heidegger's kantbuch, by joseph belbruno doc

8/14/2019 Heidegger's Kantbuch, by Joseph Belbruno doc

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Schopenhauer and Heidegger Comparison with Kantbuch

Heidegger makes essentially the same argument in Section One, in different idiosyncraticterminology, certainly more precisely and with greater enucleation. For Heidegger, Kants

Critique is not an epistemology !ecause it looks at "the possi!ility# of knowledge, and

therefore seeks "to lay the foundations# $%rundlegen& for epistemology !y seeking todelimit metaphysics, that is, !y descri!ing the limits of the 'metaphysica generalis,

opposed to the 'specialis of traditional metaphysics that deals merely with the Seienden

$!eings or essents such as %od, the soul, the !ody, language, man, politics, education& andthat narrows the focus of ontological reflection !ack onto the 'ontic $the world of

empiria&.

(ou!tless, Heidegger is !eing kind $see )almer on 'Huss*Heid, and intro to 'K)+&. uthe and Schopenhauer agree that Kants greatness lies precisely in this- * that he widened

the scope of philosophical reflection $metaphysics& on to "the possi!ility of eperience#.

/he pro!lem is that, in doing so, he posited a dualism of Su!0ect and O!0ect where!y the

latter is inscruta!le sa1e as it is "shaped# or configured !y the Su!0ects own "aestheticconstitution#. /he "forms# of eperience are in1estigated2 !ut the "origin# or "ground# of

eperience the eing of !eing * is left to one side. /his is why Schop. insists that "onlythe other side of human !eing can disclose to us the other side of the inner !eing of

things#. 3t is a re*run of 4ugustines "in interiore homine ha!itat 1eritas# !ut not in

theological terms, in search of "the /ruth#, or in ontic terms $knowledge&, !ut rather insearch of "the !eing of eperience#, of our awareness of it, of its "hori5on#. /he 6ill is the

thing we know !est, according to Schop, not !ecause we know its "contents#, !ut !ecause

we know its "!oundaries# !ecause it is the "qualitas occulta# the other side of what we

know, the noumenon that Kant had confused partly with a "/hing 7in itself#8 and partlywith a Su!0ect $9eason and the 3ntellect 7:erstand8 to the etent that it is !ased on "the

idea of the o!0ect#, the representation&. 3t is awareness of "the 6ill# that is the "!eing ofeperience#, our eperience $or with Heidegger,presentment& of the (ing an sich, thepossi!ility of the world, the 6orld*9eality or 6eltprin5ip whose impenetra!le limit or

"hori5on# is time itself, the e1er*pre*sent(a*sein $awareness of !eing*in*time, of the

possi!ility of nothingness, !eing*toward*death, thePosition7Stellen8 of !eing*in*the*world&. ")osition# is defined on p;&. 3t is this "common root#

that Kant does not pursue, turning instead to pure reason $p=>&.

Here the similarities of Heid. and Schop. !egin to surface. oth attack at this point of

"intuition#, where the su!0ect*o!0ect unity in the :orstellung and ?rscheinung is most

"percepti!le#.

/his is the way Schopenhauer reads his Kant. The Critique

of Pure Reason, he thinks, treats experience as the result of the

conceptualizing of the perceptual material, by which process this

material of sensation first becomes organized and real. ow he


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finds perception in no need of such conceptual transformation,

for it possesses in itself all the concrete reality that is possible

in experience. /hinking owes its whole significance to the perceptual

source from which it arises through a!straction. @3f we

hold firmly to this, the inadmissi!leness of the assumption !ecomese1ident that the perception of things only o!tains reality

and !ecomes eperience through the thought of these 1ery thingsi%., 3. pp.


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principle of reason $in its logical use& to find for e1ery conditioned

knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, where!y

the unity of that knowledge may !e completed. @ /he pure

concepts of the understanding, the categories, find their meaning

and their sphere of operation in the organic interdependence of

GC., in this connection, 9ichterGs treatment of G:erstandG and G:ernunftG asused !y Kant and Schopenhauer, SchopenhauerGs :erhaltnis 5u Kant in seinen

%rund5iigen, pp. >== ff.

@Kr. d. r. :., p. ;IJ2 +., p. =D.

I SCHO)?EH4?9GS C93/3C3S+ OF K4E/.

the different sides of conditioned eperience. /he concepts

of pure reason, on the other hand, or the G/ranscendental 3deas,Gas Kant calls them, are eplicitly concerned with the unconditioned

ground of eperience2 they refer to @something to which

all eperience may !elong, !ut which itself can ne1er !ecome

an o!0ect of eperience.@ 3n this sense the distinction !etween

pure understanding and pure reason, in KantGs technical procedure,

tends to correspond to the distinction !etween theory of

knowledge and theory of reality.

0eyond Kants 1pistemology( 'he Hori2on of 0eing 3ntuition and 'ime

So Heidegger goes !eyond Kant implicitly !y interrogating the adaequatioof su!0ect and

o!0ect which still remains at the ontic le1el. Kant theorises the transcendental conditions ofthis correspondence in the 4esthetik, the positing of a "pure reason# that makes synthetic a

priori 0udgements. ut there is no adaequatio or "correspondence# !etween different

"entities# or "essents# or "!eings# without an inquiry into what it is that corresponds, notthe -quidditas or -what/ness, but rather the 0being of beings1L 6e ha1e two "!eings#

opposed the knowing Su!0ect and the to*!e*known O!0ect. 4nd Kant tells us how theone can know the other, that is, !y the adaequatio rei ad intellectus. ut !ecause the

O!0ect remains "in itself#, and the Su!0ect is only "known# as the "pre*condition ofknowledge#, we cannot know what this "adaequatio# really consists of, what it conceals,

until we enquire a!out "the eing of the essents# $'K)+, pI2 a!o1e all, p=;&.

Met it is o!1ious that this "eing of the essents# is a "reality# or rather "actuality# or

6irklichkeit that must emanate from "eperience#, not from "knowledge#. ecause

otherwise it would remain within the category of 9eason or the Su!0ect, or the 3ntellect, of"3deas or 9epresentations# says Schop., and not to a category "toto genere different#,

which can only !e "eperience#, that is, the 1ery a!ility to interrogate !eing itself (a*

sein or 6ill. 3t follows that Kant was wrong in delimiting metaphysics with the"unknowa!le o!0ecti1ity# of the (ing an sich, operating a preposterous separation of

su!0ect and o!0ect. 4s Heidegger reminds us $pI&, it is impossi!le to engage the "3

connect# or adaequatio with either analytic or synthetic 0udgements !ecause it is

impossi!le to know the predicateL Eot only, !ut also, as we will see, e1en the 1alidity ofanalytic and synthetic 0udgements is questiona!le once we peer into the "instrumentality#

rather than "true# character of these $cf Kants 'Opus )ostumum and Cacciari, 'K, ch on

Eiet5sche and 6ittgenstein&. 4nd gi1en that space is a dimension "eternal# to eperience,


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Heidegger comes to focus on "time# which, as Kant himself descri!ed it, is the

"representation of our inner state# $p


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!egin with traditional ontology2 one can pose the question as Hume did !efore

Kant. One does not need the pro!lem of finitude either@ $;B, e.a.& 6hen

$/he Hague- Ei0hoff, >DA&, p. >IA.Heidegger goes on to assert that the finite human asein )needs the

ontological synthesis in order to exist as Dasein,) Husserl underlines these

words and as#s( )But is this the right way to pose the question philosophically? 3sn*t

here an entity already presupposed whereby the presupposed 0eing already

presupposes sub&ecti!ity; 3s not man himself already pre.gi!en, etc$; $ $ $

'his is already Heidegger$) s Husserl sees it, one does not need to posit

infinite #nowledge in order to describe the finite processes of human

#nowledge" human eistence does not require some #ind of )ontological

synthesis) to enable it to ta#e place" one )does not need) ontology, period$

/hat Heidegger is doing is ontologi2ing Kant the epistemologist$4nd whenHeidegger starts to descri!e what (asein needs @in order to eist as (asein,@

Husserl suspects that a good deal of anthropologi5ing is going on in #P2 and

also in "3.

6hereas 4ristotle put the "causa causans# at the !eginning of the causal chain, Kant putsthe )ure 9eason as a faculty that can com*prehend the totality of the causal chain, that can

see the indi1idual rings as part of the "chain#. ut Schop o!0ects that this is inadmissi!leand inconcei1a!le !ecause the causa causans is "a ring# in the chain, !egging the

question, what is the causa causae causantisN 4nd then !ecause Kants )ure 9eason, whichseeks to e1ade this endless chain of causation, is not a faculty "toto genere different# from

the causal chain as it must !e for a successful e1asion, then it remains yet another "ring#.

4nd if it is meant to !e toto genere different, then it cannot !e unless it is a qualitasocculta. ut !ecause Kant has already nominated the O!*0ect as the (ing an sich, as the

qualitas occulta, then we ha1e two qualitates occultae, one on the su!0ecti1e and one on the

o!0ecti1e side, separated !y Eiet5sches "o!scure 1eil# a logical impossi!ility !ecausethen there is no adaequatio at all !etween intellectus and res.

