heidegger's ontological difference and mahayana's twi-satyas...

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Heidegger’s “Ontological Difference” and Mahayana’s “Twi-satyas” Theory

Heidegger's "OntologicalDifference" and

Mahayana's "Twi-satyas"Theory

Wu Xue guo

Associate Professor of Religion

and Comparative Philosophy,

Department of Philosophy,

Nankai University

Qin Yan

Lecturer on Religion and Literature,

School of Arts,

Shanxi University

The article is a comparative study on theHeideggerian and Buddhist Mahayananphilosophies. We attempt to bring them intodialogue and promote their mutual under-standing through discussion of their two fun-damental ideas, i.e. "Ontological Differ-ence" and "Twi-satyas". On the one hand,Heidegger's differentiation between theBeing Itself and beings, namely the differ-entiat ion between "Nothingness" and

《普門學報》第21期 / 2004年5月論文 / 海德格的「存在論差異」與大乘之「二諦」論_中英對照 ISSN：1609-476X

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Universal Gate Buddhist Journal, Issue 21

"beingness", is similar to the MahayanaBuddhist distinction between "Sunya" and"bhava" in that both of them aim for recog-nition of "Nothingness" by the overcomingof obstinacy in "beingness", so we may sayH e i d e g g e r ' s t h i n k i n g h a s B u d d h i s tsignificance. On the other hand we regardthe "Twi-satyas" theory of Mahayana Bud-dhism also as a kind of "OntologicalD i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " : F i r s t l y , j u s t l i k eHeidegger's "Nothing", Sunya is the truthand essence of being; secondly, just like theHeideggerian "Differentiation", the "Twi-satyas" theory also contains as its signifi-cance the deconstruction of Metaphysics;lastly, "Sunya" in Chinese Buddhism is non-fixedness (Wu Zhu or aniketa), which meansfreedom in the same ontological significancewith Heidegger's "Nothing". The principaldivergence between the Heideggerian andMahayana theories consists in their differ-ent understanding of "Nothingness". Sunya,the Nothingness in Buddhism, is a beingabsolutely non-linguistic; so the differencebetween the two "satyas" is in fact the dif-ference between the linguistic and the non-linguistic; To Heidegger, however, the Noth-ingness as Being itself is just the languageitself or its essence, so the Ontological Dif-ference is just distinction between the lan-guage essence and the beings coming intothis language. Moreover Heidegger's Noth-ing (Nichts) is time itself, whereas the



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Sunyata of Mahayana Buddhism is totallynon-temporal.

The Buddhist significance inHeidegger's Ontological Dif-

ferentiation

Heidegger's "ontological difference"(Ontologische Untersheidung) is a distinc-tion between Being itself and the beings ,which makes clear that Being is not the be-ings (das Seiende), but is the totally other(schlechthin Andere) of everything in theworld and is separated from the latter byunfathomable abyss . This "Being-itself"is totally without relation, unintelligible,unspeakable; in contrast with the "being" ofordinary things, it is rather "Nothing". Ne-vertheless this Nothing is the source ofeverything, so Nothing is "Nothingness" asessence (Wesen). Therefore the ontologi-cal difference is differentiation betweenbeing and nothing.

Chinese philosophers also discussed theproblem about "being" and "nothing". Sosaid Lao-tsu in Tao-Te-King, "Everything inthe world originated from being(You), andbeing from nothing (Wu)", but it seems thatthis kind of thought have not reached thehorizon of Ontological Difference . TheUpanishads in ancient India have referred

Ontologische Untersheidung

das Seiende

schlechthin Andere



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to the distinction between two satyas too,but it has not gained an ontological meaninguntil Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahayana"Two satyas" are "paramartha-satya" and"sajvrti-satya", the latter of which is ordi-nary experiential existence (correspondingto Heidegger's "Seiende"), i.e. "being"(bhava, or "You" in Chinese); the former isbeing's essential truth (corresponding toHeidegger 's "essence of being") , i .e ."sunya" (emptiness, or "kong" in Chinese).So the Mahayana distinction between thesajvrti and the paramartha is actually ad i ffe ren t ia t ion be tween "being" and"sunya", which is similar to Heidegger'sontological difference between "being" and"nothing".

