hartlapp dynamics paper july 2008 infl comisarilor pag 9

7/31/2019 Hartlapp Dynamics Paper July 2008 Infl Comisarilor Pag 9

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Internal Dynamics

Position formation in the EU Commission

Miriam HartlappSocial Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)

Schumpeter Fellowhartlapp (at) wzb.eu

DRAFT, comments highly welcome!

1 Introduction1The Commission of the European Communities (in the following EU Commission) is at the

heart of the EU political system. The body implements community policies, upholds the Union's

treaties, runs the day-to-day activities in Brussels and represents the EU on the international

stage. In these respects the EU Commission can be compared to national governments. The

major difference is a monopoly in initiating legislation. Yet we know relatively little about how

the Commissions position is formed internally when drawing up a new legislative instrument.

While we observe a recently increasing interest of EU researchers in analysing intra-institutional

dynamics, they focus almost exclusively on the European Parliament (Hoyland 2006; McElroy

2006; Hix/Noury/Roland 2005; Ringe 2005; but see Naurin/Wallace 2008, forthcoming for the

Council). A gap remains with respect to these questions for the EU Commission.

1Funding from the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaties_of_the_European_Unionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaties_of_the_European_Unionmailto:[email protected]


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Miriam Hartlapp DRAFT, COMMENTS HIGHLY WELCOME July 2008

2

From national political systems we know that decision taking in government is far from conflict

free. The official government position is often the result of prior wrestling between ministries.

Looking at the EU Commission, there are good grounds on which to expect the administrative

departments, called Directorates General (DG), to differ even more in their policy positions than

national ministries do. Compared to national governments the EU Commission is moreheterogeneous. Within a Commission the affiliation of the different officials embraces a broad

range of political parties. They come from 27 different countries varying in national interests,

regulatory styles and decision making culture. Moreover, division of competences is reflected in

smaller administrative entities than at national level. This creates more intersections between

DGs with more room for potential conflicts (for more details see Hartlapp 2007: 146). Thus if

we are interested in position formation in the EU Commission, we are well advised to look at

differences in policy positions between DGs or Commissioners.

At the same time the Commission has great incentives to come up with a coherent position. This

is shaped by the necessity to strengthen its position in the subsequent decision taking process

involving the European Parliament and the Council and goes hand in hand with the collegiality

principle a procedural rule impeding voting among the Commissioners aside from very

exceptional cases (Egeberg 2006: 8; Spence 2006b: 48). Therefore, most of the time, the

Commission has been described as a consensual actor or unitary actor (but see Hooghe 2001;

Endo 1998; with respect to implementation Hartlapp 2005). However, this does not necessarilycapture the process taking place before the official proposal is induced in the legislative process.

News about position formation in the daily politics in Brussels put a question mark behind the

unitary actor assumption. Press reports escorting the making of REACH or the service directive,

emission targets, patient mobility, roaming reforms or trading Chinese light bulbs all highlight

struggles between DGs or their Commissioners. Turning to academia the picture is supported by

multiple case studies. Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 87, 141, 191) have described the bitter

contest of DG AGRI

2

and DG TRADE on food policy issues as well as that of DG ENV andnine other DGs on energy policy. Cram (1994) has built her case of Commission policy making

around DG EMPL and DG INFSO. Hooghe (1996: 107) highlights the fight between DG

REGIO and a newly founded DG in charge of mainstreaming the regional dimension (abolished

in 1992) while differences between DG REGIO and DG COMP are exemplified by Christiansen

(1997: 78-80) and Nugent (1995: 612). Radaelli (1999: 136-144, 761, 766) looked into

2 Throughout the paper we use the reader friendly acronyms for the DGs even though some of the cases and

literature stem from times when the numerical system was still in place.


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conflicting DG positions on media ownership and Endo (1998: 78) at education and social

policy (more evidence can be found in Lequesne 2000: 45-46). Interaction and dynamics

between the different portfolios form part of the daily policy-making in the Commission yet

there is at best punctual evidence which factors are decisive for DGs or Commissioners to put

their position through in these struggles.

Addressing the issue of position formation in the EU Commission, this paper puts forward two

research questions: What shapes the policy position of a DG or its Commissioner? And: What

shapes the assertiveness of a DG or its Commissioners in internal contentions? After a brief

description of the process of internal interactions preceding an official Commission proposal

and the actor involved (chapter 2) both questions are developed more fully in form of working

hypotheses (chapter 3). To this aim, we systematically combine insight from the analysis of

preference formation in the EU system with institutional and organisational factors in the

tradition of comparative political system and (public) administration studies. Presenting the

conceptual outline of a multi-annual research project at the Social Science Research Center

Berlin (WZB) the paper also lays out the criteria for case selection and provides a brief

overview on what we plan to do in research practice (chapter 4). We conclude with an outlook

on the potential value of the research (chapter 5).

