HeliOffshore

François LassaleChief Operating Officer

Maintaining Safety performance in a

challenging business environment

2

Enablers

HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Programme

HSIP

4

HSIP Aims• Understand true safety picture

• Measure the effect of initiatives

• Guide safety strategy / areas of focus

• Highlight common issues

• Close the loop - how do we know?

HSIP Assess

Act

Measure

Closing the loop

HSIP• 3 phases

Phase 3

Phase 1InfoShare

Phase 2

2018 20202016

HSIP

Phase 3

Phase 1InfoShare

2018

Phase 2

20202016

SectorsHigh potentials

FDM

Flight hoursAccidents

RTB

Governance& Security

HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Programme - Collaborative Memorandum of Understanding

Version 2.0 - 18th April 2018 Page 1

COLLABORATIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

HeliOffshore AND

INSERT Organisation Name FOR

SAFETY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMME

1. AUTHORITY

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is between [INSERT Organisation Name] with a principal place of business or headquarters at [INSERT Organisation Address] (hereinafter referred to as "Participant") and HeliOffshore, with a principal place of business or headquarters at 7 Henrietta Street, London WC2E 8PS, United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as "HeliOffshore") for the collection of information relating to the HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Program, each a “Party” and, together, the “Parties”. The Parties agree as follows:

2. DEFINITIONS

1. HSIP The HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Programme, specifically the data sharing, exploitation and presentation aspects of that Programme.

2. HSIP Management Committee The governing body tasked to oversee the operation of the HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Programme.

3. HSIP Project Team The team responsible for executing the Safety Intelligence Programme including developing and supporting the operational infrastructure.

4. Data Information exchanged under this MOU and described in Exhibit A.

3. PURPOSE

This MOU defines the responsibilities of the Parties, including making Participant Data available to HeliOffshore to support the development, analysis, and delivery of the Safety Intelligence Programme. This MOU defines the terms and conditions between the Parties governing Data access and usage. Both Parties agree that all uses of Data provided under this MOU or results generated by the Safety Intelligence Programme will be governed under the direction of the HSIP Management Committee.

HeliOffshore Safety Intelligence Programme - Collaborative Memorandum of Understanding

Version 3.0 - 26th April 2018 Page 17

Participation in the data-sharing programme is voluntary and open to all operator members of HeliOffshore by signing the MOU above. Although voluntary, the active participation in safety efforts, including the provision of relevant data in the spirit of industry safety improvement, is expected for all HeliOffshore members. Operator members will be classed as a contributing member once they have signed the MOU and begun to share data within the HSIP. Under the direction and oversight of the HSIP Management Committee, contributing members will have full access to the work products generated from the data they contribute.

D6. Access to Data

Access to data by HeliOffshore staff All HeliOffshore staff will be able to view and handle data in support of the Safety Intelligence Programme and/or HeliOffshore’s safety improvement strategy (as is currently the case with InfoShare data). Access to data by the HSIP Project Team Any person who is not a HeliOffshore member of staff, but is involved in the Safety Intelligence Programme shall be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA - available to view on request) before being allowed access to the data. HeliOffshore shall ensure no conflict of interest exists for such persons. Once the NDA is signed, they will be able to view all data (including operator etc.) but will only be able to discuss this information with other members of the HSIP Project Team. Operator representatives may not be part of the HSIP Project Team.

HSIP Engagement and Progress

~2/3 of our Operator Members have signed

the MOU

Those that have signed operate >85% of total

Member fleet

MOU revised to v4

Industry Safety Report

• Currently have data covering >600 airframes

• Thank you to Milestone and the competition winners:

Irene Makris – P&WC

Jamie Mitchell - BSP

• Published by end of July

Phase 2

• Proof of concept

• Overcome barriers

• Demonstrate support

• Show value

• Develop the mechanisms, structures, taxonomies etc.

Previous study

• Working group agreed to focus on one aircraft type: AW139

• Agreement to utilize the Approach Path Management Guidelines developed by the Operational Effectiveness workstream and on a specific capture window of 0.5NM to 0.1NM prior to touchdown with the following parameters:

• Intent was to show ‘proof of concept’ – that FDM data can be shared safely, securely and anonymously

• Heading

• Roll

• Pitch

• Airspeed

• Groundspeed

• Vertical Speed

FDM Work Group: Report

What did it show?

• Can share safely

• Can share anonymously

• Doesn’t threaten competition

• Gives a new perspective

• Picture isn’t uniform

• Doesn’t replicate existing FDM

Raises question for next collection

Flight Data Monitoring Working Group

Summary of Initial Data Collection Project

Version 1.0

January 2019

This report represents a consensus view from the Flight Data Monitoring Working Group.

