heidegger hegel and the greeks

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H e i d e g g e r Re a d i n g Ro o m

Hegel and the Greeks

Martin Heidegger

The title of this conference can be transformed into a question: How does Hegelpresent the philosophy of the Greeks within the horizon of his philosophy? Wecould respond to such a question by historically studying Hegel's philosophystarting from the present point of view and by such means follow in step Hegel'shistorical presentation of Greek philosophy. Such a method provides historicalresearch with historical connections. Such a project has its proper justification andutility.

Nevertheless, something other is in play. By stating "the Greeks" we think back tothe beginnings of philosophy; by stating "Hegel" we think to its completion. Hegelhimself understands philosophy in such a manner.

Within the title "Hegel and the Greeks" it is the whole of philosophy within itshistory that speaks, and that today in a times in which the collapse of philosophybecomes flagrant; because it has migrated into logistics, psychology, andsociology. These autonomous domains of research assure themselves ofincreasing importance and polymorphous influence as functional forms andperformance instruments in the political-economic world, that is, in an essentialsense, of the technical world.

However, this collapse of philosophy, determined from afar and irresistibly, is notwithout further ado the end of thinking, but rather something else, howeverwithdrawn from public accessibility. What follows will ponder for a while on this inan attempt to bring to mind the matter of thought. The matter of thought comes into


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play. Matter means here that which, by its nature, the presentation requires. Tocorrespond to such requirement, it is necessary that we let ourselves gaze from outof the matter of thought and prepare for thought , determined by its own matter, totransform itself.

What follows confines itself to show a possibility out of which the matter ofthought is discernible. Why then, if the objective is attaining the matter of thought,the detour via Hegel and the Greeks? Because we are in need of this road that

surely in its essence is no detour; because only a just experience of the traditionbestows us the present, that, as the matter of thought, presents itself to us and assuch comes into play. The authentic tradition consists so little in lugging the loadof the past that rather it frees us for that which comes to us and shows us thematter of thought by bearing us in its direction.

Hegel and the Greeks: that sounds like Kant and the Greeks, Leibniz and theGreeks, medieval scholastic philosophy and the Greeks. It sounds so, yet isotherwise. Because Hegel thinks for the first time the philosophy of the Greeks astotality, and that totality philosophically. How is that possible? In that for Hegelhistory as such is determined in such a manner that it must be fundamentally

philosophical. The history of philosophy is for Hegel the inherently united andthereby necessary process of advancement of Spirit toward itself. The history ofphilosophy is no mere succession of diverse opinions and doctrines that withoutconnection supplant one another.

Hegel states in the introduction to his Berlin course on the history of philosophy:"The history we have before us is the history of the self-discovery of thought"(Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed Hoffmeister 1940, Bd. I, S. 81, Anm.)."For the history of philosophy only develops philosophy itself" (Hoffmeister a. a. O.S. 235f.). Accordingly, philosophy as the self-development of spirit into absoluteknowledge and the history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to

Hegel's had acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling andrequiring philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be inthis movement philosophy itself. Philosophy however has, following a word ofHegel's taken from the Introduction of his first course here in Heidelberg , as"purpose": "the truth" (Hoffmeister a. a. O. S. 14.).

Philosophy is as its own history, Hegel notes in a marginal comment in themanuscript of this course, the "reign of pure truth - not the activity of outeractualization, but the inner dwelling with self of spirit" (a. a. O. S. 6, Anm.). "Thetruth" - that means: the truth in its pure realization that at once brings to thetruthfulness of truth the presentation of its essence.

Should we now take Hegel's determination of the purpose of philosophy as truth asa clue for reflecting on the matter of thought? Presumably yes: as soon as thetheme "Hegel and the Greeks", that means presently philosophy in the totality of itshistorical destiny and from the viewpoint of its purpose, the truth, is sufficientlyclarified.

So we ask first of all: to what extent must the history of philosophy as history be inits fundamental traits philosophical? What does philosophical mean here? Whatdoes history mean here?

The answers must presently incur the danger of stating the apparently obvious.However, at no time is the obvious given to thought. Hegel clarifies: " With him


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(namely with Descartes) we enter into autonomous philosophy proper... Here wecan state we are at home and can as a navigator after a long journey in a stormysea cry out 'Land'; ..."

