harkavy- defeat, national humiliation, and the revenge motif in international politics

International Politics 37: 345-368, September 2000 o 2000 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United States 345

Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics

ROBERT E. HARKAVY Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

Abstract. The complex relationships between national defeat, and the resultant humiliation and compulsion to revenge, constitute a critical understudied area of international relations. Recent historical illustrations abound: Russian after the Cold War, the Arabs, France after several defeats, Germany after World War I, Argentina, etc. The salience of this factor may also call for critical adjustments to realist and rational choice theories hinged on assumptions of rational behavior. There is no existing relevant scholarship directly on this subject. But there are some strands of the literature which, in combination, may form the basis for future research: general works on revenge, territorial irredentism, and military defeat; psychological studies of shame and “narcissistic rage;” and applications of concepts in the clinical psychology of individuals as possibly applied to nation-state aggregates.

Introduction One of the curiosities of contemporary international relations is that some of its

presumably most important dimensions remain ignored or “understudied.” Most notable is the absence of attention to the interconnection - on a comparative basis - between defeat (usually but not always military defeat), national (or other levels of identity) humiliation or shame, and the consequent and resultant quest for compen- satory revenge. Whether this involves an outright “taboo” on the subject of revenge, as is actually claimed by Susan Jacoby in a recent work, is a question to which we shall return.1 Further, whether this is the result of methodological or political bias, or just because these subjects appear to be un-measurable in an empirical sense, is also an interesting point of speculation.

Whether or not subject to actual measurement or empirical research, this subject lends itself to an implicit model (See Figure 1 below). Amidst obvious complexity, and begging some definitional problems that will be addressed in the following analysis, the core of the model is fairly simple. It depicts a relationship between military defeat, the psychological absorption of such defeat by a collective body, subsequent widespread and persistent shame and humiliation, and a resulting collective rage and an almost ineradicable need for vengeance. The model allows for some vari- ants of “defeat,” for the nuanced distinction between deep psychological humiliation and “mere” revisionism, and the possibilities for alternative responses other than vengeance, i.e. withdrawal (acceptance) or internal revolution.

tt

Figure 1: A Model of Defeat, Humiliation, and Revenge

Narcissistic injury, shame,

humiliation, revisionism,

lowered testosterone at individual level

Vengeance

-cl / Or

Chronic collective - Withdrawal

narcissistic rage

\ or

lnternrl revolution

Cultural differences

\ produce variations in response

Begs questions of long-term persistence

Humiliation, Revenge, and International Relations Theory Humiliation and revenge relate, directly or tangentially, to several important, even

pivotal issues of international relations theory. Indeed, the accepted wisdom associated both with realist and liberal perspectives may confront questions arising from this analysis. Were revenge seen as a major component of international politics, foreign policy models based on assumptions of realism, rational choice or rationality, would be weakened as would notions that have been labeled “endism” and “the obsolescence of war.” In traditional realist or neo-realist models, in the tradition running from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz and others, such psychological issues are simply submerged or altogether marginalized relative to those involving system structure and the security dilemma. Morgenthau’s brief nod to the concept of revisionism is the only exception - but, even then, his view of revisionism was absent any mass psychological component, and more or less coterminous with imperialism.2 For the most part, too, the realist scholarly tradition does not allow much for cultural differences in foreign-policy making - a topic to which I return later.

Psychological factors such as humiliation and revenge at first blush would appear also to run against the grain of rational choice models with their built-in assumptions about value maximizing and a bias towards economic determinism. Or do they? Some rational choice scholars might claim, to the contrary, that vengeance can very easily fit within preference functions and that, indeed, there is nothing to pre- clude vengeance from being a dominant preference in some situations. They would claim, in other words, that vengeance is not necessarily “irrational,” even pathologi- cal, as assumed by psychiatrists and psychologists who deal with this subject.

Defeat, national humiliation and the revenge motif in internationalpolitics 347

Most of all, the humiliation/vengeance syndrome runs against the grain of theses that, in the modern zeitgeist, fall under the colloquial labels of “endism” or “the obsolescence of war.” The central point of “endism” is that “bad things are coming to an end.” Huntington sees endism as manifest at three levels - the end of the Cold War (indisputable), the proposition that wars among nation-states, or at least among some nation-states, are coming to an end and, per Fukuyama, “the end of history as such,” which results from the “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” and “the exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives.“3

The related “obsolescence of war” thesis is closely associated with political scientist John Mueller and military historian John Keegan. 4 In their writings, one finds the assumption that warfare among modern and relatively wealthy democracies has become anachronistic, even unthinkable, to the extent that analogies are drawn with the disappearance of slavery. In a related vein, the “democratic peace thesis” claims that, historically and with few exceptions, democracies have not committed aggression against each other.5 Further, “low politics” (trade competition) is said now permanent- ly to have superseded anachronistic “high politics” (national security) as the central focus of competition among the major contending powers.6 Additionally, the long period dating back at least to the 1930s, in which ideological competition has defined international bloc rivalries, is now seen to have come to a permanent end. The role of the nation-state is said to be in decline, nibbled at from above by international organizations and multinational corporations, and from below by increased regionalism and the strengthening of sub-national identities. 7 If these trends are permanent, then the old tradition of balance of power politics would be dead, in practice and in theory. Replacing it is, for instance, an image of the emerging international system that centers on a three-bloc, neo-mercantilist economic competition between a US-led Americas bloc, a German-led European bloc, and a Japan-led Asian bloc.8 Otherwise, a recent and frequently reviewed work by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky dwells on the coming sharp bifurcation between “zones of peace” (peaceful economic competition between the major democracies, singly or en bloc) and “zones of turmoil” (the assumption of looming chaos and neo-Malthusian disaster - poverty, AIDS, tribal warfare, etc.) in the developing areas.9

“Endism” and the “obsolescence of war” are not without their critics. But, to the extent such concepts are prophetic, the revenge motif might be relegated to the developing world or to areas characterized by Singer and Wildavsky as “zones of turmoil.” And, indeed, accumulated humiliations in northern zones of peace are more likely to be worked out through economic competition (as with Japan and Germany) or conventional and nuclear arms sales (as France and China utilize). But the jury is still out. Richard Rosecrance has, for instance, by way of partial dissent, characterized the present period as one of a “concert of powers” similar to what transpired after the Napoleonic wars and World War I - a concert likely to break up and lead to a renewal of big power security rivalries.10

Is the syndrome from shame and humiliation through collective narcissistic rage, to vengeance, an anachronism rooted in the family structures and cultures of less-than- fully modern societies, of which the Arab - or more broadly, Islamic - world would be a good example? According to this thesis, modern consumer societies and/or democracies would, by their very natures, be less prone to collective fantasies about revenge.

348 Robert E. Harkavy

The humiliation/revenge thesis thus raises questions about realism, rational choice theory and the basic tenets of liberalism applied to international relations. Such a contrarian thesis allows for, and often expects, what some might deem “irrational” national behavior based more on emotions than narrowly defined interests. In the latter case, it raises serious doubts about the sustainability of optimistic views on limiting war and conflict particularly in long-term conflicts and serial wars where some nations’ national pride has been wounded.

