Dedication

IfnothingelsepauseandconsidertheunnecessarydeathofSecondLieutenantD.A.Addams-Williams,4thSouthWalesBorderers,aged19,leadinghistroopsintobattleatChocolateHill(YilchinBurnu)11August1915.

FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2015byPen&SwordMilitary

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Contents

AcknowledgementsListofAbbreviationsForeword

Chapter1 GeneralSirIanHamiltonandtheBritishArmy,1853–1915

Chapter2 WhyGallipoli?

Chapter3 ABadlyLaunchedOperation

Chapter4 FightingandCommand

Chapter5 CommandandPolitics

Chapter6 FightingandtheTruth

Chapter7 AnUnfairWithdrawal?

Chapter8 Conclusion

NotesBibliography

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge and thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre forMilitaryArchivesforpermissiontousequotationsformtheirarchives.

ListofAbbreviations

ADCAide-de-Camp

ANZACAustralianandNewZealandArmyCorps

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

CIGSChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff

GHQGeneralHeadquarters

GOCGeneralOfficerCommanding

HEHighExplosive

Headquarters

HQ Headquarters

KCBKnightCommanderoftheBath

MEFMediterraneanExpeditionaryForce

NATONorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NCONonCommissionedOfficer

OCOfficerCommanding

RNRoyalNavy

RNDRoyalNavalDivision

RNVRRoyalNavyVolunteerReserve

T.F. TerritorialForceUnitedKingdom

UKUnitedKingdom

VDVenerealDisease

WOWarOffice(UK)

2i.c. SecondinCommand

T

Foreword

hisworkconcernsapassingeraasnewmenandnewideasreplacedwhathad been seen as traditional values. General Sir Ian Hamilton and his

commandoftheforcesatGallipoliin1915,thesubjectofthisbook,wasalreadyoutmoded,aswastheBritishArmywhenitsetouttodefeattheenemiesoftheBritishEmpire.HamiltonwastotallyconfidentthathewoulddefeattheTurksashewasagentlemanandBritish;hisconfidencewasmisplaced.Theworldhadturnedandhewasabouttobecomeunstuck.ToaddtohismiseriesatGallipolihewastofindthathewasoutmanoeuvredpoliticallyandnotonlybypoliticians.Hamilton’s frustrations were to be compounded by the political use of thepopularmediatoconvincetheBritishgeneralpublicthatfailurewasthefaultofoneman and not of the politicianswhich had sent him poorly prepared for amajoroffensive.Littlehaschangedsince1915.Ihavea fewpeople to thankfor theirhelp in thepreparationandwritingof

thiswork.Thebiggest debt I owe is to the staff at theLiddleHartCentre forMilitary Archives, King’s College, London, notably Diana Manipud, whoalwaysensuredthatIhadmaterialavailabletoworkfromandLianneSmith,theArchivesServicesManager,whohelpedgreatlywith the supplyof images forthisbook.IwouldalsoliketothankthestaffatSpecialCollections,BrothertonLibrary, University of Leeds, for their unfailing help and assistance. SpecialCollections atLeeds is anunderused source and isworthyofgreater attentionfrom the academicworld. Iwould also like to thankGeorgeAnderson for hismapwhichheproducedswiftlyandatamodestprice.

EvanMcGilvrayLeeds,20February2014

G

ChapterOne

GeneralSirIanHamiltonandtheBritishArmy,1853–1915

eneralSir IanHamiltonwasbornon16 January1853on the islandofCorfu.TodayCorfuisapopularholidaydestination,butin1853itwas

part of theUnion States of the Ionian Islands and aBritish Protectorate since1815andremainedsountil1864whentheislandsunitedwithGreece.Hamiltonwas born into amilitary family with his father serving as a Captain with the92ndGordonHighlanders.IanHamiltonwasdestinedtolivelong,dyingattheage of ninety-four in 1947 and sowas towitness to themany changeswhichoccurredduringhislifetime.Thesenotonlyincludedchangesasadvancesweremade inscienceor insociety,butalso thosewhichaffectedhischosencareer,that of anofficer servingwith theBritishArmy. IndeedHamiltonwas also toinfluence some of these changes as the nature ofwarfaremoved rapidly fromman and horsepower. Instead ofmenmarching and horses galloping, modernarmiesatthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturybegantousemotorizedvehiclesand explore aviation.While scientific developments allowed for more deadlyweapons, medical advances saved many soldiers from illnesses and woundswhichpreviouslywouldhavekilledthem.Hamiltonwas born shortly before the outbreak of theCrimeanWar,which

waslargelyfoughtfromhorsebackincavalrymanoeuvres,includingthefamousChargeoftheLightBrigade.AttheCrimeatheinfantrystillusedmusketsandtheartillerycontinuedtofirecannonsloadedwithcannonballs.BythetimeofHamilton’sdeath,military technologyhadprogressed, if that is the rightword

fortheobliterationoftwoJapanesecitiesduringAugust1945bytheAmericansusingatomicbombs;thefirstandonlyexampletodateofnuclearwar.Between1853and1945thenatureofwarfarehadalteredtotallywithcivilians

becoming mass casualties for the first time owing to aerial bombardment.Advances in technologyandcommunicationsmeant thatmassarmiescouldbemoved around theworld reasonably swiftly.This led toworldwar, protractedbattles,chemicalwarfareandmasscasualtiesasparticularlyexperiencedduringthe FirstWorldWar. Scientific advances also made genocide possible as themass slaughter of European Jews by theNazis during the SecondWorldWarusingpoisonousgas,gaschambersandanefficientrailnetworkwassurelythenadirofso-calledEuropeancivilization.During Hamilton’s life the British Army experienced a great number of

reformsinwhichHamiltonwasinvolved.Thefirstof thesereformsbeganjustafter the end of the CrimeanWar which British society considered had beenbadly conducted and poorly led.TheBritishArmymayhave been part of thevictoriousallianceagainst theRussianEmpire,but theseniorofficerswhohadcommandedtheBritishArmyattheCrimeahadleditinamannerthatwasmoresuited to theNapoleonicWars,whichhadbeen fought fortyyearsearlier.Thepoor leadership and command of the British Army during the Crimean WarmeantthatbeforefinallyachievingvictorytheBritishArmyhadsufferedmanysetbacks and became the object of examination and eventual overhaul wherenecessary.1ThesituationregardingtheCrimeanWaranditsaftermathdoesnotinitiallyaffect theHamiltonstory,howeverthequestionofmodernitydoesrunthroughthisworkandbeginswithjournalismattheCrimea.TheCrimeanWarwasthefirstmediawarandwaswellcoveredinTheTimes

ofLondonbyW.H.Russell,who,inhisregulardespatcheswasdeeplycriticalofthe British military leadership in the Crimea. His despatches were publishedwithin hours in London, owing to the advances in electric telegraphy, and sogave theBritishgeneralpublica regular reviewofwhatwasgoingon in theirname. Russell’s criticism of the British commanders caught the publicimaginationinBritainandwaspartlyresponsibleforthefallofLordAberdeen’sGovernmentin1855.AtthesametimeRogerFenton’sphotographsofthewar(asyetnot innewspapersowing to the lackof technology todoso) illustratedtheconflict and itsaftermathvividlyandmorehonestly, rather than imagesasdepictedinheroicpaintingsashadbeenthecasepreviously.In1915Hamiltonwas to fall foul of journalists reporting of his command of theMediterraneanExpeditionaryForce(MEF)atGallipoli.

The reform of the lateVictorianArmywas chiefly thework of Edward T.Cardwell who was Secretary of State for War between 1868 and 1874. ThisneatlyoverlappedwithHamiltonbeinggazettedtothe12thSuffolkRegimentasaSecondLieutenantduringDecember1872afterpassingthroughtheSandhurstMilitaryAcademy.During1870,CardwellexaminedtheroleoftheBritishArmyandconcluded

that itsmain dutieswerewide ranging and included home defence against anexternal attack, which throughout much of the nineteenth century manifesteditself asperiodic fearsof aFrench invasion.Externally, the roleof theBritishArmywastoprovideadequategarrisoningofIndiafollowingtheIndianMutiny(1857), aswell as supplying troops for colonial garrisons scattered across theglobe. Nearer to home the Army was also expected to bolster the civilauthorities,especiallyinIrelandwhereFenianpara-militariessoughttheremovalofBritishrulefromtheisland.TheBritishArmywasillequippedtorespondtothisthreat.2Cardwell set about reforming the British Army from top to bottom. His

reforms encompassed administrative, penal and regimental reforms, aswell asprovidingthebasisforestablishingamilitaryreservetosupplementtheregulararmy. His most memorable reform was the abolition of the purchasing ofcommissionsandpromotionswithin thearmy,with theexceptionof theRoyalEngineers and Royal Artillery where promotion only came on merit. Theabolitionofthepurchasingofcommissionswaspassedintolawduring1871.3ItwasonlyafterthislawwaspassedthattheBritishArmycouldfinallyembarkontheestablishmentofatrulyprofessionalofficercorpsratherthanonedominatedbywealthandprivilege.Hamiltonwasgazettedoneyearafter this reformwaspassed.Bythe1870sitwasconsideredthattherewasa‘younger,brashergeneration

(ofofficerswhowere)agitatingforreform’.4Hamiltonwaslessthanayearwiththe12thSuffolks.HespentmuchofhistimeinIrelandwherehewasstationedeither fishing or practising drill. In July 1873 his battalion transferred fromAthlonetotheCurraghwherehetookuppolo.ItwastherethathemetsomeofthetroublesofIrelandwhentheSuffolks,withfixedbayonets,clearedapublicsquare during an affray.5 Eventually, as expected, his transfer to his father’sregiment, the Gordon Highlanders, was finally granted. In November 1873Hamilton set sail for India on HMS Jumna to join the regiment, which wasstationedatMooltaninthePunjab.6

OnceinIndia,HamiltonbegantotakehismilitarycareermoreseriouslythanhehaddonepreviouslyinIreland.HespentthenextfiveyearsusefullylearningHindustani as well as Urdu, Nagri and Arabic script, and so qualified as aninterpreter and spoke in Hindustani to Indian troops whenever he could. Noteverybody was impressed with this accomplishment and the RegimentalAdjutantwasfuriousandtoldHamiltontoconfinehimselftoregimentaldutiesandnotto‘indulgeinridiculousside-shows’.7AproblemforHamilton,andonethatheshouldhavebeenawareof,wasthattheGordonHighlanderswasaverytraditional regiment and that any variance from the norm was frowned upon.Amazingly, at that timenoofficer from theGordonshad ever volunteered forStaffCollege, for active service or for anything at all.AsHamilton’s nephewobserved in his biography of his distinguished uncle, theGordonHighlanderslived and fought as a regiment anddidvery little else.8Hamiltonwas alreadyshowing that he was going to be different, and the reforming late VictorianBritish Army was definitely the place to try to make a difference for anambitiousyoungofficerwithaneyetothefutureandforpromotion.HamiltondidnotonlytakeaninterestinthelanguagesofIndia,whichshould

have been made compulsory for those wishing to rule India, he also took anactive interest in military training. Just after his upbraiding by the RegimentAdjutant,HamiltononcemoreshowedinitiativeataGeneral’sparadewhenheusedhis intelligencerather than justblindlyfollowingordersand thusavoidedchaos. This time he was commended by the inspecting General for showingcommonsense.9Hamiltonwastomakefurtherchanges,aswhenhewasonhisfirstsixmonths leave in theUKfromIndiahewasorderedby theWarOffice(WO) to attendamusketry course atHyde, an establishment inKent. In1855Hamilton’sfatherhadspenttimeatthesameplaceonthesamecourse.10Thiswassomething thatHamiltonhadwanted todo,butowing to thestrict

traditions of his regiment he dared not volunteer. Hamilton did well on thecourseandobtainedan‘ExtraFirst’Certificateandthanks to thisandpossiblyhis reputationasaskilledbiggamehunter in India,hewasgazettedMusketryInstructor of his regiment on his return to India.Hamilton’s nephew observesthat this was trivial in itself, but made a distinct difference in his uncle’scareer.11HamiltonknewthatinfantrytrainingintheVictorianBritishArmywasbasedontheuseofthebayonetwithtroopsformedupintosquares,fourdeep,torepulse cavalry; the famousBritishSquare.However,Hamilton could see thatthis tacticmightprovedisastrousif thesesquarescameunderconcentratedfire

from modern rifles. To remedy this, Hamilton began to consider that theshootingskillsofevery individualsoldiershouldbe improvedso that infuturecombat, soldiers could work individually or in groups depending oncircumstances. As Musketry Instructor, Hamilton took his idea to anextraordinary length, even to the point of buying extra cartridges at his ownexpense for additional shooting practice. Steadily the shooting skills of hisbattalion increased until they were the best in India. This brought him to theattentionof seniorofficerswhobegan to consider that therewas something inthe training led byHamilton and that perhaps hewas an extraordinary youngofficer.12Following the Indian Mutiny the British tried to follow a policy of

noninterference in Central Asia, but once the Russians recovered from theirdefeatintheCrimeanWar,theyreturnedtothepolicyofexpandingtheRussianEmpireintoAsia.TheRussianpolicyincludedannexingterritoriesinagradualmovetowardsAfghanistanandIndia;theso-called‘GreatGame’sobelovedbytheBritishwriterRudyardKipling.TheBritishGovernmentconsideredtryingtoreachanagreementwith theAfghan ruler,EmirMohammadYaqubKhan,butthey were too late as Russian influence in the Afghan capital, Kabul, wasabsolute.ThespectreofRussiansinKabulalarmedtheBritishGovernment,whointerpreted this move as a direct threat to Indian and British interests there.Therefore on 1 December 1878 the British embarked on an invasion ofAfghanistan.Initially the invasionwasasuccessandtheroadtoKabulwasopen.During

January1879theBritishsettleddownfor thewinterafteropeningnegotiationswiththeAfghans,whobythenhadbeendesertedbytheRussians.ItwasduringthiscampaignthatHamilton,asaLieutenant,sawactiveserviceintheKurramValleyarea.ThisvalleywasalittleknownroutewhichheadedtowardsKabul.ThiswaswhereMajor-General FrederickRoberts,Commander of theKurramFieldForcedecidedtoestablishcommunicationstohisadvancedpostatAlikhel,about fifty miles from Kabul. However, fifty miles by land is a long way inAfghanistan,eventoday.NegotiationsdraggedonthroughouttheSpringof1879untilfinallyatreatywasagreedbetweentheAfghansandtheBritish.Twooutofthe threecolumns thathad invadedAfghanistan, theKandaharand theKhyberweremoreor lessdisbanded.Hamilton’scolumn, theKurram, remained intactandconcentratedatAlikhel.During thesummerof1879Hamiltoncontractedmalariaandwasextremely

ill.HewassenttorecoveratPeiwarKotal,theGeneralHeadquarters(GHQ)of

theKurramColumn,abouttenmileseastofAlikhelandstilladangerousplace,aseventsweretoprove.Despitebeingreportedasveryillandtooweaktowalk,Hamiltonwasriding

withanotherofficerintheforestsnearPeiwarKotalwhentheyheardshotsfromtheforestabovethemandthensawsoldiersrunningdownthehillsideinsomedisorder.HamiltonandhiscomradeinterceptedthesoldiersanddiscoveredthatAfghans had attacked the soldiers’ signalling post and had overrun it.Furthermore, two British soldiers were missing. The officers sent two of thesoldiersontheirownponiestoraisethealarmandthendrawingtheirrevolversbegantoclimbthehillsidefollowedbyoneoftheremainingsoldiers,whostillhad his rifle.Once the brow of the hill had been reached they found the postunoccupiedandnosignoftheenemy.Takingupdiscardedrifles,thetrioloadedthem,fixedbayonetsandmountedguardinfullexpectationofafurtherAfghanattack.They were finally relieved by a company from the 8th King’s Regiment

completewithasignalsofficer.Itwasdecidedtopursuetheenemydownthefarsideofthehill,butHamiltoninhisweakenedconditionbecameseparatedfromthepursuingparty and came face-to-facewith theAfghan raidingparty.Frombehindastout tree trunkHamiltonengaged theAfghanswithhis revolver,butthe enemy began to outflank him. One of the party, ‘an oldMullah’ fired atHamiltonatpointblankrangewithanancientflintlock.LuckilyforHamiltonitmisfiredandtheAfghanwaskilled,probablybyBritishsoldiersattractedtothespot by the firing. The rest of the raiding party fled. Hamilton picked up theswordoftheoldwarriorasasouveniroftheencounter.This incident in itselfwasaminorscrimmageofVictoriancolonialwarfare,

butwastobeimportanttoHamiltonandhiscareer.TherewasnotonlytalkofHamiltonreceivingadecorationforhisactions,butalsoMajor-GeneralRobertssentforhim,gavehimaglassofsherryandthenaskedforafirsthandreport.Hamiltonconsideredthis tohavebeenaturningpoint inhiscareerasnotonlydidRoberts showhimgreatkindness,but twoandahalfyears laterappointedHamiltontohisStaff.TheimmediateresultofHamilton’sheroismwasthathewas gazetted ADC to Brigadier General ‘Redan’ Massy, a veteran of theCrimeanWarandwhoby1879commandedtheCavalryBrigadeoftheBritishforcewhichhad invadedAfghanistan.Hewasshortly to takecommandof theentireforcewhenRobertsleftAfghanistanforaconferencewiththeViceroyofIndia,whogovernedIndiaonthebehalfofhismonarch,QueenVictoria.TheTimesinformeditsreadersthatthewarinAfghanistanwasoverandthat

‘thecampaignwasmarkedbynodecisiveactions,bynobrilliantfeatofarms.TherewerenodisasterslikeIsandlana[sic],andnoheroicepisodeslikeRorke’sDrift to appeal to the passions of the multitude.’13 These were obviousreferencestoactionsfoughtduringtherecentZuluWarwhichhadindeedcaughtthepublicimagination,eveniftheyhadtowaitforseveralweeksbeforenewsofthatwarwasreceived.However,TheTimeswaswrongabouttheAfghanWarasevenifitprovedtooboringtoreportregularly,eventswereabouttotakeatragicturn.FightingbrokeoutoncemorebetweentheBritishandAfghansfollowingthe

massacrebyAfghansoftheentireBritishMissionincludingtheBritishMilitaryCommander,MajorCavagnariinKabul.RobertshurriedbacktotakechargeatAlikhel while Hamilton’s new boss, Brigadier General Massey, seized theShutargardunPasswhichcommandedtheroutetoKabul,fiftymilesdistant.Theadvance intoAfghanistan began oncemore on 30 September 1879 and by 13October 1879Robertsmade his formal entrance intoKabul.Despite being aninfantry officer, Hamilton, as a result of being ADC to Massey, spent thecampaign with the cavalry while the Gordons fought a most distinctivecampaign,butheregrettednothing.AfterthisstageofthecampaigninAfghanistan,Hamiltonsoughttorejointhe

Gordons but had another bout of malaria and was forced to recover atRawalpindi.Whilst hewas ill hemissed thewinter campaign as theAfghansroseupagainst theBritishoncemore.Finally,afterpassingamedical,hewasable to return toactiveservice.Hamilton thenhada frustrating time travellingaroundIndia trying tocatchupwithhis regiment.Hefinallycaughtupwith itjustintimefortheBattleofKandahar,on1September1880.Hamiltonsaidofthatdaythathehadarrived‘earlyenoughtohavebeenshot,buttoolateforthedistinctionoftheKandaharStar’.Hehadtobecontentwithamedal,twoclaspsandtwomentionsindespatches.14AftertheSecondAfghanWar(1878–80)theGordonswereorderedtoreturn

totheUK.BeforetheregimenthadevenleftIndiaitreceivedorderstoembarkfor Natal in Southern Africa. This embarkation was necessary as the British,during 1880, had sought to annexe the territory of Transvaal, occupied byfarmersofDutchdescentknownasBoers.TheBoers revolted and stood theirground and fighting broke outwhich turned into irregularwarfare. TheBoerswere not professional soldiers but knew their country well. In addition, theywereskilledriflemenwhousedlargeboregameriflesandtheyswiftlyinflicteda series of defeats on the British Army in Southern Africa. The transfer of

Hamilton andhis comrades toNatalwas also the result of a ployby them, astheycabledSirEvelynWood,therecentlyappointedSecond-in-Command(2-i-C)toGeneralSirGeorgeCooley,GovernorandCommander-in-Chief(C-in-C),Natal Province, to the effect that subalterns from 92nd Highlanders from a‘splendid battalion’ were eager to see service nearer Natal than England andrequested to be sent to South Africa. Their wish was granted and The Timesreported that Lieutenant I.S.M. Hamilton and other officers of the 92ndHighlanders were en route to the Front, having come from India anddisembarkedatDurbanon29January1881.15Service in the First Boer War was to cost Hamilton dear, as it is not

unreasonabletoconsiderthatlikemanyVictorianmilitaryofficersheprobablythoughtthatthewarwiththeBoerswouldnotbeagreatchallengebeyondfiringa fewshots,planting theUnionflagandcarryingonhome to theUK.Hewaswrong. The Boers were considerable guerrilla fighters even if they had nevertrainedtobeso.ItwastheBoerwayoflifewhichhadunconsciouslypreparedthem for this; living in the saddle, shooting since they were children andknowingtheirenvironmentandthewaysoftheSouthAfricanBush;the‘Veldt.’Theeveningof26February1881foundHamiltononanightmarchheading

towardsasteepsidedhillwhichwas in factanextinctvolcanocalledMajuba.The small forcewithwhichhewasmarchingwas amixtureof infantry and acompanyof sailors from theRoyalNavalDivision (RND).The appearanceofsailorson theSouthAfricanveldt someconsider tohavebeen the intrusionofpoliticsontothebattlefield–itwasallaboutsharingglory.16ItwasnotthelasttimethatHamiltonwastoservealongsideaNavalDivision.Hamilton’sforcemovedonto theMajubaunder thecoverofdarkness.They

discoveredthat itwasextremelysteepsided,astheirascentwasat timesmadeonlybycrawlingontheirhandsandknees,pullingthemselvesupusingtussocksof the long grasswhich grew there. Itwas not until first light that theBritishbegan to appreciate their position, but still had not realized the peril inwhichtheyhadplacedthemselves.From their positionon thehill theBritish could seemanyBoers,whowere

unaware of the British presence until they were fired on. The British madeseveralmistakesintheirseizureofMajubaHill.Theirbiggestmistakewasnotdigging in their positionor reinforcing it, despite thepicks and shovelswhichthey had taken with them. It is also probable thatMajor General Sir GeorgePomeroyColley,theBritishCommanderontheMajuba,thoughtthattheBoerswould be overawed by the British presence on the heights and withdraw. He

certainlyhadnotanticipatedthattheywouldattackhispositionfrombelow.TheBoers attacked the British, swarming up in small groups using the tall

grassascoverwhilepanicsetinamongstthedefendingBritish.Atonepointinthefighting,thirteenoutofeighteenofHamilton’smenhadeitherbeenkilledorwounded.HamiltonhadhadseveralcloseshavesashedashedfromhispositiontotheHQonthehill.Hiskiltandcoathadbeenslashedseveraltimesbybullets.Once the Boers got to the rim of the Majuba they fired straight into it. AsHamiltonwastryingtoorganizeacounterattackhewaswounded;shotthroughthewrist.At this point he realized that theBritish linehadgivenway;Colleyshouted orders to hold the rear ridge of the volcano’s crater, the direction inwhich the British were running. Despite his shattered wrist, Hamilton, underheavyfire, ran towards theridgeand justaboutreached it.Oncemoreabullethadcuthiscoatandanotherhadgrazedhisknee.TheBoerfirewasmurderousandrelentless.ThenHamiltonwashitbysomethingatthebackofhisheadandfellunconscious.After a couplemore encounterswith theBoers inwhichHamiltonnot only

lost his sword, a Claymore given to him by his father, Hamilton, he draggedhimselfintotheshadeofathornbushontheledgebelowthecrestfromwhichhehadfallen,andwasnearlymurderedbyayoungBoerfighter,outcollectingcartridges. The young man clearly saw that Hamilton was wounded anddefenceless,butstillwouldhaveshothimbutforanoldBoergentlypullingtheyoungman’s rifle toonesideandsopreventingmurder.TheBoers treatedhiswounds,butdidnotbringwaterforthewounded.Hamilton,woundedashewas,set out for water to bring back, but lost his way and collapsed. He neverexpected to rise again. The nextmorning hewas found in a pitiful state by aBritishsearchparty.TheharrowingexperienceofMajubaHillnodoubtmadeaneverlasting impression onHamilton. Its fiasco raised concerns of howBritishtroopsfoughtandhowtheywereled.Indeed,theBritishdefeatinSouthAfricawasreportedbyTheTimesasatragedy.ThedeathofHamilton’sCommander,MajorGeneralColleywasreported,killedatMajuba.Hamiltonwasreportedasbeing amongst the wounded, even if he was recorded as Lieutenant ‘J’.S.Monteith Hamilton. This error was amended on 3 March 1881 and he wasreported asdoingwell on19March1881.17The slipwas a simplemistake tomakeasHamiltonwasknowntohisclosestfriendsas‘Johnnie’–‘Ian’beingtheScotsversionof ‘John’andconsideredquite exotic forVictorian tastes.Later,letters from the Commander of theAustralian andNewZealandArmyCorps(ANZAC) serving at Gallipoli, Major-General Sir William Birdwood, in

correspondencewithHamiltonafter1915alwaysbeganwiththesalutation‘DearGeneralJohnny.’18OnceHamiltonwasfittotravel,hisbrother,Vereker,whooverafour-month

period had looked after him, took him back to the UK. Once back home,HamiltonconsultedthegreatJosephLister,whocarefullyexaminedHamilton’sruined hand and then suddenly seized it, causing Hamilton to faint from theresulting pain. Lister strongly agreedwith themilitary surgeons atNewcastle,SouthAfrica,whohadsuggestedthatthehandshouldbeamputated,remarking‘saveyoualotoftrouble,myboy–chloroformandfees.’19However,thehandremained intact for the remainder of Hamilton’s life, neatly manicured butuseless. Meanwhile, Hamilton railed in vain against the armistice concludedbetween the British Government and the Boers. Hamilton considered that thearrival in South Africa of reinforcements meant that the British could havedefeatedtheBoers.20Hamilton’s actions in South Africa furthered his career, even if his wound

threatenedtoendit.HewasrecommendedfortheVictoriaCrossforhisservicesatMajuba, but itwas decided that hewas too young and that therewould beamble opportunity in his career to have another chance to win the VC, thehighest award for gallantry while serving in the British armed services.Ironically, the next time he was recommended for a Victoria Cross it wasconsideredthathewastoooldandtooseniorfortheaward.Hamiltonwasalsofeted by polite British society and during August 1881 dined with QueenVictoria.HewasgrantedaprivateaudiencewithhismonarchduringwhichhegaveheranaccountofthefightingonMajuba.Elsewherehewasreceivedasthegallant young hero, home from the wars, and then in the autumn he begancramming for the next Staff College examination. Within a few days of theexam,Roberts,nowC-in-CatMadrasofferedtomakeHamiltonhisADCandsohewenttoIndiaforthenexttwentyyears.If the fighting inAfghanistan and SouthAfrica introducedHamilton to the

realitiesofwar,thenexttwentyyearsofserviceinIndiataughthimmaturityashelearnthowtodealwiththeroutineadministrationwhichkeepsanarmygoingrather thanjustfightingwars.InFebruary1882Hamiltonwaspromotedto therankofCaptain,butdidnotarrivetotakeupthispromotionandhisnewpostinIndiauntilJuneofthesameyear.In1887HamiltonmarriedJeanMuir,thedaughterofaGlasgowbusinessman.