So Schop turns inward, eamining pure intuition as the source of the O!0ect and of thecausal chain. /his a1oids the regressio ad infinitum of 4ristotles causa causans !y electing

a su!0ecti1e qualitas occulta as the intuitus originarius for which all "!eings# are

"o!0ectifications# the 6ill. 4gain, we ha1e a transcendental fons et origo, a qualitas

occulta that is not a "causa causans# !ut is an "intuiti1e origin# of !eing. /his is whereHeidegger is connected with Schopenhauer and !ecomes his direct descendant. Heidegger

also cannot concei1e of the "immanence# of !eing human, and therefore needs to place or

situate it within the "hori5on of time# indeed, as "time itself#, as facticity, !ut not inspace as "em!odiment#L *, he then needs transcendence as a replacement for "su!0ecti1ity#

and as the foundation of (asein, the interrogation of eing.

nlike Schop and like Kant, Heidegger does not a!olish "the o!0ect of the idea# so that theseparation of (asein from the o!*0ect is retained. /he o!0ect is not an e*pression or

o!0ectification of the 6ill. 9ather, Heidegger maintains the "tension# of Schops original

intuition, the "ec*stasis# in1ol1ed in the consciousness of a qualitas occulta, and turns this"consciousness# from a "conscious*ness# $a qudditas& to an "ec*stasis# of (a*sein,

awareness of "finitude# and "ec*sistence# such that "the world# or eing hinges on

"nothing*ness# and (a*sein is "thrown# into the world*of*essents- (asein !ecomes "!eing*in*the*world#. 6hereas Schop turns our intuition of the 6ill into the intuition of a qualitas


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occulta, Heidegger turns intuition itself into the intuition of primordial time so that

"eing# is "temporalised# and !ecomes "ec*static#.

/he resulting "gap# or "tension# !etween eing and /ime is the result of "de*su!0ectifying

eing# so that "transcendence# allows the "ec*static# perspecti1e or "synopsis# of eing

without a "Su!0ect# that does the 1iewing. /hat is what distinguishes metaphysicageneralis from metaphysica specialis, namely, the "ontological synthesis# required to

locate or position not "the eing of !eings# as causa causans, as yet another "!eing# that is

a ring in the causal chain, !ut rather the "what*ness# of "!eings# or essents understood notas a su!stance or su!stratum !ut as the "dimension# or pure intuition of that chain.

+etaphysica generalis !ecomes a "metaphysics of metaphysics#, to quote Kant. On the

"o!0ects# or essents side, this "ontological synthesis# retains "the o!*0ect# without

turning it into a (ing an sich and, !y reflection, the "temporality# or "facticity# of pureintuition into "a transcendental su!0ect or ego#, which is what Kant ended up doing. Only

through "finite transcendence# and "ontological synthesis# can Heidegger a1oid the

solipsism of his conception of "pure intuition as time#, as intuitus deri1ati1us that retains

the independence of the o!*0ect and does not turn it into an "e*0ect# of an intuitusoriginarius. 3t can !e said that up to the#antbuchHeidegger maintained this eistential

"tension#, !ut that later he turned it into a mysticism of eing.

Husserl poignantly remarks in a marginal note in#P2 that he could not see

why su!0ecti1ity, especially a purified transcendental su!0ecti1ity, was an

unaccepta!le !asis for phenomenology*and !y etension for philosophical

in1estigation. /o the 1ery end, Husserl felt that Heidegger had ne1er

understood what he meant !y transcendental su!0ecti1ity and the importance ofgoing !ack to the transcendental ego. >or Heidegger, asein was not &ust

another name for human sub&ecti!ity but a way of a!oiding the concept of

sub&ecti!ity itself$ 4s the later essays, like the @/he 4ge of the 6orld

)icture@$>D;B& and the @etter on Humanism@ $>D=A& make quite eplicit,

Heidegger could not ma#e sub&ecti!ity, e!en a )transcendental) sub&ecti!ity,the anchor of his reflection. HusserlGs marginal notes 1i1idly show us his

deep disappointment, e1en outrage, at HeideggerGs desertion, !ut they ne1er

a!andon the hori5on of su!0ecti1ity, the 1ision of philosophy as rigorous

science, and the quest for a relia!le grounding for knowledge. His remarks in

the margins of#P2 all testify to this 1ision of philosophy, a 1ision Husserlmore and more reali5ed that Heidegger did not share and really had ne1er

shared.

ack to 'K)+, in par.>< Heidegger reminds us that the o!*0ect of pure intuition and the

synthesis a priori ena!led !y the transcendental schema $through the su!sumption that

results in the understanding& this o!*0ect is not an 'e*0ect, or the "creati1e# product of the

$di1ine& intuitus originarius as against the deri1ati1us $human and finite&- Kant calls it an"P#, the (ing an sich $pp>


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'he second issue has to do with Heidegger*s discussion of the "finitude of

huan knowledge" as discussed in D4$ Here Heidegger, originally a theology

student, follows Kant in comparing the supposed mode of di!ine #nowing as

originary and creati!e, an intuition that is intuitus originarius, with human

#nowledge as the reception into #nowledge of something whose nature one did not

oneself create$ 'his Kant calls intuitus derivativus$ 0ut Heidegger notes here

also a moment of )finite transcendence,) in that human #nowing gains access to

something other than itself, something of which it had no prior #nowledge and

did not create$ 'his process, the )!eritati!e synthesis,) in!ol!es the

synthesis of intuition and thought by which a thing )becomes manifest) as what

it is$ Heidegger finds in Kant*s close analysis of this synthesis a more

nuanced description of what he had in! connected with )the ontological

comprehension of 0eing,) the hermeneutical as# and his definition of

phenomenology as )letting something appear from itself$)Small wonder, then,

that 6illiam 9ichardson, in his lengthy study,4eidegger% Through Phenomenology to

Thought, de1otes a >;&. /here

is an "intra*mundanity# of !eing 0ust as there is an "intra*temporality# of the ego or the

self. For Heidegger, !eing and ego are the "interrogation# of these what is dis*closedwhen their not*!eing or nothing*ness is countenanced resulting in (a*sein and self*

consciousness respecti1ely. ut the pure intuition of "intra*temporality# is "primordial


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time#. "3ntra*temporal time# or "the pure now*sequence# is what Heidegger indicates as

"time#, which is simultaneously "spatial#.

Eow, if we return to Schops notion of "the 6ill#, it is e1ident that if the 6ill itself is

"time*less# and only its "consciousness# $conscious*ness still !elongs to the 6ill, which is

the qualitas occulta, from which e1erything "springs out# or is etrinsic*ated or mani*fested or o!0ecti*fied& is "temporal#, this is only !ecause the 6ill is "the e1er*present#, the

"always*now#. ike Heidegger, Schopenhauer refrains from turning the 6ill into "the pure

now*sequence#, into "intra*temporality#. ut he fails to epress or articulate $fugen& the6ill as something that can !e intuited !y "consciousness as (a*sein#, as ?k*stasis or ?c*

sistence that is not "su!0ecti1e# or a "e!enskraft# or "6eltprin5ip#. Heidegger maintains

the "tension# of ec*stasis, of the ontological synthesis through the "positioning# of eing

in the hori5on of time. Schopenhauer ends up with the 6ill filling up $o!0ectifying& alleistence or !eing- Heidegger sees eing only through the *ray of nothing*ness. /hat is

"transcendental imagination#.

Here is )almer on Husserls notes on Heidegger, showing some of the same perpleities onthese points-

4 fourth ma0or issue !etween Husserl and Heidegger in the margins of#P2 is

the nature of the transcendental self.4ow is such a self to be concei)ed; ccording

to Heidegger inBeing and $ie, both escartes and Kant wrongly thought of the

famous )3 am) in terms of a static metaphysics of presence, while Heidegger

wanted to see asein as a factical, temporally eisting entity$ s Heidegger

saw it, Husserl in his BEF@ lectures on internal time consciousness had already

ta#en a step beyond Kant in ma#ing time a definiti!e factor in consciousness$

nd now here in the Kantboo#, Heidegger goes further to credit Kant with

showing that the shaping power of the imagination is temporal" indeed, says

Heidegger, imagination )must first of all shape time itself$ %nly when we reali&e

this do we have a full concept of tie) 5B=@8$>or Heidegger, time and humanfinitude, are #eys to a more adequate fundamental ontology, and it is important

to ma#e them also the essential core of the self$ >or Husserl, the transcendental

ego functions as the philosophically necessary anchor of his phenomenology$ 3n

order to be transcendental, Husserl*s transcendental ego would need in a

certain sense to transcend at least ontic time$3nterestingly, at this point

Husserl instead of differing with Heidegger on the temporality of the ego seems

to !e trying hard to understand what Heidegger is saying. Husserl in the

margin refers to @the immanent life of the ego@ and asks- @3s the ego the

immanent time in which o!0ecti1e time temporali5es itselfN@ $>B=&, as if he

were trying here principally to grasp HeideggerGs concept. ater, forinstance, he writes in the margin, as if paraphrasing- @/he immanent life of

the ego as, rather, originally temporali5ing@ $>BJ&.!t would seem here he is

merely restating what he understands to be 4eidegger$s point, for he concedes, is necessary< &7?@'. Ahat 4usserl

may be saying is% Time is of course an essential component of the

transcendental ego* what baffles me is all this talk about what time is


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for it philosophically" rather, he is doing metaphysics and bringing Kant along

with him$ es of course there is an immanent temporal hori2on for

transcendental sub&ecti!ity, says Husserl, but how does that ma#e the

transcendental ego into )time itself); ?ot only is Heidegger*s language

strange here, he also seems to be ma#ing philosophical assumptions or claims

about the metaphysical nature of asein, which raises the issue of the nature

of man, and more pointedly for Husserl of philosophical anthropology as a basis

for philosophy. +ay!e Heidegger here is really doing philosophical

anthropology, Husserl thinks2 in any case, he is not doing phenomenology, again

not doing what philosophy today ought to !e doing.

ing an sich and 'ranscendence

9eturning to our starting point with Schop, what makes the 6ill or pure intuition a qualitas

occulta is precisely the ina!ility of consciousness "to know# and "to !e# 6ill at once,!ecause the concept of a reality is not the reality itself- this im*possi!ility makes the

"quality# of the 6ill or pure intuition "occult#, in*scruta!le. /hat is why consciousness canec*sist only as self*consciousness. 4nd it ec*sists not merely in time, as Heidegger seeks toesta!lish !y appealing to Kants "in*there# and "out*there#. ut the 1ery fact that there can