Recent Historical Examples The importance of this subject is brought to mind via numerous analyses of the

interminable Arab-Israeli conflict. In such a case, the deep humiliation felt by Arabs over the loss to Israel of at least five wars, has been noted. Given the disparity in rival populations and the magnitude of the military defeats, such loses have been humiliating.” Immediately after the 1967 war, for instance, The New York Times cited an Arab source as saying:

Tallal’s depression and subsequent turn toward a more fundamen- tal belief in Islam after the 1967 war is, by all accounts, not uncom- mon. Many people feel that the resurgence of Islamic militancy in Egypt dates to that overwhelming defeat...everyone was question- ing themselves after the war...they kept asking what it was about our society, our culture, our political system that could pave the way for such a defeat.12

Indeed, the recognition of a linkage between such humiliation and the subsequent need for revenge prompted Henry Kissinger’s strategy at the outset of the 1973 war, one designed to allow the Arabs a limited victory, even if largely mythical. Such action was meant to relieve them of enough shame and humiliation to allow for making peace. Some writers have questioned whether a permanent Arab-Israeli set- tlement is truly possible, given the Arabs’ deep rage over a succession of humiliating defeats by Israel dating back to 1948, striking at the core of self-respect, honor, and pride. This rage may have been heightened by Iraq’s humiliating defeat in the second Gulf War, even among the masses in Egypt, Syria, and Morocco who, nominally, were part of the victorious coalition.13

There are numerous other recent examples. During the recent mini-war between Ecuador and Peru, one Ecuadorian journalist was quoted as saying that “Ecuador is a nation wounded in its dignity...It is a nation with a defeat complex.“14 The Argentine bid to take the Falklands/Malvinas islands in 1982 was discussed in the context of historical grievance and national humiliation over foreign occupation of a “part of Argentina.” The subsequent loss of the war must have enhanced that Argentinean humiliation and need for vengeance.15

Not all such examples are contemporary; indeed, this is a classical historical theme. Barbara Tuchman, in her work on the origins of World War I, The Guns of August, provides a vivid portrayal of the workings of the related themes of humiliation and revenge with respect to France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the previous war with Germany in the early 1870s:

Defeat, national humiliation and the revenge motif in internationalpoli~ics 349

Through returning prosperity and growing empire, through the perennial civil quarrels - royalism, Boulangism, clericalism, strikes, and the culminating, devastating Dreyfus Affair - the sacred anger still glowed, especially in the army. The one thing that held together all elements of the army, whether old guard or republican, Jesuit or Freemason, was the mystique d’Alsace. The eyes of all were fixed on the blue line of the Vosges. A captain of infantry confessed in 1912 that he used to lead the men of his com- pany in secret patrols of two or three through the dark pines to the mountaintops where they could gaze down on Colmar. “On our return from those clandestine expeditions our columns reformed, choked and dumb with emotion.“16

Thomas Scheff quotes Gambetta’s legendary advice to the French about this defeat: “Speak of it never, think of it always,” which he calls “a counsel of obsession, denial and bypassing of shame.“17 He also argues that France’s sense of shame and loss, and its need for revenge, was a primary, albeit rarely acknowledged, contributing cause of World War I.

These themes are almost omnipresent in discussions of contemporary affairs. With a US-Japan struggle for global economic hegemony looming a few years ago, some analysts quietly worried that Japan’s defeat in 1945 lay just under the surface (in what was, we should not forget, a “war without mercy,” as highlighted in the title of one recent widely read book). l8 One study of nuclear proliferation attributes French aggressiveness in selling weapons technology to a need for compensation in relation to a long string of national defeats, from the Napoleonic wars to Algeria.‘9 So common are these themes that they may not be dismissed easily or entirely as excessive “psychologizing.”

Sometimes, the need for vengeance following a defeat may be displaced on other objects, or time-delayed. In the aftermath of its defeat by Iraq in 1988, much of Iran’s animus was directed against the US or the West. Only many years later did Iranians begin, publicly, to mull over the reasons for their defeat against what normally would have been thought of as a weaker foe.20

Not all cases of humiliation/revenge involve military losses by nation-states. Indeed, they may not involve contests between nation-states or national identities. Some sub- or supra- national identities may be strong enough to provide the basis for collective shame requiring vengeance. And, sometimes, defeats can be of a sort other than outright or easily identified military losses. The seemingly endless spiral of defeat and revenge involved in the struggle between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi is but one of many examples in connection with ethnic, tribal or religious wars in the Third World. Others can be seen in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan, the Caucasus, the Peruvian mountains, and Afghanistan.

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, where one is reminded constantly of the roots of Serb bitterness and humiliation that originated with the Serbs’ defeat by Ottoman Turks at Kosova Polje, and with the Jasenovic con- centration camp in World War II. 21 The current and much discussed Islamic rage against the West (perhaps yet to be expanded to a “clash of civilizations” b la Hunt-


ington) is obviously connected to a history of humiliation, defeat, and dominance by the West, culminating in Desert Storm. Much of that rage is openly couched in the rhetoric of revenge. 22 Indeed, one of the major Arab terrorists of the recent period utilized a nom deguerre that meant “father of revenge.“*3

Asian leaders in recent years have hinted often at a psychological requirement for overturning centuries of humiliation rooted in racism as well as defeat and domination, usually accompanied by the prediction that the next century will be Asia’s century - there is more than a hint of revenge in that. 24 Latin America has long seethed with resentment of the Yanquis from the “Colossus of the North,” although most of the region’s nations (Mexico is an exception) have never suffered a military defeat at the hands of the US. Visitors to the Yad Vashem memorial in Jerusalem will see a vivid exhibition of German primary school books in the 1930s which focused on the theme of the dolchstoss (stab in the back) attributed to Jewish anti-war leftists towards the end of World War I, deemed by the Nazis responsible for Germany’s defeat and humiliation and, hence, requiring revenge.*5 Thomas Scheff also under- scores this point, stating that Hitler’s appeal lay in his public being in a chronic state of humiliation over Versailles.26

Some of the examples of humiliation/revenge are deeply rooted in past centuries, and constitute examples of the permanent effects of defeat. French Canada is a good example. That problem is not merely a matter of minority status within Canada, various esoteric (to an outsider) constitutional issues, or a desire for a more solidly rooted national identity. Rather, French Canada psychologically confronts its own humiliation by military defeat in I759 - a defeat also associated with ethnic cleansing.

Growing discussions about the role of national humiliation and revenge in Russia are also worth noting. Article after article in press coverage of the late 1990s into 2000 portrays Russian’s susceptibility to appeals rooted in the shame and humiliation of the loss of the Cold War and its status as a superpower. Added to these momentous shifts was shame over losing the first war in Chechnya and shame produced by the need for Western economic aid.27 Indeed, much of the current policy debate in the US - particularly as pertains to the eastward extension of NATO - is centered on the perceived dilemma of security policy “practicalities” and a desire to push forward European integration versus what some see as the danger of “piling on” - i.e., of further humiliating the Cold War loser to the point that it may strike back and seek revenge.

Concepts and Definitions: From Humiliation to Revenge The causal nexus between humiliation and revenge, with an arrow between them

running from left to right, is my principal interest. A bit of terminological and definitional confusion may surround these and related terms. On the left side of this equation, so to speak, are humiliation, shame, defeat, and loss. On the other side of the equation are revenge and vengeance, plus retaliation, payback, “tit for tat” and, perhaps, revisionism and irredentism. These are no mere quibbles; instead, some fairly important nuances may be masked by these terms, the discussion of which can shed light on important causal relationships.

The meanings of defeat and loss would appear to be self-evident if we leave aside questions about the depths, frequency, and other dimensions of such an occurrence. In

D@at, national humiliation and the revenge motif in internationalpolitics 351

defining humiliation, Webster’s Dictionary employs cognates such as “humbling” and “mortification,” and goes with “to reduce to a lower position in one’s own eyes or in the eyes of others.” Shame is defined as “a powerful emotion excited by consciousness of guilt, shortcoming or impropriety,” and further refers to “disgrace” and “dishonor” or (in verb form) “to cover with reproach or ignominy.” The key definitional fragments for revenge are “to inflict harm or injury in return for,” “to vindicate by avenging,” and “vindictive retaliation.” Vengeance seems defined a little more strongly: “punishment inflicted in return for an injury or an offense, retribution . . . often, passionate or unre- strained revenge.” “ With great violence, force and the like.” The term “with a vengeance” is noted here as reflective of the underlying force involved.

