hazel markus jeanne smith richard l. morelandpeople.loyno.edu/~nmstraig/self concept...

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1985, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1494-1512

Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/85/S00.75

Role of the Self-Concept in the Perception of Others

Hazel MarkusUniversity of Michigan

Jeanne SmithUniversity of Virginia

Richard L. MorelandUniversity of Pittsburgh

A diverse set of psychological phenomena including impression formation, personperception, attributional bias, attitude assimilation and contrast, projection, androle taking all accord the self a significant role in the understanding of the thoughts,feelings, and behavior of other people. This article examines the nature of the self-concept's involvement in social perception. The self-concept is defined as a set ofcognitive structures (self-schemas) that provide for individual expertise in particularsocial domains. Two studies examine the information-processing consequences ofthis expertise for the perception of others. In a unitizing task, subjects with mas-culinity schemas (schematics) consistently divided a schema-relevant film aboutanother person into larger units than did those without schemas (aschematics).Moreover, in reconstructing the film sequence, schematics made more global con-jectures about the personality and motivation of the target individual. This resultis viewed as an instance of expert performance, in which the self-schema providesthe schematics with an interpretive framework for organizing the schema-relevantbehavior of others. Moreover, when given instructions to attend to the details ofbehavior, schematics made smaller units, whereas the performance of the aschematicsdid not vary. The role of the self-concept in the perception of others is seen to varysystematically with whether self or other is the cognitive reference point and theconditions associated with each are delineated.

The self-concept provides a framework forthe perception and organization of our ownlife experiences. It is also broadly and system-atically used as an interpretive framework forcomprehending the thoughts, feelings, and be-haviors of other people. The clearest expressionof this notion is found in the phenomenon ofprojection (e.g., Freud, 1924/1956; Holmes,1968,1978; Schiffenbauer, 1974), where char-acteristics of the self are attributed to others,but a concern with the relation between self-perception and other perception is found in awide range of psychological theorizing.

The idea that there is a mutual and recip-rocal influence between the self-concept andthe perception of others was obvious for manyof psychology's earliest theorists (Hall, 1898;

This research was supported by Grant BNS 8005749from the National Science Foundation.

The authors would like to thank Nancy Cantor andRobert Zajonc for valuable suggestions on an earlier draftof the manuscript.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Hazel Markus,Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, AnnArbor, Michigan 48106.

James, 1915; McDougall, 1921; Mead, 1934),requiring little in the way of empirical verifi-cation. Baldwin (1902) wrote "my sense ofyourself grows in terms of myself . . . mythoughts of others, as persons, are mainly filledup with myself" (p. 18). Subsequent psycho-logical theorizing reaffirmed this belief in theimportance of the self/other relation in per-ception. Social psychologists Krech andCrutchfield (1948) argued that "the self is themost important structure in the psychologicalfield" (p. 69) and stressed that the perceptionof other parts of the field (e.g., objects, people,groups, social organizations) depends primar-ily on their relation to the self.

Personality theorists Combs and Snygg(1959) asserted that the self is the central pointof the perceptual field and is "the frame ofreference in terms of which all other percep-tions gain their meaning" (p. 145). More re-cently, developmental psychologists Lewis andBrooks-Gunn (1979), building on Piaget's(1954) work on perspective taking, claim acomplete interdependence between self-knowledge and knowledge about others. Spe-

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ROLE OF THE SELF-CONCEPT 1495

cifically, they state as a basic principle of socialcognition that what can be demonstrated tobe known about the self can be said to beknown about the other, and vice versa.

A diverse empirical literature focusing pri-marily on how self-perception influences otherperception has kept these intriguing ideas alive.Person perception research documents thatindividuals often use the same categories indescribing other people that they use in de-scribing themselves (see Dornbusch, Hastorf,Richardson, Muzzy, & Vreeland, 1956; Hig-gins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Hirschberg & Jen-nings, 1980; Lemon & Warren, 1974; Lewicki,1983; O'Keefe, Delia, & O'Keefe, 1977;Shrauger & Altrocchi, 1964; Shrauger & Pat-terson, 1976).

In the attribution and attitude literature,several effects, sometimes contradictory, havebeen observed. One, the false consensus effect,is the tendency for people to perceive similarity,to assume that others feel, think, or behave asthey do (e.g., Fields & Schuman, 1976; Ross,Greene, & House, 1977; Sherman, Presson,Chassin, Corty, & Olshavsky, 1983). The otheris the tendency to perceive differences, tosharply contrast their own attitude, for ex-ample, with the attitudes of others when theyhold a strong attitude position themselves (e.g.,Marks, 1984; Sherif & Hovland, 1961;Steiner& Johnson, 1963; Wallen, 1942).

Together, these studies leave little doubt thatthe self-concept can have some effect on theperception of others, but the studies have notprovided a comprehensive picture of the self-concept's involvement. The self-concept hasbeen accorded a biasing function in social per-ception, yet the precise nature of the contactbetween self-perception and the perception ofother people remains something of a mystery.

Despite the fact that many theories accordthe self a pivotal role in the entire person per-ception process, the primary empirical em-phasis has been only on one result of that pro-cess: the evaluation of others. The presumedselective influence of the self on other aspectsof the process is not well understood, and avariety of significant questions remain unan-swered. What, for example, is the effect of theself-concept on the perception and organiza-tion of the behavior of others? What is the in-fluence of self-concept on memory for the be-havior of others? What is the effect on infer-

ences about their behavior? To answer thesequestions we first define the self-concept as aset of cognitive structures that provide for in-dividual expertise in particular domains of so-cial behavior. We then examine the informa-tion-processing consequences of this expertisefor the perception of others, and finally, wedelineate the conditions under which the in-fluence of the self-concept will be particularlypowerful.

The Self-Concept: A Definition

For purposes of definition, we formulate theself-concept as a set of self-schemas that or-ganize past experiences and are used to rec-ognize and interpret relevant stimuli in the so-cial environment. A self-schema is defined asa "cognitive generalization about the self, de-rived from past experience, that organizes andguides the processing of self-related informa-tion contained in the individual's social ex-periences" (Markus, 1977, p. 64). A series ofstudies (e.g., Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane,Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Rogers, 1977, 1981;Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) have indicatedthat self-schemas have a systematic influenceon the way information about the self is or-ganized and used. Individuals who have self-schemas in a particular domain can makejudgments about themselves in this domainquickly, confidently, and consistently. Bothmemory for one's past thoughts, feelings, andbehaviors and predictions about one's futureappear to be influenced by these self-relevantcognitive structures.

Self-schemas result from the process of ac-quiring knowledge about the self. This processleads to a thorough understanding of particularfeatures of one's disposition and behavior.Some individuals, for instance, determine thatthey are introverts: fearful of large parties, un-willing to speak in a public discussion, andhappy with their own company. Many havetheories about why they are introverts; theycan anticipate the circumstances that will mostclearly reveal their introversion, and very oftenthey seek out or construct situations that arecompatible with this view of themselves. Otherindividuals come to achieve this same knowl-edge and understanding about their creativity,their independence, or their ability to nurtureor give support.