It does not imply that any member of the Working Group agrees with any specific point.

CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT CIRCULATE

New collection

• S92 and AW139

• Offshore approaches

• Continuous data

• Final 5 minutes

• Larger parameter set

• but…

• The group has gone further and agreed to share full flights and all parameters.

Value

• Bring expertise together to work on issues

(e.g. stabilised approach / when to go-around)

• Understand differences in operations

(e.g. shuttling, circling approaches)

• Feedback on FCOM / APM usage

• Examine automation usage

• Inform HTAWS algorithms

Operational Events (RTBs)

Infoshare Events

Accidents

Infoshare & Accident Database

HeliOffshore ‘Space’Members Secure Collaboration & Data Portal

Fleet Flight Hours

AccreditationsISO27001 info securityCyber Essentials

Flt hrs & Accident Rates

Event analysis

Enterprise grade SSO by JiveData encryption – transit & restPhysical Security–Microsoft Azure

Raw Flight Data

Safety Intelligence Process

Where we started!

The Journey!

The Destination!

HSIP

• 3 phases

Phase 3Raw flight data?

Big data?Predictive?

Phase 1InfoShare

2018

Phase 2

20202016

SectorsHigh potentials

FDM

Flight hoursAccidents

RTB

Broadening our scope

Accidents

Serious IncidentsASRsMx errors InfoShareMORsObs data

Data sources

ASR

Weather

Maintenance

ADS-B

OEMs

Raw FDM

Phase 3

FRMS

InfoShare

Phase 1

HiPos

LOSA

Regulators

HUMS

MORs

Phase 2

System reliability – System Failure

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System reliability - Return To Base RTB

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Collaborating to Study RTB Causes

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Goals:

• Reduce the number of Return to Base events

• Improve safety by reducing crew workload

• Improve safety perception…amongst the customer passengers

• Reduce the strain on the resilience of the operator’s frontline staff

Feb 2019

Sikorsky Conclusions

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1. RTB root causes and priority correlate with Sikorsky reliability data

2. We remain committed to enhancing reliability, but we need to do more

3. Opportunities for improved system safety may be present in the fault annunciation protocols

4. Perception of safety will not improve without industry-wide collaboration

System Reliability

Human Hazards Analysis - HHA

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AW139 Human Hazard Analysis Workshop

First HHA Workshop was held on October 3rd in

Leonardo premises in Cascina Costa the 1st AW139

Human Hazard Analysis (HHA) Workshop for AW139.

Two parallel teams were assigned, each consisting of

• One HeliOffshore representative;

• Two Leonardo engineers and one Leonardo system specialist;

• Two aircraft Maintenance Engineers from one operator.

First HHA Workshop was mainly focused on maintenance activities related to Transmissions and Rotors (ATA 62, 64, 63 and 65).

HHA Process

• Preparation Selection of Safety Critical Tasks on Safety Critical Components/Systems

• Phase 1 "5 Initial Questions - Draw out the potential errors associated with the task“

• Phase 2 "Full Error Analysis - Task Initial Rating (1 -5) “

• Phase 3 "Mitigation Design - Reduce Task Rating to ALARP

• Phase 4 "Deployment of Mitigation(s)“.

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No

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Insig

nific

an

t

Min

or

Mo

de

rate

Ha

za

rdo

us

Ca

tastr

op

hic

Zero Likelihood 0 0 0 0 0 0

Very Unlikely 0 1 1 1 2 2

Unlikely 0 1 2 2 3 3

Possible 0 1 2 3 3 4

Likely 0 1 3 3 4 4

Almost certain 0 1 3 4 4 5

CONSEQUENCE

LIK

EL

IHO

OD

TH

AT

CO

NT

RO

L M

EA

SU

RE

S

CO

UL

D F

AIL

Achievements and Next Steps

The following aircraft types have had a Human Hazard Analysis Workshop , supported by the OEMs and the operators’ maintenance engineers:

• H225 - HeliOne

• AW 139 – Weststar, CHC Helicopter

• H175 – CHC Helicopter, NHV, Babcock

Next Steps

• AW139 second workshop, supported by Era and Chevron

• S92A workshop

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Operational Effectiveness

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Operational Effectiveness Workstreams Vision

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Safety Information Programme

(HSIP)

Evidence-based

Training

(EBT)

Flight Crew Operating Manuals

(FCOM)

Eye-tracking Research

Flight

Path Manageme

nt

(FPM)

Terrain Awareness

Warning System

(HTAWS)