2 The internal process and its actorsWhat do we know about position formation in the EU Commission prior to the presentation of

an official legislative proposal? Position formation in the EU Commission is a sequential

process entailing most or all of the following steps (see figure 1).

In the initiating phase decisive actors formulate an interest in a specific policy or the need for

revision of an existing instrument and kick start the process. The initiative is mentioned in the

annual management plan or for major legislative initiatives, in the Commissions annual work

programme, both officially published documents. Typically a middle ranking official in the lead

department then drafts a concrete proposal and adjusts contributions from other units in the DG.

In a vertical coordination process (I) up the ladder of competences the draft proposal is put

forward to the Policy & Management Board in the respective DG. This is a body comprised of

the Director General and the Directors of the different departments in the DG. It can amend or

adjust the proposal before sending it to the Commissioner and his / her Cabinet with the request

to agree to inter-service consultation. From 2003, gradually, an impact assessment wasintroduced to take place in the preparation and parallel to the early stages of the internal process


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(Commission of the European Communities 2002). Since 2006 the procedure is fully

operational with an Impact Assessment Board controlling the quality of the impact assessment.

The preparation of the impact assessment often requires early interaction with other DGs

(interview DG EMPL, 7.7.2008). However there are no detailed rules on this interaction.

Figure 1: The internal process of position formation in the EU Commission

Source: author

According to the Commission rules of procedure (Commission of the European Communities

2005: article 23.2) it is the task of the lead department to assure that the different stages of

vertical and horizontal cooperation and coordination are effective and to take into account all

the departments with a legitimate interest in the initiative by virtue of their powers or

responsibilities or the nature of the subject. Fixed rules on what this cooperation and

coordination should look like are very basic and were introduced gradually by changes to the

Commission rules of procedure in 1993 and 1999, establishing the need to consult the legal

service for all drafts or proposals for legal instruments and on all documents which may have

legal implications. Moreover DG BUDG shall be consulted on all documents which may have

implications for the budget and finances or for personnel and administration respectively. A

similar clause exists for OLAF. In 1999 likewise involvement of the Secretariat General became

compulsory. Beyond these contacts it is in the interest of the lead department to assure

involvement of other legitimate interests and to avoid that unforeseen conflicts emerge at more

advanced stages. As a result of this involvement the proposal is amended accordingly by the

lead department or the diverging position is indicated as such. According to the Commission

rules of procedure [t]he department responsible shall endeavour to frame a proposal that has

the agreement of the departments consulted. In the event of a disagreement it shall append to its

Cabinet & Commissioner

Policy & Management Board

lead department

Directorate General Directorate General

lead department

Commissioner & Cabinet

vertical coordination I vertical coordination IIhorizontal coordination I

entire Commission

inter-service consultation

political consultation(Cabinets)

inter-service groups

horizontal coordination II

entire Commission


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proposal the differing views expressed by these departments (Commission of the European

Communities 2005 : 88-89 article 23.7).

In a second vertical coordination process (II) the lead department sends the revised proposal to

the Cabinet and the Commissioner, who can then start political negotiations with other Cabinets

and Commissioners. Mostly this will concern divergent positions rather than routine cases. At

this stage horizontal coordination (II) can take different forms. Specialised task forces or

working groups may be set up, so called inter-service groups. They can be seen as structural

attempts to overcome inter-Commission rivalries by creating sub-groups or networks of

Commissioners, Director-Generals or DG heads in specific areas of policy (Ludlow 1991: 120;

Peterson 1999: 57). Spence (2006a: 148) numbers 48 inter-service groups in 1990, 63 in 1993

and 224 in 2006.3

A central route of horizontal coordination at this stage is between Cabinet members shadowing a

policy area. When it comes to decision taking or in cases where no consensus can be achieved at

lower echelons the dispute becomes subject to discussions between the chefs de cabinet. It is to

these unresolved cases to which Endo (1998: 45) refers when putting forwards that the meeting

of chefs de Cabinets, chaired by the Secretary General is the major forum through which the

main in-house battles are channelled. In any case highly politicized proposals are forwarded to

the weekly College of Commissioners meetings. Decisions are taken by the entire College, 4 yet

controversial decisions are the exception rather than the rule. Voting is rare and follows the

principle of simple majority (Art. 219 TEC). Egeberg (2006: 8) has quantified the phenomenon

to yearly 8-10 formal votes in the Prodi Commission as opposed to hundreds of yearly decisions

(including those for new instruments). Even lower numbers can be found in Spence (2006b: 48),

while the Delors Commissions were characterised by more actual votes than ever before or after

(Peterson 1999: 53).

In sum we face a multi-staged, only partially formalized process running along vertical and

horizontal lines. On the road at multiple points provide opportunities for interaction and internal

dynamics. They might be more or less contentious in nature with the less conflictual ones

showing a higher probability of being solved on the road and by actors in the administrative

sphere of the EU Commission.

