headed for the exits final · headed for the exits an empirical assessment of the key factors...
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Headed for the Exits AnEmpiricalAssessmentoftheKeyFactorsDrivingHonduranEmigration
Ryan C. Williams
ABSTRACT With the surge in Central American families and unaccompanied children arriving at the United States’ southern border, there has been renewed interest and debate about why people are leaving the region in such great numbers. Despite the increased attention being paid to this phenomenon, there is a disconnect in the literature about what is driving individuals to leave their homes. While some researchers point to clear economic underpinnings of the mass emigration, others claim that the majority of people are fleeing violence and insecurity. By analyzing survey data from Honduras, I measure the relationship between economic and security factors and the individual decision to emigrate. My analysis reveals that in the aggregate, Hondurans are more likely to express an intention to emigrate due to insecurity than they are as a result of economic distress.
University of San Diego | MAIR
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Table of Contents
Introduction 3
CountryConditions 3
MassEmigration 5
RelevantTheoreticalFramework 7
KeyDrivers:Securityvs.Economics 8 Security 8 Economics 9
ResearchGoalsandMethodology 10 DependentVariable 10 IndependentVariables–Cross-Tabulation 10 IndependentVariables–LogisticRegression 11
Results 12 Cross-Tabulation 12 LogisticRegression 15
SummaryandConclusions 16
Acknowledgements 16
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IntroductionInrecentyearstherehasbeenwidespreadrenewedinterestinCentralAmericanmigration,startingin2014withasignificantsurgeinunaccompaniedCentralAmericanminorsarrivingattheUnitedStates’southernborder,andcontinuingthroughtodaywiththearrivalof“caravans”ofmigrantsandrefugeestravellingfromthe“NorthernTriangle”countriesofElSalvador,Honduras,andGuatemala.TherearecompellingreasonstolookattheseeventsthrougharegionallensandindeedreportingontheuptickinCentralAmericanmigrationhasfrequentlyemployedbroadcharacterizationsofregionalconditions.However,inordertodevelopadeeperandbetterunderstandingofthecircumstancessurroundingtheselarge-scalemigrationevents,itisusefultonarrowourfocustoasinglecountry,andtoconsiderfactorsatthesubnationalandindividualhouseholdlevel.ThispaperendeavorstomapoutabetterunderstandingofwhatcausespeopletoemigratefromHonduras.ThereareseveralreasonsfortheselectionofHondurasasmycountryoffocus:(1)thecountryhasbeenthestartingpointforrecentmigrantcaravanstravellingfromCentralAmericatotheUnitedStates,makingitanintriguingsamplepopulationtostudybroaderfactorsofemigrationfromtheregion;1(2)thepopulationofimmigrantsfromHonduranslivingintheUnitedStateshasrisenmoresharplyinthepastdecadethanthatfromGuatemalaandElSalvador;2and(3)HondurasholdsthetwindistinctionsofbeingbothoneofthepoorestandoneofthemostviolentcountriesinallofLatinAmerica,3allowingmetoanalyzewhichfactorisagreaterdeterminantofthedecisiontoemigrate.
CountryConditionsHondurasisoneofthemostviolentcountriesinLatinAmerica.Drugtraffickingnetworks,streetgangs(ormaras),andcartelsfromMexicoandColombiaalladdtotheextremelevelsofviolence.Criminalgroupsareemboldenedduetohighlevelsofcorruptionwithinthecountry'ssecurityforcesandeliteclass.Thecountry’smurderrateisastronomicallyhigh-43.6per100,000residentsin2017–whichwasdownsignificantlyfromitspeakof86.5per100,000in2011,4butstilloneofthehighestratesintheentireworld.Figure1providesavisualizationofhomicidesatthesubnationalstate(departamento)level,whichrevealsthatmurderratesremainhighinthenorthofthecountryalongtheAtlantic 1ElColegioDeLaFronteraNorte.LaCaravanadeMigrantesCentroamericanosenTijuana2018:DiagnosticoyPropuestasdeAccion.Tijuana:2018.AccessedFebruary21,2019.https://www.colef.mx/estudiosdeelcolef/la-caravana-de-migrantes-centroamericanos-en-tijuana-2018-diagnostico-y-propuestas-de-accion/2D’VeraCohn,JeffreyS.Passel,AnaGonzalez-Barrera,“ImmigrationfromGuatemala,Honduras,ElSalvadorUp,”PewResearchCenter,June04,2018,http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/.3“HondurasProfile,”InSightCrime,lastmodifiedAugust29,2018,https://www.insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/honduras/.4“Honduras2018Crime&SafetyReport,”OverseasSecurityAdvisoryCouncil,lastmodifiedApril3,2018,https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=23798.
