heidegger, german idealism, neo-kantianism _ rockmore

7/30/2019 Heidegger, German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism _ Rockmore

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German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism

ed. RockmoreKerszberg : Being as an Idea of Reason

36 In his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Kant is credited with discovering pure temporality aspure imaginationH. then says imagination contains the whole secret of time and being.

(Remember, intuition is passive, intellect is active synthesizing, imagination is _____?transcendental imagination is the mediating faculty that represents in time that which is structuraland intelligible, it is the seat of the schematism, which fits the categories of the understanding ontothe manifold----a propos, is the function of understanding bijective onto the manifold?)

Kant claims that the transcendental subject constitutes time, but is itself atemporal. H. is searchingfor a subjectivity in Kant that is historical or temporal.

The imagination is prior to both subject and object, since it mediates the two. Kant calls it Urzeit.37Kant's objection to Heidegger's primordial temporal transcendence of Dasein is that Dasein can'tever get at Being, since by approaching Being, the Unconditioned is necessarily transformed into an

Idea of Reason (just like self, world and god). (The whole Unconditioned, which is fallaciouslyassumed to be already given (sez Kant) reminds me of the transcendence of the world...there isalways more unconditioned out there, and we can never establish closure on the cosmos. The worldis the model by which we learn the value ofexcess, individuality. Think of the horizon like a planarorifice, spewing novelty.)

Heidegger thinks there is a ground where intuition and concepts meet up, but Kant asks us to seethem as absolute heterogeneity, never a heirarchy, and we freely jump from one to the other(admittedly problematic).

There are transcendental illusions when we take what makes sense for subject knowledge to be anobject.

Kant: Reason has an indirect relation to intuition, and can put undestanding out of play for a pauseto capture the regularly concealed essence of appearance (e.g. as apperance). The understandingis unable to do this in its constant forward motion, for it is always a re-cognizing. We wish toredouble the appearance so we can make sure it is what it is.40Thought is a spontaneous production: how to check its sources? Reason is not constitutive, butsome sort of dynamic regulative principle which is at play in the dialogue between thought andworld, sez Kant. The illusions are useful for our epistemological projects, unavoidable with thepeckish tendencies of Reasonit's just that these ideas need to be used regulatively and notconstitutively ???? A645/B673 We are incapable of jettisoning these ideas, and need to use themwiselythey will not provide concepts through which we can access objects of speculativereason.73)

41 B&T 166 (Macquerrie) Dasein, in its lostness within the they, takes on all of reality, the ensrealissimum. This is broadest, highest, concept of reality in Kant (god itselfcan we havetheoretical knowledge of god? Or is the Idea just a useful fiction? Every theory is god, isn'tit? A heaven on Earth?). And Heidegger speaks disparagingly of it. The ens realissimum, I believe,is the unified worldwhen all is one. In line with Heidegger, this is to be avoided, and we must stepback from it to find the authentic self.


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Re: illusions in Kantthey are not outright errors, but are created when thinking withdraws from thesensory world. There is a danger of transgressing the boundaries of any human contact with thereal world. Reason does this ineluctably by its appetite for closure. [What is the reasonably basicmovement of Reason's drive toward systematization? Why, in posing this very question as such it'sobviously: generalization. The foundation of mathematics is a composite of a very few axioms of settheory (perhaps, an articulated unity? For surely no axiom is prior to the other, but they worktogether to form the world). The original movement of reason is that these distinct things share

a have ownedness in common.

46 Possibly the Crux of the essay so far: Thinking the absence of a transcendental appearance(the always visible correlate to sensibility's tug on the understanding, which is made sensible byouter intuition) can only be done by doubling that very same appearance. This logic of illusiondefines the phenomenality of thought, which is more orginary than pure thought itself. (and so wehave the strain toward mystical non-thought?)

