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Harry Frankfurt “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”

Up to this point we have been discussing the compatibility of determinism and whatwe might call “free action”. Our question has been: if determinism is true, is itever true that people act freely, where this means that the person could havedone otherwise.

But what about the concept of free will? What is the relation between freedom ofthe will and freedom of action? And what is freedom of the will, anyway?

Frankfurt is going to give us an account of these two notions, i.e. freedom of actionand freedom of will. Frankfurt thinks that his account supports compatibilism.Along the way we are also going to get a theory about what it is to be a person.

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First-order desires: desires to do this or that

- expressed in statements of the form “A wants to X”, where “to X” refers to anaction

Effective 1st-order desires vs. Non-effective 1st-order desires

-Effective 1st-order desires: desires that have motivated, are motivating, or willmotivate an agent to act

On Sunday I had the desire to go to a movie. This motivated me to go themovies (“The Aviator”, thumbs up).

Right now I desire to be speaking to you about free will.

I also desire to get a cup of coffee after lecture is over. This will motivateme to go get a cup of coffee.

-Non-effective 1st-order desires: desires that are not effective

On Sunday I had the desire to stay in bed all afternoon.

Right now I have the desire to take a nap.

I also want to take a nap after lecture is over.

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Frankfurt: your effective first-order desires = your will

“To identify an agent’s will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he ismotivated in some action he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) bywhich he will or would be motivated when or if he acts.”(325)

Second-order desires, 2 varieties:

1. desire for a first-order desire

- expressed by statements of the form “A wants to X”, where “to X” refers to afirst-order desire

“I want to want to exercise everyday”

“I want the desire to eat more vegetables”

2. desire for a first-order desire to be effective

= second-order volition

“I want my desire to get a cup of coffee after class to be effective”

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Psychotherapist example

A psychotherapist treats heroin addicts. He believes that he can better help hispatients if he knows what it is like to want to take heroin. But, he has a strongaversion to heroin - he strongly desires not to take heroin.

The psychotherapist’s desires:

- 2nd-order desire for the desire to take heroin

- 1st-order desire not to take heroin

- no 1st-order desire to take heroin

- no 2nd-order volition regarding the desire to take heroin

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Having a 2nd-order desire for some 1st-order desire

Having that 1st-order desire

Having the 2nd-order volition that some 1st-order desire be effective

Having that 1st-order desire

does not entail

does entail

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Frankfurt: “Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-orderdesires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.”(327)

wantons = beings with first-order desires but no second-order volitions (wantons may have second-order desires that are not volitions)- wantons are not persons, according to Frankfurt- a wanton does not care about her will, she is indifferent about which ofher first-order desires is effective- “a wanton may possess and employ rational faculties of a high order. Nothing in the concept of a wanton implies that he cannot reason or thathe cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do.”(328)

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3 kinds of addicts, same physiological addiction in each addict

Unwilling addict

- 1st-order desire to take the drug

- 1st-order desire to refrain from taking the drug

- 2nd-order volition: he wants his 1st-order desire to refrain from taking thedrug to be effective

Wanton addict

- 1st-order desire to take the drug

- 1st-order desire to refrain from taking the drug

- no 2nd-order volitions

Willing addict

- 1st-order desire to take drug

- 2nd-order volition: he wants his 1st-order desire to take the drug to be effective

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unwilling addict

desire to takethe drug

desire not to take the drug

2nd-order volition for this1st-order desire to be

effective

Question: does the unwilling addict have free will?

Is the unwilling addict free to have the will (i.e. effective 1st-order desire) that hewants to have?

NO

Because of the unwilling addict’s physiological addiction, his 1st-order desire to takethe drug will be effective. So he is not free to have the will he wants to have.

Frankfurt: “It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will.”(331)

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Freedom of the will = being able to have the will one wants to have.

wanton addict

desire to take the drugdesire not to take

the drug

Does the wanton addict have free will?