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coastlineandwherethecountrybordersGuatemala.ThisislargelyattributabletothefactthatdrugtraffickingorganizationstakeadvantageofHonduras’unprotectednortherncoasttolandnarcoticsbyboatandplanebeforemovingthemacrosstheborderintoGuatemalaandultimatelytoNorthAmerica.5Whilethemurderratehasbeentrendinglower,thepercentageofHonduransreportingthattheywerevictimsofcrimehasgoneup,accordingtonationalsurveysconductedbytheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject.
Figure1-2017HomicideDatabyDepartment.
DataSource:LaUniversidadNacionalAutónomadeHonduras,ObservatorioNacionaldelaViolencia
Economicconditionsarealsodire.HondurasranksasoneofthepoorestcountriesintheWesternHemisphereandmorethan60%ofresidentsliveinpoverty.6HondurasalsosuffersfromthehighestlevelofeconomicinequalityinLatinAmerica.7Roughlyathirdofthecountry’sresidentsareunderemployed,andtheeconomyreliesonremittancesfromothercountries(primarilyfromtheUnitedStates).In2017,thegrossdomesticproduct(atpurchasingpowerparity)percapitawas$5,600,rankingHondurasasthe170thwealthiestcountryglobally,justaheadofPakistan.8
5CrisisWorkingGroup.CorridorofViolence:TheGuatemala-HondurasBorder.Belgium:2014.AccessedMay01,2019.https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/corridor-violence-guatemala-honduras-border6“TheWorldFactbook:Honduras,”CentralIntelligenceAgency,lastmodifiedFebruary1,2018,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html7“HondurasOverview,”TheWorldBank,lastmodifiedOctober4,2018,https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/honduras/overview.8CentralIntelligenceAgency,“TheWorldFactbook:Honduras.”
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Beyondthekeyeconomicandsecurityfactors,therearesignificantissueswithgovernance,majorflawsinthejusticesystem,rampantcorruptionandhighlevelsofimpunity,widespreadsocialinequality,9andseriousenvironmentalrisksduetoclimatechange.10
MassEmigrationHondurashasservedasanet“sending”countryformanyyears,meaningtherearemoreemigrantsleavingthecountryonanannualbasisthantherearenewimmigrantscomingin.AccordingtotheMigrationPolicyInstitute(2018),722,000migrantsfromHonduraslivedinothercountriesaroundtheworldin2017,whileonly39,000migrantsfromothercountrieswereresidinginHonduras.However,beginningwiththemassmovementofunaccompaniedchildrenoutoftheregionin2014,therehasbeenasignificantuptickinthenumberofpeopleleavingHonduras.Reportsindicatethatsomewherebetween200-400peopleleavethecountryeachday11andagrowingportionofthesemigrantsareunaccompaniedminorchildrenandfamilies.FromaUnitedStatesperspective,thismassexodusseemedtolullfollowingthe2014surgebuthasagainpickedupin2018and2019.InFiscalYear(FY)2017,U.S.BorderPatrolapprehended47,260HonduransalongtheSouthwestborder,ofwhichnearly64%wereunaccompaniedminors(7,784)orfamilymembers(22,366).InFY2018,thetotalnumberofHonduransapprehendedroseto76,513,66%ofwhichwereeitherunaccompaniedminors(10,913)orfamilymembers(39,439).InthefirsthalfofFY2019(OctoberthroughMarch)alone,thenumberofborderapprehensionsofHonduransjumpedto102,449,and80%wereunaccompaniedchildren(9,138)orfamilymembers(72,728).12Recently,largecaravansofmigrantshavebandedtogethertomakethejourneyfromtheNorthernTriangletotheUnitedStates.ManyoftheCentralAmericansarrivingattheSouthernU.S.borderoverthepastyearmadetheirwaynorthwithoneofthesecaravans.Thelargestcaravantodate,estimatedatitspeaktobearound7,000migrants,setoutfromHondurasinOctober2018.13Threesimilarconvoyshavesetoutinsubsequentmonths,includingagroupofnearlyathousandtravelingnorthfromSanPedroSula,Hondurasatthetimeofwriting.14 9“WorldReport2019:RightsTrendsinHonduras,”HumanRightsWatch,lastmodifiedJanuary17,2019,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/honduras.10MuzaffarChishtiandFayeHipsman,“IncreasedCentralAmericanMigrationtotheUnitedStatesMayProveanEnduringPhenomenon,”MigrationPolicyInstitute,February18,2016,https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/increased-central-american-migration-united-states-may-prove-enduring-phenomenon.11AzamAhmed,KatieRogersandJeffErnst.“HowtheMigrantCaravanBecameaTrumpElectionStrategy.”NewYorkTimes,October25,2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/world/americas/migrant-caravan-trump.html.12“U.S.BorderPatrolSouthwestBorderApprehensionsbySectorFiscalYear2019,”U.S.CustomsandBorderProtection,accessedApril24,2019,https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.13ElColegioDeLaFronteraNorte.“LaCaravana.”14NoeLeiva,“HonduransdefyTrumptoheadnorthforUSborder,”YahooNews,April10,2019,https://news.yahoo.com/hondurans-defy-trump-head-north-us-border-224745018.html.
