which is 40,000 bpd short ofthe country’s domestic needs, cur-rently estimated at approximately120,000 bpd. The agreements withVenezuela thus provide Cubaenough to cover this shortfall andstill leave some 40,000-50,000 bpdfor re-exporting. Furthermore,Venezuela is offering oil under gen-erous subsidies. Oil expert GustavoCoronel estimates that because pay-ment terms are so favorable toCuba, Venezuela is providing Cubaapproximately 20,000 to 26,000bpd of free oil, amounting to a“gift” of $6 billion to $8 billionover the next 15 years. The arrange-ment allows Cuba to pay 25% of oilshipments over 15 years at interestrates of 2% and with a two-yeargrace period. Payment requires no

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international guarantees and a sig-nificant part of the debt can berepaid in services. In April 2006,Venezuela rewarded Cuba with yetanother subsidy: an agreement tofinance the refurbishing of theCienfuegos oil refinery, which wascompleted in 1990 with obsoleteSoviet technology, but left idleshortly thereafter because of its inef-ficiency. Refurbishing this refinerycould cost more than US$100 mil-lion (and may never prove worth-while).

Cuba has thus essentially regainedthe lucrative oil business that itenjoyed with the USSR prior to1991, with only one difference:This time, Cuba is making moremoney. In 1989, the USSR sentCuba approximately 260,000 bpd,of which Cuba used 200,000 bpd,and then resold the 60,000 bpd sur-plus. At US$22.05 per barrel (theaverage world price for oil in 1989),Cuba was probably generating rev-

enues of US$1.3 million per dayfrom the resale of unused Soviet oil.If today Cuba is reselling 40,000bpd of Venezuelan oil at the 2005average price of $58.16, its revenueis near US$2.3 million per day,almost twice what it made duringthe Soviet era.

In return for oil, Cuba sendsVenezuela between 30,000 and50,000 technical workers, of whichabout 30,000 are medical doctors.The rest include sport coaches,teachers, and arts instructors, as wellas an undisclosed number of intelli-gence, political, and military advis-ers. There is debate about howmany of the presumed doctors limittheir role to practicing medicineand how many are political-militaryadvisers in disguise, but if we acceptofficial statements that they are sim-ply doctors, then Cuba is exportingone-fifth of its medical profession-als. This is a large number, but onestill affordable for Cuba, which has


TABLE 1: VENEZUELA’S OIL INDICATORS IN RELATIVE TERMS

IndexAverage Barrels (Venezuela’s IQ05

Per Day production = 100)

Saudi Arabia’s Production (a) .................................................9,000,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340.91Venezuela’s 2012 Production Target (b) .................................5,800,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219.70Venezuela’s Total Production in 2002 (a) ...............................3,300,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125.00Venezuela’s Total Production IQ05 (a) ...................................2,640,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00PDVSA’s share (c) ..................................................................1,700,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.39Venezuela’s Exports to the US ................................................1,500,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.82Venezuela’s Domestic Consumption, 2004 ...............................522,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.77Targeted Exports to China (d) ..................................................135,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.11Estimated Exports to Cuba, 2005 (e)..........................................92,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.48Exports to China (d)...................................................................68,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58

Sources:(a) Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international(b) www.pdvsa.com (c) Veneconomía estimates (d) El Universal, August 24, 2005 (e) El Universal, September 10, 2005

an extraordinary surplus of doctors.As Table 2 shows, Cuba has a fargreater number of doctors per capitarelative to rich countries and relativeto its own health achievements, asmeasured by infant mortality rates.Furthermore, Cuba has significantunderemployment and a highdemand for exit visas, especially onthe part of professionals. Accordingto James Cason, former head of theUS Interests Section in Havana,since 2002 more than 100,000Cubans have entered the consularsection and refugee annex in thatcity seeking to emigrate to theUnited States and another 81,400have requested non-immigrant visas.Furthermore, Cuba has also beenexperiencing a serious “domesticbrain drain” since the mid 1990s,with high-skill workers (in the med-ical and engineering professions)migrating from state-controlled jobstoward informal sector jobs, whereincomes are much higher. ForCuba, therefore, sending highlytrained personnel, especially doc-tors, to Venezuela is thus affordable

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and even convenient because itallows the government to meetsome of the demand for exit oppor-tunities (both from the country orfrom state-controlled jobs). It alsooffers the Cuban state one morechance to reward well-behaving citi-zens by deciding who gets to travelto a freer and richer country.

What Venezuela GainsFor the Venezuelan government,

the deals with Cuba also yield polit-ical payoffs. Cuban workers are sta-tioned in poor areas where fewhighly trained Venezuelans rendersocial services. This allows the gov-ernment to establish a presence inareas where political competition(and thus political accountability) islow and the rewards, in terms ofpotential new voters, are high.There is evidence that many recipi-ents of these medical services areappreciative.

The agreement also calls for edu-cational and medical exchanges,including trips to Cuba byVenezuelans and their relatives for

medical treatment. More than100,000 Venezuelans have traveledto Cuba in 2005 to receive eyetreatment. In addition to the med-ical benefits they provide, these tripsalso serve a political purpose byallowing the Venezuelan state toalso reward loyalists with travelopportunities.

From Venezuela’s point of view,the deal with Cuba involves morethan oil-for-labor/services. Leavingaside the “intelligence” assets thetwo countries trade, which are hardto quantify because they are secret,Venezuela derives enormous eco-nomic and military benefits that areeasy to observe.

First, Venezuela’s rapprochementwith Cuba is helping Chávez in hislatest effort to reform the military.This most recent military reform,launched in 2004, involves twodimensions. First, the governmentis seeking to replace the NATO-compliant Belgian rifles that thearmy has used for more than threedecades with approximately100,000 Russian AK-103s and AK-104s. Venezuela will build factoriesto produce ammunition for theserifles. There is talk in 2006 ofacquiring Russian helicopters andSukhoi advanced fighter jets. Thesecond pillar of the current reformis the creation of urban reservists todefend the nation in the event ofinternational aggression. Thereservists are also supposed to helpwith “the maintenance of internalorder.” Estimates place the num-ber of current reservists at 300,000;the government’s goal is two mil-lion. Both initiatives require thehelp of Spanish-speaking expertscapable of training Venezuelan sol-diers in the Russification of theirarsenals and helping the govern-ment train and organize the newreservists. Cuban military person-nel, with their more than 40 yearsof experience in Russian military


TABLE 2: CUBA’S MEDICAL SURPLUS

No. of doctors per Infant mortality per10,000 inhabitants, 1000 live births,

1995 near 1995

Japan...........................................17.7 .................................................4USA............................................24.5 .................................................7Germany.....................................31.0 .................................................5Norway.......................................24.0 .................................................4Switzerland .................................30.1 .................................................5Netherlands ................................23.8 .................................................5Canada .......................................22.1 .................................................6Chile...........................................12.0 ...............................................12Cuba...........................................40.0 ...............................................11

Source: Madrid-Aris (2002)

equipment and training urbanreservists, are a perfect source oftechnical advice. Some analystseven argue that in organizing itsurban reservists, Chávez is copyingthe Territorial Troop Militia, Cuba’sown paramilitary units.