!e no physical or psychological "!oundary# !etween "in# and "out# $and !ecause they are

!oth "there#, they are "!eing#&, it is e1ident that consciousness or "!eing*in*itself# that issimultaneously "!eing*for*itself# must also ec*sist in spaceL

/his means that all (asein is at once !oth in time and in space and that therefore theCartesian transcendental distinction !etween mind and !ody $res cogitans and res etensa&

is fictitious $un*real& and fallacious $false&. $Kant epresses this "at once# with "at the

same time#, in connection with "the possi!ility of eperience# !eing also "the possi!ility

of the o!0ects of eperience# see 'K)+, p>;.& "/he mind#, consciousness, necessarilyec*sists in !oth space and time if it ec*sists at allL /he Kantian and Heideggerian

pri1ileging of time is unwarranted. $Kant speaks of "e*position# and ?kstasis, p>;. /he

pro!lem is that Kant is always thinking of the su!0ect as separate from the o!0ect, andtherefore transcending and dominating it.& 3ndeed, it is this "conscious*ness# that is !oth

"self*consciousness# and "consciousness of !eing*in*time*and*space#, that is,

consciousness of immanence, that allows human !eings to ha1e "con*science#, scientificconsciousness of their "!eing*in*the*world# where "world# stands for !oth space and

time, for !oth mind and matter, for history and nature $see !elow for discussion of these

concepts in Heidegger&, so that "trans*scendence# is utterly meaningless.

Once again, Spino5as "(eus si1e Eatura# may !e con1erted into "+ens si1e Corpus#./here is a "corpo*reality# of mind $0ust as %regory ateson spoke metaphorically of

"ecology of mind#&. /he answer lies already in Kants characteri5ation of the/ranscendental '4esthetic, which requires !oth time and space in 'aesthesis which

means also that "transcendental aesthetic# is an oymoron, 0ust as immanent aestheticis a

pleonasm. /hat this pro!lematic is foremost in Heidegger is e1inced !y the paragraph onp>= where once more it is the "possi!ility of eperience and of its o!0ects# in reference to

"that which makes it possi!le# that preoccupies him. ut this "that which makes


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eperience and its o!0ects possi!le# is erroneously seen as a transcendent faculty $p>=,

"intrinsic unitary structure of transcendence#& not an immanent one, as we ha1e shown it

must !e. $elow we will follow Heidegger in the analysis of "the o!*0ect#.&

3n the footnote, Heidegger then shows that he must ha1e !een grappling with Schops

critique of Kant, !ecause he refers to "the principle of sufficient reason# as no o!stacle tothe ec*sistence of the faculty that makes possi!le the "synthesis# of 0udgements, the

acquisition of "totally different knowledge# $p>I&. ut it is in eposing the

"instrumentality# of knowledge the inapplica!ility of synthetic 0udgements to science that Schop attacks Kants schematism $and derision a!out "all good things come in

threes#&. Kants lament a!out "schematism is one of the most difficult points# is in the

posthumous writings $cited on p>>B&. 6hat Heidegger considers to !e the most punctilious

part of the K9: $"weighed word for word#, p>>J&, Schop pilloried mercilessly for its"schematism#. Kants search for "a medium# !etween the understanding and aesthesis that

would account for its a!ility "to su!sume# o!0ects with concepts $see 'K)+, p>>A& ends

with the magical unco1ering of "the transcendental schema# - * a gross piece of

legerdemain. Kant calls it "a mediati1e representation 7what elseN8 at once intellectual andsensi!le#. 3t is neither, in fact, we would argueL etweengeneralisandspecialis, this is

metaphysica speciosaL /hus !egins the /ranscendental ogic.

3n this !eing "a force#, the 6ill is at once the time hori5on and "in*concei1a!le impulse#,

it is a "will*to*li1e# the precursor of the Eiet5schean "will to power# once Schops"su!0ecti1ity# arising from the :erstand*:ernunft is remo1ed. /he question arises of how

the 6ill then comes to !e "self*consciousness#. (ifferently and con1ersely put, the

question is how this "unity# of su!stance and time in "!e*ing# this pre*sentment of !eing

can !e separated or asported or "split# from self*consciousnessL nless we do away withall notions of "consciousness#, of "self# itselfL Here /sanoffs 0udgement may !e applied

to Schop as well as to Heidegger !ut he o!scures the fact that Schops critique is now

directed more at Hegel $for whom Kant opened the door& than at the Konigs!erger.

)henomenalistic idealism

and 1oluntaristic materialism, aesthetic quietism and ethical

nihilism, are ad1ocated one after another2 and, while the criticism

of KantGs principles often lays !are the concealed inconsistencies

of the Critical system, the solutions offered are as often inadequate.

3s not the real eplanation of the situation to !e found

in the fact that Schopenhauer is not the true successor of Kantat allN 3nstead of !eing a neo*rationalist, as Kant, on the whole,

remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his

attitude towards ultimate reality is concerned.'e is keen in

perceiving and criticising (ant)s confusion of various aspectsand eleents of experience* but# instead of tracing their ianent

organic unity# which (ant iperfectly reali&es and forulates#

he goes so far# in alost every case# as to assert their actual

separation$/his was seen to !e true of his treatment of perceptionand conception, understanding and reason. 3nstead of

recogni5ing their unity in the concrete process of knowledge,

Schopenhauer dogmatically separates them in a scholastic manner,

thus su!stituting a lucidly wrong theory for KantGs confusedly

right one. $).J


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4 similar critique can !e applied to Heidegger in the sense that (a*sein, the "unity of

intuition in time# which would require the positing of an "intuiti1e agency in time#, a"!eing# capa!le of consciousness and self*consciousness, then !ecomes merely another

"essent# whose "o!*0ecti1ity# $%egen*standlichkeit& is purely "the oppositionof

o!0ecti1ity# $p>>;& made possi!le !y time, where "7time is8 the aspect 7)osition, 4n!lick,4nschauung8 of the permanent# $p>>&.

Met, howe1er refined and sophistical the attempt $see especially p>>;&, what remains is the"in*separa!ility# and "in*concei1a!ility# of "time without concept and therefore su!*stance

or su!*stratum#. /his is the Kantian "su!sumption# that Heidegger discusses $from p>>;&.

Our argument is 1irtually identical to Spino5as "(eus si1e Eatura# in the sense that time

is co*etensi1e with su!stance, e1en where su!stance can !e "reduced conceptually# topure concept without "space#. ?1en in Kants formulation, "the in*here#, time, and the

"out*there#, space, require a "spatialisation# of the concepts which only ser1es to

demonstrate the futility of the attempt to separate themL Heidegger himself refers to "pure

intuition $time $pD&. ut intuition cannot !e separated, not only from "time#, !ut alsofrom "concept# which is the 'eidos of thought, nor indeed from the moment of perception

$the su!sumption of the o!0ect !y concepts& and therefore from "space#L $4gain, Kantsreflection entails this conclusion- intuition without thought is empty, thought without

concept is !lind# !ut !oth "emptiness# and "!lindness# 7sight8 refer to "space#L& /his

idealism forms the !asis of Hegels de1elopment of Kants 'Kritik in the)haenomenologie the inescapa!le fact that "hic et nunc# are "concepts# $egriffe&. ut

then they remain "concepts#, e1en when he tackles the 'inter*su!0ecti1ity of concepts- *

namely, the process !y which it is possi!le to allow !oth the 'pre*sence of intuition and

the awareness of 'the other, and then the possi!ility of '!eings human that are part of the"out*there#, of spatial separation $physis&. 4lthough not resorting to Kantian

"schematisms# of pure reason or pro*0ections $Schop, Fichte& into practical reason, Hegel

also remains "locked# in the transcendental sphere.

/his is how 9ichardson $'Heidegger& summarises Heideggers "position# a passage we

read well o1er a year after we took these notes $L&-

"efore we mo1e on, we should note that !etween the two types of intuition, time en0oys a distinct

priority o1er space2 for in all presentations the act of presenting is always a modifi*7>>B8cation of the

interior sense which takes its place in the succession of moments we call "time#. ecause of this greater

uni1ersality, time must !e more fundamental to ontological knowledge than space. /hat is why the

author in his analysis of pure intuition feels 0ustified in restricting himself almost entirely to the

intuition, time# $6R 9ichardson, Heidegger- From )h. /o /hought, pp>>J*B&

(iscussing Heideggers return to Kants schematism in the contet of Hegels critique of

Spino5as notion of time in the ?thics, Eegri concludes $'Spino5as 4nti*+odernity, pB


12/41

$pBA& Here, in this falling, in !eing this GcareG, temporality constitutes itself as )ossi!ility and self*pro0ection

into time*to*come. Here, without e1er eposing itself to the snares of teleology and the dialectic, temporality

re1eals possi!ility as the most originary ontological determination of (asein. /hus it is only in presence that

fate opens up onto possi!ility and time to come once again. ut how is it possi!le to authenticate (aseinN 3n

this tragically tangled skein death is the ownmost and most authentic possi!ility of (asein. ut the latter isalso an impossi!ility of presence- the Gpossi!ility of an impossi!ilityG therefore !ecomes the ownmost and

most authentic possi!ility of (asein. /his is the way the Hegelian theme of modernity comes to conclusion-in nothingness, in death, the immediate unity of eistence and essence is gi1en. /he nostalgic Hegelian claim

of estimmung has !ecome a desperate ?ntschlossenheit in Heidegger a deli!eration and a resolution of the

disclosedness of (asein to its own truth, which is nothingness. /he music to which the dance of

determination and the transcendental was set has come to an end.