(WW. XV, 328) With this image, Hegel means to state: The "ego cogito sum', this "Ithink, I am" is the secured base upon which philosophy can establish itselftruthfully and thoroughly. With Descartes' philosophy, the ego becomes themeasure giving subiectum, that is, that which is deployed beforehand. This subjecthowever will not be taken possession in a proper manner, namely in the Kantiantranscendental sense, and fully, in the sense of speculative idealism, until the

whole structure and movement of the subjectivity of the subject unfolds andbecomes elevated into the absolute knowledge of itself. In so far as the subjectknows itself as the knowledge that conditions all objectivity, it is as thisknowledge: the absolute itself. Being in its truth is thought thinking itselfabsolutely. For Hegel, being and thought are the same, and that in the sense thateverything is taken in by thought, and by that becomes determined by what Hegelsimply names " Der Gedanke".

As the ego cogito, subjectivity is the consciousness that represents something,relates this representation back to itself, and so gathers with itself. To gather is saidin Greek, 'legein'. The gathering of the manifold by the I, is expressed by means of

'legesthai'. The thinking I gathers the represented to the extent that it goes throughit, transverses it by means of representation. "To transverse through something" issaid in Greek: 'dia'. 'Dialegesthai', dialectic, here means, that the subject in thestated process and as such a process, brings itself out: produces itself.

The dialectic is the process of self-production of subjectivity, of the absolutesubject, and as such is its "necessary action". According to the structure ofsubjectivity, the production process has three layers. First of all as consciousness,subjectivity is drawn immediately to its object. This immediate, thereforeindeterminate, representation, Hegel names 'being', the universal, the abstract. Butthe relation of the object to the subject is thereby overlooked. Only through this

relating back of objects to the subject, will the object as object for the subject, andthe subject for itself, that is, as relation to the object, be represented Nevertheless,as long as we only distinguish between object and subject, refection and being,and remain tied to these distinctions , the movement from object to subject has notyet produced subjectivity as this totality for itself. The object, being, is doubtlessalready with the subject as mediated by reflection, but this mediation itself is notyet itself the presentation of this innermost movement of the subject for itself. Onlywhen the thesis of object and the antithesis of subject becomes discernible in itsnecessary synthesis , is the movement of the subjectivity of the object-subject-relation established in its trajectory. This trajectory is departure from the thesis,progression through antithesis, transition as synthesis, and, as this totality , thereturn of this posited establishment to itself. This trajectory gather the totality ofsubjectivity in its developed unity. So assembled it grows, 'con-crescit', becomes

concrete. Accordingly, dialectic is speculative. 'Speculari' means to discern, to setbefore, conceive, com-prehend [be-greifen]. Hegel states in the introduction of the'Science of Logic' (ed. Lasson, Bd. I, S. 38) : Speculation consists "in conceivingthe opposed in its unity". Hegel's characterization of speculation becomes clearerwhen we take note that with speculation the synthesis results not only fromconceptual unity, but , in the first place and always, from the conception of 'theopposed', as such. To this belongs the conception of opposites as appearingagainst and within one another, which as the reign of antithesis is in this mannerpresented in the "Logic of Essence"

( that is , the logic of reflection). From this self reflecting appearance, this mirroring,the 'speculari' ('speculum': the mirror) receives its sufficient determination. Soconsidered, speculation is the positive totality of what dialectic must signify here:not transcendental delimitation critically or polemically thought, but the mirroringand reuniting of opposites as the spirit's process of self production.

Hegel also names "speculative dialectics" simply "the method". By this appellationhe means neither an instrument of representation nor a peculiar procedural mode


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of philosophy. "The method" is the innermost movement of subjectivity. "the soulof being", the production process through which the fabric of the whole of theabsolute's actualization becomes actualized. "The method": "the soul of being" -that sounds bizarre. One may consider our age to have left behind such aberrationsof speculation. However we live in the midst of this presumed phantasm.

When modern physics exerts itself to establish the world's formula, what occursthereby is this: the being of entities has resolved itself into the method of the totally

calculable. The first work from Descartes, by which according to Hegel philosophyand thereby modern science arrives at solid land, bears the title: Discourse onMethod

(1637). The method, that is speculative dialectic is for Hegel the fundamental trait ofactuality. The method determines accordingly the movement of all occurrences, i. e.history.