Second, the relationship withCuba provides the Chávez adminis-tration with additional avenues toevade oversight mechanisms on hisgovernment’s financial operations.The Venezuelan state owns PDVSA,the state-oil company that holds amonopoly on oil exports. With netsales of US$58 billion in 2004,PDVSA is the second largest com-pany in Latin America next toMexico’s PEMEX and the fifthlargest state-owned oil company inthe world. Whoever controlsPDVSA controls one of the world’smost formidable cash cows.Previous Venezuelan presidentsnever quite enjoyed total controlover PDVSA. The company hadsignificant independence from theexecutive branch. Venezuelan lawused to stipulate that PDVSA’s rev-enues be transferred to the CentralBank, and in 1998, Venezuela creat-ed a rule mandating a savings mech-anism in times of high oil revenues(the FIEM). Chávez has under-mined both rules. In addition tofailing to make the obligatory trans-fers of PDVSA revenues into theCentral Bank and reforming theFIEM to allow the government touse saved resources, he has eliminat-ed the autonomy of PDVSA’s gov-erning board. Yet, PDVSA stillretains some degree of exposure toexternal scrutiny. PDVSA’s offshoreoperations must still comply withinternational laws and the laws ofhost countries, and its domesticoperations continue to be coveredby the press, which frequentlyreports on PDVSA’s irregularities.Chávez, therefore, needs a place toconduct oil-related financial transac-

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tions free of scrutiny. As a countrywhere conventional, internationalfinancial and trade laws hardly exist,Cuba provides the perfect hidingplace. This explains why Chávezhas selected Havana as the head-quarters for PDVSA’s Caribbeanoffice and for PETROCARIBE, aproposed Caribbean energy agree-ment. Chávez has also established anew Industrial Bank in Havanacharged with financial intermedia-tion of foreign exchange tradesinvolving everything related to oiland its derivatives. In September2005, the president of Venezuela’sIndustrial Bank in Cuba, LuisQuiaro, reported that the bank’sofficial line of credit was US$200million. Chávez can now conductmultimillion dollar oil-based trans-actions away from the scrutiny ofinternational and Venezuelanobservers.

What Cuba Loses Most analysts in Venezuela believe

that the new relationship with Cubais disproportionately favorable toCuba. This is true, but only in theshort term. In the medium term,Cuba’s new relationship withVenezuela hurts Cuba’s developmentprospects.

For Cuba, the main advantage ofits relationship with Venezuela is theillusion of political autonomy.Unlike the European Union, whichhas provided trade agreements andbilateral aid to Cuba since 1993,Venezuela offers more substantialand less conditional aid. The aid ismore substantial because it includesthe lucrative oil deal as well as otherundisclosed state-to-state transfersthat are exempt from scrutiny bothin Cuba and in Venezuela, whereaccountability of government trans-actions is quickly eroding. It is lessconditional because Cuban-Venezuelan relations involve fewprivate investments, sparing Cuba

the need to meet the demands ofbusiness groups looking for favor-able investment facilities and donorswho make aid conditional onhuman rights. For Castro,Venezuela represents the perfectpolitical gift: an internationalpatron who makes no domesticdemands.

This autonomy is only shortterm, however. In the mediumterm, Cuba is heading toward adegree of economic dependencethat will ultimately hurt the state’spolitical autonomy. One of theenduring insights of the dependencytheorists of the 1970s is that nationscan gain control of other nations bybecoming their benefactors. Whilethe dependencia literature overstatedmany claims, their basic insight thatoverreliance on external windfallsand patrons hurts development is aserious proposition. At themoment, Cuba is suffering from atleast three forms of dependency.

First, Cuba is accumulating ahuge debt with Venezuela. InFebruary 2005, The Miami Heraldreported Cuba’s debt to the countryas US$2.5 billion and rising. Itmay reach US$3 billion by mid2006, which makes VenezuelaCuba’s top creditor nation, followedby Japan and Argentina. A lot ofthis debt comes from Cuba’s issue oflong-term IOUs to PDVSA, defer-ring all payments for at least 15years, which violates the original2000 accord stipulating that nomore than 25% of petroleumexports to Cuba would be financed.

Second, by allowing the govern-ment to meet its energy and finan-cial needs, the agreements are elimi-nating the incentives the Cubangovernment faced in the early 1990sto develop new sources of revenue.One positive trend of the SpecialPeriod of the 1990s was that Cubabegan to rethink its economic strat-egy, identifying new areas for invest-


ment and export promotion(tourism, agro-exports, biomedicalservices, film/cultural production,energy exploration), new forms ofbusiness organization (joint ventureswith international firms, someforms of self-employment, restruc-turing of state-owned enterprises,legalization of dollars), and newmarkets (the European Union). Forthe first time in decades, Cuba wasbeginning to diversify its economicrelations. To use present-day jar-gon, the Cuban state was finallymanaging (rather than eschewing)globalization. The alliance withVenezuela is eroding the incentivesto stay on this path. It is no coinci-dence that since 2000, Cuba hasallowed the number of foreign ven-tures and liberalized sectors todecline, has launched crackdownson self-employment activities, hasbanned the use of dollars byCubans, and has been complacentabout provoking tensions withEurope and Mexico, its mostimportant trading partners. Bymaking Cuba’s economy even lessdiversified, Venezuela is furtherdelaying Cuba’s capacity to competein today’s world economy.

Finally, the Cuba-Venezuela dealis giving rise to significant politicaldiscontent in both countries. Thedeparture of so many Cuban doc-tors for Venezuela is seen at home asa form of economic loss that theCuban government cannot blameon the US embargo. Furthermore,Cubans cannot help but wonderwhy the now legendary apagones(power outages) across the islandhave become increasingly frequentsince 2004, just at around the sametime that Venezuelan oil importsalmost doubled. It is hard for thegovernment to escape blame forwhat seems to be a clear failure touse available imports for domesticneeds. In turn, most public opin-ion polls in Venezuela reveal that

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the agreements with Cuba are enor-mously unpopular, even amonggovernment sympathizers, preciselybecause they appear so dispropor-tionately beneficial to Cuba. Thisdiscontent is bad for Cuba. Itmeans that in the event of a changeof government in Venezuela, thenew leaders may want to act on thisdiscontent and reduce, or possiblyterminate, Venezuela’s deals withCuba. This possible pulling of theplug would mean a repeat of thesevere blow that Cuba received inthe late 1980s, when MikhailGorbachev abruptly terminated sub-sidies to Cuba, plunging the islandinto a depression.

The Price of Castro’s Sovereigntyand Implications for the US

One of the most consistentthemes of the leaders of the CubanRevolution, even before they cameto power, has been the defense ofthe island’s sovereignty. For FidelCastro, this slogan seems to meannothing more than maximizing hispersonal freedom to rule the islandwith no accountability. He has con-stantly searched for some interna-tional patron willing to shower hisgovernment with benefits whilesimultaneously allowing him to dic-tate with impunity. Luckily forhim, he has always found one, andVenezuela is his latest find.

While the deals with Venezuelahave been fortunate for FidelCastro’s local freedom, they repre-sent a political curse for Cuba. Thedeals have eliminated the pressures,strong in the 1990s, that were push-ing Cuba to restructure its economyand manage globalization moreingeniously. Paradoxically, grantingthe Cuban government more politi-cal autonomy has served to rein-force rather then lessen its historicalproclivity toward mono-dependen-cy. In the end, Castro should know,dependency on one commodity, one

market, and one foreign govern-ment ends up restricting rather thanexpanding any state’s room formaneuvering. As long as the Cubangovernment continues to uphold apersonalist view of political sover-eignty, real freedom for Cubans willremain a dream.