Eegri here takes up owiths accurate characteri5ation of "the certainty of death and ofnothingness# as "the a!solute fied point of Su $p;J, see his first essay, from p>J&, !ut

not that of the 'Kehre, the one championed !y Cacciari, to which we will turn later.

4t the !eginning of Section ;, in parA, when introducing "anthropology# and metaphysics

as part of "human nature#, Heidegger presents the imagination as "the essential unity of

pure intuition $time& and pure thought $apperception $p>;=& and then quotes Kant saying$4nthropologie&, "/he imagination is a faculty of intuition e1en without the presence of an

o!0ect# $p>;;;Jff shows neatly how !oth thinkers fail to see that the a!ilityof the mind "to imagine# a!*sent o!0ects does not in the least mean that its "act ofimagining# is not an acti1ity with an ob(ect, that includes an o!0ect that indeed the 1ery

fact that it is an "acti1ity# implies the "materiality# of the mind, its "!eing*intheworld#.

/he fact that the imagination can dispense with this or that o!0ect does not remotely meanthat it is a ockean tabula rasa, or that indeed it is a ta!ula rasa with "pre*formed#

intuition and thought articulated !y imagination, !ecause then we would concei1e of

human "faculties# $Heidegger discusses the word from p>;D& as capa!le of !eing "mental#or "psychological#, that is "independent# of "o!*0ects#. For this to !e "possi!le#, for these

faculties to allow "the possi!ility of eperience and of the o!0ect of eperience#, these

faculties must "transcendQ the finitude of human knowledge# and therefore encompass

"the impossi!le# $see p>=J2 see also Eegri quote a!o1e, pBA&. /hat is why Heideggerwishes to a1oid "anthropology#, to epose its "limitations# and "lack of transcendence#,

the !etter to ealt the merits of "ontology# $p>;D Heidegger calls any attempt to collapse

the latter into the former "useless# and "a mistake#&.

Heidegger appreciates the point made a!o1e, that intuition cannot !e "form without

content# $p>=D&. He quotes Kant to insist that the forms of intuition $space and time& are an


13/41

"ens imaginarium# that, although without "o!*0ect#, "are still somethingQ !ut are not

themsel1es o!0ects which can !e intuited# $p>&

4nd he hastens to add-

/he ens imaginarium pertains to the possi!le forms of @Eothing,@to what is not an essent in the sense ofsomething actuallypresent. )ure space and pure time are @something,@ !ut theyare not o!0ects. $p>A, p>==& in

the tradition of Kant and Schopenhauer. $ut in the latter the "schematism# is replaced !ya "ife force# that is "immaterial# in preser1ing its qualitas occulta, and a force that Schop

ultimately "renounces# !y "going !eyond# it intellectually a "renunciation# that !ecomes

an "acceptance# of the world as its quietistic "mirror# in Eir1ana. 3t is this '3m*potencethat Eiet5sche eecrates and hopes "to o1ercome# with the 6ill to )ower.&

(istant is the 'potentia that Eegri disco1ers in Spino5a2 the "producti1e# indefiniteduration of appetitus $the link of this ei!nit5ian and Spino5an concept to "das 6ille# is

traced !y 9ichardson in his 'Heid. from )henom. to /hought, chapter on Eiet5sche.& ostas they are in their +anichean and Cartesian opposition of mind and matter, Kant and

Heidegger cannot o1ercome the necessity of transcendence. Eegri, for his part, whilstchastising Heidegger, does not address this "primordiality# of time, e1en when contrasting

it to Hegels estimmung and Heideggers Eicht*heit-

'empus potentiae$ insistence on presence fills out what Heidegger lea!es us as mere possibility$

'he hegemony of presence with respect to the becoming that distinguishes Spino2ian from Hegelian

metaphysics reasserts itself as the hegemony of the plenitude of the present faced with empty

Heideggerian presence$ /ithout e!er ha!ing entered into the modern, Spino2a eits from it here, by

o!erturning the conception of time which others wanted to fulfill in becoming or nothingness .into a

positi!ely open and constituti!e time$nder the 1ery same ontological conditions, lo1e takes the place of

GcareG. Spino5a systematically o1erturns Heidegger- to 4ngst $aniety& he opposes 4mor, to msicht

$circumspection& he opposes +ens, to ?ntschlossenheit $resolution& he opposes Cupiditas, to 4nwesenheit$!eing*present& he opposes the Conatus, to esorgen $concern& he opposes 4ppetitus, to +oglichkeit

$possi!ility& he opposes )otentia.

3n this confrontation, an anti*purposi1e presence and possi!ility unite that which different meanings of

ontology di1ide. 4t the same time, the indifferent meanings of being are precisely di)ided /4eidegger aims

at nothingness, and "pinoza at plenitude. The 4eideggerian ambiguity that )acillates in the direction of the

)oid is resol)ed in the "pinozian tension that concei)es the present as plenitude.$'Ss4*+, pBA&


14/41

Small wonder that, as we shall see shortly, Husserl was dri1en to despair !y Heideggers

negation of su!0ecti1ity and the transcendental ego and descent into a paradigm that, he

thought, could only ha1e legitimacy as philosophical anthropology, not e1en as "ontology!ecause, as Heidegger himself found out, the inquiry into eing could ne1er !e completed.

Here is )almer-

/he quest Heidegger so ardently pursued for the meaning of eing,

a quest that dominated his philosophical life, leading him later

into the philosophy of Eiet5sche, into reflection on the @origin@ of the workof art, into eplicating the poetry of HTlderlin and down @forest paths@

without end,4usserl would say/had he li)ed to see it/was a dead end, only a

way of getting bogged down in sub(ecti)e reflectioninstead of making a solid

and positi1e contri!ution to philosophy.

4s Heidegger neatly concludes,

Hence, if it is true that the innermost essence of transcendenceis grounded in pure imagination, then thetranscendentalcharacter of transcendental intuition is made clear for the firsttime !y means of this

interpretation of pure intuition. )lacedas it is at the !eginning of the Critique of )ure 9eason, thetranscendental aesthetic is !asically unintelligi!le. 3t has onlyan introductory character and can !e trulyunderstood only inthe perspecti1e of the transcendental schematism. $p>


15/41

Here is the return of Hegels "negation#, now transformed into a :ernichtung of the o!*

0ect in order to preser1e the "primordiality# of transcendence. "/hrowing man !ack into

the hardness of his fate from out of the softnessQ 7of8 the work of the spirit# here is theeistential contingency of human !eing etended to the world of signification, of

conceptuali5ation not in itself !ut as the comm*union of !eing human. /he retreat of

metaphysics into 3ch*heit, into pure su!0ecti1ity $Cacciari, pA=&- "/he awareness of thething is a!o1e all self*consciousness# $Heid. cited in Cacciari, ')Ee9, pJ&. 4s with 6ittgenstein, the only "meaning# possi!le is the tautological one of

"language games# $pJ=&. /he rest is topia.

7). C4SS39?9- 3 !elie1e it has already !ecome dearer in

what the opposition consists. 3t is, howe1er not fruitful to stressthis opposition repeatedly. 6e are at a point where little is to !e

gained through purely logical arguments. 3t seems, then, we are

condemned here to some sort of relati1ity. Howe1er, we maynot persist in this relati1ity which would place empirical man

in the center, 6hat Heidegger said at the end was most important.

His position cannot !e anthropocentric either. 4nd then,

3 ask, where now lies the common center in our oppositionN 6e

do not need to look for this. >or we ha!e this center, and we

ha!e it indeed because there is one coon ob&ecti!e human

world in which, although the differences of indi!iduals are in

no way cancelled, a bridge is built from indi!idual to indi!idual$

'hat 3 find again and again in the primal phenomenon of language$

1!eryone spea#s his own language, and yet we understand

one another through the medium of language$ 'here is

something such as the language, something such as a unity o!er

and abo!e the endlessly different ways of speaking. 'herein lies

the decisi!e point for me$4nd therefore 3 start from the o!0ecti1ity

of the sym!olic Form !ecause here @the inconcei1a!le

+@+ +49/3E H?3(?%%?9

is achie1ed,@ /hat is what 3 should like to call the world of

o!0ecti1e spirit. /here is no other way from one eistence

7(asein8 to another eistence 7(asein8 than through this world

of Form. 3f it did not eist, then 3 would not know how such a

thing as a common understanding could !e. Cognition, too, istherefore simply only a !asic instance of this position, !ecause

an o!0ecti1e assertion is formulated which no longer takes intoconsideration the su!0ecti1ity of the particular indi1idual.

6e would part ways with Cassirer here, where "the Forms# !egin a neo*Kantian

delusion. ut the question of meaning does not stop with linguistic analysis. +athematics

and logic may well !e "language games#2 !ut language itself is not $cf )iana 'ectrs. on

6itt&. etween 9atio and 9ationalisierung lies prais and not 'scientia. /he pro!lem forCacciari $'Confronto con H& is that he asks us to throw out, not 6ittgensteins ladder after

clim!ing the wall or the raft after crossing the ri1er, !ut the !a!y with the !athwater $see

his discussion on ppBI*>&.


16/41

Hermeneutics

/he same argument we find with regard to the interpretation of history and of tets$hermeneutics& in owith $second essay, ppD8.& Similarly with Husserl, as )almer notes-

4 fifth issue that arises with regard to HeideggerGs interpretation in#P2

is that of interpreti)e )iolence. Heidegger asserts- @?1ery interpretation, if

it wants to wring from what the words say what they want to say, must use

)iolence. Such 1iolence, howe1er cannot simply !e a ro1ing ar!itrariness. The

power of an idea that sheds ad)ance light must dri1e and lead the eplication@ $>D;*

>D=, e.a.&.4usserl underlines the words D;&.

3nterestingly, Husserl himself had elsewhere earlier argued that Kant was

constrained !y the thought*forms of his time, so he could not carry through the

founding of a truly rigorous transcendental philosophy.