So it's clear from whence the history of philosophy is the inner movement of thecourse of spirit, that is, of absolute subjectivity, towards itself. The outset,progression, transition, and return of this course are determined as speculative-

dialectical.

Hegel says: "In philosophy as such, most currently and recently, is contained whatthe work from a thousand years has produced; it is the result of all that haspreceded it."

(Hoffmeister a. a. O. S. 118). In the system of speculative dialectics, philosophy iscompleted, that is, it attains the highest and thereby its conclusion. One isastonished at Hegel's statement on the completion of philosophy. One considers itpresumptuous and descries it as an error that has long since been refuted byhistory. Because after Hegel's time there has been philosophy, and there still is.But the statement on the completion of philosophy does not say that philosophy isat end in the sense of a cessation and a breaking off. Rather the completionprovides precisely for the first time the possibility of diverse transformations evento its simplest expressions: the brutal turnaround and the massive opposition.Marx and Kierkegaard are the greatest Hegelians. They are so despite themselves.The completion of philosophy is not its end, nor does it consist uniquely in thesystem of speculative idealism. The completion is only as the whole course of thehistory of philosophy, a course in which its inception belongs just as essentially asits completion: Hegel and the Greeks.

How is the Philosophy of the Greeks, now, determined out of the fundamental traits,speculative and dialectical, of history? In the course of this history, Hegel's

metaphysical system is the highest level, that of synthesis. It's preceded by thestage of antithesis that begins with Descartes, because with his philosophy for thefirst time the subject is posited as subject. By the same token, objects for the firsttime become representable as objects. The subject-object relation then appearsclearly as op-position, as antithesis. In contrast, all of philosophy before Descartesexhausts itself in the mere representation of the objective. Soul and spirit alike arerepresented like objects, though not as objects. Consequently, according to Hegel,the thinking subject is here already everywhere operative, but not yet conceived assubject, not as one that grounds objectivity. Hegel says in the Lessons on theHistory of Philosophy: "The man (of the Greek world) is not yet returned into self asin our times. He is certainly a subject, but he has not posited himself as such"(Hoffmeister a. a. O., S. 144). The antithesis of subject to object is in philosophybefore Descartes not the secured base. That stage which precedes antithesis is the

level of thesis. With it begins philosophy "proper". The complete unfolding of thisbeginning is Greek philosophy. This, which the Greeks start and lets philosophybegin, is according to Hegel the pure objective. It is the first "manifestation",Spirit's first emergence, that in which all objects acquiesce. Hegel names it the"universal in general". Because it is not drawn out the subject as such, not yet inthis manner determined and arranged conceptually and that means not fully-


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developed, not concrete, the universal remains the "abstract". "The first productionis necessarily the most abstract; it is the simplest, poorest, to which the concrete isopposed." Hegel remarks on this: "and so the oldest philosophy is the poorest."The stage of Greek "consciousness" is "the stage of abstraction". At the sametime, Hegel describes "the stage of Greek consciousness" as "the stage of beauty"(WW. XIII, S. 175).

How are these two interrelated? The beautiful and the abstract do not seem

identical. They are if we understand the one and the other as Hegel does. Theabstract is the first manifestation, demurring purely with itself, the most universalof all entities, being as immediate, simple appearance. Such appearance, however,determines the fundamental trait of the beautiful. This pure self abiding appearanceis assuredly also that of spirit, that is, the subject springing forth as the Ideal; butspirit "has not represented itself yet as medium, (and therein) itself, and thereby,founded its world" (a. a. O.)

How Hegel structures and presents, from the viewpoint of the stage of thebeautiful, as the stage of abstraction, the history of Greek philosophy, will not befurther illustrated here. Instead, we will follow a short indication of Hegel's

interpretation of four fundamental words of Greek philosophy. They speak thelanguage of the key word "being", 'einai' ('eon','ousia'). They speak in ensuingwestern philosophy constantly up to our own times.

In the enumeration as translated by Hegel,, the four fundamental words decree:1.'En', the whole; 2. 'Logos', reason; 3.'Idea', the concept; 4. 'Energeia', actuality.