1496 H. MARKUS, J. SMITH, AND R. MORELAND

Self-Schemas and Expertise

In this process of self-definition, the attri-butes that are used to characterize the self takeon fairly precise meanings and become asso-ciated with particular patterns of behavior. In-dividuals who have well-differentiated self-schemas for introversion, for example, becomesensitive to introversion, acquire a large storeof knowledge about it, and thereby develop atype of expertise for introversion. Nearly ev-eryone will have some general knowledge ofthe prototypical attributes of introversion, butthis knowledge will be particularly dense andrichly textured for those who have dennedthemselves in this domain. For the individualwith an introversion self-schema, the self-con-cept will function as a compelling, perhapsunavoidable, reference point when consideringintroversion, one's own or that of others.

The empirical work on expertise reveals thatit is associated with systematic cognitive con-sequences (Charness, 1976; Chase & Simon,1973; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; deGroot,1965;Frey&Adesman, 1976;Reitman, 1976;Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). Ex-perts seem to be able to do four things betterthan novices: (a) recognize when input infor-mation is relevant to their domain of expertiseand distinguish such information from irrel-evant material; (b) organize or "chunk" thatinformation into consistent, meaningful, dis-cernible units and integrate the informationwith previously acquired information; (c) re-trieve that information, when asked to do so,with greater accuracy and make greater usethan the nonexpert of contextual cues to im-prove the amount of material recalled; and (d)vary the information-processing strategy, de-pending on the required task.

For schematics (people with a self-schemain a particular domain), the ability to use theinformation in the self-schema should allowthem when perceiving others to do many ofthe things that experts can do: recognize wheninput is relevant to their domain, integrate thisinformation with previously acquired infor-mation, make use of contextual cues to fill inincomplete or missing information, and varytheir information-processing strategy from onethat focuses on the "big picture" to one thatconcentrates on details of the actions. Asche-matics, those without self-schemas in a partic-

ular domain, in contrast, are likely to perceivethe actions of others only on the basis of thegeneral knowledge shared by all individualsand according to whatever structure can begleaned from the targets' behavior. These in-dividuals will have relatively low levels of self-knowledge for the domain in question, and asa result the self-concept will not be of use inprocessing the behavior of the stimulus others.

Self-Schemas and Chunking

Most studies on expertise (e.g., Chase & Si-mon, 1973; Reitman, 1976) have used a par-adigm in which experts and novices are askedto divide a relevant stimulus array (a chessboard, a baseball sequence) into units calledchunks. Everybody can chunk; it appears,however, that experts' chunks contain moreuseful, goal-relevant information, and more-over, experts can vary the size of their chunksdepending on the task at hand. To explore theability of schematics to vary their processingstrategy and make chunks relevant to the task,we used the unitizing procedure developed byNewtson and his colleagues (Massad, Hubbard,& Newtson, 1979; Newtson, 1973; Newtson &Engquist, 1976) in which a subject views a filmof another person and is simply requested topush a button each time a meaningful unit ofbehavior occurs.

In studies using the unitizing task as a de-pendent measure, subjects tended to alter theirunitizing patterns as a function of the noveltyof the stimulus, generating relatively large unitswhen viewing a familiar sequence but switch-ing to exceedingly small units if the behaviorin the stimulus became unusual or inconsis-tent. Although Newtson does not refer specif-ically to the role of knowledge structures inhis discussion of the unitizing process, histechnique provides a potentially useful methodfor examining the role of self-schemas in or-ganizing the behavior of other people. Musicenthusiasts, for example, can listen to a pieceof music and categorize it in one large unit asa beautiful symphony, or alternatively, they candescribe it in many small units in terms ofwell-formed resolutions of chords. Novices, inorganizing the same stimulus, will rely pri-marily on the categories of fast and slow, orquiet and loud, and at best notice the separa-tion among movements.


The knowledge structures of .the expertcontribute additional structure to the perceivedstimulus and allow for multiple categorizationsand interpretations. Similarly, the self-schemacan serve as a framework within which the be-havior of others can become meaningful to theobserver (cf. Hayes-Roth, 1977; Jones & Davis,1965; Markus & Smith, 1981). Individuals whohave a self-schema for masculinity, for exam-ple, and who define themselves as competitive,aggressive, and athletic and value these char-acteristics are likely to find more meaning andstructure in the competitive or athletic activ-ities of another person than are individuals whodo not view themselves in these terms. Theschematic individuals' interest and the knowl-edge allow them to contribute significantlymore to the perceptual product and to thinkabout these actions in a variety of ways thatare not available to aschematic individuals, forwhom the same actions may be much less in-terpretable.

To evaluate the hypothesized cognitive con-sequences of the self-concept on the perceptionof others, we used Newtson's unitizing task tocompare individuals with relatively high levelsof involvement and self-knowledge in the do-main of masculinity (masculine schematics)with individuals with low levels of involvementand knowledge in this domain (aschematics).Specifically, both groups were required to uni-tize two different film segments, one irrelevantwith respect to masculinity and one relevantto masculinity. On the basis of the findings ofthe cognitive consequences of expertise, wehypothesized that schematics as experts in thedomain of masculinity, in contrast to asche-matics, would recognize the schema relevanceof the film segment containing stereotypicallymasculine behavior and would respond to itquite differently than they would to theschema-irrelevant film. We anticipated thatthese subjects would see relatively more co-herence and meaning among the activities ofthe target individual shown and thus formlarger units. In this study we were primarilyconcerned with the investigation of unitizingbehavior, but we also predicted that the sche-matics would view the target individual as bothmore masculine and more similar to them-selves and would have enhanced memory forhis actions.

Study 1

Method

Identification of Subjects

The following procedure was used to identify subjectswho were schematic or aschematic for the domain of mas-culinity. Five hundred students in introductory psychologyclasses were given questionnaires that contained a numberof self-rating scales. Three of the scale items were relevantto masculine behavior ("aggressive," "dominant," and "actsas a leader"). In addition, "masculine" and "feminine"were used; the remaining scale items were words not di-rectly related to masculinity. Subjects were asked to ratethemselves on each of these traits using an 11-point scale(1 = describes me; 11 = does not describe me). For eachof these scales, subjects were,also asked to indicate howimportant each trait was to their overall self-evaluation,again using an 11-point scale (1 = very important; 11 =not at all important). On the basis of their responses tothis questionnaire, 120 male students were selected forparticipation. Only male students were used in the presentstudy. From these individuals, two groups of subjects wereidentified. The first group, the masculine schematics (n =62), consisted of individuals who rated themselves ex-tremely high (scale points 1-4) on at least two of the threemasculine characteristics, who indicated that two of thethree characteristics were important to their self-evaluation(points 1-4), who rated the item "feminine" as not at allself-descriptive (points 8-11), and who indicated that thisdimension was very unimportant to their self-evaluation(points 8-11). The second group, the aschematics (« =58), comprised individuals who rated themselves moder-ately (points 5-7) on two out of three masculine adjectives,who rated two out of three of the adjectives as unimportant(points 8-11), and who placed themselves on the middleor low range on the item "feminine" (points 8-11).'