Both the Heideggerian and the MahayanaBuddhist "differentiations" have overcomethe obstinacy in beings (seiende), and real-ized an intuition in "Nothingness" (truth ofthe essence of being). We know that the"Sunya" in Mahayana contains mainly threesenses as follows: firstly sunya as the ulti-mate truth of essence of being, secondlysunya as an attitude to things (namely asnegation of hetu-pratyaya or experientialexistence), lastly sunya as the goal ofnegation . We think Heidegger's conceptof Nothing contains similarly three aspectstoo.

pa rama r tha - sa tya

s aj r t i -

s a t y a

Seiende



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s v a l a k s an a

die Seiendheit

des Seiendes

Ereignis

Firstly, his explanation of Nothing asb e i n g ' s e s s e n c e c o r r e s p o n d s w i t hMahayana's elaboration of the "essence"(sva-laksana) meaning of sunya (here "sva-laks an a" means t ru th and essence) .Mahayana Buddhists regard Nothingnessi.e. sunya as the ultimate truth of being,and Heidegger's Nothing is also the truth ofbeing in similar sense. Heidegger thoughtthat Metaphysics saw only being, but notNothing which is more authentic thanbeing. So that in Metaphysics Being wasnever understood as Being-Itself, but in-stead as the "beingness of beings" (dieSeiendheit des Seiendes) ; and Nothing,accordingly, was understood as "non-being". But in truth Nothing is never "non-being", but "the movement of the essenceof Being-itself, so it is more truly being thanall the other beings" . So one can saythat pure Nothing is pure Being, i.e. the truthof Being .

Mahayana Buddhism, especially that inChina, mostly understands sunya, i.e. Noth-ingness as being's substratum or origin(dharmabhuta or bhuta-tathata), and re-gards everything to be produced from it. InHeidegger's philosophy "Nothingness","Occurrence of Being" (Ereignis) is also



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the source of all the beings. So Nothing's"baselessness" (Abgrund) becomes con-versely the "base" (Grund) of being andworld. Nothing is the original openness ofBeing as Being, in this sense Nothing is con-versely the source of "things" (beings):"from the nothing all beings as beings cometo be" . There has been a shift of stressfrom "Dasein" to "Sein" in the developmentof Heidegger's thought. Relevantly the"Nothing" in his early thinking meansDasein's authentic "Seinkonnen", namelythe original openness in which beings arerevealed; whereas in his later thinking itm e an s t h e " O c c u r r e n c e o f b e i n g "(Ereignis), i.e. the secret source of beingand world.

Heidegger's Nothing, as a openness inwhich beings are revealed is identical withfreedom. Freedom is truth of Being'sessence The essence of Being is themovement of interpreting revelation andprojection, while the beings are the revealedand projected. As something projected thebeings are somewhat inert and non-free, butthe Being Itself as the action of revealingand projecting is characterized as the "non-determined", in this sense it is freedom. Theessence of Heidegger's "Nothing" (Nichts)is "nihilation" (Nichten) . Nihilation is

Abgrund

G r u n d

Dasein Sein

Seinkonnen

Ereignis



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not elimination of beings, but the negationof obstruction and concealment of being, sonihilation is transcendence and freedom .Freedom in this sense is not without simi-larity with Mahayana Buddhist sunya.Firstly sunya is freedom because it's freefrom the fetters of beings. Secondly, Chi-nese Buddhism emphasizes "Sunya" as "WuZhu Sheng Xin" (keeping the mind movingfreely without obstacle), so it is more simi-lar with the concept of Heidegger's Nichtenand freedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" does notinterpret sunya as an immutable being, butas a "free moving" (Yuan Yong) essence.As freedom and movement, "Wu Zhu ShengXin" is totally identical with the Heide-ggerian "Nothing". "Wu Zhu" (aniketa, get-ting rid of obstruction, fixedness and inertia)overcomes our obsession (abhinivewa) withfinite things, and brings understanding of be-ing into the state of "Wu Ai Wu Zhi" (nofetter, no blockage), "Zi Zai Yuan Yong"(absolutely free and perfect); We thinkHeidegger's "Nichten" is a freedom in thesame sense, it overcomes the one-sidednessof Dasein's understanding of being andbrings Dasein for the first time in front ofthe unity of being as being .

Nichts Nichten

an i k e t a

Nichten

Dasein



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Secondly, Heidegger's discussion onNothing aims at deconstruction of Meta-physics too, which is also "breaking withabhinivewa (obstinacy, one-sidedness, sink-ing in world, indulging in practical life)" justlike Mahayana's Sunya as negation of hetu-pratyaya (i.e. as prayojana). The wisdomof "breaking with abhinivewa" is not thepatent of Buddhism or oriental spirit. Forexample Plato's distinction between the sen-sible world and the supersensible is also abreaking with the "abhinivewa" in sensibleworld. But Metaphysics always takes up an e w " a b h i n i v e w a " ( w i t h P l a t o , t h e"abhinivewa" in supersensible world) afterdoing away with the old one. Husserl's phe-nomenological reduction also aimed atbreaking with "abhinivewa", for reduction is"just the cancellation of the presumption ofthe being of the objective world" , whichis in fact implied in the significance of theMahayana Sunya. As the result of reductiononly the transcendental consciousness thathas direct evidence survives . In the Bud-dhis t view, the reduct ion "sunyates"(nihilates) the "Jing" (artha, or world) bymeans of "Xin (cit, or Subject), but stills a v e s " X i n " , i . e . t r an s c e n d e n t a lconsciousness, so it, as "sunya", is notultimate. The saved "Xin" as a self-ad-equate reality is dissolved by Heidegger intoDasein's temporal movement . There-fore in hermeneutic ontology there is no