'En' is the word of Parmenides.

'Logos' is the word of Heraclitus.

'Idea' is the word of Plato.

'Energia' is the word of Aristotle.

To understand how Hegel interprets these fundamental words we must attend tothe following two points: on the one hand, to that which for Hegel is decisive withinthe interpretation of the aforementioned philosophers in contrast to what hementions in passing. Secondly, the manner in which Hegel interprets the fourfundamental words within the horizon of the key word "being".

In the introduction of his Lectures on The History of Philosophy (Hoffmeister a. a.O., S. 240) Hegel explains: "The first universal is the immediate universal, that is,being. The content, the object is therefore objective thought, the thought of whatis." Hegel means: being is the pure state of thought of what is immediately thought,without the reflectiveness of thinking that thinks this thought apart from its

notification (Ermittelung). The determination of pure thought is "theindeterminate", its notification is the immediate. So understood, being is theimmediate indeterminate representation in general, in such a manner, indeed, thatit keeps awy from itself the omission of determination and mediation, as it were,inveighs against them. Out of this, it becomes clear: being as the first simpleobjectivity of the object is thought starting from its relation to the thinking subject


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thanks to the pure abstraction of the latter. It is important to note this, first of all, tounderstand the direction according to which Hegel interprets the four philosophersin question, but likewise to measure the power that Hegel attributes each time tothe fundamental words.

Parmenides' fundamental word is 'hen', the one, that which unites all, and so theuniversal. Parmenides explains 'semanta', the sign, through which 'hen' showsitself, in the great Fragment VIII with which Hegel is acquainted . Nevertheless,

Hegel finds the "highest thought" of Parmenides not in 'hen', being as theuniversal. The "highest thought" according to Hegel is rather ennunciated in thestatement:"Being and thought are the same". Hegel interprets this statementnamely in the sense: being as "the thought, there is" ("der Gedanke, der ist") is aproduction of thought. Hegel draws from Parmenides' statement a prefiguration ofDescartes, with whose philosphy the determination of being out of the essentiallypositing subject begins. Accordingly Hegel will explain: "With Parmenides hasphilosophy proper begun.. This beginning is certainly still nebulous andindeterminate"(WW XIII, S. 296f.).

Heraclitus' fundamental word is 'logos', the gathering, that allows the display and

appearance of everything that is, the totality of entities. 'Logos' is the name thatHeraclitus gives to the being of entities. But Hegel's interpretation does not orientitself strictly from out of the 'logos'. This is peculiar, very peculiar given that Hegelconcludes his preface to the interpretation of Heraclitus with the words: "there isnot a proposition from Heraclitus that is not contained in my Logic" (a. a. O. S. 328)From the point of Hegel's Logic, the 'logos' is reason in the sense of absolutesubjectivity. But the Logic itself is the speculative dialectic by means of which themovement of the immediate universal and the abstract, being as the objective , isreflected in its opposition to the subject. And this reflection is determined asmediation in the sense of becoming, wherein this opposition is returned to itself,made concrete, and brought to unity. To conceive this unity is the essence ofspeculation that develops as dialectic.

According to Hegel, Heraclitus is the first to recognize the dialectic as a principle,thereby surpassing and advancing beyond Parmenides. Hegel clarifies: "Being, asParmenides thinks it, is the one, the first; the second is becoming - by thisdetermination, does he (Heraclitus) go further. This is the first concrete, theabsolute in which the oppossed are united. With him (Heraclitus) for the first time isthe philosophical idea in its speculative form encountered" (a. a. O. S. 328) Hegelthus rests the power of his interpretation of Heraclitus on the statements in whichthe dialectical, the unity, and the unification of contradictions come to language.

