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Heiner MeulemannForschungsinstitut für Soziologie, Universität

zu KölnGreinstraße 2, D50939 Köln

Tel. 0221 - 470 5658, Fax 0221 - 470 5169e-mail: meulemann@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Perspectives on Social CapitalDefinition, questions and some results from the

European Social SurveyLecture at the X. Conference of the SU-Higher School of Economics,

Moscow, April 6-10, 2009

I like to express my gratitude to the “Verein der Freunde und Förderer der Universität zu Köln”

(Association of friends and sponsors of the University of Cologne)for the generous support of this research visit.

> traditional-corporatist regime

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Three topics

1 How is social capital (SC) best defined? According to this definition:2 Which questions on SC should be

reserarched first? And which have? First priority: Transfer hypothesis

3 Example of transfer hypothesis - European social survey - Economic sphere of labour relations

1 Defining social capital: Social relations as resources

of actors in contexts

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1.1 Criteria

• Putnam: “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks”

• Combines reference to social process – “organization” – with enumeration – “such as”.

• I will analyze what is “social” of “features of organization” in order to understand the enumeration

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„Features of social organization“

= collective good of organizations. Organizations can be distinguished by their SC – just as by constitution, function, size. Grammatical singular “organization” accidental.

Yet: singular meaningful: “organization” = process sustained by persons. Members of a group interact, “organize themselves”, so that collective products result

Question: what “collective goods” or products?

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Three collective goods, resulting from interaction of persons

(1) productivity of a network: from flow of exchanges between persons with positions and intentions

(2) climate of trust: sufficient number of people reciprocate benevolent actions; if number goes down, trust risky, vicious circle: climate of distrust

(3) validity of norm: sufficient number follow norm and sanction violations; if number goes down, vicious circle of deviance and tolerance, norm breaks down

In each case: “collective good” from interaction of members. “Features of organization” established bottom up

Therefore, genus proximum of definition not organizations, but persons.

New definition 1: SC = any property of a group member, which contributes to group outputs.

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Problem of new definition 1: too broad, „social“ lost

Contribution of persons also from human or cultural capital

Therefore restricton: only outputs from membership in group.

In pursuing common interest, members form social relations, interactions more densely knit amongst members than with non-members.

Somewhat narrower definition 2: SC = sum of social relations a person holds in groups

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Problem of new definition 2: still too broad, includes intimate relationships

Intimate = sexual and generational relations, rest on biology; everybody can, and most will, enter into them. Practiced in “private living arrangements”.

“Private” = “particularistic” (Parsons): person essential for the relation

many mothers, but only my mother is “my” mother

SC consists of “universalistic” relations in “public” realms, persists with interchangeable persons

New and final definition 3: SC = sum of social relations a person holds in groups beyond intimate living arrangements

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Uses of SC in social contexts

SC does not “capitalize” by itself. In order to not decay, it must be utilized. What can actors gain from SC?

Due to its relational nature, SC more useful when more relations in group.

Therefore, distinction of contexts of use:

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1.2 Relational capital and system capital: Concept and measurement

“Relational SC” of persons - “system SC” of groupSystem SC: conceived of independently of persons as sum

of relations. Person may aim to manipulate and to improve relational SC System SC of group exists independently of membersEmerging quality in two ways(1)network of relations knitted between members in

pursuance of group goal = social structure of the group. (2)Some relations bundled in civic associations. System SC

= sum of civic associations acting within group

Measured in surveys by aggregationTwo problems:

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Measurement problem 1: interdependency, solitary decisionsIn social reality interdependency: some are eager to and

some detest emulating other people. Measurement should follow up interdependency until SC is

established Yet surveys - neglect interdependency and time- Instead: means within groups at single time pointJustification: Practical short-cut? Yes, but also substantive reasons: some decisions made

without looking at others (join a tennis club). If this holds: measure of system SC as group mean of

relational SC also theoretically justified

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Measurement problem 2: circularity, random sampling

Danger of circularity: system SC = relational SC. Yet: Sum of relations of all persons does not necessarily

amount to system SC of group. Example 1: Two persons related = only one relation,

counting two relations not correct. However, random samplings: improbable that two persons with relation are drawn. Total as system SC feasible

Example 2: Two persons join same association = one, not two association. Again, random sampling. Furthermore: multiple memberships reflect size of association. Again, total as system SC feasible

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Summary so farSC consists of relations of persons, basically

relationalRelations add up within a group to system SC: (a) network, social structure (b) civic associationsAlthough system SC conceived of as independent of

relational SC, measurement of system SC through mean of relational SC can be justified. Mean of relational SC = indicator of system SC.

Question: Which properties of system SC fruitful for group member in pursuance of goals?