Hamilton’s life became a mixture of work and leisure, especially literarypursuits,but changes in theadministrationof theBritishmilitaryowing to the

CardwellReformswerebeginningtomaketheirmark,evenoutindistantIndia.TheCardwellReformswerenotuniversallywelcomedandHamilton’smentor

andsponsor,Roberts,openlycondemned them,especially the systemfor shortservice.Thiswaspriortothesystemofdemocraticcivil-militaryrelationswhichdemandsthatservingmilitarypersonnel,notablyNATOmembers,abstainfrompublicallycommentatingoncontemporarypolitical issuesandserveonly inanadvisoryroletotheirelectedpoliticalmasters.However,inthe1880stherewasnosuchobstacleandRobertswroteseveralarticlesintheinfluentialjournalXIXCentury. In Roberts’ opinion the way to modernize the British Army and tomake it more effective was to promote long-term enlistment as well as animprovementinthesocialstatusoftheordinarysoldier.Basically,hewantedtopromotetheArmyasacareerchoicerather thansomethingwhichwasslightlybetterthantheworkhouse.Equally,Robertswasagainstconscription.Thiswasusedextensivelyacross

the European mainland. The Europeans used conscription as a method forbuildingupa trainedmilitaryforcewhile theBritishconsidered that therewassomethingunsoundaboutthisandconsideredittobe‘un-British’.TheaverageBritonthenandtodaywantedthestatetohaveaslittleinterferenceaspossibleintheir life; conscription clearly would have been a major interference. Robertswas convinced that if his ideaswere acted on, theywouldmake theArmy anattractive career choice and would attract recruits. Hamilton was heavilyinfluenced by Roberts and learnt much from him. Indeed while fighting atGallipoli,Hamilton,inlettershometohiswife,LadyHamilton,stillfoundtimetorailagainstshorttermserviceandthespectreofconscriptionwhichwasyettocometotheUKin1915butwasintroducedin1916.Hamiltonoftendenouncedconscriptionasbeing‘un-British’.21AttimesHamilton’snotionsofbeingBritishseemtobeatoddswithreality

anditwouldseemthatheconsideredthatbeingBritishmeantbeinglikehim–inotherwordsfromtheso-called‘upperclasses’.His1911studyofthequestionofconscriptionintheUKratherrevealsthatinthetermsofBritishsociety,heisratheroutoftouch.Atthelevelofinternationalpoliticsheisextremelyaccurateas he noted that unlike most of the European states and Empires, the BritishEmpirewaslargeoverseas;furthermoretheBritishhomelandfrontierswerenotlandbutsea.ThereforeastrongnavywasneededtoprotectBritishinterestsathome and overseas.22 Regarding the Army, Hamilton genuinely feared thatconscriptionwouldweakenit,buthewasalsowillingto takeadvantageof theunfairnessandunemploymentwidelyfoundintheBritishworkmarketpriorto

theFirstWorldWar.HamiltonhadclearlyexaminedworkpatternsintheUKandhadnoticedthat

mostrecruitsjoiningtheBritishArmywereabouteighteentonineteenyearsofagewhocouldnotfindregularemploymentoncetheyceasedbeing‘boys’intheworkplaceandsocouldcommandanincreasedwage.Thismeantthatemployerswere unlikely to employ them, especially unskilled workers, and insteademployedyoungboyswhocoulddosimilarworkbutatalessersalary.HamiltonclaimedthatabouteightypercentofrecruitsjoinedtheArmyastheycouldnotfind work at fifteen shillings (75 pence) a week, which was half of what alabourermighthaveexpectedtoearnatthattime.Followingtheintroductionofthe Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1906 Hamilton also noticed thatrecruitmentalsoincreasedasemployersbecomeevenmorereluctanttoemployseventeentoeighteenyear-oldmenincasetheyweresubjecttoacompensationclaim owing to this new legislation. Hamilton clearly saw the unfairness andirregularpracticesoftheworkplaceasgreatsourcesofrecruitmentandwarnedoncemore against conscription.Hewrote that if ‘hungryhobbledehoys’ knewthattheywouldbeconscriptedwith‘continuoushousingandfeedingduringthewinter, theRegularArmywouldbegin to shrivelup from the roots’.23ClearlyHamiltonknewnocharityformostofhiscountrymenandonlysawthemastheundeserving poor, to be shorn of any aid that they might have received andrevealing that the best recruiting sergeants are unemployment, hunger andhomelessness.This is a themediscussed byChrisBellamywhen he considersthe future of the Gurkhas and that of the British Army. He noted that in the1990s during a period of relatively high employment in the UK, the BritishArmywasunder-recruited;duringtheseconddecadeofthetwenty-firstcenturytheUK economy is performing badly, unemployment is high and thewelfarestate is beingdismantled. It is at these times,Bellamywrites, that recruitmentpicksup,butassoonastheeconomyrevives,recruitmentdrops.24Itwouldseemthatoutsideoftheofficerclassfewpeoplejointhearmedservices,especiallythearmy, for a career, but do so out of necessity and nothing else.Hamilton hadrealizedthisandwashappytoseeitcontinue.HewaslatertopaythepriceforhislackofforesightwhenhewasdeniedthenecessarydivisionsatGallipoli,butitmustbeunderstoodthatheagreedthatconscriptionmightbeusedinamajorwarbutitdependedonwhenitwasintroduced.Hesuggestedinthemiddleofawarwhichwas going badly, but not at the beginning of awar or in the latterstagesofawar.25Hamilton,intheeyesoftoday’sreaderhadsomeverystrangenotionswhich

should be seen as quite normal just prior to 1914. One of these was beingBritish. At times he overcompensated for this, perhaps because he was bornoverseas, but hewas aBritish officer serving in theBritishArmy at the verypeakoftheBritishEmpire.HehadbeenbornintoaveryprivilegedpositionofBritishsocietywhichwasconsideredtohavebeentheverypinnacleofmoderncivilization.Eventhosebornintomuchhumbler,ifnotwretchedcircumstancessuchastheunemployedfifteenshillingsaweeklabourers,werefiercelyproudtobeBritish.ItwaslikebeingbornacitizenofRomeinancienttimes.Hamiltonsincerely believed that being British, notwithstanding the defeat at Majuba,meantthatBritishsoldierswerespecialorsuperior.Hewrotethat‘ourbreedhasthe fighting qualities, descended from the bowmen of Cressy, and our armyaloneinEuropeisselective,raisedbyvoluntaryenlistment’.26Hamilton’sthoughtsandworkontheBritishArmywerequiteextensivefora

servingofficerandasearlyas1884hewrotethemonogram,TheFightingoftheFuture, in which he reviewed British military tactics in the light of hisexperienceonactiveserviceinAfghanistanandSouthAfrica.Hamiltonarguedthatonlyskillinshootingcantipthebalancewhenforcesequalinnumbersandskill in drill clash. He had seen enough poor British marksmanship while onactiveservice.InSouthAfricahehadwitnessedhisownmencutdownbyBoerguerrillafighterswholackedconventionalmilitarytrainingbutwerecrackshotsowingtotheirlifestyle.Hamiltonmadetheradicalproposalthatthetrainingofthe Victorian British Army should be reversed with emphasis on drill beingforsakenfortheprimacyofriflepractice.Healsoadvisedthattargetsshouldnotbe the classical bull’s eye target as in the sport of rifle shooting but instead,movingtargetsofvaryingdifficultiessuchasasoldierinthefieldmightface.AsafavouriteofRoberts,Hamiltonwassupportedbyhimandhis ideaswerenotignored,ariskthathehadfaced.EventuallyhisideaswereadoptedthroughouttheBritishArmyafterbeingtrialledinIndia.27Hamilton’scareerinIndiacontinuedunhinderedevenifitwastobeanumber

ofyearsbeforehesawactiveserviceagain.Itwasnotthroughalackoftrying,asin1885hetriedtobecomepartof theabortiveattempttorescuetheBritishnational hero, General Gordon, from his besieged garrison at Khartoum inSudan. The British military column sent to Sudan was too late and asunsuccessfulasHamiltonhadbeenintryingtojoinit.Gordonandthegarrisonwereslaughteredbyrebeltribesmencommonlyknownas‘Dervishes’anditlefta rancourwhich took nearly twenty years for theBritish to avenge.HamiltoncontinuedoninIndiaandin1895wasofferedthepostofDeputyQuartermaster

General there. Finally, after more than twenty-five years in India, HamiltoncamehomeduringApril1898.HewastoruntheSchoolofMusketryatHythe.28HamiltonwasatHythefortwoyears.DuringthattimeMajorGeneralHoratio

Kitchener led a British military expedition into Sudan and defeated theDervisheswhowereheld responsible for themassacreofGordon’smission in1885.Hamiltonhadwantedtobeonhandforthistriumph,buthadtosettleforanaccountof it fromhisyoung friend,WinstonChurchill.HamiltonhadonlyrecentlybecomeacquaintedwiththeyoungChurchillwhowasgoodenoughtosend him a full description, written in pencil, of the decisive Battle ofOmdurman,2September1898,whichsawwhatmanyconsidertohavebeenthelast BritishArmy cavalry charge. This charge destroyed theDervish forces.29However, war was on its way and active service beckoned once more forHamilton.ItwasunfinishedimperialbusinessinAfricathatbroughtthenextwarwhich

flareduponcemoreinSouthAfrica.TheBoers,emboldenedbytheirvictoryatMajubaandwithEuropeansympathy,decidedtoengagetheBritishoncemore.The Boers were canny in the timing of the beginning of the fighting as theywaiteduntiltherewasenoughgrasstosupporttheirhorsebackmilitaryunitsor‘commandos’ before sending the British Government an ultimatum whichexpired on 11 October 1899. The British were wholly unprepared for war indistantAfrica.30HamiltonarrivedinSouthAfricaon3October1899, landingatDurban.He

wasgiventhecommandofSeventhBrigade,whichconsistedof1stDevons,2ndGordons and 1st Manchesters. Hamilton was also credited with a local(temporary)rankofMajorGeneral.Hamilton immediately began to put his own experience of warfare to a

practicaluse.HerecalledthatwhilstservingontheNorth-WestFrontierbetweenIndiaandAfghanistan,nativetribesmensnipingwithafewstolenrifleshadbeenextremely successful in fighting British and Imperial troops who foughtshoulder-to-shoulder and provided their foes with excellent targets. This hadcausedHamilton to doubt the perceivedwisdom of standardBritish tactics offighting shoulder-to-shoulder against rifles with magazines which could fireconcentrated shots into mass ranks of troops; there was little or no room formovement. In light of his experience on the North-West Frontier, Hamiltonspent three days retraining his brigade and told his Colonels to keepexceptionallyopenorder.TheDevonsweretohave1,000yardsfrontwiththreeyardsforeachman.31Thiswasamajordeparturefromthenormaltacticofclose

formationfighting.Hamilton’sbrigadedidnothavetowaitlongtoseeaction,ason19October

1899theJohannesburgCommandocapturedtherailwaystationatElandslaagte.This Boer action cut communications between the British force at LadysmithandadetachmentatDundeewheretheBritishhadmassedtheirtroopsasthewarbegan.Withthetelegraphlinecut,theBritishCommander,GeneralSirGeorgeWhite, sent his cavalry commander, Major General John French to recaptureElandslaagte.ItwasduringthisoperationthatHamilton’sbrigadedistinguisheditself,asdidHamilton,intheirworkwhichalsobegantoclearthewayreadyforcavalryoperations later.Duringacrucialperiodof theBritishoffensive,whenthe attack began to falter,Hamilton personally rallied hismen and carried theforward momentum of the British operation until such a time when Britishcavalry could sweep through the Boer opposition and recapture the railwaystation.32ThevictoryatElandslaagtewasseenaspaybackforMajuba.HamiltonwasfrequentlyinvolvedinthefightingoftheSecondBoerWarand

accordingtohisnephewwasusedasa‘veritablesheepdog’ashewassentoutin all possible directions across South Africa.33 The next major battle whichinvolvedHamiltonwastheBattleofWagonHill,justoutsideofLadysmithandsawthelastdeterminedBoerattackonthetown.ThomasPakenhamassertsthatHamiltonwasresponsiblefortheinitialBritishconfusionastheBoersbegantomaster the situation and started to overrun the British positions. However, hedoes concede that Hamilton made amends with personal gallantry as he tookchargeofthebattle.Small groups ofBritish troops led by their officers had been charging their

foesthatwerehiddeninlonggrass,andsofromtheirconcealedpositionseasilyshot down the attackingBritish.Hamilton stopped any further such attacks astheywerebasicallysuicidalandbegantostudythebattlefieldinordertotrytodrive theBoers off and defeat them. Later during the day, a group of raidingBoersmanagedtoinfiltrateapositionwhereHamiltonwasactuallytakinglunch.Hesuccessfully ledacounterattackwhicheventuallydislodged theBoers.ThesoundofgunfirealertedmembersoftheRNDwhorushedtoreinforceHamiltonandhissmallgroupofofficers.34ItwasafterthisactionthatHamiltonwasoncemorerecommendedfortheVictoriaCross,butagainhewasdeniedtheawardashewasconsidered tohavebeen tooseniorand thatgeneralofficersshouldnotleadtheirtroopsintobattleatthefront.35At the end of 1900 Lord Roberts, who had just been appointed C-in-C,

succeedingLordWolseleyasCommanderinSouthAfrica,advancedHamilton’s

nameforaKCB(KnightCommanderoftheBath)aswellaspromotinghimtoMajorGeneral,andsoHamiltonbecame‘Sir Ian’.Hamiltonwasable tocomehomeandreturnedtotheUKon2January1901.RobertsalsoofferedHamiltontheadministrativepostofMilitarySecretary.Hamiltonreluctantlyacceptedthispost,butwiththeprovisothatheremainedinthispostforonlytwoyears,andbegan work straight away. At the time of Hamilton taking office the BritishArmywasgoingthroughaperiodoffurtherreformwhichsawitsubjugatedtocivilianoversight and the establishmentof aprofessionalGeneralStaff.Thesewere not the only changes being implemented, as a new rifle was beingintroduced, designs for guns were being approved and new uniforms beingdecided on. It was all change at the WO, but it was also a time of conflictbetweenciviliansand thearmedforcesas theyall jockeyed forposition in themidst of these reforms, as senior officers tried to retain the powerwhich theyenjoyedasmilitaryspecialists.TheSecondBoerWar proved to be a very difficultwar for theBritish and

eventuallytheBritishArmy,nowunderthecommandofLordKitchener,ashewasbythenstyledafterbeinghonouredfollowinghisdefeatoftheDervishesinSudan, resorted to some extremely questionablemethods forwinning thewarwhich many considered to be ‘un-British’. This involved the use ofconcentration camps in which non-combatant Boers i.e. women, children andelderlypeoplewereincarcerated,whiletheirhomesandfarmswereburnttothegroundandtheirlivestockconfiscatedbytheBritish.ThisscorchedearthpolicydeniedtheBoerfightersshelterandsupplies,buttheirfamiliesdiedinthousandsin the British concentration camps. This was not the British intention but ahorrific consequence of ill thought out ideas. During 1901, Roberts offeredKitchener the choiceof a senior officer asChief of hisStaff;Kitchener choseHamilton.PakenhamspeculateswhetherHamiltonwasreturnedtoSouthAfricatoansweraquestionwhichtheBritishCabinetwasasking:‘WasLordKitcheneron thevergeof anervousbreakdownashe sought amethod fordefeating theBoers on the battlefield, but to date had failed to do so. And was Kitchenerawareofthequestionbeingasked?’36TheproblemwasthatthewarwassullyingthereputationoftheBritishArmy

andasaconsequencethatoftheBritishEmpire.ThiswasnotlostonKitchener,whowould have been glad to leaveAfrica and return to India.Hamilton alsobecameawareduring the finalmonthsof thewar that the so-called ‘loyalists’,those British colonists professing loyalty to the Empire, were basicallyopportunists. Hamilton told Churchill that these people had seen the Zulus

smashedandnowwanttheBoersdestroyed.OncethiswasdonetheywouldthenbeleftwithallofSouthernAfricatoworkfromandprosper,butatthecostofthe lives of British soldiers and Boer families. The loyalists did all that theycouldtosabotagepeacetalkstogetwhattheywanted.37EventuallypeacetermswereagreedandapeacetreatywassignedbetweentheBritishandtheBoerson31May1902.ThepoliticsofthisdismayedHamilton.The British did defeat the Boers, and there had been personal success for

Hamilton,butitwasnotanunqualifiedsuccess.TheSecondBoerWarhadbeenthefirstlargescalewarsincetheCardwellreformshadbeenintroducedinwhichtheBritishhadfoughtalongsidetheirimperialallies,andstillglaringproblemsin how the British Army operated were revealed. The task of reforming theBritish Army further fell to RichardHaldane, the Secretary of State forWar.HaldanenotonlyreformedrecruitingpolicybutalsocreatedanImperialGeneralStaffashetriedtopreparetheBritishArmyforanyfuturewar.Healsotriedtoreduce the military budget. All previous attempts to create a professionalGeneralStaffhadbeenhamperedbyanumberofinfluentialopponentsrangingfromQueenVictoria,seniorofficersatHorseGuards(homeofthethenGeneralStaff – stuffed full of privileged elites) as well as leading politicians. ThehistorianEdwardSpiersnotesthatittookthewarinSouthAfricatoexposethefailingsof theprevioussystem.TheRoyalCommissionwhich investigated theconductofthewarrevealedalackofplanning,achronicshortageofmapsandtheoutdatedtacticsusedatthebeginningofthewar.38AtleastHamiltoncouldnotbeaccusedofusingoutdatedtactics.Hereturned

homeduringJuly1902andresumedhispositionasMilitarySecretary.InApril1903HamiltonwasmadeQuartermasterGeneral.Thiswasatabusytimewitharmy reformsbeing further implemented, aswell asLordElgin’sCommissioninvestigatingtheBoerWar,whichsatfromOctober1902untilJuly1903beingin session. Hamilton was examined for an entire day by this commission; inadditionhesubmittedalongmemorandumconcerningthemodernizationofthecavalry.Hamilton’sviewwasthatthecavalryshouldbetransformedintoaformof mounted infantry and described what was basically a tank – as yet notinvented or even considered as an alternative to the horse.39 Indeed tanks andarmoured fighting vehicles were to be the future of the cavalry. However,Hamilton was to enjoy his most interesting assignment of his career to datewithoutactuallygoingtowar,ashewasappointedBritishmilitaryobserverofthe Russo-JapaneseWar,which broke out in 1904 andwas to last into 1905.Hamiltonwastoencountermodernwarfareandamajorjolttohisperceptionsof

lifeandhiscareer.Hamilton spent a year in Manchuria observing the fighting between the

Japanese and the Russians. The Japanese victory in 1905 was a shock toEuropeans owing to the contemporary racist attitude that a ‘white man’ willalways defeat other races. Hamilton’s observations, faithfully recorded in hisbook,AStaffOfficer’s ScrapBook, clearly illustrated the Japanese concept ofwarfare and attitudes towards the military and education. In Japan, Hamiltonrealizedthatmistakes,similartothosethathadbeenmadebytheBritishArmyin SouthAfrica, had also been committed by the JapaneseArmy in theirwaragainstRussia.ThereforetheBritishwerenotuniqueintheirfailings.However,attimesitseemsthatHamiltononlysawwhathewantedtosee,butneverthelesshisobservationsareinstructiveandindicatedhowfuturewarsmightbefought.Hamiltonwas impressedwith the so-calledwarrior spirit of the Japanese, a

spiritwhichheconsideredtobeneglectedintheBritisheducationsystemofthedayandthathefearedmighthaveledtoconscriptionintheUK.HamiltoneventriedtoplacetheblameforthemilitaryfailuresinSouthAfricasquarelyontotheheadmasters ofBritish schools in that they tried to educate their pupils ratherthan teach patriotism, as well as failing to encourage them to join the armedservices.Equally,hewascriticalofhowBritishpoliticianswere suspiciousofsuccessfulsoldiersiftheycametooclosetopoliticalinfluence.Hamiltonnoticedthat in the 1880s the Japanese Army had been largely responsible for theeducationsysteminJapan,whilehealsosawthatamajorfailingoftheJapaneseArmy had been a lack of adequate maps of Manchuria, where much of thefightingwas takingplace,whichobliged the Japanese tousecapturedRussianmaps.Hamiltonsawthisasanopportunity torailagainstciviliancriticsof theBritishmilitaryanddemanded that in the future theWarOffice shoulddefenditselfagainstsuchcritics.40BytheendofHamilton’slonglife,surelyhewouldhaveseenthedangerof

militarizedstatesandthatsuccessfulsoldierswhobecomepoliticiansareusuallyquitedangerous.HelivedtoseeJapanenduretwonuclearattacksbeforeitcouldbeinducedtosurrender.Politicalsoldiersdodiffer,astheSupremeCommanderofAlliedArmedForcesinEurope,GeneralDwightEisenhower,servedfortwotermsasPresidentoftheUSAbetween1953and1961.Thereforeanofficercantranslateintoasuccessfuldemocraticpolitician.Whatisdangerousisasocietyinwhich themilitary holds the reins of power, aswas the case of Japan until1945. In the same way, a society which is uncritical of soldiers but blameselected civilian politicians for the failings of a political-military policy, while

treatingeveryservingsoldierasahero,regardlessiftheyareservinginKabulorBordon, is running the risk of not understanding what the military’s properfunctionactuallyis.Hamilton,asaservingofficer intheEdwardianArmyandofaVictorianvintagewasclearlysmartingfromcriticismoftheBritisharmedforces by civilianswhomhe consideredhadnoknowledgeof the armyor therighttocriticizeit.Hamilton’s professional observations of the fighting in the Russo-Japanese

Wararemuchmorevalidandtheregretisthattheyweremoreorlessignoredbetween1905and1914.AttheBattleoftheRiverYalu(30April–1May1904)HamiltonnotedhowtheJapanesehaddugdeepemplacementsfortheartillery;bomb proof shelters were also dug as deep andwell protected, aswere otherpositionsincludingtelephonestationsandammunitiondumps.Atthesametimemost of these positions were linked by trenches connected by telephone, yetremained hidden from theRussians.41 This form ofwarfarewaged from deepdefensivepositionswastobecomealltoofamiliarontheWesternFrontbetween1914and1918.AnincidentontheYaluduringthebattleisworthtellingofanerajustafew

yearsshyofmilitaryaviation;twoboatloadsofJapanesesapperspaddleddowntheriver,perhapsaspartofanexpeditiontosurveytheareabutmorelikelytodrawRussian artillery fire,which they successfullydid. Immediately Japaneseartillery, seventy-two guns and twenty howitzers opened fire and eventuallydestroyed the Russian artillery. Hamilton was not only impressed with the‘sporting’engineersbutalsowiththeJapaneseartillerywhichhadbeencarefullyprepared‘invisibleandinvulnerable’whiletheRussiangunswere‘conspicuousandeverywheremostvulnerable.’42ArtilleryspottingandconcealedgunsweretobecomealargepartofthefightinginEuropebetween1914and1918.Hamilton also took the opportunity to review the tactics which he had

experiencedinhisownwars.Heapprovedoftheinfantrytrenchbecauseashesaid,sincethedisasteratMajubahehadrealizedthevalueofcover.Aninfantrytrenchgaveasoldierwithoutanynaturalcoverachanceforsurvival,whiledeepand well-prepared entrenchments also provided shelter from artillery fire.Furthermore, he made the claim, to the surprise of some of his friends, thatcavalry no longer had a role inwarfare except perhaps asmounted infantry.43IndeedaftertheBattleofLiaoYang,HamiltonsentadespatchbacktoLondonwhich many in the British military establishment would have consideredoutrageousifnotsacrilegiousashewrote that theonly thingthecavalrycoulddointhefaceofmachinegunswas‘tocookricefortheirowninfantry’.44

Hamilton’s observations of the Russo-Japanese War, as he recorded themimmediatelyafterthatwarinatwovolumeworkandthenagainin1912,wereimportant, but his work went largely ignored in senior military circles. Thequestion of horsed cavalrywas to rumble on for nearly forty years in variousguises across Europe. The British Army, unlike the German Army, by theoutbreak of the SecondWorldWar had stopped using horses, but during the1914–1918WarmanyBritishcommandersstillwaitedforanopportunityforthecavalrytobreakthroughenemylines.AsHamiltonpredicted,itwastheuseofarmouredvehiclesthatweretoprovidethevitalbreakoutsinbothworldwars.Hamilton returned to theUK in 1905 and as theworld slid towardswar he

heldthreemoreseniorpostswithintheBritishArmy,allofthemadministrativewhile he remained involved in the reorganization of the Army. Between hisreturnand1909HamiltonwasCommanderofSouthernCommand,alargeareawhich contained Salisbury Plain where he was able to combine infantry andartilleryfiringexercises.In1909HaldaneappointedHamiltonAdjutantGeneral,apostwhichhehelduntil1910.Duringhisshorttenure,Hamiltonspentmuchofhis time trying tobuildup, in theconstrainedconditionsofapeacetimearmy,thecadreswhichwouldbedemandedbytheGeneralStaffduringwartime.Hisfinal post before war broke out in 1914 was that of General OfficerCommanding Mediterranean and Inspector General of Overseas Forces.Hamilton,basedinMalta,travelledtheEmpireinspectingBritishandDominionForceswherehemadepersonalcontactswithpoliticiansandofficerswhichweretobeofgreatimportancetohimoncewarbrokeout.Thesecontactswerealsotoprove tobe invaluablewhenhecommanded theMEFin1915atGallipoliandlaterduringtheinquiryintothisill-fatedventure.By1914Hamiltonwasaveryseniorofficerwhohadseenaction,butat the

sametimehewasanintelligentman,keentolearnthehardlessonsofwarandnot remain moribund in old ways which were either outmoded or had neverworked in the firstplace. InManchuriaHamiltonhadseen the faceofmodernwarfare and he seemed to have been the ideal choice to command anexpeditionary force in the Mediterranean in 1915. However, Hamilton had aweakness,commoninsoldiers:alackofunderstandingoftheguileofcivilianscompared with that of soldiers, and he totally underestimated the ability ofcivilianstogettheirownwayinthepoliticalarena.Thiswastoprovetobehisnemesis.

T

ChapterTwo

WhyGallipoli?

heUnitedKingdomwenttowaragainstGermanyon4August1914andHamiltonwasappointedC-in-CHomeForces.Itcouldbearguedthatwar

came tooquickly forHaldane’s reforms to bed in and that therehadnot beenenough time for a more professional non-political General Staff to establishitselfandbeofuse.Old ideasandattitudes,whichwerenotall totally invalid,werenotgoingtodisappearimmediately.Quitesimply,soldiersstillconsideredthat theyshouldhave the last say inmilitaryaffairs rather thandemocraticallyelectedandaccountablecivilianpoliticians.Thepoliticians,after takingadvicefromtheirservicechiefs,werethentomakeallofthedecisionsconcerningtheconduct of thewar.Aswe shall see, the fact that the changes concerning thecorrectfunctioningoftheBritishGeneralStaffhadnotbeenabletosettleinwasto create problems with conducting the war, especially in the early stages asLord Kitchener, who had been appointed Secretary of State for War at theoutbreak of war, was able to take unilateral decisions with little or noconsultation from colleagues. This was to have a detrimental effect on theGallipolicampaignduring1915.The war was also not going to plan. Initially, the opposing forces had

consideredthatthewarwasgoingtobeswiftandshortindurationandthattheywouldbeineachothers’capitalcitiesbyChristmas1914.Theywereallwrongandbytheendof1914stalematehadsetinandthefrontinFrance,theWesternFront orFlanders,was one inwhich armies faced each other fromentrenchedpositions.Hamiltonhadseensomethingsimilaradecadeearlier inManchuria.The trenches of theWestern Front ran from theNorth Sea coast to theAlps,

whichprecludedanychanceofoutflankingone’sfoeandsoadifferentsolutionhadtobefoundinordertofinishthewar.ThiswasthesubjectofadiscussionoftheBritishWarCabinetheldon1January1915duringwhichevenanoutrightmilitaryamateursuchastheChancelloroftheExchequer,DavidLloydGeorge,wasalivetothefactthattheWesternFrontwasnothingbutastalemateandthatan alternative way needed to be found in order to win the war.1 And so analternative route to victory was sought by both the British and FrenchGovernments.If the Allies (Britain and France) had reached an impasse in the fighting

against the Germany on the Western Front, the same cannot be said aboutoperationsincentralandeasternEuropewheretheGermanswiththeirAustrianallies (the Germans and their allies were known as the Central Powers) weremakinggreatadvances intoImperialRussian territory,notablymodernPoland.The Russian Government sought some relief against the Central Powers’offensive and the allies identified Turkey, another ally of Germany, as theweakestlinkamongsttheCentralPowers.TurkeywasnotasinglestatebutwasthecollectivenamefortheremainsoftheOttomanEmpire,anempirewhichhadpeakedduringthesixteenthcenturyasitconqueredtheBalkans,andduringtheseventeenth century even threatenedViennabeforebeingdefeatedby aPolishArmy.BythebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyithadlostmostofitsEuropeanandNorthAfricanterritories,butstillretainedpossessionsthroughouttheentireMiddleEast, including Iraq.However,as theonlyMoslempower, theTurkishEmpiregreatly influencedMoslemsandanyTurkish successon thebattlefieldagainst Christian countries, notably the UK and France, who both ruled overMoslem territories, as well as being quite heavily reliant on colonialMoslemtroops to hold these possessions. Furthermore, it should be recognized thatreferringtotheTurkishArmyortoTurksdoesnotnecessarilyrefertoTurkeyortoTurksalone,butisusedinthisnarrativeasshorthandformenfromallovertheTurkishEmpire,rangingfromAlbanianstoIraqiswhoservedintheTurkishArmy in 1915; while Turkey in 1915wasmore or less similar in geographictermstotheMiddleEastweknowtodayandisnotthemodernstateofTurkeyalone. It is to thewriter’s and the readers’ advantage thatmost of the eventsbeingrelatedinthisworkdidindeedtakeplacewithinTurkeyitself.Asthewaradvanced, British and French commanders agonized over the question ofwhethertheycouldtrusttheirMoslemtroopsoncepittedagainsttheTurks.TheAllies were always aware that a Turkish victory at Gallipoli might spark aninternational insurrection across theMoslem world against European colonial

ruleinIslamiclands;asituationnotdissimilartothatseentoday.DespitetheperceptionofmanythatTurkeyinfluencedtheMoslemworld, it

had been known since about the mid-nineteenth century as the ‘sick man ofEurope’asitsinfluencewaned.However,despitethis,Turkey,sincetheturnofthetwentiethcentury,enjoyedthepatronageofGermanyandbegantofallunderthat country’s sway. The German influence culminated in the signing of amilitary alliance between the two countries on 2August 1914.An immediaterepercussion of this was that on 3 August 1914, Turkish warships in Britishshipyardswereseizedbytheauthorities.On4August1914theTurkishArmy,underGermanleadership,wasmobilized.2Therewereothermoveswhichwereto further antagonize the Allies. One of the most blatant snubs to BritainoccurredwhenGermanysoldthebattlecruiserGoebentoTurkey.Thiswarship,with the light cruiserBreslau, had been pursued by theBritishMediterraneanFleetacross theeasternMediterranean,butbothvessels safelymade theirwaythroughtheDardanellesStraits,whichstandguardovertheentrancetotheBlackSea, and then made their way to Constantinople, then the Turkish capital.Without doubt this was a disappointing turn of events for the BritishGovernment as the Royal Navy had been advising the TurkishNavy since atleast1912.3On1September1914,displayingpro-Germansympathies,Turkeymobilized

its army in Syria. The fear of Turkish intervention into the war haunted theBritish and FrenchGovernments owing to their imperial possessions inNorthAfricaandAsia,notablyBritishIndiaandEgypt,whiletheFrenchhadconcernsaboutAlgeriaandMorocco.AlloftheseimperialpossessionshadhugeMoslempopulationswhomight supportTurkey inawardue tocommon religious ties.Throughout North Africa, anti-European agitation had been spreading. Justbeforetheoutbreakofwar in1914,anItalianmilitaryforcehadbeendefeatedby rebellious Arabs.4 Religious and national sensitivities were to become afeature of the Gallipoli Campaign, especially as the British feared Turkishattacks against the vital shortcut to India, the Suez Canal. Turkish intentionscontinued to be unclear in the earlymonths of thewar, but clearly somethingwasafootinTurkeywhenthepresenceofagroupofGermanofficerswasnotedthere.5On 30October 1914 the TurkishNavy attacked open Russian ports on the

BlackSeacoast.ThefollowingdayTheTimesassessedtheTurkishmilitary,intheoryandpractice.ItwasreportedthathavinglostbothBalkanWars,1912and1913, the Turkish military no doubt had been humbled and perhaps lacked

confidence,butremainedauseful‘tool’forGermany.ItwasconcededthattheTurk was a ‘good soldier’ and was quite well armed, mainly with Germanequipment. It was thought that the German commander in Turkey,GeneralleutenantOttoLimanvonSandersandhisStaffhadorderedtheattacksontheCrimeanandOdessaareasontheRussianBlackSeacoastlineinordertotry todivertRussian troops to thoseareas. Itwasalsoconsidered thatperhapstherevitalizedTurkishmightdefeattheRussianBlackSeaFleetbeforelandinganexpeditionaryforceintheOdessaregion.6Von Sanders, in his account of his time in Turkey,made two observations

connectedwiththecommentsmadebyTheTimes.Thefirstwasthepitifulstateof theTurkishArmywhenhe first arrived inTurkeyduring1913; the secondwastheneedtoreformthatArmyfromtoptobottom.VonSandersnotonlyhadtoensurethat theTurkishArmywasre-equippedwithmodernarms,paidonaregularbasisratherthantheadhocmethodpreferredbeforehandwhereTurkishtroops might go unpaid for months, if not years, and provided with properuniforms; he also had to attempt to remove the Turkish Officer Corps fromdomesticpolitics.ElementsoftheTurkishArmyhadbeeninvolvedinthe1908YoungTurks’revoltwhichsawtherestorationofthe1876ConstitutionandthebeginningoftheendoftheTurkishEmpire.Inshort,in1913theTurkishArmywasashamblesanditistoVonSanders’creditthathemanagedtomodernizeitsoquicklyandsoeffectivelyby1915.7It is also true that Von Sanders had considered an offensive in the Odessa

regionasheconsideredtheRussianBlackSeaFleettobeweakandinefficient.VonSandershadalsorealizedthat therewerefewRussiantroops in theBlackSea area which could put up resistance to a Turkish attack. However, to thedismayofVonSanders theTurksweremore convinced that an attack againstEgyptwould serve them better.Von Sanders could not understand this, as heconsideredthattheTurkslackedthenecessarymentoundertakesuchamission.HehadahigheropinionoftheBritishwhoinhisopinioncontrolledtheseasandcould easily transfer troops from India toEgypt in order to fend off any suchTurkishattack.HealsoknewthattheobjectofanyoffensiveagainstEgyptwasthe Suez Canal, which was well defended with the most modern artilleryavailableandadequatelysupplied.8On 1 November 1914, Egypt was invaded as Bedouin tribesmen loyal to