Six weeks after the questionnaire was administered, 26masculine schematics and 24 aschematics were called in-dividually to the laboratory, where they received the iden-

1 Previous studies (Bern, 1981; Markus, Crane, Bern-stein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus, Crane, & Siladi, 1978) havedocumented that describing oneself extremely on mascu-line characteristics and rating them as important to self-evaluation is accompanied by relatively extensive knowl-edge about one's masculinity in comparison with thosewho do not rate themselves extremely and who do notbelieve the characteristics are important. It is importantto note that there were no subjects who rated themselvesmoderately (points 5-7) on two out of the three adjectivesand who rated two out of three as important in self-de-scription. In the studies that have used this technique toselect schematic and aschematic subjects, there has beena strong positive correlation (ranging from .78 to .89) be-tween extremity and importance in self-definition. If in-dividuals evaluate themselves extremely in some domain,the domain is apparently viewed as important in self-def-inition, and vice versa. Using the midpoint of a trait ratingscale seems to imply that the characteristic is actually notrelevant or not appropriate for describing one's behavior.


tical treatment. They were not informed of the connectionbetween the laboratory session and the questionnaire. Inaddition, it is unlikely that they could have inferred sucha connection because different ostensible purposes werepresented to them and different experimenters were usedfor the studies. Questionning during the debriefing sessionconfirmed that they were not aware of a connection.

Materials and Procedure

The laboratory session consisted of three separate cog-nitive tasks designed to assess the influence of self-schemason processing information about others in schema-relevantdomains.

Task I: Unitizing. To create a stimulus that was relevantto the masculinity dimension, a film was constructed con-sisting of two segments that depicted a male college studentperforming a number of routine activities in his dormroom. The film, although carefully controlled for thenumber, type, and duration of activities, showed one personin a continuous stream of activity that appeared quite nat-ural. One segment (schema-irrelevant) consisted of behav-ioral sequences that were rated by independent judges tobe neutral with respect to the masculine sex role (e.g.,playing records, eating an apple). Another segment(schema-relevant) showed the same actor in behavioral se-quences judged to be stereotypically masculine (e.g., liftingweights, watching a baseball game). All subjects saw theneutral film first and the schema-relevant film second. Thefilm segments were matched in that the behavioral se-quences in the schema-irrelevant segment were of the sameduration as the behavioral sequences in the schema-relevantsegment. Each segment contained five behavioral se-quences, and each sequence consisted of four repetitionsof a single behavior (e.g., eating four bites of an apple,taking four swallows of beer). The film was projected ona movie screen placed in front of the subject. Subjects weregiven one-button response panels and written instructions,similar to those used by Newtson, to press the button eachtime they observed a meaningful action unit. The instruc-tions were as follows:

What I would like you to do is to press the button infront of you whenever you see what TO YOU is a mean-ingful unit of action. For example, if you see a persontake ten steps across a room and get a drink of water,you can say that you saw twelve meaningful actions (tensteps across the room, picking up the glass, and drinking),or two meaningful actions (crossing the room anddrinking the water), or one meaningful action (going toget a drink of water). Any number of units is a possibleanswer. There are no right or wrong answers. Just pressthe button whenever YOU feel that you have seen ameaningful unit of action.

No instructions were given regarding the expected orappropriate size of subjects' units. All subjects appearedable to perform the task, and no one experienced any dif-ficulty understanding the instructions. Subjects' responseswere recorded by a PDP-11/20 minicomputer; the filmswere presented on a super-8mm movie projector operatedunder program control.

Task 2: Descriptions of the actor. Following the unitizingtask, subjects were shown the 60 trait adjectives makingup the Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 1974), 20 masculinewords, 20 feminine words, and 20 neutral words, in randomorder. They were asked to judge if the adjectives describedthe actor by pushing a button labeled him if the word wasdescriptive of the actor or a button labeled not him if itwas not descriptive of the actor. Sujbects responded at theirown pace. Each new stimulus was presented 2 s after theprevious response was made. The adjectives were presentedon a CRT (cathode ray tube) screen in four different randomorders generated by a PDP-11/20 minicomputer.

Task 3: Recall of the actor's behavior. After makingtheir judgments of the actor, subjects were asked to performa cued recall task in which they were asked to supply detailsfrom both the schema-irrelevant and the schema-relevantfilms by answering a series of recall questions, such as"What did the actor do after he turned on the TV?"

Task 4: Liking and similarity ratings. In a final task,subjects were given a short questionnaire in which theywere asked to rate on 11-point scales (1 = not at all; 11 =very much) how much they liked the actor in the film, howmasculine they thought he was, and how similar to them-selves they thought he was. Subjects were then debriefedand dismissed.

Results

Task 1: Unitizing

In analyzing the data from the unitizingtask, schematics were compared with asche-matics for the mean number of button pressesfor each minute of the schema-relevant andschema-irrelevant film. Figure 1 shows thepattern of unitizing over the 5 min of eachfilm. A smaller number of responses indicateslarger units. Masculine schematic subjectsconsistently divided the schema-relevant seg-ment into larger units (Kruskal-Wallis = 4.79,df= 1, « = 50, p < .03)2 than did aschematics.The two groups did not, however, differ in theirunitizing of the schema-irrelevant segment.

These findings are consistent with the notionthat the schematics were able to use their self-concepts to organize the behavior portrayed inthe film into larger chunks. Presumably, the

2 An analysis of variance reveals the predicted interactionbetween schematicity (aschematic/schematic) and film type(relevant/irrelevant), f\l, 46) = 3.50,p < .07. However, anonparametric statistic (based on the median) was used inreporting these results because the variance within the as-chematic group was significantly larger than that withinthe schematic group. This difference in variance is consis-tent with the rest of our reasoning: Aschematics as a groupare much less consistent in the type of units (gross or fine)they produce.


SCHEMA-IRRELEVANT FILM

1 2 3 4Time (Minutes)

SCHEMA-RELEVANT FILMIS

14

13

12

I "•6 10

z e7

6

Schematics

Aschemalics

1 2 3 4 5Time (Minutes)

Figure 1. Mean number of units (button presses) for sche-matics and aschematics for each minute of the schema-irrelevant and schema-relevant film.

masculine behavior portrayed in the schema-relevant segment evoked the masculine self-schema for the schematics. The self-schema isassumed to have provided both a context andan interpretive framework for the film, whichallowed the stream of behavior to be organizedinto relatively large chunks. Differences be-tween schematics and aschematics did not oc-cur in the schema-irrelevant film, however, be-cause the neutral (with respect to sex role) ac-tions portrayed presumably did not activatethe masculinity self-schema.3

Task 2: Description of the Actor

In the unitizing task, schematics chunkedrelevant information into larger units than as-chematics. Analysis of the description task wasperformed to determine if the results of theunitizing task can be related to inferencesabout and evaluations of the actor. This mea-sure as well as the liking and similarity mea-sures require subjects to form an impression

of the actor. Because the actor was the sameperson in both film segments, and becausethese measures were not given until after bothfilm segments were shown, they cannot be an-alyzed separately for the schema-relevant andschema-irrelevant segments. Consistent withthe idea that the schematics perceived theschema-relevance of the film, schematics at-tributed significantly more masculine attri-butes to the actor than did aschematics, x2( 1.N = 100) = 5.90, p < .02. Thus, schematics'judgments of another person's masculinityfollowed the same pattern as their judgmentsof their own position on that dimension. Sche-matics and aschematics, however, did not differin the number of neutral or feminine traitsattributed to the actor.