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Clearly,manymoreHonduransaredecidingtoleavetheircountryandheadfortheUnitedStates,butthosestartlingstatisticsdon’ttellthewholestory.ChishtiandHipsman(2016)pointoutthatwetendtoviewtheflowofmigrantsandrefugeesthroughthelensofthosethatarriveontheSouthwestU.S.border,butdoingsofailstoproperlyacknowledgetheconsistencyofCentralAmericansfleeingtheNorthernTrianglecountries.MexicoestablishedtheSouthernBorderPlan(ProgramaFronteraSur),atthebehestoftheUnitedStatesgovernment,andindoingsobegantointerrupttheflowofmigrantsandrefugeesboundfortheUnitedStates.Figure2showsthepopulationofpeopleofconcern(whichincludesrefugees,asylees,andinternallydisplacedindividuals)intheUnitedStatesandthoseinothercountriesaroundtheworld.Thischartillustratestwoimportantpoints,1)thatthenumberofvulnerablepeopleleavingtheirhomesinHondurashasexplodedoverthepastfiveyears,and2)thatonlyamoderateportionofthoseindividualsweredestinedfortheUnitedStates.
Figure2-PeopleofConcernfromHonduras
AccordingtotheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)thenumberofpeopleofconcernfromHondurashascontinuedtoriseunabatedsince2010.In2017,themostrecentyearforwhichdataisavailable,morethan177,000Honduransweredisplacedwithintheirowncountry.ThousandsmorehavesoughtasylumorbeenadmittedasrefugeesincountriesaroundtheworldincludinginCanada,Spain,Italy,Mexico,CostaRica,andBelize.ThisdatarevealsthemassivemovementofHonduranindividualsandfamilieswhohavelefthomewhilealsohighlightingthefactthattheUnitedStatesisnottheonlycountryaffectedbythisflowofpeople.
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RelevantTheoreticalFrameworkInordertobetterunderstandwhyHonduransdecidetoemigrate,weneedtostartwithatheoreticalframeworkformigration.Ravenstein's(1889)"push-pull"theoryofmigrationiswidelyseenasformingthebasisofmostcontemporaryscholarshipontheissue.Accordingtohistheory,unfavorableconditionsinoneplace(suchas"badoroppressivelaws,heavytaxation,anunattractiveclimate,uncongenialsocialsurroundings,andevencompulsion"[p.286])pushpeopletoemigrate,whilefavorableconditionselsewherehavetheeffectofpullingthemin.Therearetheoristswhocriticizethesimplicityofpush-pullanalysis,sayingitoverlooksimportantfactorsthatinfluencemovement(seeforexampleO’Reilly[2015]).Despitetherelevantconcernssuchcritiquesraise,Ichoosetousethepush-pulldichotomyasthefoundationofmyresearchforthereasonsoutlinedbyKivistoandFaist(2010),because“itoffersaremarkablyintuitiveandparsimoniousaccountofthe(migration)process”(p.35).BuildingoffofRavenstein’sbaseunderstandingofmigration,Lee(1966)iscreditedwithgiving"expression"tothepush-pulltheoryofmigration,assertingthatwhenthefactorspushingapersonoutofaplacearestrongerthanthefactorskeepingthemthere,migrationwilloccur.ThereisdebateintheUnitedStatesaboutwhetherpushfactorsinCentralAmericaorpullfactorsintheUnitedStatesaremoreresponsiblefortheincreasingnumberofindividualsmakingthejourneynorth.TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesreportedthatbetween2008and2015,countriessurroundingtheNorthernTriangle(includingMexico,Belize,CostaRica,Nicaragua,andPanama)receiveda13-foldincreaseinthenumberofasylumclaimscomingfromHonduras,ElSalvador,andGuatemala.15Thisfact,MusaloandLee(2017)argue,suggeststhatCentralAmericansaremorelikelyleavingtheirhomesbehindasaresultofworseningcountryconditionsratherthanasaresultofpullfactorsinothercountries.Ifweadjustourscopetoinvestigatejustthepushfactorsthatleadtomigration,wefindarangeofpotentialexplanatoryfactors.O'Reilly(2015)pointsoutthatRavenstein'sconceptofpushfactorswasprimarilyconcernedwitheconomicsandlabormigration,andthatlesshasbeenwrittenaboutindividualsfleeingviolenceandinsecurity.16,17Morerecenttheoristshaveappliedthepush-pulldynamictoclassifyotherfactorsthatcompelpeopletoleavetheirhomecountries.UNHCRdefinespushfactorsofmigrationtoincludeunemployment,conflict,threatstolifeandliberty,alackofeducationalopportunities, 15UNHCR,WomenontheRun:First-HandAccountsofRefugeesFleeingElSalvador,Guatemala,Honduras,andMexico,Washington,DC:UNCHR,2015.AccessedFebruary21,2019.https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html.16MichaelClemens,“Violence,DevelopmentandMigrationWaves:EvidencefromCentralAmericanChildMigrantApprehensions,”Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment(2017).AccessedMarch11,2019.https://www.cgdev.org/publication/violence-development-and-migration-waves-evidence-central-american-child-migrant.17DavidScottFitzgerald,RawanArar,“TheSociologyofRefugeeMigration,”AnnualReviewofSociology44,no.1(2018):387-406,doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073117-041204
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poverty,famine,andenvironmentalfactors.MusaloandLeeciteCentralAmerica’shighhomiciderates,violenceagainstwomenandchildren,gender-motivatedmurders,householdviolence,andextremepovertyasprimarypushfactorsfromtheregion.Inadditiontothewell-definedpushfactorsofviolenceandpoverty,ChishtiandHipsman(2016)pointoutthatCentralAmericaisexperiencingaterribledrought,whichisalsocontributingtopeople'sdecisiontoemigrate.Somearguethatpeopleescapingviolenceorpersecutionarenotmigrantsatall,andthattheymustbeunderstoodandtreatedasrefugees,distinctly.18However,FitzGeraldandArar(2018)worrythatclassifyingindividualsaseitherrefugeesoreconomicmigrantsdoesnotcapturethecomplexityofindividualcircumstances.AccordingtoClemens(2017),thethreefactorsthatinfluencemigration(violence,economicconditions,andsocialnetworks)areallsignificantlyinterrelatedanddifficulttofullydistinguishfromoneanother.Seelke(2014)andJaitmanetal.(2017)provideusefulillustrationsofthiscomplexity.Seelkenotesthateconomicfactorsstrainsocialcohesionandlimitindividualopportunity,causingyoungpeopletoturntogangsandviolence.Jaitmanetal.establishthatviolentcommunitiessuffereconomicallyasaresultofthatviolence.InCentralAmerica,thisexacerbatestheeconomicdepressioncommunitiesalreadyfaceduetostructural,social,andgovernanceproblems.Despitethecomplexityandinter-relatednessofpushfactorsdrivingmigrationfromCentralAmerica,observersandanalystsoftentrytoboildowntheissuetoonesinglepredominantfactor.Therearefrequentlyattemptstoproveapointbycharacterizingthe“mostimportant”pushfactorofmigration.IntheUnitedStates,debateoverwhichfactorismostimportanthasevolvedintoapoliticaldispute,withanti-immigrationcommentatorspointingtothecleareconomicunderpinningsofthemassemigration(makingmigrantseasiertoturnaway),andpro-immigrationvoicesarguingthattheflowcanonlybecharacterizedasrefugeesfleeingtheregionduetoviolenceandinsecurity(makingthemthusdeservingofhumanitarianprotection).