That Cuba has becomeVenezuela’s new colony has implica-tions for US-Cuban relations.These deals will give Chávez enor-mous leverage during Cuba’s post-Castro transition. Venezuela’s pres-ence in Cuba is increasing not onlyeconomically, but also militarily.The number of Venezuelan militarypersonnel and state officials in resi-dence in Cuba is at an all-timehigh. Venezuela’s current ambassa-dor in Havana is none other thanAdan Chávez, Hugo’s brother.Cuba’s future leader will inherit theobligations and dependence that theCastros and Chávezes are cultivat-ing. And any regime succession inCuba will also occur with signifi-cant US involvement—either by UScitizens acting privately or by gov-ernment figures carrying out officialpolicy. The Cuban transition mayeven descend into a military con-frontation, possibly involvingCuban-Americans, and thus, theUnited States. It is impossible topredict the outcome of such a con-flict, but we can now be certain thatthe Venezuelans will be part of it.

Javier Corrales is associate professor ofpolitical science at Amherst College inAmherst, Massachusetts. In 2005 hewas a Fulbright Scholar in Caracasand a visiting lecturer at the Centerfor Research on Latin America inAmsterdam. Corrales is the author ofPresidents Without Parties: ThePolitics of Economic Reform inArgentina and Venezuela in the1990s (Penn State Press 2002).


The rationing systemwas introduced inCuba in 1962 andgradually expanded inthe following 43 years

to include most food and selectedmanufactured goods. The economiccrisis that followed the collapse ofthe socialist camp led to a drasticcut in rationed quotas and, despitethe partial recovery since 1995,rationing monthly quotas in 2005only met seven to 10 days of foodneeds. Surprisingly, at a speech atthe University of Havana inNovember 2005, Fidel Castroannounced that rationing wouldsoon end. In February 2006,Francisco Soberón, president ofCuba’s Central Bank, referred tothat speech and explained thatthere is a contradiction in Cubabetween those who live only fromtheir salary, which is insufficient tobuy goods at market prices, andthose who receive non-laborincome (legal such as remittances aswell as illegal) that allows them tolive comfortably, but both groupsbenefit from rationed goods at statesubsidized prices. Soberónremarked that “this is catastrophicfor the nation and economy, andethically unacceptable.” He furtherstated that the situation has “led usto the gradual extinction of therationing booklet.”

This article traces the backgroundof rationing in Cuba, comparesprices in rationed and nonrationedmarkets, calculates the purchasingpower of wages and pensions, andassesses the feasibility of five alter-native strategies to fulfill Castro’spromise.

The End of Rationing?by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

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Inception and Evolution ofRationing

The official justification forrationing was that the population’spurchasing power had increasedmuch faster than the domestic pro-duction of consumer goods and thestate’s capacity to import them: ifallowed to be set by supply anddemand, prices would haveincreased significantly and hurt thepoor and lowest income groups. Inorder to protect these groups thegovernment fixed prices centrallyand secured minimum quotas forall the people at subsidized prices,in some cases below productioncosts. On the positive side,rationing was an equalizer and wel-fare tool in the midst of scarcity.On the negative side, it was costlyfor the state, did not avoid longqueues in front of state shops, andstimulated the emergence and rapidexpansion of the black market,where goods were sold at severaltimes the rationing price. In the1970s and the first half of the1980s, the government fought theblack market by introducing paral-lel official markets, as well as peas-ant markets, where prices of goodswere set by supply and demand.But those two markets were abol-ished during the antimarket“Rectification Process” in the sec-ond half of the 1980s.

The major problem has been thatproduction of food and other con-sumer goods, after an increase inthe 1970s and 1980s, decreasedsharply during the crisis of the1990s and by the end of 2004were, in most cases, below the out-put level of 1989, for instance: beef

63%, fish 65%, sugar 69%, milk51%, eggs 32%, citrus 22%, tex-tiles 87% and tobacco 42%. Onlyproduction of beans, some vegeta-bles, and tubers was higher in 2004than in 1989. As a result, the gov-ernment was unable to maintainrationing quotas and cut them sothat by 2005 they only coveredfrom seven to 10 days of monthlyfood needs and considerably less inmanufactured-good needs.

The first three columns of thetable on page 32 show monthlyrationed quotas per person of 20consumer goods in Havana in threeyears: 1962 at the start of rationing,in the 1980s before the crisis, andat the end of 2005. In 1962, sevengoods were sold “free” (withoutquotas) but its number had beencut to four by the 1980s and nogoods were sold free in 2005. Witha couple of exceptions, the quotasof all goods steadily declined in theperiod. Gasoline, cigars, toiletpaper, and beer were sold free in1962 but were unavailable throughrationing in 2005; bread was soldfree in 1962 but restricted to asmall daily roll in 2005, while sugarwent from free to five pounds andcigarettes from free to three pack-ages monthly; the quotas of oil,chicken, tubers, coffee, and deter-gent shrank between 50% and75%. Rationed milk is only sold tochildren age seven and younger oradults under a medically-prescribeddiet (one liter daily). It used to besold also to elderly people (six cansof condensed or evaporated milkmonthly) but was discontinued inthe early 1990s. Butter is not avail-able through rationing and potatoes


are the only tuber occasionallyoffered. The quota of beef wasthree pounds in 1962 but in 2005the quota was a half pound for amixture of ground soy, beans, andmeat; very few medicines areobtainable in state pharmacies.

The people survived the severecut in rationed quotas thanks to thegovernment reforms implementedin 1993-96 that allowed the circu-lation of the dollar, foreign remit-tances in that currency, the resur-rection of free agricultural markets

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and self-employment, and theintroduction of state hard-currencyshops (“shoppings” or TRD) opento nationals. By 2004 about 62%of the population received dollar-remittances from relatives andfriends abroad that permittedCubans to buy goods in agriculturalmarkets and TRD. Income andaccess to these markets came fromself-employment, family restau-rants, dollar incentives paid under-the-table to employees in joint ven-tures, and speculation in the black

market or the informal sector.Nevertheless, a new antimarketwave that started in 2003 and con-tinued in 2006 reversed the mostimportant reform measures: Thecirculation of the dollar wasbanned; a fee of 10% to changedollars into “convertible” Cubanpesos was imposed (two pesos cir-culate in the island: the regular andthe “convertible” whose value is notset in the international market butarbitrarily by the government at arate of 24 pesos to buy one convert-


Despite the rhetoric, Cubans need thegovernment dole to survive

A person holds out a food rationing booklet while standing in line at a government store in the province of Pinar del Rio.

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Monthly Quotas of Rationed Goods per Person in Havana (1962, 1980s, 2005)and Prices in Regular Pesos at Rationed and Non-rationed Markets (2005)

Goods Rationed Quotas (years) Prices in Regular Pesos (2005)

1962 1980s 2005 Rationing Agriculture TRD

Beef, mixed with soy (pound) 3 1 0.50 0.80 No 43-215

Chicken (pound) 3 2 1 0.70 No 29-53

Fish (pound) 1 Free 0.688 0.70 No 68-135

Rice (pound) 6 5 5 0.25 4-5 11-14

Beans (pound) 1.5 1.25 1.875 0.40 8-20 30-40

Tubers (pound) 14 5 4 0.40 2-4 No

Lard (pound) and soy oil (liter) 2 1.5 0.50 0.20 10-18 54

Eggs (units) 5 Free 8 0.15 1-2 2-3

Milk (liter, powder in TRD) 6 3 0 No 6 64

Bread (roll) Free Free 30 0.05 10 No

Sugar (pound) Free 6 5 0.10-0.15 No 16-22

Coffee(pound) 1 0.375 0.25 5.00 No 145-158

Cigarettes (package) Free 4 3 2-2.50 No 9-57

Cigars (unit) Free 4 0 No No Vary

Gasoline (gallon) Free 10 0 No No 73-86

Bath or wash soap (tablet) 2 1.5 1 0.20-0.25 No 8

Detergent (bottle) 1 0.5 0.25 0.90 No 24

Toilet paper (roll) Free 1 0 No No 26

Tooth paste (small tube) 1 1 1 0.65 No 60

Beer (national, bottle or can) Free Free 0 No No 20-26

NOTE: Data sent by Cuban independent economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe and a researcher who requested anonymity, as well as articles inHavana internet, December 2005 and January 2006. TRD prices in convertible pesos have been estimated in regular pesos at the currentofficial exchange rate of 24 to one. “No” means that the good is not offered in a given market.