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1.3. Three Properties of System SC

From (1) density of social relationsto (2) social trust and (3) validity of norms

(1) fundamental, (2) and (3) derived

This to be shown in following

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(1) Density of social relations

Network of high mean personal relationships eases moves, each partner has more relations. That is: value of relational SC increases with system SC

Quantity of relations increases the number of ways to attain goals

Quality of relations affects probability of attainment on these ways. In particular:

“Niceness” eases goal attainment. Starts interactions with a cooperative move, and end up better than people starting with a non-cooperative move (Axelrod)

“Nice” relations result from two “nice” tendencies of partners- to trust each other, > 2nd property - to endorse norms of cooperation, > 3rd property

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(2) Climate of trust Trust = overrides suspicion that partner will not give back.

More trusting, longer chain of reciprocation, stronger climate of trust

Trust learned in “particularistic” relations, reinforced reciprocally in “universalistic” interactions

I trust in others who have repeatedly not disappointed me, and others trust in me if I have repeatedly not disappointed them.

My trust in others indicates the trust others have in me. Trust not personal attitude alone, but indicator of trustful relations in group.

If trust = indicator of “niceness” of relations, climate of trust = system SC useful for persons

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(3) Validity of norms of cooperation

Norms of cooperation (proscription “not to”), justified by the norm of reciprocity alone.

Norms of institutions (e.g. marital fidelity), additionally justified by values the person beliefs in (“family” or “life”)

Endorsement of norms of cooperation, more or less strongly reciprocated:

- Behavior: If enough follow norms of cooperation and enough sanction violations, norm becomes valid.

- Attitude: If enough endorse norm, it becomes validConsequently, the more norm held among interaction

partners, the more one can uphold norm oneself. Endorsement of norms = indicator of “nice” relationsValidity of norms of cooperation = system SC

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In sum: Triad of system SC, but only „relations“ relational SC

Distinction between density and “niceness” of social relations justifies to classify system SC into Putnam’s triad: “networks, trust, and norms” (order changed!).

Yet: - density of relations only justified directly as a system SC - further arguments required to classify climate of trust and

validity of norms of cooperation as system SC: indicators for “niceness” of social relations, not measured directly with reference to relations, but indirectly as means of attitudes.

Test: switch back from system SC to relational SC: - Just as density of relations = system SC, so relations of

person = “relational” capital. - However, while climate of trust and validity of norms =

system SC, trust or norm endorsement not = SC of person.

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1.4 System SC as context: Social order and opportunity structure

Which kinds of groups bearer of system SC? Any aggregation level or “context”.

Trivial question? No. To explain system SC, reference to analytical properties of groups. Question changes:

Which kinds of analytical properties define their system SC? Two:

(1) Name and a border, constitution and laws, folklore and customs. Become “social facts” = social order.

(2) Resources of action: money, educational degrees, power. Circulate among citizens and make up different “life chances” = opportunity structure.

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Context 1: Social OrderConsists of norms directly guiding actions. Valid because- most people endorse them- in large parts, written down in legal form: constitution. Example: equality defined in constitutions, achievement (equality’s twin

value) only in peoples’ minds Typical variables: federal or unitary constitution, % Protestants

(tradition of self-determination)Guides actions in same way as personal endorsement of

norm – only difference: binds every citizenMust be symbolically identified: kings or presidents, laws

and customs, flags and hymns, border stones and national football teams.

Higher aggregation level = more important. Nation state has a social order, city precinct not

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Context 2: Opportunity Strucuture

Sets de facto range of options for every citizen, beyond personal resources, indirectly affects actions.

Results from actions of all citizens and all organizations of country.

Examples: Social inequality, reduces trust. Democracy since long, facilitates associations.

Options and restrictions in same way as opportunity profile of person (combination of resources) - only difference: for every citizen alike

Need not be symbolically identifiedLower aggregation level = more important level. Public

swimming pool in neighborhood, not in city.

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Cross-Classification with societal domains

Social order Opportunity Structure

Economy Economic Freedom (EFR)

GDPpc

Polity Good Governance

Years of democracy

2 2 Classifying and evaluating research questions

on SC

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“Capital” two qualities

(1) every capital = means for ends to be attained in purposive action

(2) every capital “capitalizes” = pays off in same kind

These two qualities = dimensions to classify research questions

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Quality 1: means to ends in purposive action

Money = exchange against goods and services. Prestige = used to attain goods and services from others. SC = channels to goods and services.

Each: means to “success”. Yet difference: Money buys everything of its worth. “Success” no problem. Prestige, SC: be worked upon to become a means. “Success” problem.

Thus: If SC contributes to success, consequences should before causes. If not, reduced importance of causes.

SC research agenda: 1 consequences - 2 causes

Money “success” for everyone who holds it, first: how got it; second: what done with it.