prayojana

reduc t ion



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more Metaphysical Ego (Xin), but only thet e m p o r a l L an g u a g e m o v e m e n t o finterpretation; in words of Buddhism, it even"sunyates" the world-sunyating conscious-ness (cit) , so it is "sunya-sunyating" (inChinese, "kong kong"). The cit or self ex-ists only in the temporal process of thetransformation of language into the "non-self"(things), so Gadamer said language is" the most se l f less"( i .e . n i r-a tman inMahayana) . The temporal languageconsciousness is essentially identical toMahayana Yogacara's concept of a layavijbanana .

The problem of Metaphysics consistsessentially in its seeing only being but notnothing , which means almost the samething as the so-called "abhinivewa" in onto-logical sense by Buddhism. So the Heide-ggerian nothing and Buddhist sunya have thesimilar object to nihilate. Apart from therelation with nothing, Metaphysics under-stands Being as beingness (seiendheit) ofbeings, while the absolute idea, substance,absolute spirit and will to power, etc. all fallinto its scope. So the so-called "Meta-physik" is actually still "physik" , in thatit sees only Anwesen but not Anwesen-lassen, only Lichte(light) but not Lichtung

D as e i n

°

nir-a tman

seiendheit

Meta-physik



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(lighten) , only "being" in light but notthe secret nothing which leads the beingsinto light. It is in essence "flight from" the"nothing". Being afraid of Nothing, man al-ways attempted to hold on to being, thencehe projected a being "best qualified as be-ing" (das seiendste Seiende), i.e. the abso-lute idea, the highest reality, the highestgood to protect himself from the attack ofNothing and assure himself safety. Likewisethe "Onto-theo-logie" of Christianity under-stands God as "the most absolute being", andregards the authentic nothing, i .e. thefreedom, as sin; so its essence is also "flightfrom nothing", whereas Heidegger's funda-mental ontology ought to be regarded as anattempt to cut off the way of Dasein's flight

. In words of Mahayana Buddhist, "flightfrom Nothing" is abhinivewa in beings, whileforcing man to face nothing is similar toBuddhist giving up "being" and realizing"sunya".

Lastly, Heidegger's analysis on nothingaimed at the revelation of the truth of Being,

physik

Anwesen

Anwesenlassen

Lichte Lichtung

das seiendste Seiende

Dasein



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hence it is similar to the Buddhistic "Sunya"as goal of negation (namely the "artha" as-pect of "Sunya"). Twi-satyas theory lies innegating "being" and revealing "Sunya",likewise Heidegger's distinction betweenbeing and nothing consists in "highlightingBeing from beings" . Heidegger thoughtthat old Metaphysics always determinedBeing from the viewpoint of beings, whichled to the forgetting of the essence of Being,and finally even this forgetting is forgotten

. But the "Nichten"(nih i la t ion) of"Nichts" makes the world as unity of be-ings indifferent, and deprives Dasein of hisrelation with being's unity, therefore makeshim come directly in front of Being itself, i.e. Nothing, Abyss or the secret source ofbeings occurrence (Ereignis). Here we thinkHeidegger's intention agrees with that ofMahayana to negate vyavaharika "being"(bhava) and reveal paramarthika "nothing"(sunya).

The sentiment (Stimmung) in which theNothing is revealed is anxiety. But anxietyis not an ordinary feeling. It is like the Bud-dhist Dhyana. Here, as Heidegger says, "Allt h i n g s an d w e o u r s e l v e s s i n k i n t oindifference, .... The receding of beings asa whole that closes in on us in anxiety op-presses us. We can get no hold on things. Inthe slipping away of beings only this `no

Nichts

Nichten

Dasein

Ereig-

n i s

bhava

Stimmung



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hold on things' comes over us and remains.Anxiety reveals the nothing" . Dhyanaalso requires the student to be "away withdifference, away with concept of human,away with Egoism" and perceive the authen-tic sunyata (Nothingness). Moreover the so-called "indifference" is neither ordinaryexistence of beings, nor an emptiness withall things annihilated, but is characterizedas "non-being, non-emptiness"; similarly theBuddhist "sunya intuition" is not an abso-lute elimination of being either, but aims atthe "non-being, non-emptiness" too. More-over Heidegger's nothing is formless,unthinkable, so it cannot be held on likebeings; that is in accordance with the ne-gating spirit of Buddhist too. Lastly just asit is with Mahayana's "intuition in sunya",so Heidegger's realization of nothing is also"speechless", because in Nothing being'sunity disappears, both the objects of speechand the being's relation which makes speechpossible come into silence. The situationfinds its analogous expression in a phraseof Chinese Taoism "Great speech is with-out voice, great being is without form".