ible peso in 2005); the convertiblepeso was appreciated by 8% (pro-portionally reducing the value of thedollar); the number of self-employedactivities and family restaurants wasreduced; controls over agriculturalmarkets were tightened, and TRDprices were raised between 10% and30% and set them in convertiblepesos (thus adding another 10%increase due to the exchange fee forthe dollar). As a result of thesemeasures, as well as the tighteningof the embargo by the Bush admin-istration, the amount of remittancesand the access to goods in TRDdeclined sharply in 2005.

Prices in Rationed and Non-Rationed Markets and PurchasingPower of the People

The last three columns of thetable compare prices in regular pesosof goods in rationed and nonra-tioned markets (agricultural andTRD) in Havana in December2005. There are huge differences in

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the ratios of nonrationed to rationedprices, for instance, 100 times infish, 200 times in bread and 92times in toothpaste; 18 and 52times in rice (the first betweenrationing and agricultural marketprices and the second betweenrationed and TRD prices), and 90and 270 times in oil. Furthermore,many rationed items disappear formonths (soap, detergent) and thequality of rationed and some nonra-tioned goods has badly deteriorated:beef has been substituted by aground mixture of soy, beans, andmeat; rationed rice is small and ofbad quality; potatoes are often rot-ten; fish is small and full of bones;bath soap lacks perfume and easilydisintegrates; the rationed bottle ofdetergent is only good for washingdishes, a bag of powder from TRDmust be bought for washing clothes;shoes break after a few months ofuse.

The average monthly wage at theend of 2005 was 334 regular pesos

($16.70 at the official exchange rateof 20 pesos per one dollar), the min-imum wage 225 pesos ($11.25), theaverage monthly pension 180 pesos($9), and the minimum received byhalf of the pensioners 150 pesos($7.50). The whole basket ofrationed goods for the first seven to10 days of the month costs onlyabout 30 pesos, but monthly elec-tricity rates adds 10 to 20 pesos, bustransportation 12 to 20 pesos (onetaxi drive costs 10 to 20 pesos), andphone and water eight to 10 pesos;the bulk of the population owns adwelling but a minority pays 10% ofsalary, an average of 33 pesos; thetotal ranges from 60 to 115 pesos.With the income left, everyone mustbuy food unavailable throughrationing at agricultural markets orTRD for the remaining 20-23 daysof the month, as well as other foodand manufactures not availablethrough rationing at all. That isimpossible to minimum and averagepensioners, as well as minimumwage earners, without foreign remit-tances, family help, or extra income(many pensioners sell stuff in thestreets or do similar tasks). Withwhat is left, average salary earnerscan buy about one-half of theirremaining food needs at agriculturaland TRD markets. One poundeach of beef, chicken, and fish, fourpounds of rice, two pounds ofbeans, two onions, one bottle of soyoil, and four eggs cost 213 pesos—two-thirds of the average wage.Additional essential toiletries boughtat the TRD (one each soap tablet,bag of detergent and deodorant bot-tle) costs 84 pesos, one-fifth of theaverage salary; a pound of ham or apressure cooker wipes out almosthalf of the monthly average wage orthe whole minimum pension, and alight bulb bought at a TRD takes30% of the average wage and 50%of the average pension. Many carsare immobilized because spare parts,


Food and other goods unavailable through the rationing system can be purchasedat hard-currency shops, or TRDs, such as the one pictured above. But for an over-whelming majority of Cubans—who cannot afford to shop at the TRD—the mea-ger basket of rationed food and goods is essential for their survival.

only available in TRD, are highlypriced or because a gallon of gaso-line takes 22% of the averagemonthly wage.

Feasibility of Five AlternativeStrategies to End Rationing

All of the above shows that, asinsufficient as the meager basket ofrationed food and a few manufac-tured goods is, it is essential for thesurvival of the immense majority ofCubans. According to the govern-ment, the basket of rationed foodsguarantees half of the daily con-sumption of calories although itactually covers one third at best. Inany case, the intriguing question ishow rationing could be terminated?Five potential strategies to tacklethat problem are evaluated below.

The logical way to eliminaterationing would be to increase thesupply of consumer goods eitherthrough domestic production,imports, or a combination of both.This alternative is unfeasible inCuba in the mid term for variousreasons: domestic production in2005 was below the 1989 level inmost consumer goods (see above)and the population has grown 7%in the last 16 years; imports of foodhave significantly increased in thelast three years, mostly from theUnited States, but still are grosslyinsufficient to compensate for thepoor domestic output and Cubalacks convertible currency to buythe needed additional quantities(the merchandise trade deficit in2005 surpassed $4 billion, a histori-cal record).

Accepting its present restrictions,the government could terminate therationing booklet but maintain thecurrent subsidized prices, eliminatethe compulsory adscription of fami-lies to the neighborhood state gro-cery, and free consumers to pur-chase the existing limited goodsanywhere they are offered. This

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would create chaos because produc-tion and services would be disrupt-ed as people abandon jobs to huntfor food everywhere, generating thelongest queues under the revolu-tion, and unleashing a potentiallyvolatile political situation, all ofwhich makes this alternative highlyimprobable.

The government could also abol-ish the rationing booklet but allowprices to be set by supply anddemand, and let those people whohave enough money to buy the lim-ited goods sold at considerablyhigher prices. This strategy wouldbadly harm the poor and lowestincome groups (poverty is estimatedto afflict from 20% to 67% of thetotal population), precisely the jus-tification that the government gaveto introduce rationing back in1962. In addition, it would signifi-cantly expand the inequality of foodaccess in favor of the highestincome group and provoke severenutritional deficiencies in a largepart of the population. In view ofthe current official criticism ofinequalities, chances of this alterna-tive are poor.

The previous alternative, however,could be combined with an increaseof social assistance to the poor andlowest income groups to allow themto purchase goods at market prices.The government seemed to takethis path in 2005 by raising mini-mum wages, minimum pensions,and social assistance; but the cost of2 billion pesos (10% of GDP) pro-voked a significant jump in statebudget expenditures, and probablyin monetary liquidity and inflation.Still, that largesse was grossly insuf-ficient to improve food access ofthese vulnerable groups (as shownabove); further increases in socialwelfare would be extremely costlyand provoke financial instability.

Finally, rationing could be restrict-ed to the poor and lowest income

groups and leave the rest of the pop-ulation to purchase goods at pricesset by supply and demand, withsupplemental buying at agriculturalmarkets and TRD. Such action,however, would be harmful to themiddle-income group, particularlythose who do not receive remit-tances. In order to compensatethem, further increases of averagewages would be necessary, leading tosimilar adverse fiscal and stabilityconsequences as in the previous sce-nario. Castro estimated that theelimination of rationing would cost600 million pesos, a flagrant under-estimation based on the previousanalysis.