There may be a scale here, with vengeance at the one extreme and revenge close by. “Retaliation” does not appear to capture the meaning sought here, because it is more redolent of the “tit for tat” familiar in a game theoretical context, i.e., involving short- term or transitory matters, devoid of much deep emotion (such as retaliating to the imposition of a tariff with one of your own). Vengeance, however, captures a deeply rooted and primordial rage associated with humiliating defeat, leaving a nation or other identity group seething in mass hatred.

Convergent Strands of an Emergent Literature on Humiliation and Vengeance Several disparate and otherwise seemingly unconnected strands of social science

literature are germane to the study of humiliation and revenge. In recent years, several major works have appeared which come at the subject from different angles. Together, they provide the basis for a more serious look at the revenge motif in international relations. We must still confront a dearth of badly needed basic data, and daunting methodological problems that render truly empirical work in this area a difficult proposition. Nevertheless, various strands within expert literature can be discerned:

. Two important works devoted explicitly to the concept of revenge as an historical, religious, legal, literary and psychological theme, require our attention; in one case, the analysis is more centered on the individual level and on criminal behavior than on the application to international relations. In the other, a split exists between an emphasis on domestic and family situations and two cases involving national shame and vengeance.

. A second theme is evident in a major work on territorial irredentism, mostly involving the study of lost wars, but centered on ethnography and the geography of borders and largely devoid of related psychological content.

. Third one can identify several works on military defeat and misfor- tune, in the context of how nations adjust strategies and tactics after losing - or winning - wars, works that touch on the problem of national humiliation and revenge.

. Two recent studies are a fourth touchstone within the social science literature on the nexus between personal and national identity - on identification theory. These books probe questions about collective


moods and actions and the extent to which one can legitimately utilize concepts applicable to individuals to gauge the behavior of national or other aggregates, i.e., the problem of isomorphism and anthropomorphism.

. Fifth, a significant body of writing in psychiatry, much of it years ago, focused on the concepts of “narcissistic rage” and “shame-rage cycles,” claimed to underpin neurotic individual vengeance and vindictiveness.

. A small literature on comparative political culture and comparative cultural psychiatry is a sixth strand, raising the crucial issue of whether some peoples or nations may be abnormally prone to shame or humiliation - and hence to compulsions to vengeance - in turn rooted in family and small group relations and patterns, or historical tribal behavior.

. Some recent work in sociobiology suggests a seventh strand that involves decreases in testosterone levels after individuals are defeated in sports contests or suffer a loss of social status. This raises an intriguing question about the applicability of such patterns to nations in the aftermath of defeat, although researching such matters for large populations and in historical retrospective confronts obvious impediments.

. Finally, socio-psychological research and writing, past and present, has dealt with nationalism, patriotism, group loyalty and the “we- they” phenomenon.

Each of these is discussed in more detail below.z8

Works on Revenge Susan Jacoby’s work, Wild Justice, is one extant social science work devoted explic-

itly to the study of revenge (Scheff’s is the other). 29 As noted, it makes only occasional references to international relations, being largely devoted to the interplay of revenge and justice as an historical problem largely cast in legal and religious terms. Jacoby reviews the historical record of the revenge motif as expressed in literary works and embedded in legal systems and associated codes of legal ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome, the Bible, and Europe since the Medieval period. She addresses the popular fascination with revenge expressed in literature, film and theater, referring to “the popularity of revenge as a theme in modern mass entertainment.“30 Indeed, Jacoby refers to the “semi-pornographic fascination” with revenge themes in literature and drama, noting that 17th Century revenge themes in English tragedies would strike a familiar chord in connection with any number of contemporary works. A late 1990s film that appeared more than a decade after Jacoby’s book - Sleepers, fea- turing Robert DeNiro - epitomizes her point.

Jacoby seems to agree with Karen Horney and others to the extent that vengeance is discussed as an archaic, illegitimate and neurotic emotion and activity - “. . .the sick vestige of a more primitive stage of human development.“31 Vindictiveness is seen as neurotic and, although the urge to retaliate may be universal, it is deemed

D@at, national humiliation and the revenge motif in internationalpolitics 353

unhealthy. In domestic systems, retributive systems, i.e., the courts, are claimed to remove the burden of revenge from individuals; otherwise, the religiously inclined are advised to look to a higher authority to provide retribution,

In the interstices of her analysis, however, Jacoby makes some points interesting and germane for this discussion. First, she concedes that, certainly in the modern world and even when compared to recent centuries, a virtual taboo exists on the subject of revenge. In a related vein, she notes the paucity of literature on this subject in psychoanalysis, although that discipline would appear clearly suited to the explo- ration and explanation of the theme of revenge. This would seem all the more so in view of the pervasive importance of the vengeance theme in Greek mythology. In summary, she says that “a taboo has been attached to the subject of revenge in a century that has witnessed the fearful union of mass vengeance with technology,” a reference to Nazi revenge against the Jews as manifested in the Holocaust.32

By extension, one might speculate that the taboo Jacoby perceives in connection with domestic legal systems has been extended to the field of international relations. One might argue that, to the extent that “liberal” analysts project the normative ille- gitimacy of revenge onto the field, a defacto taboo does, indeed, underlie the study of international conflict. And, whereas Jacoby and others may decry the emotion and practice of revenge in domestic systems where courts may provide surrogate avengers of sorts, no such authorities exist in the anarchic international system - except, perhaps, the occasional war crimes tribunals such as Nuremberg and The Hague.

Literature on Irredentism The recent publication of at least one major edited work on territorial irredentism

by Naomi Chazan coincided with growing interest in ethnic politics.33 This volume provides concepts and historical context of several “waves” of irredentism after its emergence as a “distinct process.” Such an emergence occurred “when issues of state formation and national awakening converged over the delineation of political bound- aries.“34 Those waves have occurred, respectively, during the latter part of the nine- teenth and the early part of the twentieth century; after World War I at the time of the Paris Peace Conference; during the decolonialization process after World War II; and, again, after the Cold War in conflict-prone areas of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Several related definitions of irredentism exist. One has to do with “attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people who inhabit them in the name of historical, cultural, religious, linguistic, or geographic affinity? Alternatively, another view asserts that “intrinsic to the notion of irredentism is a tension between people and territory, between politics and culture - indeed, between symbolic and instrumental aspects of international relations.“36 Such competing definitions, exhibit tension over the relative importance of people versus territory, and over the centrality of the nation- state which demands that territory be seen as a part of national heritage.

In the Chazan volume, a number of case studies are provided: Alsace, post-World War I boundary problems in Europe, irredentism in Germany since 1945, Turkey, and Africa in toto in the wake of the decolonialization process. In many but not all of these cases, defeat in war accompanying humiliation and striving for revenge all have been involved. And, the authors in this collection stress the sentimental and subjec-


tive features of irredentism. The contribution on Turkey notes that “Pan-Turkism is evidently romantic and emotional,“37 while another contributor dubs irredentism “the atavistic call of the wild of modern nationalism,” which “recalls the instinctive urge of humans to define their territory in the same way that animals do, although not by the same physical means.“38

Generally speaking, however, Chazan’s volume does not employ the language concepts of clinical psychology, particularly those that have to do with identity or identification theory, to which we shall return. The psychology of revenge is little noticed. But the importance of the psychology of loss, humiliation, and (at least as it is perceived) physical dismemberment, however, is implied - sentiments at the heart of the humiliation and vengeance theme.