3He is ambivalent in judging their usefulness to bring about coordination though (Spence 2006a).

4The only exemption being the rehabilitation procedure, applied in rare cases mostly related to management

and administrative decisions. It deferrers the collegiality principle by assigning exclusive responsibility to a

subgroup of Commissioners.


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3 Conceptualization and operationalizationHow does the position for a legislative proposal of the EU Commission form? Put very broadly

we are interested in where issues come from and why they arise in one rather than in another

form. The question what constitutes an issue or an item is answered pragmatically by reference

to a legislative proposal.5 In EU research the position of relevant actors is typically described

along two main dimensions. On the sovereignty-integration dimension the Commission is held

to have an extreme supranational position (Thomson/Stokman/Achen/Knig 2006). The other

prominent dimension is ideology on a left-right scale. Further dimensions include typical

national patterns of capitalism (liberal versus sector-, family-oriented or national-coordinated

market economies), welfare states (Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon or continental) or the

belongingness to a region (north-south, accession groups). Methodologically, research on EU

Commission positions assigns positions ex-post on the basis of characteristics of the

Commissioner (party political affiliation or nationality, e.g. Crombez 1996; Wonka 2004;

Dring 2006) or arguments in (Commission-) documents (e.g. Knig 1997; Cram 1994;

generally: Laver 2001). Studying the position formation process prior to an official legislative

proposal this type of documents may not always exist for the DGs involved or they may not be

easily accessible. Hence we need to complement information in documents with expert

judgements on DG positions (cf Hug/Knig 2002; Thomson/Jovanka/Stokman 2004;

Thomson/Stokman/Achen/Knig 2006) and interviews with high Commission officials. Wecontrol for bias by cross checking their answers with perceptions of EU level actors from other

EU institutions (Council, European Parliament) and organised interests. The answers obtained

will feed into our dependent variable: the position of the EU Commission when making a

legislative proposal.

In the following we develop theoretically informed working hypotheses that contribute to

answering the two research questions: What shapes the policy position of a DG or its

Commissioner? And: What shapes the assertiveness of a DG or its Commissioner in internalcontentions? The working hypotheses discuss different explanatory factors and the direction of

their potential influence on the research question. Yet, we do not attempt to test them in a strict

methodological sense. Rather the working hypotheses are thought to act as structuring devices to

bring order into relevant factors, causal relationships and context variables. Ultimately we are

interested in providing the best possible explanation for an observable empirical phenomenon.

5 A DG can actively shape the agenda of the EU Commission by selecting and emphasising issues, but a DGs

agenda is also shaped by the issue emphasis other DGs choose.


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This approach has been labelled y-centered (Ganghof 2005) and comes close to what Scharpf

(1997: 25-26) discussed as backward-looking research design.

PLEASE NOTE THE VERY PRELIMINARY NATURE OF WORKING HYPOTHESES

AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS !!!

3.1 Policy position of a Directorate GeneralThe literature provides for seven theoretically grounded expectations to explain what the

position of a DG looks like: a functional logic, a power expansion logic, three logics of interest

representation, following national, party political or sub-national interests, a logic of

international transfer and a logic of path dependency. While much of the existing research and

the media attention focus on national interests to explain the content of positions we expect that

other logics or a mix of different logics will dominate in less exposed cases.

3.1.1 Functional logicThe functional logic assumes that a position can be explained from the purpose and nature of the

policy area. Policies emerge or existing positions are adjusted in reaction to new challenges and

problems, emerging tasks, performance crisis or the perception of functional inefficiencies.

XXX THEORY. Egeberg (2006) links this thinking to the structure of the EU Commission and

argues that the position evoked by a Commissioner is functional since the Commission is

specialized along sectoral lines. Along this line a position can be explained by analysing the

problem to be solved following the logic inherent to the policy area.

H1: The position of a DG results functionally from the problem to be solved.

Operationalization: position addresses a problem according to the DGs logic of action,

justification that policy was necessary to answer external changes and tasks.

3.1.2 Power and influenceIn political science organisations are often considered to be power hungry. They are constantly

striving for more competences or resources (for an institutional perspective see Wildavsky 1974;

for an economic perspective Niskanan 1974; also bureau shaping: Dunleavey 1991). For the

EU system a similar argument has been made by Nugent (2002: 9). Stressing the personal


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characteristics of the Commissioner rather than the organisational interest he puts forward:

With most Commissioners wanting to be responsible for as much as possible, turf disputes

can sometimes become decidedly sharp. Power is relative in nature since we may assume that

influence is not a zero-sum game but depends on the behaviour and strategies of other actors.

From this perspective the interest to maintain or extend influence is the driving force behind aposition and should be reflected in the position of a DG.

H2: The position of a DG is determined by a strategic interest to maintain or extend influence.

Operationalization: position (de facto) increases (scope or depth of) competences, allocates

greater financial resources to the DG, or is timely related to the policy of a rival DG.