In view of the lack of easy alterna-tives, Fidel’s announcement of theend of rationing might well beanother symbolic ingredient in theofficial discourse aimed at gettingsupport for the ongoing economicrecentralization process, the cam-paign against corruption, and toassure the Cuban people that therevolution is on the right track witha bright future ahead. Such prom-ise, along with abundant energy in2006, could go astray as many otherpromises made by the MaximumLeader have done so in the past 47years: the largest industrial outputper capita in Latin America and afourfold increase in milk productionby 1965; a sugar harvest of 10 mil-lion tons and the creation of anunselfish “New Man” in 1970; anda fourfold jump in nickel output, aworld power in biotechnology, andfood self-sufficiency in the 1980s.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago is DistinguishedService Professor Emeritus of econom-ics and Latin American studies at theUniversity of Pittsburgh and was visit-ing professor at FIU from 1999 to2003.



War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898

War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 by John Lawrence Tonetakes as its focal point the Cuban war for independence from Spainprior to the United States’ entry into the conflict in 1898. Tone con-tends that the events in Cuba before American intervention are par-adigmatic of warfare in Latin America and elsewhere in the 19th and20th centuries and are ultimately more interesting than the “splen-did little war” of 1898. Employing Spanish and Cuban sources torecover the experiences of civilians and common soldiers duringwartime, the author takes a fresh look at well-known figures such asJosé Martí, Máximo Gómez, Valeriano Weyler, and AntonioCávanos and contributes to ongoing historiographical debatesabout the nature of war, the attitudes of its participants, the methodsof combat, and the necessity of US involvement to defeat Spain.

Through his careful examination of the Spanish and Cuban positionsprior to US involvement, Tone offers new answers to old questionsconcerning the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the war andthe ways in which the conflict was a civil war as well as a war of lib-eration. Tone also explores the Spanish policy of “reconcentration,”which called for the forcible relocation of thousands of Cubans toconcentration camps, raising the question of whether this policy con-stituted genocide or whether it represented an acceptable level ofviolence toward a civilian population within the standard rules ofengagement. In addition, Tone examines how Spaniards andCubans fought one another, challenges the widely held notion thatthe Cuban’s had defeated Spain before the US declared war, andexplores the necessity of US intervention.

Tone treats the “splendid little war” as but a single chapter in thelonger war that preceded the 1898 conflict, involving participantswho hailed from Havana, Madrid, and the Cuban countryside. Hisapproach depends greatly on newly released evidence from Spanishgovernment and military archives, including hospital records that tella different story about how battles were fought; intercepted Cubanletters that reveal the war’s effect on civilians; battle diaries kept bycommanders on both sides that cast new light on the condition ofthe troops; and administrative records that provide fresh insight intothe tragedy of reconcentration.

By telling this more complete story, Tone fleshes out the existing nar-rative of the war for Cuban independence and underscores the com-plexity of the issues that lay at the heart of the conflict.

John Lawrence Tone is Associate Professor of History at theGeorgia Institute of Technology.

War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898by John Lawrence Tone352 pp., 8 illustrations, 4 tables, 3 maps, notes, bibliography, indexISBN 0-8078-3006-2$35 hardcoverPublication Date: March 13, 2006 University of North Carolina Press

“Tone deals with not only the militaryaspects of the Cuban-Spanish-American war, but also the internalpolitical complexities of those coun-tries and the social and economicbackdrop on which the story unfolds.The author’s narrative techniquemakes for easy reading, with somechapters centered around the per-sonal life of one of the main charac-ters in the drama and other chapterson political and social problems ormilitary history. Tone masters all ofthese fields.”

-José Alvarez JuncoCentro de Estudios Políticos yConstitucionales, Madrid

P H O T O E S S A Y

Everything Old Is New Againby Uva de Aragón


automobiles and late-modelEuropean and Japanese cars to car-riages pulled by horses and theodd-looking camellos. Within thesame block one can contemplatethe renovated splendor of Havana’smagnificent colonial architecture,as well as crumbling buildings.Tourists and natives can easily bedistinguished from one another bythe way they dress, the places theyvisit, and where they eat. A newluxury hotel can suddenly sproutin the countryside, a short distanceaway from old “bohíos” andclotheslines draped with colorfulsheets, underwear, and T-shirts.But, the contradictions run deeperthan what the eye can see. Familiesthat have suffered the pain of sepa-ration for years now communicateby e-mail, and even collaborate increating family trees or sharing webpages. Family visits, care packagesand remittances, and the internetare healing the wounds and forgingeven stronger ties among relatives.While the US travel restrictionsimplemented in 2005 have had anegative effect on this family rec-onciliation, they have not broughtit to a halt.

Cuba, of course, is not entirelyfrozen in time. It is also a countryof constant change, for the govern-ment reacts with continuous new

campaigns, slogans, and decrees. Itis a place that has suffered isolationfrom the world, but, yet, the signsof modernity are starting to appear,albeit slowly. In its essence, how-ever, Cuba clings to the past ratherthan embrace an elusive future.Even that effervescent and hopefultime when the Revolution was inits infancy is not part of the collec-tive memory of young Cubans.The irony is that what is beingrenewed today in Cuba is preciselythe past that the Revolution hadhoped to bury. One more contra-diction in the new old Cuba.

The following photographs weretaken during several trips to theisland from 2002 to 2005 andhope to capture, much better thanthese words, the paradoxes of lifein Cuba.

Uva de Aragón is associate director ofthe Cuban Research Institute atFlorida International University. Aprolific writer, she has published sev-eral books on literary criticism, poet-ry, short stories, essays, and a novel,Memoria del silencio. Her mostrecent work is Morir de exilio, pub-lished June 2006.

Despite efforts to eradicate thepast, its appeal is palpable in theCuba of today

If revolution means radicalchange, then the CubanRevolution has lived up to itsname—but only in part.Since its earliest days in

1959, the leaders of the Revolutionproclaimed a new future for Cuba,even insisting on creating el hombrenuevo. Along with the call for rev-olution was the exhortation tobury what was considered an igno-minious past: the Catholic Church,tourism and its ills, bourgeois soci-ety and values, and class and racialdisparities. The Revolution’s intentto create a radically different social,political, and economic order hascertainly succeeded. Cuba today isa fundamentally different countrythan it was 45 years ago.

Yet, almost five decades afterFidel Castro marched triumphantlyinto Havana at the head of hisrebel army, Cuba remains a coun-try virtually frozen in time. Thepervasive winds of revolution havenot managed to blow away deep-rooted beliefs and traditions.Cubans cling to the past bothphysically and emotionally. Fromantique cars to old wives´ tales,from yellowed family photos tomomentary recollection of theglamour and genteelness of abygone era, the new men andwomen of Cuba seem to findgreater comfort in old customs andmemories, than in the hope of theelusive new Cuba once promised tothem.

Today, Cuba is a country of con-tradictions. Any visitor to theisland will immediately see its myr-iad forms of transportation: fromshiny, as if new, old American


Photo Essay

Cubans have learned to performmiracles to keep their old Americancars running. This one, parked inCentro Habana, shines like new.

A cochero awaits to transporttourists in his horse and carriagearound Old Havana. The renova-tion of old buildings can be seen inthe background.

A billboard in Havana with theimages of revolutionary figureCamilo Cienfuegos, student leaderJulio Antonio Mella, and the iconicChé Guevara—all of whom metviolent deaths—promises that abetter world is possible.

Photo Essay


Prices in this small coffee shop inCentro Habana are more in tunewith the meager salaries of mostCubans.