>< /his claim would seemto parallel HeideggerGs deconstruction in suggesting this was what Kant really

wanted to say.0ut the larger issue at sta#e here is Heidegger*s whole pro&ect of

Destruktion# of unco!ering what has been repressed and forgotten in /estern

philosophy since %lato. 3n other words, we again ha1e to do with a quite

different 1ision of philosophy and its mission. For Heidegger, philosophi5ing

See his comments on Kant in 6rste Philosophie !, cited a!o1e.

meant seeking out of the @primordial roots@ of 6estern thought, @restoring@ to


17/41

thought what had !een @forgotten@ or only preser1ed in a atini5ed distortion,

as in the case of 4ristotleGs ousia!ecomingsubstantia. 4s Heidegger later put

it, philosophy is really @a thoughtful con1ersation !etween thinkers,@

o!1iously an endea1or more hermeneutical and dialogical than rigorously

scientific and 1erifia!le. )hilosophy for Husserl, on the other hand, wassupposed to in1ol1e rigorous logical and scientific reflection, purifying oneGs

thinking of unreflected presuppositions and esta!lishing a philosophicalfoundation for further work, in order to achie1e @results@ that would !e

uni1ersally accepta!le scientifically. Such a 1ision of philosophy makes

quite clear HusserlGs continuity with the ?nlightenment faith in reason as a!le

to o1ercome religious dogma and other !aseless inherited assumptions.

Heidegger was aware of the implications and sought to defend his method-

3t is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that

which these words @intend to say,@ e1ery interpretation must

necessarily resort to 1iolence. /his 1iolence, howe1er, should

not !e confused with an action that is wholly ar!itrary. /he

interpretation must !e animated and guided !y the power of

an illuminati1e idea. Only through the power of this idea canan interpretation risk that which is always audacious, namely,entrusting itself to the secret elan of a work, in order !y this

elan to get through to the unsaid and to attempt to find an epression

for it. /he directi1e idea itself is confirmed !y its own

power of illumination.

owith notes further, p


18/41

ut note once more how !y "sensi!ility# Heidegger intends the "primordial !eing# of pure

intuition as the hori5on of time, as time itself and therefore as transcendental and

insu!stantial, immaterial, dis*em!odied. /his seems to run counter to Kants Critique,which now threatens to !e reduced to philosophical anthropology precisely !y the

Schopenhauerian "instrumentalisation# of :ernunft. /his is entirely e1ident in paragraph

;I on )ractical 9eason, where Heidegger reduces Kants source of moral and ethical0udgement to a "feeling#. /he sophistical contortions are almost amusing as Heidegger

seeks to a1oid the o!1ious implications of 'instrumentality on "practical reason# and on

"the moral law#-

3n su!mitting to the 7moral8 law, 3 su!mit myself to myself qua pure

reason. 3n su!mitting to myself, 3 raise myself to myself as a

free !eing capa!le of self*determination. /his raising the self

!y su!mitting to the self re1eals the ego in its @dignity.@ Eegati1ely

epressed- in ha1ing respect for the law which 3 gi1e tomyself as a free !eing, 3 am una!le to despise myself. Consequently,

respect is that mode of !eing*as*self of the ego

which pre1ents the latter from @re0ecting the hero in his soul.@

9espect is the mode of !eing responsi!le for the eing of theself2 it is the authentic !eing*as*self.

'he pro&ection of the self, in submission, on the total, fundamental

possibility of authentic eistence, this possibility being

gi!en by the law, is the essence of the self, i$e$, practical reason.

3t is little wonder that Schop had such an easy time of it in the '%rundpro!lemeLHeidegger percei1es the pro!lems and seeks to address them, gi1ing an intimation of the

hermeneutic "1iolence# that Husserl so despised.

/his fundamental constitution of the essence of man, @rooted@$>AA& in the transcendental imagination, is the @unknown@ of which

Kantmustha1e had an intimation when he spoke of @the rootunknown to us@2 for the unknown is not that of which we

know a!solutely nothing !ut that of which the knowledge

makes us uneasy. Howe1er, Kant did not carry out the primordial

interpretation of the transcendental imagination2 indeed,

he did not e1en make the attempt, despite the clear indications

he ga1e us concerning such an analytic.

Kant recoiledfrom this unknown root.

Kant !egins !y striking out in the second edition the two

principal passages in the preceding edition which specifically

present the imagination as a third fundamental faculty !eside

sensi!ility and the understanding. /he first passage is replaced

!y a critical discussion of the analyses !y ocke andHume of the understanding, 0ust as if KantValthough mistakenlyV

looked upon his conception in the first edition as

being still too close to the empirical. $p>AJ&

9eferring to the second edition of 'K9:, he writes-

/he transcendental imagination no longer functions as an

autonomous fundamental faculty, mediating !etween sensi!ility


19/41

and understanding in their possi!le unity. /his intermediate

faculty disappears and only two fundamental sources of the

mind are retained. /he function of the transcendental imagination

is transferred to the understanding.+nd when# in the

second edition# (ant provides a proper nae# apparently

descriptive# for the iagination# naely# synthesis speciosa,++

he shows by this expression that the transcendental iagination

has lost its forer autonoy$ 3t recei!es this name only because

in it the understanding is referred to sensibility and without this

reference would be synthesis intellectualis$

ut why did Kant recoil from the transcendental imaginationN $p>JI&

Heideggers eplanation makes for !reath*taking reading-

How can sensi!ility as a lower faculty !e said to determine

the essence of reasonN (oes not e1erything fall into confusion

if the lower is put in place of the higherN 6hat is to happen

to the honora!le tradition according to which, in the long history

of metaphysics, ratio and the logos ha1e laid claim to the

central roleN Can the primacy of logic disappearN Can thearchitectonic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics,i.e., its di1ision into transcendental aesthetic and logic, !e

preser1ed if the theme of the latter is !asically the transcendental

imaginationN

(oes not the Critique of )ure 9eason depri1e itself of its

own theme if pure reason is transformed into transcendental

imaginationN (oes not this laying of the foundation lead to an

a!yssN

0y his radical interrogation, Kant brought the )possibility)

of metaphysics before this abyss$ He saw the un#nown" he

had to draw bac#$ ?ot only did the imagination fill him with

alarm, but in the meantime 9between the first and second

editions: he had also come more and more under the influenceof pure reason as such. $p>J;&

Spoken like a 1erita!le Schopenhauer Kants conception of pure reason !ecomes toto

genere different from intuition and the principle of sufficient reason.

3t should !e noted, in truth, that the laying of the foundation

is no more @psychological@ in the first edition than it is

@logical@ in the second. n the contrary, both are transcendental,i$e$, necessarily )ob&ecti!e) as well as )sub&ecti!e$)4ll that

takes place so far as the su!0ecti1e transcendental deductionis concerned is that in order to preser1e the supremacy of

reason the second edition has decided for the pure understanding

as opposed to the pure imagination. 3n the second edition,the su!0ecti1e @psychological@ deduction does not disappear.

On the contrary, !ecause it is oriented on the pure understanding

as the faculty of synthesis, the su!0ecti1e side !ecomes e1en

more prominent. /o attempt to trace the understanding !ack

to a more primordial @faculty of knowledge@ is, henceforth,

superfluous. $>J


20/41

/hen Heidegger rightly underlines the importance of this "1iolent interpretation#,

confirming the "anthropocentriclogical# concerns held !y Husserl-

/his ontological pro!lem of the person as finite pure reason

cannot !e formulated with reference to anything peculiar to

the constitution and mode of eistence of a particular type of

finite, rational !eing. Such, howe1er, is the imagination whichis not only regarded as a specifically human faculty !ut alsoas a sensi!le one.

5eing thus self/reinforcing, the problematic of a pure reason

must ine)itably thrust the imagination into the background,thus concealing its transcendental nature copletely$

3t is incontestable that the distinction between a finite

rational being in general and man as aparticular exapleof

such a being comes to the fore in the transcendental deduction

as the latter appears in the second edition$ 3ndeed, e!en Kant*s

first )correction,) appearing on the first page of the second

edition, ma#es this clear$'o the characteri2ation of finite #nowledge,

more precisely, to that of finite intuition, he adds( )to

man at least$) ++ 'his is intended to show that although allA;. ;;, EKS, p. AJ=

finite intuition is recepti!e, this recepti!ity does not necessarily,

as is the case with man, require the mediation of sense organs$

3n other words, gi1en "the transcendental nature of the imagination#, then "the distinction

!etween a finite rational !eing in general and man as a particular eample of such !eing#made !y Kant means that "the recepti1ity of finite intuition in a finite rational !eing in

general does not necessarily, as it would in the case of man taken in his 'particularity as

an eample of such !eing $that is, taken 'anthropologically&, require the mediation of

sense organs#. 3n otherother words, then, sense organs are not necessary for the

conceptuali2ation of the transcendental imagination.

Once again, and unequi1ocally, Heidegger is a!le to do what we cannot, namely to

concei1e "human nature# or "reality# or "!eing# in ontological guise only,

transcendentally, "without the mediation of sense organs# and in the dis*em!odied

"primordial hori5on of time#L $Cf owith, from pB.& Soon after, we will see, Heideggerdistinguishes !etween "finite self# and "self*consciousness# and !etween "intra*temporal

ego# and the ego as "3 think#, as pure sensi!ility. /he former are "intra*temporal# notions

and not "primordial possi!ilities# staked against their finitude or nothing*ness, andtherefore not transcendental. Met, as we stressed earlier, it is impossi!le for us to concei1e

of our "faculties#, of the mind, as ha1ing any reality outside of !oth time as well as space,

and therefore independently of sense organsL Eor is it possi!le for us to a!stract from thisspace and this time to "ec*static# notions that "spatialise# space and $in Heidegger&

"temporalise# time. 4s Hegel put it, there is no dichotomy !etween consciousness and

self/consciousness- the one is implicitly the other. ut Hegel insisted on the "concreteness#of his categories against Kants a!stractness only to remo1e them to the empyrean of the

dialectic of Spirit. /he 1ery fact that Heidegger speaks of "the ediationof sense organs#

gi1es away the incipient idealism of his notions. 3n this lies the fundamental difference

!etween our immanentism and idealist thought from Kant to Heidegger.