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The Twi-satyas theory as an"Ontological Differenciation"

What are the twi-satyas? Nagarjuna saidin Mulamadhyamaka-karika

"The Buddhas teach the people

dharma according to Twi-Satyas,

t h e o n e i s t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l

(sajvrti-satya);The other is the

ultimate (paramartha-satyas). If

one does not know the distinction

between the two satyas, he would

not understand the true meanings

of Buddha's deep dharma" .

And Pivgalanetra's commentary on it is:"The sajvrti-satya is that all things areempty but ordinary people owing to wrongunderstanding produce untrue dharmas andlook upon them as true. The saints knowtheir wrongness and look upon all dharmasas empty and without or igin, so i t isparamartha-satya, namely the truth." "Satya" means teaching, theory or truth. InMahayana Buddhism the Twi-satyas are notonly two methods of teaching, but also twos e n s e - d i m e n s i o n s o f b e i n g . T h eparamartha-satya is the original truth ofbeing, i .e . ta thata or dharmata , a lso



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called"sunya"or "sunyata"; while thesajvrti-satya means experiential beings, itis the being projected by human conventionand custom, also called "being" or "vyava-harika being". We think the distinction be-tween "sunya" and "being" is similar in spiritto Heidegger's differentiation between"Nothing" and "being".

The Buddhist Twi-satyas theory con-verted the differentiation of Upanishads be-tween the pa ra-Brahman ( the higherBrahman) and the apara-Brahamn (the lowerBrahman) into distinction between sunyaand being, hence raised it onto the ontologi-cal level. Sunya is the truth and essence ofbeing, but is different from ordinary beings(the vyavaharika), it is the "totally other" ofall beings. Rather than ranked as "being"(bhava), it would better be called "Nothing-ness" (while the "being" as asanta-bhava,i.e. wrong existence is conversely producedfrom "sunya" by vitatha,i.e. wrong under-standing).

Just as it is with Heidegger's differen-tiation, so the twi-satyas theory is broughtforth in order to reveal the realm of Noth-ingness as opposite to being (bhava). TheNothingness, i.e. sunya, is a speech-less,formless dark principle. Sunya as Nothing-ness is neither a real "being" as Vorhan-denheit (the present existence), nor "non- Vorhandenheit



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being" as negation of Vorhandenheit, but"non-being, non-emptiness" as in the casewith Heidegger. In sectarian Buddhism theSarvastivadins held on to "being" theory, i.e. realism, regarding all dharmas as ulti-mate "bhava" (being); on the other hand theVaipulyists held on to"empty"theory, i.e.nihilism, regarding all dharmas as absolute"abhava" (emptiness). The Mahayana Bud-dhists view both as wrong. They think thattrue sunya falls neither on the side of"being", nor on the side of "non-being". Thatis called the "Middle Way". The true sages"love neither sunya nor non-sunya" . Af-terwards the San-lun school in China devel-oped out of Nagarjuna's twi-satyas the"Four-fold Twi-satyas", in the fourth (thehighest) fold of which it is understood thateverything can be spoken of is sajvrti-satya,only the "speechless, unintelligible" essenceis the absolute truth (paramartha-satya) .

T h e Tw i - s a t y as t h e o r y, j u s t l i k eHeidegger's "Differentiation", also aims atdeconstruction of Metaphysics. There isMetaphysics in the East as well as in theWest. Like their counterpart in the West,the eastern Metaphysicians also hold on to"being"(bhava) and don't see "Nothingness"(Sunya). So the Twi-satyas theory aims todeconstruct the "being" of things and revealthe "Nothingness"( i.e. sunya which is theessence of the truth of being), which is simi-lar with Heidegger's deconstruction of



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Western Metaphysics.

Metaphysics is just "abhinivewa". Ac-cording to Buddhism the "abhinivewas" in-clude abhinivewa in being (dharma) andabhinivewa in self (a tman). In Indianthoughts, Hinaiyana Buddhism and the Brah-man Vaiwesika school etc. are experientialrealism, while the philosophy in laterUpanishads and Bhagavadgita etc. is tran-scendent metaphysics, both of them are"dharma abhinivewa". Very similarly to thecase with Heidegger, the Buddhists also takethe understanding of the temporality of be-ing as their starting point in deconstructiono f dha rma abh in ive w a . The dha rmaabhinivewa of Hinayana and Tirthaka (thenon-Buddhists) is mostly holding on "dharmaas real, dharma's being as eternal", i.e. theythink dharmas are eternal substances with-out time. But Buddha has said that "all phe-nomena are transitory"(anityah sarva-sajskarah), so revealed phenomena as mo-mentarily appearing and disappearing andhav ing no e t e rna l ex i s t ence ; aga inMahayana's "occurrence theory" (pratitya-samutpada vada), e.g. the alaya pratitya-samutpada of vijbapti matrata, also empha-sizes that all beings appear in the temporalcontinuous running (samta-prortti) of being.Moreover the manner of Mahayana's nega-tion of self-abhinivewa is analogous to thato f H e i d e g g e r ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o fsubjectivism. We have pointed out that the