Turkey crossed into the frontier into Egypt and onto British territory. On 4November 1914 it was reported that Allied naval squadrons had bombardedTurkish forts along the Dardanelles Straits.9 This seemingly premature action

was partially explained later, during the Dardanelles Inquiry, by WinstonChurchill,whoin1914wasFirstLordoftheAdmiralty.ChurchillinacarefullypreparedanswersaidthattheNovember1914actionhadbeen‘purelynaval’asthe Admiralty were anxious to discover if the Turkish forts were armedwithmodern 15-inch guns. They were indeed, but the Turks did not fire them inresponse to the Allied attack and so the Allies were left as ignorant of theTurkish defences as they had been prior to their bombardment of the Turkishforts.10On 5 November 1914 the Allies declared war on Turkey. By the end of

November 1914 it was reported that 76,000 Turkish troops commanded byDjemalPasha,theTurkishMinisterofMarine,weremarchingagainsttheSuezCanal.TheBritishwere subtle in theirmethodofdefeating this threat to theirinterestsinEgypt.VisuallytheBritishruledEgypt,butlegallythiswasnottrueasEgypthaditsownruler,theKhedive,anEgyptianandaMoslem.TheTurkswerecausingallmannerofmischiefinEgyptastheysoughttostirupdiscontentamongst thenativepopulationbut theBritishfoughtbackusingespionageanddiplomacywhichcauseddifficultyforTurkishintelligenceinEgypt.TheBritishpulledofftwomajorcoups.One,aliteralcoupastheymanagedtoremovethepro-Turkish Khedive and replace himwith Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha whowaspro-BritishandacceptedtheKhediviateandtookthetitle‘SultanofEgypt’.The other blow to theTurkswas that the leader of theSenussi tribe ofLibyadeclined to become involved in an invasion of Egypt.11 These two eventswithoutdoubtconvincedtheBritishGovernmentthatwiththelong-termdeclineof theTurkishEmpire, itwas certain thatTurkeywas theweakest link of theCentralPowersalliance.Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty and therefore fully

responsible for all British naval affairs, was therefore heavily involved in theconcept of the Dardanelles campaign. Delage noted that the spirit behind theDardanelles was indeed Churchill.12 During May 1915, Churchill made thefollowing observation of the situation and how he saw the origins of theDardanellesoperation:‘InthemonthofDecember(1914)thepoliticalsituationinSouth-EasternEuropewasstagnantand torpid,and the immensecurrentsofopinionfavourabletotheAlliedcauseintheBalkansandinItalyflowedslowlyinourfavour,orevenebbed.At thesametimetheRussianGovernmentaskedthe Foreign Office whether some action against Turkey in theMediterraneanwas not possible to relieve pressure in theCaucasus. In consequence of thesecommunicationsfromtheForeignOfficeandtheWarOffice,Ibegantodirect

theattentionoftheFirstSeaLordandothernavaladvisorstothepossibilitiesofaction inTurkishwaters.Noarmywasat that timeavailable, and itwasclearthat naval action alonewas possible.’13 Churchill was probably correct in hisassessmentofthesituationandthepossibilityofAlliednavalattacksdistractingTurkishmilitary efforts away from their campaign againstRussia, butmissioncreep began to set in with thoughts of going beyond the Dardanelles andcapturingtheGallipolipeninsula.Therefore, inanattempt tohelpRussia,plansweredrafted toattackTurkey

viatheDardanelles.ThisareaisanarrowstraitonthesoutherncoastofaslenderslipoflandcalledtheGallipolipeninsula,whichtookitsnamefromthetownofGallipoli, situated at the northern end of the peninsula. Overall, the proposedareaofoperationswasonlyaboutfiftymileslongandatbesttwentymileswide.TheDardanellesStraitsbristledwithgunsandfortsaswellasseamines,bothfloatingandsubmerged.If theGallipolipeninsulacouldbecaptured,theeffectwould have been to split Turkey in two.TheEuropean sidewould have beenisolated fromAsiaticTurkey and therefore unable to receive supplies from itsallies while the capital, Constantinople, would have been left open to Alliedattacks.OncethishadbeenachievedtheremainderoftheTurkishEmpirewouldhave been imperilled owing to British and French colonial territories abuttingTurkishpossessions,whichwouldhavebeenimmediatelyattackedandTurkeyknockedoutofthewar–orsotheidearan.ChurchilltoldtheRussianCommander,GrandDukeNicholasandtheFrench

Admiralty, of the proposed British naval attack on the Dardanelles. Both theRussiansandtheFrenchwere infavourandaskedwhat theycoulddotohelp.The concept of attacking Turkey from the sea drew several comments, all ofthem positive at this juncture. Lord Kitchener considered that a naval attackwouldbeextremelyimportantandthatifsuccessful,itwouldbetheequivalentofanysuccessfulcampaignfoughtbyhisnewarmieswhichhadbeenrecruitedsince the outbreak of war. Equally, he also commented that an unsuccessfulnavaloperationcanbebrokenoffmucheasierthanamilitaryone.Other views included that of the former British Prime Minister, Arthur

Balfour, who not only observed that a successful attack on the Dardanelleswould knockTurkey out of thewar, butwould also give theAllies access toRussianwheat,thusenablingRussiatoexportoncemore.Thiswasanimportantpoint as the Russian economy was failing, as Russia could no longer tradeinternationally due to being virtually blockaded by the Central Powers.Furthermore, an important trade routewould have been reopened toRussia as

the capture of the Black Sea would have reopened a passage to the RiverDanube. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, considered that ‘itwouldfinallysettletheattitudeofBulgariaandthewholeoftheBalkans’while‘theTurkswouldbeparalyzedwithfearif theyheardthatthefortswerebeingdestroyed one by one’.14 Thiswas in reference to the Turkish defensive fortsguardingtheDardanelleswhosenarrowpassagepreventedaneasyentryintotheSeaofMarmara,whichinturnledtotheBlackSeaandtowardsConstantinople.Ifthesentinelfortscouldbedestroyed,thenTurkeywasoutofthewarandtheoperationcompleted.TheassaultontheDardanelleswasconceivedasbeinganavaloneonly;there

was no consideration initially for military support. It was all very similar tocontemporarypoliticianswhooftenconsiderthataerialattacksaresufficienttowin a war despite the evidence which continuously points to the fact thatsoldiers,or‘bootsontheground’,asjournalistsinsist,arealwaysnecessaryforthe taking and holding of territory. As the Dardanelles operation was beingplanned and decided on, therewere already sufficient causes for doubting thesuccessofthecomingoperation.Themainproblemwasthatanoffensiveofthenatureof theDardanelleshadnotbeen triedby theBritish forover ahundredyears.In 1807 a similar attack had failed, but in 1915 it was considered that the

technology of 1807, sail and wind power, were the reasons for this historicfailure.In1915,allshipsweremechanizedandthereforenotatthemercyofthewhimsoftheweather.Itwasconcludedthatnothingcouldgowrongandsofearoffailurewasdismissed.15VanderVatnotesthatChurchillignoredthewisdomofBritain’s greatest naval hero,LordNelson,who after successfully attackingthefortsatCopenhagenin1801declaredsuchacourseofactiontobefolly.Thisadvice was heeded by every British naval officer including those serving in1915, but ignored by Churchill.16 He considered that things hadmoved sinceNelson’sday.At thebeginningof 1915 theBritishgeneral public, as ever,was subject to

somewildinaccurateandspeculativemediareporting.Asalreadydiscussed,bytheendof1914itwasobviousthatthewarontheWesternFrontwasnotgoingtobringaswiftvictoryandsoanothersolutionhadtobefound.WhentheDailyExpress reported, on 2 January 1915, news of the imminent fall ofConstantinople,peoplemusthavebeenverysurprisedandperhaps relieved,asthereportsuggestedthataquickfixforthewarhadbeenfound.17Itisnotclearonwhat evidence this assertionwas based. Two days later theDaily Express

reported panic in Constantinople as the ‘situation’ in the Turkish capitalworsened.18TheBritishpublicwasbeingpreparedforthe‘fact’thatTurkeywouldeasily

falloncethefortsattheDardanellesweredestroyed.ThentheAlliedfleetscouldsail intotheBlackSeaandontoConstantinople,whichwasallegedlyinchaos.Once all of thiswas accomplished theCentralPowers couldbedefeated fromtheEast.HoweversomenewspaperreportsexaggeratedwhatwashappeninginTurkey, asVonSandersmadeno comment onpanic inConstantinople duringJanuary 1915. However, he did admit that at the end of February 1915 theSultan, his Court, the Turkish Treasury with the civil and militaryadministrations,madepreparationstoevacuatetotheAsiansideofTurkey.19The idea that Turkey was the weakest member of the Central Powers was

reinforcedduringFebruary1915followingtheTurkishinvasionofEgyptduringJanuary. The Turks may have reached the Suez Canal by 28 January but theBritish counterattacked and after two days of fighting had defeated the Turkswholost3,000meninthefighting.20LordKitchenerreportedtotheBritishWarCabinet on 19 February 1915 that the Turkswere leaving the Suez area.21 AnavalassaultontheDardanelleswasreportedon22February1915,butwithintwodaysthebombardmentwashaltedduetopoorweather.22ChurchillreportedtotheBritishWarCabinetthattheattackagainsttheDardanellesfortshadbeensuspendedowingtogalesandlowvisibility.23Admiral Sir Sackville Carden, Commander of the Royal Navy at the

Dardanelles, who had planned to systematically destroy the forts as his fleetslowly advanced up the Straits, as well as undertake intensive minesweepingoperations there, reported that the naval bombardment of the forts could onlycontinue in thepresentconditionsatgreatexpense inwastedammunition.TheForeign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, observed that the delay, politically, wasunfortunateandthatheneededtosendconfidentialtelegramstoboththeGreekand Bulgarian Governments giving the reason for the cessation of thebombardment.AtthesametimeheaskedChurchillifanyoftheAlliedshipshadbeenhit,whowasabletoconfirmthatthiswasnotthecase.Allshipsweresafe.Evenso,ChurchillinformedGreyoftherisksthattheAllieshadbeentaking

astheshipshadbeenclosinginontheenemyandattackingthemat10,000yardsandhadusedmedium-rangeshellsratherthanlong-rangeshells.ArthurBalfour,later to succeed Churchill at the Admiralty, asked if the Royal Navy hadsufficient ammunition and would the ships’ guns wear out? Churchill replied

that theNavywaswell stockedwith28,000roundsofheavygunammunition,while the question of the guns had been carefully considered, which rathersuggestedintonethattheyremainedingoodworkingorder.24However,itwouldseemthatChurchillwasbeingeconomicalwiththetruthin

his answers to the British War Cabinet as Air Vice Marshal Sir GeoffreyBromet,asayoungnavalairman,clearlyrecallsinhisdiaryforFebruary1915.Of19February1915hewrotethatat5pm,HMSVengeancewithdrewfromthebombardment ofTurkish forts at theDardanelles as did twoFrenchwarships.Theshipsseemedtohavebeenreceivingmorethantheyhadgivenor inotherwordsfirefromtheTurkishfortswasinflictingmoredamageontheshipsthantheyweremanagingagainsttheforts.Equally,itmustbeconcededthatBrometalsowrotethat‘theTurkishbatteriescontinuedrightonuntilduskbutfrom5:10pmwhenInflexibleandAgamemnonjoinedforce,they(theTurks)weregettingitveryhotandIimaginemanygunswereputoutofaction.AfterdusktheAlliedfleet returned to Tenedos Island and anchored.’ Bromet recorded that badweatherpreventedanyfurtherattacksontheouterfortsandstrongwindslastedforsixdays.Later,on25February1915, therewasa furtherbombardmentbytheAlliedfleet,buttheseawastooroughforseaplanes(whichheflewnodoubtforthepurposeofspottingfornavalguns)andacknowledgedthatthisdaywasa‘black day in the history ofTurkey’ asmany of their fortswere destroyed byAlliednavalgunfire.25SomeofthefortswerenotdestroyedbynavalgunfireandsopartiesofRoyal

Marines were landed in order to complete their demolition. Indeed it wasconsidered that the landingsof theMarinedemolitionparties especially on25February1915 suggested that if a largermilitary forcehadbeenavailable, theGallipoli peninsula could well have been occupied by Allied forces duringFebruary1915.26E.J.Evans,anavalPettyOfficerStoker,servingonHMSJeddin1915,inaninterviewwiththeBritishhistorianPeterLiddleduringMay1974,wasclear thatwhenhis shipbombarded fortsatKumKale,demolitionpartieshadtobelandedtocompletethedestructionofthefortsthere.27Another sailor, Engine RoomArtificer, Arthur Bramham, serving on HMS

Canapus, reported in his journal that Marine landing parties destroyed fiveTurkish forts on 27February 1915.28RearAdmiralHughT.England,who in1915 was the Captain of HMS Chelmer, in a letter said that if the militaryexpeditionhadbeenreadyby25February1915,thepeninsulacouldhavebeentaken ‘fairly quickly’.He also noted that between 26 February and 18March

1915,Turkishgunneryimproveddaily.Ithadbegunwithbeing‘hopelesslywildand inaccurate’ and by midMarch 1915 had ‘greatly improved’.29 18March1915 is significant as it was the date of the failedmajor naval assault of theDardanellesfortsbytheAlliedfleetswhichsawseveralshipssunkordamaged.Therefore, themen ‘on thespot’werequiteclearasearlyasFebruary1915

thatmilitary actionwasnecessary to successfully seize theGallipoli peninsulaand knock Turkey out of the war. However, the British War Cabinet onlydiscussed for the first time,military action atGallipoli as a possibility, at theWar Cabinet meeting of 24 January 1915. Churchill was asked if suitableprovisionhadbeenmade for transporting troops to theGallipolipeninsula.Hewas able to answer positively and clearly stated that arrangements had beenmade for embarkingmen of 29thDivision, a force of some 40,000men fromEgypt,aswellasforthemovementoftheRND.Afurtherquestionwasasked;apolitical one. Which was more important, the Dardanelles or Mesopotamia(modernIraq),whichwasthenpartoftheTurkishEmpire.Balfourprovidedtheanswerthat if theDardanelleswasnottaken,veryseriousconsequenceswouldhavetobefacedupto.30Thereappearedtobenoargument.Nomatterwhat,theDardanellesStraitsandtheGallipolipeninsulahadtobecaptured,butthenavalactionofFebruary1915hadalreadyalertedtheTurksandtheirGermanadvisorstowheretheAlliesweremostlikelytotrytoland.The question ofmilitary involvement according to Hamilton’s nephewwas

one of politics, as efforts were being made to induce Greece to declare waragainstTurkey and itwas suggested that a showof force by theAllies in theBalkansmighthavesomeeffect in thismatter.31However, thiswouldseemtodilute the purpose of the operation and divert it from the original offensiveagainstTurkey.ThechangeinemphasiswasnotedbyBalfourinamemorandumwhichhesubmittedtotheCommitteeofImperialDefenceon24February1915.He wrote ‘Only one further observation would I make which points in thedirectionofnotbeingniggardlyasregardsthenumberoftroopswesendortheirquality.Weareallagreedthat,whateverelse isdone, theBosphorusoperationmustbecarriedthroughtoasuccessfultermination.ThismayinvolveapitchedbattlewithTurkishtroopsintheneighbourhoodofConstantinople;andasfarasIcangatherfromourlastdiscussion,wehavenoverypreciseinformationastothenumberandqualityoftheTurkishtroopswithwhich,insuchcircumstances,wemighthavetodeal.Evidentlywemustworkwithamplemargins,forachecktheremightamounttodisaster.’32ThiswasthefirsthintthattheoperationattheDardanelles might well end in fiasco as Balfour, even though he was not a

militaryman,wasalreadyof theopinion thatnotenoughdetailor thoughthadbeenputintotheproposedoperation.TheproblemfortheBritishGovernmentin1915wasthatitsmilitarystrength

lay with its navy; the British Empire was a thalassocracy or maritime worldpower.33ThereformsoftheBritishmilitaryhadfailedtoestablishanarmylargeenoughtofightawaroutsideofitsimperialbordersi.e.aso-called‘ContinentalArmy’.Owingtoalongstandingaversiontoconscription,atleastinpeacetime,theBritishArmyin1915waswhollyreliantonvolunteers,manyofwhichcamefromtheparttimereserve,theTerritorialArmyestablishedin1908aspartoftheHaldaneReforms.EventhoughattheoutbreakofwarrecruitingofficesfortheBritishArmywere floodedwith volunteers, until 1916when conscriptionwasfinally implemented in theUK, the lackofmanpowerwasaperennialconcernfortheBritishArmy.The Dardanelles operations were to suffer a distinct lack of sufficient

manpower despite drawing on troops from Australia and New Zealand (theANZAC force) aswell as Indian troops transferred fromEgypt.Bothof thesecasesthrewupproblemsoftheirown,notablyAustraliantroopswhoparticularlydislikedwhat they sawaspaternalisticBritish commandand leadership,whilethe British in so many ways despite considering the Australians to be goodfighters often saw them as a rabble with poor discipline. Indeed, GeneralBirdwood,onbeingappointedCommanderofANZAC,wroteinaletterofthemenunder his command.He informed J.E. Pearson, the recipient of the letterthatthesoldierswere‘magnificentmen’butwithlittletrainingordiscipline.HeconsideredthatjuniorofficersandNCOswerethemostdifficultastheyhadnodiscipline themselvesandhadno ideaofhowtoenforcediscipline.Overallheconsidered that the men were ‘full of enthusiasm’ but only a very smallpercentagewereprofessionalsoldiers.34AriotintheCairoredlightarea,HaretAl Wassir on Good Friday, 2 April 1915, which saw ANZAC troops,predominately Australian, run amuck, firing buildings, looting and attackingcivilians,didnothingtoenhancetheAustralians’reputationfordiscipline.Thisincident is often referred to as the Battle of the Wasser (there are variousspellingsof this) andwas finallyputdownwithgreatdifficultyby theBritishMilitaryPolice.35Thereareclaimsandcounter-claimsoflossoflifeduringthisincident.However,thelocalMoslempopulationmusthaveseenthisasevidenceof the barbaric behaviour of Christians, especially given the history of theCrusadersseveralcenturiesearlier.Therefore,notonlywasthereaquestionoverEuropeanattitudestowardsthe

local population, but also the entire matter of deploying non-Moslem troopsfrom British India against the Turks, meant that Moslem troops were left toguard Egypt. Egyptians were on the whole Moslems, and seethed withdiscontent against British influence if not outright rule, despite having anEgyptianSultanwhowasinrealityaBritishpuppet.Overall,theBritishwereina very poor position as theywere unable to feel safe in their use ofMoslemtroops,nomatterwhereintheMiddleEasttheyweredeployed.TheBritish, in their contemplationof anopposed landingon enemy shores,

weredoingsoforthefirst timeinoveracentury.Thismeantthat thelandingsweregoingtobesomewhatperilous,notonlybecauseofenemyoppositionbutalso because of the obvious lack of experience in carrying out an amphibiouslanding.Balfourhadalreadyhintedatadistinctlackofpreparation.LieutenantColonelCharlesJerrammadetheobservationinhisunpublishedautobiographythat theBritish in1915hadnot foughtanavalaction for threegenerations, assailorsandmarineshadbeenusedforlandoperations.36Hamiltonhadcertainlybeenawitness to this inSouthAfrica.According toa recentcommentator thecriteriaforanysuccessfulamphibiouslandingconsistsofmanycrucialelements,not all of them military or naval. This includes having a good and thereforelegitimatereasonformakinganysuchlandinginthefirstplace.Furthermore,anoperation of this nature should be sound, possess unambiguous political andstrategic direction, as well as having well trained and suitably equipped landforces. Equally, joint Staff procedures should bewell practisedwith a carefulselection of officers for key appointments as well as adequate weaponry,munitions, thorough attention to logistics, reliable intelligence based on theavailability of good maps, complete reconnaissance, accurate assessment ofenemycapabilitiesbasedongathered intelligence,agoodunderstandingof thelocal geography, both land and sea, andhow thismight affect the outcomeofany landings in that area. In the context of the Dardanelles and the Gallipolilandings most of the above criteria was ignored. Hamilton, once he tookcommand of the MEF, found that he was operating under quite severeconstraints.37Lord Kitchener had already forbidden extended operations on the Asiatic

shore of the Turkish mainland other than a diversionary landing. The RoyalNavyalsoopposedany landingatBulair,where theGallipolipeninsulawasatits most narrow. This was extremely unfortunate as Von Sanders identifiedBulair as having been quite vulnerable and at this point of the peninsulawasonlyfivetosevenkilometreswide.IfBulairhadbeencaptured,theAllieswould

haveimmediatelyrealizedtheirobjectiveastheentireareawouldhavebeencutoff from the rest ofTurkey.38However, themost tellingmistake of the entirecampaign was the lack of political direction and purpose, especially aspoliticians refused to listen to professional military advice. Even so, the twobranches of the British armed services, the Army and the Royal Navy, weredivided in their counsel, especially at the Admiralty where Churchill and hisNaval Chief, Lord ‘Jackie’ Fisher were at loggerheads. Eventually it was allchange at theAdmiralty as bothmen resigned their posts before theGallipolicampaignhadbeenplayedout.39At the War Office, General Wolfe-Murray (CIGS) who should have been

privytoalldecisionsrelatingtotheprogressofthewarwasoverawedbyLordKitchenerwhoasSecretaryofStateforWarfounditalltooeasytomarginalizehim.Aspinall-OglanderwasoftheopinionthatKitchenerthoughtsolittleoftheGeneralStaffand theirabilities towin thewar thathedidnotconfide in themandsomadeunilateraldecisions.Thiswas tobecomeamajorproblemfor theDardanelles as it was further away fromKitchener than France and could beignoredthatmucheasier.40Furthermore,theWOandtheAdmiraltyworkedasseparateentitieswithnojointcommandatthehighestlevels,whileatapoliticallevel none of the British Cabinet understood both naval and militaryoperations.41ChurchillhadservedintheBritishArmyandwasconversantwithnaval procedure but lacked the discipline and patience to oversee a difficultoperation such as theGallipoli offensive became.Hickey observes that itwasonlyHamilton,a‘consummatediplomat’,whowasabletomaintainharmoniousrelationsbetweentheArmyandtheNavyaswellaswiththeFrench.42Attacks on the Dardanelles forts resumed at the beginning ofMarch 1915.

This time theAllies found thatTurkishresistancewasmuchstiffer than ithadbeen during February. From the War Diary of HMS Queen Elizabeth it isquickly learnt that operations ran into difficulties as on 4 March 1915approximately 300Marines were landed to destroy Forts 1 and 4 with HMSQueen Elizabeth giving covering fire. Despite this, the Marines ran intodeterminedoppositionfromTurkishtroopsintheruinedvillageofSedd-el-BahrandatYeniKeni.Twenty-fiveMarineswerereportedaskilledormissingwhileafurthertwenty-threehadbeenwounded.Theship’sdiarynotedthatitwasverydifficult to extract the Marines from the area of operations and back to theBritishfleet.43Afurtherproblemfor theAlliedfleetswasseamines.On15March1915it

was logged thatminesweeping by night wasmore or less impossible. At thistime civilian volunteers, operating from trawlers under naval command, wereresponsible for mine sweeping day and night, but after 18 March 1915 thenocturnalrolewastakenoverbytheRoyalNavy.Thiswasbecauseofthehighcasualty rate endured by what were essentially fishermen trying to fulfil anoperational task by night in converted trawlers. Midshipman A.G. Buchananwrote that trawlersbeingusedasminesweepers thatentered theDardanellesatnighthadencountered‘hotfire’andsufferedagreatnumberofcasualties.44A note made on 18 March 1915 was that since the previous Allied

bombardmentof 8March1915, theTurkshadmade extensivepreparations tomeet anAllied invasion.All of theminarets at Chanak,which theAllies hadused as aiming posts on 8 March, had been pulled down by the Turks, thusdenying theAlliesauseful referencepointwhenranging theirguns.When theRoyalNavyattacked theTurkish fortson18March1915,at first the fortsdidnot reply, but later began counter-shelling using notably howitzers and fieldartillery, firing fromboth sidesof theDardanelles aswell as fromguns in theforts. It was recorded that HMS Inflexible received the worse of this fire ashowitzershellssettheship’sforebridgealight,whilemoreTurkishhitsagainstthe vesselmade further artillery spotting by Inflexible impossible.45However,whatisimportantabouteventsattheDardanelleson18March1915wasmadeinanAmericanreportwhichnotedthatonlyFortHamidiewasmannedentirelyby Germans, the others were crewed by Turks. The author also wrote of 18March 1915 ‘I am convinced that both the German and Turkish officers feelconfidentthatthefleetwillnotbeabletoforcetheDardanellesalone.TheysaythatthemaximumnumberofshipsthatcanmanoeuvreintheStraitsatthesametime,werethereonMarch18th.’46SirGeoffreyBromet, in his diary, noted that operations on theDardanelles

ceasedfrom19March1915until24March1915owingtoagaleblowingfromthesouth-west.Later,on26March1915while flyinganaerial reconnaissancemissionat3,000feetwithgoodvisibility,henotedthatForts13,16.17,19and20 remained virtually intact.47 Clearly the Allied naval bombardments of theTurkish forts were not having the desired results. Another Dardanelles navalveteranV.Froggit,servingonHMSLordNelsonalsokeptadiaryoftheshellingofTurkishfortsbytheRoyalNavy.Froggitreportedon4March1915thatHMSLordNelson’s 9.2-inch fired at intervals using ‘common shell’ trying to coverlandingparties.Thisprovedtobeveryeffectiveandleftafortonfire.Froggit’sship’s landing party returned safely after demolishing a fort, while others

returnedwith casualties – twodead and fivewounded.During7March1915,LordNelsonhelpedtoattackmoreTurkishforts,butaswithotherAlliedshipsoperating in theDardanelles area,LordNelsonwas hit by enemy artillery butcontinued to attack forts directly at a range of 14,000 yards. After an initialreturnoffire,bothfortsblewupastheirammunitionmagazinesexploded.LordNelson was hit eight times by shellfire in this engagement and suffered threemenwounded.FroggitgaveanaccountofamuchmoresubstantialAlliedattackonTurkish

fortson17March1915.Thisassaultbeganat08:30hoursandlasteduntil19:30hours, but was costly for the Royal Navy, as by the end of the day HMSIrresistible had run aground and had to be towed off by HMSOcean, whichstruckamineandsunk.TheFrenchalsolostashipwhenitblewup,anotherwasdisabledandranaground,whileInflexiblecompletedthedaybyhittingamine.48Lord Alastair Graham, also serving on HMS Lord Nelson, noted in hisreminiscences of theDardanelles, that after 18March 1915 it was decided toabandon the ideaof adirectnaval assault on theDardanellesusing shipsonlyandthedecisionwasmadetobringtheArmyin.49The period 17–18March 1915was critical in the narrative of theGallipoli

campaign, as Hamilton suggested to Admiral D’Amade in 1917, during theDardanelles Enquiry. Hamiltonwrote that theGallipoli campaignwould havebeensuccessfuliftheMEFhadbeenreadytolandon19March1915,afterthenaval attacks against the Turks on the previous day.50 Indeed HamiltontelegraphedtoKitcheneron19March1915andsaid‘Ihavenotyetreceivedanyreport on the naval action but from what I actually saw of the extraordinarygallantry yesterday I ambeingmost reluctantly driven towards the conclusionthat theDardanellesare less likely tobeforcedbybattleships thanatonetimeseemed probable and that if theArmy is to participate, its operationswill notassumethesubsidiaryformanticipated.TheArmy’ssharewillnotbeacaseoflandingpartiesforthedestructionoffortsetc,butratheracaseofdeliberateandprogressive military operation carried out in force in order to make good thepassage of the Navy.’51 Kitchener replied immediately ‘You knowmy viewsthat the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced, and that if large militaryoperations on theGallipoli by theArmy are necessary to clear theway, thoseoperationsmustbeundertakenaftercarefulconsiderationofthelocaldefences,andmustbecarriedthrough.’52Two days earlier, 17 March 1915, there had been a conference on HMS

QueenElizabeth.TheBritishnavalcommander,AdmiraldeRobeck,explainedthat thepresentpositionwasthat theGallipolipeninsulaandall landingplaceshad been strongly entrenched by the Turks, while enemy field guns andhowitzers (the howitzers were located on the Asiatic side of the Straits)combined together andhamperedAlliedminesweepingoperations.DeRobecknotedthatminesweepingwasprogressingveryslowly;iftheTurkishminefieldscouldbecleared thenAllied submarineswouldbe able tooperate andpreventenemyreinforcementsgettingtothepeninsula.However,healsoaddedthatthesubmarineswouldalsoneedsupplying,whichmeant that thepeninsulaneededseizingandoccupying.DeRobeckinformedtheconferencethattheheavynavalgunfire was only temporarily silencing Turkish guns, but was not destroyingthemandthatonlytenpercentoftheenemy’sgunswereunserviceable.53Therefore it was quite clear that by 17 March 1915 even the Royal Navy

considered that the Army had to be landed in order to seize the Gallipolipeninsula,butthequestionwaswhereandhow?‘Why’wasalreadyagreedon.Itwasobviousthateventscouldnotcontinueastheyhadpreviouslyasitwasbythen very clear that theAllied fleet alone could not push itsway through theDardanellesStraits.AsignalsenttoHamiltonbydeRobeckechoedthewordsofFroggit,eventhoughFroggitgetsthedateswrongashewrote17March1915;the following happened on 18March 1915.DeRobeck toldHamilton that 18March 1915 had been a disastrous day owing to floating mines or torpedoeslaunched from shore tubes and fired at long-range. HMS Irresistible and theFrench vesselBouvet had been sunk by enemy action. HMSOcean was justaboutafloatbut‘probablylost’,whileaswehavealreadyseen,HMSInflexiblehadbeendamagedbyamine.AnotherFrenchwarship,Gaulois,hadbeenbadlydamagedbyartilleryfire.54The sinking of Bouvet was particularly dramatic as it sunk within thirty

seconds, stern first.Out of a crew of 700men only twenty-onewere saved.55E.L.Berthon,servingonHMSQueenElizabeth,inhisdiariesof1915faithfullyrecorded the operations at the Dardanelles; 18 March 1915 was to be nodifferent.OfthesinkingofBouvetBerthonwrotethatitwashitinitsmagazine,listed to starboard and then sank by the stern. He also recorded that onIrresistible,eightyofficersandmenwerekilledwhile Inflexiblewashitbelowthewaterlineandwas leftwithahole twentyfeethighandfourteenfeetwide.Forty-threemendrownedinthisincident.On28March1915Berthonremarkedthatlong-rangebombardmentwas‘notverydestructivetoforts’.56The Dardanelles Commission later, while considering the evidence of the

DardanellesExpedition,notedthatperhapsifthenavalassaultof18March1915hadbeensupportedbytroops,theresultinglandingsmighthavebeensuccessful.ThisideawasfavouredbyChurchillandwassupportedbyAsquith,theBritishPrimeMinisterandbyBalfour.However,suchlandingswereabandonedowingtooppositionbyboththeArmyandtheNavy.GeneralBirdwoodwishedto‘landatonce’,butHamilton–eventhoughheconsidered‘thattherewasagreatdealtobesaidforit’–failedtosupporthimashestillheldthatKitchener’sordersnot to land if it could be avoided were still to be obeyed. Later, the Turkishleader,EnverPasha,wasreportedtohavesaid‘IftheEnglishhadonlyhadthecourage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles they could have got toConstantinople, but their delay enabled us to thoroughly fortify the Peninsula,wehadtimetotakedownthereover200AustrianSkodaguns.’57In an interview in 1979 Charles Smith, who had servedwith the RNAS at

Gallipoli,saidthatTurkishprisonersdidnotunderstandwhytheAlliesfailedtocontinueshellingon18March1915.Furthermore,theTurkshadfullyexpectedinfantry to land as there was nothing to prevent the Allies from going rightthrough theDardanelles.58 This sentimentwas echoed by another veteran,M.Parker Buchanan, who during 1975 wrote his account of the Dardanelles.Buchanan’s personal opinionwas that the 18March 1915 attack should havebeenpressedhome.HeconsideredthattheDardanellescouldhavebeenseized,but theAllieswouldhavehad to endurehuge losses inmenandequipment.59ThiswastobethetaleoftheGallipolicampaign:astoryofmissedchancesandlost opportunities as the risks were not taken up and so an expedition waseventuallylostandawarprolonged.