21/41

(On all this, cf Nietzsche, TotI, Reason in Philosophy, par1 re body Par!" #o$ic assy%bolic con&ention In the sa%e part, see refs to lan$'a$e and ill )lso, *o the tr'eorld and +oni$sber$ers thin$s -chop in par. and The /o'r 0rrors, esp par hich oes%'ch to -chop, on ho% see also -2ir%ishes of an 'nti%ely %an 3f #oith on *eide$$ersinterpretation of Nietzsche on &al'e, pp111ff, and political econo%y, p11! ref to -chop onp114 and p11 on 5ollend'n$6

ut are not these considerations enough to condemn thepresent interpretation and, a!o1e all, the primordial eplicationof the transcendental imagination which it proposesN

0ut why, from the beginning, has the finitude of pure #nowledge

been placed at the center 9of our interpretation:;Because

etaphysics# with the laying of the foundation of which we

are concerned# belongs to "huan nature." ,onsequently# the

specific finitude of huan nature is decisive for the laying of

this foundation$/his question, apparently superficial, as to

whether, in the interpretation of the Critique of )ure 9eason,the second edition deser1es to !e ranked o1er the first or con1ersely

is only the pale reflection of a question which is decisi1e

insofar as the Kantian laying of the foundation is concernedQ $>JA&

Human finitude necessarily in1ol1es sensi!ility in the senseof recepti1e intuition. 4s pure intuition $pure sensi!ility& it is $>JJ&

a necessary element of the structure of transcendence characteristic

of finitude. Human pure reason is necessarily pure

sensi!le reason.$his pure reason ust be sensible in itself and

not becoe so erely because it is connected with a body$

Rather, the con!erse is true" an as a finite rational being

can in a transcendental# i.e.# etaphysical# sense "have" his

body only because transcendence as such is sensible a priori$

?ow, if transcendental imagination is to be the priordial

ground of huan subectivityta#en in its unity and totality,,

then it must also ma#e possible a faculty on the order of pure

sensible reason$But pure sensibility# according to the universalsignification in which it ust be taken for the laying of the

foundation of etaphysics# is tie$

How can time as pure sensi!ility form a primordial unity

with the @3 think@N 3s the pure ego which, according to theinterpretation generally accepted, Kant concei1ed to !e etratemporal

and opposed to time, to !e considered as @temporal@N

4nd all this on the !asis of the transcendental imaginationN

How, in general, is the latter related to timeN $>JB&

6e really ought to thank Heidegger here for resiling from his characteristic speciosity

$"a!strusion# to owith, pA, later 1erging on "sophistic art# that grows more mystical in

the "Kehre#, pB& and stating matters as clearly as he can. For him, it is not that "pure

reason must !e sensi!leQ !ecause it is connected with a !ody#. 9ather, "the !ody# itself,as an essent, as an o!*0ect of pure intuition, "is there# or sense "has# it "only because

transcendence as such is sensible a priori# 6hate1er Heidegger may mean !y this "apriori# he pro!a!ly refers to pure intuition or sensi!ility as "making possi!le !oth

eperience and its o!*0ects#, which is what transcendence means *, it seems o!1ious that

the "a priori# character of this "sensi!le transcendence# $an oymoron if e1er one eisted&

requires that pure sensi!ility * "accordingto the uni1ersal signification in which it must !etaken for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics# is time itselfL


22/41

et us take a pause and return to Eegri-

4ccording to the dynamic of his own system, which takes shape essentially in the /hird and Fourth )arts of

the ?thics, Spino5a constructs the collecti1e dimension of producti1e force, and therefore the collecti1e

figure of lo1e for di1inity. Rust as the modern is indi1idualistic, and there!y constrained to search for theapparatus 7dispositi1o8 of mediation and recomposition in the transcendental, so Spino5a radically negates

any dimension eternal to the constituti1e process of the human community, to its a!solute immanence. /his

!ecomes completely eplicit in the )olitical /reatise, and already partially in the /heological*)olitical

/reatise, although pro!a!ly only the /) allows us to clarify the line of thought go1erning )roposition I of

the Fifth )art of the ?thics, or !etter, allows us clearly to read the whole apparatus of the constituti1e motions

of intellectual o1e as a collecti1e essence. 3 mean that intellectual o1e is the formal condition ofsociali5ation, and that the communitarian process is the ontological condition of intellectual o1e.

Consequently, the light of intellectual o1e clarifies the parado of the multitude and its making of itself a

community, since intellectual o1e alone descri!es the real mechanisms that lead potentia from the multitudo

to itself as the unity of an a!solute political order- the democratic potestas. > On the other hand, the modern

does not know how to 0us* /he modern always gi1es democracy as a limit and therefore transfigures it into

the perspecti1e of the transcendental. $pBB, 'Ss4*+&

1#stasis 'he 3ntuition of 'ime

)aragraph ; is remarka!le, !ecause here we find Heideggers most direct "peering# intothe central "dualism# in his philosophy eing and/ime.

4s the pure succession of the now*series, time is @in constant

flu.@ )ure intuition intuits this succession uno!0ecti1ely.'o intuit means ( to recei!e that which offers itself$%ure intuition

A=B.AA. D>, EKS, p. BI

all in the Kantian sense, should not be thought of as an indifferent

field of action which the imagination enters, as it

were, in order to further its own acti!ity$ lthough, on the

ordinary plane of eperience where )we ta#e account of time,)


23/41

we must consider it to be a pure succession of nows, this succession

by no means constitutes primordial time$ n the contrary,

the transcendental imagination as that which lets time

as the now.sequence spring forth isLas the origin of the latter

L+primordial time$

Here we ha1e the clearest eample of how Heidegger "correlates# the !inary approaches to"!eing# that owith says are inconsistent $see end of first essay, from p=;&. For thequestion is- what can possi!ly !e meant !y the proposition that "the transcendental

imaginationQ is primordial timeQ as that which lets timeas the now*sequence spring

forth#N 3f pure intuition "gi1es itself that which offers itself#, we simply ha1e noconcei1a!le idea whether it is pure intuition that "gi1es itself# "that*which*offers* itself# or

whether pure intuition "is gi1en# that which offers itself that which, in offering itself, is

gi1en to intuition. 3n any proposition, one must !e the su!0ect and another must !e theo!0ect. ut if the o!0ect is defined as "that which is not an o!0ect#, !ecause "it offers

itself#, then we ha1e "the mother of all confusions# literally, a "fusion# of !rain cellsL

/he mystery of "es gi!t# returns. 3f there is $es gi!tL& an e*1ent $?r*eignis& such that "timesprings forth as the now*sequence#, then this e*1ent must ha1e an origin and therefore a

cause either the imagination "lets# or "time*as*the*now*sequence# "springs forth#. 3n

either case we cannot conceptualise the imagination or time independently ofa spatialdimension of its perception. /he imagination simply cannot betime, !ecause timeis

inconcei1a!le without "spatial !eing#. 3n other words, "!eing# is !oth temporal and spatial,

not 0ust the formerL Heidegger is "fudging#. 4s with (asein and eing, he first makes(asein !e the 'ichtung of eing, and then makes "the ichtung*of*eing# !e that which

"gi1es itself# $es gi!t& to ena!le (asein to !eL From "it is gi1en# $passi1e, !y a su!0ect&,

"es gi!t# !ecomes "gi1es itself# $acti1ely !estows or confers its quality upon its o!0ect&.He does the same with "the o!0ect of imagination# fudging !etween the su!0ecti1e and

the o!0ecti1e geniti1e- "the ob(ectof imagination# or "the o!0ect of imagination#. 3n theformer it is the imagination that has an o!*0ect, and in the latter it is the imagination that is

the o!*0ect. 3f the two are said to correspond, as Schop did with his "3deas#$:orstellungen& as a "unity of su!0ect and o!0ect#, then there must !e a qualitas occulta

somewhere that com*prehends them as its "o!0ectification# the 6ill.

Heidegger continues-

?ow we are in a position to clarify the meaning of the

statement( 'ime necessarily affects the concept of the representations

of ob&ects$ 'o affect a priori the act of ob.&ectification

as such, i$e$, the pure act of orientation toward $ $ $ means(

to bring up against it something on the order of an opposition,)3t)Lthe pure act of ob.&ectificationLbeing pure apperception,

the ego itself$ 'ime is implicated in the internal possibility of

this act of ob.&ectification$ s pure self.affection, it originally

forms finite selfhood in such a way that the self can become

self.consciousness$$>D


24/41

of "op*position# which, Heidegger calls "the ego itself# or "self*consciousness#, though

clearly he cannot mean !y this something "per*manent# or "intra*temporal# such as "the

finite self#, a su!stance or entity that "lasts# $recall %er. 'ast, or 'weight, the iron used!y shoemakers&.

/he predicates @a!iding@ and @unchanging@ are not onticassertions concerning the immuta!ility of the ego !ut are

transcendental determinations. /hey signify that the ego is

a!le to form an hori5on of identity only insofar as qua ego

it pro*poses to itself in ad1ance something on the order of

permanence and immuta!ility. 3t is only within this hori5on

that an o!0ect is capa!le of !eing eperienced as remaining

the same through change.$>DB&

3t would be contrary to sense to try

to effect an essential determination of primordial time itself

with the aid of what is deri!ed from it$ 'he ego cannot be concei!ed

as temporal, i$e$, intra.temporal, precisely because the

6FF

self originally and in its innermost essence is time itself$ %uresensibility 5time8 and pure reason are not only homogeneous,

they belong together in the unity of the same essence which

ma#es possible the finitude of human sub&ecti!ity in its totality$

3t follows that the ego is identical not with the "self# !ut with "the self originally and in its

innermost essence#, the self as pure sensi!ility or pure intuition, which is identical with

primordial time.