s a m t a -

prortti



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alaya vijbana concept of Vijbaptimatrataschool dissolved the non-temporal Ego ofSajkhya and Vedanta in to the se l f -transforming, eternal running movement oftime. So the Buddhist Karma theory is anexpression of their understanding about thetemporality of existence: it makes clear thatthe essence of man is not an immutable con-sciousness but is formed by his past life,which reminds us of the explanation of thehistoricity of human being by hermeneuticphilosophy. The dissolution of Ego in thehorizon of time or its disappearance inkarma's movement is the same.

Moreover, Sunya-vada deconstructed theo l d B r ah m an t h e o l o g y, j u s t as t h eHeideggerian "Nothing" theory did to theChristian scholastic theology. Heidegger's"Ontological Difference" negates the Godconcept of Christian "Onto-theo-logie" as thehighest being, the eternal transcendent ab-solute far beyond the world, thence forcesman to face Nothing squarely. In Indianthoughts it is in later Upanishads that a Meta-physics about Brahman's supersensibleworld is at first established, thereafter theBhagavadgita, identifying Brahman withGod, introduced the upanishadic Metaphys-ics into theology, therefore the then Indiantheism also was an Onto-theo-logie. The twi-satyas theory contains deconstruction of thistheism. Mahayana regards "non-difference,non-duality (advaita), middle way" as the

K a r m a



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true understanding of dharma required bytwi - sa tyas theo ry , so i t " sunya ted"( d e c o n s t r u c t e d ) t h e t r an s c e n d e n tintelligence. Moreover Mahayana Buddhismis also against Hinayana's opposition ofNirvana and world and its flight from worldto nirvana, but insists on "neither stickingto world, nor to nirvana" , because alldharmas are one, indifferent; consequentlythe division between noumenon and phe-nomenon is broken. The decon-struction ofthe transcendent world requires man to re-turn from the ideal "heaven" to the world ofreal life. In words of Mahayana, it is "real-izing sunyata just in the rupa"(rupajwunyata, wunyata iva rupaj); in words ofNietzsche and Heidegger, it is "returning tothe earth again" .

The negation of "being" aims to mani-fest sunya. Some scholars pointed out that"karma" in Buddhism, just as "essence oftechnology" in Heidegger, is the cause ofconcealment of being . Both WesternMetaphysics and Eastern "bhava"(being)theories concealed the original truth ofBeing, so they must be negated. But obvi-ously the Buddhis t negat ion is morethoroughgoing. Mahayana looks upon all be-ings as non-substantial and thence their ex-istence (sva-bhava) as empty, so we mustnihilate them and realize "all dharms arenothing, all hetu-pratyayas are empty" ,

a



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and finally come to the state of "havingnothing". This "having nothing", however,does not mean nihilism, but aims at the re-alization of sunyata, i.e. the truth of dharma.All are sunya(empty), while only the clear,taintless substratum as sunyata is real. Nev-ertheless the reality of the substratum is notthe Metaphysical reality, substance, i.e.atman, but the true Being manifested afterthe nihilation of atman.

The "Vajracchedika-prajba-paramita-sutra" explains sunya as "keeping the mindmoving freely without obstacle" (In Chinese,"Wu Zhu Sheng Xin") . Chinese Bud-dhism always understands "non-abhinvewa"and "sunya" f rom the point of "non-obstruction, non-blockage", so it realizedthroughout the spirit of "Wu Zhu"(aniketa,non-fixedness). "Wu Zhu" is ontologicallys imi la r to Heidegger ' s "Nichten" asfreedom. "Wu Zhu Sheng Xin" in ChineseBuddhism means keeping the mind freefrom abhinivewa and keeping it movingnaturally, running smoothly without fetter.In words of Chan, it is "no blockage in mind,""sticking to neither the exterior nor theinterior, going and coming freely, getting ridof abhinivewa thoughts and realizing non-obstruction" . Not only those ideas stickto the mistaken, but also those stick to "thecorrect" must be gotten rid of, hence even-tually the complete freedom of spirit is

Nichten



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realized. This freedom is neither autocracyof reason over the senses (as in Kant), norreckless fool action, but removing the con-cealment (avidya, abhinivewa) and keepingan openness for the truth of being (bhuta-tathata); the so understood freedom is inontological sense totally similar withHeidegger's understanding of Nothing.Maybe that is the reason why Heidegger wasso interested in Chan Buddhism!