Some current examples underscore that point. Americans have some difficulty in understanding the persistent obsession of mainland China about the reincorpo- ration of Taiwan, perceived at all levels of Chinese society as historical dismemberment following from earlier defeats by Japan and, in a sense by the US, which undertook to maintain Taiwan’s separation from China at the outset of the Korean War. For many Chinese, the Taiwan problem is symbolic and expressive of past humiliations and defeat.39 Likewise, in the Middle East, Israel’s existence is, for many if not most Arabs, a concrete symbol of their past defeats and humiliations, first at the hands of the West in general, and then by Israel after World War II. In both cases, irredentist claims on territory appear to be closely linked to heartfelt feelings of the nation’s physical mutilation. Iran’s feelings about Persian Gulf islands evoke similar metaphors; likewise, Iraq’s irredentist emotions about Kuwait, Pakistan’s about Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh in the eyes of Armenians, and numerous other cases. Many of these cases are linked to historical memories of military defeat and national humiliation.

Volkan’s work, focused on group identity and self esteem and emerging from Eric Erickson’s earlier pioneering work, addresses the problem of territorial loss and irredentism. He avers that a physical border, psychologically speaking, “is like a second skin around a group,” the piercing of which can cause unbearable mass anxiety.40

Lessons of Lost Wars Loss in war compels change in military doctrine and strategy. One recalls the gen-

eralization in the military history literature that winners stand pat while losers review their failures and innovate in the expectation of future conflicts. In particular, a significant literature follows Germany and France through the Napoleonic Wars, the France-Prussian war of the early I87Os, and World Wars I and II. Similar accounts have followed the progression of the several Arab-Israeli wars, in the late I94Os, 1967, 1969-70, 1973, and 1982. Both of these situations of serial war are suffused with the themes of defeat, humiliation, and vengeance.

Recently, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have written a book on Military Misfor- tunes, which is an analysis of military failures. 41 In it, they point out that one main reason for Israel’s seeming intelligence failure to predict the I973 Arab onslaught was a lack of empathy among Israel’s leaders for the Egyptians’ and Syrians’ need to over- come past feelings of shame and damaged national honor. This deeply wounded


sense had to be addressed even at the price of still another defeat for the Arabs, for whom the status quo was psychologically unbearable. Failure to take into account the revenge motif then became a prominent cause of intelligence failure (not only with respect to the Arabs, but also the Soviets, who responded to the humiliation of their weapons in 1967 by introducing whole new classes of weapons into the conflict).

Individual and National Identity: The Issue of Anthropomorphism By far the most important and daunting methodological and conceptual problem

in the study of national (rather than individual) vengeance is how to apply the conceptual baggage of individual or small group psychology to nation-states, or other collectivities. This raises the issue of anthropomorphism. Of course, that issue can be raised in various contexts of international relations - for instance, when preference scales are attributed to the nation-state. But, somehow, the issue seems particularly difficult dealing with “irrational” states of mind involving vengeance, more than when “rational” behavior may be attributed.

Such a methodological issue is not new in the application of social-psychological concepts to foreign policy. Indeed, it was cited as a major obstacle to research and understanding long ago by S. E. Perry, Herbert Kelman, and Otto Klineberg - all pioneers in the application of psychological concepts to the study of international relations.J2 More recently, this issue has been addressed head-on in a full-length treatment by William Bloom.43 In it, Bloom engages in a lengthy exegesis of what he refers to as “identification theory,” drawing variously upon the works of Sigmund Freud, George Herbert Mead, Erik Erikson, Talcott Parsons, and Jurgen Habermas.

Bloom avers that, in making statements such as “France declared war on England,’ an implication is made that entire populations have a joint attitude. Further, he notes that, by making such statements, academic integrity and intellectual credibility are severely strained, and that this strain “is due to the lack of theory which in a methodologically coherent way explicates the relationship between a mass national population and its state.“44 He looks to the possibility of a psychological theory - what he calls identification theory - giving the mass national population of a state just such a theoretically coherent status.

Bloom recognizes that the lack of any theoretical status for the mass national population became more apparent with the advent of the behavioral revolution in the study of international relations in the 1960s. In particular, he notes,

the language of anthropomorphism in which nation-states as apparently coherent personalities acted and reacted on the international stage...along with such notions as “national honor:’ “national prestige,” and “national character,” was shown up as having little if any explanatory power and certainly no methodologically coherent internal logic45.

In what then becomes a lengthy and complicated analysis, devoted to a variety of key areas of international relations theory, Bloom further attacks what he calls the “individual-aggregate problematic.” He draws on an essay by J. David Singer,46 in which Singer, first “having delineated certain attributes of the international system,” proposes the use of three psychological variables - personality, attitude, and opinion - said to interact


with the system. Singer is then discussed and quoted as follows, providing a good summary of the methodological issues involved:

In other words I would hold that the aggregation of individual psychological properties provides a quite sufficient base for describing the cultural properties of the larger social entity which is Xom- prised of those individuals.” He repeated further on that, “The position taken here is that the cultural properties of any subna- tional, national or extranational system may be described in a strictly aggregative fashion, by observing the distribution and con- figuration of individual psychological properties.“47

Bloom concludes that “there is no psychological theory which precisely explains how to argue coherently from the individual to aggregate group or mass behavior, which explains political integration and mobilization,“48 and cites political psychologists such as Kelman and Fred Greenstein as “having been acutely aware of the need for a coherent psychological theory which could be applied so as to aggregate from the individual out to the group. “49 Particularly germane to our central focus here on collective feelings of humiliation, shame, and vengeance is his discussion of the work of Erik Erikson - specifically, Erikson’s work on the individual need to protect and enhance ego identity, and the projection or aggregation of that problem to a more collective basis.

Bloom’s analysis is echoed by Harvard psychiatrist John Mack and by the sociolo- gist Thomas Scheff. Mack discusses the “collective psychological forces in the study of history” and “collective myths,” and further notes that “there is no equivalent at a group or collective level to the superego restraints which can operate at an individual level to curb hostile or violent impulses.“50 He refers to “the difficult methodological problem of finding a sound, conceptual balance among the relevant insights of individual and group psychology - in a field where realities are multilayered and com- pelling.‘151 Scheff, on the same wavelength, admits that “in claiming an isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations, I realize that I challenge an article of faith of modern social science: that structure and process at the societal level are fundamentally different from those at the level of persons, as Durkheim claimed, is a reality sui generis.“52

Narcissistic Rage in Psychiatric Literature Moving back to the specific subject of humiliation and vengeance, it is noteworthy

that in psychiatric literature, the clinical term “narcissistic rage” is most commonly used. It provides the link between, on the one hand, shame and humiliation - aggregated to the collectivity of the nation - and on the other, aggressiveness and vengeance. According to Heinz Kohut, 53 this actually involves a spectrum describing relative degrees of such rage, culminating at the extremes to what the author sees as the neurotic and dangerous state of “chronic narcissistic rage.“54 Hence, this spectrum is seen to run from “the deepest and most inflexible grudge of the paranoiac to the apparently fleeting rage reaction of the narcissistically vulnerable after a minor slight.“55 (The author is mum, however, on whether there really is such a thing as a narcissistically invulnerable person, and whether such a person could really cope in


most human environments.) Those in the grip of a narcissistic rage are said to “show total lack of empathy towards the defender.“56 Chronic narcissistic rage is deemed “one of the most pernicious afflictions of the human psyche - either, in its still endogenous and preliminary form, as grudge and spite; or, externalized and acted out, in disconnected vengeful acts or in a cunningly plotted vendetta.“57

Kohut elaborates in this context on the “metapsychological position of shame and rage,” which he calls the “two principal experiential and behavioral manifestations of disturbed narcissistic equilibrium,” and notes, in this regard, “narcissistic rage belongs to the larger psychological field of aggression, anger, and destructiveness.“58 Anticipating one of our later-to-be discussed research problems, he also suggests that the “narcissistically vulnerable individual responds to actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefaced withdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight):‘59 begging the important question of why and when either of these two alternative responses occur.