/ime and the @3 think@ are no longer opposed to one another

as unlike and incompati!le2 they are the same. /hanks to the

radicalism with which, in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics,

Kant for the first time su!0ected time and the @3 think,@each taken separately, to a transcendental interpretation, hesucceeded in !ringing them together in theirpriordial identity

Vwithout, to !e sure, ha1ing seen this identity epressly as

such. $>DJ&

'he pro!ision of a pure aspect of the present in general

is the !ery essence of time as pure intuition$ 'he description

of the ego as )abiding and unchanging) means that the ego in

forming time originally, i$e$, as primordial time, constitutes

the essence of the act of ob.&ectification and the hori2on

thereof$

Eothing has !een decided, therefore, concerning the atemporality

and eternity of the ego. 3ndeed, the transcendentalpro!lematic in general does not e1en raise this question. 3t is

only as a finite self, i$e$, as long as it is temporal, that the ego

is )abiding and unchanging) in the transcendental sense$

3f the same predicates are attributed to time, they do not

signify only that time is not )in time$) Rather, they also signify

that if time as pure self.affection lets the pure succession of the

now.sequence arise, that which thus arises, although it is

considered in the ordinary eperience of time as subsisting

in its own right, is by no means sufficient to determine the true


25/41

essence of time$

Consequently, if we are to come to a decision concerning

the )temporality) or )atemporality) of time, the primordial

essence of time as pure self.affection must be ta#en as our

guide. $>DD&

3n the second edition, a %eneral Eote on the System of the

)rinciples, on ontological knowledge as a whole, was added.

3t !egins with the sentence- @/hat the possi!ility of a thing

cannot !e determined from the category alone, and that in order

to ehi!it the o!0ecti1e reality of the pure concept of understanding

we must always ha1e an intuition, is a 1ery noteworthyfact.@ Here in a few words is epressed the essential necessity

of a sensi!ili5ation of the notions, i.e., their presentation in

the form of a @pure image.@ 0ut it is not stated that this pure

image must be pure intuition qua time$

/he net paragraph !egins with an eplicit reference to the

sentence quoted a!o1e- )0ut it is an e!en more noteworthy

fact that in order to understand the possibility of things in conformity

with the categories, and so to demonstrate the ob&ecti!e

reality of the latter, we need not merely intuitions but intuitions

that are in all cases outer intuitions$) ++ Here appears the transcendental

function of space, which unmista#ably opens up a

D


26/41

time is the primordial ground of transcendence.+s such,it

is also the condition of the possibility of all formati!e acts of

representation, for eample, the ma#ing manifest of space.3tdoes not follow, then, that to admit the transcendental function

of space is to re&ect the primacy of time$ Rather, this admission

obligates one to show how space, li#e time, also belongs to the

self as finite and that the latter, precisely because it is based

on primordial time, is essentially )spatial$)

/he acknowledgment in the second edition that space in

a certain sense also !elongs to the transcendental schematism

only makes it clear that this schematism cannot !e grasped in

its innermost essence as long as time is concei1ed as the pure

succession of the now*sequence. /ime must !e understood aspure self*affection2 otherwise its function in the formation of

schemata remains completely o!scure.

3n other words, understood as "the pure succession of the now*sequence#, "time#

$Heidegger uses in1erted commas& is always and necessarily identical with space !ecausethe now*sequence is the intra*temporal notion of time. "Howe1er, it is not in this form !ut

as pure self*affection that time is the primordial ground of transcendence# and space isnot!ecause "the making manifest of space# depends on "time as pure self/affection#

which "is also the condition of the possi!ility of all formati1e acts of representation# including "the making manifest of space#. /ime or self can !e staked against nothingness

when taken as "the primordial ground of transcendence#. 3t is only this "Eothing# the

possi!ility of the essent or o!*0ect, not their presence that determines time as primordialtime, that allows "the self*affection of time#. Similarly, the self !ecomes "self*

consciousness# only in this 1ertiginous contrast with nothing*ness. "/he self as finiteQis

essentially 'spatialQ precisely !ecause it is !ased on primordial time#. 3t is the "finitude#of self or "!eing*toward*death# that turns finite self into "self*consciousness# !ased on the

"possi!le eperience of its o!0ects or essents#. /ime in its form as self*affection is the

primordial ground of transcendence. "4s such#, it is "the condition of thepossibilityofspace, or of the making manifest of space#. ut when time is understood "intra*

temporally# as "the pure succession of the now*sequence#, then this "time# !ecomes

identical with space. Space does ha1e a "transcendental function# in the Schematism. ut

"as long as time is understood as the succession of the now*sequenceQ the schematismcannot be graspedin its innermost essence#L

/he key to "penetrating# Heideggers philosophy is to understand how he conceptuali5esnotions such as "!eing# and "time# and "self# !ystanding outsidethem, thus "animating#

them with "!eing*outside*oneself# $owith, p=;&. /hus, time "temporali5es#, the Eothing

"nullifies#, the essence "essentiates# $das 6esen west&, the thing "thingifies#, language

"speaks#, the world "glo!alises#, truth "re1eals#, the e1ent "appropriates#. Finally, eing"lightens# and "has a !eing#, the "!eing of !eing# which lowers human status where

(asein had ele1ated it $owith, =;&.

3t is !y "standing outside time*as*now# that Heidegger can ideate the concept of

"primordial time#, time as not*essent, not*now, and from its "perception# or "intuition#

mo1e to the concept of (a*sein, the "thrown*ness of human !eing not a "su!0ecti1ity#,!ut an "ec*stasis#- precisely, "standing outside oneself#L /hat is why "!eing# is always de*


27/41

fined !y its "nothing*ness#, its "finitude# and, in the case of (a*sein, the awareness of

"!eing*toward*death#. eing is ")osition# $Cacciari, ')E, pA=&. /his "opening up# of (a*

sein, this standing on the a!yss, this "temporalisation# must mean that (asein does notrecogni5e "history# as ha1ing any "truth# !ecause it is the mere "succession of now*

sequence#, of pre*sent moments. 4nd in this "gap# or a!yss (a*sein in its "thrown*ness#

must "decide#, !e "resolute# whence, "?nt*sclossenheit#, this "opening# of (asein thatin the 'Kehre will !ecome the "a*letheia# of eing with its mystical religious "tone#.

/here is little left for Heidegger to do than to summarise his critique of Kants 'K9:. /hecritique hinges on well*nigh identical points to those made !y Schopenhauer- First, the

illicit 'separation of su!0ect and o!0ect, which Heidegger has o1ercome !y making time

the hori5on of pure intuition, thus "temporalising# the o!0ect of intuition, turning it from a

"thing# to an "essent# that is an "aspect#, not a presence, of "!eing*there#, so that the"!eing# is not "intra*temporal#, not per*manent or su!*stanti1e. Schop does something

analogous !y turning the :orstellung into the o!0ectification of the 6ill. Second, the

dichotomy !etween intuition and understanding is a!olished through the mediation of

transcendental imagination. Schop achie1es this !y 'instrumentalising the :erstand and:ernunft, that is, !y confining them to the sphere of "mechanical# $mechane& perception

and causation. /his is why Heidegger prefers the first edition of the 'K9:# to the second.

/he modes of pure synthesisVpure apprehension, pure

reproduction, pure recognitionVare not three in num!er !ecause

they are relati1e to the three elements of pure knowledge

!ut !ecause, originally one, they are time*forming and thus

constitute the temporalization of time itself. Only !ecause

these modes of pure synthesis are originally one in the three*

I>fold unity of time do they constitute the ground of the possi!ility

of the original unification of the three elements of pure

knowledge. /his is why the primordially unifying element, thetranscendental imagination, apparently only a mediating, intermediate

faculty, is nothing other than primordial time. Only

!ecause the transcendental imagination is rooted in time can

it !e the root of transcendence.

)rimordial time makes transcendental imagination, which in

itself is essentially spontaneous recepti1ity and recepti1e spontaneity,

possi!le. Only in this unity can pure sensi!ility asspontaneous recepti1ity and pure apperception as recepti1e

spontaneity !elong together and form the essential unity of

pure sensi!le reason.Howe!er, if, as ta#es place in the second edition, the transcendental

imagination is eliminated as an autonomous fundamental

faculty and its function is ta#en o!er by the understandingas pure spontaneity, then the possibility of coprehending the

unity of pure sensibility and pure thought in finite huan reason

is lost$ 3ndeed, it cannot e!en be entertained as an hypothesis$

'he first edition is more faithful to the innermost character

and de!elopment of the problematic which characteri2es the

laying of the foundation of metaphysics because, by !irtue of

its indissoluble primordial structure, the transcendental imagination

opens up the possibility of a laying of the foundation

of ontological #nowledge and, hence, of metaphysics$ 'herefore,


28/41

relati!e to the problem which is central to the whole wor#, the

first edition is essentially to be preferred to the second$ ll

transformation of the pure imagination into a function of pure

thoughtLa transformation accentuated by


29/41

eperience# arising from the finitude of !eing primordial time, time as contingency, as

finitude, as limitation, as possi!le nothing*ness and therefore as !eing*toward*death.