KeyDrivers:Securityvs.EconomicsThedebateaboutwhethereconomicsorsecurityisthekeyfactordrivingHonduranemigrationhasbynowbecomewellestablished.However,thereislittleconsensusamongobserversaboutwhichisthemoresignificantcause.SecurityHiskeyetal.(2018)analyzeddatafromVanderbilt’sLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP)2014AmericasBarometersurveytodeterminewhetherviolenceandinsecurityhaveameasurableinfluenceonthedecisionofCentralAmericanstoemigrate.TheyfoundthatinHondurasandElSalvador,concernsaboutpersonalsecurityaremoreclosely 18ErikaFeller,“RefugeesarenotMigrants,”RefugeeSurveyQuarterly24no.4(2005):27-35,doi:10.1093/rsq/hdi077
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relatedtoemigrationintentionsthaneconomicfactors.Orozco(2018)assertsthatrecentmigrationtrendsfromtheregionarebeingspurredbyviolenceandinsecuritybroughtaboutbyorganizedcrimenetworks.HisresearchshowsthatinHonduras,a1%increaseinhomicidesdrivesmigrationby120%.AsurveyofCentralAmericanmigrantsbyMédecinsSansFrontièresshowedpersonalexperiencewithviolenceasthemostimportanttriggeringfactorinaperson’sdecisiontoleavetheircountryoforigin.19Inthesurvey,50.3%ofCentralAmericanscitedviolenceasatleastpartofthereasontheylefthome.Severalauthorshavefocusedtheirresearchspecificallyontheemigrationofchildren.Forinstance,Clemensdeterminesthattheimpactofashort-termincreaseinviolenceonunaccompaniedchildmigrationisroughlyequivalenttolong-termeconomiccharacteristicslikeincomeandpovertylevels,andismuchgreaterthanshort-termeconomicchangessuchasarapidriseinunemployment.Ameudo-Dorantesetal.(2016)findthatahighhomiciderateinthecountryoforiginishighlycorrelatedtothedecisionofunaccompaniedchildrentoemigrate.CarlsonandGallagher(2015)surveytheliteraturetoassesstheimpactofviolenceonthedecisionbychildrentoemigrate,andtheyultimatelymakethecasethatviolenceisaprimarycauseforrecentsurgesofunaccompaniedchildrenarrivingattheSouthwestU.S.border.EconomicsOntheothersideofthedebate,Luna(2018)usesasurveyconductedbytheHondurannonprofitCompanyofJesus(ERIC-SJ),toarguethatHonduransemigrateprimarilyforeconomicreasonsandnot,asmanysuggest,toescapeviolenceandinsecurity.Lunaclaimsthatoftherespondentswhohadafamilymemberemigratewithinthepreviousfouryears,82.9%reportedthatthefamilymemberemigratedduetolackofemploymentortogenerateincome.Only11.3%reportedtheirfamilymemberhadmigratedduetoviolenceandinsecurity.QuijadaandSierra(2018)conductamixedmethodsstudyintothecausesofemigrationfromHonduras.Theauthorsstateverydirectlythat"theprevalenceofviolenceinareaswherepotentialmigrantsliveisunrelatedtotheirmigrationdecisions".Instead,theyfindthatthepropensitytomigrateisincreasedforindividualsinlow-incomehouseholdswholackaccesstobasicservicesormeansofself-improvement.Likewise,manyconservativepoliticalfiguresintheUnitedStateshavestatedincleartermsthattheyseetheCentralAmericanexodusasbeingeconomicinnature.InJune2018,speakingonNBC’sMeetthePress,OklahomaSenatorJamesLankfordsaid,“thevastmajorityof[CentralAmericans]arecomingforeconomicreasons…notjustasylum,they’retryingtocomeforeconomicgains."20AreportissuedbythePewResearchCentersupports
19MSF,ForcedtoFleeCentralAmerica’sNorthernTriangle:ANeglectedHumanitarianCrisis,NewYork:MedecinsSansFrontieres,2017.AccessedonMarch17,2019.https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/msf_forced-to-flee-central-americas-northern-triangle.pdf.20JamesLankford,InterviewwithChuckTodd,MeetthePress,NBC,June24,2018.