These questions are addressed by Mack, Volkan, and Scheff as well. Mack, in discussing collective psychological forces in the study of history, stresses collective myths, “the pain of their histories,” “ the accrued grief of the centuries,” the problem of historical grievances, and the rise and fall of national self-esteem.60 Scheff’s emphasis is on unacknowledged or bypassed shame, and on prestige as a codeword for honor and the avoidance of shame.61

Comparative Cultural Propensity to Shame, Humiliation, Vengeance Kohut joins other psychiatrists and other social scientists by asking whether

propensities to shame and humiliation, and to narcissistic rage, and hence to vengefulness, may be more strongly evidenced in some cultures than in others, just as they may be more strongly evidenced in some individuals within these cultures. In some writings, this is perceived as derived from deeply rooted cultural legacies of family structure, child-rearing, and gender relations. The psychiatrist H.W. Glidden and the political scientist Leonard Binder (the latter writing about Egypt’s political culture in an edited volume devoted to the comparative aspects of that subject) have, for instance, characterized Arab societies as intensely suffused with propensities to shame and humiliation. Binder actually refers to Egypt as a “shame culture,” one with a deeply rooted mass tendency for conformity in relation to fear of shaming.62 Glid- den applied this explicitly to the Arabs’ hitherto incapacity or unwillingness to make peace with Israel, absent the psychiatric terminology of narcissistic rage:

Failure to conform, however, brings shame. Shame is intensely feared among the Arabs, and this fear is so pervasive that Arab society has been labeled a shame-oriented one. This contrasts sharply with Judaism and with Western Christian societies, which are guilt-oriented. It is to be noted, however, that in Arab terms shame is not defined as the commission of an act condemned by the value system; instead, it means the discovery by outsiders that a given individual or group committed such an act. Hence there is an intense concern with and catering to outward appearances and public opinion that many observers have noted as being characteristic of the Arabs.63


Numerous writers on the interminable civil war still raging in Afghanistan have observed the deeply embedded Afghan cultural traditions of retaliation and revenge. Kohut, meanwhile, in discussing the work of Ruth Benedict, refers to the propensity toward narcissistic rage in the Japanese, attributed to their methods of child-rearing through ridicule and the threat of ostracism and “to the sociocultural importance which maintaining decorum has in Japan.” Benedict is quoted as noting that in Japan, “sometimes people explode in the most aggressive acts...They are roused to these aggressions not when their principles or their freedom is (sic) challenged...but when they detect an insult or a detraction.“e4 Benedict does not, apparently, attempt to project these claimed national attributes from the individual to the collective level much less to national behavior. Seemingly missing in the literature is a discussion of cases at the other end of the extreme, i.e., those of cultures or nations deemed relatively less inclined to collective narcissistic rage and vengeful behavior. Might this apply, for instance, to more “modern” or “liberal” or “democratic” cultures, or to those with a history of successful diplomatic and military endeavors?

Glidden’s article, almost alone in the literature, posits a causal relationship between family and tribal structures, culturally based value systems, collective shame and humiliation, and the compulsion to revenge.65 He posits, “ingroup solidarity, stemming originally from Arab tribal values, is probably the most salient characteristic of the mechanics of Arab society.“@j Further, this ingroup solidarity is said to demand a high degree of conformity and “therefore imparts a strong authoritarian tone to Arab culture and society.” In that connection, Glidden refers to the prevalence of an other-directed personality in Arab culture, said to be characteristic both of Arab tradition and of the outlook of Islam. He then proceeds to discuss the role of shame and conformity in Arab society, as follows:

Conformity brings honor and social prestige, and it also ensures for the individual and his group a secure place in society. As long as the individual conforms, the other members of his ingroup and its allies . and clients are bound to help him advance his interests and to defend him unquestioningly against outside forces and agencies...

Why is this fear of shame so powerful among the Arabs? Shame destroys one of the key elements in the Arab prestige system: the ability to attract followers and clients. (Arab society is and always has been based on a system of client-patron relationships.) Since among the Arabs the identification between the individual and the group is far closer than it is in the West (indeed, it may be said that the group is the individual’s alter ego). The consequences of shame are therefore much more widespread and complex than in Western culture.67

Glidden relates this analysis to the matter of vengeance, specifically, the requirement for revenge against the Jews for the history of Arab defeat. He states that “for the Arabs, defeat does not generate a desire for peace; instead it produces an emotional need for revenge, and this need is deepened rather than attenuated by each successive defeat.“68 With reference to Bloom, et al, regarding the issue of anthropomorphism, Glidden suggests that “the first thing to note is that since the Arab value system is a group- and not an individual-based one, it is not possible for the individual Arab


states to dissociate themselves from the Arab collectivity any more than the individual can dissociate himself from his clan.“@ Hence, he concludes that all Arabs and their governments are driven “to eliminate the shame that had been visited on them and the other Arabs by their defeats by IsraeL”70

Because Glidden’s analysis is near sui generis in the literature, particularly with respect to its focus on revenge, one wonders about its more genera1 applicability, perhaps to situations involving Arabs and/or Islam. What, for example, does it tell us about the future of Iranian need to extract vengeance against Iraq, given that Iran’s defeat in 1988 involved the large-scale use of chemical weapons against the Iranian army? What about Pakistan’s compulsion for revenge against India, given the back- drop of the 1971 defeat that led to the creation of Bangladesh? Further, what is the applicability to Bosnia, Chechnya or, for that matter, Ireland, Japan or Peru? And, in a reversal of the standard analysis of humiliation and vengeance in the Middle East, one writer - Jay Gonen, in his Psychohistory of Zionism -has characterized Israeli bravado and machismo as a function of the humiliation of the Holocaust, also requiring a kind of psychological vindication, if not outright revenge.71

Americans, even the social scientists among them, may less easily comprehend these problems. The US collective psyche lacks a strong shame component. Even Vietnam was a mere pinprick, and collective shame could easily be assuaged by the knowledge that the North Vietnamese could easily have been beaten by an all-out effort. Pearl Harbor probably caused more shock than shame, but it did give rise to a vengeful response. But, overall, Americans have been spared this kind of deep national trauma, and they may not easily understand it elsewhere.72

Sociobiological Research and Socio-Psychological Literature on Nationalism Approaching this subject from different disciplines and a different level of analy-

sis, recent work in sociobiology has measured declines in testosterone levels suffered by individuals after athletic defeats such as tennis and chess, or as a result of loss of social status.T3 This refers back to Mazur’s “biosocial theory of status,” which hypoth- esizes a feedback loop between an individual’s testosterone level and his or her assertiveness in attempting to achieve or maintain interpersonal status or dominance rank.T4 Winning raises testosterone levels, losing decreases it; this is further claimed to explain, in part athletic winning or losing streaks, or the alternations between “hot streaks” and slumps on the part of baseball players, among others. Whether such phenomena could be attributed or applied to international politics and victory or defeat in war may be far from trivial.

Finally, an extensive social-psychological literature on the roots of nationalism has long focused on individuals and small interacting groups, often involving laboratory experiments and surveys of college students. This approach has ramifications for the role of attachments, national and group identities in cognitive development, ingroup versus out-group loyalties, the denigration of outside groups, individual and collective images of others, the role of reference groups in enhancing individuals’ self-esteem, and negative self-identities. This literature has been surveyed by Daniel Druckman, who dwells on the extent to which groups and nations provide security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for loyalty and commitment.


Druckman seems focused on symmetrical rivalries, and does not reveal small-group research that analyzes the asymmetrical relationships involved in defeat, shame, humiliation, and revenge.75

Relationships Among Disparate Strands of Analysis The foregoing seven or eight somewhat disparate strands of literature and analy-

sis, laid out separately, may have heuristic utility, pointing the way to further research. How, then, in a theoretical or conceptual sense, do they combine to inform scholars intent on moving the subject forward to more empirical analysis? That is not easily answered. The key, however, lies in finding a way to bridge the levels of analysis problem all too familiar in international relations.