Approaches that centre interest presentation can be clearly marked off these two previous logics.There is a broad literature of interest representation arguing that (organised) interests attempt to

use actors and structures of the political system to put their positions through. From this

perspective positions of EU actors always result from national position formation processes

(with respect to the EU system see Hug/Knig 2002; Thomson/Stokman/Achen/Knig 2006). In

the following we distinguish three groups of such interests.

3.1.3 National interestFirst, the influence of national interest has been stressed by intergovernmentalists when arguing

for the role of Member State governments presenting national economic interest in Brussels

(most prominently Moravcsik 1993). Recurring on a different theoretical frame Hooghe (2001)

puts forward that the view of Commission officials is strongly determined by socialization in the

national sphere. From both perspectives a DG should serve notice to national interests. Case

study evidence for this line of reasoning is more prominent in some policy areas than in others,

notably those linked to distributive politics or interfering with national varieties of capitalism

and the allocation of funds at the national level. Every Commissioner is prepared to support his

or her country vis--vis the college when it deals with competition rules affecting a national

enterprise, for example, or a transfer of funds from the EU budget (Lequesne 2000:48; cf

Schmidt 2001: 180; Christiansen 1997:78).

H3a: The position of a DG is determined by the nationality of the Director General.

H3b: The position of a DG is determined by the nationality of the Commissioner.


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Operationalization: nationality of Director General / Commissioner, position of the country in

the Council (minutes of COREPER, Council meetings,Agence Europe).

3.1.4 Party politicsSecond, one of the most classical categories to explain policy outcomes is party politics

(Schmidt 1996). If we consider the Commission to be a political actor parties should have great

influence on the position of a DG. There are two mechanisms through which they should matter.

First, the Commissioner or the Director General holds a specific position due to their ideology.

Such a perspective assumes that durable ideological preferences translate (directly) into a

specific policy position. Second, Commissioners are nominated and appointed by national

governments which in turn belong to a (national) party and are thus accountable to this party.

Both reasonings differ from the hypotheses on national interest presentation in that they take

ideologies rather than a national interest to be decisive for a position. Evidence for this logic is

mixed. Wonka (2007) shows Member State governments trying to influence EU policy-making

via Commissioners sharing their party political affiliation. But party affiliation has also been

questioned as important appointment criterion (Dring 2007). And Lequesne (2000: 47)

provides a list of case study examples questioning the relationship between party politics and the

position of a Commissioner.

H4a: The position of a DG is determined by the party affiliation of the Director General.

H4b: The position of a DG is determined by the party affiliation of the Commissioner.

Operationalization: former national minister or holder of (high) party position, position of the

party on the issue according to MANIFESTO data.

3.1.5 Sub-national interestsSub-national interests are the third group that can be conceptualized as influencing the position

of a DG on the basis of interest representation. There is an increasing and sophisticated literature

in EU studies dealing with their influence on policymaking (most recently Gornitzka/Sverdrup

2008). They differentiate between the channels interest groups use to influence positions of the

decisive actors (e.g. stake holder conferences, specialised working groups or informal contacts

Mazey/Richardson 1993; Kohler-Koch 1997), types of interests (e.g. economy, environment and

consumer, regional offices Hooghe 2001: 65; specifically on social partner organisations

Falkner 1998; or firms Coen/Dannreuther 2003) or actors they address (European Parliament,


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Commission, Council or ECJ Bouwen 2002; Bouwen/McCown 2007). Strictly speaking these

studies capture the access of sub-national interests (Bouwen 2004; Woll 2006) rather than their

factual influence on Commission positions. However, we hold that interest group access is an

important indicator to study differences in the representation of sub-national interests by DGs.

H5: The position of a DG is determined by sub-national-interest representations.

Operationalization: type of interest groups that have access to the DG (Expert Group Register),

their position according to key documents and expert interviews.

3.1.6 International transferRather than being inspired purely by national or EU-policy interests in many cases a proposal

may represent broader international policy models or those of a third country. Analytically the

stretch of policy models is often captured by concepts of diffusion or policy emulation

(Braun/Gilardi/Fglister/Luyet/Meseguer 2006; Knill 2005). Our understanding is that of a more

straightforward relationship. This will be easier to be observed while controlling for other

influences. The international transfer may take the form of a direct response to an international

policy instrument (such as an ILO labour convention). Or it may be based on an international

event (such as the UN Year for the Elderly in 1999). From this perspective we can expect the

position of a DG to be a copy of or come close to the substance of a related policy put forwardby an external or international actor.

H6: The position of a DG is determined by the policy of an international actor.

Operationalization: link in substance to earlier international policy instrument or to that of an

external actor.

3.1.7 Path dependencyFinally the position a DG may be shaped by earlier EU decisions and policies. Many legislative

proposals originate in the need for revision as e.g. laid down in a directive (pregnant workers

directive), a call for refinement due to legal uncertainties or can be understood as an attempt to

role developments back such as after an ECJ ruling (working time directive). We can assume

that the position a DG will hold vis--vis a new instrument is shaped by these earlier policies.