G

ChapterThree

ABadlyLaunchedOperation

eneralSirIanHamiltonwasthefirstcriticoftheDardanellesoperation.Hewaswellawareoftheperceivedfailureofthe18March1915assault

against the Turkish forts along the shores of the Dardanelles, but was stillsurprised, even if he had an inkling that he might be sent to the EasternMediterraneanbyLordKitchener.OnceHamiltonwas toldon12March1915thathewastocommandamilitaryforcewhichasbeingsenttotheDardanelles,hecouldalreadyseethatitwasbeinghastilyandbadlyprepared.Hehadbeenina similar situation during the Second BoerWar when he was sent out on anoperationbyKitchenerwiththesamelackofpreparation,butthattimeHamiltonknewtheTransvaal,theoperationareawellandcouldanticipatewhatmightormight not happen. TheDardanelleswas a far different prospect andHamiltonwroteinhisdiary‘butmyknowledgeoftheDardanelleswasnil;oftheTurknil;of the strengthofourown forcesnext tonil’.1However,Hamilton alsowrotethat‘havingenteredontheprojectoftakingConstantinopletherecanbenoideaofabandoningthescheme.Itwillrequiretime,patienceandmethodicalplansofco-operationbetweenthenavalandmilitarycommanders.Theessentialpointisto avoid a fiasco which will jeopardize our chances of strategic and politicalsuccess.’2Past experience had taught Hamilton that Kitchener considered that having

given his orders, he expected the officer receiving them to set about his task.Later, as theGallipoli offensive finallyunravelled into failure andbecame thesubjectofaninquiry,itwassaidthatKitchenerwasbynatureverysecretiveandkeptpaperworktoaminimum,eventelegramsbetweenhimselfandHamilton.3ThislackofformalitymadeitmucheasiertocondemnHamilton’sgeneralshipat Gallipoli as he could provide little evidence to defend himself, while

Kitchenerwasbeyondquestioningandreproach,havingdrownedatseaduring1916whenhisship,HMSHampshire,onwhichhewassailingtoRussia,struckamineandsunk.Hisbodywasneverrecoveredandhediedahero’sdeath.ThisleftHamiltonmoreorlessdefencelessattheGallipoliInquiryasKitchenerandhismemorywerebeyondnegativecriticismat thetime.AsCallwellremarked,part of the problem was that Kitchener was dead.4 Callwell’s testimony wascrucial because as Hamilton said to Winston Churchill, Callwell not onlyhabituallyworkedwithKitchenerattheWarCouncil,butalsoinhisroomwhere‘all these matters (Gallipoli) were discussed’. Hamilton considered that ifCallwellspokeagainsthimandChurchill,itwouldbedisastrous.5However,atthetimeofreceivinghisordersfortheDardanelles,Hamiltondid

decide to request more details from Kitchener. As he had expected, initiallyKitchener was quite short and abrasive in his replies, but with a littleencouragementfromHamiltonbegantofillinthedetail.Hamiltonlearntofthenumbers involved; about 80,000 men were to be sent to Gallipoli of which50,000werefightingtroops;therestwouldbesupplyandsupport.Hamiltonalsolearntofthetroopshewouldbecommanding.TherewastobeanAustralianandNewZealandcontingent (ANZAC–Australian&NewZealandArmyCorps),30,000 in strength, commandedbyGeneralSirWilliamBirdwood, a friendofHamilton; the29thDivision,ofabout19,000menandcommandedbyGeneralAylmerHunter-Weston,andtheRNDunderthecommandofMajor-GeneralSirArchibaldParis.Hamiltonwasquite enthusiastic about themartial qualitiesofthese formations and he also noted that there was a French contingent of anuncertainstrengthunderthecommandofhisfriend,GeneralAlbertd’Amade.6Kitchenermade it very clear during this informal briefing that there was a

major problem regarding the deployment of the 29th Division in the EasternMediterranean. The idea was that a solid and successful operation in theDardanelleswouldseducethewaveringBalkanstates intojoiningtheAllies inthewar against theCentral Powers and perhaps finish itmuch quicker than itseemed possible in 1915. However, not everybody agreed with this idea andsuggestedthat29thDivisionwouldbebetterdeployedontheWesternFront.AsKitchenerobserved,thereweresomeatGHQinFrancewhosincerelybelievedthat if theGermanswerepushed fiftymiles eastward, back towardsGermany,the war would be over. These people seemed to Kitchener to be opposed toanythingwhichsuggestedmodernityandsowereopposedtoanylandingsattheDardanelles which they considered to be a huge risk. Those against theDardanelles venture fought ‘tooth and nail’ for 29th Division to be sent to

FranceandnottoGallipoli.7Thiswasthebeginningofthe‘western’versus‘eastern’schoolsofthoughtof

wherethewarcouldbewon–inEuropeorintheEastbyknockingTurkeyoutof the war. Kitchener made it very clear to Hamilton just how strongly the‘westerners’feltinatwopointobservation:that29thDivisionwasonloanandhadtobereturnedattheearliestopportunityandthatallthingssenttotheEastwere considered ‘by powerful interests at home and in France as being stolenfromtheWest’.8ThiswastheimmediateproblemfacingHamilton,asfromhisfirstbriefingfor theDardanelleshewasmadeaware thathewouldbefightingforeverymanneededandforeverypieceofequipmentnecessaryforthesuccessoftheGallipolicampaign.Therefore, from the very outset the Dardanelles campaign was not one

universallyembracedbytheBritishmilitaryestablishment,whichhadnaileditscoloursfirmlytothemastofthe‘westernschool’.Furthermore,Major-GeneralWalter Braithwaite, Hamilton’s Chief-of-Staff (COS) noted that such was therapidityofHamilton’sdeployment to theEasternMediterranean that times fortrainstothesouthofFranceinordertogetashiptotheEastwerewrittenonascrapofpaper.9Therewasclearlynotimeforatypedupscheduleoftrainsfromthe UK to Marseilles. A further note should be added that Hamilton, in hisrecordofmeetingwithKitchener regarding theDardanelles landingwrote thatKitchenercalledintohisofficetheChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff,GeneralWolfe-Murray and the Inspector of Home Forces, General ArchibaldMurray.Neithermanhadheardoftheproject;theywereleftquitespeechlessonhearingof the impending operation againstTurkey.10 Thiswas howKitchener ran theWarOffice;heneverfoundtheneedtoinformothersaroundhim,evenmilitaryofficersof impendingorcurrentoperations,andkeptall such information toaminimum. Mark Urban observes that Kitchener considered every detail ofoperations tobe a secretwhichwas inkeepingwith the spymaniawhichhadinfected the UK in years before war broke out in 1914.11 Hamilton knew ofKitchener’swaysandhowtodealwiththem,butevenso,hugegapsremainedinthe Allied knowledge of Turkey and its capabilities and Kitchener had donenothingtoupdatemilitaryintelligenceconnectedtotheDardanelles.Inthisfirstinformalmeeting,Kitchener revealed furtherhisattitude towards theoperationwhenBraithwaitesuggestedthattheoffensiveshouldbesupportedbyuptodateaircraft to ensureAllied air superiority in this fairly small area of operations.Kitchenerwasterseinhisreply:‘Notone.’12

Interestingly, even though Hamilton claimed not to have had any priorknowledgeoftheDardanellesexpeditionandhisroletobeplayedinit,twodaysearlier,10March1915,hewrotealettertoWinstonChurchill,inwhichhesaidthathehadmetKitchenerregardingtheDardanelles.Hamiltonwrotethisline;‘Ihavenoinstructionsyet,noStaff,butImeantobeofftoMarseillesassoonaspossible. For this I feel myself everlasting in your debt.’13 Therefore we areconfronted with a slight editing of events in Hamilton’s diary, while heacknowledges Churchill’s influence as First Lord at the Admiralty. It is clearthat Hamilton was aware that something was afoot, but he was probably notcertainofwheretheoperationalareamightbe,buthedoesconfirmtheslapdashnatureoftheplanning.Hamiltonalsocontributedtowardsthehaphazardnatureof theoperationashe setout for theMediterraneanon13March, twenty-fourhours after his meeting with Kitchener. He had originally wanted to goimmediately;Kitchenerwanted him to stay his hand for another twoweeks.14DespiteHamilton’sapparenthaste toget to the theatreofoperations it isquiteclear that very little had been put into place by either Kitchener or the WarOfficeforsuchanexpedition.ItwastobeuptoHamiltontodothebestthathecould with the troops he had available so perhaps he had been wise in hisdecisionstoleaveLondonandbeginpreparationsfortheinvasionofTurkeybyat leastbeing inplaceandawareofwhatheactuallyhad in thewayof troopsandequipmentratherthanahypotheticalestimation.OnceHamiltonnearedtheDardanellesonHMSPhaetontheenormityofthe

taskandthelackofitspreparationbegantodawnonhim.InalettertoKitchenerdated 18 March 1915, Hamilton advised him of the reality of the Gallipolipeninsula as he inspected its north-western coast and even though hewas notactuallyonlandbutstillonboardship,itwasobvioustoHamiltonthattherewasaworldofdifferencebetweenthepeninsularmapsbackattheWOandwhathecouldactuallyseeashesteamedtowardsit.ItshouldalsobenotedthatinaWOpublication,Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, printed in1913,Chapter4remindedthereaderoftheimportanceofgoodreconnaissancebeforeundertakinganysuchoperations.ThiswasclearlyignoredbytheBritishauthorities,especiallyKitchenerin1915,andsobypage16ofthispublicationitwasclearthattheDardanellesoffensivewasdoomed.15In his communication of 18March 1915 toKitchener,Hamiltonwrote that

once in situ,Gallipoli ‘looks amuch toughernut to crack than it didover themapinmyroom’.Hethenwentontodetailthenew,improvedTurkishdefencesat Gallipoli. Hamilton reported the new lines of trenches and the number of

concealed guns (whichmust have been estimates if theywere concealed) andjusthowrapidlyallofthishaddevelopedsincehehadseenthemapsearlierinthe month at the WO. Hamilton also observed that a further mistake in theplanning had been that it had considered the area between Cape Helles andCrithiatobeclearoftheenemy.HamiltonreportedtoKitchenerthatAdmiraldeRobeckhadtoldhimthattherewerelargenumbersofenemytroopsinthatarea,whichwerehiddeninthenaturalfoldsoftheground.Itwasalsosuspectedthatanumberofenemyartillerybatterieswerealsointhesamearea.AbombardmentbyHMSQueenElizabethhadflushedoutabout5,000enemysoldiersfromtheCapeHelles area rightup to theBulair lines,but this initialpanichadpassed.NowintheestimationofHamiltonthesetroopshadreturnedowingtoGermanleadership andwere now better entrenched ‘scientifically’ as Hamilton put it,with‘telephonesetcthroughout’.AtthispointevenHamiltonstillhopedthatanavalbombardmentalonewouldbesufficienttocapturetheGallipolipeninsula,but did consider that if amilitary offensivewas required, it would be a slowcampaignproceeding‘bitbybit’.16ThereforebeforeasingleBritishsoldierhadsetfootontotheGallipolipeninsula,Hamiltonhadalreadydismissedtheideaofa grand and swift push through the area complete with a rapid Turkishcapitulation.ItwouldseemthattheTurksdidtakeadvantageoftheBritishdelayinlanding

in the Dardanelles and furthered their defences. In an interview during July1972,GeneralOlanBeri(TurkishArmyretiredandGallipoliveteran)saidthatbetween26Februaryand18March1915,everydaytheBritishtriedtoentertheDardanellesandcapturetheStraits.TheTurkishtacticduringthisperiodwastorelocate their artillery batteries, especially howitzers, every night. Theconsequence was that each morning the British would have to discover oncemore where the Turkish artillery was located, before being fired on from anunexpectedquarter.However,GeneralBericlaimed that in theperiodbetween18Marchand25April,theTurkstooklittleadvantageofthistimetoreinforcetheirpositionsatGallipoli.TheTurkshadbeenexpectingtheBritishtolandonthepeninsula,butinforce,asitwouldhavebeendifficultforthemtooccupythearea without deploying large numbers of men.17 General Beri’s observationsaboutthenumbersheconsideredtobedeployedtosuccessfullyinvadeandholdthe Gallipoli peninsula are telling, once the Allied failure at Gallipoli isconsidered. Beri also confirms the amount of military advice the Turks werereceivingfromGermanadvisors,whohadarrivedinTurkeyninemonthspriorto the landings, and that the Turkish Army had quickly benefited from their

presence.18Hamilton had already confided in his diary, his fears about the coming

operationashe travelledsoutheastwardbytrainandboat towardswhatwouldeventually prove to be his nemesis.On 15March 1915, once he had boardedHMSPhaetonatMarseilles,hetriedtorecallwhatKitchenerhadactuallysaidinthebriefingbackinLondon.Onethingthatstoodoutinhisrecollectionofthemeetingwasthatthemilitaryweretobe‘stringNumber2’astheNavywasstillcertainthatitwascapableoftakingtheDardanellesunassisted.TheArmywastoremainoutofsightandtheBritishWarCabinetdidnotwanttohearfromituntil it had sailed through the Straits. Hamilton confined his critique of theDardanellesoffensivetohisdiaryashedarenotgoelsewherewithit,andit isquitedamning.Overall,HamiltonwasextremelyunhappywiththelackofscopeandlimitedpoliticalsupportfortheentireventureagainstTurkey.TheroleoftheAlliedmilitaryaswehavealreadyseenwassecondaryinthe

planning of the offensive against Turkey. Kitchener, even though he was aservingsoldier,alsomadeHamilton’staskmoredifficultinliterallydenyinghimroomformanoeuvreasheforbadeoperations,beyondfeints,along theAsiaticsideoftheDardanelles.ItwasquiteclearoncetheMEFbegantoarriveinthetheatreofoperationsthatlittlethoughtorplanninghadgoneintothecampaignandthatitwasagameofwaitandsee;mainlytowaitandseeiftheAlliedfleetcould force theStraits, andwhether themilitary be needed in anymeaningfulway.19HamiltonruefullyrecalledthatonlyadecadeearliertherehadbeenplansforanamphibiousassaultonConstantinople,butwhenhisStaffwenttolookforgenuine and realistic military intelligence in order to try and organize asuccessful landing, there was nothing except a text book and another of atraveller’s tales and nothing else. As Hamilton wrote, Constantinople and theBosphorusmightaswellhavebeenonthemoon.Hehadnothingtoworkon,butasHamiltonnoted,theBritishGeneralistheproductofanimprovisingnation.20And so once Hamilton arrived in the Dardanelles he could see clearly thatplanning at Horse Guards had counted for nothing, as everything he sawopposing him had not been seen or calculated, and so an improvising BritishGeneralhadtosetto,andworkoutwhatcouldrealisticallybedonewithwhathehad available.The first thing thatHamilton noticedwas that theTurkish fortswerefarmoreformidablethanhehadbeenledtobelieve.AmajorproblemforHamiltonwasthatanyoperationagainsttheDardanelles

hadbeenbroadcastfollowingthenavalattacksagainstthefortsalongtheStraits.Thishadledtodefensiveimprovementsbeingmade,underGermansupervision,

whichhadexceededallofthecalculationsmadebytheAllieswhohadassumedthattheTurkswouldberesponsiblefortheirowndefencesandhadnotforeseentheGermanleadinthismatter.TheBritishcouldonlyadmirethepositioningoftheTurkishtrenchesandwonderatthenumberoffieldgunsavailablebythentotheTurks.IndeedthenumberofgunsavailabletotheenemyhadrisensincetheAllieshadfirstventuredintotheStraits.21InatelegramtoKitchener,Hamiltonremarked on the use ofmobile searchlights by the enemy andwrote ‘Germanthoroughness isevident inallpreparations’.22God forbid that theTurksmighthave been able to do something for themselves!The increasing use ofmobilefieldartillery,especiallyconcealedbatteriesalongtheDardanelles,suggestedaremovalbytheTurksfrombeingreliantonthestaticandvulnerablefortswhichguarded the Straits from attack and so presented theAllieswith an additionalproblemtoconsiderintheirplannedoperation.Admiral de Robeck told Hamilton that at the time of the first naval

bombardmentofthefortson19FebruaryhebelievedthattheAlliescouldhavemoved5,000troopsupfromCapeHellestotheBulairlines.Hamiltonhowever,wrote in his diary that ordinary sailors did not agree with their Admiral andthought that this was impossible. However, this is irrelevant in many waysbecauseassoonastheAlliedfleetattackedtheenemyforts,theTurkswereputon alert and took necessary precautions to repel a full landing from the sea.23AfterlookingathisproposedareaofoperationsitwasnotlongbeforeHamiltonbegan to fret about the lack of organization and what it really meant to be‘second string’ to the navy in the Eastern Mediterranean and to the westernschoolofthoughtregardingtheobjectivesofthewar.Beforehehadfiredashotin the Mediterranean, Hamilton was beseeching Kitchener to ensure thatmunitions,especiallyshellsforhowitzers,willbeinplentifulsupply,readyfortheDardanellescampaign.ByMay1915,howitzersweredesperatelyneededastheirhighangledelevationsallowedforshellstobefiredupandoverridgesanddroppingontoTurkslurkingbehindthem.24HamiltonobservedthathisnearestsupplybasewasAlexandria,Egypt,whilstsuppliesfortheWesternFrontintheworst case scenario couldbe in the front linewithin twenty-four hours.Egyptwasseveraldayssailingawayandeverythingneededtobeloadedandunloadedfromdocksidetodocksidebeforebeingtransported,probablybyhorseormule,to thefrontlines.Theproximityofsupplyof theWesternFrontcomparedwiththatoftheDardanellesmadeHamiltonconsiderthatheevenhadamoralrighttocalluponadditionalsuppliesofmunitions.25

Hamilton, towards the end of March 1915, also set about acquainting theChiefof the ImperialGeneralStaff (CIGS),GeneralSir JamesWolfeMurray,withtherealityofthesituationattheDardanelles.InalettertoWolfeMurray,Hamilton, despite Wolfe Murray being privy to communications sent toKitchenerbyHamilton, informedhimthateverythingwhichwasconsideredtobeinorderbackat theWOinLondonwasmoreor lesswrong.Evenafterhis‘hasty reconnaissanceof the front’and theseasaround it, itwasnecessary forHamiltontoconsiderthateverythinghadtoberearrangedasthejudgementsinLondonhadbeentoosimplisticandquiteinappropriatefortheconditionsbeingfound on the ground or at sea. Hamilton remained upbeat about the comingoffensive,butsubject tofine-tuningandalterationsbyhimandhisStaff in thetheatreofoperations.26Hamilton’smotivationforwritingtoWolfeMurraywasthathedidnottrust

Kitchener to fully appraise his CIGS of the entire situation in the EasternMediterraneanaswasinkeepingwithKitchener’ssecretanddeviousnature.Itbecamequiteobviouslater,justbeforetheGallipolilandings,thatHamiltonwasgetting quite angry with some of the appointments made by Kitchener toHamilton’s Staff. Hamilton was disappointed that his preferred choice ofartillery commander was replaced by another. Hamilton confided in WolfeMurray thathe suspected that the replacementofficer,who inhisopinionwasquite inferior, had influence, and sowas able to joinHamilton’sStaff.At thistimeHamiltonwas railing against the overall picture of junior liaison officerstryingtogetpromotedtopositionsoverandabovetheirtrueabilities.27AsHamiltonwas trying toworkout justhowhewas toattack theGallipoli

peninsula,hecomplainedtoChurchill’sPrivateSecretary,EddieMarsh,thathisseniorcommanderssawtoomanydifficultiesastimeforthemtolandbegantodrawcloser,andtriedtosuggestspecialschemesoftheirown.ToHamilton,itseemedthatmanyof thecommandershadforgottenwhathehadbeenchargedwith,andconsideredthathehadsomespecialformoflicencetodoashewishedinTurkeyratherthanthejobhehadbeentaskedtodo,whichwastogetthefleetthroughtheDardanelles.28Andthatwastheproblem:thereweretoomanyideasaboutwhattodo,whileonlyHamiltonremainedfocussedonthetaskinhand–theonlyone–getthefleetthroughtheDardanellesStraitsbyeliminatingenemyartillery along the Straits, whether they were static forts or mobile artillerybatteries.Theplanningfor the landingsatGallipoliwasconsidered throughoutMarch

1915,afterHamiltonhadreachedthetheatreofoperations,andcouldappreciate

asbesthecouldthroughatelescope,theproblemswhichlayahead.AtleasthewasnotdoingsofromanoutofdatemapinremoteLondon.Aswehavealreadyseen,AdmiraldeRobeckveryearlyonhadexplained toHamiltonmostof theproblems which faced the Allies at Gallipoli. This included the fact that thenaval bombardments were having little effect and that Turkish artillery waspreventing effective minesweeping, and so denying the Allies the ability todeploysubmarinesuntiltheminefieldhadbeencleared.ThishadclearlygivenHamiltonsomethingtothinkaboutasheconsideredhis

optionsofwhereandhowhewasgoingtolandhisforcefortheseizingoftheGallipoli peninsula. A document dated 23 March 1915 illustrates the optionsavailabletoHamiltonandthebeginningofaplanforthecomingoffensive.Fivepossible landingplaceswere identified:Gulf ofXeros (BaklaBay)SuvlaBayandthesouthofNibrunesiPoint,NorthofKabaTepe(totheFisherman’sHut),SouthofKabaTepe,CapeHellesandMortoBay.Thiswasnarroweddowntotwolandingsiteswithathirdactingasapossiblediversion.Thetwoapparentlyfirm favourites, CapeHelles withMorto Bay and an offensive north of KabaTepe,carriedtheobjectiveoftroopsreachingandtakingtheKilidBahrplateau.ItwasalsosuggestedthatinordertodistracttheTurksitwouldbeagoodideatosendaforcetotheGulfofXeros(BaklaBay)asadiversion.Anoteinpencil,possibly inHamilton’shand,suggested thatassaultsshouldbenorthandsouth(Kaba Tepe – it is not specified) and Fisherman’s Hut should be carried outsimultaneously.29Major-General Hunter-Weston, Officer Commanding (OC) 29th Division,

alsowrotehisassessmentof thecomingcampaign.Heopenedwithapoliticalanalysisofthesituationandpurposeoftheoperation,whichwastoconvincetheBalkan states to join the Allies in the war against Germany. A successfulcampaignagainstTurkey,whichwouldhavehadtheeffectofbreakingTurkeyand its empire, complete with the ‘annihilation’ of the Germans in Turkishservice and the capture ofConstantinople,without doubt according toHunter-WestonwouldhaveconvincedtheBalkanstatestosupporttheAllies.However,an unsuccessful landing inHunter-Weston’s viewwould certainly convince atleast Bulgaria to come into the war against the Allies, as ‘a Turco-GermansuccessclosetothemwouldimpressthemmorethanamuchlargersuccessonthepartoftheAlliesinadistanttheatreofwar’.Hunter-Weston was also concerned about the concealed enemy artillery

batteries, as his experienceof theWesternFront had ledhim to conclude thatknockingoutsuchemplacementswasimpossible.Hunter-Westonreflectedthat

itwouldhavebeenfarbetteriftheoperationhadremainedasecretandthattherehadbeennonaval bombardments and that the first that theTurksknewaboutlandings onGallipoliwaswhenAllied troops landed. Then he considered theoperation might have a chance. Hunter-Weston noted that prior to thebombardments, littledefensiveworkhadbeencarriedout in theGallipoliarea,but afterwards ‘big guns had been brought from Chatalja, Adrianople andelsewhere–roadshadbeenmade–heavymovablearmamentsprovided–troopsandmachinegunshadbeenpouredintothepeninsula–severallinesoftrencheshad been dug – every landing place had been entrenched andmined, and thatclever German officers under Von der Goltz (FieldMarshal Colmar Von derGoltz–GermanmilitaryadvisortotheTurkishSultan,MehmedV)candesign,andhardworkingdiggers like theTurkscancarryout,hasbeendone tomakethe Peninsula impregnable.’ However, Hunter-Weston’s conclusion was that‘there is a reasonable probability of success’.30At least the report ended on anoteofprobablesuccess,but its tonewasnegative,basedonHunter-Weston’sexperienceofthepresentconflict,butmorevalidthanthemusingsofKitchenerand the sights held through Hamilton’s telescope. Hunter-Weston’sconsiderations about the political implications of the Allies’ offensive againstTurkeywere echoed in the diary ofHMSQueenElizabeth in an entry for 15Aprilwhichreadthatthelossofshipson18March1915wassaidtohavemadea ‘very bad impression’ and any reverses inGallipoliwould have a ‘very badeffect’inalloftheBalkanstates.31Nevertheless, Hamilton continued in planning the operation, and the first

order of the operation was issued on 13 April 1915. It was straightforward,concerninghowinfantrywastobeturnedoutonthedayofthelanding,andhowmuch ammunitionwas to be carriedwith their rations.Therewas informationabout piers on ‘Z’ and ‘W’ (landing) beaches aswell as the establishment ofcasualtyclearingstationsonthosebeaches.Informationaboutwatersupplywasplentiful.32ForceOrderNo.4gavemoredetailofhowtheoperationwastobecarriedout.Possibly toheadoffallaircraftbeingshotatbyBritish infantry, itwasmadequiteclearthatnoaircraftwastobefiredatduringoperationsunlessthey bore a black cross, which identified it as a German aircraft, or was‘committing hostile acts’. An interesting detail was that British sailors andmarineswhowerepartof thebeachpartiesorservingotherwiseon landwere,withoutexception, towearkhaki.Navalofficersandratingsemployedonboatdutieswerenottodoso.Therefore,itwasassumedthatanybodyencounteredonlandwearingbluenavaluniformwastobepresumedtobeaspy.33

Theorder regardingaircraft is interestingas infantryofallcoloursandhuestended to loose off at aircraft, while one can only assume that the BritishconsideredthattheTurkshadnoaircraftoftheirown.Thequestionofwearingkhakionlandwasimportant,asspieswerefoundontheAlliedoccupiedbeachesaswe shall see later.Therefore, itwasanecessaryprecaution to insiston thisrelatively simplemeasure to prevent infiltration of the beaches by the enemy.Indeed theactivitiesofGermanspieshadbeen reported inTheTimes just twoweeks before the landings atGallipoli.34 It should also be noted that once theGallipolilandingshadbegun,atleastoneTurkishsniperwearinganAustralianuniformwasdiscoveredononeofthelandingbeaches.35The timing of the landings was another source of disagreement between

KitchenerandHamilton.ThiswasrecalledduringtheDardanellesCommission,the inquiry into the campaign held during 1916 and 1917 in an attempt todiscoverwhytheoffensivehadfailed.AcabledraftedbyKitchenertoHamiltonread ‘I am informed you consider the 14thApril (1915) as about the date forcommencingmilitaryoperationsif thefleethavenotforcedtheDardanellesbythen. I think that you had better know at once that I consider any suchpostponementasfartoolong,andshouldliketoknowhowsoonyouwillactonshore.’36Sitting inhisofficeatHorseGuards,Kitchenerhadnoideaof therealityof

the Eastern Mediterranean. It was not only military concerns which couldhamperHamilton, nature could aswell in the formof poorweather, as it hadduring the earlier naval campaign against theDardanelles forts.Hamilton hadalreadytoldKitcheneron18March1915thathehadreluctantlyconcludedthattheStraits couldnot be forcedbynaval force alone and that his troopswouldprobablyhave to land.HamiltonwarnedKitchener that theArmy’srolewouldnotbeconfinedtoafewlandingpartiestodestroyforts,butwouldbethatofa‘deliberateandpreparedoperation, carriedout at full strength, soas toopenapassagefortheNavy’.37Therefore,we can see thatHamiltonwas determined not to be bullied into

hurryinghisdecisionofwhenandhowtoland,especiallybyacharactersuchasKitchenerwhowasremoteinsomanyways.AdiaryentrywrittenaboardHMSTalbot confirms that on 5 April 1915 operations at the Dardanelles weresuspended owing to bad weather.38 As the days counted down towards thelandings, Hamilton lamented the delays being encountered owing to badweather.39

CassarhasdescribedKitchener’sguidelines tohavebeen‘naïveandfraughtwithdifficulty’.40ThiswastheproblemforHamilton,asbytrainingandinstincthepreferredtoobeyordersgiventohim,butwhentheyappearedtobevagueorwronghetendedtodohisbesttoobeythem,atleastinthespiritoftheordersgiven,whileusinghiscommonsenseandjudgementandmakingallowancesforthe realitywhich confronted him. Thiswas the case atGallipoli. It should benoted thatKitchener sent an immediate reply toHamilton’s telegramas aboveandacceptedtheneedformilitaryactionaslocalconditionsdictated,butfailedto issue any further guidelines and appeared to wash his hands of the entireenterprise.41 But it was already too late; the mine had been set and the fusealreadyburning.Anexplosionwasabout to rockGallipoli and its shockwavesweretospreadfurtherthananticipated.