The literatures on revenge (Scheff, Jacoby), bio-social status (Mazur, et al), and narcissistic personalities (Kohut, et. al.) are obviously focused on the individual level of analysis. Literature on the comparative cultural aspects (Glidden, et. al.) is directed, if only implicitly, at the nation-state level, i.e., at comparative national behavior. The literatures on nationalism (Druckman, et. al.) and on irredentism (Chazan) and on lost wars (Cohen) involve aspects both at the national and systemic levels, primar- ily the former, treating the nation-state as a unitary actor with imputed psychological characteristics. Tying this all together, the works on individual and national identity, focused on the issue of anthropomorphism (Bloom, Perry, et. al.) attempt to provide a bridge over this conceptual divide.

How Could this Subject be Researched? How, then, could this subject further be subjected to empirical analysis, to move

beyond the merely heuristic? No database exists, and historical data would be acquired only with great difficulty since subjects (people) are gone and, even for wars a decade or two old, the topic has become stale.

This subject would require individual level analysis via survey research in nations defeated at war, perhaps with time series analysis to gauge the progression of vengeful attitudes at intervals beyond war’s end. Psychological analysis as pioneered by Robert Lane in New Haven might be particularly appropriate here as objective responses in such a sensitive and threatening area might be difficult to obtain.76 Content analysis of statements by leaders or of the press in relevant nations would be very valuable in contemporary analyses of historical cases, but here the bridge would have to be established between public or mass attitudes, and those attributed to a nation via its elite. And, such research would require native country specialists, in most cases with requisite language skills and an ability to interpret country-specific attitudes.

A Research Format for the Study of Humiliation/Revenge The relationship between shame, humiliation, and vengeance may be fairly complex,

particularly because the variety of defeat may be the underlying cause of shame or humiliation. Just looking at the various types and levels of loss and defeat may help us to assemble questions that may act as a guide to research in this area.

Dejzat, national humiliation and the revenge motif in internationalpolitics 361

As noted above, we may be talking about an actual military defeat or a functional equivalent. Egypt and Syria in 1967 and 1973, Iran in 1988, Argentina in 1982, Ger- many in both world wars may be cited as examples of clear-cut military defeat. But even here, there may be important distinctions. Otherwise, the Soviet Union as rep- resented by Russia suffered a non-military defeat at the end of the Cold War, with resulting narcissistic injury to the Russian people that is now becoming apparent. Or, as previously noted, numerous ex-colonial peoples, now independent, may suffer from various levels of shame and humiliation related to long-term subjugation that may or may not so easily be related to discrete and identifiable military defeats. Fur- ther, some situations of territorial irredentism may also not so easily be related to military defeat, although they may have come to represent, psychologically speaking, various levels of dismemberment and territorial mutilation, with consequences in the areas of shame and humiliation, or at least, some level of frustration.

The extent or depth or type of defeat may be very important in determining the level of resulting humiliation. The Arabs in 1967 and Iraq in 1991 suffered overwhelming, humiliating defeats of the kind that produces lasting shame. In both cases, before-the-war boastfulness (enemies were going to drown in their own blood) was followed by almost comic-opera levels of military performance, widely interpreted throughout the world as something akin to cowardice that, subsequently, was to produce high levels of shame. 7’ In the case of Iraq in 1991, as noted, there is some evi- dence that this shame was shared on the ‘Arab street” even in some countries that nominally were part of the US-led victorious coalition. Particularly in 1967, a defeat was absorbed by the side that had an overwhelming numerical advantage as well as asymmetrical levels of international support and weapons supply, all the worse at the hands of a people that historically had been considered inept in military matters. It is that combination of factors that led to the shame and vengeance syndrome so well described by Glidden.

Volkan’s work suggests the need for further attention to what he refers to as “chosen traumas,” i.e., powerful historical memories or images associated with major defeats and humiliations.78 For Greek Cypriots, this means the defeat in 1974; for the Arabs, above all the 1967 war; earlier for the French, the 1871 loss of Alsace and Lor- raine; and, later, for the Germans, Versailles. For the Serbs, it is Kosova over 600 years ago. One recent article, in discussing the growing anti-Americanism of Chinese youth, portrayed the vivid symbolry involved in the memory of the Opium Wars and the humiliation by the British (representing the West) as long ago as 1848.79 Research on such “chosen traumas,” either via survey research or in-depth interviews, might reveal the roots and depths of historical national humiliations.

Some military defeats might leave the defeated side’s honor at least partially intact. Both the German and Japanese armies in World War II were widely adjudged, even by Western military experts, to have been superior to allied armies on a man-to-man basis. They were ultimately defeated in long and hotly contested wars by overwhelming numerical superiority on the part of their foes. But the psychological impact, at least in part, may have been equivalent to that upon an underdog football team that plays a good game and comes close to an upset - a kind of “moral victory” - which at least minimizes shame. There is a spectrum here. Argentina’s defeat in 1982 was


similar to that of the Arabs in 1967 - a horrendous, shameful embarrassment after a big rhetorical buildup. Pakistan, in 1965, fought a larger foe to a near stand-still; hence, even though defeat may have been looming at the close of the war, Pakistan may have been left with a feeling that it had fought well, certainly nothing about which to feel ashamed. Further, the factor of surprise may be important, having to do with nations losing wars they had expected to win, even to win easily.

There is another hypothesis worth noting in this regard. Kohut has stated, with reference to an individual, that the narcissistically vulnerable individual responds to actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefaced withdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight). 80 Implied in Kohut’s statement is the idea that these responses are somewhat optional, or that given individuals might respond to the same level of humiliation with either response, whether randomly distributed or, more likely, as a function of personality structure. Years ago, in discussions of this matter with the late Harold Lasswell, he provided another possibility. His view was that a person or nation undergoing an overwhelming defeat where, most importantly, there did not appear any reasonable chance of ever getting retribution or revenge, would likely become withdrawn, apathetic and submissive. 81 Even in a situation where an overwhelming defeat had been absorbed, the presence of reasonable hope for a comeback and reversal means vengefulness is likely to be a normal psychological response.

This may, for instance, account for the behavior of the Arabs throughout the conflict with Israel, during the whole of which time they have felt that their numerical superiority would some day be translated into victory, even if preceded by numerous intermediate defeats. Germany after World War II, on the other hand, might be cited as a case where there must have appeared almost no hope for winning another round against what now would be, in addition, nuclear-armed foes such as Russia and the US. Hence, few manifestations of vengefulness have appeared, at least on the surface. Of course, others would argue that guilt over the Holocaust and Germany’s broader role during the Nazi period might have precluded that type of response.82 Post-Cold War Russia, where all signs of the humiliation/vengeance syndrome appear to be in play, would appear to be another case where there is sufficient hope for a turnaround to produce a response of revenge, not withdrawal.

Whether the humiliation of the defeated - and hence its compulsion to revenge - has resulted from serial defeats may be important. The Arabs were defeated by Israel in multiple wars without a compensating victory. France went down against Germany, or combinations in which Germans wer

I” involved, in 1870 and 1940, and would have been

defeated by Germany in 1914 if it had to go it alone. Pakistan has been bested, to one degree or another, in three conflicts with India, though only the last of these was deci- sive. But, the point is, defeat and humiliation may become cumulative.

Whether a nation loses a war that it has started, or one where it has been the vic- tim of aggression, may also be important, notwithstanding difficulty in defining aggressors and victims in war. Germany, Japan, the Arabs, Iraq all lost wars they had begun, by most people’s calculations, and the shame of losing such a war (presumably begun with the expectation of success), may be all the greater.