At the hotel Los Jazmines, adjacentto the Valle de Viñales in Matanzas,Cubans can enjoy the restaurantand other facilities, but are forbid-den to stay at the hotel, even if theycan pay for it.

Havana’s Café de Oriente, an imi-tation of the famous Madrid land-mark, caters to tourists. TheCuban government started to wel-come visitors to the island as partof its modest economic reforms ofthe mid 90s. Jobs serving touristsare highly coveted.

Photo Essay


Not far from the luxury hotel, thereare indications that life in Cuba’scountryside has not changed signif-icantly.

With the passing of time, thepromise of an egalitarian society hasbecome elusive. Beggars can againbe seen in the streets of Havana.

Tourists walk through the cobble-stone streets of Old Havana.

Photo Essay


School children and their coachtake a stroll in Plaza Vieja, which isbeing restored to look the way itdid when it was first built in the17th century.

Quinceañeras pose for photographsunder the shade of old trees. Thelavish celebration of a young girlbecoming 15 is a stark reminder ofa more elegant era once highly criti-cized by the Revolution.

Built in the 16th century, Castillode la Fuerza is Cuba’s oldest mili-tary fortress and one of the archi-tectural jewels attracting foreignersto the island.

Photo Essay


Amelia Goyri de Adot was buriedin this tomb in the Cementerio deColón when she died during child-birth in 1901. Legend has it thatwhen the casket was opened yearslater, the body was intact andAmelia was holding the baby in herarms. According to the popularmyth, “La Milagrosa,” as she isknown, has special healing powers,and is particularly helpful to moth-ers and their children. Her tomb isalways adorned by flowers andnotes from devoted visitors.

Young Cubans, dressed in jeans,stroll by a mural in Old Havanadepicting distinguished 19th centu-ry Cuban men and women of let-ters.

Since 1997, when the governmentallowed Christmas to be celebratedonce again, families immediatelystarted to display their old trees,ornaments, and nativity sets, whichhad been hidden for decades.

Brian Latell, After Fidel: TheInside Story of Castro’s Regimeand Cuba’s Next Leader. NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Don Bohning, The CastroObsession: U.S. Covert Opera-tions Against Cuba, 1959-1965.Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,2005.

Jorge I. Domínguez, OmarEverleny Pérez Villanueva andLorena Barberia (ed.), The CubanEconomy at the Start of theTwenty-First Century. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press,2004.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago and JorgePérez-López, Cuba’s AbortedReform: Socioeconomic Effects,International Comparisons, andTransition Policies. Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 2005.

It is said that after a particu-larly heated exchange withNeville Chamberlain,Winston Churchill vowedthat “History will not be kind

to Neville Chamberlain. I knowbecause I’m going to write it.”And, he did indeed write it solidify-ing, perhaps for ever after, the asso-ciation between clichéd portrayalsof “Chamberlain” and “Munich.”

Will history be kind to FidelCastro and his revolution now inits 47th year? It is a fact that thetendency among non-Cubanauthors has been to be increasinglycritical of the path taken. And yet,the fascination with the revolution’s

R E V I E W F O R U M

Plus ça change...by Anthony P. Maingot

charismatic leader continuesunabated. On balance, there ismore biography than macro-socio-logical analysis on the shelves.

Joining this trend toward criticalbiography is Brian Latell’s AfterFidel. Latell has been for decadesthe senior CIA analyst on Cuba,“fascinated” (his word) since hisgraduate student days with Cubancommunism. On his own admis-sion, this book has been in the ovensince at least 1986. Given his longcareer with the CIA, his access torecently released ex-Soviet files, andhis acquaintance with the recentslew of hefty volumes on Castro,one was expecting a ponderousencyclopedia-like tome. What hefinally delivered, rather, is a fast-paced and elegantly writtenaccount, in every way a terrificgood read. That said, one has to be

cautious with Latell’s heavily psy-chologistic slant on Castro’s styleand modus operandi as well as histake on Raúl, which, let it be said,is the most important contributionof the book.

To be sure, Latell is quite persua-sive when he argues that in Castrowe have a classical case of the childbeing father to the man. Presentedhere is the illegitimate Fidel in anearly and single-minded—evenobstinate—struggle to overcomethis family shame and a myriad ofother obstacles to social and educa-tional mobility. The end result ofthe many battles to overcome his“pariah” status was a deep-rootedauthoritarian personality. Listen toLatell:

The survival skills that Fidel began todevelop as a child – being on his


guard, fearing betrayal and rejection,improvising solutions, seizing initia-tives, trusting almost no one, threat-ening and committing acts of vio-lence, and relying on his instinctsrather than waiting for fate to bedealt him – have carried overthrough the rest of his life (53).

None of this of course, is new.What is new and interesting is theway Latell compares and contrastsFidel’s personality with that of hisyounger brother Raúl. Also bornout-of-wedlock and without any ofthe attractive physical and socialattributes of Fidel, Raúl emergesfrom these pages as the more stableand dependable of the two. Assuch, he is “the linchpin” of Fidel’ssuccession strategy, the “guarantor”of political stability in Cuba. “It ishighly unlikely,” says Latell, “that

Review Forum

Fidel could have held power so longwithout Raúl’s steady control of thearmed forces” (21). After Fidel,Latell predicts, it will be Raúl whowill have the occasion and thecapacity to set the revolution in amore rational and conciliatory(with the US) course.

The problem with the author’spsychological approach to bothFidel and Raúl is that it does notexplain why and how a leader (inthis case, Fidel) variously describedas “paranoid” (49, 51), operatingunder a “permanent link” with a“fantasy world of historical heroes”(59), “vain, spoiled and narcissistic”(84), in short, a “sociopath” (89),managed to out-maneuver theworld’s greatest power for over fourdecades. We can disregard Latell’sthrow-away explanation that Fidelhas had “exceptionally good

luck…” (18). Rather, we can piecean alternative interpretation fromoccasional concessions the authormakes to Fidel’s “exceptional intelli-gence” (38) and to his total dedica-tion to understanding US politicsso as to thwart it at every turn.“With the exception of a successionof Israeli leaders,” says Latell, “thereis probably no other political figureanywhere in the world who hasbeen more knowledgeable in assess-ing American politics and accuratein predicting American gyrations”(69). Thus, what we have here isnot a leader divorced from realitybut rather one inflexibly fixed onhis chosen path and determined todevote his considerable talents toshort-circuit any and all attempts atstopping him. Clearly not an adver-sary to be taken lightly which, onesuspects, is precisely what the USconsistently did.

That there have been no majorUS leaders equally dedicated to adeep understanding of Cuban poli-tics and gyrations is evident in thetightly argued book by DonBohning. Writing in the straight-forward, unadorned style of thejournalist, Bohning makes extensiveuse of newly unclassified materialsto describe what he calls “one ofthe most extensive sustained, andultimately futile covert action pro-grams by one country against thegovernment of another in the post-World War II era” (1). He skillfullydissects the eight known CIA plotsto assassinate Fidel Castro between1960 and 1965 as well as thebroader attempts at bringing aboutpopular uprisings, including thedisastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.


A review essay on Cuba

Two of Bohning’s conclusions areworthy of reflection 40 years afterall the plots and destabilizationattempts. First, Bohning concludesthat on restudy, it is difficult to see“how grown men could have taken(all these anti-Castro plans) serious-ly” (8). Secondly, and here onecannot help but think of the Iraqfiasco, Bohning records how thesober CIA assessments of theCastro regime’s strengths and itsurgent counsels against excessiveoptimism about impending implo-sions of the system were consistent-ly ignored by the political leader-ship.