T

ChapterFour

FightingandCommand

heplanthatwassobadlyconceivedintheheadandonthemaptablewasput intoactionduring thenightof24–25April1915.Hartobserves that

the Gallipoli Campaign was driven by wishful thinking – led mainly bypoliticiansandpoliticsandnotprofessionaldetachment.1Thisnodoubtistrue,but war is always a case of wishful thinking. Clausewitz noted ‘that war isnothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of othermeans’.2Gallipoliwascertainlyacaseof‘amixtureofothermeans’andsoitisworthlookingatthe‘othermeans’aswellasthepoliticsofthisoperation.Hamilton was nobody’s fool, but was perhaps a bit too intelligent and

sensitivetohavebeenasoldier.Allthesame,aswehaveseen,hehadby1915madea successfulcareer in theBritishArmy.3A failingofHamiltonwas thatwhen he accepted the command of theMEF he was too subservient towardsKitchenerandreluctantto‘kickupafuss’abouttheplanningandsupplyoftheGallipolicampaign.Whenhefinallydidso,itwasinhismemoirsandrathertoolate.4Much ofHamilton’s coyness in his relationshipwithKitchenerwas notthathewasoverawedbytheman,butbythefactthattherewasverylittlepointinarguingwithhim.Aswehave seen,Hamiltondidask for somedetail fromKitchener about theGallipoli campaignwhen hewas first told that hewas tocommand themilitary going there, andwe shall see thatHamilton does arguewithKitcheneraboutre-supplyingandreinforcementsfortheMEF.Buthewasnot strong enough with his arguments. Kitchener was a cold character;geographic distance allowed him to ignore Hamilton’s various requests as hetried to ensure a successful campaign. Broadbent observes that Hamiltonwasoptimistic by nature (perhaps too optimistic); furthermore, Hamilton had nochoice in theappointmentsofhisStaffasKitchenerhadalreadydecidedupon

whowasinandwhowasout.5HamiltonheadedofftowaraboardHMSQueenElizabethsailingtowardsthe

GallipoliPeninsula during the night of 24–25April 1915.At 04:00hours, thevesselbegantoclearherdecksreadyforaction.Fifteenminuteslater, theshipwas cleared and making its way towards the battle. At 04:30, HMS QueenElizabethwasoffSedd-el-Bahrwhereitwas‘allquietandgrey’andcontinuedtowardsGabaTepe.Halfwayalong thecourseforGabaTepe,ataround05:00Hamilton heard heavy firing frombehind them atHelles.He realized that theTurkswere‘puttingupsomefight’.6IndeedtheTurkswerefightingback;itwasnotgoingtosuchawalkoveras

perhapssome inLondonmighthavehoped.TheTurkshadbeenfightingwarswith varyingdegrees of success or otherwise over the previous decade and sowerenoteasilycowed.JackHaywardinaninterviewwiththeBritishhistorian,PeterLiddle,duringJuly1977,saidthatthelandingson25April1915cameasnosurprise to theTurks,asAllied troopcarriershadbeen lyingoffshore fromGallipoli and could clearly be seen by theTurks. Indeed the collier, SSRiverClyde, which was having holes cut into its sides to provide for rapiddisembarkationoftroops,waspositionedveryclosetotheshore.Furthermore,itwas rumoured that the Turks knew the day and ‘zero hour’ of the landingsthankstothetreacheryofaGreekinterpreterworkinginAlliedships,whowaspossiblyaTurkishintelligenceagent.7D.J. Claris, serving on HMS Queen Elizabeth, kept note of what was

happening on 25April. The first parties landed at 04:00. TheAustralians andNewZealanders (ANZAC) landed in silence onZ beach (laterANZACCoverunningfromGabaTepenorthwardstoFisherman’sHut),andrelyingsolelyontheirbayonets,workedtheirwaythroughtheTurkishlinesandbegantoclimbahillbeyondthebeach.Asmallareaofbeachwasleftfortheremainingtroopstolandon.Upto4,000menwerelandedinthirtyminutes.Ybeach(CapeHelles–westside)wasquietand2,000mendisembarkedwithinhalfanhour,whiletherewasheavyfightingonWbeach(CapeHelles–southerntip).TheworstbeachtolandonwasVbeach(eastofWbeach)wheretheDublin

Fusiliers, theMunsterFusiliers,half abattalion from theHampshireRegimentandWestRidingFieldCompanylanded.There,thelandingareawassurroundedby high ground, while thick barbed wire entanglements hampered any rapidprogressup thebeach.Toadd to themisery, the ruinsofnearbySeddelBahrfortwaschockfullofsniperswhoshotdownAlliedsoldiersas theystruggledfromtheirboatsorlightersbringingthemashore.Atdaybreak,scenesofcarnage

wererevealedwithboatsupsidedownandbodies floatingbackandforth.Theseawas fullofdeadandwoundedmen,while in frontofSeddelBahrFort itlookedasiftherewerethousandsofdeadTurkspiledup.Laterittranspiredthattherewereactually400deadTurksatthispositionandmanymorewoundedasaresult of naval gunfire. However, it seemed that the Turkish snipers in andaround the fortwere invisible and they continued to take their toll of landingAlliedtroops.From 15:00, 25April 1915, troops fromW beach at Cape Tekkewho had

been involved in some pretty heavy fighting themselves, began to work theirwaytowardsVbeachandattackitfromFortNo.1(FortEtrugrul).Clariswrotethat the infantry advanced ‘gallantly’ through the barbed wire entanglementswhile under heavy fire. V beach was captured and held during the night andearly hours of 25–26 April 1915. However, the Allied position there wasuntenableandsoAllied troopswere re-embarkedandmoved toWbeach.Thefailed assault on V beach had produced 5,000 casualties, both dead andwounded.OnZbeachitseemedallhadgonewellandtheAustraliansadvancedatfirstlighton25April1915,butfailedto‘digin’orreinforcetheirpositionsonthebeachorbeyondit.TheAustralianshadtoswiftlyreturntowheretheyhadbegun, as they were heavily shelled by concealed Turkish artillery batteries.AlliednavalshipscouldnothelptheAustraliansastheywereunabletoidentifywheretheartilleryfirewascomingfrom.8ThediaryofE.L.Berthon,servingonHMSRacoonatthetimeofthelanding

serves to add more detail to the overall plan of the 25 April 1915 landings.SailingfromTenedoson24April1915,Berthonrecordedthegeneralplanofthecoming operations which was as ever to destroy the forts on the DardanellesStraitsandsecurecontroloftheDardanelles,butforthefirsttimeasacombinedattack by the British Army and the Royal Navy. Themain task of the RoyalNavywastosupportmilitarylandingsandtocontinuetodosountil theArmyhadsecuredbeachheads.Oncethiswasdone,theNavywastoresumeattackingenemy forts along the Dardanelles Straits assisted by the Army. Two mainlandingpointswereidentifiedasGabeTepeandCapeHelles.1stand2ndNavalSquadrons were assigned to support these landings. Warships laid down a‘furious bombardment’ against Turkish trenches above V beach where it wasthoughtthatTurkishinfantrywithmachinegunswerepositioned.BerthonnotedthatatYbeachtheTurkscounterattackedanddrovetheAlliesbacktothebeachwheretheyhadbegunthelandoffensive.9ClearlythingswerenotgoingaswellastheAllieshadhoped.

ThediaryofHMSQueenElizabeth recordedeventsconcerningthelandingsat Gabe Tepe and atW beach (CapeHelles). ANZAC forces landed at GapeTepe,whichwasdescribedasabeachconsistingofaverynarrowstripofsandand about 1,000 yards in length, and proved to be evenmore difficult inland.However,itwasatWbeachwheretherealhorrorshappened.Wbeachwasonly350yardslongandbetweenfifteentofortyyardswidewithdeep,powderysand.This was where 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, commanded by MajorBishop,landed.AssoonastheLancashireFusilierslanded,a‘hurricaneofleadswept over the battalion’. Led by their officers the Fusiliers were reported ashaving ‘literally hurled themselves ashore and fired upon from right, left andcentre,commencedhackingtheirwaythroughthewire.Alonglineofmenwereatoncemowndownasbyascythe,but the remainderwerenot tobedenied.’The courage and determination of the Lancashire Fusiliers was such that by10:00,25April1915,theyhadcapturedthreelinesofenemytrenchesaswellasensuringpossessionofWbeach.TheyalsocapturedHills114and138aspartofanattempttolinkuptheinvasionbeaches.10FlightLieutenantGeoffreyBrometRNVR (RoyalNavyVolunteerReserve)

wasalsoawitnesstothelandingsof25April1915.Brometnotedthatonthatday 20,000 ANZAC troops were landed at Gaba Tepe; approximately 40,000wereputashoreatSedd-el-Bahrand50,000FrenchtroopslandedontheAsiaticside of the peninsula.LieutenantH.P.Gordon recorded that on the day of thelandings, information concerning Turkish strengths (and weaknesses) wasgleaned from three capturedTurkish soldiers.From theprisoners itwas learntthat at Fort Hamedieto there were nine 28.5 cm guns, one of which wasdamaged.ThecapturedTurksclaimedthattheyweretiredofwarandwereonlyfed twice daily onwheat porridge and beans. Furthermore, they had not beenpaid recently. The men were unarmed as they were telephonists and thetelephonesystemintheirareawasbroken.TheyalsoclaimedthatTurkishtroopsonlyhad150roundsofrifleammunitionperman.Brometwroteon27April1915thatonthedayofthelandingsatCapeHelles,

thefirst1,500menashorehaddone‘splendidly’andhadsecuredagoodpositionandthateventually20,000menhadbeenlanded.Muchofthisnumberconsistedofinfantry,17,000innumber,aswellasartillerybringing18-pounderfieldgunsashore.The remainderwereservicepersonalandmedical staff sonecessary toanymilitaryoperation.Later,4.5-inchhowitzersformedintoahorseshoeshapetook post, but overall the terrainwas difficult for the deployment of artillery.TheTurkswerereckonedtobegoodsoldiersbutdidnotlikebayonetfighting.

TheBritishwerebeginningtogetthemeasureoftheirfoeandsomeofhistrickssuchasafterdark,Turksmightcallout‘Don’tshootweareIndian!’–thisruseatfirstworked,butveryquicklyBritishsentrieslearntnottoheedsuchacall.11Lieutenant-Surgeon J.G.T. Taylor, Royal Navy, was also a witness to the

carnageofthelandings.HewrotethatAchiBaba,asmooth-lookingroundedhillwhichrose600feetabovesealevel,butwasfourorfivemilesfromthelandingsiteswasakeypositiontobecapturedbytheAllies.TheheightofAchiBabameantthatitmoreorlessdominatedtheentireGallipolipeninsula.TaylorgivesavividaccountoftheactionfoughtatVbeach.TheSSRiverClyde,underthecommandofCaptainEdwinUnwin,hadbeenconvertedintoaprototypelandingcraftwhichwas tobe runaground, so that soldierscouldbe landedeasierandhopefullydirectlyontothelandingbeachoratleastintoshallowwater.CaptainUnwinwontheVictoriaCrossonVbeachashenotonlytookRiver

Clyde onto the beach under fire, from the fort at Sedd-el-Bahr, but he alsosupervisedthelandingsoftheMunsterRiflesandotherunitstryingtodisembarkfromhisshipundergreatdifficultiesandagainst the‘fiercestopposition’ fromthe enemy.YoungMidshipmenwhowere commanding the small boats takinginfantryontothebeachesandbringingbackcasualties,weredescribedbyTayloras ‘verybraveboys’.Manyof theMidshipmenwereagedbetweenfifteenandseventeenyearsofage.SomehaveclaimedthatsomeoftheMidshipmenwereonlyfourteenyearsofage.12Midshipmen as well as a Petty Officer also wonVictoria Crosses for their

heroicactionsinhelpingCaptainUnwinashetriedtohelptroopsdisembarkforthebeaches.TaylorbeganhismedicalworkonVbeach.Atfirsthispositionwastooclose toTurkishinfantryfireandsoheandhismedicalstationwithdrewalittle distance. However, he could still see the horrific damage being done tobothmenandtheirboats,butashesaid,therewas‘notimeforsightseeing’astherewere‘swarmsofwounded’mainlyfromtheLancashireFusiliersfromWbeachtobetendedto.Tayloraddedthattheywerea‘splendidlot’.13T.C.Traill,in an interview with Peter Liddle during September 1972, recalled eventsconnectedwith the landings fromtheRiverClyde.Traillasserted thatbetweensixty-six per cent and seventy-five per cent of themen running from the shiptowards the beach were hit by enemy fire.14 Captain H. Tate (RN) in aninterviewheldduringApril1974recalledthatatWbeachthewaterwasredwithbloodandthattherewerebodiesallalongthebeach.15Taylorandhiscolleagues,owingto thehugenumberofcasualties,beganto

operate a triage system; treating the seriously wounded, dealing with the lesswounded later and thosewhohadnochanceof livingmadeascomfortableaspossible in their lastmoments.While strugglingwithdressings, injections andgenerally trying to deal with the huge number of non-stop casualties Taylorwrotethatinaddition‘Wewereplaguedbydemandsfromtheofficeofnominalrollsand(for)detailsofthenextofkinandreligionofthemenunderourcare.’He said that very quickly beds available on hospital ships were full and somattresses were laid on decks to accommodate the wounded. He alsocommented that thenurses (sooften forgotten in thenarrativeof theGallipolicampaign)‘didwell’.Taylor’s contempt for the administration and organization of the landings

becomesquiteobviousowingtotheresultofeventsof26April1915.Hewrotethat ‘to our surprise’ about 300–400 wounded men were loaded onto an ex-Royal Mail liner being used as a troopship fresh from landing troops on thebeaches.ItseemedthatasinglemedicalofficerhadbeenconsignedtolookafterthesemenastheyweretakenfromGallipolibacktoAlexandria,Egypt.HewasalsocontemptuousofHamiltonwhomheconsideredtohavebeenremotefromthefighting,havingsetuphisadvancedHQatLemnos,whereheandhisStafflived comfortably in tents near the beach at Kephalo. Taylor concluded hiscriticism and comments by noting that naval doctors had to argue with themilitaryauthoritiesinordertogetbacktothebeachestocareforthewounded.16Clearly resentment was already building against how operations at GallipoliwerebeinghandledbytheBritishHighCommand,whichowingtotheideaofnothavingdoctorsonthebeachesduringtheseconddayofoperationsborderedonthecallous.Therewereotherwitnesses to the landingsof25April 1915.K.S.Muskett,

serving in communications with the Royal Navy and later decorated with theDistinguishedServiceMedal in recognition of his service atGallipoli, left hismemoirsintheformofatypescriptandmanuscript.Muskettrecordedthatunderthecoverofdarknessat03:30hourson25April1915,ANZACwaslandedatGabaTepeandsufferedterribly.Controversially,Muskettclaimedthatthehighcasualty rate was of the ANZAC’s own making writing ‘It seemed, by allaccounts,thatafterbeingpennedupintroopshipssolongthey(ANZACs)gotcompletelyoutofcontrolwhentheygotashore. Ihavebeentoldbysomethatthey even took off their packs and took a trench at bayonet point. Anothersection rushed a trench and as soon as they were inside it was blown up byelectronicallyfiredmines.Theorderwasthenpostedthatnooneinanyaccount

wastooccupyacapturedtrench.’17Muskett’sremarksareindeedcontroversial,butwehavealreadyseenGeneral

Birdwood’sremarksconcerningthelackofdisciplineamongsttheANZACsandtherewasfurtherevidenceofthisasweshallsee.However,astothethrowingoff of equipment there were good reasons for this; ease and rapidity ofmovementwhile the trenches had to be taken in silence, hence the use of thebayonet.Becomingvictimsofabooby-trapped trenchwasa tragicexampleofbeing rookies. However, the difference in how the British considered a warshould be waged, compared with that of noticeably the Australians, was tobecomepartofthenarrativeofhowGeneralSirIanHamiltoncommandedandledoperationsatGallipoliduring1915.Of X beach (Isthmus of Gallipoli) Muskett wrote that the Royal Fusiliers

landed there and did not hang back, but jumped straight into thewaterwhichwaswaist deep and began towade ashore. Just before reaching the beach theFusiliersfixedbayonetsbeforeclimbingaclifffacewhichconfrontedthem,allthetimeunderenemyriflefire.By07:3025April1915thetelephonesystemouttotheshipsfromthebeacheswasupandrunningandsoconstantreportsbeganto come in from the beaches.V beachwas under heavy artillery firewith theinfantrytakinghighcasualtiesincludingthe‘Anson’NavalBrigadeoftheRND.Muskett described the Turks as being ‘filthy and ragged’, straight from thefields;however,fromthepositionsfromwhichtheywereoperating–shrubbery,avillageandafortwhichhadacommandingviewofVbeach–theTurkshadexcellent posts from which to snipe.18 Muskett’s description of the Turkishsoldierswouldsuggestthehastyconscriptionorrecallofreservistsfrompeasantfarmers,butthisshouldnotdetractfromthefactthatsomanyTurkishsoldiersappearedtohavebeenexcellentsharpshooters ifequippedwiththeappropriateequipment, and causedmayhem and bloodshed amongstAllied troops as theytriedtolandonthebeaches.A.H.K.Cobb, servingas aWriter (Clerk)onHMSBacchante, an armoured

cruiser,inhisjournalrecordedthatatmidnight25April1915HMSBacchantearrived at Gaba Tepe, about 800 yards off shore. At 04:30 the ship’s gunsopened fire as Allied troops were beginning to land on the beaches. At thelandingbeachtroopswereconfrontedbyahighhillwithyetanotherbehindit.Ontheridgebetweenthetwohillswasa‘splendid’concealedTurkishbattery,whichburstshrapnel‘absolutelyunmercifully’over troopsas theystruggledtoland.Cobbremarkedthatnavalgunfiresoonendedtheactivitiesofthisbattery’sactivities. By 26 April 1915 thousands of troops had reached the first ridge

whichhadconcealedtheTurkishartillerybatteryanddugin.However,holdingthispositionprovedtobedifficultuntila6-inchhowitzerwaslandedduringthenightof26–27April1915andpositionedbytheAlliedtrenches.Thepresenceof the howitzer providedmuch needed support to the infantry in the trenchesthere.TheANZACCommander,GeneralSirWilliamBirdwood,wasdelightedwith

thecoveringfirefromHMSBacchanteandsentatelegramtotheship’screwinwhichheexpressedhisadmirationfortheirfinefiringwhichBirdwoodclaimed‘hadabsolutelysavedtheirlives’.Evenso,theANZACshadenduredsomeveryheavy casualties that had filled two hospital ships, which had led to othertransportsbeingfittedouttoactasmakeshifthospitalsinadesperateattempttoclear thewounded.Cobb reported that the roar of the heavy (naval) gunswassplendid,buthealsosaidthatBritishaircraftcouldnotlocateanenemyartillerybattery on a further ridge which was ‘causing great havoc’. But the lack ofprogressatGallipoliwasclearlyillustratedbyCobbashewroteofanadvanceofamere800yardsasifithadbeenamajorbreakthrough.ThehiddenTurkishbatterycausedgreatconcernason27AprilCobbreported

that eight ships were firing at a position where it was considered that theconcealed enemy battery was located. He wrote that ‘eight of our ships haveabsolutelyrained12-inchand6-inchshrapnelandcommonshellsonthisbatteryand at the end of it, you can see them firing as happy as ever’. During theforenoongreatquantitiesofTurkishshrapnelshellscontinuedtocausehavoconthelandingbeaches.Atrawlerusedformineclearingwassunkandseveralotherboats damaged. By 28 April 1915 the ships were beginning to run short ofammunition,neverthelesstheshellingofconcealedTurkishbatteriescontinued,butCobb remarked that itwas extremelydifficult to locate such targets.By4May1915theshortageofammunitionforthefleetwassoacutethatAdmiraldeRobeck sent a signalwhich forbade ships to fire their6-inchgunswithouthisexpress permission. This confined HMS Bacchante to using only her muchsmaller 12-pound guns and as Cobb remarked, not much damage could becausedusingthem.OnthesamemorningtherewasanattempttotakeapositionjustsouthofGabaTepeusing120handpickedmenastheArmycouldnotspareany more. This assault was defeated by Turkish snipers. The Army sufferedsevendeadandtwentywoundedduringthisabortiveattack.By the thirdweek ofMay1915 theGallipoli campaign had becomeone of

grindandattrition.Cobbwrotethatthewarwasgetting‘dirtier’ashereported‘TheTurksplayedtheirusualtrickwiththewhiteflag.Undercoverofthisthey

broughtuptheirreserves,butourmenwerereadyandrepulsedthisattackkilling4,000 Turks while our losses were only 60!’ The result of this one-sidedslaughter was an armistice so that the Turks could clear away and bury theirdead.19 This armistice was to become a topic of disagreement after the war,especiallyregardingwhocalledforitandwhy.In his memoirs published nearly fifty years after the Gallipoli landings,

AdmiralJohnGodfreywasscathinginhisobservationsoftheentireoperationatGallipoli.Godfreywouldhavebeenoneof the first to salute the soldierswhostormedthebeacheson25April1915,flingingtheirpacksontothebarbedwireentanglementsinanattempttofindsomepurchaseoverthem,buthewasswifttocondemntheorganisersoftheentireoperation.HemadetheobservationthatGeneral Aylmer Hunter-Weston, Commander of 29th Division and AdmiralRosslynWemyss, the British Naval Commander at Cape Helles on 25 April1915 had both underestimated the strength of the enemyonVbeach, but hadcompletely overlooked the lack of enemy defences on Y beach. Godfreysuggestedthatiftheyhadunderstoodwhatlaybeforethem,perhapsthelandingsmighthavebeensuccessful.Admiral Godfrey was quite clear that Hunter-Weston lost control of the

fightingattheCapeHellesashewasnoteventhere,butwasaspectator‘afloatintheEuryalus’.GodfreyclaimedthatHunter-Weston’sremotelocationledtoalack of mobility, with troops getting stuck on the landing beaches while hisoperationaldecisionswentunchallengedbyseniorcommandersuntilitwastoolate,owingto the thenmilitarydoctrineofnon-interference.20Theideabehindthisprotocolwasto‘preventthechaosofsplitcommandoncefightingbegan’.Many,includingKeyes,thoughtthatHamiltonshouldhaveintervened,buthereitshouldalsobenotedthatthisprotocolalsopreventedHamiltonfromorderingtheRoyalNavytomoveshipsaroundtosupportthemilitary.21ThispracticeofseniorBritishmilitarycommandersnotinterferinginanoperation,eventhoughit was quite clear that subordinate officers had made huge mistakes and anoperation was becoming a disaster, was just what happened at the Gallipolilandings.Hunter-Westonalsohadapoorattitudetowardslifeashewatchedtheoffensive at a safe distance; his attitude was that the ‘young pups’ neededblooding and his time at Gallipoli was marked with the ordering of suicidalfrontalattacks.Later,seniorofficerstriedtogetHunter-Westonremovedwhiletherewasanearstateofmutinyamongstthetroopsunderhiscommandasmenbegantobecomereluctant toadvance.Anexampleof thetypeofadvancethatHunter-Weston ordered was that during June 1915 an advance of 450metres

costtheAllies17,000deadandwounded.TheTurkssuffered40,000deadandwounded.22 The British journalist, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett wrote of Hunter-Westonthathesufferedfroma‘lamentableignoranceofwhatitispossibleforinfantrytoaccomplishinmodernwarfare’.23 ItshouldbenotedthatAshmead-BartlettwasalmostatwarwithHamiltonandhiscommandoverthewaythattheentireGallipolicampaignwasorganizedandhowAshmead-BartlettwasallowedtoreportonitintheBritishpress.24WhenHunter-Westonwasfinallysentbackto theUK, the official line was that hewas sick owing to dysentery, but theAustraliansoldiersgaveadifferentview.ItwasclaimedthatHunter-Westonhada mental breakdown, first recorded 13 July 1915. Later it was reported thatHamiltonhadsaidthatHunter-Westonwasnow‘sufferingverymuchfromhishead’ and had locked himself away, refusing to see anybody. According tosome,thiswasaresultofHunter-Westonhavingseensomanydeadanddyingsoldierswhomhehadorderedtocrossopenlandheavilydefendedbymachineguns.25However, hewas not alone, asGodfreywas also very critical of howHamilton conducted himself during the campaign in as much that he alsoisolatedhimselfintheremoteImbrosHeadquarters,whilehisrelationshipwithKitchener in Godfrey’s opinion was too subservient. As Prior observes,Hamilton inhiscommunications toKitchenerwas ‘uncomplaining,determinedto make the most of what he had, and at the same time mealy-mouthed andhighlydetrimentaltohisarmy.’26AsSecretaryofStateforWar,KitchenercoulddenyHamiltonthenecessary

menandequipmentneededforasuccessfuloperationatGallipoli;hecouldalsoprovideHamiltonwiththenecessitiesforitaswell.AccordingtoGodfrey,asaresult of this, Hamilton suffered from ‘very senior officer veneration’, whichinhibitedhimfromaskingforthereinforcementswhichweresobadlyneededatGallipolibutwerecontinuouslydiverted toFrance.Hamiltonalsodislikedandtherefore avoided sending Kitchener any bad news. Godfrey noted that thelandingsatGallipoliwerebadnewsfromtheveryoutset.27SothequestioniswhatwereHamiltonandhisStaffactuallydoingwhenthe

landingsof25April1915began?ThetruthisthatHamiltonwasappalledbytheevents unfolding atGallipoli. He had never seen anything like it, evenwhilstobserving theRusso-JapaneseWar a decadebefore. In two letters to hiswife,LadyHamilton,heconfidedhismostprivate thoughtsconcerning the landingsandhowithadallgonewrongsoquickly.Asearlyas3May1915hetoldLadyHamilton that ‘My troops are mostly good but poor dears they have been

throughsuchdreadfultimesthattheirstandardsarenotnowwhattheywere.’28Withinaweekhegavehiswifeavisionof the truehorrorof the landingsandhow,despitethebesteffortsofhismen,littlehadbeenachieved.Hewrote‘Ourmen beganwith prodigious rations. Landing under themost terrible of fire inboats - whence they couldmake no reply. Leaping out and breaking throughbarbedwireanddefeatingtheenemy.Insomecases–onlytowedboatloadsofcorpsestotheshore!Thenwehadatoncetoadvanceandtryandgainground,butthemenweresoexhaustedthattheycouldnotmakemuchheadwayandwewerehemmedin.’HamiltonalsocomplainedtoLadyHamiltonthathewasnotreceiving any reinforcements, whilst the Turks had a daily cycle ofreinforcements arriving from all over their empire. Hamilton grimly observedthat within a fortnight British casualties were 12,000 dead and wounded,including450officerswhiletheFrenchhad8,000suchcasualties.29Hamilton tried to tell Kitchener of the facts for the opening days of the

operation. Being fully aware that Kitchener had no idea of the theatre ofoperationsatGallipoli,hemadereferencetoanactionfoughtduringtheSecondAnglo-BoerWar atColenso on 15December 1899.He toldKitchener that topicture the scene at Gallipoli he needed to imagine that the River Tugela atColenso was the sea; reduce the scale of that battle slightly but ‘fill all theamphitheatre with pom-poms, machine guns, galleries, subterranean passages,barbedwiresandpitfalls–youmayhavesomesortofanidea.Insteadof,asatColenso, entering in battle formation, these poor devils entered in boats!’Hamilton toldKitchener thatmany of the boats arrived at the beaches full ofdead troopsbut this didnot deter others, andhementioned thebraveryof theLancashire Fusiliers whose first wave landing at W beach, as we have seenearlierinthiswork,wereallkilledasHamiltonwroteseventymen‘bowledovertoaman’.Thoseleftbehind,hewrote,didnothesitatebutwithfixedbayonetsleaptfromtheirboatsandmadefortheleftandrighthandsidesoftheclifftobescaled.TheLancashireFusilierspassed throughpassages in the enemybarbedwire,whichtheyhadalreadybeenwarnedwasprobablymined.Itwasnot,andtheLancashireFusilierswereabletogettothecliffs.OfVbeachHamiltonsaidthat they (landing British troops) had been held up all day and that now heappreciated the problems there. Previously Hamilton admitted he had onlylookedatthebeachthroughatelescopeatadistanceofamileandadmittedthatthis was ‘a very different thing’. After a landing had been attempted on thebeach, Hamilton realized that objectives he had ordered to be executed there‘simplydidnotseemhumanlypossible’.30

This was a clear admission of Hamilton’s, his Staff’s and Intelligence’sfailingswhentheywereconsideringtheoffensiveagainstVbeachandorderingits capture and the takingof objectives beyond thebeach.However,Hamiltonwas able to remain positive when he came to mention the conduct of theAustralians.Hewrote that they had arrived a little late, at dawn, and that theTurkswererunning,fixingtheirbayonets,downtothelandingbeachwheretheAustralians were to land. Two Australians were killed immediately, but insilencetheremainingAustralianswithfixedbayonetsleaptoutoftheirboatsandcounterattacked the enemy. The Australians drove the Turks from the beach,capturedTurkishtrenchesandwerealmostuptheSariBairRidge(KocacimenTepe:Hill971)whichrosetoaheightof971feetbeforetheenemyhadpropertimetorecoverfromtheirsurprise.Two days later, after recovering themselves, the Turks counterattacked and

drovetheAustraliansbacktotheirstartingpointonthebeach.HamiltonwroteoftheAustralians(andNewZealanders)‘Also,thanktheLord,theAustraliansandNewZealanderswho,aftertheirfirstsplendiddash,reactedworsethanevenourownmen,haverecoveredmuchfaster–infact,ImaysayIthinkthatthesetroops are every bit as good now as they were at the first start.’31 However,HamiltonwasgoodatputtingaglossonhisreportstoKitchenerasatthetopofthisparticularcommunicationheprefaceditwiththeremark‘Waterisaworry;weatherisananxiety.’32Oh,sotypicallyEnglish!Withindays,HamiltonbegantorealizethattheTurkswerefarfrombeinga

wild disorganized mob, but were in fact disciplined and methodical. Heattributedthis to the influenceofGermanmilitaryofficersandadvisors,whichhad been modernizing the Turkish Army since 1913. This was a worryingdevelopment for the Allies. Hamilton noted that the Turks were able toeffectivelycounterattackeven‘afteraprettyseverehandling’.AgainHamiltonsaw this as a result of the influence of German officers. However, Hamiltonexpressed a desire to break the Turkish will to resist as ‘This high strungdiscipline cannot be natural to the Turkish character.’33 This provides aninteresting insight to the thinkingof a seniorBritishofficerof that timeandaliberaloneatthat.Hamilton’s idea of trying to wear the Turks down very quickly ran into

trouble as the British and the French both began to run seriously short ofammunition,whiletheTurksseemedtohavenoendofammunition.TheBritishartillery was rationed to two rounds per day per gun except in the case ofrepellinganenemyattack.TheFrenchhadgot throughanamazingamountof

ammunition until being brought into check with the appointment of GeneralGouroud. However, they were still positively reckless in their firing off ofammunitioncomparedwiththeBritish.Hamiltonwasfrustratedwithwhatseemedtohavebeentheenemy’sendless

supplyofammunition.InareporttoKitchenerhewrotethatduringthepreviousweekinasingletwenty-fourhourperiodtheTurkshadfired1,000,000roundsofsmallarmsammunitionatANZAC;andinadditiontothatfiredattheBritishfurther south from the ANZAC position. Hamilton reported that AdmiralThursbyhadcounted240shellsfallingintenminutesontoAustraliantrenches.On18May1915fiftyheavyshellsincludingnine12-inchand14-inchshellshaddropped onto Australian positions. However, it was noticed that shells fromTurkishfieldartillerywerebeginningtobeofaninferiorproduction.34BynotingwhatheconsideredtobeaworseninginTurkishmunitionsupplies,