/his "open*ness# of !eing, the possi!ility of !eing and not*!eing, in1ites its "resolution#,

its ?nt*sclossen*heit that Schop and Eiet5sche descri!ed as "6ill#. 4nd the im*materiality

of (a*sein, dictated !y its ec*static !eing as primordial time and pure intuition, requiresalso the a!straction from all essents as "Eature# or "the Other# or "the thing in itself#, all

e*pressions of "o!*0ects#. Here it is (a*sein that is not an o!*0ect !ut is transcendental

hori5on, primordial time !ecause it is primordial intuition. Eature is percei1ed only as :or*handenheit, as "the world# into which (asein is "thrown#. Eor can (a*sein !e the "off*

spring# of this nature, the physis. (asein "utili5es# the world in its resolution, in its

"e1enientiality#, using it as u*handenheit. ut, owith asks, does not the 1ery finitude of

(asein presage its "physis#, its dependence on "nature#N 4nd if so, how can this nature !eencompassed, let alone !e "com*prehended#, through the pure intuition of primordial timeN

/he same enigma arose with the "intuiti1e# nature of Schopenhauerian 6ill.

4nd if nature is missing, so must any notion of history that is not founded on the 1eryHistorismus and idealism that Heidegger pretends to confute $from (escartes to :ico and

Hegel to (ilthey owith, pJ>&. Furthermore, primordial time can ha1e no history, it isonly "e*1ent#, e1enientiality acti1ity that cannot !e comprehended through

historiography, as culture or history or ci1ili5ation. 3ndeed it cannot e1en !e seen as

"communion# or inter*action !ecause (a*sein is not e1en a "su!0ect# that can make senseof its finitude, and !ecause as (asein it must indeed !e in*communica!le to other (a*

seienden $a contradiction in terms for Heidegger !ecause (asein is not a Seiend, an essent

among many !ut rather the "ichtung# of other essents&.

+an would not !e a!le to !e, qua self, an essent thrown

7geworfene8 into the world if he could not let the essent as such

!e.GG Howe1er, in order to let the essent !e what and how itis, the eistent essent 7man8 must always ha1e already pro0ected

that which it encounters as essent. ?istence implies !eing

dependent on the essent as such so that man as essent is gi1en

o1er to the essent on which he is thus dependent.

4s a mode of eing, eistence is in itself finitude and, as

such, is only possi!le on the !asis of the comprehension of eing.

/here is and must !e such a eing only where finitude has !ecomeeistent. $;A&

3t is on the !asis of his comprehension of eing that man

ispresenceX(a8, with the eing of which takes place the re1elatory

7eroffnende8 irruption into the essent. 3t is !y 1irtue of

this irruption that the essent as such can !ecome manifest to a

self./ore priordial than an is the finitude of the Dasein inhi.01234

Eor can (asein peer into eing itself a task Heidegger a!andoned after >DJ. ut the

1ery "facticity# of (asein, its !eing sur*rounded !y :or*handene and u*handene means

also that it is lia!le to forget eing and lose itself in the Hol5wege. /hat is how the focuson the essent has led to the decline of authenticity and the triumph of nihilism the desert

has spread to the point that metaphysics has accomplished its mission to conceal eing.


30/41

Met how is this decadence possi!le if all we ha1e is the "isolation# of (asein in pure

intuition, in that temporalised time that a!stracts from "the intra*temporal pure now*sequence# and the "intra*mundane world of essents#N $owith, pJB& 4nd why then should

this decadence !e solely philosophical and not only 6estern, !ut also circum1enting the

whole of Christianity $p


31/41

of metaphysics than any other philosopher !efore or since,

would not ha1e understood his own intention had he not percei1ed

this connection. He epressed his opinion concerning it

with the clarity and serenity which the completion of the Critique

of )ure 9eason !estowed on him. 3n the year >JB>, he wroteto his friend and disciple, +arcus Her5, concerning this work-

@n inquiry of this sort will always remain difficult, for it contains

the metaphysics of metaphysics$)

/his remark once and for all puts an end to all attempts to interpret,

e1en partially, the Critique of )ure 9eason as theory of

knowledge. ut these words also constrain e1ery repetition of

a laying of the foundation of metaphysics to clarify this @metaphysics

of metaphysics@ enough to put itself in a position to openup a possi!le way to the achie1ement of the laying of the foundation.

/he entire initial section of )art 3: of the Kant!uch is dedicated to showing that the

question of "how we can know a!out an essent# is really only a question a!out "what is

man# which is what Kant poses at the end of metaphysics. ut there is a "metaphysics of

metaphysics# !ecause the "what# of "what is man# does not relate only to human

"faculties#, !ut it refers a!o1e all to the "!eing# of humans and therefore not 0ust to the"possi!ility of knowledge# !ut to the 1ery essence of "!eing#, "!eing as such#, "the !eing

of !eings#. Met in addressing the question, we must ensure that the "ec*stasis#, the "!eing*outside*oneself# that is made possi!le linguistically !y certain languages $man, on, si& does

not decei1e us. 3t is not that "agency#, a 'su!0ect, is logically necessary the impersonal

shows that it is not. ut the ec*stasis required to ena!le us "to 1iew eistence# almost asif a "soul# suddenly le1itated out of our !odies or of our "eistence# as essent or !eing is

one that inelucta!ly will !e tied to our "faculties#, !y definition. 3t is not possi!le for

human !eings to 1iew or inter*pret themsel1es or !eing, "stand outside their sel1es or

!eing# without using those 1ery "faculties# $thought, reflection, imagination, intuition call it what you like& that form the "spring# of our !eing and our "1iew# of all !eing.

y insisting on ?k*stasis and "thrown*ness#, Heidegger ends up making this fundamentalerror. (a*sein is literally in/com/prehensible* it cannot !e "grasped# or "sei5ed# in its

totality * !ecause a condition of our awareness is that we utili5e the "faculties# that we

ha1e. ut it is a regressio ad infinitum for us to pose the question of the "!eing# of thesefaculties, and then the !eing of the !eing of those faculties and so on indefinitely.

Somewhere, something has to gi1e. 4nd Heidegger, like Hegel, makes nothing*ness the

"limit# of eing. y de*limiting the essent through the possi!ility of its not*!eing, itsfinitude, Heidegger is a!le to show that this "comprehensionof eing#, this awareness of

"finitude#, of death, the eschaton, this "!eing*toward*death# $memento mori&, this a!yss of

nothing*ness, is the way in which eing dis*closes itself to us !ecause we are a!le to see its

o!*1erse, the other side. 4nd that is how "!eing# acquires an "intuitible dimension# through finitude.

ut this "finitude#, intuited as the a!straction from "intra*temporal time#, the "pure now*sequence#, to "primordial time# is an "untena!le# a!straction !ecause this "finitude# or

primordial time, delimited as it is !y nothing*ness, is inconcei1a!le ecept as a "totality#

for the simple reason that "nothing*ness# cannot de1our "!eing#, and if it did, it would !e a"something*ness# in any caseL /he "tension# cannot last !ecause e1ery time we imagine


32/41

the "possi!ility of not*!eing# we come up with "some*!eing# any howL /his result is

identical to Humes with regard to "the self#- e1ery time we try "to imagine it#, we come

up with a "particular image#. 4lthough we can accept with Hume that this throws dou!t onthe notion of "su!0ecti1ity# or "identity#, it certainly does not throw dou!t on the notion of

"self*consciousness#. 4nd here is where the notion of "immanence# gains strength in the

"materiality# of intuition $howe1er "pure#& e1en in its etreme as "primordial time#necessitating a "primordial space#. ltimately, we are condemned to "this# space and time,

"this# hic et nunc.

Schopenhauer does something analogous to Heidegger !y "re1ersing# the locus of the

Kantian qualitas occulta from the (ing an sich to the interior hominis $erkeley& identified

not as a Su!0ect or )ure 9eason $the a!ility "to com*prehend# finitude& !ut rather as the

a!ility to intuit the "6eltprin5ip#, the ife*force, the 6ill the dis*integration of"su!0ecti1ity# that will e1ol1e with Eiet5sche and 6ittgenstein to Freud and Heidegger.

/his non*dialectical, a*historical and anti*historicist perspecti1e marks the !eginning of

"negati1es (enken#.

Heidegger also peeks through the hole of pure intuition, turns )ure 9eason into a function

of the transcendental imagination, and comes out $like (escartes& with the primordialidentity the identity of pure intuition and self*consciousness or "3 think# $cogito& with

primordial time. ut Heidegger eschews qualitates occultae. 3f !eing is "finite# it is

!ecause it has a "finis#, an "end#, !ecause it is "su!0ect to time#. Met this "time# cannot !e0ust "the pure succession of now*sequence# !ecause this is merely the percepti!le

"passing# of time, not its "!eing#, its "essence#. /he "!eing# of time is the finitude of

eing. /hat is why we ha1e "eing and/ime# simultaneously, that is to say, the eing of

!eing is intrinsically $"innermost essence of finitude#, quoted a!o1e& "temporal# and not"intra*temporal#. 6e can percei1e this through our "innermost or primordial faculty#, that

of pure intuition and its transcendental root, the imagination. 3ntra*temporally, time has a

"spatial# dimension it determines our "image# of finite self and the ego as "presences#$(a&, as permanences, as "a!iding and lasting#, as "weights#. ut the primordial notion of

time a!stracts from this "intra*mundanity# and reminds us that "!eing*in*the*world# is

"!eing*among*essents# and is not the same as (a*sein. eing*in*the*world is the"condition# of (a*sein, not its transcendental actuality or essence. /he essence of (asein is

to apprehend its own finitude, and there!y "un*co1er# the truth of eing, which is the "un*

concealment of eing# the truth of !eing is the !eing of truth. /hat is why owith can

say $pJI& that for Heidegger-

"uomo non e natura, ma, come per )ascal, condition humaine. 4nche la nascita e la morte non appaiono

come realta di natura, ma r

heidegger's kantbuch, by joseph belbruno doc

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