Task 3: Recall of the Actor's Behavior

Contrary to our hypothesis, no differenceswere found between schematics and asche-matics in recall of either schema-relevant orschema-irrelevant behaviors. Both groups wereequally accurate in their answers for both filmsegments (ts < 1), even though their patternsof unitizing differed.4

3 Although schematics are organizing the informationin the schema-relevant film differently from aschematics,the present task structure does not allow us to determinewhether this difference is a function of differences in theprimary process of encoding by units (Newtson, 1973) orin the secondary process of responding to task demands(cf. Ebbesen, 1980). According to Newtson, subjects' un-itizing behavior is a reflection of the amount of informationthey gather from the film; thus, in this view, larger unitsmean that a smaller amount of information has been ex-tracted from the segment. Ebbesen (1980) has recentlyquestioned this view by arguing that Newtson's stimuli wereconstructed so as to encourage this effect. Under normalcircumstances (i.e., a less regimented or structured streamof behavior), the relation between unitizing and the en-coding of information may not be as straightforward asNewtson claims. It might be that the data are initially en-coded in the same way by the two groups but that theschematics use their expertise to elaborate and interpretthe stimuli with information in their existing knowledgestructure and that this process produces the unitizing dif-ference.

4 That both groups were extremely accurate in their re-sponses indicates that the recall task so soon after viewingthe film was probably too easy. However, it is significantthat even though equally accurate in recall, recall was quitedifferently related to unitizing for the two groups. Therewas only a weak association between unitizing and recallfor aschematics (r = -.10), but the size of the units pro-


Large differences were found in confidencefor recall, however. Schematic subjects wereconsistently more confident about their an-swers than aschematic subjects, t(90) = 4.70,p < .001. A regression analysis of the confi-dence data, using correctness and schematicity(schematic/aschematic) as dummy variables,revealed that schematics were significantlymore confident of their responses when theywere correct, ?(88) = 4.64, p < .001. In addi-tion, schematics were also confident when theywere not correct, f(88) = 4.75, p < .001.

Schematics, whose self-schema gives themthe status of experts in the area of masculinity,are more confident of their responses regard-less of the correctness of those responses; theirschema operates to make them quite confidentof those details they may have filled in or sup-plied from past experience. In contrast, asche-matics do not possess a schema to fill in detailsthat they may have missed and are conse-quently less confident of their guesses and per-haps more aware of gaps in their knowledgeof the behavior exhibited in the film.

Task 4: Liking and Similarity Ratings

Schematics saw the actor as more similar tothemselves than did the aschematics, t(48) =3.28, p < .002, and they were more confidentof this similarity, /(48) = 3.3, p < .02. The twogroups did not differ, however, in their likingfor the actor, /(48) < 1. Among schematic sub-jects, those who rated the actor as more mas-culine in Task 2 also saw him as more similarto themselves, r = .47, p < .05, and as morelikable, r = .64, p < .01. For aschematics nei-ther of these judgments is significantly relatedto their judgment of the actor's masculinity,r = .25 for similarity, and r = .16 for liking.Thus, schematics' liking and masculinityjudgments are related to a greater degree thanthose of the aschematics, z = 2.73, p < .001,

and this is also true for similarity and mas-culinity, although not significantly so, z = 1.14,

Discussion

The results from Study 1 indicate that sche-matics behave as experts in the domain ofmasculinity. Because they recognized theschema relevance of the stereotypically mas-culine film, their unitizing behavior was quitedifferent for the two film segments. Schematicsorganized the schema-relevant film into largerunits than the aschematics.

In the domain of chess, a well-developedknowledge structure allows the expert to ex-tract more information from a relevant stim-ulus (Chase & Simon, 1973) and to "move thatinformation through the system" (Newell &Simon, 1972) more efficiently. In this study, itmay be argued that schematics use the self-concept to organize relevant information abouta relatively unknown stimulus person into itsmost usable form. The subjects in this studywere given no instructions concerning the na-ture of the information we wished them togather from the films. In such a situation, asin many situations taking place in the courseof naturally occurring interaction, the strat-egy providing the most cognitive economymay well be to form a global impression ofthe stimulus individual. The well-developedknowledge structures of the schematics withrespect to their own masculinity may facili-tate just this type of global or "big-picture"impression of another person and may resultin larger units of behavior. The fact that theschematics saw the stimulus person as moremasculine and were more confident of theirrecall of his behavior than the aschematics alsoindicates that the schematics were going be-yond the information given to form a generalimpression of the stimulus person.

duced by schematic subjects showed a more substantialnegative correlation with the number of correctly answeredrecall items (r = -.38, p < .07). This difference in corre-lation, though not statistically significant (2 = 1.00, p <.16), suggests that larger units may be associated with betterrecall for schematics. In addition, schematics' larger unitswere related to a higher degree of confidence in these judg-ments (r = -.32, p < .04), a relation that was not significantfor aschematics (r = -.18; z = 2.32, p < .01).

Study 2

In a second study we continued our explo-ration of the relation between the self-conceptand the perception of others, using the sameset of tasks but varying the reason given to thesubject for attending to the other person. Instudies of expertise in nonperson domains,


greater skill is not always associated with largerchunks. When asked to do so, chess masterscan use their knowledge of the domain tochunk a chess board into smaller units than anovice (Chase & Simon, 1973). Will schemat-ics behave like experts and vary their infor-mation processing strategy when the situationdemands attention to detail? In an effort toevaluate these further consequences of exper-tise, we hypothesized that schematics could usethe dense knowledge (Chi & Koeske, 1983) thatis assumed to be part of their self-structure toorganize the behavior of the stimulus personinto smaller meaningful units when specific ordetailed information is necessary. Aschemat-ics, who are without this relevant knowledge,will rely primarily on the structure inherentin the behavior of the stimulus person for theirunderstanding and interpretation and as suchshould be relatively unresponsive to changesin processing goals.

This second study is also necessary for fullyinterpreting the results of Study 1. An impor-tant alternative interpretation for the results isthat the schematic and the aschematic subjectsdiffered in ways other than those revealed bythe self-ratings of masculinity and that it isthese differences that produced the observedunitizing and rating differences. It could be,for example, that those individuals who ratethemselves extremely and thus are identifiedas schematics are generally extreme types thatare given to quick, global judgments of them-selves and others and are not particularly sen-sitive to multiple meanings or ambiguity. Itcould be this tendency of the schematics ratherthan their greater involvement and knowledgein the domain of masculinity that producedthe effect. Such an explanation is unlikely inthat several other studies (e.g., Markus, 1977;Markus et al., 1982) have not found intelli-gence or cognitive style differences betweenschematics and aschematics in various do-mains. Moreover, individuals are rarely foundto be generally schematic (schematic in manydomains) or generally aschematic. Yet with justthe data of Study 1, the interpretation cannotbe completely disregarded. In the second study,however, we varied the instructions that ac-company the unitizing task. If the large unitsof the schematics reflect a global or undiffer-entiated response style rather than the way theyare applying their knowledge of the domain of

masculinity, they should not be any more re-sponsive to variations in processing goals thanthe aschematics.

Specifically, in this study we comparedschematics with aschematics to investigate thedifferential effect of an explicit instruction onthe unitizing response. The relation betweenthe pattern of unitizing and the nature of theinferences made about the stimulus person wasalso examined by substituting a reconstructivememory task for the cued recall task of Study1. With this task, we hoped to determine whattypes of information schematics and asche-matics would generate if we allowed them toreconstruct the films in their own way.

