hawk-dove and “rights”

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Hawk-Dove and “Rights”

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Hawk-Dove and “Rights”. Recall our puzzle from intro lecture: Where do “ rights “ come from? . Self evident? The creator?. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…”. Might?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Hawk-Dove and “Rights”

Hawk-Dove and “Rights”

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Recall our puzzle from intro lecture:Where do “rights“ come from?

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Self evident? The creator?

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable

Rights…”

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Might?

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The “state of nature”?

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A “social contract”?

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What does this mean?

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Today’s lecture is motivated by larger goal of understanding where human rights like those in the Declaration of Independence come from

We’ll develop a foundation for thinking about this puzzle

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… using the Hawk-Dove game

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First, let us discuss a related phenomena in animals

(Recall, our “parsimony” argument: if we see similar phenomena in animals, probably same cause)

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Territoriality:

Animal more likely to behave aggressively to defend a resource (land, mate, food) if arrived at first

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Even against larger intruder

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Even if arriving first doesn’t affect value of resource, or likelihood of winning combat

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Why would it matter if got there first?

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Will explain using (extension of) Hawk-Dove Game

Recall…

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Hawk-Dove

Object worth v>0Cost of fighting c>vGet object if only H, o/w split

v/2-c v

0 v/2

HD

H D

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Now extend this game as follows:

Assume that can play “hawk if arrived first” (bourgeois)

Assume that randomly determined before each encounter who “arrived first”

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Hawk Dove

Hawk

Dove

Bourgeois

Bourgeois

v/2-c v, 0

0 v/2

½(v/2-c)+½v

v/4

v/23/4v½(v/2-c)

If play B and other plays H, half the time you arrive first, and both play hawk And get (v-c)/2, otherwise he arrives first and you play dove and he plays hawk, So get 0.

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Hawk Dove

Hawk

Dove

Bourgeois

Bourgeois

v/2-c 20, 0

0 v/2

½(v/2-c)+½v

v/4

v/23/4v½(v/2-c)

-(B, B) is only “symmetric” (“pure”) Nash (will prove in homework)-Symmetric = where both players do same (makes sense when both drawn from singlepopulation)

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In HW, you’ll also show that this Nash Equilibrium emerges in dynamics

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Thus, we expect animals to pay attention to who arrived first!

Even if arriving first has NO impact on value of resource or likelihood of winning combat

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Note:

We could have written model where play Hawk if arrive second

Play Hawk if second would be unique symmetric equilibrium in that game as well

But we don’t ever observe Hawk if arrive second. Why not?

We’ll find out later in the semester!

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“Who arrived first?” or “who arrived second?” are examples of…

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Uncorrelated asymmetry:

Difference between the two players that doesn’t (directly) impact payoffs

Another example: “who has darker skin?”

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Questions to keep in mind as today’s class progresses:

Which uncorrelated asymmetries can (in theory) dictate who plays hawk?

Which uncorrelated asymmetries in practice do (empirically) dictate who plays hawk?

We’ll start to address later today, and will have more insight at the end of the semester. But plenty more work can be done!

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Now we will present evidence that H-D-B game explains animal territoriality

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Wood speckled butterflies mate in sunspots in the forest

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Males patrol these sunspots

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And wait for females to come by

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Source: Davies 1978

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Spiral flight is symbolic:

Lasts <5 secsNeither male is hurtOriginal owner always wins

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Why don’t the butterflies actually fight over spots?

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Life is short (c is high) and spots are abundant (v is low)

So v < cB is equilibrium of this H-D-B game

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How can we be sure this isn’t driven by some kind of home court advantage?

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What does this have to do with humans?

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In an experiment, humans did the same thing as the butterflies

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Multiple players simultaneously played a computer game

To stay alive, had to find berries in bushes

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When arrived at same bush, had to decide whether to fight or flee:

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Hawk Dove

Hawk

Dove

Bourgeois

Bourgeois

v/2-c 20, 0

0 v/2

½(v/2-c)+½v

v/4

v/23/4v½(v/2-c)

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Some players were bigger

Some players were healthier

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And some simply arrived first

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Turns out, arriving first matters a lot

(And matters more than being large or healthy)

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But arriving first stops mattering as much when lose H-D necessary condition for bourgeois equilibrium: v < c

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As H-D-B predicts, humans, like butterflies, attend to who arrived first even with size

difference

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“Who got there first?”

is just one example of an uncorrelated asymmetry

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What about in this real-world situation?

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Why do you pay? Why not just leave?

If the cabby complains to a cop you can claim you paid in cash? No evidence that you didn’t

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If pay with cash, why doesn’t the cabby claim you didn’t pay even if you did?