Rather than creating an instrument in a vacuum, it is inherently linked to existing instruments

and we can expect a position to be largely determined by earlier choices.

H7: The position of a DG is determined by existing instruments.


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Operationalization: mentioning of earlier legislation or ECJ rulings in recitals.

Before developing the second research question in more detail, the following table summarizes

the logics the position of a DG in the process of position formation prior to a legislative

Commission may result from.

Table 1: Factors impacting on a DGs policy positions

- functional logic

- power expansion

- national interests

position results from - party politics

- sub-national interests

- international transfer

- path dependency

3.2 Assertiveness of a DG in internal contentionsIn this section we will discuss the ability of one or more actors in the Commission to assert their

own position against divergent other positions with the aim to obtain the desired content for a

legal instrument. Thus our dependent variable is the assertiveness of a DG in internal

contentions with other DGs. What are indicators that a DG was successful in putting its position

through?

First, a DG should officially have the lead in shaping content as well as process of the legislative

instrument. This implies that we question the division of responsibility being an outcome of

purely functional or administrative rationality. Rather we side with Stevens (2001: 167) who

puts forward that the division of responsibilities between DGs may owe more to political

infighting and bargaining. However while Stevens sees member state governments as decisive

actors in these tussles we hold that DGs are highly influential in deciding about allocation of

responsibilities for specific policies. Second, lead departments do not necessarily dominate the

complete process. Most likely struggles between DGs are far from questioning the overall

content of a legislative proposal but evolve around specific issues or paragraphs. Hence we need

to adopt a finer grained lens. Looking inside legislative proposals can help to overcome this


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problem. Thus, looking at outcomes, a DG was successful in putting its position through where

the content of one or more paragraphs of the legislative proposal is equal to or close to the ideal

position of a DG. Having developed a process and an outcome related indicator for assertiveness

we will now turn to the factors that can explain differences between DGs and over time when it

comes to assertiveness.

3.2.1 CompetenceThe EU system is characterised by an unequal competence transfer from the Member States to

the supranational level. Policy areas differ with respect to the competences allocated to them in

the treaty base. DGs that act in policy areas for which more competences have been transferred

can recur on legally founded arguments to put their position through. This argument is grounded

in reasoning by Scharpf (1996) on the asymmetric competence transfer with respect to market

making EU policies and EU social policy (cf also Schfer 2005). Looking at mechanisms

through which competences matter we can distinguish between DGs referring to the more

favourable decision taking rules rendering adoption in the Council more likely. A concrete

example is competition policy where the strong treaty base allows the responsible DG to

relatively immune against the need of consensus-building and log-rolling in the Council (Cini

2000: 82-83). Or competences may matter because they assign legitimacy to community policies

when DGs interact.

At the same time we are aware that the treaty base can be actively stretched to include bordering

issues. A well known example is the argumentative link of social policy issues to the market

freedoms in order to advance workers protection (Rhodes 1995: 100). Hence what competences

apply might itself be subject to internal dynamics.

H8: Assertiveness of a DG is great where supranational competences are great.

Operationalization: scope and degree of competence, decision rules applied, length of time spancommunity policy exists.

3.2.2 Personnel resourcesIf we take the professional preparation of a dossier to be decisive for its success in internal

contentions, features of the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy should be central to DG punch.

Yet, features such as speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, discretion and strict

subordination are difficult to capture directly. A more hands on indicator for organisational


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success are personnel resources. All else being equal, a greater number of personnel should be

conducive to the preparation of dossiers (cf Mayntz/Scharpf 1975: 8-20). Existing research has

shown the number of personnel of a DG to be of relevance in explaining the successful use of

agenda setting power by the Commission (Bailer 2006: 18). 6 It has even been argued that

political weight of a DG is contingent on the size of the DG (Tmmel 2008: 109). A DG that hasmore personnel resources at its disposal should be more likely to put its position through against

a DG with fewer resources. To avoid, that personnel resources simply reflect a wider range of

issues to be dealt with, we control for the range of issues dealt with by a DG.

H9: Assertiveness of a DG is great where more personnel resources are allocated.

Operationalization: number of personnel divided by number of units.

3.2.3 Policy entrepreneurshipIn contrast to organisations as units of analysis we may look at single individuals when striving

to explain DG assertiveness. Here the concept ofpolicy entrepreneurcomes into the picture.