Vasterling : The Problem of Time97

Only if we could stop time would understanding be complete and definite. The unretreivable pastcomes from behind our back to imbue the present with meaning, it is the light in which we see (the

decoder ring for the present circumstances). It is a beckoning and receding horizon we can nevergrasp because we cannot stop time.

[Now, can time be stopped? The reach of information may complete its projectthe past will befixed and understanding complete. A catalogue of all, a final cyclopedia.]

The transparency of knowledge and perception are due to this blindness to the informingpresuppositions. Just as we are able to ecstatically get beyond our bodies because we can ignorethe biological foundations. Or the noise in our brains is transcended....

98Dasein is able to regain its sense of authentic time, deconstruct the grasp of the presentonly if

there is a world to be open to, that is. There may be no more elbow room for ecstatictranscendence.

Young H and Fichte108 Fichte sez all science is systematic. It is important that the first principle be an act, not anempirically determined state.110 When the divisible-I determines the divisible-not-I ----practical reason. Vice versa, theoreticalreason. The striving between the two is an intentional structure that must be enacted time and timeagain112 Fichte understood that basic philosophy must abstract out the content of experience to find the

unvarying forms and norms.But, sez H, is doesn't get to ought.Fichte sez reason just ought to be, for freedom

113 Heidegger and Windelband both agree that the ideals of reason depend on the material at hand(church, state, etc. cf Scheler's ethics)But, poor Windelband, the ideals cannot be abstracted from ontic material116 Unlike Fichte's highest principle, the primal something of H is not self-evident, but must betaken phenomenologically.Husserl identified the pre-theoretical with the theoretical....a mistake. H is more subtle

Strube : h's turn to German Idealism


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GA 28:91 Fichte prescribed a program basic to metaphysics: the priority of certainty over truth.Facticity is prior to meaning, it is meaningless, and Fichte is hungry for the deductive step-wisemarch of certainty.

124The upshot of phenomenology is that unconditioned, the unproveable (which serves as the limit

encountered by Fichte's will to certainty) is phenomenologically significant.125There is a strange unconditioned decree of Reason which provides the end-goal...maybe...It applies in Fichte's famous 3rd principle, which posits the divisibility of the non-I and the I, so thatKnowledge may begin. He says since the principle is made up of two propisitions, and is determinedby form alone, it may be thereby proved (cf. formalism in mathematics). The task is given at hand

easily, but theresolution, the solution, Lsungis given by an unconditioned decree of reason.126 We are already surrendered (berantwortet) to the decree, sez H's reading of Fichte127 It is the hermeneutic situation that must always be presupposed facticity132 The decree of reason, proclaims: let there be no not-I at all! In the encounter of I and not-I, the Imust dominate. Dasein is its acts, its situation...the absolute I solves the problem of interaction. Theinfinite self, yet bounded...the peace of a nation!!

Schelling : Hedley143 Jacobi sez that speculative (idealistic) philosophy leads to nihilism. And, whaddyaknow, heused 'Seyn' for Spinoza's monistic substance. The challenge of German Idealism was to make asystem that is not nihilistic.Mysticism could rise to the challenge. It assumes an activitybetween god and man

(Look up Michel VaterHeidegger and Schelling : the finitude of being

147 Hegel locates the final freedom in the state (mediation, rational praxis of the spirit), Jacobi sezfreedom is immediate, prerational and supernatural148 Schelling : there is a non-mediated rupture in the godhead, it opens an abyss in which we may

freely exercise decision

Hegel and Heidegger : Rockmore158 Heidegger sez Hegel has dissolved ontology into logic, and for this must be overcome160 Weltanschauung presupposes both a subject and a perspective161 Kant's theoretical reason is, after all, practical. His philosophy fits within the bounds of humanreason, and goes after the ends of reason.