You can’t complain to a cop—there’s no evidence that you paid

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Cabby gets angry if you didn’t already pay for the service

You get angry if you did pay for the service and he claims you didn’t

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Demand payment Don’t insist on payment

Refuse to pay

Agree to pay

Pay if haven’t

already paid

Insist if hasn’t already paid

$10-c, $10-c 20, 0

0, 20 10, 10

$10-c, $10-c

0, 20

0, 2010, 100, 20

The uncorrelated asymmetry

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Here are some more uncorrelated asymmetries

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In a study, subjects were asked to determine who deserved a found object and why for 10 legal cases

Source: DeScioli and Karpoff

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Commonly stated “why”s:

Who found the lost itemWhose land it was onWho lost itWho made it (like John Locke said)

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Note that the red “why”s don’t effect payoffs from keeping the object, and the others often

don’t either

These are examples of other uncorrelated asymmetries

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Also note the following pattern for uncorrelated asymmetries (we’ll come back to this late in the class)

Yes: Who got there firstNo: Who is taller

Yes: “One drop” or “one grandparent” ruleNo: Darker skin

Yes: Reserved for handicapped or pregnantNo: Reserved for people older than you

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Note that behavior in these examples is guided by emotions, and is not strategic or deliberative

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We get angry when:

We aren’t paid for our servicesSomeone takes something we made

And we play hawk when we’re angry

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Behavior in these examples could also be guided by beliefs / ideologies about what’s right

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We believe:

If I haven’t paid, the cabby is right to demand the money

If I made something, I am right to keep it

And we are willing to play hawk when our rights are violated

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And, of course, our emotions or ideologies are learned or evolved

If everyone believes it’s right to pay when you haven’t yet paid, and you deviate, you’ll get in a

lot of fights and quickly learn “what’s right”

You’ll show this in your HW simulation

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In addition to anger and beliefs/ideologies, there are other things that might guide our play

in Hawk-Dove

Here are two examples…

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Give ½ subjects in the lab a mug and ask them how much they’d sell them for

Average: $5.25

Give the other ½ $4.50 and ask them how much they’d pay for the mug

Average: $2.50

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We value things we possess more than identical things we don’t possess (even if possession is

randomly determined and short-lived)

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This is called the endowment effect

It is usually explained by loss aversion (harmed more by the loss of an item than benefit

from gaining identical item; see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990)

But that just begs the question, where does loss aversion come from?

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Hawk-Dove predicts that we fight harder for something we possess

One way to implement this is to get us to value things we possess more

This is the endowment effect (and loss aversion)

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Open question: Need to rule out alternative explanations

This would make a great final project!

Is the endowment effect specific to settings in which Hawk-Dove applies? I.e., is it about contested resources?

Do endowment effects show up for all uncorrelated asymmetries Does the endowment effect disappear for people who so strong

they always win, or in situations where the resource is super valuable?

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Another example…

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Ask ½ of subjects to build a piece of Ikea furniture

Ask the other ½ to simply inspect the identical piece of furniture

Then ask both groups how much they value it

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This is called “The Ikea Effect”

One explanation for The Ikea Effect is the sunk cost fallacy

(when value something more than “should” because sunk work into it)

But where does the sunk cost fallacy come from?

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Hawk-Dove predicts that we fight harder for something we made

One way to implement this is to get us to value things we worked hard on more than identical things we didn’t

Another is the sunk cost fallacy!

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Open question: Need to rule out alternative explanations

This would make a great final project!

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Hawk-Dove can predicts that conflicts arise when there it isn’t clear who got there first

(Or who made the object, or… )

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Let’s go back to the butterflies

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What happens when there is ambiguity over who arrived first?

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They actually fight:

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And, again, same is true about us humans

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“But in the ancient home we are welcomed heartily”

- Theodore Herzl

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“Our people will continue to fuel the torch of the revolution with rivers of blood until the whole of the occupied homeland is liberated…”

- Yasser Arafat

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And conflict may also rise if two uncorrelated asymmetries apply, and they conflict

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Remember the 10 cases we referenced earlier?

Source: DeScioli and Karpoff

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In these and many other cases, the source of the dispute is two conflicting uncorrelated

asymmetries

E.g., You found it...

… on my land

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So far, we’ve been dealing with property rights

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Where do the human rights in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution come from?

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“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable

Rights…”

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We think that with some modification, H-D-B provides the right framework for analysis

Here is some evidence for this…

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Historically, many human rights are extensions of early property rights

(E.g., “the pursuit of happiness” in our Declaration and “the king cannot grant anyone the right to take

an aid from his free men” in the Magna Carta”)

And rights such as self governance may have developed to protect property rights

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Additional evidence…

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We predict that rights conditioned on uncorrelated asymmetries, but not that these asymmetries are universal

Indeed, we see rights varying across geography

E.g., squatter’s rights in India or voting in North Korea

And over time

E.g., no taxation without representation, women’s vote

Note that Locke and the Founding Fathers would not have predicted this!

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But more evidence is needed!

(Ehem, final project, ehem)

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This foundation suggest the key insight from today’s lecture will hold for human rights, not

just property…

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Rights can be self- sustaining even if not given by God or social contract

We expect to have them, and a government that violates them should expect a revolution

(e.g., American Revolution)

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Rights are not God-given or inalienable, nor are all humans are born with them

Such beliefs are useful because prevent us from deviation and harm

But that doesn’t make them right

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Have we mentioned…

Evidence needed!

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Lots more open questions….

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For example…

Why do we have these particular rights?

Are some rights more inalienable than others?

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And…

Why do rights appear to be “increasing” over time? (See Pinker’s Better Angels)

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For example, collective punishment is decreasingly accepted:

“Thus says the Lord of hosts, ‘I have noted what Amalek did to Israel in opposing them on the way when they came up out of Egypt. 3 Now go and strike Amalek and devote to destruction all that they have. Do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey." (1 Sam. 15:2-3).”

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What’s the evidence that these rights are H-D?

What prescriptions does H-D give? Can it help us resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

These, too, would make great final projects!