NO

Because of his addiction, the wanton addict’s desire to take the drug will be effective.Is this the will the wanton addict wants to have?

The wanton addict has no 2nd-order volitions - he is indifferent about what his will is. The wanton addict lacks free will, but for a different reason than the unwillingaddict.

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Another definition of person-hood: “the type of entity for whom freedom of the willmay be a problem.”(330)

This is just another way of saying that persons have second-order volitions.Freedom of the will is a problem only if you have some desires about which ofyour1st-order desires should constitute your will.

Freedom of action vs. freedom of will

Freedom of action = being able to act on one’s 1st-order desires- both the unwilling addict and the wanton addict have freedom of action

Freedom of will = being able to have the will one wants to have- neither the unwilling addict nor the wanton addict have free will

Freedom of action Freedom of will

Freedom of will Freedom of actionimplies

does not imply

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willing addict

desire to take the drug

2nd-order volition for thisdesire to be effective

Does the willing addict have free will?

NO

The willing addict is not free to have the will he wants to have, even thoughhe does have the will he wants to have.

Frankfurt: “The willing addict’s will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will beeffective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will. Butwhen he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will.”(335)

[This is puzzling: his will is not free, yet he takes the drug of his own free will?? I am inclined to ignore this last remark.]

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Moral responsibility

Recall Chisholm’s view about the connection between moral responsibility andfreedom.

Being morally responsible for your action.

You acted freely.

You could have done otherwise.

At the time of acting you had a number of alternatives open to you.

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Is the willing addict morally responsible for her actions when she takes the drug?

Frankfurt: YES

But because of her physiological addiction, the willing addict did not have anyalternatives open to her. She could not have done otherwise. Nevertheless,Frankfurt thinks that the willing addict is morally responsible.

For Frankfurt, moral responsibility implies that you have a 2nd-order volition for the1st-order desire upon which you act.

Being morally responsible for your action.

Having a 2nd-order volition for the 1st-order desire that motivated youto act.

Having alternatives open to you.

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Frankfurt: “My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be neutral withregard to the problem of determinism. It seems conceivable that it should becausally determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want. If thisis conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys a freewill.”(336)

me

desire to eat more vegetables

desire to eat fewer vegetables

2nd-order volition for thisdesire

According to Frankfurt, it may be causally determined that I am able to satisfymy 2nd-order volition.

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Gary Watson, “Free Agency”

Watson provides a completely different account of freedom of action and freedom ofthe will, i.e. one that is completely different from Frankfurt’s.

Platonic distinction between two sources of desire:

Appetites & Passions- source of “desires”, in Watson’s technical sense of the term- e.g. desires for food, sex, sleep, drugs

Reason- source of “values”- involves the agent’s recognition of what is good or valuable for her to do

There is an opposing Humean distinction between Reason and the Passions, but onHume’s view, only the Passions can motivate. The faculty of reason can beused to draw inferences, but it is not the source of states that can move one toaction.

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At 6:30 am this morning when my alarm clock went off I had two competing desires:

- I had the strong desire to turn off the alarm and stay in bed

- but, I knew that if I stayed in bed I wouldn’t have time to eat breakfast, and Iknow that eating breakfast is good for me

- so, I also had the desire to get out of bed; this is an action I valued

My passion for sleeping is the source of the first desire.

Reason, i.e. the recognition of what is good for me, is the source of the seconddesire or value.

These are two competing 1st-order desires. Both are desires to do something, i.e.stay in bed or get out of bed. The difference between these desires is that theyhave different sources.

me

desire to stay in bed

desire to get out of bed

= value

Passions Reason

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Another example

The unwilling addict also has 2 competing 1st-order desires:

- the desire to take the drug

- the desire to refrain from taking the drug

Watson would say that the first of these is an appetitive or passionate desire. Thesecond is a desire of reason - it is the result of the addict’s knowledge that takingthe drug is bad for him. Hence, the source of the second desire is reason - it isa rational desire. Watson calls this kind of desire a “value”.

unwilling addict

desire to take thedrug

desire/value to refrainfrom taking the drug

Passions Reason

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The relationship between these two sources of desire is complicated.