The factor of social distance between foes, and/or the degree of hatred or conde- scension involved may also be a factor in determining the level of shame and humili-


ation that follows defeat. Various wars may be compared to what John Dower called the US-Japan Pacific War: a “war without mercy,” with obvious racial overtones, and between peoples of vastly different cultures as well as races.83 These factors may be present in the Arab-Israeli conflict, just as they were, relatively speaking, absent in the European wars of this century and also the Cold War. The vengeance factor may or may not vary accordingly.

Finally, there is the factor of time, which may be related to some of the cultural factors discussed above. How long does it take before shame and humiliation associated with a defeat fades away, at least to the point where it no longer requires a vengeful response? And, how does that relate to, for instance, the magnitude and the level of embarrassment of defeat? In the case of the Arabs’ narcissistic rage vis-a-vis Israel, for instance, Glidden sees an almost open-ended time frame. Hence, according to Glidden:

As for the element of time, the Arabs consider it to be of little account in the quest for vengeance, which to them is an integral part of what they conceive of as “‘justice.” There are vendettas among the Arabs that have lasted for centuries, as all students of the Near East are aware. In Islamic law, the question of the conduct of Islam in defeat is regarded as an anomaly and is almost totally ignored. Those few jurists who did deal with it maintained that the battle would be resumed no matter how long the Muslims had to wait.84

The impact of defeat in war and the accompanying humiliation may be examined in some related contexts. For instance, there is the long-standing generalization that internal revolutions tend to follow military defeats. That thesis has been applied to France after its defeat in the French and Indian wars in the 176Os, Germany and Rus- sia after World War I, Argentina after the Falklands War, and many others.85 Some have pointed to the connection between the Soviets’ debacle in Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the regime. Indeed, some have also pointed to the connection between America’s debacle in Vietnam and the accompanying domestic disarray, even if well short of a revolutionary situation.

Heretofore, we have surmised a rough equivalence, psychologically speaking, between defeat in wars and resulting humiliation, and humiliation derived from colonial domination and racial oppression as per Franz Fanon. Druckman, however, posits an alternative view in discussing Latin America and the concept of “xeno- centrism:‘87 or, the situation in which dependent countries under-value themselves and over-value their dominators. Such an inward-turning, negative self-identify was also discussed by Volkan in the context of masochism and the turning of aggression inward in anticipation of further danger and humiliation.88

One major recent work has pointed to a possible connection between defeat and the need for revenge as a driving force behind nuclear proliferation. This may, of course, be a merely pragmatic response to defeat, the psychological effects notwithstanding. India appears to have reacted to its defeat by China in 1962 with a drive towards nuclear weapons.89 Ditto Iran after its defeat in 1988 in which it was on the receiving end of chemical weapons. Concerning Pakistan, in the period after its defeat by India in 1971, Burrows and Windrem describe the public hero worship


devoted to scientist A.Q. Khan, “father” of the Pakistani bomb, who is seen as person- ally representing that nation’s transcending of defeat and humiliation via nuclear precociousness.g0

Summary The relationship between national defeat, humiliation, and revenge is crucial to an

understanding of international relations. This relationship has received far too little attention because of inherent research obstacles, problems of anthropomorphism and isomorphism, and a virtual taboo on discussions of revenge in modern liberal societies. There is no data base. Some survey data might be compiled, none of it retroactive. Small sample, in-depth interviews might be assayed, either or both with decision-makers or the public at large.

Quite probably, moving this subject forward will require detailed case studies by country specialists (combining the efforts of political scientists and psychologists) who would be able to tap a variety of sources - conflict data, survey research, literary works, the media - in an attempt to produce a balanced picture. Still, such efforts risk being branded as merely “intuitive” or “anecdotal” to the extent solid, empirical materials are elusive. Truly comparative research will be difficult. Nonethe- less, at the very heart of most war and peace issues in the contemporary world, the humiliation and revenge path demands further scrutiny.

NOTES

1. 2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

a.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

Susan Jacoby, WildJustice: The Evolution of Revenge (New York: Harper and Row, 1983). Hans Morgenthau, Politics AmongNations, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 54-55. Samuel Huntington, “No Exit: The Errors of Endism:’ The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp.

3-11. John Mueller, The Retreat from Doomsday The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993). See, among numerous sources, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 1993). Richard Rosecrance, The Rise ofthe Trading State State (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Keichi Ohmae, “The Rise of the Region State,” Foreign Afiirs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1993), pp. 78-89. See also Daniel Nelson,“Threats and Capacities,” Contemporary Politics,Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), pp. 341-363. Edward Garten, ‘r

ttwak, The Endangered American Dream (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993); Jeffrey Cold Peace (New York: Times Books, 1992); and Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming

Economic Battle amongJapan, Europe, and America (New York: Morrow, 1992). Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). Richard Rosecrance, “A New Concert of Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1992), pp. 64-82. See Gil Carl Alroy, Behind the Middle East Conflict: The Real Impasse Between Arab and Jew (New York: Putnam, 1975); and Robert E. Harkavy, “‘After the Gulf War: The Future of Israeli Nuclear Strategy,” T!re Washington Quarrerly,Vol. 14, No. 3 (1991),PP. 161-179. “Rise of Militancy by Moslems Threatens Stability of Egypt,” The New York Times (October 27, 1981), p. Al. This paradoxical point is discussed in Ahmed Abdalla, “Egypt and the Gulf Crisis: Short-Term Tremor, Long-Term Trauma,” in John O’Loughlin, Tom Mayer, and Edward S. Greenberg, eds., War and Its Consequences: Lessons from the Persian Gulf Conflict (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 125-131.


14. “Two Leaders Seek Laurels Along Peru-Ecuador Border,” The New York Times (February 9,1995), p. A6. 15. See for example Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),

chapter 2; and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

16. Barbara ‘Iuchman, The Guns ofAugust (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 47. 17. Thomas Scheff, Bloody Revenge (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), p. 87. 18. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books,

1986). 19. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp.

107-108. 20. Author’s private conversation with Shahram Chubin, noted Iran scholar. See also Chubin and Jerrold

D. Green, “Engaging Iran: A US Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1998), pp. 153-169. 21. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). 22. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 22-49.

The thesis of an all-encompassing Islamic rage and its threat to the West is countered in, among other sources, John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1995).

22. “Portrait of Pan Am Suspect: Affable Exile, Fiery Avenger,” The New Yark Times (December 24, 1989), p. Al; discussing Mohammed Abu Talb, whose nom de guerre is “Intiqam,” revenge. Others have noted that the names of various Arab terrorist organizations are often redolent of the vengeance theme, as noted in Harold Glidden, “The Arab World: American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 128, No. 8 (1972), p. 100. Glidden notes organizations with names like “Vengeance Partisans,” “Youth for Revenge,” etc.

23. The lingering humiliation in China over past defeats by the West is noted in “Life and Death in Shanghai,” Time (June 8, 1987), p. 47, with reference to the British bombardment of the Chinese coast in 1840.

24. This may be even an older theme than many people realize. One article has pointed out that, earlier, the Jews were blamed for the humiliation visited upon Germany by Napoleon. See Emil J. Facken- heim,“Germany’s Worst Enemy,” Commentary, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1990), pp. 31-34.

25. Scheff, op. cit., p. 118. 26. Among numerous items, see “The Zhirinovsky Phenomenon: Bombast and Barbs but Devout Believ-

ers,” The New York Times (April 5, 1994), p. A12; William H. Luers, “Don’t Humiliate Gorbachev,” The New York Times (January 30,1989), p, Al 7.

27. In addition, Donald Kagan has initiated a discussion of the role of “honor” in international affairs, a theme closely linked to the concerns of this paper. See Kagan, “Our Interests and Our Honor,” Com- mentary,Vol. 103, No. 4 (1997), pp. 42-50.