Nothingness or Sunya never belongs tobeings, so it cannot be exposed by means oflanguage. The Chinese Xuan Xue (theoryabout Tao) often says: "When the fish aregotten, the net can be given up; when themeaning is gotten, the speech can be givenup"; the Indian Upanishads also said thatwords are only "weariness of speech" andthe ultimate truth is unspeakable ; and theEuropean mystics sighed over the limita-tions of language too. We must also admitt h e N o t h i n g n e s s o f H e i d e g g e r an dMahayana Buddhism as unspeakable be-cause it does not belong to the sphere ofbeing and has no relation of being with world

. Mahayana believes everything speak-able i s vyavahar ika "be ing" but notparamarthika "sunya". Being is converselyproduced from "sunya" by virtue of abhuta-parikalpa(wrong understanding), whileabhuta-parikalpa is senseless speech of or-dinary man. Therefore being is only a prod-



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uct of language, while Sunya is the absolutetruth outside of Language. So Buddhism isca l l ed a r e l ig ion "wi thou t speech" ,Wakyamuni "the King of Silence". TheBodhi-sattvas of great intelligence ought tonihilate all the senseless speech and realizewith prajba wisdom the languageless truth(tathata), this is what is called "tasting itlike a dumb" by "Mahayana-sajuparigraha-wastra".

Conclusion

We believe that, the similarities betweenthe Heideggerian and Buddhist thoughts aremainly due to (besides their common logicof thinking) the direct or indirect influencesof oriental tradition on Heidegger. Firstly,Heidegger's Ontological difference was in-spired by Christian mysticism, and today'sscholars have found that there have been anumber of ties between medieval mysticismand Indian Upanishadic mysticism ; sec-ondly Heidegger could get in touch with andtake use of the achievements in Orientalstudy in the 19th century and the first two orthree decades of the 20 th century .Heidegger's differentiation between Beingand beings has benefited from Rudolf Otto,a theologian in Marburg, Heidegger's say-ing that Being is "the absolutely other "(schlechthin Andere )of beings was bor-rowed from Otto, and Otto's expression wasinspired by Buddhist and Indian thought . schlechthin Andere



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On the other hand we think a compara-tive research should not only see the com-mon aspects of both sides, but also theirdifferences. Although both the OntologicalDifferentiation and Twi-satyas theory aimt o n i h i l a t e " b e i n g " an d r e a l i z e"Nothingness", but their understanding ofNothingness is not wholly the same one.The Buddhist Nothingness, i.e. sunya, is anabsolutely non-linguistic being (in IndianBuddhism, it is mostly still an absolutelynon-spiritual being), a dark indifferent es-sence which is "speechless, unthinkable"(totally opposed to language and thought),so the distinction of the Two Satyas is infact that between the linguistic and the non-linguistic (Sunya is unspeakable, becauseit is just the opposition of language). But inHeidegger's thought Nothingness, i.e. theBeing Itself is in essence language, "Lan-guage is the house of being" ; that Beingis "unspeakable" is just because it is lan-guage itself or its essence, Language cansay anything, except itself . Relevantly,the Nothingness or Ereignis of Heidegger istime; whereas the sunya of Buddhism, re-maining the same one from no beginning, isabsolutely non-temporal. Moreover thoughthe Buddhist negation of substance by vir-



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tue of momentariness of beings shares acommon Logic with Heidegger's decon-struction of the metaphysical concept ofreality by means of being's temporality, yetthe Buddhist attitude is "negation withoutaffirmation":"momentariness"(anityah) isvyavahara-satya, i.e. the existent state ofordinary beings, while the essence of Be-ing (paramartha-satya) is the absolutelytimeless sunyata or bhuta-tathata; that isquite contrary to Headeggers viewpoint.Heidegger used the concept of temporalityto negate the Metaphysical being, mean-while "affirmed" temporality as Being'sessence, so his attitude is "affirmation withnegation".

Moreover although Heidegger's interpre-ta t ion of Nothing is formal ly a lso adeconstruction of Metaphysic abhinivewa,this deconstruction means only overcomingof the one-sidedness of Metaphysics, but notthe absolute negation of worldly life. Thepurpose of the Heideggerian discussion onNothing is not to come to the Buddhist emp-tiness (sunya) or non-action (vyupawama),on the contrary it is to let Being developitself more freely.

Nevertheless, Chinese Buddhism is quite



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different from that of India, in that it insistso n t h e i d e n t i t y o f " X i n " ( c i t o rconsciousness) and "Xing" (tathata or truth),"Li" (bhuta-tathata or essence) and "Shi"(dharma or phenomenon); their "sunya" isno longer anything non-spiritual, passive,immutable, but consciousness, truth andfreedom of existence (Wu Zhu, Wu Ai);Moreover their teaching(e.g. as in Chan),insisting that "the ordinary consciousnessis truth", completely negated the negationof ordinary life, which makes it more inharmony with Heidegger than IndianBuddhism. Maybe here lies the reason whyHeidegger, lacking of Schopenhauerianwarmth for Indian thought, was so fond ofthe teachings of Chan Buddhism!