Heidegger -- Lask -- Fichte : Kisiel

242 Cassirer made the comparison between Fichtes irrationality to the ego and Kants notion thatfreedom is inconceivable.244 In the middle abyss, Fichtes hiatus irrationalis, in which Kants schematism interfaces,disclosed by anguish...Lask saw a pre-judicative supra-oppositional panarchy of the logos whichstructures irrational matter and becomes the matter of judgement (apparently a position to combatthe pan-logicism of Hegelian school). In Fichte's vocab, facticity has a counter-concept: logicity(lawfulness). This abyss that opens between various sorts of empirical and trancendental poles:

Husserl: pure givens are in a separate realm and reducible to each other

Scheler: emotional intuition of value essences


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Lask: alogical dispersion of forms through their matter which itself is logically nude.

All of these and more are in Heideggerequiprimordial categories, throwness of the situation, angst

Facticity is a concept that goes back a ways--possibly to Descartes--as the basic fact of the I-think.For Kant, the fact of the feeling of pure practical reason that cannot be given any ground.

Freedom is the sole fact of pure reason. (Is this the distinctly human character of world-

openness?)[the ultimate ground is that ground grounds. This applies equally to electricity as well as evolution.]246 In selective moments of historical time there happen Events, which impart new meaning.((cross this with my kairological ruptures.) Kant's second critique sez freedom and the moral law

are the sole factof pure reason There are, to some degree, individual values, transcendentalfacts, irreducible value singularity. (Fichte Werke Vol 1, 226 or 240)

247 Philosophic logic, logic of logic, is not situated in the psyche. Or for that matter, in the physicalor metaphysical, but in the Third World. ((this jives with an LoA understanding...there is a logicbetween tree-soil, my two hands, math. Insofar as there is communication (the logos?). Thus,logical truths are just stable channels of communication. This is why Hegel is forced to assert evennegativityhas a certain presence)

248 The fundamental ways of beingfor productive logical activity are, around 1925-26, for H calledTemporalien (tensors---rhema @Sophist 410 are called tense-words (Zeitwort). The verbs don'thave any content themselves, but work on the content-laden nouns, to produce a gathered-together speaking which is delotic) and then Existentialen.

252 The environing world appeared to Lask as the ought or value...the not speculatively unthinglikeworld is factic. To grasp this non-object would be grasping the mediating LoA immediately. (Thus,in SZ we are normally absorbedin the homogeneous environing world)Division 1 of SZ: a techne of poeisis. Division 2: a phronesis of praxis.253 Recall with Lask that form is materiallydetermined. Domains of reality are differentiated bymatter to begin with, put into regionalized material logics. Homogenization comes next.

Now, Lasks reflexive category seems to encompass the undifferentiated primal concrete totality (cf.Deleuzes anexact?).

255 For there to be an object there must be difference (sez Rickert, and, like, everyone else inGermany).

Heidegger sez every object has (or is?) an intentional nexus. (cf. Scheler has that an object canbe the bearer of indefinitely many values) and Lask describes the panarchy of logos as a bundle of

rays and relations. Should it not seem to me that so many officially diverse thinkers are the samething? Maybe its just easiest to notice what they get right...

259 Knowledge seems to always be of something--mediated in a way--but young Heidegger sez asfor the original something, Ur-etwas, the primal grasp is of the comporting relation (Verhalten) itself.This pays no mind in who or what does the comporting, or what is comported toward. It is just the

out-toward relational sense (Bezugsinn). This is what a formal indication indicates--nospecification of ontic content. In SZ this becomes the description of Daseins sense (Sinn), and thisintentional drive is transformed into Daseins temporality. Dasein, and life at the most basic level,holds potency (Sturm?) to world-out.

So....the primal something is a comporting relation, the intent, interest, value conferring drive. All of


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these are particular LoAs, with their own behavioral temporality. But even more, to immediatelyapprehend the LoA is nothing but a view from nowhe(n)re And the momentous suspension of these

system times discloses the impossible possibility for transcendence.

heidegger, german idealism, neo-kantianism _ rockmore

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