Individual workstreams informing each other through the provision and use of data via HSIP

Addressing priority risks:

• System Failures

• Loss of Control

• Controlled Flight into Terrain / Water

Operational Effectiveness

Flight Crew Operating Manual FCOM

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Background

Each OEM developing FCOMs for their models

High-level guidelines only specified what each section of the FCOM should be, not format of content

FCOM meeting in Oct 2018 resulted in OEM concern that the content structure may not be consistent

OEMs agreed to meet to develop content structure (standardisation)

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FCOM Meeting 2 – 4th April 2019

Hosted by Leonardo at the Leonardo Training Facility in Sesto Calende

Attendees: Leonardo, Airbus, Bell, Sikorsky, Bristow, Babcock, HeliOffshore

We are all HeliOffshore!

Created FCOM Steering Committee responsible for:

• Determining content structure (i.e. common callouts, table construct, etc.)

• Reviewing and approving feedback for incorporation

• Developing and maintaining FCOM roadmap

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FCOM Steering Committee

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Members:

David Denman – Bristow (Chairman)

Simon Fielding – Babcock

François Lassale – HeliOffshore

Christophe Pozzo-di-Borgo – Airbus

Serge Tyran - Airbus

Mike Gralish – Bell

Neil Barton – Bell

David Bohn – Bell

Dario De Liguoro – Leonardo

Matthew Boffin – Leonardo

Carmine La Rocca – Leonardo

Alessandro Dina – Leonardo

Rod Duplin – Sikorsky

Simon Gharibian – Sikorsky

Alan Walling – Sikorsky

FCOM Implementation Roadmap

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Initial FCOM

development

Pre-release

Revision

OEM and Operator

SME Input

Initial Release

Operator Impleme

nt

Partial / Full

Post-release

Feedback

HO supported Survey

Iterative Revision

OEM and Operator

SME Input

Iterative Release

Operator Impleme

nt

Partial / Full

Post-release

Feedback

HO supported Survey

Final Release

Standalone FCOM adoption

HeliOffshore

Targeted Survey

Which elements adopted

/ not adopted

Feedback

Database

Focused

Revision

Elements to be

prioritised for

development?

HeliOffshore

FCOM Status

Table

What is status of latest

version of FCOM for each

fleet?

Operator

Gap

Analysis

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FCOM Status Table

OEMHelicopter

Type

Stage

GateStatus Revision # OEM POC

Airbus

H225 G9 FR Rev. 2, 15-18 C. POZZO DI BORGO

H175 G9 FR Rev.3, 18-39 C. POZZO DI BORGO

H160 G6 ID - C. POZZO DI BORGO

Bell B525 G6 ID - Mike Gralish

LeonardoA139 G9 FR issue A 6/3/2017 D.de LIGUORO

A 189 G9 FR issue 1 5/10/2018 D.de LIGUORO

Sikorsky76 G6 FR Rev 1.0 Mike Petras

92 G6 FR Rev 1.0 Rod Duplin

Revision #ID = In developmentPR = Pre-releaseFR = Post-release feedback required“n.n” [date] = Regular Published Revision

Operational Effectiveness

HTAWS

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HTAWS Progress

Phase 1 - enhanced envelope protection

• increasing warning times on existing Modes 1-6

• develop new Mode 7 (low speed / low power)

Phase 2 - enhanced HMI (increasing impact of warnings)

Status update

• Enhancements to existing Modes 1-6 agreed (60% net safety benefit)

• Development of new Mode 7 not agreed

• EUROCAE WG established – April 2019 – to define HTAWS standards

• HMI report issued – published as CAP 1747

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Leonardo Deployment and Assumptions

•Mode 1 / 3 / 4 envelope modified per CAP1519 when TAWS Offshore Mode is

selected

•No Primus Epic SW changes necessary to install -036 EGPWS

•Mode 7 disabled, waiting for refinements of CAP 1519

•OEI integration associated to updated TAWS TSO basis, currently under discussion

• Flight Test effort limited to check of envelope implementation

•Analysis effort to demonstrate low percentage of nuisance alerts

Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Design

freeze

Certification

Flight test

today

2019

Development

EASA

cert.

SB

issue

Application

to EASA

TSO approval(current TAWS TSO)

HTAWS Sikorsky S-92 ImplementationProject Summary Date: February 2019

Dave Howson / Mark Prior

PROJECT TEAMAlan Walling

SikorskyUK CAA /

HeliOffshore EASA

David Solar

Airbus H175 Next Steps and Schedule

Schedule of CAP 1519 (mode 1 to 6) implementation in AH avionics Mode 1 to 6:

* this milestone could be anticipated by 1-2 quarter depending on the outcome of milestone 3

• The two first candidates proposed for this upgrade are the H175 and H160. H145, H135 will follow

• Mode 7: AH continues to work on this key topic for aviation safety by:

• Contributing to the Eurocae working group

• Invest in R&D to improve pilot workload and anticipation of risks; more will be communicated in the upcoming months.