Note

With reference to Martin Heidegger,

Unterwegs zur Sprache(Stuttgart:

Neske, 1997), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger, Beitraege Zur

P h i l o s o p h i e ( F r an k f u r t : Vi t t o r i o

Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.

Here "Nothing", as the first cause of

"being", is actually another "being"

(Seiende).

Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs

zur Sprache(Stut tgart : Neske,

1997), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger, Beitraege Zur

Philosophie(Frankfurt:Vittorio

Klostermann, 1989), P. 477.

Seiende



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N a m e l y S u n y a s s v a - L a k s a n a

( e s s e n c e ) , p r a y o j an a ( ac t i v i t y,

function) and artha (object, value).

See Mulamadhyamaka-karika XXIV

( Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu

1944). Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti

have given different interpretation to

this Karika. Our explanation basically

agrees with that of Candrakirti, be-

cause we think it is more objective

than that of Bhavaviveka.

Beitraege Zur Philosophie, P. 266.

ibid., P. 266.

Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings

(London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.

ibid., P. 110.

Ma r t i n H e i d e g g e r , We g m a r k e n

( F r an k f u r t a m M a i n : Vi t t o r i o

Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.

Basic Writings, P. 105.

ibid.

ibid.

E . H u s s e r l . C a r t e s i a n i s c h e

Meditationen (Hamburg:Felix Meiner

Verlag, 1980), P. 22. See also Cairns'

translation: Cartesian Meditations

XXIV

( , 1944)

Beitraege Zur Philosophie , P.

266.

Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings

(London:Routledge,1978), P. 110.

Martin Heidegger,Wegmarken

(Frankfur t am Main :Vi t to r io

Klostermann,1978), PP. 81-83.


E . H u s s e r l . C a r t e s i a n i s c h e

Medi ta t ionen (Hamburg :Fe l ix

Meiner Verlag, 1980), P. 22.



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(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977),

PP. 20~21)

Husserl said:"The sense of transcen-

dental reduction is that it can only

take Ego and not the others as the

beginning of being"(Cartesianische

Meditationen, P. 31; see also Cairns'

translation, P. 30).

The process is similar to the Bud-

dhist negation of "man-abhinivesa".

Zimmermann has written a book on

Heidegger, whose title is "Eclipse of

the self", which means a gradual pro-

cess to overcome egoism, where

"inauthenticity is an intensification of

everyday egoism; authenticity is a

d iminu t ion o f i t " (Z immermann ,

Eclipse of the Self(Ohio: Ohio Uni-

versity Press, 1981), P.47.) The pro-

cess is the dissolution of the Ego as

immutable substance, self-under-

standing or self-adequate subjectiv-

ity into temporal language movement.

H e r e G a d a m e r c o m m e n t e d :

"Heideggers thesis is: being itself is

time, thence all the subjectivism of

modern Philosophy is exploded"(H.

G.Gadamer, Wahrheit Und Methorde

(Tybingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1986), P.

243.).

C a i r n s ' C a r t e s i a n

Meditations(The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1977), PP. 20~21)

(Cartesianis-

che Meditationen, P. 31;

Cairns' P. 30)

Zimmermann

Eclipse of the self

(Zimmermann,

Eclipse of the Self(Ohio: Ohio Uni-

versity Press, 1981), P. 47.)

(H.

G . G a d a m e r , W a h r h e i t U n d

Methorde(Tybingen: J.C.B.Mohr,



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Hans Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte

Werke Band2 (Tuebingen: J .C.B.

Mohr, 1986), PP. 125 126.

The alaya vijbana is not an "Ego". It

is not an eternal substance, but is al-

ways converting itself into world,

and is always changed by our every-

day understanding and behavior,

therefore its existence is "temporal".

Moreover the "self" of Heideggers

Philosophy is Language, while alaya

vijbana in Yogacara school is also

called "manojalpa vijbana". i.e. lan-

guage consciousness; both Heidegger

and Yogacara school attribute the

occurrence of being (in Buddhism

"pratitya-samutpada") to Language

movement. So Heideggers interpre-

tation of Nothing and the work of

Mahayana don't only have the same

purpose, but also have reached the

similar end.


Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to

Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1959), P. 17.

See Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des

Denkens(Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer

Verlag,1976), PP. 72-74.

1986), P. 243)

Hans Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte

Werke Band2(Tuebingen: J.C.B.

Mohr, 1986), PP. 125 126.


Martin Heidegger, An Introduc-

tion to Metaphysics (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1959), P. 17.

Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache

des Denkens(Tuebingen: Max



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Rydiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus

Deutschland(Mynchen: Carl Hanser

Verlag, 1994), P. 191.


An Introduction to Metaphysics, PP.

19.