MethodTask 1: Unitizing

Thirty-six masculine schematics and 34 aschematicsidentified as described in Study 1 were shown the two filmsegments described in Study 1. Again, only male subjectswere used. In this study, however, subjects were assignedrandomly into one of three goal conditions. The no-in-struction condition was a replication of Study 1; 30 subjects(15 schematics, 15 aschematics) were given the instructionsto unitize that are described in Study 1. In the detail con-dition, 30 subjects (15 schematics, 15 aschematics) weretold to divide the films into the "smallest possible actionunits"; furthermore, they were told to "concentrate on de-tails of the films" because they would be asked to rememberthem later. In a third condition, the impression condition,10 subjects (5 schematics, 5 aschematics) were given noinstructions concerning the size of their units but were toldto "pay attention to the actor" because they would be askedto make judgments about him later on.5 All subjects ap-peared able to perform the task and had little difficultyunderstanding the instructions.

Task 2: Description of the ActorFollowing the unitizing task, all subjects were again

shown the Bern Sex Role Inventory adjectives in randomorder on a CRT screen and were asked to make him or nothim judgments. Responses were recorded as in Study 1.

Task 3: Reconstruction of theActor's Behavior

In the third task, we asked subjects to write on cardsanything they could remember about the film or about theactor. Subjects were instructed to write one item on eachcard and to number the cards as they responded. Theywere then instructed to sort the cards they wrote into pilesaccording to their perceived similarity. We hoped that

5 This condition was included primarily for comparisonwith the no-instruction condition in an effort to determinewhat subjects were probably thinking under these circum-stances.


analyses of the size and content of the card piles they con-structed would allow us to learn something more of thecategories that schematic and aschematic individuals useto make sense of information about the personality andbehavior of another person. All subjects performed the re-construction task; following this task, they completed theevaluation form and were debriefed.

ResultsTask 1: Unitizing

Results from the unitizing task in each ofthe three conditions over the 5 min of the film

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Schemotics—— Aschemotics

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(Detail Condition)

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Figure 2. Mean number of units in three conditions of theschema-relevant film.

again showed marked differences betweenschematics and aschematics in unitizing be-havior as a function of goals. Overall, sche-matics vary their patterns of unitizing and thusappear to be much more sensitive to the de-mands of the different unitizing instructionsthan aschematics.

Schema-relevant film. In the first analysis,schematics and aschematics were comparedseparately in each instruction condition fortheir responses to the schema-relevant segment(see Figure 2).

In the no-instruction condition, which wasidentical to the unitizing task in Study 1, sub-jects showed the same pattern of unitizing asin Study 1. Schematics consistently divided theschema-relevant film into larger units than as-chematics (Kruskal-Wallis = 4.36, df= l,n =30, p < .02), thus confirming our hypothesisthat the masculinity self-schema consistentlyaffected schematics' unitizing patterns in aschema-relevant sequence. In the detail con-dition, however, schematic subjects divided theschema-relevant film segment into smallerunits than aschematic subjects (Kruskal-Wal-lis = 6.30, p < .02). In the impression condi-tion, schematics tended to make larger unitsthan aschematics, although the large variationin response among aschematics rendered thisresult non significant.

In a multivariate analysis of variance, sche-matics were compared for their responses inthe three conditions, and aschematics werecompared for their responses (see Figure 3).

In the detail condition, in which subjectswere instructed to divide the film into smallunits and to remember details, schematic sub-jects consistently divided the schema-relevantfilm into smaller units than schematic subjectsin either the impression, F(l, 36) = 3.44, p <.07, or no-instruction, F(l, 36) = 4.61, p <.04, conditions, overall F(2, 36) = 3.27, p <.05. This difference does not occur for asche-matic subjects, Fs < I.6 Thus, it seems thatschematic subjects are able, when required, tovary their information-processing strategies,

6 The multivariate analysis of variance performed hereis a profile analysis described in Morrison (1967). It testshypotheses about mean vectors of responses rather thansingle data points. Thus, the statistics reported here arenot tests of single means but rather tests of the differences


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Figure 3. Mean number of units made by schematics and aschematics for the schema-relevant film.

generating smaller units in an effort to payclose attention to detail.

In the impression condition, in which sub-jects were told that they would be asked ques-

among schematics or among aschematics across time. Thisanalysis allows us to examine the hypothesis that schematicsand aschematics, though perceiving generally the samestructure in the film, are nevertheless responding with dif-ferent numbers of units across the sequence. A conventionalanalysis of variance using mean number of units as a de-pendent measure does not produce this additional infor-mation. However, the results of such an analysis supportthe claim concerning the behavior of schematics and as-chematics. Planned comparisons indicate that schematicsgenerate significantly smaller units in the detail conditionof the schema-relevant film than schematics in either theno-instruction condition or the impression condition, f\ 1,36) = 12.83, p < .001, or in any of the conditions of theirrelevant film, F(l, 36) = 5.25, p < .02. These differencesdo not hold for aschematics (Fs < 1). Moreover, as pre-dicted, there were no differences among schematics oramong aschematics in their unitizing of the irrelevant film(Fs < 1).

tions about their impressions of the actor,schematics' responses resemble those of sche-matics in the no-instruction condition, sug-gesting that schematics' natural units may bea form of impression units. The consequencesof a self-schema for social perception may beto provide for larger units and a global impres-sion, unless the schema is invoked in the spe-cific service of some other goal.

Schema-irrelevant film. With respect to theschema-irrelevant film, there were, as in Study1, no differences between schematics and as-chematics in unitizing in any of the three con-ditions. Moreover, there were no differencesamong the three schematic groups or amongthe three aschematic groups when unitizing theschema-irrelevant film.

Task 2: Description of the Actor

Results from the description task at the endof the study parallel those in Study 1. In each


condition, schematics described the actor withmore masculine traits than did aschematics,although these differences did not reach sig-nificance.

Task 3: Reconstruction of theActor's Behavior

In this task, subjects were required to re-construct the film sequence by writing on cardswhatever they could remember about the filmor the actor. This task generated a wide varietyof responses, ranging from observable physicalattributes of the actor (e.g., "Jack has brownhair") to conjectures about his future behavior(e.g., "Jack will quit school").

In each condition, schematic subjects gen-erated slightly more responses (as measuredby the number of correct cards)7 than asche-matics; however, they grouped these responsesinto fewer piles. Among schematics, there wasa significant relation between number of pilesand number of units in the unitizing task (r =.68, p < .01) such that fewer piles were relatedto larger units. This relation was much strongerfor schematics than for aschematics (z = 3.16,p < .001), whose unitizing and sorting wereunrelated (r = .04). This result was obtainedin each of the three conditions, although thedifference in correlation between schematicsand aschematics was not significant in theimpression condition. Responses were codedby five judges who rated each card on type ofresponse and degree of conjecture (averageagreement between coders was 87%).