Policy entrepreneurs are advocates who are willing to invest their resources time, energy,

reputation, money to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in form of

material, purposive, or solidary benefits (Kingdon 1984: 188). Closely related is Blondals

(1987: 25, cited after Endo 1998: 18) concept of political leadership.7

In EU studies theconcept has been used to describe the capacity of the EU Commission to generate new

competences or to advance policies even against the wish of Member States (for an example

from social policy: Cram 1997; from regional policy: Tmmel 1992; for the integration process

more generally: Sandholtz/Zysman 1989). DGs may differ in the capacity of their leading

personnel to initiate policies, to negotiate them or to advance them more generally. The ability

to act as policy entrepreneur should be equally decisive in the internal interaction in the

Commission (Simpson 2000). The most prominent example is probably Delors (Ross 1995;Pollack 1997: 124; Lord 2002).

6Ultimately her argument rests on the ability of the DG to anticipate the position of Member States in the

Commission proposal, hence on strategic knowledge (see below).

7Three factors are considered central personal characteristics of the leader (i.e. energy, drive, ability to grasp

problems quickly, sociological background, psychological traits), instruments at their disposal (i.e. groups,

parties, bureaucracy, court, legislatures, degree of centralisation/ decentralisation of the given political

system, loyalty of the members of these bodies) and situations they face (i.e. vast/ limited problem,

objective/ subjective problem, crisis or routine).


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H10a: Assertiveness of a DG is great where the Commissioner shows policy entrepreneurship.

H10b: Assertiveness of a DG is great where the Director General shows policy

entrepreneurship.

Operationalization: expert assessment, secondary sources.

3.2.4 Size of Member StateBeyond personnel capacities a Commissioner and a Director General can draw strength from the

political weight he carries. Following realist reasoning from international relations studies

political weight is strongly influenced by the power base a country offers. XXX THEORY.

From a network perspective it can be expected that Commissioners from large Member States

have a comparative advantage when drafting legislation because they can draw on bigger or

more specialized networks of national experts when preparing arguments (Joana/Smith 2006:

39). From both perspectives the punch of a DG should increase with the size of the Member

State its Commissioner comes from.

H11: Assertiveness of a DG is great where the Commissioner comes from a big country.

Operationalization: nationality of Commissioner, population size.

3.2.5 Interest group involvementDecision theory has highlighted the importance of information asymmetries. Information can be

provided in-house or can come from the outside. XXX THEORY. In this case interest groups

play a central role. They create knowledge advantage and should thus be central factors for

assertiveness (Peterson 1995). We know that there are relevant differences between DGs in

involvement of and support for interest groups (Hooghe 2001: 65; Page 1997: 107). Strictly

speaking we do not know what effect the number of interest groups has on knowledge provision.

A greater number of think tanks and organised interests do not necessarily provide better or

more information. Moreover there might be a trade off between a DGs internal expertise and the

buying of external expertise.8 However research has shown that the Commission actively

advances and shapes the formation of organised interest groups and their role in policy making

8A lack of expertise can lead to a battle about expertise among DGs. But the opposite might be equally true,

a lack of external knowledge can put a DG in the situation to make up its own expertise. And too much

external information might challenge the position of the Commission.


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(Hritier 2001; Bauer 2002; Hartlapp 2007). Besides privileged access or the setting up of

networks this might take the form of direct financial incentives. On this basis we assume, that in

principle, greater interest group involvement creates an informational advantage for a DG.

H12: Assertiveness of a DG is great where there are comparatively many interest groups

involved.

Operationalization: existence of specialized expert networks in the area, budget lines that are

allocated to interest groups and commissioned reports.

A second aspect crucial to the role of interest groups as source of valuable information is the

type of information they provide. Information can be characterised as technical knowledge or

expertise. This is what Weber refers to, when he attaches great importance to (economic) private

interests: "Only the expert knowledge of private economic interest groups in the field of

"business" is superior to the expert knowledge of the bureaucracy. This is so because the exact

knowledge of facts in their field is of direct significance for economic survival." (Weber [1925]

1978) 1978 #3468: 994]. Interest groups can also provide strategic information on the

preferences of the relevant actors (Broscheid/Coen 2006: 3). And information can relate to

knowledge about causal relationships between processes and in the political system (cf

Mayntz/Scharpf 1975: 10). We do not know yet what differential impact the three types of

knowledge have on DG assertiveness but consider this a fruitful category to include in our

research.

H13: Assertiveness of a DG depends on the type of knowledge (technical, strategic, process)

provided by interest groups.

Operationalization: ???

3.2.6 Visibility of the positionAlthough citizens are more distanced from political decisions in the EU system than in the

national political sphere, public opinion matters for EU policies, too. XXX THEORY. Generally

the mechanism at play should be that Commissioners from a DG with a high public profile, such

as competition or foreign affaires (cf Spence 2006b: 46), should have a powerful voice in the

interaction with other DGs. They can put forward that otherwise there will be a public outrage

and a backlash in support for integration. In case of special events an issue might become salient

disregarding the general public profile by force of circumstances. From this perspective the


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assertiveness of a DG should be great where an issue is highly visible be it generally or due to

current events.

H14: Assertiveness of a DG is great where the policy is highly visible.

Operationalization: content analysis of national newspapers.