Bohning ends by quoting a CIAreport from 1963 which arguedthat US programs at their presentlevels were not likely, barringunforeseen events such as the sud-den death of Castro, to result in theearly overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime. Having care-fully and dispassionately reviewedthe record of the US “obsession,”Bohning concludes that the CIA’s1963 assessment “remained validmore than four decades later”(263). This “obsession” with theleader’s reasoning and intentionshas obviously not produced strate-gies to defeat, or at least neutralize,that leader. Latell, however,believes that the focus on Fidel isessential even though he confessesthat dealing with, for instance, howthe economy was faring “wouldhave been easier” (184). Would itnow? Not if the books byDomínguez, Pérez Villanueva andBarberia, and Mesa-Lago andPérez-López are good measures.

Although both books attest to thefact that while external factors (fun-damentally the US embargo) haveplayed a part in Cuba’s economicfailures, it is mostly the same “rea-soning and intentions” of FidelCastro, which bedeviled Latell (andhis US bosses), that account for

Review Forum

nearly five decades of developmen-tal frustration. This is, of course,not a new revelation. Decades ago,socialist friends of Cuba, such asRené Dumont, K. S. Karol, andCharles Bettelheim, bemoaned thevoluntaristic and often hare-brainedschemes of the Cuban leader.Today, the view that such schemeshave for four decades fallen short oftheir goals seems to be the consid-ered view of a new generation ofCuban economists. Eschewing thetired old Marxist, “world system”and “dependency” paradigms andlanguage of the 1960s and 1970s,they show a solid grasp of moderndevelopmental economics and ofthe global realities, which presentreal challenges to all countries,including their own.

The enormous value of theDomínguez reader is that itincludes some solid essays by themost outstanding of these econo-mists, i.e. Omar Everleny PérezVillanueva (two essays), PedroMonreal, Jorge Mario SánchezEgozcue, Mayra Espina Prieto,Viviana Togores, and Anicia García.Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López analyzethe work of most of these, plusthose of other outstanding Cubaneconomists such as Julio Carranza,Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez,Hidiam Marquette, and JuanTriana.

To a man and woman, theseeconomists deal with the economicreforms implemented in the early1990s in order to confront the dis-astrous collapse of the economy fol-lowing the removal of Soviet subsi-dies, the opening of the economyto foreign investment, the restruc-turing of foreign trade, the conse-quences of an expanding touristsector, and the free circulation ofhard currency.

Arguing well within the ideologi-cal parameters of the socialist statethey all appear to support, there is

consensus that the reforms of the1990s did not go far enough inrestructuring the economy. Whatis urgently needed are changedproperty relations, decentralizationof economic decision-making, andthe promoting of production effi-ciencies through increased competi-tion and appropriate incentives.They all agree that the existing nat-ural resources economy is exhaustedand, as Pérez Villanueva puts it,“physically run down” (Domínguez,66). “The traditional model—sup-ported by antiquated methods andalready obsolete administrativepractices,” he says, “exists alongsidea second one based on decentral-ized models of self-financing withnew economic actors” (67). Thiswas of course before Fidel droppedthe guillotine on that decentralizedmodel.

So, one has again to ask: Who inCuba listens to their best economicthinkers? Certainly not PresidentFidel Castro. He never has. Writingin 1971, a very sympathetic USeconomist, Bertrand Silverman,noted that in Cuba the economywas being directed by “individualswithout previous experience, tech-nical know-how, or reliable infor-mation.” Even where there was aformal economic team in place,Silverman noted, Fidel Castro madeall final decisions through a parallelplanning apparatus (BertrandSilverman, Man and Socialism inCuba [1971], p. 22). This contin-ues to be his modus operandi:reforms are implemented onlywhen circumstances force a sort of“law of necessity” only to be uncer-emoniously pulled back as soon asrelief is in sight. Sustaining “social-ist morality” is invariably the justifi-cation. That sustained develop-ment is impossible under such cir-cumstances is made evident byJorge Domínguez. In a succinctanalysis of the gains and deficien-


cies of the reforms of the 1990s,Domínguez argues that “Several ofCuba’s economic reforms were onlypartial. Partial reform equilibriumis a long-term recipe for disaster; itdelays microeconomic reformsindefinitely” (Domínguez, 41).And, this was written before thedraconian measures against “neo-liberalism” pushed by Fidel Castroin November, 2005.

Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López notethis cycle of on-again off-againattempts at reform and leave nodoubts as to where the problemlies:

We believe that the core reason whythe leadership limited, closed down,

Review Forum

and eventually reversed pro-marketpolicies and launched anti-marketcycles – actions certain to bring aboutadverse economic performance – isthe fear of losing political control as aresult: decentralization of economicpolicymaking, expansion of the mar-ket the private sector, and the subse-quent surge in economic behaviorindependent of the state. Politicallogic, therefore, has trumped econom-ic logic, even though the results havebeen the deterioration of economicconditions and standard of living.(xii-xiii).

As of now it appears that Latell’sbiographical approach to the politi-cal and economic history of the


Cuban revolution “under Fidel”will be vindicated. The questionbecomes: Will Raúl listen to hiseconomists any more than hisbrother did? It is most intriguingthat Latell seems to be betting thathe will. Those in the US adminis-tration still “obsessed” with a “cleantransition” in Cuba better read hisbook.

Anthony Maingot is ProfessorEmeritus of Sociology at FloridaInternational University. His mostrecent publication (with WilfredoLozano) is The United States andthe Caribbean: TransformingHegemony and Sovereignty(Routledge 2004).


THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED

by Samuel Farber

Analyzing the crucial period of the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1961, Samuel Farber challenges dominant scholarlyand popular views of the revolution’s sources, shape, and historical trajectory. Unlike many observers, who treat Cuba’srevolutionary leaders as having merely reacted to US policies or domestic socioeconomic conditions, Farber shows that rev-olutionary leaders, while acting under serious constraints, were nevertheless autonomous agents pursuing their own inde-pendent ideological visions, although not necessarily according to a master plan.

Exploring how historical conflicts between US and Cuban interests colored the reactions of both nations’ leaders after theoverthrow of Fulgencio Batista, Farber argues that the structure of Cuba’s economy and politics in the first half of the 20thcentury made the island ripe for radical social and economic change, and the ascendant Soviet Union was on hand to pro-vide early assistance. Taking advantage of recently declassified US and Soviet documents as well as biographical and nar-rative literature from Cuba, Farber focuses on three key years to explain how the Cuban rebellion rapidly evolved from amulticlass, antidictatorial movement in to a full-fledged social revolution.

“A first-rate synthesis and interpretation of the Cuban revolutionary experience--both the rebellion against the

Batista regime and the consolidation of power in 1959-60. It is intelligent, well written, and well organized...it

is a major contribution to the field of Cuban studies.”

--Jorge Domínguez, Harvard University

Samuel Farber is Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College.

Baldassarri, Mario, and SergioCararo, eds. Cuba: Orgoglio ePregiudizi. Verona, Italy: Achab,2005. 254 pp. (Collection ofpapers, in Italian, on contemporaryCuba.)

Barbassa, Juliana. “The NewCuban Capitalist.” In: Capitalism,God, and a Good Cigar: CubaEnters the Twenty-first Century,edited by Lydia Chávez, 17-30.Durham NC: Duke UniversityPress, 2005.

Bray, Donald W., and Marjorie W.Bray. “Cuba Dreaming: On aPark Bench in Havana WithJohn Lennon.” Latin AmericanPerspectives 32, no. 6 (November2005): 5-21. (Maintains that theCuban Revolution has achieved anew form of democracy basedupon shared social goals.)