For type of response, judges determinedwhether the response was related to an attrib-ute of the actor or a description of his behavior.Categories consisted of (a) behavior (e.g., "Jackwatched a baseball game"); (b) personalitytraits (e.g., "Jack is competitive"); and (c)physical characteristics (e.g., "Jack is tall"). Fordegree of conjecture, judges determined towhat extent the response represented infor-mation or ideas not found in the film. Theresponses were rated on a 5-point scale: 1 =no conjecture, a response reflecting behaviorthat actually occurs in the film (e.g., "Jackwatched a baseball game"); 2 = some conjec-ture, a response that can be inferred directlyfrom the film (e.g., the response "Jack likesbaseball," which is a generalization of the spe-cific behavior of watching a baseball game);

3 = moderate amount of conjecture, a responsethat can be indirectly inferred from the film(e.g., the response "Jack is competitive," whichcould be inferred as a result of Jack's strongreaction to the outcome of a baseball game);4 = great deal of conjecture, a response onlymarginally traceable to behavior in the film(e.g., the response "Jack gets bad grades,"which is the generalization that Jack's recre-ational habits interfere with his study habits[not shown in the movie]); 5 = total conjecture,a response not typically inferred from the film(e.g., the response "Jack is a loser," which hasno specific reference point in the film).

Type of response. When the data were an-alyzed for type of response, schematic subjectsin the no-instruction condition and theimpression condition were found to respondwith significantly more trait evaluations of theactor than aschematics, particularly in theirearly responses. The data for the no-instructioncondition are illustrated in Figure 4. Schematicsubjects also responded with more trait eval-uations of the actor than reports of the actor'sbehavior; aschematics in this condition do notdiffer in the number of trait and behaviors theygenerated.8 Both groups of subjects respondedwith a similarly small percentage of physicalcharacteristics of the actor, overall x2(2, N =90)= 18.03, p<. 001.

In the detail condition, in which subjectswere called upon to remember the details ofthe actor's behavior, schematics responded dif-

7 It is difficult to ascertain the "correctness" of a con-jecture or a personality trait; therefore, all responses wereconsidered correct and were used in the analysis unlessthey were reports of behavior or physical characteristicsnot shown in the film. For example, the response "Jackwore a sweater" would be coded incorrect because Jackwore a T-shirt in the film; however, the response "Jack isgentle" would be coded correct, even though it is a schema-inconsistent trait, because it does not directly contradictanything actually observed in the film. Fewer than 1% ofeither schematic or aschematic subjects' responses werecoded incorrect.

8 Obviously, type of response and degree of conjectureare not independent of each other. For example, a person-ality trait is more likely to contain a great deal of conjecturethan is a behavior or a physical characteristic. These re-lations are reflected in the data; for example, responsesthat are rated high in conjecture (e.g., "Jack is a loser")are most likely to be personality traits. However, this is notuniversally the case. Some trait attributions (e.g., "Jack isa baseball fan") involve much less conjecture.


Schematic!- (Trails)

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ferently, however. They reported a significantlyhigher percentage of responses that fell intothe behavior category than the personality traitcategory. Aschematic subjects in this condi-tion, however, divided their responses evenlyacross the two categories, \2(2, N=90) = 2\ .2,p < .001. Schematics, then, seem to be able tovary their responses to suit the task. Whengiven no explicit instructions, or when givenimpression instructions, they respond withtrait evaluations. When asked to rememberdetails, however, they can respond with behav-ioral details in the reconstruction tasks. As-chematics, having no clear frame of referencefor the actor, are much less flexible in theirresponse patterns.

Degree of conjecture. When schematics andaschematics were compared for degree of con-jecture in their responses, across conditionsschematic subjects made significantly moreresponses involving a great deal of conjecture(4-5 on the 5-point scale) than aschematics,X2( 1, N = 70) = 17.67, p < .0001. Conversely,the majority of aschematic subjects' responsesconsistently fell into the no-conjecture cate-gory (responses that simply reported activities

occurring in the movie). Aschematics appearto be relying on what they saw to reconstructthe movie sequence, and schematics appear tobe filling in from their own knowledge struc-tures.

With respect to conjecture in the variousconditions, the schematics again appear to besensitive in their responses to the goals of thetask. Although schematics in the no-instruc-tion condition and in the impression conditionengaged in more conjecture than aschematics,schematics in the detail condition produced ahigher percentage of responses in the no-con-jecture category than aschematic subjects,X2(l, N = 60) = 5.68, p < .05. Comparedamong conditions, schematics generated ahigher percentage of no-conjecture responsesin the detail condition than in the no-instruc-tion or impression condition; aschematics' rateof no-conjecture responses again remainedrelatively constant. It is important to note,however, that schematics in the detail conditionalso produced a higher percentage of responsesthat indicate a great deal of conjecture thandid aschematics, \\2, N = 70) = 5.23, p <.07. This pattern suggests that schematics,when concentrating on the details of schema-relevant behavior, can report these details butthat they are also able, at the same time, toextract from the films the global impressioninformation necessary to make complex in-ferences about the actor. One type of responsedoes not appear to suffer as a result of the other.

Discussion

Self-Schemas and Expert Performance

The results from Study 2 indicate that sche-matics, presumably because of the denseknowledge incorporated into their self-struc-ture for masculinity, can, when required to doso, vary the way they organize and interpretanother person's ongoing behavior. When in-structed to attend to details, they producedvery small units. These units were, in fact,smaller than those used by aschematics whenthey were given the same instructions to attendcarefully to the details of the film. When sche-matics were not given an instruction of thistype, but rather were asked to form an impres-sion of the actor in the film or were given noinstructions at all, they partitioned the film


into much larger units. The aschematics, how-ever, were virtually impervious to variation ininstructions, dividing the film into the samenumber of units regardless of the requirementsof the task.9

The results of this second study indicate thatthe schematics are not just vague or globalthinkers, as might be suggested by the resultsof Study 1. Instead, their involvement withmasculinity seems to allow them to extractmore from the schema-relevant behavior ofanother person when they are given the timeand opportunity to do so. Under these con-ditions they are quite sensitive to detail andcan see more meaningful units in the target'sbehavior than can the aschematics.

The results of the inference task also suggestanother feature of expertlike performance, thatis, the tendency to use relevant contextual in-formation to go beyond the information given.The self-schema appears to be providing sche-matic subjects with a framework within whichto make these inferences. Aschematics, notpossessing this framework, tend to focus ondirectly observable behavior. What to theschematics is a coherent sequence of actionmay be simply a series of unconnected or dis-crete behaviors for aschematics. Schematicsinvoke their knowledge about the domain ofmasculinity to recognize and respond to mas-culine behavior in the stimulus in appropriateways. Invoking this network makes more in-formation available to the schematic; he canthen use his knowledge of masculinity as acontext within which to fill gaps in his knowl-edge of the stimulus, to elaborate an impov-erished stimulus situation, to interpret ambig-uous behavior, and to predict the dispositionsand behavior of the actor in other contexts.

Together these findings suggest that themasculinity self-schema can be viewed as atype of expertise in the domain of masculinity.The schematics in this task display some of themost important qualities of expert perfor-mance. The greater flexibility characterizingthe schematics' responses is hypothesized tobe a function of their heightened attention toand interest in the domain of masculinity be-cause of its importance in defining the self.This concentration on masculinity produces amore dense and complexly organized store ofknowledge, which in turn allows schematics to(a) recognize schema-relevant information, (b)

chunk stimulus material into units that areuseful for the designated task, and (c) fill outor render meaningful impoverished stimuli,and allows for (d) variation in their informa-tion processing strategy.