3.2.7 Isolation in CollegeVoting is a rare mode of decision taking in the College consensus dominates. Yet we may

assume that the majority requirement (Art. 219 TEC) nevertheless casts a shadow on the

decision taking. XXX THEORY. Following this reasoning a DG that is isolated with its position

should have greater difficulties to put the position through even in the many cases where no vote

is taken.

H15: Assertiveness of a DG is small where it is isolated in the College.

Operationalization: DG is the only one holding a diverging position on a proposal.

3.2.8 Distance to horizontal services, Secretariat General and College positionBesides sectoral departments the EU Commission also comprises horizontal departments. They

provide services related to translation, legal expertise or budget and financial spending. Most of

them are technical in nature. Nevertheless they can hold a concrete policy position. Competent

intervention from a technical DG such as the legal service on a critical judicial interpretation in

a draft directive or from the DG Budget and Financial Control on a position in spending policies

like agriculture or regional policy can strengthen influence (e.g. Spence 2006b: 46, 148).

Strictly speaking the Secretariat General is also a horizontal service. It fulfils the role of a

secretariat not only for the Commission in general, but more specifically for its political head

the Commission President, and his Cabinet. Thus, far from being a technical service, it is best

characterised as a strategic-political actor. Often the Secretariat General and / or the

Commission Presidents Cabinet are the needles eye through which a proposal has to pass

before it will be negotiated and decided in the College. Both technical as well as political

support for a position can increase the assertiveness of a DG vis--vis other DGs. Following this

reasoning a greater distance between the policy position of a DG and the horizontal services, the

Secretariat General or the College should weaken the DG in internal contentions.


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H16a: Assertiveness of a DG is great where the position is equal to or close to the position of

the involved horizontal services.

H16b: Assertiveness of a DG is great where its position is equal to or close to the Secretariat

General.

H16c: Assertiveness of a DG is great where its position is equal to or close to the Cabinet of the

President of the Commission.

Operationalization: position of DG BUDG for spending instruments, or of other technical

services where relevant, position of the Secretariat General and Cabinet of the President of the

Commission.

3.2.9 Distance to Council positionIn the EU system behaviour and strategies of the Commission do not take place in a vacuum.

Rather the political system can be characterised as polycentric. The different European

institutions are interdependent in policymaking. Following this line of reasoning the position of

the European Parliament (EP) and the concerned Council formation are likely to matter directly

for assertiveness of a DG.9 While only the EU Commission President is a member of the

Council, the mechanism can in principle hold for other Commissioners with respect to their

Council formation. A DG that holds a position equal to or close to the conceivable majority or

unanimity in the Council formation or in the EP should have more punch in the internal

interaction.10

9At the same time it is true that the Council position is not fixed. The ability to influence the Council position

(such as skillfully exercised by Delors and to a lesser degree also Jenkins) can be the most powerfulexternal resource of the Commission president (Endo 1998).

10Including the position of the Council and the EP in our analysis might be relevant with respect to a second

argument. We may assume a more complex relationship between internal interaction in the EU Commission

and external interaction with the other EU institutions (Scharpf 2000). From this perspective the position of

the Council (respectively of the EP) does not impact directly on the assertiveness of a DG, but indirectly

influences behaviour and strategies of DGs in their internal interaction. Regardless the decision procedure

the Commission is most powerful vis--vis the Council (and EP) when presenting a coherent position.

Taking this into account we may assume that the DGs anticipate the reaction of the Council (or EP). Thus

the external interaction would have a positive effect on the interaction between DGs. This relational

hypothesis may be summarised as the indirect influence of the coherence or fragmentation of the Council on


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H17a: Assertiveness of a DG is great where its position is equal to or close to the conceivable

majority or unanimity in the Council.

H17b: Assertiveness of a DG is great where its position is equal to or close to the conceivable

majority or unanimity in the European Parliament.

Operationalization: Agence Europe, COREPER minutes and Council votes, EP deliberations

and voting

Summarizing the last pages the following table provides an overview of the working hypotheses

and their expected effect on DG assertiveness.

Table 2: Overview on factors influencing DG assertiveness

factor expected effect on assertiveness

competence +

personnel resources +

policy entrepreneur +

size of Member State +

interest group involvement +

(type of knowledge provided) ?

visibility of the position +

isolation in College -

distance to horizontal services / Secretariat

General / College position

-

distance to Council / EP position -

the formation of a Commission position (Hartlapp 2007). It is situated at a different level of analysis than the

other factors discussed so far.


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4 Organising researchThis paper is the conceptual outline of a five year research project on Position formation in the

EU Commission. Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, an Independent Young Researcher

Group started in February 2008 at the Social Science Research Center Berlin. Directed by

Miriam Hartlapp, the group of collaborators includes two doctoral students who write their

dissertations on specific aspects within the group's common theme (starting as of September for

three years each). Likely topics are the link between internal dynamics in the Commission and

external decision taking dynamics in the EU political system; or the involvement of interest

groups in the EU political system as position shapers and power resource in internal contentions.