Money research agenda: 1 causes - 2 consequences

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Quality 2: capitalizationMoney = interest. Prestige of educational degrees = prestige of occupations

attained SC = social relations, pay off in social relations. That is:- Relational SC the more useful, the more embedded in network

of relations, the more system SC. A’s relation to B = limited value if B knows nobody, = highly valuable if B at core of network.- Due to relational nature of SC, capitalization depends on

contextResearch agenda: priority of effects of system SC:1 on a means end chain of some action (“slopes”)2 on ends themselves (“intercepts”)

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CAUSES CONSEQUENCES

Context: Others Context: System Capital, others

Resources/Attitudes

Social Capital: end

Social Capital:means

Action goals

2: Output of social capital,

a = effect on (interceot, independent variables centered=) mean, mean hypothesisb = effect on (slope=) relation, effect hypothesis(a,b effects on the corresponding parameters of micro level regression)

1 Capitalization3 Social Capitalas result

3 Formation

b a b a

Figure 1: Causes versus consequences, processes versus outputs in social capital

research

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Agenda followed by research up to now? Yes, but only implicitly

Research not in SC per se or causes, but in consequences for social integration, democratic stability of nation state.

At heart of SC research: transfer hypothesis. “Good government is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs” (Putnam). Abstractly: citizens’ involvement grants social integration.

Transfer hypothesis: on consequences, implicitly priority of consequences over causes. But apart from that, not clear. .

Meaning specified: using right half of figure 1.

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Transfer hypothesis, specifiedCountry level correlation Corresponding person level effect: = more citizens in associations, more articulation of interests in democratic

decision making= Transfer from civic life to organized social life. = Figure 1: SC as a means > action success

Two Problems:(1) Articulation of interests not yet social integration. Further causal link

from successes of persons to integration of groups, ultimate impact of social capital research. Beyond figure 1 to the right. Mostly, taken for granted on theoretical grounds and not researched empirically.

(2) Reference also to embeddedness in macro conditions. Thus, “the singing groups and soccer clubs” = cipher for system SC. But its effects on micro relation not specified. Therefore: both effects of figure 1

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Transfer hypothesis, summarized

Comprises right half of figure 1 as a whole and expands it to the right. To be tested, its four elements must be specified

(1) Macro relation. To which added

Two top down elements: (2) Effect hypothesis, capitalization of system SC (3) Mean hypothesis, output of system SC. A new bottom up element: (4) From action success to social integration

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3 Example: Empowerment at the

work place

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3.1 Question and research design

Transfer of transfer hypothesis From politicsThe more someone is involved in private associations,

the more.. - able to assert political interestsTo labor relations system - attain empowerment at the workplace= range of discretion in order to make decisions about

work

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Controls to examine transfer hypothesis of labor relations

On the level of persons - Human capital, union membership,

workplaceOn the level of countries- Institutions and opportunity structures of

labour relations system

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Research Design: Influences on empowerment

Empowerment:discretion at work

5 Collective: work placesector, size of firm

3 Human Capital, person political efficacy, education,

Exit options

1 Civic Involvementsocial capital

Labour relations system: Favourable to unions

(+)

2 Human Capital in FirmPeople supervised,

Prestige of occupation

4 Collective: strategyunion membership, +

-

(+)

+

+

+

+?

(+)

?

+

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Dependent Variable: Index of Inventory and a Question

Inventory: “Please say how much the management at your work allows you:- to be FLEXIBLE in your working hours, - to DECIDE how your own daily work is organised, - to influence your work ENVIRONMENT, - to influence decisions about the general DIRECTION of your work, - to CHANGE your work tasks if you wish to?”

“0 I have no influence” - “10 I have complete control”Single question: “To what extent can you ORGANIZE your

own work, to a large extent (4), to some extent (3), very little (2) or not at all (1)?” – reversed for analysis

Sample: ESS 2002, employed population

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Figure 1. Mean empowerment, one standard deviation above and below means

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

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A B DK E FIN GR IRL IT L N NL P S UK D-W D-O H PL SLO0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Highest N: 6.69

Lowest PL: 2.49

Empowerment at the Work Place

High: Scandinavian countries, NL > social democratic regimeMedium: AU, B, EI, I, LUX > traditional-corporatist regimeLow: E, GR, PT, D-E, D-W > traditional-corporatist regime

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3.2 Hypotheses and measurements: Level of persons

(1) Civic Involvement: +(2) Human capital: Person: + Political efficacy, education, exit options

(3) Human capital: Firm specific: + People supervised, prestige of occupation

(4) Union membership: +(5) Work Place Size, sector of firm

(6) Control variables: Age and Gender

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(1) Civic Involvementin private organizations

“For each of these voluntary associations, tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months

- A member of such an organization - Participated in an activity arranged by such an organization - Donated money to such an organization - Done voluntary (unpaid) work for such an organization.”