For example, in the first example, it may be that I also recognize that it is good forme to be well-rested. So part of the source of my desire to stay in bed couldalso be Reason.

One might say that because I recognize that being well-rested is good for me, Ivalue my appetite for sleep. This means that I will also value the desires thatresult from this appetite.

me

Watson: “It would be impossible for a non-erotic being or a person who lacked theappetite for food and drink fully to understand the value most of us attach tosex and to dining.”(344-5)

desire to stay in bed

Appetite for sleep Reason

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Another complication

It is possible that the appetitive desires can influence what we value - i.e. what wethink is good for us.

Under the consuming influence of his desire for the drug, the unwilling addict might(temporarily) decide that taking the drug is in fact good for him.

unwilling addict

Watson: “...some desires, when they arise, may ‘colour’ or influence what appear tobe the agent’s evaluations....”

This will make it hard to know what the agent really values.

desire to take the drug

Appetite for drug Reason

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A third complication

Watson mentions a third source of desire: Acculturation. This is distinct fromPassion and Reason.

An agent has been acculturated to desire and admire large, gas-guzzling SUVs.But the agent recognizes that SUVs are bad for the environment - and so theyare ultimately bad for her. She has an acculurated desire for an SUV but doesnot value having an SUV.

agent

Watson: “...aculturated desires are irrational (better: non-rational) in the same senseas appetitive and passionate desires.”(346)

desire to have an SUVdesire not to have an SUV

Acculturation Reason

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With these complications in mind, here is Watson’s account of free action.

Actually, let’s start with unfree action.

An agent’s action is not free when it is motivated by a desire for something shedoes not value.

Unfree actions are those actions which are:- motivated by appetitive desires- disvalued by the agent

Watson: “The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that an agent’svaluational system and motivational system may not completely coincide.”(347)

Watson: when the unwilling addict takes the drug he does not act freely.

Frankfurt: the unwilling does act freely when he takes the drug.- acting freely = being able to act on one’s 1st-order desires

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What about the willing addict? Let’s assume that the willing addict values taking thedrug.

Watson & Frankfurt will agree that the when the willing addict takes the drug he actsfreely, but for different reasons.

Watson: the willing addict is motivated by a desire for something he values

Frankfurt: the willing addict is able to act on his 1st-order desire

free actionfree actionFrankfurt

free actionunfree actionWatson

willing addict takes thedrug

unwilling addict takesthe drug

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There is an objection to Frankfurt here. One wants to say that there is a differencein freedom between the unwilling and the willing addict.

For Frankfurt, both the unwilling and the willing addict:

- act freely

- lack freedom of the will

So for Frankfurt there is no difference between the two with respect to freedom.Frankfurt does say: “the willing addict’s will is not free, for his desire to take thedrug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire toconstitute his will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his ownfree will.”(335, my emphasis)

On the other hand, the unwilling addict does not take the drug “of his own free will”.But as I mentioned earlier it is not at all clear what Frankfurt is getting at withthis distinction.

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Another criticism of Frankfurt.

Watson: “Indeed, practical judgements are connected with ‘second-order volitions’.For the same considerations that constitute one’s on-balance reasons for doingsome action, a, are reasons for wanting the ‘desire’ to do a to be effective inaction, and for wanting contrary desires to be ineffective. But in general,evaluations are prior and first order.”(350)

unwilling addict

desire to takethe drug

desire to refrainfrom taking the drug

2nd-order volitionFrankfurt

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Watson

unwilling addict

desire to take the drug

desire not to take the drug

Appetites Reason

2nd order volition

Watson: “Initially, they do not (or need not usually) ask themselves which of their desires they want to be effective in action; they ask themselves which course of action is most worth pursuing. The initial practical question is about courses ofaction and not about themselves.”(350)