We are supported by a student research assistant. We plan to publish the results in form of a

common book project and to present them at international and national conferences.

Each researcher will focus on one (possibly two) issue areas. They should fall in the

responsibility of two or more DGs and be characterised by a systematic interconnectedness of

instruments that go beyond punctual or superficial links. Examples are the issue area of social

security measures in the common market, competition and regional policies, or consumer

interest and agriculture. Within each of these issue areas 10-15 concrete legislative proposals

will be studied. Most likely we will focus on directives as the most common legislative

instrument. Our choice will be guided by an interest to cover all important but not only the

exposed and highly contentious instruments in a fixed time period. It will be based on

information provided in the EU data base PreLex. Here for each instrument the leading DG and

the DGs that participated can be identified. Having chosen a medium-N setup (and working with

a reasonably long time horizon) entails two great advantages. First we can conclude what are

typical processes of position formation within the EU Commission. Second we can verify or

falsify innovative hypotheses not only in later studies (which is typical for small-N research that

often ends with a new and over-generalised hypothesis being 'aired') but with the rest of the

rather many cases at hand.

In case studies we will trace the policy formulation process between these DGs using the

working hypotheses presented in section 3 as a structuring device. Studying similar processes

across a number of instruments will allow holding variables constant at a time to make inference

on others possible, e.g. the nationality of the Commissioner or isolation in the College. The

cases will rest on primary document analysis and semi structured expert interviews to be

conducted with officials in Brussels. These interviews are planned to cover officials responsible

for drafting proposals, as well as more high ranking officials involved in the successive steps of


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the process (Director Generals, cabinet members and possibly Commissioners). Some of the

working hypotheses already contain suggestions for operationalizations that will combine this

qualitatively gained knowledge with other data sources e.g. the new expert group register of the

EU Commission or MANIFESTO data.

Currently we are working on developing our hypotheses more fully and to advance the research

design and conceptual outline of the project. Therefore we are immensely happy to have been

invited by the experts from the CONSENT network to present our thoughts. And we are looking

forward to critical remarks and comments that will surely help to advance our research. In

parallel to these conceptual works we are empirically exploring the ground by conducting pilot

case studies in the issue area of ageing workers. This is subject to a different paper I am

currently writing that analyses the policy formation processes for the Directive safeguarding

the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the

Community (98/49/EC), for the Framework Directive establishing a general framework for

equal treatment in employment and occupation (2000/78/EC), for the Directive on activities

and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (2003/41/EC) as well as

for the OMC processes on pensions and social inclusion. In this context earlier this month we

interviewed officials in Brussels from DG EMPL, DG MARKET, DG ECFIN and DG EAC and

we supplemented this information by talking to NGOs. The next 2 years will be dedicated to

carrying out and analysing in team work the 30-45 case studies.

In a second phase of the project the factors isolated as relevant and / or particularly interesting

for understanding policy formation within the EU Commission will be traced over time. We will

thus try to increase leverage on the factors answering our research question by introducing a

longitudinal perspective. While some are likely to vary over time such as nationality or

personnel resources of a DG for others we assume relative stability from the founding days until

today, e.g. the competences in some policy area. Using material from theHistorical Archives at

the European University in Florence and other sources a new data database on evolution of theEU Commission will be built up to serve research interests beyond this project.

5 Summary and outlookThere is a true research gap as to our understanding of position formation processes prior to the

presentation of an EU legislative proposal. We can not provide a systematic explanation why the

EU Commission proposes legislative drafts that contradict each other or that disembogue into asituation characterised by opposition from a majority of Member States. Focussing on the EU


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Commission as agenda setter in the EU political process the paper asked two questions central to

advancing our knowledge on this issue: What shapes the policy position of a DG or its

Commissioner? And: What shapes the assertiveness of a DG or its Commissioners in internal

contentions? The paper discussed the state of the art on position formation in the EU

Commission highlighting the contrast between daily politics and case studies that stress internaldynamics in the Commission on the one hand and the picture of a unitary actor on the other

hand. It described the process of internal interactions preceding an official Commission proposal

as multi-staged, only partially formalised and involving actors from different DGs at the

administrative as well as at the political level. We then moved on to develop a catalogue of

working hypotheses drawing on insight from the analysis of preference formation in the EU

system as well as on institutional and organisational factors in the tradition of comparative

political system and (public) administration studies. This allowed us to discuss differentexplanations for policy positions and to combine them with fresh operationalizations for

assertiveness of DGs. Tackling the two research questions systematically for a medium number

of cases in different policy areas will put us in a position to generate new insights into the

dynamics of conflict and consent within the EU Commission and to understand what is typical

for position formation. It should boost our understanding of how the EU-system functions and

ultimately allow a more substantiated reasoning about the evolution of the integration process.


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