In many cases, expertise also implies ac-curacy. How accurate the schematics are intheir perception of others in a schema-relevantdomain remains to be determined. For thosecircumstances in which criteria of accuracycan be specified, it is likely that the schematicswould indeed be quite accurate. Yet there arealso circumstances where a self-schema couldbe used inappropriately. The information pro-vided by a schema may not always be good oruseful or accurate. If this is the case and theperceiver does not receive feedback, as in thoseinstances where one forms an impression ofanother yet never interacts with him or her,the resulting perception may be characterizedby faulty generalizations and biased inferences.The other person may be assumed to be muchmore like the self, or more different from theself, than is actually the case. The tendenciesof the schematics revealed here could also leadquite naturally to stereotyping in schema-rel-evant domains. Schematics in this study sawthe stimulus person clearly in trait terms; theyfelt that they knew what kind of person he wasand what his character was like. One could

9 Ebbesen and his colleagues (Cohen & Ebbesen, 1979;Ebbesen, 1980; Ebbesen & Allen, 1979) have been quitesuccessful in inducing different organizations of a stimulusfilm by varying the instructional or goal set. In these studies,when subjects were instructed to remember details of afilm, they made smaller units. However, when given in-structions to form an impression of the actor, subjects al-tered their pattern of unitizing and neglected the detailsof the film in favor of their "world knowledge," which wouldbe more helpful in evaluating the stimulus actor. We havedemonstrated that even though the natural tendency ofschematics may be to make relatively large units, they will,under certain conditions, unitize an action sequence morefinely than someone unacquainted with the behavior in-volved. When required to do so, schematics responded likefine-unit perceivers. Presumably this occurred because theywere able to understand the subtle differences in the mean-ings of certain types of behavior, distinguish among relatedor similar actions with relatively greater precision, and ap-preciate the basic structure of each schema-relevant be-havior. Moreover, in varying their information-processingstrategy, schematics were able to respond with finer unitsthan aschematics, just as Chase and Simon's (1973) chessmasters were capable, when instructed to do so, of dividinga chess board into smaller chunks than were novices orbeginners.


Table 1Reference Space for Self and Others

Knowledge of others

Self-knowledge Little Much

Much

Little

1. Self as reference point:False consensusProjectionAttitude assimilationEgocentric thinking

3. Variable reference point:Social comparison

2. Common reference point:Efficient communicationEmpathy

4. Other as reference point:Role takingIdentificationAttitude contrastFailure to use consensus information

easily imagine that these individuals would in-teract with this person on the basis of theirinitial ideas about him and would probably besomewhat reluctant to modify these initialimpressions. This view warrants further in-vestigation because it suggests that one mustbe particularly careful of stereotyping or faultygeneralizations in self-relevant areas, the veryareas about which one has the most infor-mation.

It is important to note that in this study wehave not attempted to determine which aspectof the self-concept is primarily responsible forthe observed cognitive consequences. That is,are these effects the result of an affective con-nection or involvement with the domain ofmasculinity or are they simply the result ofmore and better organized knowledge of thedomain? Whether these two factors can beconceptually and empirically distinguished(e.g., whether one can be an expert in mas-culinity, baseball, or nuclear defense and nothave this fact become a significant element ofself-definition or whether one can have a greatdeal of involvement with a domain withoutmuch knowledge of it) and what this wouldmean for information processing are the focusof several recent and on-going studies (Smith,1980, 1984).

The Self and Social Perception:An Integration

Most theorists assume a complete interde-pendence between self-perception and otherperception. However, virtually all empiricalwork, including the current studies, has fo-

cused on only one aspect of this relation: theinfluence of the self on judgments of others. Itis important to note, however, that on the basisof these data we cannot confidently infer thedirection of this relation. It may be that indi-viduals initially develop a general schema fora domain of behavior by observing other peo-ple and that they only develop a separatestructure for the self to the extent that theyappear to be distinctive or to depart from oth-ers in this domain. In some instances, then, itmay be judgments of the self that are influ-enced by the perception of others.

Regardless of the direction of the influence,each self/other social perception situation istremendously complex (see also Wegner &Giuliano, 1981). Nevertheless, some simpli-fying distinctions can be made. Theoretically,each social perception situation can be clas-sified according to the amount of knowledgein the domain of concern that is available toa perceiver about himself or herself (self-knowledge) and the amount of knowledge inthis domain that is available about the relevanttarget other or others (see Table 1). The con-dition that is typically researched and the onethat most often underlies the phenomena ofinterest here (i.e., attitude assimilation, pro-jection, false consensus) is that in which theindividual has considerable expertise in a par-ticular domain (relatively high levels of self-knowledge) and relatively low levels of knowl-edge about the others being perceived. Thiscondition was the focus of the two experimentsreported here, and the results suggest that un-der these circumstances the self-concept can


provide a powerful frame of reference for socialperception.

In the absence of other strong, availablecognitive structures, the readily accessible self-concept will be used in the processing of in-formation about others. This type of self-ref-erent processing of other people will result inenhanced attention to them and in quick andconfident inferences about their behavior.Others will be assumed to have ideas, beliefs,feelings, or characteristics that are similar toone's own.

The self-concept is not an equally strong andaccessible structure in all social perception sit-uations, however. If, for example, the stimulusothers constitute very strong stimuli, such thatthey activate cognitive structures that are quiteindependent of self-structures, the consequentprocessing will be relatively stimulus drivenand the self-concept is unlikely to participateat all. A more specific answer to the questionWhen is the self-concept invoked when think-ing about others? can be approached by con-sidering who—self or other—is likely to be theanchor or reference in the perceptual or cog-nitive process under consideration. Recentwork by Tversky and Gati (1978), Holyoak andhis colleagues (Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Hol-yoak & Mah, 1982), and Srull and Gaelick(1983) suggests that the outcome of variousjudgment tasks is importantly dependent onone's cognitive reference point. Here we sug-gest that the use of the self-concept as a sig-nificant frame of reference in person percep-tion is a systematic function of the extent ofone's self-relevant knowledge structures in therelevant domain.

The self is likely to be the natural referencepoint when thinking about another person ifany of the following conditions are met: (a)One is very involved with and/or has a lot ofknowledge about the domain in question (inthe present studies, this is the case for the mas-culine schematics); (b) the information aboutthe target other is ambiguous or impoverished,such that the stimulus alone cannot drive theprocessing; and/or (c) the circumstances re-quire very quick responses to the target other.If all of these conditions are met (a strong self-structure, the absence of other available struc-tures, and the need for quick judgments), theself-concept is certain to be implicated in thesocial perception process. The stimulus others

are likely to be the reference point if any ofthe following conditions are met: (a) The self-structure contains little relevance for the do-main in question (in these studies, this was thecase for the aschematics); (b) the other is astrong, rich, well-articulated, or nonambiguousstimulus, such that the stimulus activates rel-evant cognitive structures, quite separate fromself-structures that drive the consequent pro-cessing; and/or (c) the circumstances allow orencourage a thorough consideration of the tar-get other. These criteria, satisfied in differentcombinations, can generate the four distinctconditions indicated in Table 1. The self ismost likely to be a reference point when theconditions for cell 1 are met: high self-knowl-edge and low other knowledge. The other islikely to be a reference point when the con-ditions for cell 4 are met: low self-knowledgeand high other knowledge.