In order to describe the experience

of Nothing, Heidegger cited a passag

from Knut Hamsun's poem "The Road

Leads On" : "Here he sits between his

ears and all he hears is emptiness. An

amusing conception, indeed. On the

sea there were both mot ion and

sound, something for the ear to feed

upon, a chorus of waters. Here noth-

ingness meets nothingness and the re-

sult is zero, not even a hole. Enough

to make one shake one's head, utterly

a t a l o s s " ( A n I n t ro d u c t i o n t o

Metaphysics, P. 27.)

Mulamadhyamaka-karika with the

Commentary by Pivgalanetra.X X IV

(Nan Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu,

1944.)

Ibid.

Asajga, Shun Zhong Lun. Nan Jing:

Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932.

Niemeyer Verlag,1976), PP. 72-74.

Rydiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus

Deu t sch land (My n c h e n : C a r l

Hanser Verlag, 1994), P. 191.


An Introduction to Metaphysics,

PP. 19.


Knut Hamsun

(An Intro-

duction to Metaphysics, P. 27.)

XXIV

1944

1932



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.

1944

Grund

XVI

( N e w Y o r k : T h e M a c m i l i a n

Company, 1916), P. 88.

Ji Zang, Da Chen Xuan Lun I. Nan

Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu 1944.

Mahayana Buddhism has throughout

kept the inquiry on the essence of

being in its originality. In western

thought, however, the inquiry has

been transformed into the inquiry on

the reason (Grund) of the being of

beings at the beginning, and modern

science understands reason simply as

causality of natural forces, conse-

quently the reason interpretation was

changed into a rationality explanation

which is determined by practical

need of technological production.

Whereas according to Mahayana,

both the reason interpretation and

rationality explanation are limited in

vyavaharika (concerning only the

beings ) , on ly the pa rama r th ika

(authentic thinking and being) reveals

the truth of essence of being; The

paramarthika and the vyavaharika,

the wunya and the being are sharply

different. Therefore it avoided the

confusion of the essence inquiry

with reason explanation, and assured

the ontological inquiry its purity.

Mulamadhyamaka-karika X VI

Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra

(New York: The Macmilian Company,

1916), P. 88.

,

,



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Akihiro Takeichi, "On the Ori-

gin of Nihilism", Heidegger and

Asian Thought(Ed by G.Parkes)

(Honolulu: University of Hawaii,

1987), PP. 183-185.

1932

(

1942)

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad IV

4 21(from: The Thirteen Princi-

pal Upanishads, Oxford University

Press, 1995.)

R.C.Majumdar, Ancient

See Akihiro Takeichi,"On the Origin

of Nihilism", Heidegger and Asian

Thought(Ed by G.Parkes) (Honolulu:

University of Hawaii,1987), PP. 183-

185.

Jian Yi, Ru Da Cheng Lun.

Vajracchedika -prajba -pa ramita -

su tra(Trans by Kumarajiva) (Nan

Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1932).

Hui Neng,"on prajba,"Tan Jing (Nan

Jing: Jin Ling Ke Jing Chu, 1942).

Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad

( f r o m : T h e T h i r t e e n P r i n c ip a l

Upanishads, Oxford University Press,

1995.)

Nevertheless the meaning of the two

" N o t h i n g n e s s " s i s s o m e w h a t

different, thence the reasons for their

"unspeakablity" are different too.

It is because the repeated foreign in-

vasions and the active propaganda of

native religions led to cultural mix-

ing-together. As a result the Greek

king Menandros and the Kusana king

Kaniska became famous patrons of

Buddhism, and a number of foreign

rulers had been converted to other



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Indian religions (With reference to:

R.C.Majumdar, Ancient India(Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass,1982), P. 166;

Benimadhab Barua, A History of Pre-

B u d d h i s t i c I n d ian P h i l o s o p h y

(Calcutt: University of Calcutt Press,

1921), P. 420. etc.)

See J. L. Mehta, "Heidegger and

Ve da n t a " , H e i d e g g e r an d A s ian

Thought, P. 24.

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy

(Oxford University Press, 1936), P.

30.

Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117-118.

Although Heidegger has said in an

occasion that the "sunya" of Bud-

dhism is "the same with" his "Noth-

ing" (Unterwegs zur Sprache , PP.

108-109), we would rather think

such an expression as originated

f r o m h i s m i s u n d e r s t an d i n g o f

Buddhism.

India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,

1982), P. 166; Benimadhab Barua,

A History of Pre-Buddhistic In-

dian Philosophy (Calcutt: Univer-

sity of Calcutt Press, 1921), P. 420.

etc.

J. L. Mehta, Heidegger and

Vedanta, Heidegger and Asian

Thought, P. 24.

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy

Oxford University Press, 1936 ,

P. 30.

Unterwegs zur Sprache, PP. 117-

118.

(Unter-

wegs zur Sprache, PP. 108-109)



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