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Milestones Gate Initial commitment Update 01/2019

1 Validation of the technical solution G5 February 2019 February 2019

2 Decision of development in next Helionix upgrade G5 Q4/2019 Q1/2019

3 Validation of the solution on the first Helionix candidate G7 Q4/2020 Q4/2020

4 Deployment on the first candidate for the HLX upgrade G9 Q2/2021 Q2/2021*

5 Deployment on the next candidate for the HLX upgrade G9 None Previous milestone + 3 to 6 months

HTAWS Next Steps

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• Honeywell ready to certify Mode 1-6 enhancements for EGPWS -036 release (late 2019)

• Operators to plan Mode 1-6 upgrades following -036 release for AW139 (early 2020) and S92 (late 2020/early 2021)

• Mode 7 enhancements to be addressed post EUROCAE WG effort –software upgrade plan unknown (3+ years?)

HeliOffshore

Windfarm group

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Windfarm Workgroup: Recommended Practices for Offshore Wind

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Aim − Establish a set of recommended practices which can be applied to aviation and related subjects in both current and future offshore global wind industry markets

Why − Current disparate regulation does not cover all topics sufficiently− Enhance safety, consistency and enable the efficient use of helicopter & personnel assets in

offshore wind.

How − Industry led, practitioner-based approach − Look to address and align, as best as practicable, to a single, global, methodology− Using existing peer reviewed objective data, standards & regulations as a base

Who Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo, Bell Helicopters

MHI Vestas, Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy

Equinor, Ørsted

CHC Helicopter, HSi, Wiking, Bristow, ERA, HTM, KN Helicopters, NHV EASA, FAA, NOGEPA, HeliOffshore

When

Offshore WindFarm Recommended Practices & Standards (RP&S)Project Summary

1) Background and Scoping 3) Work Breakdown Structure and Macro-Schedule

2) Targets and Expected Benefits

5) Decision-ready requests for G2 Project Launch decision:❑Go as is❑Go, but modify and

review by xx❑No

go

Scope IN OUT

• All offshore windfarm operators• All offshore helicopter operators• All helicopter OEMs• All national/international aviation

regulators• Future offshore windfarms

• Same role but different industry (egHHO in O&G, SAR)

• Onshore renewable energy

Project Team Organization Project Team Organization Project Team Organization

Lee Harris (Chair) Siemens Gamesa

Matthias Klein Airbus Helicopters

Alistair Riches HeliService International

Andy Overton (dep Chair)

CHC Helicopter Markus Lipp HTM Bernd Brucherseifer

HTM

De Jansen CHC Helicopter Mike Soldo Bell Roger van Schijndel

CHC Helicopter

Mike Deer Bell

4) Risk Assessment

Project Aim

Using the input of a broad cross-section of stakeholders, establish a set of recommended practices

and standards (RP&S) which can be applied to aviation and related subjects in both current and

future offshore wind industry markets.

• Establish industry safety standards thereby reducing inconsistency of operations

• Implement safety standards where none currently exist

• Raise safety standards where existing guidance is insufficient

• Promote risk-based approach to considerations

• Promote evidence-based policies

Next Steps:• Conclude WP1 by end Dec 18• Agree internal review team and commence editing and proof reading• Convene next F2F meeting to undertake WP2

Risk Mitigation Owner

Safety standards ill conceivedBroad cross section of the industry is debating and reviewing the potential wording for inclusion in the RP&S

Working Group

Safety standards not representativeWorking Group includes representation from USA and Europe, with interests in Far East, OEM, wind farm operator, helicopter OEM and helicopter operators

Working Group

Safety standards will not be accepted

Recommended practices and standards will be peer reviewed and regional regulatory input will be invited to ensure validity

Working Group

Type and Amount of Resource Budget until G5 Budget Owner name & validation

Budget G2 to G5

Project Leader

WP1

Top 3 RP&S

discussed and

agreed

WP2

Next 3 RP&S

discussed and

agreed

WP3

Editing and proof

reading

WP4

Regulator and peer

review

WP Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020

Offshore WindRP&S

WP1

WP2

WP3

WP4

WP5

G3

Date: Oct 2018

WP5

Final draft and

Publication

G5

G7

G9

G4

Thank you

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