28. Jacoby, op. cit. 29. Ibid., p. 8. 30. Ibid., p. 7. 31. Ibid., p. 362. 32. Naomi Cha d n, ed., Irredentism and InternationalPolitics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). 33. Ibid., p. 142. 34. Ibid., p. 139. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., pp. 139-140. 37. Hedva Ben-Israel, “Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined,” in Chazan, ed., op. cit., p. 33. 38. This writer spent a brief two weeks lecturing in China in 1995, and was stunned at the extent to which

Chinese people at all levels of society, most of whom appear very well-disposed towards Americans, would react with an extreme level of emotion when the subject of Taiwan, and US support for it, arose. This emotion is not often analyzed or understood in coverage by the American media.

39. Vamik Volkan, “Ethnonationalist Rituals: An Introduction,” Mind and Human Interaction, Vol. 4, No. l(l992) p. 10.

40. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990). See also Charles Fair, From theJaws ofvictory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).

366

42.

Robert E. Harkavy

43.

44. 45. 46.

S. E. Perry and A. Stanton, Personality and Political Crisis (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964); and Herbert C. Kelman, “Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations,’ in H.C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965); and especially, S. E. Perry, “Notes on the Role of National: A Social-Psychological Concept for the Study of International Relations:’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1957), pp. 346-363. See also Harold Lasswell, “The Climate of International Action,” in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 339-353, particularly the discussion about a “Theory of Collective Mood,” on pp. 344-346. According to William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 19, Kelman “did grasp the nettle of the crucial issue of the psychological link between the individual and the nation-state, recognizing its pivotal place in any attempt to work towards a psychological theory of international relations.” Ibid. See, in addition, Richard Berk, Collective Behavior (New York: Richard C. Brown, 1974); Wilfred Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953); and Neil Smelser, Theory ofCollective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962). Bloom, op. cit., p. 1. Ibid., p. 2.

47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62.

J. David Singer, “Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface,” Journal ofSocial Issues, Vol. 24,No. 3 (1968),pp. 127-156. Bloom, op. cit., p. 2 1. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23. John Mack, “Foreword,” in Vamik Volkan, Cyprus - War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1979), p. XV. Ibid., p. XIX. Scheff, op. cit., p. 75. Heinz Kohut, “Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage,” The Psychoanalytic Study ofthe Child, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1972), pp. 360-400. Among the useful pieces in this area, most devoted to the psychology of shame and humiliation, are Sidney Levin, “The Psychoanalysis of Shame,” International Journal of Psycho- analysis, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1971), pp. 355-361; Moshe Halevi Spero, “Shame: An Object-Relational For- mulation,” Psychoanalyric Study of the Child, Vol. 39 (1984), pp. 259-282, and A. Morrison, “Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism,” Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Vol. 39 (1983), pp. 295-318. The latter has a discussion of the distinction between the two effects of shame and guilt, and what is referred to as “the hairline distinctions between shame, humiliation, and mortification” (p. 261). Also discussed are “narcissistic depletion and loss,““ shame personalities,” and the “severity of narcissistic trauma,” all relevant to our analysis of the underpinnings of revenge. Perhaps only Blema Steinberg, heretofore, has attempted to tie these themes to political events, as in her “Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychoanalytical Perspective,” Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1991), pp. 653-690. Also valuable is Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), wherein there is a discussion of “the narcissistic projection of aggressive impulses outward” (p. 57). Kohut, op. cit., p, 396. Ibid., p. 386. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 396-397. Ibid., p. 379. The methodological and philosophical problems involved in utilizing a concept such as “shame” are discussed in Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Men,” The Review of Metaphysics,Vol.XXV, No. 1 (1971), pp. 3-51, esp. p. 13. Kohut, op. cit., p. 379. Mack, op. cit., p. XIII. Scheff, op. cit., pp. 3-4,96-97. Leonard Binder,“Egypt: The Integrative Revolution,” in Lucian Pye, ed., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 396-449. See also David Pryce-Jones, The Closed Circle: An Interpretation oftheAr& (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).


63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82.

83. 84. 85.

Harold W. Glidden, “The Arab World,“American Journal ofpsychiatry, Vol. 128, No. 8 (1972), p. 99. Kohut, op. cit., p. 380. Glidden, op. cit. The only other useful source that pursues some of these themes, if only implicitly and absent of explicitly psychological analysis, is Gil Carl Ahoy, Behind the Middle East Conflict: The Real Impasse Between Arab and lew (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), esp. Chapters 5 and 6. In relation to these themes, see also Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception ofJustice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984). Glidden, op. cit., p.100. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 99-100. Ibid., p. 100. Jay Gonen, A Psychohistory ofZionism (New York: New American Library, 1975). Though there is nothing in the literature that specifically focuses on shame, humiliation and vengeance, there are some socio-psychological interpretations of US foreign policy behavior in a related vein. See, in particular, Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955) in which the author discusses America’s “liberal absolutism” and the hysteria surrounding the “red scare” after World War I and again during the McCarthy period in the 1950s. Absent psychological modes of analysis, this work focuses on the propensity of Americans to project values onto others and to become angry when that is ill-received. Alan Booth, Greg Shelley, Allan Mazur, Gerry Tharp, and Roger Kittok, “Testosterone, and Winning and Losing in Human Competition,“HormonesandBehavior, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1989), pp. 556-571. Allan Mazur, “A Biosocial Model of Status in Primate Groups,” Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1985), pp. 377-402. Daniel Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective,’ Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, Supplement 1 (1994), pp. 43-68. Robert Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind (Chicago: Markham, 1969). This is noted in Jonathan C. Randal, “The Monkey on the Iraqis’ Back: Hussein Hangs on Amid His People’s Growing Bitterness,” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (June 10-16, 1991), p. 18, wherein one member of the Iraqi Baath Party is quoted as saying that “in losing the war, we lost our dignity as Iraqis, as Arabs and as men and so did the president.” According to Randal, the speaker “was reflecting a sense of shame at the Iraqi military’s rapid collapse, the helplessness felt during the war;’ etc. See Volkan, “Ethnonationalistic Rituals,” op. cit., p. 16. “Rebels’ New Cause: A Book for Yankee Bashing,” The New York Times (September 4, 1996), p. A4, wherein a student is quoted as saying: “Britain sold opium to China and waged the Opium Wars against China. That was a great infringement on Chinese human rights. Yet I never heard of any apologies being made by your Government.” Likewise, see James R. Lilley, “Nationalism Bites Back,” The New York Times (October 24, 1996), p. A27, wherein nationalist xenophobia is discussed as a “rallying cry for Chinese everywhere - from Shanghai to San Francisco,” in the context of “a century of humiliation.” Kohut, op. cit.

Author’s conversations with Lasswell, circa 1968. Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994), discusses the war guilt and post-war pacifism of Germany and Japan as largely pre- cluding a temptation to revenge. Dower, op. cit. Glidden, op. cit., p. 101. See David Ggess, “Demystifying the French Revolution,” Commentary, Vol. 88, No. 1 (1989), pp. 42- 49, wherein, “the flip side of the anti-British resentment was a growing demand that France, as it were, pull itself together, rise as a united nation, and take revengefor past insults and defeats. This burgeoning nationalism spurred the French intervention in the American Revolution; but that was not enough” (p. 46).


86. Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), with a foreword by John Paul Sartre.

87. Druckman, op. cit., p. 61. 88. Volkan, “Ethnonationalistic Rituals,” op. cit., p. 13. 89. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., pp. 107- 108. 90. Ibid., chapter 11.

Address for correspondence: Robert E. Harkavy, Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University, Department of Political Science 164N Burrowes Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA. Phone: 814-863-0743; Fax: 814-865-3098; E-mail: reh2Gpsu.edu

harkavy- defeat, national humiliation, and the revenge motif in international politics

Documents