HamiltonwasasevertryingtofinishonacheerynoteastheBritishammunitionsituationatGallipoliwasbecomingcritical.ForceOrderNo.11dated13May1915 revealed the seriousness of the situation. The use of artillery was to becarefully regulatedwith 18-pounder and 60-pounder guns only being used for‘themaintenanceofpositionandretaliation’.Gunnersweredirectedtouselesseffective15-poundergunsratherthanthe18-poundersinordertotrytopreservedwindlingstocksofammunition.Theuseof6-inchand4.5-inchhowitzerswasequallyregulatedandasaruleitwassuggestedthatsuchpiecesshouldonlybeused in co-operation with the infantry in ‘a definite tactical exercise’. Theshortageofartilleryshellswasunderlinedinthedirective:‘Incaseofattackbythe enemy the expenditure can only be governed by the one principle of theamountnecessary todefeat theattack,butevenatsucha time thenecessityofeconomy should never be lost sight of.’35 Clearly not a good position for aninvadingforcemaroonedonenemybeachestofinditselfin.InletterstoGeneralWolfe-Murray(CIGS)Hamiltonwasmoreopenthanhe

wasinhiscorrespondencewithKitchener.Hamiltondidnotdoubtthecalibreofhistroopsbutdespairedofthenatureofdefensivewarfarewhichhismenfacedas they tried to advance through ‘successive lines of entrenchments andredoubts,mannedbymachinegunsandveryscientificallyechelonedonebehindthe other, constitute an extraordinarily difficult problem, especially when theattackmustbe,andcanonlybe,frontalwithoutscopeformanoeuvre’.Theonlyalternative toa frontalassault seemed tobeamphibious landingparties,butasHamiltonwrote ‘But everybodyhashadabellyfulof that– the riskof a totalwipeoutofeverybody ismore thanhumanfleshandbloodcanstand twice in

shortsuccession.’36Clearlythebutcher’sbillbeingpaidatGallipoliwasalreadygettingHamilton

down.A fewdays earlierHamiltonhad informedKitchener that theANZACshad suffered 700 casualties on 2May 1915 ‘straightening out the left of theirline’.37 Twoweeks later Hamilton requestedmore troops in order to advanceabout1,000yardssoastogetoffthebeachesandawayfromtheenemyshelling.However,Hamiltonconcededthathewonderedwherehemightputthesetroops.At the same time he requested more artillery ammunition, especially highexplosiveshells(HE).38Hamiltonhadwatchedthelandingsfromadistanceandeverythinglookedas

ifitwasgoingtoplan.FromHamilton’svantagepointmenassmallasantswereadvancing, climbing, digging and consolidating their positions. It seemedas iftherehadbeenlittleornoenemyopposition.HamiltonwassoontolearnthatallwasnotgoingwellastheNavalBeachmasteronWbeachstatedthatthefightingtherewas‘verydangerousandbloody’.FromtheconningtowerofHMSQueenElizabethHamiltonsawthe tragedyof theRiverClydeas troopsdisembarkingfrom that ship, often up to their necks in water and trying to make for thebeaches were mown down by heavy Turkish fire. Both he and CommodoreRogerKeyeswerehorrified.Keyes told Hamilton that he ‘simply could not bear it’. Hamilton said that

even thoughhehad faceddeathasayoungsoldierand itwasnowthe turnoftheseyoungmen,whathesawwas‘Monstrous; toocold-blooded;likelookingonatgladiatorsfromthedresscircle.’OnceitwasestablishedthatBritishtroopshadnotventuredvery farup thebeach,HMSQueenElizabeth opened fireonTurkish targetswithher batteries of 6-inchguns.SSRiverClyde also advisedwhere to fire, depending on which direction she was fired at from the shore.However,itwasbecomingverycleartoHamiltonthatthelandingsonVbeachhadstalledandthathismenwerepinneddown,unabletomovebackorforwardowingtothemurderousTurkishfire.Achangeofplanwascalledfor.ItwasKeyeswho suggested that troopswhowere yet to land onV beach,

which was the vast majority of those assigned to that beach, should bereallocated to another beach.Keyes’ suggestionwas that the troops should belandedatYbeach,where therewasnoenemyopposition,and thenmake theirwayoverlandtoVbeach.InthiswaytheforcecouldgivemoreassistancetotheadvanceguardtrappedonVbeachthanbytryingtolanddirectlyontothebeachandruntheriskofalsobecomingtrapped,assumingthattheyevenmadeittothebeach.Furthermore,BritishtroopscomingfromYbeachwouldhavebeenina

betterpositiontocutoffanyTurkishretreatfromtheareaaroundVbeach.However,HamiltonwastodemurtothestifferelementsonhisownStaffas

General Walter Braithwaite reminded Hamilton that it was unorthodox for aseniorofficertointerferewiththeplansofanotherevenifhewasjuniorinrankandmakingahashoftheentireoffensive.Suchwasthethinkingatthetime,andasGeneralHunter-WestonwasExecutiveCommanderoftheSouthernflankoftheinvasion,Hamiltonaskedhimratherthanorderedhimtosendtheremainingmen to Y beach. Hunter-Weston ignored Hamilton’s signal and as Hamiltonobserved in his diary, things were not getting better and he knew that it wasmore than likely that the situation would only get worse. Hamilton sent hissignal again and demanded thatHunter-Weston acknowledge it. This time thesignalwasanswered,butnegativelyasHunter-Westoncravenlypassedthebuckonto the Navy and claimed ‘AdmiralWemyss and Principal Naval TransportOfficerstate that to interferewithpresentarrangementsand try to landmenat‘Y’Beachwilldelaydisembarkation.’39Thiswas justwhatHamiltonwas trying toprevent; disembarkinganymore

menontoVbeach,butinsteadhebowedtoapeculiarmilitaryconventionratherthan boldly sacking Hunter-Weston on the spot and taking command ifnecessary,andsomoreliveswerelostunnecessarily.40Hamiltonregrettedtryingto land on V beach. Afterwards he realized that such a landing had beenunnecessaryasthelandingsatbeachesSandYcouldhaveoutflankedthetargetofV beach, Sedd-el-Bahr fort, and attacked it from the rear and so prevent aTurkish withdrawal from that area. At noon, Hamilton was apprised of thesituation in and around theRiver Clyde by a young naval officer, LieutenantSmith,whohadcometogetmoreammunitionforthemachinegunsontheRiverClyde.HetoldHamiltonthatthesituationtherewas‘awful’.ThisreportalarmedHamiltonasheconsideredSmith tobea levelheadedandcalmyoungofficerwhowasonhis‘mettle’tomakeanunemotionalandprofessionalreporttothemost senior officer in the area, but still described the situation as ‘awful’.Hamilton heard out Smith’s report of the situation on V beach, which was‘ringedwithfire’.SmithtoldHamiltonthatnavalgunfirewashavinglittleeffecton theTurksandmightaswellbe ‘confetti’whencomparedwith the fire thatRiverClydewasreceivingnotonlyfromriflesat100yardsrangebutalsopom-poms and field guns. The River Clyde, using its battery of machine gunsmountedinherbows,gavesomecoverfortroopsalreadyonthebeachbutwhowerepinneddownbehindasandbank.Messengersreportedthatthewaterintheareawasredwithblood.41

ThetragedyatVbeachwasintotalcontrasttowhatshouldhavehappenedifallhadgonewell.Aspinall-Oglanderwrote thatonVbeach if allhadgone toplan2,000men shouldhavedisembarked fromRiverClyde onto the beach. Ithadbeenexpectedthatbynoon25April1915allinfantry,artilleryandsapperswould have been ashore on V beach.42 Aspinall-Oglander also points to thefailure of British military intelligence to accurately predict the numbers ofenemy troops at the various invasion beaches, which led to poor decision-making both by commanders and planners. The problem was that the Alliesoverestimatedthenumberoftheenemy,whilevonSanders’orderstohisforcesto remain out of sight andmove only at night added to the confusion of theAllies.Theresultwasthat theBritishwerecautiousaboutmovingtroopsfromthebeacheswhichseemedtohavelittleornodefencesasitwasbelievedthattheenemy had reinforcements nearby. Troops were not moved from W and Xbeachesuntilmiddayon25April1915.43Anearliermovementoftroopsmighthaveallowedforconsolidationofforcesandanabilitytomoveinland,butaswehavealreadyseen,foraseniorofficer to interferewith theordersofanofficerjuniorinranktohimwasanathemaandsotheslaughtercontinuedonVbeach.Theinabilitytogetfarfromthebeacheswastocondemntheentireoffensive

atGallipoliandveryquicklytrencheswerebeingdug.ThiswasalltoofamiliarwiththescenesontheWesternFrontinFrance,butwithalackoffrontfortheAlliedforces.ThelandingAllieshadtheenemybeforethemandtheseabehindthem. This was the front at Gallipoli. It was not the scene envisaged byKitchener or Hamilton. Hamilton often referred to the operational area as a‘cockpit’ owing to its relatively miniature scale compared with the WesternFrontorwith thebattles theyhad fought asyoungmenand the large scaleofcampaigninginAfricaduringthelatenineteenthcentury.TheCommanderoftheANZACforce,GeneralSirWilliamBirdwood,inhis

autobiography,wroteofthetypeofwarfareandcounterattackswhichtheAlliesfaced at Gallipoli. On 19 May 1915 his force faced a determined TurkishoffensivewhichsoughttodrivetheANZACsbackintothesea.At03:00,42,000Turksattacked1stAustralianDivision.TheTurkishattackscameinsuccessivewaves; the Australians repulsed these attacks using 950,000 rounds of smallarms ammunition and fired 1,400 shells from mountain guns. The Turksswitched tactics and launched an attack against the New Zealanders on thehighergroundtotheleftoftheAustralianposition.However,whattheTurksdidnotknowwasthattheNewZealandershadaconcealedtrenchwithintheirownpositionwhichranthroughtheentirepost.Thetrenchhadbeenduginsecretand

the soil from it had been thrown over the cliffs on the left flank. The Turkschargedin largenumbersandwerecutdownbytheNewZealanders; theyleft350deadinfrontofthesecrettrenchalone.44Following the failedTurkishattack therewasanarmistice tobury thedead.

Birdwoodwas anxious for this to happen as the unburied bodies lying in theopen and in the heat were becoming a definite health hazard. Birdwoodestimated that 3,000Turkish dead lay before theANZACpositions,while theANZACs had only suffered 500 dead and wounded. During 1936 whenBirdwood was visiting Gallipoli, Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish President and aveteranoftheGallipolicampaignsenthisChiefofStaff,FahreteinPasha,withBirdwood to the former battlefields. Fahretein Pasha had also been on vonSanders’StaffandsoBirdwoodaskedhimifheremembered theattackon theANZACpositioninMay1915.Thereplywasintheaffirmative.Birdwoodthenasked about Turkish casualties for the attack and was told 10,000 dead andwounded.45ItseemedthattheAllieshadunderestimatedTurkishcasualtiesatthetimeas

HamiltoninalettertoGeneralMaxwellconsideredthattheTurkshadreceivedatotal of 7,000 casualties spread over eight acres in front of the ANZACpositions.46 E.L. Berthon wrote of the day that Turks under ‘Marshal vonSandershadmadeadeterminedattackonpositionsatGabeTepeandhadbeenrepulsed with colossal losses.’ The Australians under General Birdwood had‘moweddown the advancingTurkswho attacked inGermanmass formation’.The losses according to Berthon’s diary were 8,000 dead over eight acres ofgroundwhilethoseoftheBritish(Australian)were350deadandwounded.OnthesamedayherecordedthataGermanofficerhadbeenseenphysicallybeatingTurksintobattle.47TheTurkishattackof19May1915wasnottheendofthematter.Birdwood

learntfromaGreekspythattheTurksweremassingcracktroopsatKabaTepe,readyforanoffensive.Armedwiththisknowledge,Birdwoodmanagedtomasshis troops, complete withmachine guns and field guns, in the same area andattacked the Turks. It was said that the ANZACs ‘gave the Turks an awfulleathering’.TheTurkssuffered7,000casualtiesandtheAlliesamere700.TheTurkshadbeencaughttotallyunawaresandhadreceived‘adamnedgoodhidingintothebargain’.48HamiltonwasappraisedofthesituationattheANZAClinesand was advised by Birdwood that there was a pressing need to make someapproachtotheenemyonthenextday,20May1915,inordertotrytogetthe

deadandwounded removed from thebattlefieldbefore theentire areabecameinsanitary.Hamilton was cautious as he feared that such a request might be used for

propaganda purposes by the enemy.His advice to Birdwoodwas not to opennegotiations with the Turks, but if the enemy came into the open in order torecover their dead and wounded, they should be allowed to do so withoutmolestation. Birdwood told Hamilton that this was unlikely to happen as theTurkswerehabituallycalloustowardstheirdead,butsomethinghadtobedonesoonbeforetheAustraliantrenchesbecameuninhabitable.HamiltonsaidthathehadnoobjectiontotheAustraliansthrowingmessagestotheTurkssayingthattheycouldcomeoutandcollecttheirdeadandwounded,butheinsistedthatnowhiteflagwastobehoistedfirstfromANZACpositions.49Hamiltonwasverycarefulwhilstagreeingtoanarmisticeinordertoburythe

deadfollowingtheTurkishattacksonANZAC.WhilecomingtoanagreementwithvonSanders (whowasquitepolite inhisapproach towards thearmistice)Hamilton ensured that the wording in his communication agreeing to thearmistice to bury the dead read ‘your dead’ i.e. deadTurks rather thanAllieddead.50Theamnestyfortheburialofthedeadwasconductedon24May1915as by then there were 3,000 dead Turks piled up in front of Allied trenches.Overall conduct during the armisticewasgood; aTurkish soldier stole a handgrenadefromanAlliedtrench,butitwashandedbackbyaTurkishofficer.AnAustralian soldierwhowas asked if theTurks could drive theANZACs fromtheir trenches was reported as saying ‘a live one couldn’t – but a dead onemight!’Thiswasafterseveraldaysofhotweather.51Thetrucelastedforninehoursandhostilitiesrecommencedat16:30hours,24

May 1915.52 However, there seemed to have been some locally agreedarmisticesfortheburialofthedeadasA.H.K.CobbservingonHMSBacchanterecorded an armistice atGabaTepe agreedwithGeneralBirdwoodwhich ranfrom 21May until 22May 1915.He also noted an official armistice atGapeTepewhich ran from 07:30 until 16:00 (24May 1915).53 From the diaries ofAustraliansoldiersitisclearthatnegotiationsforanamnestyinordertoburythedeadbeganon20May1915withlocalinitiativesbeingtakenbybothsidesuntilthe official armistice was declared, which allowed for the battlefield to beclearedofcorpses‘whichwerealreadyblackandswelledup…’54The Turkish side of these events is interesting as Captain A. Ozgen, a

machine-gunofficer of theTurkishArmy in 1915 in an interviewheld during

July1972saidofthefightingagainsttheANZACson18May1915,‘Itwaslikehell.IwasfightingwithmymachinegunandIrememberthatmymachinegunbecamehotwiththeheat.Ihadnot timetochangemycartridgeandofcoursewehadalotofcasualties.’Ofthe24May1915truce,CaptainOzgendeniedthatitwastheTurksthathadrequestedit,butclaimedthatitwastheANZACswhohadsuggestedit.HealsoclaimedthatKemalhadcomeindisguisetosurveytheANZACposition,whichwasveryusefultohimlater.55Ozgen’s claim cannot be proved one way or the other, but the contrast of

viewsconcerningthetruceis interesting.Probablytheonlythingthatcouldbeagreedwasthattherewerethousandsofcorpseslayingunburiedintheheatanddecomposing.Thiswasnotonlyunsightlyandoffensivetothesenses,especiallythatofsmell,butadefinitehealthrisk.Furthermore,withoutdoubt itoutragedreligious sensitivities of both sides, especially the Turks; Islamic traditionrequired the dead to be buried as swiftly as possible, but in 1915 it must beagreed that this seemed to have been ignored at least by the Turkish HighCommand.As the campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula began to set its own pace,

HamiltonwrotetoKitchenerofthesituationthere.Hamiltonwasclearlyshakenbyeventsashewrote‘muchfightinghastakenplaceandmanyliveshavebeenlost since I lastwrote you…’56 PrimarilyHamiltonwaswriting to try to getreinforcementsforGallipoliandusedthedepthandscopeofaletterratherthanthe brevity of a telegram to try to explain the situation in the EasternMediterranean.His regretwas that theentireoperationwasbecoming ‘knottedup’ in ‘this cursed trench warfare, just as much as the British and GermansappeartobetiedhandandfootbyitinFrance’.However,HamiltonseemedquiteblindtothefactthattheTurkswerefighting

fortheirhomelandfollowingtheattemptedinvasionofitbytheAllies,ashetoldKitchenerthattheTurksweregoodfightersbutcouldnotunderstandwhytheywere fighting. Furthermore Hamilton could not attribute anything whichresembledanynotionofintelligentmilitaryengineeringtotheTurks,ashesawanythingconnected tomodernwarfareatGallipolias theworkofvonSandersandhisfellowGermanadvisors.57ItwasmorethanlikelythattheTurksdidnotunderstandwhytheAlliesandGermanswerefighting,butthey,theTurks,hadagoodreason;thedefenceoftheirhomeland.Hamilton’sattitudeshouldalsobenoted,asitwastypicaloftheracismofhisclass,raceandoutlookatthattime.Hamilton’sletterprovidedKitchenerwithampledescriptionofthefightingat

Gallipoli from the time of the landings to early June 1915. Hamilton told

Kitchener that his troops and their officers right up to the ranks of CorpsCommanderhadbeenunderfireforthesixweekssincetheylandedon25April1915 and remainedunder fire.TheTurks on the other hand, hadbeen able toreinforce,replaceandresttheirtroops.ThiswasaluxurythatwasnotavailabletoHamiltonandtheMEFashepointedouttoKitchener,evenwhentroopswerewithdrawn from the front line to the rear lines for rest; theoperational theatrewassosmalltheenemywasabletoshelltherearlineswithease.Quitesimply,on theGallipoli peninsula therewas no safe place for anAllied soldier to be.Hamiltonwrotethat theresultof thiswas‘thetroopsgetverytiredand(bettermake no bones about it) exceedingly jumpy, especially during these everrecurring night attacks, an invention grafted onto Turkish methods by theGermans’.Hamiltonwas alsobeginning to experienceother problemswhich related to

theuntestednatureofhistroops;hemadethisquitecleartoKitchener.Hamiltonrelated an incident which had occurred on 5 June 1915 in which a battalion,whichuptothatpointhadbeenafineoneoperatinginasmallareacapturedonthe previous day, saw a strong enemy force advancing towards them and sobegan to retreat back to their original line of 4 June 1915. This retreat wasbroughttoahaltbyayounglieutenantfromanotherregiment,whoshotfourofthe retreating soldiers.Thishad the effect ofbringing the remainderback intolinebeforebeinghandedbacktotheirCommandingOfficer.Hamiltonnotedthatthe Commanding Officer was a ‘promoted Sergeant Major who though goodwithin his limits was not equal to such a situation as that’. Hamilton toldKitchenerthathispurposeofrelatingsuchanunhappyepisodewasnotonlytotell the truth, but also to emphasize ‘the absolute necessity of a fresh divisionbeingsentouttotheseparts‘ifoperationalneedsaretobemet’.58IfHamilton’saccountoftheofficershootingfourmen(dead?)isaccepteditis

interestingthathemakesnofurthercommentoftheincident.ItwouldseemthatHamiltonwas perfectlywilling to accept thatmenwhoperhapswere shirkingtheirdutyormerelymakinganintelligentwithdrawaltoapostwhichcouldbemoreeasilydefended,couldbearbitrarilyshot.Heraisesnoprotestordemandsan inquiry, but merely commented on the lack of suitability of a man beingpromotedfromtherankstothatofanofficer.However,in1917,duringthetimeof the Dardanelles Commission Hamilton denied that any British officer hadshot anyBritish soldiers if they refused to advanceor appeared tobe shirkingtheirduty. In thecourseof evidencebeing takenat the inquiry, theAustralianjournalist Keith Murdoch claimed that an order had been issued to British

officers to shootwithoutmercy, any soldierswho laggedbehindor refused toadvance. Murdoch claimed that this was mentioned in the diary of a MrNevinson, who denied keeping a diary or of having ever heard of such anorder.59KeithMurdochwastoprovetobethenemesisofHamilton.Asthefightingprogressed,HamiltontoldKitchenertoforgetall thewarfare

that he knew of; Gallipoli was something quite different. In the opinion ofHamilton,whatwasrequiredatGallipoliwas‘highcourage,aquickeyefortheprobablepointsofattackordefenceandacleardeterminationnottoletlossoflifestandinthewayofgainingafewyardsofground’.AsHamiltonexplainedtoKitchener,ifhedidnottakeadvantageofhowtrencheslaybeforehimandtryto straighten them and so cut off significant amounts of the enemy, the samedevicecouldwellbeusedagainsthimandhisforcesbytheTurks.Forsuchanoperation Hamilton informed Kitchener that he would require fresh troops.Furthermore, anything like a general advance or attack could not becontemplated by the Allies at the time, as not only was there a shortage ofammunition,butalsothemenwereexhausted.60ItshouldbenotedthatpriortotheTurkishonslaughtof19May1915againstANZACpositions,theANZACshadsufferedconsiderablecasualtieson2May1915tryingtostraightenouttheleftoftheirline.61Suchweretherisksofsuchanoffensive.InalettertoCliveWigram,AssistantPrivateSecretaryandEquerrytoKing

GeorgeV,Hamilton described the fighting atGallipoli.As in correspondencewithKitchenerhe reflectedon theminiature scaleof the areaof operations atGallipoli. The constant artillery fire had become the main feature of thecampaign,tosuchapointthatithadbecomemerebackgroundnoiseorperhapsintheparlanceoftoday,‘whitenoise’.ItwasjustthereandwentunremarkedbythosepresentatGallipoli.HamiltoncommentedthateverybodyfromDivisionalGeneralstoordinarysoldiershadbeenunderfirefromriflestoartilleryfromthevery first dayof the invasion andwere still enduring such fire fiveweekson.Hamilton told Wigram that on the peninsula there was nowhere to hide orwithdrawto.Someevenclaimedthatthesupportandreservetrencheswereevenmore dangerous than those at the front as they were subject to long-rangeartilleryfirefromtheAchiBabaarea;theGenerals’QuartersatCapeHellesandSedd-el-Bahr were also victims of enemy long-range artillery fire. ThisillustratedthedifferencebetweenthefightinginFranceandthatatGallipoli,ascommandersinFranceweregenerallywellawayfromthefrontline.As ever, fighting was heavy, especially at ANZAC which Hamilton had

visited two days previously (1 June 1915). In his letter toWigram, Hamilton

mentionedaninterestingyetancientmethodofwarfareandonemoresuitedtosiegewarfare–miningandcountermining–astheAlliesandtheirenemiestriedtodigintoandundereachother’strencheswiththepurposeofblowingthemup.ThefightingwasindeedheavyandHamiltonreferredtotheconstantstreamofwoundedcomingdownfromthefrontlineonacliff200feetabovethebeaches;as thewounded camedown, the rations for the front ascended.Suchwere thelogisticsofthebattle.Hamiltonclaimedthatthe‘Turco-Germans’weremakingtheir main effort at ANZAC and claimed that he had detected signs of anammunition shortage amongst the enemy. However, if the Turks were firing2,000shellsanhour,thisclaimwasveryhardtosustain.Hamiltonconcededthatthe Turks seemed to have an ‘absolutely unlimited’ supply of bombs (handgrenades)andsmallarmsammunition.Fightingwithgrenades seemed tohavebecomeadominantfeatureofthiscorneroftheDardanelles.62AfewdayslaterHamilton,incorrespondencewithMajor-GeneralSirGerald

Ellison,noted that thewarwas ‘tending todegenerate intosiegeoperationsonthe French pattern’. As ever the old campaigner railed against the so-calledmodernity of war with machine guns, barbed wire entanglements, trenches,mining and countermining and ‘all the rest of the detestable business’. AfterrecentfightinghetoldEllisonthattheywere‘lickingtheirwounds’.Therehadbeenamajorbattle,buttheresulthadbeenagainofamerefewhundredyards‘attheusualghastlycost’.SincethefightingtheTurks,accordingtoHamilton,had been quiet, but he observed that the Turks easily replaced their tireddivisionswithfreshones.HamiltondidnothavesuchaluxuryandsothesamemenintheAlliedtrencheshadtogoonfightingwithlittleifanyrest.63Later during June 1915, Hamilton in a letter to General C.F.N. (Nevil)

Macreadywrotethat‘Officersarebeingkilledofffasterhere(Gallipoli)thaninFrance.’64 Clearly the Gallipoli operation was going badly wrong and wasbecoming a bloody conflict of attrition. Thiswaswhat theAllies had tried toavoid as they had originally sought a shortcut to victory against the CentralPowers in attacking the perceivedweakestmember of that alliance. The poorresults atGallipolimeant that somethinghad tobedone and so itwasgettingclosetothetimetounleashtheuntriedmenofKitchener’s‘NewArmy’ontotheGallipolipeninsula.Meanwhile,Hamiltonandhismenhad tocarryonasbesttheycouldwithoutreceivinganyreinforcementsforthetimebeing.On13 July 1915,Hamiltonwrote toLordDerby of a newAllied offensive

whichhadbegunatdawnon12July1915.Onthefirstdayoftheoffensiveallseemed to be going well for the Allies with two French divisions making

progresswhile theLowlandDivisionmade progress for theBritish.However,after dark the Turks counterattacked and in hand grenade attacks captured asectionof trenches in thecentreof theAlliedgains.At the timeofHamilton’swritingtherewasfurtherfightingastheAlliesattemptedtoejecttheTurksfromthis position, butwere struggling to do so.Hamilton lamented the shortageofhigh explosive shells,whichmight have at least blasted the enemy out of thecontested trenches.Hamiltonalso remarkedon thecalibreofenemywhich theAllies faced.BothGeneralsHunter-WestonanddeLisle,divisionalofficersaswellasotherBritishofficerswhohadrecentlyservedinFrancealongwiththeirFrench counterparts, claimed that the Turks were tougher opponents than theGermans.Like the Allies, it seemed that the Turks lacked stocks of ammunition and

material of the type which the Germans enjoyed in abundance in Europe.Hamiltonnotedthatthiswasfortunateforhimandhismenasherequestedthatfresh drafts of men might be sent out to Gallipoli to reinforce the EastLancashireDivisionalreadyonthepeninsula.65Hamiltonmadeasimilarrequestfivedayslateraswellasusingtheopportunitytodescribefurtherhisproblemsat Gallipoli. Writing once more to Derby in an upbeat style, even thoughHamiltonclaimedallwasgoingwell atGallipolihealsowroteof theTurkishinfantryman’s dogged nature in defending a trench. Such was the stubbornvigilance of the Turk that theAllies found it very difficult to launch surpriseattacks against enemy positions. Again Hamilton noted that for himself healmosthadtobegforreinforcements,whilehisenemyseemedtohaveanalmostinexhaustiblequantityoftroopsavailable.AllthatHamiltoncouldpromisewasthattheTurkswereinforafightagainsttheAllies.66The question of the Turkish fighting capabilities is described in notes

concerningtheoperationsof11thDivisionfrom30Juneuntil23August1915.AnepisodeinvolvingthecaptureofHill10,aTurkishredoubtconstructedabouthalfamile fromAbeach,was theobjectiveofanoperationshortlybefore thesecondlandingsatGallipoliandservedasadiversiontothecomingoperationatSuvla Bay. The capture of Hill 10 on 6 August 1915 caused considerablecasualties;nineofficersalonefrom9thWestYorkshireswerekilledorwounded,suchwas the fighting.Again, the fighting and tenacity of theTurkish soldiershadbeenunderestimatedbytheAllies.Furthermore,Turkishdefensivepositionshadbeenwellconstructed,completewithgunemplacementsandtheareasownwithlandmines.HamiltonnotedthatnotonlywereTurkishdefensivepositionswell constructed and sited but also the manner in which the Turkish soldier

defendedhis postwas remarkable.Hewrote that enemy infantry jumpedontothe parapet of their trenches to meet oncoming British infantry. The Turkishdefender may well have been cut down by machine-gun fire, but anotherimmediatelytookhisplace.67ItisquiteclearthatevenaftercampaigningagainsttheTurkishArmyforover

three months, Hamilton and his Staff were incredulous that a non-EuropeanarmycouldstillholdandfrustrateaEuropeanforce.HamiltonshouldhavebeenalivetothispossibilityashehadbeenwitnesstotheRussiandefeatatthehandsoftheJapaneseonlyadecadeearlier.FromBritishintelligencereportsitcanbeseen that it was widely believed that the Turkish Army on the Gallipolipeninsula by June 1915 was largely commanded by German officers. Itsuggested that there was a scarcity of ‘trusted’ Turkish officers and as aconsequence cadets still attending military academies in Turkey were hastilycommissioned,asmanyofficersoftheoldregimecouldnolongerbetrusted.68FurtherreportsseemtoconfirmtheproblemswithintheTurkishArmyregardingofficersandthelackoftrustworthycommanders.Aprisonerof14thRegiment,Turkish Army, captured by ANZAC forces on 23 June 1915 stated that hisDivision(5thDivision)wascommandedbyaGerman,MajorvonWester.Theprisoner also confirmed that casualties amongst theofficers hadbeen replacedbycadetsintheirfirstyearorfromtheranks.AcorporalcapturedbytheFrenchcorroborated previous reports of immense losses suffered by the Turks.69 Thethemes of command, politics and the truth will be explored in the followingchapters, as it seems that it was not only Hamilton who suffered politicalconstraintduringtheGallipolicampaign.

Hamilton7/12/24,UnloadingofstoresfromSSRiverClyde,VBeach.