Plato's fundamental word is 'Idea'. For Hegel's interpretation of the the philosophyof Plato, what one must attend to is that he conceives the ideas as "the universaldetermined in itself". "Determined in itself" means: the ideas are thought in theirsameness; they are not merely pure models existing in themselves, but "theexistent in and for itself" as distinct from the "sensibly existing" (WW XIV, S. 199)."In and for itself" means that which becomes itself, namely com-prehends itself.Accordingly, Hegel can elaborate: the ideas are "not immediately in consciousness(namely as intuitions), but (mediated by consciousness) in cognition". "Thereforeone does not posses them, instead they are brought forth by cognition into spirit"(a. a. O. S. 169) This bringing forth, production, is the concept as the activity ofabsolute knowledge, that is "the science". That is why Hegel says: "With Platobegins philosophical science as such." "That which is specific to platonicphilosophy is the orientation to the intellectual, supersensible world.." (a. a. O. S.170)

Aristotle's fundamental word is 'Energeia', which Hegel translates as "Actuality"["Wirklichkeit"] (in latin, 'actus'). The 'energeia' is , "further determined ", theentelechy


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('entelecheia'), which is in itself purpose and realization of purpose." The 'energeia'is "the pure effectivity out of itself". "First of all it is the energy, whose form is theactivity, the effectuating, negativity itself related to itself" (a. a. O. S. 321).

Here, 'energeia' is also thought from out of speculative dialectics as the pureactivity of the absolute subject. While antithesis negates thesis, and this in turn isnegated by sysnthesis, there prevails in such negation what Hegel calls "negativity

itself related to itself". This is nothing negative. The negation of negation is ratherthat position within which spirit through its own activity posits itself as theabsolute. Hegel sees in Aristotle's 'energeia' a preliminary stage of the absoluteself movement of spirit, that is of actuality in and for itself. Hegel shows in thefollowing statement how he appraises the whole of aristotelian philosophy: "Ifphilosophy is taken seriously, nothing is worthier than the study of Aristotle" (a. a.O. S. 314).

Philosophy becomes "serious" according to Hegel when it no longer loses itself inthe object and its subjective reflection, but concerns itself with the activity ofabsolute knowledge.

The elucidation of the four fundamental words allows the clarification: Hegelunderstands 'en', 'logos', 'idea', 'energeia' within the horizon of being, which hecomprehends as abstract universality. Being and thus what is represented in thefour fundamental words is not yet determined nor yet mediated by and in thedialectical movement of absolute subjectivity. Greek philosophy is the stage of this"not yet". It is not yet the completion, nevertheless it is only comprehended fromout of this completion, as the system of speculative idealism.

It is according to Hegel the innermost "drive", "the need" of spirit, to deliver itselffrom abstraction, in absolving itself in the concrete of absolute subjectivity and soto free itself to its own self. Thus Hegel can say: "philosophy is the opposition tothe abstract; it is nothing but the campaign against abstraction, the constant warwith the reflective understanding" (Hoffmeister a. a. O. S. 113). In the Greek world,for the first time, spirit comes to a free encounter with being. But spirit comes notyet properly as the self knowing subject to absolute certainty of itself. Only whenthis first occurs in the system of speculative dialectical metaphysics, doesphilosophy become what it is: "the innermost sanctuary of spirit itself" (a. a. O. S.125).

Hegel determines the "purpose" of philosophy to be: "the truth". This becomes

attained only at the stage of completion. The stage of Greek philosophy remains inthe "not yet". As the stage of the beautiful, it is not yet the level of truth.

Here we become thoughtful - when we traverse the whole of the history ofphilosophy, "Hegel and the Greeks", the completion and the beginning of thishistory - and ask: does not 'aletheia', the truth, stand at the beginning of the pathsof philosophy with Parmenides? Why does Hegel not bring this to language? Doeshe understand by "truth" something other than unconcealedness? Certainly. Truthis for Hegel the absolute certainty of the self knowing absolute subject. But with hisinterpretation, the subject does not yet appear as subject for the Greeks.Accordingly 'aletheia' cannot be the determination of truth in the sense of certainty.