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thisassessment,findingthat96%ofHonduransdeportedfromtheUnitedStatesin2016citedworkasamainreasonfortheirinitialmigration.21
ResearchGoalsandMethodologyInlightofthispuzzlingdisconnectintheliteratureaboutwhatisdrivingrecentmigrationfromCentralAmerica,andgiventhelackofquantitativeempiricalanalysisoftherootcausespushingHonduranemigration,Iendeavortomeasureandcomparetheinfluenceofeconomicandsecurityfactorsontheindividualdecisiontoemigrate.Toaccomplishthis,Ianalyzedatafromthe2016AmericasBarometerSurveyfromtheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP).AmericasBarometerisamulti-countrysurveywhichfocusesonpolitical,economic,andquality-of-lifeissuesincountriesthroughoutLatinAmerica.Themostrecentroundofsurveystookplacein2016and2017,andincludedsurveystakenin29countriesandtotalingmorethan43,000interviews.The2016surveyinHonduraswasconductedamonganationallyrepresentativesampleof1,560votingageadultsthroughface-to-faceinterviews.Toanalyzethesurveydata,Ifirstcross-tabulatedanumberofvariablestodeterminetheirbivariaterelationshiptotheintentiontoemigrate.Secondly,Iusedabinarylogisticregressionmodeltorunapredictiveanalysisthatexplainstherelationshipbetweeneconomicandsecurityfactorsandtheintentiontoemigrate.DependentVariableMydependentvariableisthedichotomousquestionofwhetheranindividualhasanyintentionofgoingtoliveorworkabroadinthenextthreeyears.Theresponsetothisquestionisrepresentativeofanindividual’sintentiontoemigrate,andresearchhasshownthatintentionstomigrateareastatisticallysignificantpredictorofaperson’sdecisiontodoso(see,forexample,CreightonandDeJong).Foreaseofstatisticalinterpretation,Irecodedthisvariablefrom(1=yes,2=no)to(0=no,1=yes).IndependentVariables–Cross-Tabulation• CRIMEVICTIMIZATION–Respondentswereaskediftheyhavebeenavictimofanytypeof
crime(robbery,burglary,assault,fraud,blackmail,extortion,violentthreats,oranyothertypeofcrime)inthepast12months.
• CRIMEVICTIMIZATION-OTHERHOUSEHOLDMEMBER–Respondentswereaskedifanyother
memberoftheirhouseholdwasavictimofcrimeinthepast12months?
21Cohnetal.,“ImmigrationfromGuatemala,Honduras,ElSalvadorUp.”
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• LEVELOFFEAROFBEINGAVICTIMOFHOMICIDE–Respondentswereaskedwhatleveloffeartheyhaveofbeingadirectvictimofhomicide.Responseoptionsincludealotoffear,somefear,alittlefear,ornofearatall.
• PERCEPTIONOFNEIGHBORHOODINSECURITY–Respondentswereaskedhowsafetheyfeel
intheneighborhoodwheretheylive,consideringthepossibilityofbeingassaultedorrobbed.Responseoptionsincludeverysafe,somewhatsafe,somewhatunsafe,andveryunsafe.
• PERCEPTIONOFPERSONALECONOMICSITUATION–Respondentswereaskediftheythink
thattheirpersonaleconomicsituationisbetterthan,thesameas,orworsethanitwas12monthsago.
• HOUSEHOLDMONTHLYINCOME–Respondentswereaskedwhichincomerangetheirtotal
monthlyhouseholdincomefitsinto,includingremittancesfromabroadandincomefromallworkingadultsandchildren.
• PERSONALMONTHLYINCOME-Respondentswereaskedwhichofaseriesofrangestheir
personalmonthlyincomefallsinto,withouttakingintoaccountotherhouseholdmembers.
IndependentVariables–LogisticRegression• HOUSEHOLDMONTHLYINCOME–Respondentswereaskedwhichincomerangetheirtotal
monthlyhouseholdincomefitsinto,includingremittancesfromabroadandincomefromallworkingadultsandchildren.Thisisascalevariableconsistingof16rangesofincome.
• FREQUENCYOFCRIMEVICTIMIZATION-Tocreatethisvariable,Icombineddatafromtwo
questions“Haveyoubeenavictimofanytypeofcrimeinthepast12months?Thatis,haveyoubeenavictimofrobbery,burglary,assault,fraud,blackmail,extortion,violentthreats,oranyothertypeofcrimeinthepast12months?”,and“Howmanytimeshaveyoubeenacrimevictimduringthelast12months?”.Thisrequiredrecodingthefirstquestionfrom(1=yes,2=no)intoascalethatincorporatesfrequencyofvictimization.