Hamilton7/12/139,French75mmartillerybatteryinactionnearSedd-el-Bahr.

Hamilton7/12/35,Hamilton,MajorGeneralWalterPiponBraithwaite,ChiefofGeneralStaff,MediterraneanExpeditionaryForce,CaptainFrederickLewisCrichton-Maitland,Hamilton’saide-de-camp,

beingmovedinship’stender.

Hamilton7/12/49,BritishtroopsonVBeachwatchingashellburstinwaterfromTurkishgun‘AsiaticAnnie.’

Hamilton7/12/66,FieldHospitalof42(EastLancashire)Div,showingsurgerytoagunshotwoundinasoldier’sarm.

Hamilton7/12/194,HamiltonandhisStaffatKephalus,IsleofImbros,onhisfinaldayatGallipoli.

Hamilton7/12/237,December191915,ThelastdayatANZACBeachofLieutenantGeneralSirWilliamRiddellBirdwood.

Hamilton7/12/117,InterioroftheundergroundNavalObservationStation(CapeHelles).

Hamilton7/12/146,ViewofBritishtroopscampedoncliffslookingfromXBeachtoANZACCove.

Hamilton7/12/39,MajorGeneralAylmerGouldHunter-Westonandtwoofhisstaffinthetrenchleadingtotheirdugout.

Hamilton7/12/56,CompanyofmenoftheRoyalNavalDivisionchargingfromatrench.

Hamilton7/12/94,BritishandANZACsoldiersmanufacturing‘jamtin’grenades.

Hamilton7/12/232,PartofANZACBeachshowingsandbaggedshelters.

Hamilton7/12/280A,BritishTerritorialguncrewwith4.5-inchhowitzer.

Hamilton7/12/121,ArmouredcarsoftheRoyalNavalAirServiceArmouredCarDivisionindugouts.

Hamilton7/12/33,HamiltonwithLieutenantGeneralSirWilliamRiddellBirdwoodinspectingtheRoyalNavalDivision.

Hamilton7/12/44,Major-GeneralWilliamDouglasGeneralOfficerCommanding42(EastLancashire)Divatlookoutpostintreetop(Helles).

Hamilton7/12/62,Britishsoldier(King’sOwnScottishBorderers)usingatrenchperiscope.

Hamilton7/12/159,CapturedTurkishsniperinfoliagecamouflageguardedbytwoANZACsoldiers.

Hamilton7/12/233,BritishsoldierinatrenchwithahelmetplacedatendofhisrifleasatargetforTurkishsniper.

I

ChapterFive

CommandandPolitics

thasbeennotedearlierinthisworkthattheentireconceptoftheDardanellesand later Gallipoli operations in the Eastern Mediterranean theatre of

operationswerebasedonhalf-bakedandlazypoliticalwishfulthinking.Aseverin these situations, soldiers and sailors diedwhile civilian politicians bickeredandposturedforpower.Aswehaveseen,Hamiltonwaschargedwithmilitarilydefeating the Turks in their own backyard so that the Allied fleets could sailthroughtheDardanellesintotheMarmaraSeaandthenontoConstantinople,theTurkishcapital.ThenitwasconsideredthattheTurkswouldpanicandsurrendertotheAlliesandthusprovideacheapandeasywaytodefeatingGermany.Thatwasthetheory,butatalltimesowingtothepoliticssurroundingtheDardanellesoperations, Hamilton had one hand tied behind his back as he was deniedsufficientmen andmunitions necessary to successfully complete theGallipolioffensive. Once Hamilton managed to get his army ashore on the Gallipolipeninsula, it became stuck and failed to advance far from the shores of theEasternMediterranean.TheconsequenceofthefailureoftheAlliestoestablish,strengthenbeachheadsandthenpushonfromthebeacheswasthattheoffensivebecameboggeddownandthusaminiatureWesternfrontbythesea.The war in France was not going as well as had been expected, but the

‘western’ school had settled down for the long slog and hoped to beat theGermans and their allies by sheer determination and bloodymindedness. ThecampaigninGallipoliwasrapidlybecomingashamblesinmorethanonesense,butstillHamilton,whomayhavehadachanceofdefeatingtheTurks,remainedbereft of both the necessary men and equipment. By June 1915 Hamilton,unusuallyforhim,wasgettingdecidedlytestywiththeauthoritiesintheUKforstill denying him themeans for victory. In a communiqué to theWarOffice,Hamiltonwrote‘Iamverysorrythatyoucannotsendtheproperhowitzers,and

still more sorry for the reason, that of ammunition. The Turkish trenches aredeepandnarrow,and(the)onlyeffectiveweaponfordealingwith themis thehowitzer.’ Hamilton tried to be conciliatory towards the WO as he had nochoice,buthemaintainedhisdemandsforweaponsandrequestedmoretrenchmortars and bombs for them, but was once more the petitioner as Hamiltonaskedforasmanythatcouldbespared.Hewasveryawarethatthelions’shareofweaponsandmenweredespatchedtoFrancefortheWesternFront.Hamiltonconcludedthisparticularmissivebywriting‘Werealizethatforourpartthatinthematterofgunsandammunition, it isnogoodcryingfor themoon,andforyourpartyoumustrecognizethatuntilhowitzersandammunitionarriveitisnogoodcryingfortheCrescent.’1Hamilton was clearly putting theWO on notice that without the necessary

artilleryandammunition, therewas littlechanceofAlliedsuccessatGallipoli.Theproblemwasthathewasnotsodirectinhiswordsandinsteadhidhistruefeelings in his lyrical style of writing. It might have been more useful ifHamilton had beenmore direct and told theWO that therewas no chance ofdefeating theTurks atGallipoli unless hewas supplied adequately.AnhonestandopenapproachindealingwiththeWOmighthavehelpedHamiltonas,likesomanyothers,hetrustedKitchenertobehisally,butdidnotfindoutuntil6June1916whilst diningwithWinstonChurchill, thatKitchener never showedthelargenumberoftelegramsrequestingreinforcements,gunsandammunitiontotheBritishWarCabinet.BythetimeHamiltonlearntthis,itwasallrathertoolateasGallipolihadbeenlost,whilethisinformationarrivedwiththenewsthatKitchener had drowned on the previous day. As John Lee notes, this putHamiltonintoaverydifficultpositionashisonlyrealdefenceoverhishandlingof theGallipolicampaignwas toattacka‘deadhero’.Furthermore,hedidnotwanttodistracttheWarCabinetastheSommeOffensivewasbeingprepared.2BlissfullyunawareofKitchener’streacherytowardshim,HamiltoncontinuedtowritetoKitchener,reportingonthedifficultiesofwagingwaratGallipoli.TowardstheendofJune1915hewrotetoKitchenerandtoldhimthatthere

wereonlyenoughshellsfortheartilleryforonemoreattack.Afterthat‘Wefoldourhandsandwaitforthearrivalofnewtroopsandtheoutfitofammunition:-not“waitandsee”but“waitandsuffer”.’Hamiltonobservedthattohavetohaltthecampaignforamonthwouldmoreorlessbedisastrousasitwouldhavelefttroops idle and with time to reflect on what had gone wrong, and begin tocontemplate their losses at a time when it could not be disguised that theoperationtodatehadbeenunsuccessful.3

AmajorproblemforHamiltonbyJune1915wasindeeddomesticpoliticsasthe war became more prolonged than people had ever dared to think that itwould.TheresignationofChurchillfromtheAdmiraltyon25May1915wasahugeblowforHamilton,butasweshallseeChurchillremainedagreatadvocatefortheGallipolicampaign,mainlybecauseitwashisidea,butheremainedloyaltoitandtoHamilton.Atthesametime,theWarOfficeandtheImperialGeneralStaffwerepreoccupiedwitheventsontheWesternFrontandtheSecondBattleofYpres,whichhadseentheGermansusegasasaweaponofwarforthefirsttime. It was at this time that politicians, perhaps frustrated with the lack ofprogress atGallipoli, established theDardanellesCommittee to try to identifywhatwasgoingwrongontheGallipolipeninsula.Churchill, according to at least one historian, was the ‘spirit’ behind the

Dardanelles.DuringJune1915inaspeechmadeinDundee,Churchillclaimedthat ‘Through the Narrows of the Dardanelles and across the ridges of theGallipoli Peninsula lie some of the shortest paths to a triumphant peace.’4However,theproblemwasthatChurchillwasnolongerattheAdmiralty,whichwas in turmoil itself, asChurchillhadhada stormy relationshipwith theFirstSea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher, who also had resigned his post. ThereforeHamiltonactuallyhadfewfriendsremaininginHighOffice,butthoughtthathehadanallyinKitchener,whoaswehavealreadyseen,didlittle ifanythingtoaidHamiltonorfurthertheDardanellesoffensive.Churchill remained loyal to Hamilton and to theDardanelles offensive and

supported it at every opportunity. Again, during June 1915 he said of theDardanelles that ‘the position of the Dardanelles is at once hopeful anddangerous.Thelongeritlaststhemoredangerousitwillbecome.Thesooneritis settled the sooner everything can, if desired, be concentrated on the FrenchandFlemish front.Theunexpecteddelays inbeginning themilitaryoperationsandthegradualmannerinwhichthetroopsweredispatched,havealreadygiventime for the Turks to make elaborate defensive preparations, to bringreinforcements from Syria and elsewhere and for the Germans to sendsubmarines.Ifwedelaylongerinsendingthenecessaryreinforcements,orsendthempiecemeal,weshallintheendhavetosendallormorethanarenowaskedfor, and we shall run the double risk of fighting the whole Turkish Army inrelaysaroundtheKilidBahrplateauandofbeingseriouslyharassedbynumbersofGermansubmarineswhichwillbeattractedtothespotbythesuccesswhichattendedthefirstone.Itseemsmosturgenttotrytoobtainadecisionhereandwinduptheenterpriseinasatisfactorymannerassoonaspossible.’5

Churchill’s pronouncement on the situation at the Dardanelles might haveunwittinglysowntheseedsof theeventualfailureofoperationsthereasitwasindeed wound up, but not before a further attempt was made to seize theGallipolipeninsula.On9June1915theBritishPrimeMinister,HerbertAsquith,informedKingGeorgeV that the Cabinet Committee on theDardanelles haddecidedtoreinforceHamilton’sarmybysendingthreedivisionsfromthefirstofthenewarmieswhichshouldarrive in theEasternMediterraneanno later thanthefirsthalfofJuly1915.Bythistime,sotheBritishmonarchwasinformed,acontingentofhowitzersshouldhavearrivedintheareaaswellascruisers.6Atthe same time it was suggested that the three divisions should be sent to theEasternMediterraneanwiththeviewtoafreshassaultoftheGallipolipeninsuladuringthesecondweekofJuly1915.7This rather suggested that at Cabinet and at ParliamentaryCommittee level

therewaslittleunderstandingofthesituationatGallipoli,whichledtomuddleand confusion. The reinforcements and howitzers were what Hamilton hadrequested, but as he had always feared since the operation at Gallipoli hadbegun, unlike the situation in France where reinforcements and ammunitioncouldberushedtothefrontwithintwenty-fourhours,thefrontatGallipolihadto wait for weeks for similar supplies and reinforcements. Churchill had alsofearedsuchadevelopmentandwrotetoKitchener‘ItisclearthatHamiltonhasbeendeterredfromtheEnos-Bulairprojectbynavalratherthanmilitaryreasons.IfitisdecidedasIpresumeitwillbe,topushthroughfromtheAnzacposition,there ought to be no doubt about the force employed being ample, and thereought to be a strong reserve at hand. It is not a ‘starving’ but a ‘storming’operation against the enemy’s main army and within gunshot of his mainposition. Further, the ground widens out to the northward, and we must beprepared for attacks by large forces from that direction upon a battlefield nolonger restricted. It is reasonable that von Sanders will have taken whatevermeasuresareopentohimtoguardagainstsoobviousandvitalathrust.Supposethethreefirstdivisionsnowunderordersdoagreatdeal,butnotall,andafterthree or four days’ fighting are brought to a standstill with 10,000 or 15,000casualties,boththeyandtheenemybeingexhausted;supposetwoorthreefreshdivisionsarethenneededtocarrythebusinessthroughtocompletesuccess,andsupposethereisnothingnearerthanEngland,whichmeansamonth’sdelay,bytheendofwhichyouwillbeginalloveragain!Thereismyfear.’8Churchill seemed to have been the only person inLondon of any influence

whocouldunderstandthesituationatGallipoli.However,bymid-1915hisstar

was fading, while his views were becoming an irrelevance if not just plainembarrassing for the British Government and the War Office. Hamiltonremained ebullient, as he did not support the theory that Kaba Tepe wasimpregnable, and with the necessary men and equipment was certain that itcould be captured. However, he was in full agreement with the DardanellesCommitteethatthequestionofcuttingoffsuppliestotheTurkishArmyontheGallipoli peninsula was the crux of the entire problem of the campaign atGallipoli.9All the same,Hamilton still needed new forces and reinforcementsforthisaswellasplentyofweaponryandammunition.The political arguments concerning the re-supply ofHamilton and his army

draggedonintoJuly1915.ItwasobviousfromtheconclusionsreachedbytheDardanellesCommitteethattherewaslittleideaorunderstandingofthefightingor of the fact that the Turks were actually good soldiers. The fact that acontinuousshortageofmenandammunitionhadunderminedtheAlliedeffortintheEasternMediterraneananddeniedthemvictoryat theDardanelles,wasnotreallyeveracknowledgedbytheDardanellesCommittee.10Itshouldberealizedthat theTurkishArmyhadbeen inconstantcombatfor thepreviousdecadeastheBalkanstatesandItalytriedtotakeadvantageoftheperceivedweaknessesof the empire and seize territory from it. The modernizing effect of Germanmilitary advisors, combined with ten years of European and North Africanwarfare, had made the Turkish Army quite a formidable enemy for anybodytrying to seize the Turkish homeland and hearth, which was defended by theTurks with the utmost rigor. Indeed Maurice Hankey, Secretary to theCommitteeofImperialDefence,afterafact-findingmissiontoGallipoliduringAugust1915,informedAsquithinaletterthat‘ThegeneralimpressionouthereisthattheTurksaredefendingConstantinopleattheDardanelles,andthatawinhere would settle the business.’11 At least Hankey belatedly had anunderstandingofthesituationattheDardanelles,butitshouldbenotedthathedid not get this understanding until he had actually visited the theatre ofoperations.Hankey’svisittoGallipolibringsusbacktoBritishdomesticpoliticsof1915

whichwerecripplingtheMEFandanychanceitmighthavehadofseizingandretaining theGallipoli peninsula, defeating Turkey and knocking it out of thewar.ChangestotheBritishWarCabinetwereablowtoHamilton,ashewrotetohiswifethathedidnotwantAdmiralFisherorHaldanetoreplaceChurchillas ‘these mad dogs don’t know what they are doing: it is he who laid thefoundations of our present superb army’.12 From this it can be seen that

Hamilton was not totally aware of the political situation in Britain as bothHaldane and Fisher were also out of office. However, Hamilton was astuteenough to realize the value ofChurchill for theDardanelles offensive and thefuture conduct of the war in relation to the production of munitions andrecruitingpolicy.Hamilton remarked that ‘Winstonwithhisgeniusaroused toitshighestpowerbythewhiplashofdefeattellsthewholetruthandnothingbutthetruthinhissplendidspeechatDundee.’13ThequestionofreinforcementswasonethatcontinuouslyniggledatHamilton

as he was very much against conscription but was beginning to realize thatperhaps this might be the only way to replenish the ranks of his force.Hamilton’scorrespondencewiththeChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(CIGS),GeneralSirJamesWolfeMurray,isnoteworthy.InearlyJuly1915,clearlyafterHamiltonhadrequestedreinforcementsfor29thDivision,WolfeMurrayhadtodeny him any further men. Wolfe Murray claimed that there were scarcelyenoughmenavailabletobesenttotheWesternFrontwhilethevoluntarysystemofrecruitmentnolongerserveditspurposeandthatconscriptionmaywellhavetobe introduced.LordKitchenerhadalreadysaidasmuchduringaspeechhehadgivenattheMansionHouse,Londonon9July1915.WolfeMurrayalsobeganadiscussionaboutthemunitionsshortage,whichhe

claimedwasbeingpoliticallymanipulatedinfavourofDavidLloydGeorgewhohadservedasChancellorof theExchequer from1908until25May1915,andthen became Minister of Munitions. Lloyd George had ambitions to becomePrime Minister. Wolfe Murray considered that the question of munitionsremainedamootone if therewerenotenoughmen toserveat thefront in thefirst place. In his opinion the Press, namely the Northcliffe Press in London(chiefly the Daily Mail and The Times) together with Lloyd George, werepreparing toquestionKitchenerabout theperceivedshortageofmunitionsandpossiblyseektounseatAsquithfromhisofficeandhaveLloydGeorgereplacehimasPrimeMinister.Asquith’sopponentsweremakingthecasethatashehadbeen forced into coalition government, Asquith had lost the confidence andcontrolofhisparty.WolfeMurrayquestionedthisandtoldHamiltonthatthereappeared tobe a free-for-allwithinLiberalParty circleswith the consequencethat ‘everybody is as likely to act for himself and go indiscriminately foreverybody else.Wemay get to fighting amongst ourselves instead of fightingwiththeGermans,Ifear–Thesituationisdecidedlydisquieting.’14Hamilton’sreplyisequally illuminatingregardinghis thoughtsas thereality

of modern war had overridden the original and hidebound Victorian values

whichhehadpreviouslyheldregardingthemilitary.Theacuteshortageofmenforhis forcehadcausedsucha reassessmentandheconfessed thatdespite themeritsofvoluntary service, ithadbecomeobvious thateventuallycompulsorymilitary service would have to be introduced for the duration of the war. Herecalled that he had always pressed for a National Registration, ready forperhapsaneventualmodelofconscriptionbeingintroduced.ThishadpreviouslybeenignoredbytheChiefsofStaff.However,asHamiltonobserved‘Itdoesnoone any harm, but rubs into the mind of young men that, under certainconditions, the State has first pull on his pocket, labour, life and everythingelse.’15 Hamilton was writing of a time when most European states hadcompulsorymilitaryserviceeveninpeacetimewhichleftthemwithremarkablenumbersofmenavailableintheirrespectivereservearmies.IndeedinGermany,havingsomeformofmilitaryaffiliationwasmoreorlessarequisiteforsuccessandsocialmobility.Incontrast,intheUKservingintheArmyformanywasalastresorttolife’sproblems.Hamilton’s problems at Gallipoli concerning the shortage of men began to

becomeacuteasearlyasMay1915ashiscorrespondencewithGeneralSirJohnMaxwellreveals.On7May1915HamiltontoldMaxwellofabattlewhichwasragingashewrote;hedescribeditas‘abloodybattleinfullflame’.However,heswiftly got down to the technicalities of the fighting at Gallipoli and thedifficultieshewaspresentedwithonadailybasis.AseverHamiltoncommentedon thewell-presented Turkish defensive positions againstwhichAllied troopshad to make frontal assaults owing to the limited area of operations whichprecluded attacks against the flanks of the enemy. Hamilton made MaxwellawarethattheTurkswereabletocontinuouslyreinforcetheirpositionsandhadexpandedontheoriginalthreedivisionswhichdefendedtheGallipolipeninsulaagainsttheAlliedinvasion.Furthermore,everydayanewTurkishregiment,asHamilton reported, ‘dribbles over’ from the Asiatic Corps. In the two daysprevioustoHamilton’slettertoMaxwell,Hamiltonwasgiventounderstandthata complete new division had arrived in the area, having been moved fromAdrianople.Itwasagainstthesefreshtroopsthathistiredandoutnumberedmenwere supposed to invade Turkey and eventually reach the Turkish capital,Constantinople.16Maxwell, who was in so many ways theMilitary Governor of Egypt, was

responsible for thedespatchof reinforcements fromEgypt toHamilton,buthehad his problems aswell. TheBritish controlled possession of Egyptwith itsvital waterway, the Suez Canal, a short cut to India, the jewel of the British

Empire, was continuously under threat from Turkey, as its own imperialpossessionsabuttedthosebelongingtoBritain,especiallytheSuezCanal.AswehaveseenearlierinthisworktheTurkshadmadeseveralattemptssince1914toseizethecanalandMaxwellinformedHamiltonthattheTurkshadnotgivenupontheideaoftryingtocaptureit.Furthermore,onEgypt’swesternfrontiertheSanussitribewas‘gettingrestless’.17TheSanussiwasaninfluentialLibyantribewhooccasionallyrodeoutagainst

theBritishand the ItaliansduringWorldWarOne,doingvery littleharm,butremained a perennial threat to British security during this period. As manyEgyptianswereMoslemand theTurkswerealsoof the same faith, theAllies,whenconsideringmilitarypolicyintheMiddleEastorNearEastastheregionwas termed in 1915, had to take religious sensitivities into consideration. TheBritish feared relying too heavily on Moslem troops from their Indianpossessionsagainst theTurksandthereforepreferredHindusoldiersaswellasSikhs or Ghurkhas where possible. Equally, Maxwell feared being left withMoslem troops to guard the Suez Canal from the Moslem Turk enemy.Furthermore,technicallyEgyptwaspartoftheOttomanEmpireeventhoughtheBritish hadbeen in control there for over thirty years by 1915.18Therewas adistinct lackof trustby theBritishauthoritiesofMoslemtroopsserving in theIndianArmy.Maxwell made a request of Hamilton that he could send a ‘few hundred

prisoners’toEgyptinordertocounterpan-Islamicpropagandawhichwastakinghold in the local bazaars. Maxwell said that it was important that Turkishprisoners ofwar should be seen inNorthAfrica as the local populationwerebecoming so accustomed to a series of reports which spoke only of Turkishvictories over the Allies, while the ‘streams of wounded’ Allied soldiers‘pouringin’toEgyptseemedtoconfirmthewidelyheldbeliefamongstthelocalMoslempopulation that theTurkswere defeating theEuropeanChristians.AsMaxwell said toHamilton ‘A few hundred prisonerswould have an excellentaffect…’19It is not clear if Maxwell meant to parade these men, but if the Allied

woundedcouldbeseencomingintoEgypt,itisobviousthatthesightofTurkscaptured by the British could not have been avoided. It was hoped that theawarenessthattheTurkswerenothavingitalltheirownwayatGallipolimighthavehadasoberingeffectonsomeofthelocalMoslemzealots.Hamiltonwasalso told by Maxwell in the same communication that he had no morereinforcements to sendout toGallipoli.Theplanwas thatmoremencouldbe

sent to Gallipoli once more had been sent from the UK, but Kitchener hadalreadytoldMaxwellthathehadnonetosendouttohim.20Hamilton agreed withMaxwell about the question of prisoners of war and

their presence inEgypt being testimony that theTurkswere not beingwhollysuccessfulagainsttheAlliesatGallipoli.HetoldMaxwellthathewouldtrytomakesomeprisonersavailable,butthenatureofthefightingatGallipoli,mainlyfrontalassaultsagainstpreparedpositions,didnot‘producemanyprisoners’.Heobserved that he had already sent about 300 prisoners to Egypt, while theFrench,whowerehaving similar problemswith thenative inhabitants of theircolonial possessions ofMorocco andAlgeria, had sent 500 - 600 prisoners toAlgiers.21 The fact that Hamilton claimed that few prisoners were taken atGallipolidoesnotpointtowardsbrutalityandmurder,butmoretotheferocityofthe fighting at Gallipoli as well as the stubbornness of Turkish infantrymendefendingtheirpositions.Despite the lack of reinforcements,Hamilton’smen continued to fightwell

and inflictedagreatdealofdamageon theTurks.However, theBritish in theUK were largely unaware of this, as the press at first did not report on theDardanellestoowidely.However,thiswassoontochangefortheworseasfarasHamilton and his reputation were concerned. Hamilton toldMaxwell that thesmallAlliedArmyatGallipoliwasdoingsplendidworkandwas‘wearingout’the large Turkish armies through constant fighting. He claimed that the 5thTurkish Army, whom they had first fought, was all but destroyed and hadreceived40,000 to50,000casualties.The5thTurkishArmyhadbeenrelievedbythe4thDivisionfromAdrianople,the16thDivisionfromSanStefanoandthebestpartoftwodivisionsfrom5thArmyCorps.Agrandtotalofthirtybattalionsand twenty-one batteries and ‘all Nizam’ as Hamilton observed.Nizam wereregularTurkishtroopsratherthanconscripts.Hamilton said of the Turkish reinforcements that ‘I wouldn’t say smashed

(them up) but (they) were severely handled.’ Hamilton made an interestingassessment of the war against Turkey and the threat against Egypt as heremarkedthat theTurkshadsent the2ndDivisiontoGallipoliaswellas largenumbers of troops from the 4th Army, which had been operating againstMaxwell’s force inEgypt.Thismeant thatHamilton andhis forcewere facedwith a third fresh TurkishArmy.He hoped that this toowould be destroyed,whichwould then leave theTurkswithoutanyfurtherdecent troops tobesentagainsthim.Hamiltonconcludedthisthoughtintheletterinthisassessment:‘Iassureyouall this isno joke.But at least I donot thinkyouneedhavemuch

further anxiety about Egypt.We are drawing all the fighting Turks here as apoultice drawsmatter to the surface.’22Hamilton’s analysis of the situation iscorrect as the enemy was unlikely to go on an offensive overseas when hishomeland isendangered,andso theGallipolioffensivewas tobecomeacruelgameofnumbers,asmensoughttodestroyeachother.ThearmywiththemostresourceswasmorelikelytowinthismaliciousduelandtheAllieshadstartedoutwithlimitednumbersofeverything.Maxwell toldHamilton that theSultanofEgypt, in reality aBritishpuppet,

wouldbepleasedtohearthattheoffensiveattheDardanelleshadhadtheeffectof drawing the Turks away from Egypt. However,Maxwell expressed doubtsthat theBritish 29thDivisionwould ever be the same after itsmauling at thelandings.HealsohadreservationsaboutthedrawingawayoftheTurksfromtheSuez Canal, as he remained convinced that the Turks still had ambitions oftaking it. Furthermore, the Senussi continued in their restlessness on theEgyptian western frontier.Maxwell considered that the Turks encouraged theSenussiintheiranti-Britishstance.TheentryofItalyintothewaronthesideoftheAlliesduringMay1915 further exasperated the situationwith theSenussi.Italyin1911,followingawarwithTurkey,hadannexedtheSenussihomelandin Libya and as a consequence was seen as an infidel imperial power by theSenussi.MaxwellwonderedwhattheeffectoftheItalianentrytothewarmighthaveontheSenussi.23However,whereSenussitrueloyaltieslayisamatterofopinionasitisinterestingtonotethattheyfoughtboththeBritishandItaliansinminorbattlesintheFirstWorldWar,butduringtheSecondWorldWargreatlyhelped theBritish in theirstruggleagainst theGermansandItaliansduring theNorthAfricacampaign.LaterinindependentLibyatheSenussibecametheroyalhouseofthatcountryuntiltheirejectionbyColonelGaddafiin1969.However,in 1915 the Senussi were considered to have been a considerable threat toEuropeancolonialruleinNorthAfrica.The problem of Moslem religious sensibilities remained as Hamilton and

MaxwelltriedtoworkwiththeproblemastroopsweredeployedinbothEgyptand Gallipoli. Amongst the Allied troops being deployed at Gallipoli wereGurkhas.InearlyJune1915HamiltontoldMaxwell that theGurkhabattalionshadarrivedinGallipoli‘justinthenickoftime’.Therewereseveralreasonsforthis, and the legendary valour of the Gurkhas was not the only reason forHamilton’sexclamationofjoy.TheGurkhaswerenotonlysplendidsoldiers,butit was quite advantageous to the Allies that they were also not Moslems.HamiltonmaintainedhispositionwithMaxwellthattheGallipolioffensivewas

drawing Turkish forces away from the strategically important Suez Canal inorder to defend the Turkish homeland. However, he did agree that EgyptiansecuritywastooheavilyreliantonMoslemtroopsservingintheIndianArmyatatimewhenEgyptianswerevirtuallyonthepointofrevoltagainstBritishrule.Hamiltoncommentedon the intriguebeingstirredupby theTurks inNorth

AfricaandGallipolibyappealingtopan-Islamicfeeling.HetoldMaxwell thatthe Turks did their best to play on the religious feelings of Moslem troopsservingintheAlliedarmies.IndeedtheTurksmadethegreatesteffortstotrytofindifthoseinthetrenchesoppositethemwereMoslemsornot.Itseemedthatthey were disappointed as reports from enemy officers taken as prisonerssuggestedthatasfarastheTurkswereconcernedallthesoldiersfightingagainstthem were ‘infidels’.24 The Gurkhas were already known for their fightingprowess asby themiddleofMay1915 theyhadcapturedwestofKrithia andhadadvancedabout100to300yards.Hamilton’sHQwasverypleasedwiththisresultas theGurkhasalsobroughtin200prisonerswhileanumberofGermanofficers had been found bayoneted in a trench.25 The question is who hadbayoneted the Germans? Gurkhas in hand-to-hand combat, such as trenchfighting normallywas, used their distinctive curved knives, the famous kukri.Furthermore, in thedeepbutnarrowTurkish trenches,bayonets fixedon rifleswould have been very long and unwieldy. The only conclusion that can bereachedwas that the Turksmurdered theGerman officers, who probably hadbeentryingtopreventtheTurksfromsurrendering.Maxwell,asever,hadhisproblemsguardingEgyptandmadecommentonthe