The psychological phenomena involving arelationship between self and other can beplaced within the cells of this table. Most ofthe early studies that implicated the self-con-cept in social perception satisfy the criteria forself as a reference point. For example, Katzand Allport (1931) found that one's predictionof the number of other people who were likelyto cheat was closely related to one's own levelof cheating. Similar findings have been ob-tained by Fillenbaum (1961), Goldings (1959),Marks (1943), Mintz (1956), and Sherif andHovland (1961). In all of these studies, the self-structures were relatively strong because a greatdeal was known about the self with respect tothe domain in question. Moreover, only min-imal knowledge was available about the targetother, so that self-structures were readily ac-cessed and subsequently dominated process-ing, with little competition from other struc-tures.

Studies of false consensus (e.g., Fields &Schuman, 1976; Ross et al., 1977; Sherman,Presson, & Chassin, 1984) also satisfy the self-as-reference-point criterion. A false consensusbias is likely to be the case whenever one isrequired to estimate how a random or typicalother might feel or think.

The majority of studies on the clinical phe-nomenon of attributive projection (endowingothers with traits similar to one's own) alsomeet the criteria for self as reference point (seeHolmes, 1968, 1978, for a review). Although


projection is usually assumed to have an egodefensive function, some instances of projec-tion may well have purely cognitive sources.Typically in studies of projection there is amarked asymmetry in the strength and avail-ability of self and other knowledge structures,and thus the structures used to think aboutthe self may be readily applied when makingevaluations of others. A similar suggestion canbe made with reference to the literature onself-serving or egocentric biases. For example,the tendency to be unrealistically optimisticand to expect misfortunes for others but notfor oneself (e.g., Weinstein, 1980) or to accordone's self the lion's share of responsibility fora joint project (Ross & Sicoly, 1979) may wellstem from a deficit in knowledge about theothers.

The clearest examples of when the other islikely to be the cognitive reference point canbe seen in the role-taking and perspective-tak-ing studies. Here the individual is actively en-couraged or required to assume the perspectiveof the other. This requirement may work toinhibit or suppress the self-concept as a viablestructure for organizing the behavior of thetarget other. This result is confirmed by Wein-stein and Lachendro (1982), who find that aself-serving optimistic bias can be mitigatedby requiring subjects to think carefully aboutothers (see also Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Zucker-man, 1978). Similarly, Feinberg and Lombardo(1978) find that one's own level of locus ofcontrol does not affect the perception of an-other's locus of control when the target otheris not hypothetical but an actual other whoeither agrees or disagrees with the subject.

Some evidence on the failure of individualsto use consensus information (Borgida &Brekke, 1981; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) alsomeets criteria for use of the other as a cognitivereference point. In these studies, subjects donot assume a similarity between their thoughts,feelings, and characteristics and those of otherpeople, despite compelling evidence to thecontrary. In contrast to the false consensusstudies, though, the target others in these stud-ies are the point of focus. They are made ex-tremely salient and described in great detail.

The use of the other as a reference point wasreflected in the present studies in the produc-tion of relatively smaller units for organizingbehavior and was associated with an enhanced

focus on behavioral detail (the case for the as-chematics in these studies and the case for theschematics given other-referent instructions["Pay attention to details of the actor's behav-ior"] in Study 2). Those social situations thatafford, encourage, or directly require a consid-eration of the stimulus other or that allow forgeneration of more information about the tar-get other are likely to be associated with theuse of the other as a reference point and toengender a contrast of self and other.

If it is the case that the individual has littleknowledge and involvement with a domainand that the stimulus other is likewise too im-poverished to drive processing (see cell 3 inTable 1), then the individual will use whateveraspect of self-knowledge can be derived as ananchor for processing, or else some other fea-ture of the stimulus situation will constrainprocessing. It is in these situations of low self-knowledge that an individual may be mostlikely to engage in social comparison in an at-tempt to discover some basis for self-evaluation(Festinger, 1954).

In the case where the subject has both highlevels of self-knowledge and involvement andhigh levels of knowledge about the target other(cell 2), either the self-structure will dominatebecause of the inevitable knowledge and in-terest advantage accruing to self-structures orthere will be an attempt to construct the socialperception situation using both the self-struc-tures and the structures activated by the targetothers. The latter may well be the case, for ex-ample, in a relationship where two peopleknow each other well and an effective com-munication has developed.

Many phenomena that involve a relation-ship between self and others can be organizedby taking account of whether the self or theother should be considered the reference point.In this cognitive analysis we have consideredthe consequences for social perception of vari-ation in the availability and activation of selfand other knowledge structures. It is quicklyapparent, however, that there are other factorsthat, if systematically implicated, might allowfor further specification of the role of the self-concept in social perception. One such factoris the relationship between self and other.Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli(1984) find, for example, that the false con-sensus effect emerges much more strongly


when judging a liked or positive target otherthan when evaluating neutral or negative tar-gets. If the self dislikes the target other, onemay observe complementary projection(Holmes, 1978) rather than attributive projec-tion. That is, if the self is frightened, ratherthan assuming that the other is frightened aswell, the inference may be that the other ishostile or frightening. Another factor concernsthe function of self-knowledge. If one's attitudeis an important self-defining feature or an in-dication of one's uniqueness, there may be aneed to see others as markedly different. Forexample, studies on in-group/out-group be-havior (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) document that,to the extent that in-group membership is animportant feature of one's social identity,members of the out-group who represent a po-tential threat to this identity are likely to beviewed quite differently from in-group mem-bers.

Conclusion

In this article we have attempted a cognitiveanalysis of the role of the self-concept in socialperception. The studies reported here indicatethat the self-concept can influence the entireperson perception process, including the per-ception and organization of the behavior ofothers, the memory for and inferences aboutthe behavior, and the evaluation of it. The self-concept is most likely to operate in this per-vasive manner when the behavior of anotherperson is relevant to a domain of behavior re-garded as critical for self-definition. Unless oneis compelled to use the target other as a ref-erence point by some aspect of the stimulussituation or by the fact that the other personconstitutes a rich, well-differentiated stimulus,the self-concept will be the cognitive structureused initially to comprehend the thoughts,feelings, and behaviors of others.

A diverse set of psychological phenomenaincluding projection, attitude assimilation,egocentric thinking, and many aspects of per-son perception, such as false consensus, all at-tribute to the self a strong role in social per-ception. According to the preceding analysis,these phenomena are similar in that they areall consequences of using the self as a cognitivereference point. Furthermore, their effects willbe particularly powerful when one has sub-

stantial knowledge of and involvement withthe domain under consideration because theother person is likely to be viewed quite dif-ferently than when self-reference is not an is-sue. Under these conditions, the perceivermakes a substantial contribution to the per-ceptual product. The ensuing social perceptionthus has a very top-down nature; it is drivenby the self-concept. The structure of the per-ception and organization of the behavior ofanother person is suggested by the structure ofthe self in that domain rather than by anystructure inherent in the behavior of the targetother. It is likely, moreover, that the perceiveris often unaware of the extent of this contri-bution, and when it is inappropriate, the per-ception of others may be significantly biased.When the self-concept performs a useful func-tion in understanding others and when it hasdetrimental effects remain to be demonstrated,yet this analysis of the role of the self-conceptin social perception provides specific, empir-ical meaning to the idea that the self-conceptis one of the most powerful structures in thepsychological field.

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Received August 6, 1984Revision received June 24, 1985 •

hazel markus jeanne smith richard l. morelandpeople.loyno.edu/~nmstraig/self concept...

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