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ResultsCross-TabulationEmigrationIntention*CrimeVictimization
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoVictimofCrimeintheLast12Months
Yes 58.8% 41.2% 100.0% (197) (138) (335)
No 35.5% 64.5% 100.0% (428) (779) (1207)
Total 40.5% 59.5% 100.0% 625 917 1542
Chi(df)=59.295(1),p=0.000;Phi=0.196Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandcrimevictimizationwasverysignificant,χ²(1,N=1542)=59.295,p=0.000.Victimsofcrimeweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadnotbeenvictimized.Thisresultsuggeststhatcrimevictimizationisasignificantindicatorofaperson’sintentiontoleaveHonduras.EmigrationIntention*CrimeVictimization-OtherHouseholdMember
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoOtherHouseholdMemberWasa
VictimofCrimeYes 53.3% 46.7% 100.0%
(209) (183) (392)
No 36.0% 64.0% 100.0% (413) (733) (1146)
Total 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% (622) (916) (1538)
Chi(df)=36.201(1),p=0.000;Phi=0.153Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandvictimizationofanothermemberofthehouseholdwasverysignificant,χ²(1,N=1538)=36.201,p=0.000.Individualswholivedinahomewhereanotherhouseholdmemberwasavictimofacrimeweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadnotbeenvictimized.Similartoindividualswhohadbeenthevictimofcrimethemselves,victimizationofanotherhouseholdmemberledtohigherratesofemigrationintentions.
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EmigrationIntention*LevelofFearofBeingaVictimofHomicide
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoLevelofFearofBeingaVictimof
HomicideALotof
Fear 49.7% 50.3% 100.0% (249) (252) (501)
SomeFear 38.1% 61.9% 100.0% (119) (193) (312)
LittleFear 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% (117) (226) (343)
NoFearatAll
36.9% 63.1% 100.0% (142) (243) (385)
Total 40.7% 59.3% 100.0% (627) (914) (1541)
Chi(df)=26.160(3),p=0.000;Phi=0.130Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandfearofhomicidevictimizationwasverysignificant,χ²(3,N=1541)=26.160,p=0.000.Thosewithahigherleveloffearofbeingavictimofhomicideweremuchmorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadlessfear.Thisrevealsthatinadditiontotheexperienceofcrimevictimization,thefeelingofinsecurityalsoledahighernumberofpeopletoexpresstheirintentionstoemigrate.EmigrationIntention*PerceptionofNeighborhoodInsecurity
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoPerceptionofNeighborhood
InsecurityVerySafe 32.9% 67.1% 100.0%
(143) (292) (435)
SomewhatSafe 42.6% 57.4% 100.0% (186) (251) (437)
SomewhatUnsafe
43.8% 56.2% 100.0% (173) (222) (395)
VeryUnsafe 46.3% 53.7% 100.0% (120) (139) (259)
Total 40.8% 59.2% 100.0%
(622) (904) (1526)Chi(df)=16.633(3),p=0.001;Cramer'sV=0.104Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandperceivedinsecuritywassignificant,χ²(3,N=1526)=16.633,p=0.001.Individualswhoperceivedtheir
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EmigrationIntention*PerceptionofPersonalEconomicSituation
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoPerceptionofPersonalEconomic
SituationBetter 35.5% 64.5% 100.0%
(99) (180) (279)
Same 38.9% 61.1% 100.0% (223) (350) (573)
Worse 44.0% 56.0% 100.0% (303) (385) (688)
Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0%
(625) (915) (1540)Chi(df)=7.078(2),p=0.029;Cramer'sV=0.068Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandperceivedpersonaleconomicsituationwassignificant,χ²(2,N=1540)=7.078,p=0.029.Individualswithaworseperceptionoftheirpersonaleconomicsituationweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhohadabetterperception.Thisistheonlyeconomicquestionthatshowedaworseeconomicsituationleadingtohigherlevelsofemigrationintentions.It’sinterestingtonoteherethatthisquestionisbasedonperceptionofeconomiccircumstances,notmeasuredincome.ThisraisesaninterestingquestionwhichIdonotexplorehere,andthatiswhetherthereisadifferenceinthedecisiontoemigratebasedonperceivedratherthanmeasuredeconomicconditions.