Such is the case with Hegel. However, if 'aletheia', concealed and unthought asever, prevails over the beginning of Greek philosophy, must we not ask: is notcertainty in its essence dependent on 'aletheia', supposing that we do not interpret


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this imprecisely and arbitrarily as truth in the sense of certainty, but think it asdisclosedness? If in this manner we dare to think this, the 'aletheia', then twomatters come before us to consider: By no means is the experience of 'aletheia' asunconcealedness and disclosedness based on the arbitrary etymology of a word ,but rather on the matter of thought put into question here, to which Hegel'sphilosophy cannot be totally withdrawn. If Hegel describes being as the firstemergence and manifestation of spirit, then it remains to be considered if in thisemergence and self display, disclosedness [R&AW1]must not already be here inplay, no less than the pure appearance of the beautiful, by which Hegel describesthe level attained by Greek "consciousness". And if Hegel lets the fundamental

position of his system culminate in the absolute idea, in the complete self displayof spirit, then it becomes compelling to ask if in this appearing, that is, in thephenomenology of spirit and hence in absolute self knowledge and its certaintydisclosedness must not already be in play. Moreover, we are presented with thewider question, if disclosedness has its place in spirit as the absolute subject, or ifdisclosedness itself is the place and shows the place wherein the like of arepresenting subject can first "be" what it is.

Accordingly we are detained by something else that is worth considering insofar as'aletheia' comes to language as disclosedness. What this word names is not apasse-partout that unlocks all the enigmas of thought, instead 'aletheia' is the

enigma itself - the matter of thought.

However, it is not us that establishes this matter as the matter thought. To us it haslong addressed itself and been transmitted by the whole history of philosophy. It isonly a matter of becoming attentive to the tradition and therein to attest to the pre-judgments [Vor-Urteile], in which each thought, in its own manner, abides. Ofcourse, such examination can never conduct itself as a tribunal that directlydecides the essence of, or the possible relations to, history; because thisexamination has its limit, which can be described as follows: the more thoughtful,and that means the more responsive to its language, the more decisive for it is theunthought, and , even , the unthinkable.

Because Hegel interprets being speculative-dialectically [spekulativ-dialektisch]from the vantage of absolute subjectivity as the indeterminate immediate, theabstract universal, and explains from this perspective of modern philosophy theGreek fundamental words for being, 'En', 'Logos', 'Idea', 'Energeia', we are temptedto judge that interpretation as incorrect.

But every historical statement and legitimization itself moves within a certainrelation to history. Prior to a decision as to the historical correctness of therepresentation it is therefore necessary to consider if and how history isexperienced, from whence does it determine its fundamental traits.

With regards to Hegel and the Greeks this means: all correct or incorrect historicalstatements presuppose that Hegel has experienced the essence of history out ofthe essence of being in the sense of absolute subjectivity. There is at this hour noexperience of history that can, philosophically speaking, historically correspond toit. However, the speculative-dialectical determination of history brings with asconsequence that it prohibits Hegel from regarding 'Aletheia' and its prevalence asthe proper matter of thought, and this, precisely, in that philosophy that determinesthe "reign of truth" as the "purpose" of philosophy. Because Hegel experiencesbeing, when he conceives it as the indeterminate immediate, as the determining

and comprehending subject's posited. Consequently, he cannot disassociate beingin the Greek sense, the 'einai', from its relation to the subject, and release it to itsproper essence. This latter however is pre-sence [An-wesen], that which out ofconcealedness abides [vor-Wahren] in disclosedness. In pre-sence theunconcealed plays. It plays within 'en' and within 'logos', within the properlygathered bestowment [Vorliegen] - that which lets truth be [An-wahren-lassen].


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'Aletheia' plays within the 'idea' and within the 'choinomia' of the ideas, insofar asthese mutually bring to appearance and so compose the existent being, the 'ontoson'. 'Aletheia' plays within 'Energeia' which has nothing in common with actuality,but only with the Greek experience of 'ergon' and its manner of being producedbefore us within pre-sence.

However, 'Aletheia', unconcealedness plays not only within the fundamental wordsof Greek thought, it plays within the totality of Greek language, which appears to

speak otherwise, so long as we do not put out of play its Latin, Medieval, andModern representation, and view the Greek world in terms of either personalism orconsciousness.

However how is it with this enigmatic 'Aletheia' itself, that for the interpreter of theGreek world is an outrage, as long as one halts at this isolated word and itsetymology, instead of reflecting on it out of the matter of thought, as given indisclosedness and unconcealedness? Is 'Aletheia' the same as being, that is, pre-sence? That with Aristotle 'ta onta', the existent, the present, means the same as 'taaletheia', the disclosed, speaks in it favor. Yet how do disclosedness andpresenceness, 'aletheia' and 'ousia' belong together.? Are both of the same

essential rank? Or is presenceness referred back to disclosedness, but not,inversely, the latter to the former? Then, being would have everything to do withdisclosedness, but not disclosedness with being. Moreover: if the essence of truth,valued as correctness and certainty , can only exist in the realm of disclosedness,then truth has everything to with 'Aletheia', but not this with truth.