Caballero, Rufo. Un Hombre Soloy una Calle Oscura: Los Roles delGenero en el Cine Negro. Havana:Editorial Unión, 2005. 166 pp.

Campoy, Ana. “Dancers WhoStretch the Limits.” In:Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar:Cuba Enters the Twenty-FirstCentury, edited by Lydia Chávez,95-109. Durham NC: DukeUniversity Press, 2005.

Centeno, Miguel Angel. “ElRegreso de Cuba a AméricaLatina: El fin del excepcionalis-mo cubano?” Bicentenario 4, no. 1(2005): 5-20.

P U B L I C A T I O N S U P D A T E

Cuba’s New Societyby Marian Goslinga

Chávez, Lydia. “Adrift: AnIntroduction to ContemporaryCuba.” In: Capitalism, God, and aGood Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 1-14. Durham NC:Duke University Press, 2005.

Chakarova, Mimi. “Interlude: APhoto Essay.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 110-128. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Coté, John. “Cubans Log OnBehind Castro’s Back.” In:Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar:Cuba Enters the Twenty-firstCentury, edited by Lydia Chávez,160-173. Durham NC: DukeUniversity Press, 2005.

Delgado Torres, Alejandro Eddy.El Gran Libro de la Santería enCuba: Introducción a la CulturaYoruba. Madrid: Esfera de losLibros, 2005. 250 pp.

Estrada Montalván, Joaquín, ed.Iglesia Católica y NacionalidadCubana: Encuentros Nacionalesde Historia. Miami, FL: EdicionesUniversal, 2005. 2 vols.

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Fernández-Larrea, Ramón.Kabiosiles: Los músicos de Cuba.Barcelona, Spain: Linkguam 2005.235 pp.

Foley, Julian. “Trinidad: Life onthe Margins.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 45-61. Durham NC:Duke University Press, 2005.

González, Angel. “Son deCamaguëy.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 222-234. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Hodge, G. Derrick. “Sex Workersof Havana: The Lure of Things.”NACLA Report on the Americas 38,no. 4 (Jan-Feb 2005): 12-15.

Kapcia, Antoni. Havana: TheMaking of Cuban Culture.Oxford, Eng.; New York, NY: Berg,2005. 236b pp.

Klepak, Hal P. Cuba’s Military,1990-2005: Revolutionary SoldiersDuring Counter-RevolutionaryTimes. New York, NY: PalgraveMacMillan, 2005. 349 pp.

Lardner, Megan. “The Spanish AreBack.” In: Capitalism, God, and aGood Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 191-206. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Meerman, Jacob. “OppressedPeople: Economic Mobility of theSocially Excluded.” Journal ofSocio-Economics 34, no. 4 (August2005): 542-567. (Compares mobil-ity histories of four minorities:Cuban blacks, Indian Dalits,Burakumin, and US blacks.)



Mercader Uguina, Jesús R. Larealidad laboral en Cuba y laresponsabilidad social de losinversores extranjeros. Valencia:Tirant Lo Blanch, 2006.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. La econo-mía cubana hoy: ¿Salvación ocondenación? 2006.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo and JorgePérez López. Cuba’s AbortedReform: Socioeconomic Effects,International Comparisons, andTransition Policies. Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 2005.

Minaya, Ezequiel. “Authors WhoKnew or Know the Limits.” In:Capitalism, God, and a Good Cigar:Cuba Enters the Twenty-FirstCentury, edited by Lydia Chávez,78-94. Durham NC: DukeUniversity Press, 2005.

Mohor, Daniela. “Socialism andthe Cigar.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 147-159. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Perera Pintado, Ana Celia.“Religion and Cuban Identity ina Transnational Context.” LatinAmerican Perspectives 32, no. 1(January 2005): 147-173

Pérez, Louis A. To Die in Cuba:Suicide and Society. Chapel Hill,NC: University of North CarolinaPress, 2005. 463 pp.

Pyati, Archana. “The NewImmigrants Don’t Hate Fidel.”In: Capitalism, God, and a GoodCigar: Cuba Enters the Twenty-FirstCentury, edited by Lydia Chávez,177-190. Durham NC: DukeUniversity Press, 2005.

Ramirez, Ronaldo. “State andCivil Society in the Barrios ofHavana, Cuba: The Case ofPogolotti.” Environment andUrbanization 17, no. 1 (April2005): 147-171.

Roca, Alicia. “The Old CubanCadre: Four Women SurviveManzanillo.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 31-44. Durham NC:Duke University Press, 2005.

Rodríguez, Olga R. “TrueBelievers.” In: Capitalism, God,and a Good Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 131-146. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Rojas, Rafael. Tumbas sin sosiego:Revolución, disidencia y exilio delintelectual cubano. Barcelona:Editorial Anagrama, 2006.

Rojas, Rafael, ed. Cuba hoy ymañana: Actores e institucionesde una política en transición.Mexico City: Centro deInvestigación y DocenciasEconómicas/Editorial PlanetaMexicana, 2005.

Rojas, Ricardo Manuel. LosDerechos Fundamentales y elOrden Jurídico e Institucional deCuba. Buenos Aires. Argentina:CADAL [y] Konrad-AdenauerStiftung, 2005. 283 pp.

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Sawyer, Mark Q. Racial Politics inRevolutionary Cuba. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Serra, Ana. “The New Woman inCuban Revolutionary Discourse:Manuel Cofiño’s The LastWoman and the Next Combat(1971).” Journal of Gender Studies14, no. 1 (March 2005): 33-44.

Sigler, Bret. “God, Babalawos, andCastro.” In: Capitalism, God, and aGood Cigar: Cuba Enters theTwenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 207-221. DurhamNC: Duke University Press, 2005.

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Valdés Hernández, Dagoberto.Cuba: Libertad y Responsabili-dad; Desafíos y Proyectos. Miami,FL: Ediciones Universal, 2005. 414pp.

Wunderlich, Annerlise. “Hip HopPushes the Limits.” In: Capitalism,God, and a Good Cigar: Cuba Entersthe Twenty-First Century, edited byLydia Chávez, 65-77. Durham NC:Duke University Press, 2005.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri-can and Caribbean bibliographer atFlorida International University’sGreen Library.

Publications Update

Forthcoming from VERSO...

The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the Americasby Robin Blackburn

The slave systems of the Americas were to become as large as any in human history,and the huge profits they engendered stimulated capitalist growth in Europe and fos-tered war and colonial revolt. The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the Americas exploresboth why Europe’s conquest and colonization of the Americas were accompanied bythe construction of a variety of racially defined slave systems, and why they were even-tually suppressed in a century of abolitionism from 1788-1887. US and British gov-ernments have long basked in the view that they played a special role in the eventualvictories of anti-slavery. Blackburn insists that we should see the advance of anti-slav-ery as rooted in much wider social struggles and movements propelled by free peopleof color, political and religious radicals, and slave rebels. He shows how these move-ments were most effective when they challenged both racism and private property, andthat their greatest triumphs coincided with deep-going crisis of the entire social order.This fascinating book distills Blackburn’s extensive and original research into a conciseand accessible introduction to the subject.

Available March 2007

160 pages • 5.5 x 8.25 inchesPaperback $19.95 • ISBN 1 84467 569 6Hardcover $84.95 • ISBN 1 84467 113 5

Robin Blackburn is Visiting Distinguished Professor at the Committee on HistoricalStudies, The New School University, New York; and Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of Essex, United Kingdom.

hemisphere a magazine of the americas volume 17 •...

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