Membership + participation = belongingDonation of money + voluntary = engagement

In 5 private associations: - sports clubs- consumer associations- scientific/educational/teachers’ associations- social clubs- cultural associations

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(3) Exit options

- Index of (1) “How difficult or easy would it be for you to get a similar or better job with another employer?” and (2) “... and to start your own business?”, scale 0 to 10: +

- partner employed: +

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3.3 Hypotheses and measurements: Level of countries

Countries characterized by labor rule system LRS, more or less favorable to workers

= rule set and power structure, which exonerate workers from personal endeavor to attain empowerment; if unions successful = Workers less dependent on their own initiative

Two Dimensions of LRSDimensions- Relations between collectivities or individuals- Regulation through normative social order or factual

opportunity structureFour-Fold TableCollective relations- Normatively: range covered by bargaining process- Factually: a high degree of organization and public supportIndividual relations- normatively: favor employment and restrict dismissal- Factually: a labor market situation with high employment

and many secure work contracts

Indicators in following table42

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Table 1 Variables of the labor relation system

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Mean hypothesisUnion efficiency hypothesis:

The more collective or individual labor relations of a country favor normatively, or strengthen factually, the unions,

the higher mean empowerment of employees

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Effect hypothesisSubstitution hypothesis: The more the labor relation system of a country

favors unions, the less important individual strategies become for the worker in order to attain empowerment.

Negative cross-level interaction effect between LRS favorable to unions and individual endeavor to attain empowerment, in particular: human capital

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3.4 ResultsMean Union membership:- .359 mean of 19 countries- Range from .146 Portugal to .844 Denmark

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Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on Person and Country Variables: Raw Coefficients

Variables (Categories) Empty Random Intercept

Intercept Outcome

Intercept+2 Slopes

Intercept+ 1 Slope

Intercept Mean Intercept 5.233 5.406 5.472 5.509 5.512 Union Membership mean .019*** .019*** .019***Civic Involvement Private-Belonging .242 .240 .227 .233 Private-Engagement .207 .205 .203 .203Firm-Specific Human Capital People Supervised (5) .445 .445 .456 .445 P Superv * UM mean (*100) -.298 Prestige (*10) .282 .284 .283 .283Individual Strategy: Personal Human Capital Political Efficacy (5) .143 .143 .144 .143 Education (7) .139 .137 .132 .134 Exit Option (11) .213 .213 .216 .217 Exit O. * UM mean (*100) -.174* -.198** Partner Employed .124 .123 .126 .124Collective Strategy Professional-Belonging -.203 -.210 -.207 -.205Workplace Firm size (5) -.191 -.191 -.192 -.189 Sector: Service (.064) (.065) (.063) (.063)Control Variables Male (-.125) (-.125) (-.128) (-.128) Age (b for 10 years) .160 .160 .160 .160

Table 3 Multi-Level-Regression of Empowerment on Person and Country Variables: Variance Components

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Variables (Categories) Empty Random Intercept

Intercept Outcome

Intercept+2 Slopes

Intercept+ 1 Slope

InterceptVariance Components Person-Level 5.047 3.809 3.810 3.774 3.784 Country-Level: Intercepts .616 .285 .129 .111 .114 Slope1: P Supervised (*100) .689 Slope2: Exit Option (*100) .331 .332 Intercept*Slope1-Correlation -.760

Intercept*Slope2-Correlation -.383 -.416 Slope1*Slope2-Correlation -.187Intra-Class-Correlation .1094 .0696 0.033R2 Persons .245 .245 .252 .250R2 Countries .538 .791 .819 .815Deviance 69411 60383 60380 60295 60315Df (Deviance) 2 2 2 7 4N of persons 15333 14429

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Quantity of intercept and slope effects

Mean:country 25 percentage points above grand mean > predicted intercept of 5.472 + 0.019*25=5.947, half a point on 11 point scale of empowerment.

Slope: country 25 percentage points above mean > predicted slope for

- people sv.: .456 + (-.00298*25) = .382- exit option: .216 + (-.00174*25) = .172.

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3.5 Conclusion:Hypotheses confirmed?

Transfer hypothesis: confirmed. Effects stronger than many effects of the more immediate personal factors

- Belonging to and engagement in private associations stronger than belonging to trade unions. Articulation of one’s interest in private realm more easily transformed into empowerment at the workplace than in public realm.

- More distant = more effective route. Longer distances needed to acquire general capacities of self-assertion, while focusing on the very arena of interest narrows down opportunities to learn general capacities. Longer distances = more challenges to generalize.

I like to express my gratitude to the “Verein der Freunde und Förderer der

Universität zu Köln” (Association of the friends and sponsors of

the University of Cologne)for the generous support of this research

visit.

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