Wherein belongs 'Aletheia' itself, when it is unbound from references to truth andbeing and must be set free to what is proper to it? Has thinking already the realm'svision, if only to conjecture, what takes place in unconcealment, precisely withinthe concealment that disposes of all unconcealed?

The enigma of 'Aletheia' comes closer to us, but, simultaneously , the danger, thatwe are hypothesizing it as a fantastic world essence.

We have already remarked variously that an undisclosedness in itself cannot begiven. Instead, undisclosedness is undisclosedness for "each one". Thus it wouldbe unavoidably "subjective".

Accordingly, must the human, as considered here, be determined necessarily as

subject? Does "for mankind" mean without qualification: posited throughmankind? We must deny both and recall that although 'aletheia', understood in theGreek manner, prevails for mankind, the human remains determined through'logos'. The human is the saying one. To say, in high German 'sagan', means: toshow, to let appear and be seen. The human is the essence, that lets the said of thepresented in its presenceness be bestowed and attends to the bestowal [Vorliegen]. The human speaks only insofar as being the one that says.

The oldest testimony for 'alethein' and 'alethes', disclosedness and disclosed, wefind with Homer and, indeed, in connection with the verbs of saying. One hascursorily concluded that: thus disclosedness is "derived" from the verb 'dicendi'.

What does "derived" mean her, when saying is the letting be of appearance andalso is that which disguises and conceals? It is not disclosedness that "derives"from saying, rather every saying belongs [braucht] already in the realm ofdisclosedness. Only where this already prevails can something statable, visible,demonstrable, perceivable come forth. When we hold in view the enigmaticprevalence of 'Aletheia', the unconcealed, we are lead to the conjecture that even


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the whole essence of language reposes in the un-concealed, in the prevalence of'Aletheia'. However talk of prevalence remains makeshift if its mode of playreceives its determination otherwise than from out of the unconcealed itself, that isfrom the clearance of the self concealed.

"Hegel and the Greeks" - meanwhile we have apparently explained foreign matters ,far removed from our theme. Nevertheless we are closer to our theme than before.In the introduction to the lecture it was said: The matter of thought comes into play.

By means of its theme, it attempts to bring this matter into view.

Hegel determine the philosophy of the Greeks as the beginning of "philosophyproper". Notwithstanding, it remains as the level of the thesis and abstraction in the"not yet". The completion in the antithesis and synthesis remains outstanding.

The reflection on Hegel's interpretation of the Greek doctrine on being attempted toshow, that the "being" wherein philosophy begins, only emerges as presencenessinsofar as 'Aletheia' prevails, that "Aletheia' itself nevertheless as regards its

essential origin remains unthought.

Thus, have we experienced , in view of 'Aletheia', that with it our thinking is calledto correspond to something which from before the beginning of "philosophy" andthrough the whole course of its history, has already drawn thought to itself.'Aletheia' is the historical course of philosophy anticipated, but in such a way that itwithholds itself from philosophical determination, as that which requiresthoughtful consideration [Erorterung]. Thus 'Aletheia' remains for us the worthiestof thought - of thought delivered from the metaphysically conveyed retrospectiveview of the representation of "truth" in the sense of correctness and "being" in thesense of actuality.

Hegel says of Greek philosophy: "Only to a certain degree is satisfaction to befound there", namely the satisfaction of the drive of spirit to absolute knowledge.This estimation of Hegel concerning what is unsatisfactory about Greekphilosophy is spoken out of the completion of philosophy. In the historical courseof speculative idealism, Greek philosophy remains in the "not yet" of itscompletion.

However, if we attend to the enigmatic of 'Aletheia', that hovers over the begginingof Greek philosophy as well as over the course of the whole of philosophy, then

Greek philosophy likewise appears in a "not yet". Only, this is the "not yet" of theunthought, not at all the "not yet" of the unsatisfying, but rather the "not yet" towhich we are not sufficient and never have been.

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