Chi(df)=7.717(2),p=0.021;Cramer'sV=0.077
neighborhoodasunsafeweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewhoperceivedtheirneighborhoodassafe.TheperceptionofneighborhoodsecurityisanotherimportantfactorinwhetherornotsomeoneexpressedanintentiontoleaveHonduras.
EmigrationIntention*HouseholdMonthlyIncome
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoHouseholdMonthlyIncome
Low 36.4% 63.6% 100.0% (164) (287) (451)
Medium 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% (173) (255) (428)
High 45.6% 54.4% 100.0% (195) (233) (428)
Total 40.7% 59.3% 100.0%
(532) (775) (1307)
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Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandhouseholdincomewassignificant,χ²(2,N=1307)=7.717,p=0.021.Membersofahouseholdwithahighermonthlyincomeweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewithalowerhouseholdincome.Perhapsthemostsurprisingfindinginmyanalysis,thistablerevealsthathouseholdswithhigherincomelevelsaremorelikelytohaveanintentiontoleavethanthosewithlowerincomelevels.Thissuggeststhatfamiliesaremorelikelytoleavewhentheyhavethemeanstodoso.
EmigrationIntention*PersonalMonthlyIncome
IntendstoLiveorWorkAbroad
TotalYes NoPersonalMonthlyIncome Low 39.4% 60.6% 100.0%
(82) (126) (208)Medium 40.6% 59.4% 100.0%
(82) (120) (202)High 45.0% 55.0% 100.0%
(103) (126) (229)Total 41.8% 58.2% 100.0%
(267) (372) (639)Chi(df)=1.555(2),p=0.460;Cramer'sV=0.049Therelationshipbetweenemigrationintentionsandpersonalincomewasnotsignificant,χ²(2,N=639)=1.555,p=0.460.However,thosewithahigherpersonalmonthlyincomedidexpressaslightlyhigherinterestinemigrating.Thefactthatthisrelationshipwasinsignificantisinandofitselfquitesignificant.Icertainlyexpectedtoseeaclearrelationshipbetweenpersonalincomeandthedecisiontoemigrate,andwassurprisedtolearntherewasnotone.LogisticRegression
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)MonthlyHouseholdIncome
.024 .011 4.694 1 .030 1.024
NumberofVictimizations
.251 .054 21.284 1 .000 1.286
Figure3-BinaryLogisticRegression(Y=IntentiontoEmigrate)
• Foreachadditionalstepupinreportedmonthlyhouseholdincome,theoddsofanindividualexpressinganemigrationintentionishigherby2.4%.
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• Foreachadditionalreportedcrimevictimization,theoddsofanindividualexpressinganemigrationintentionishigherby28.6%
SummaryandConclusionsMyanalysisrevealsthatintheaggregate,Honduransaremorelikelytoexpressanintentiontoemigrateiftheyhavebeenavictimofcrime.Thislikelihoodincreasesby28.6percentforeachadditionalcrimevictimizationsurveyrespondentsreported.Ontheotherhand,thereappearstobeaweakrelationshipbetweenindividualorhouseholdeconomicconditionsandtheintentiontoemigrate.Moreover,contrarytowhatmightbeexpected,thelikelihoodofanindividualexpressingtheirintentiontoemigrateactuallyincreasesby2.4percentforeachstepupinreportedmonthlyhouseholdincome.Myresultswereslightlydifferentwhenconsideringindividuals’perceptionoftheirpersonaleconomicsituation.Inthatcase,thosewithaperceptionofbeingworseoffweremorelikelytoexpressintentionstoemigratethanthosewithamorepositiveperception.Baseduponthesefindings,policymakersintheUnitedStatesandelsewherelookingforwaystostabilizeHondurasshouldlookfirstatwaystoreducecrimeandenhancesecurity.SimilarresearchshouldbeconductedusingsurveydatafromneighboringElSalvadorandGuatemalatodeterminewhatfactorsaremostinfluentialinthedecisiontoleavethosecountries.
AcknowledgementsIwouldliketothanktheLatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject(LAPOP)anditsmajorsupporters(theUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,andVanderbiltUniversity)formakingthedataavailable.IwouldalsoliketothanktheDr.MichaelPfauandDr.DavidShirkattheUniversityofSanDiego,aswellasDr.AndrewSeleeandArielG.RuizSotofromtheMigrationPolicyInstitute.
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