29thIndianBrigadecommandedbyMajor-GeneralH.V.Cox.Of this forcehetoldHamilton that he doubted that hewould be able to send outmore troopsfrom Egypt to Gallipoli, as the casualties at Gallipoli began to mount up.MaxwellrefusedtosendoutmoreSikhtroopstoGallipoliasheconsideredthathedidnothaveenoughnon-MoslemtroopslefttoguardtheSuezCanal.HealsohintedatanotherproblemfacingHamiltonconcerninghisforce–officerswhoweremalingeringinhospitalsinEgyptandavoidingareturntothefrontlineinGallipoli.26Thiswastobecomeaparticularproblemasthecampaigncontinued,asHamiltonwrote toMaxwell towards theendof July1915of ‘agood lotofpessimistictalkinAlexandriaandinCairoamongstwoundedAustralian,Britishofficers etc. etc.’ Hamilton’s solution to this type of talk was to arrest theoffenderandhavehimputbeforeacourtmartial.27Despite all of the problems of trying to lead a campaignwhichwas poorly

conceived with a lack of sufficient troops and equipment, Hamilton soon

discovered that the Turks were not his real enemy, but instead it was thepoliticianswhohadsenthimandhisill-fatedforcetoGallipoliinthefirstplace.Towards themiddleof July1915LordSelbornewrote toHamiltonexplainingthatacommitteeofthetwomajorpoliticalpartiesinBritain(ConservativeandLiberal)hadbeensetuptoexaminetheDardanellescampaign.SelborneclaimedthatthiswasnotareflectiononHamilton’sgeneralshipandshouldnotbeseenasalackofconfidenceinhim.28ThiswasanobviouslieandithadeverythingtodowithHamilton’scommandatGallipoliandclearlythepoliticianshadlittle,ifanyconfidenceinHamilton.Using typical political soft soap, Selborne claimed that politicians merely

wanted to understand what the problems were at the Dardanelles and wantedHamilton to be frank and openwith them and conceal nothing, even if itwasdifficultorunpleasant.IfHamiltonrequiredmoreammunition,hewastosayso,butwascautionedthathemightnotget itastherewasashortageanditmighttake time, indeed weeks for it to arrive at Gallipoli. In practice, SelborneexplainedthismeantthatsupplieshadtobedividedbetweentheWesternFrontandtheDardanelles.Theemphasisonsupplywasthefrontwhichproducedthebestresultswouldbesuppliedfirstandthemostoften.29Itwasallratherlikeaschoolboy being hauled up before theHeadmaster in order to explain himselfwhile theHeadhadalreadydecidedwhathadhappenedandthepunishment tofollow.Theinevitableclashbetweenmilitarythinkingandthatofpoliticianswasnot

slowincomingasHamiltonimmediatelyquestionedastatementfromSelborne.ThisstatementfromSelbornequestionedwhetherHamiltonwasalwaystruthfulin his reports back to theUK.Hamilton quickly and politely askedwhatwasmeantbythestatement.30SelbornehadtoadmitthatHamiltonhadneverstrayedfromthetruthinhisreportsandthensnake-tongued,cameupwiththisgemofareply:‘Noyouhaveneverfailedtodoso,butIknowquitewellwhataGenerallikeyou thinksof the averageCabinetMinister.You think thathe is apersonwholikesthingsputassmoothlyaspossible,andthathedoesnotliketobetoldanythingthathasgonewrongishisownfaultandthatgenerallyheissomewhatof a babe forwhom strongmeat is not a proper dish. Iwanted you clearly tounderstand that the Dardanelles Committee of the Cabinet is not really likethat.’31 IndeedHamiltonwasabout todiscover thatpoliticiansweremorewilyandtougherthananyenemyhehadfoughtduringhisentiremilitarycareerandwere tospelldisaster forhim. Itwasnotonlypoliticianswhowereconspiringagainsthim,butalsocertainmembersofthepressweredoingthesame,notably

Ashmead-BartlettandlatertheAustralianjournalist,KeithMurdoch.Therefore,asthesummerof1915progressedHamiltonwasawarethathewas

being attacked from all sides, and not only by the Turks. By the end ofMay1915 the original plan of the campaign had changed beyond recognition,especiallyasitwasfinallyconcededthattheRussianshadabandonedanyideaoflandingtroopstoforcetheBosphorus.32HamiltonobservedtoKitchenerthatpart of theGallipoli operation had been reliant onRussian assistance; he alsocomplained that French colonial troops were extremely unreliable, especiallywhen under artillery fire.33A telegram from the Base Commandant ofHamilton’s force to theWOon11June1915oncemorerequestedbombsandgrenades.Therewasaneedforabout10,000grenadesperweekofwhich4,000should have been rifle grenades. It had already been noted that therewere nomoreJapanesebombsormortars,soarequestwasmadetoincreasethesupplyof3.7-inchFrenchhowitzerbombsto3,000perweek.LateritwasobservedthatAlliedartillerywaseitherwearingoutorhadbeenhitanddamagedbyenemyfire.34 The use of howitzers rather than field artillerywas essential as the flattrajectoryofastandardfieldgundidnotallowforthenearlobbingofahowitzershell into the deep but narrow Turkish trenches. The higher trajectory of thehowitzer meant that a shell from such a piece wasmore likely to explode inenemytrenches,destroyingthemanditsinhabitants.EventsatGallipoliappearedtotakeaturnfortheworse,asinearlyJuly1915

Hamiltonreportedtheuseofpoisonousgasbytheenemyduringfightingon2July 1915.35 This is a curiousmissive as the acceptedwisdomconcerning thefightingatGallipoliisthatchemicalweaponswerenotusedbyeitherside,butthere was a series of other reports concerning unconventional weapons beingdeployedbytheenemyduringJuly1915.HamiltontoldMaxwelloftwoevents.The firstwas of a ‘noiseless bomb shell’which fell ontoANZAC and burieditself into thegroundandset the sandalight fora spaceof ten feetor so.ThesecondpreviouslyunseenweaponhadbeendeployedagainsttheFrenchandwasdescribedasajetofliquidwithtremendouspowerwhensquirtedintoatrench;anenemy trenchbombingparty tried,but failed toset italight.Hamilton tookthisasanomenthattheenemywasgettingdesperate.36Equally,itcouldbeseenthattheTurkshadaccesstonewweaponsandweretryingthemout.However,the incidence of unconventional weapons ratcheted up the ante at Gallipoli.Furthermore, itseemedthatHamiltonmayhavebeencorrect inhisassessmentoftheenemy’sposition,astheWOduringJuly1915informedHamilton’sHQ

that the Turks were beginning to suffer an ammunition shortage which waslinked to insufficient coal stocks in Turkey, necessary to power munitionplants.37EventhoughitisoftendeniedthatgaswasusedatGallipolithereisevidence

thattheenemyusedatleast‘teargas’atANZAC,whiletherewasalsosuspicionthatanothergaswasusedonatleastoneoccasionbytheenemy.Beanisquiteclear that the Germans were very determined to introduce gas or chemicalwarfare onto the Gallipoli peninsula.38 At the beginning of August 1915KitchenertoldHamiltonthatgassupplieswerebeingsent toGallipoliandthatheleftittoHamilton’sdiscretiontouseitornot,buthewastotellKitchenerifhe intended to use it as itmay lead to retaliation by theGermans against theAllies,probablyon theWesternFront.Kitcheneralso remarked that theTurkshadbeensuppliedwithGermangasbuthadrefusedtouseit.39ThiswasaninterestingpieceofinformationsuppliedbyKitchener,butitdoes

confusetheissueabouttheuseofgasbytheenemyatGallipoli.ItwouldseemfromthelittleevidenceavailablethattheGermansmayhaveexperimentedwiththe use of gas, which had caused no casualties amongst the Allies. Amemorandum prepared on 30August 1915 by the Committee of the ImperialGeneral Staff concerning the Dardanelles noted that to date on the peninsulatherehadbeenastraightfightwithnogasbeingusedbyeitherside.40InalettertoMajor-General Sir A.J. Godley dated 8 July 1915, the Australian General,JohnMonash, forwarded correspondence from his own brother-in-law, whichclearlystatedthatitwasalreadyknownthattheGermanshadsentcylindersofpoisonousgastoTurkey.41Itshouldbenotedthatonthewhole,manymenwhofought against the Turks considered that the Turks were ‘clean fighters’ andgoodsoldiers. Itwasfrequentlynoted that itwas theGermanswhocommittedatrocities at Gallipoli and not the Turks, but it was also the Germans whoseemedtowanttoadvancethefightingatGallipoli.The fighting at Gallipoli caused huge problems for internal security within

Turkey as the situation within the country began to deteriorate. A BritishintelligencereportconsideredthesituationinTurkey.Thepreviouslymentionedcoalshortagehadledtoapartialclosureofflourmills,whichdespiteaplentifulsupplyofgrain,hadledtoabreadshortageowingtotheinabilitytogrindgraintomakeflourinordertobakebread.Therealsoappearedtohavebeenapetrolshortage.ThesecircumstancesconspiredtocausediscontentwithinTurkeyandanger against both theGermans and thewar in general. Furthermore, Turkish

soldiers, even after the von Sanders’ reforms, were once more reduced towearing ragged uniforms and issued with outmoded rifles while many werebeggingforbreadandanendtothefighting.The British report reflected on the differences between the Turks and the

Germansbyearlysummer1915,especiallyastheTurkshadsufferedhorrendouslossesatGallipoli.Partof thereportread‘it issaid that theTurksproposedtoEnglandtoputinTewfikPashaasGrandVizier,tosueforpeace,butEnglandsays that theCommitteeofUnion andProgressmustbedone awaywith first.TheysaythatGoltzwenttoBerlintorepresentthatTurkeywasdoneup,andtopropose a separate peace, but was told to stick it out and not to care whathappenedtoTurkey.TheGermanshavetoresisttothelast,buttheTurkswanttogiveinnow,butarenotallowedto.Ofcourse,thegoverningTurkswereallfortheGermans,butthepeoplearebeginningtofeelthepinch.ThefameoftheAustralianshasgone far andwideatConstantinople.Even theGermansadmittheirsplendidfightingqualitiesandtheTurksthinktheyaremarvels.TheTurksalso express their fear of the “little men with knives”.’42 This was clearly areference to theGurkhas.Referencewas alsomade topolitical intriguewithinthe Turkish Officer Corps as anti-German sentiment spread. At the Taximbarracks,Turkish officers had fought against each otherwhile a batch of fiftyofficers had been taken under arrest to Constantinople. Informed opinionwasthat‘thegameisup’andthattherewasadesiretomakepeace.ThreehundredGermancivilianshadalreadyleftTurkeyonasingletrainandmorecontinuedtoleavethecountry.ThisGermanexoduscausedmanyTurkstoquestionwhytheGermanswere fleeingTurkeywhen theyhadassured theTurks that theyweresureofresistingtheAlliedlandings.43TheaforementionedTewfikPashawaswellknownto theBritishauthorities

asformanyyearshehadbeentheTurkishMinisterforForeignAffairs.PriortothewarhehadbeentheTurkishAmbassadortoLondonandwasreportedtobean Anglophile.44 However, what was important was the state of near revoltwithin theTurkishOfficerCorps,and thatdespitevonSanders’ reformsof theTurkish Army, the troops were once more reduced to their usual state ofbeggary. Furthermore, reformswhich had been put into place by von Sandersimmediatelybeforethewar,whichhadincludedwholesalepurgesoftheTurkishOfficerCorps,hadfailedtoproducetheapoliticalforcewhichtheGermanshadsought.The scenesofGermancivilians fleeingTurkeynodoubt causedmanyTurkstodoubtifvictoryagainsttheAllieswasachievable,whilethefearofthereputations of theAustralians andGurkhas alonewould have seemed to have

doomed the Turkish Army to defeat at Gallipoli. However, politics and themilitary are strange bedfellows and should be kept apart, as they are equallyunpredictableowingtotheirvolatilenatures,andoftenbothlackreason.On7June1915itwasreportedthatmostTurkishofficershadbeenreplaced

by German officers. What was being sought by the Germans was politicalreliabilitywithintheTurkishOfficerCorps,whichwasoneofthemainreasonswhycadetsfromTurkishmilitaryschoolshadalsobeenhastilycommissioned,despite not having finished their training. Indeed some had hardly begun it.ApparentlyAlliedattacksagainst theTurkson9June1915hadcausedagreatloss inTurkishmoraleas theTurks sufferedover3,000deadandwounded. Itwasalsonoted that ‘Theopinionof theTurkishofficers issaid tobe that theywillsoonlosethepositiontheynowholdastheyhavenotsufficienttroopsandammunition to come to their assistance.’45 An earlier report, 7 June 1915,suggestedthatmoraleinConstantinoplewasverylowowingtotheperceptionofAllied successes at Gallipoli and that strenuous efforts were being made inmilitary circles to remove troops and ammunition from the Turkish capital. Itwas rumoured that the ItalianAmbassador was about to be approached as anintermediary for peacenegotiations.However, itwould seem that some thingswerenotasblackasmanyinConstantinoplehadthought,asmunitionswerestillavailableviaRomaniaandtheGermansensuredtheirpassagetoTurkey.Therewas another obvious bonus in that Greeks (normally the enemy of the Turk)were still spying on the British; as a consequence the Turks knew all Britishplansandmovements.46TherewerefurtherreportsfromConstantinople.AnItalianlivingtheremade

reportsconcerninganti-GermanfeelinginTurkey,whichreachedtheBritish.Itwasalleged thatan importantGermanofficerhadbeenmurderedbyaTurk inConstantinople at the beginning of June 1915. Much of the troubled Turco-German relationship was due to the fact that many Turks considered that theGermanslivinginTurkeywereleadingarelativelyluxuriouslifestylecomparedwith that of the locals who were suffering shortages, especially food. Theshortages were blamed upon the war, which appeared to be going againstTurkey.47 On paper thewar did seem to be going against Turkey, as Turkishcasualties at theDardanellesbymid-June1915were reported asbeing12,000dead,80,000woundedand20,000 sick.Theauthorof this reportwasalso thebearer of a letter from a Turkish Gendarmerie Captain stationed near Bulair.ThisletterexpressedaviolenthatredfortheGermanswhomheregardedas‘theauthorsofwhatisboundtobethefinalcatastropheoftheTurkishEmpire’.48

AgainitseemedthatTurkishmoralewasatalowebb.EveniftheTurksnolonger feared a Russian attack from across the Black Sea; they remainedpreoccupied with the Anglo-French assault at the Dardanelles ‘because theBritish once they have decided on doing a thing will surely carry the samesooner or later to a successful conclusion in spite of every opposition’.49 TheTurkish Captain’s conclusion was correct, but how was he to know that theBritishorrathertheBritishWarCabinetandWOhadalreadydecidednottoseethe Gallipoli offensive through to the bitter end. This was what hamperedHamiltonashestrovetocarryouthisordersandcapturetheGallipolipeninsulainorder toallowpassagefor theAlliedfleetspast thefortsontheDardanellesand then appear as if by magic off Constantinople, where the Turks wereexpectedtopanicandsurrendertotheAllies.InafurtherreportfromtheAdrianoplefrontier(todayEdirneTurkish-Greek

bordernorthof theGallipolipeninsula) itwas said thatTurkishmoraleon thepeninsulawasworsening.Gallipoliwas known amongstTurkish troops as the‘Slaughter House’. A consequence of the decline in Turkish morale was thatfighting troopswerebeing replacedbyyoung troopsmoreused togarrisoningThraciantowns,andtheirdutiesweretakenoverbyoldmen.50ThesamereportalsospokeofcontinuedunrestinTurkeyandmentionedthattwentypeoplehadbeen hanged in Constantinople for alleged conspiracy against the TurkishMinister of the Interior, Talaat Bey.51 Overall though, most available reportsspokeof the build upof chemicals andparaphernalia necessary for the use ofpoisonousgasasaweaponofwarattheDardanellesandwasmostdisconcertingfortheAllies.52On11July1915asecretreportwasreceivedconcerningTurkishactivity.It

wassuggestedthataforceof100,000menwasbeingbuiltupforafinalattackagainst theAllies on the peninsula. Thiswas to be reinforcedwith the use of‘gas,inflammableliquidsandallpossiblemeans’ofdislodgingtheAlliestobeemployed. It was known that chemicals for the above had already arrived inConstantinople.Furthermore,‘bigguns’werealsoontheirway.Thereportwasmore or less substantiated byTurkish prisoners taken by theAllies.However,despitetheGermanambitionsfortheuseofgasandotherchemicalweapons,theTurksrefusedtousethem.53TheanimositybetweentheTurksandtheGermanscontinuedthroughoutthe

summer of 1915, as was the poor provision by the Turks of Gallipoli asgendarmerieandpoliceunitsweredraftedinfromallovertheTurkishmainland

to maintain the defences of the peninsula, but with inadequate training andweapons.ItseemedthattheTurkishfrontmightcollapseatanytime,especiallyastheBritishcontinuedtoreceiveintelligencereportsoffurtherdisharmonyinGerman-Turkish relations. These reports were wide-reaching and mentionedfour Turkish officers and aGerman being brought handcuffed fromGallipoli;the German military attaché in Constantinople was reported to have beenmurdered,andthattherehadbeenamutinyamongstTurkishtroopsatChataljaastheyrefusedtoleavefortheFront.54ThedeathoftheGermanmilitaryattachéproved to have been suicide. It was reported that he had proposed a plan ofattack on the peninsula. This plan had not been approved by von Sanders,thereforetheGermanAmbassadorcleareditwiththeauthoritiesinBerlinanditwascarriedout atgreat loss to theTurkishArmy.The report claimed that thesuicide of the German military attaché was due to the failure of his plan.Meanwhile,anti-GermanagitationwithintheTurkishArmycontinuedandsawfifteen more Turkish officers arrested and taken in handcuffs toConstantinople.55Despite,orperhapsinspiteoftheunsatisfactorysituationbetweentheTurks

and theGermans, theGreekattaché inConstantinopleofferedhisopinion thatthe Turks were about to go on the offensive oncemore. He claimed that thepredicted Turkish offensive was, incredibly, a combination of an increasingshortageofmunitions,disaffectionamongstTurkishtroopsandtheincreasinglybadrelationsbetweentheGermansandtheTurks.Inhisviewtheattackwastohappenduring the first fortnight ofRamazan (Ramadan)whichwasbefore 27July 1915.56 Clearly, some considered that the best way to prevent furthertensionbetweentheTurksandGermanswastogivetheTurkishsomethingtodosuchasanunder-armedoffensive,butitkeptthemoutofmischief.TherewasaneedtokeeptheTurkishArmybusyasanotherBritishintelligencereportfor27July1915notedthatafterthesuicideoftheGermanmilitaryattaché,aplothadbeen discovered to killmoreGerman officers; Turkish officers from 2nd, 3rdand 5th Corps were implicated. It was further revealed that between 14May1915 and the time of the German diplomat’s suicide in early July 1915, fourGerman officers had been killed inConstantinople, eight in theCaucasus andmore at the Dardanelles.57 The implication was that these were not combatdeaths(howcouldtheConstantinopledeathsbeso?),butmurderscommittedbyTurkishofficers.The situation in the Turkish Army and its relationship with their German

advisors was reported on at the beginning of August 1915; the source of the

reportwasconsideredbyBritish Intelligence tohavebeen ‘very reliable’.ThereportcertainlyseemedtoprovethattheGreekmilitaryattachéhadbeencorrectinhispredictionofacomingTurkishoffensive.ItwasrevealedthatEnverhaddecided on an offensive against the Allies to begin on 23 July 1915 and hadissuedorderstothiseffect.AmeetinghadbeenheldinasmallTurkishvillagebetweenseniorTurkishandGermanofficersincludingEnver,YoussoufIzzedineandtheGermancommanderVonderGoltztodiscussthisoffensive.InviewofthecrapulousstateoftheTurkishArmyanditsshortageofammunition,Enverwaspersuadedtoabandonthisoffensivedespitehisenthusiasmforit.Afterthemeeting, Izzedinewent toAdrianople to inspect the troops there and to try toraise their morale. When he got there he found the soldiers on the verge ofmutiny and almost out of control. His visit achieved nothing, as the Turkishtroops there refused to go to Gallipoli as they had nowish to proceed to the‘SlaughterHouse’.Thesamebulletinwasveryclear that the relationshipbetween theGermans

and theTurks remainedvery low.TheTurksopenly stated that theyhadbeenmisledbytheGermans,whohadlefttheminthecart;‘bizétchovalasoktoulér’.In reply, theGermanssaid that theTurkswere‘ignorantanimalsandhavenotthe welfare of their country at heart’. The abandonment of the 23 July 1915attack was attributed to the fact that many Turks were prepared to desert toAlliedlines.However,twothingsseemedtopreventthem;itwasconsideredthatsomeoftheAlliedregimentsdidnottakeprisonersandtheotherreasonwasthatprisonerswereputonshipsandkeptincageswheretheywerebadlytreated.Itwas also revealed that the Turks had troops stationed behind them to try toprevent desertions, but if Turkish troops were threatening to desert en massetherewould have been little that could have been done to prevent them fromdoingso.AfurtherproblemfortheTurkishauthoritieswasthequestionofminoritiesas

Kurds,Lazes andCirassianshadvolunteered for service in theTurkishArmy,but theywereunder the impression that theAllieswereabout tobedrivenoffthe peninsula and would have ample opportunity for looting. Once it wasdiscovered that this was not the case, they wanted to leave the area ofoperations.58Regardingthematterofminorities,afurtherintelligencereportmadeitquite

clearthattheTurkishArmywasinvolvedinthemassacreofArmeniancivilians,asinearlyJune1915twodivisionsoftheTurkishArmywereusedtomassacre12,000womenwhowerekilledatKharputfollowingthattown’soccupationby

theArmenianRevolutionaryCommittee.ItwasalsoreportedthattheTurksweredeportingArmenianfamiliesenmasstoBagdadVillayet.59Theanimositybetween theGermansand theTurkscontinuedunabated.The

GermansmayhavebeenwillingtosquanderTurkishlives inmassattacks,buttheywere notwilling to helpwith thewounded, as aTurkish doctorwho leftConstantinopleon15July1915statedthattherewasagreatlackofchloroform,iodineandmorphineand thatsurgeonswerecompelled tocarryoutoperationswithout anaesthetics. It was noted that the Germans were unwilling to sendsupplies of such surgical supplies as they needed them for themselves.60Furthermore, the intrigue against both the Germans and the Young TurksCommittee which was determined to modernize and reform Turkey and itsempire, but in amannerwhich suited itself and perhaps not their compatriotscontinued, especially amongst conservative minded Turkish officers. A reportclaimed that a party of military officers that had plotted against the YoungTurks, had been summoned from the Caucasus back to Constantinople andsecretlyexecuted.61TherewerefurtherarrestsofTurkishofficersincludingtwogeneralsandaColonelHairiBey,withoverascoreoffurtherarrestsinrelationtoaplotagainstEnver.TherewasalsoafurtherreportofamutinyatAdrianopleas troops refused to leave for theFront.Thismutinywas quelled, but left theTurkishGovernmentshakenandworriedforthefuture.62Throughout this chapter, using British intelligence reports originating from

insideofTurkey,IhaveattemptedtoillustratethefactthattheTurkswerenotatoolof theGermans,butwere in factquite independentof thoughtandaction.Furthermore,therewerenotenoughGermansinTurkeytodominatetheTurkishArmy,especially theTurkishOfficerCorps.However, in1915andafterwards,there was a perception that the Turks had been misled by their ‘Germanmasters’. The overall thesiswas that Europeans, especially ‘white Europeans’willalwaysdefeat‘inferiorraces’despitetheevidenceoftheJapanesedefeatofRussiain1905.ItwasallveryinconvenientfortheAlliesnottohavemadeanyprogressagainstnon-Christiannon-Europeansin1915.The British journalist Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett reminded his readers that the

Turks, far frombeing ledorotherwiseby theGermans,werequite capableofmaking their own decisions, wrong or right, but still their own decisions.63Ashmead-Bartlettwas correct inhis assertion that theTurkswere stillmakingtheir own decisions, but with a great deal of German influence rather thanadvice, an example being that the Turks declined to use poisonous gas as a

weapon against the Allies. It may have been the case that they feared Alliedretaliation,butthefactremainstheTurksdidnotusepoisonousgasasaweaponofwardespite theGermansmakingitavailable,nodoubtatgreatexpenseandinconvenience transporting thenecessary equipment toTurkey fromGermany.However,Turkey’sweaknessin1915wastheinternalturmoil,whichithadbeenundergoing since 1908 as it sought to bringmodernity to the country and itsempire.GermanyandtheYoungTurkmovementwereinthevanguardofthis,butaconservativeandlargelyreligiouspopulationseemedtoresentthechanges.C.E.W.BeannotedthatthecasualnessandbackwardnessoftheTurksnodoubtirritatedtheGermans.64However,afteradecadeofwarmanyTurksweretired,soanewandmuchlargerwarnotoftheirmaking,againstamoresophisticatedenemy, exasperated the internal situation in Turkey. The war with BritainaccordingtoareportfromRomewastakingitstollontheTurks.65AgainstsuchabackgrounditisincrediblethattheAlliesmanagedtolosethe

campaign by the end of 1915. It should be seen that politicians and civiliansundidtheentirecampaignatGallipoli.TherelationshipbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianpoliticianscanbebestsummedupbyaTurkishofficertowardstheendofJuly1915;atimeofanotherarmisticewhenafurther3,000Turkdeadinfrontof ANZAC lines were buried. As a chaplain read a burial service, a TurkishofficerlookingatthemassgravesaidinEnglish,‘Well,Godblessthesoldiersand damnation to all politicians’.66 No doubt most soldiers from both sidesmuttered‘Amentothat!’

B

ChapterSix

FightingandtheTruth

ythesummerof1915thefrontontheGallipolipeninsulahadbeguntoresemble the Western Front.1 A new operation was required in the

Eastern Mediterranean in order to make a breakthrough and it was requiredquickly.TheGenerals and politicians scratched their heads and tried to figureout such an offensive. The next offensive was indeed looming large. A thenjuniorofficerdestinedtosucceedinhiscareer,reflectednearlyfiftyyearslaterthat the operationwas also doomedowing to politics.Hewas referring to thechange ofGovernment in theUK and its procrastination. The consequence ofthiswasthatwhenthesecondinvasionoftheGallipolipeninsulawasattempted,it was already high summer and many of the soldiers attempting this assaultwereexhaustedbeforetheyhadevenlanded.2ItwastobeyetanotherneedlesshamperingofoperationsintheEasternMediterranean,whichaccordingtomanywhoservedintheareashouldhaveworked.Politiciansletthemdownandmoresoldiersandsailorswereabouttodiebecauseofthegrossignoranceofcivilianpoliticians.HamiltonremainedoptimisticaboutoperationsontheGallipolipeninsulaand

wrotetoChurchill‘Inalloftheworld’shistorysurelythisisthequeerestofallmilitaryoperationsthathaseverarisen.WehaveturnedGallipoliintoacockpit,whereunto we have drawn to ourselves, as if with a magnet, all of the bestavailableresourcesofavast,ifdecayingempire,theadvantagesareobvious.WeareattackingConstantinopleinsteadofdefendingCairo.WereitnotforusBasrawouldhave fallen before theTurks andVanwould not have fallen before theRussians.TheobjectlessontotheBalkanStatesisnearathandandcontagious.

All these are broad considerations. From the narrow, technical point of view,nothingintheworldcouldsuittheTurksbetterthantohavebothflanksrestingonthesea(yetinthegroundsoconformedthattheycannotbebombardedfromthesea)sotheirstupid,butexceedinglybrave,infantry,canbesetdowntofightwith perfectly simple orders to stick where they are at all costs, and shootanybodywhoadvancesagainstthem.’3The Turkish defensive system was perhaps indeed simplistic but quite

effective, as theAllies couldhardlyget off thebeaches atGallipoli.Hamiltonwould have been well aware that in reality the Turks in defence were hardly‘stupid’ especially once reinforced with German military technology andscience.However,whenevertheTurksadvancedinmassformations,theyweregenerally slaughtered in their thousands, but equally, sowereHamilton’smenmassacredwhenevertheyleftthesafetyoftheirowntrenchesinordertomakeanadvance.Thismeant thatmanyhundredsand thousandsofmenwerekilledfor a fewhundredyardsof front.This alsohappenedon theWesternFront inFranceandinFlanders.The main difference between the Turks and the MEF was that the Turks

receivedreinforcementsandhadrestperiods;theAllieshadneither.Inhisdiary,Hamiltonobservedthaton12May1915,forthefirsttimeineighteendaysandnights,hehadbeenabletowithdraw29thDivisionfromthefront line.Duringthat timetheyhadbeenunderconstantattackandhadsufferedterrible losses.4However, as we have already seen, being sent from the front to the rear atGallipoliforAlliedtroopswasnotassafeasitsoundsastheAlliedfrontwasnotvery deep and as a result rear bases were vulnerable to long range Turkishartillery.ThefollowingdaytheAlliesweretosufferatremendouslossasHMSGoliath was sunk by a Turkish torpedo boat. Even Hamilton recognised theaudacity of this Turkish action and saluted it as one professional to another.5Indeed the sinkingofHMSGoliathwas an audacious act by theTurkswhichinvolved using the correct signals when challenged by British naval craft indarkness.TheassumptionisthattheTurkshadcapturedthecodebookfromtheBritish submarineE.15whichhadbeen runaground inanactionon14April1915andhadbeenblownupbyitscrew.6By now Hamilton was fretting about the lack of space on the Gallipoli

peninsula as even he and his Staff were on top of each other. Hamiltonconsidered that the only way in which he could give the various DivisionalStaffs a sense of independence and not have the impression that he wasbreathingdowntheirneckswastoremovehimselfwithGeneralBraithwaite,his

ChiefofStaff,backouttosea.7ThelackofspacegaveHamiltongreatcauseforconcernasheconsideredhisoptions foramajoroffensivewhichwouldbreakthebackofTurkishdefences,ledbyGermanofficersornot.Oneoftheleadinglights of theGallipoli peninsula,General SirWilliamBirdwood, commandingthe ANZAC force, also contemplated the best possible plan to clear thepeninsula and allow Allied naval forces to finally sweep up and through theDardanelles Straits and appear off Constantinople. At times it seemed thatpeople had forgotten what the Allies were supposed to be doing on Turkishterritory.BirdwoodconsideredthatANZAChadtobreakoutofitspositionandwouldeventuallyhavetoattackatSuvlaBayjustbeyondhislefthandposition.Hethereforegaveordersthatthereshouldnotbeanydemonstrationorattackinthat direction.Hewanted theTurks to gain the impression that theAllies hadignoredorhadoverlookedthisareaasaprobableplaceforanoffensive.8Once more Hamilton lamented the depletion of his force as he cabled

Kitchener, giving him the latest information about 29th Division whomHamiltonconsideredtobethe‘backbone’oftheMEF.TheDivisionwasshortofover11,000menand400officers.HamiltonobservedthatifhehadbeeninFrancetheselosseswouldhavebeenswiftlyreplacedandhealsonotedthat29thDivisionhadbeensentouttohimminustheusual10percentofmentoreplacecasualties.InotherwordshehadbeenshortchangedbyKitchenerfromtheveryoutset regarding the deployment of 29th Division in the Mediterranean.Furthermore, as ever, Hamilton was cautious in how he wrote his cable toKitchenerasinsteadofbeingverybluntanddemanding,finishedthecableonanoptimisticnote,tellingKitchenerthattheGurkhashadmadeanadvanceof600yardsandcontinuedtoholdthisnewlycapturedposition.9Thiswasareferencetotheactionfoughtonthewetnightof12–13May1915

when 1/6 Gurkhas had swarmed up a cliff known as Gully Spur and despitefindingtheridgethere(GullyRidge)lightlydefended,sufferedtwelvedeadandforty-twowounded in the immediateattack.Bellamynotes that theGurkhas intheiruniquemethodoffighting,usingthetraditionalall-purposelargeandheavybladed kukri knives, decapitated twelve Turks in addition to those shot in thefighting. The Turks counterattacked but could not remove the Gurkhas. ThepositioncapturedbytheGurkhaswastobecomeimportanttotheAlliesasitnotonlyaffordedthemshelterfromTurkishfire,butalsobecamethemainarteryforcommunicationsastheAlliestriedtoadvancenorthwards.10ThisnewsmayhavelightenedKitchener’smoodbutitdidnotreplacebadly

needed men and equipment. Prior notes that Hamilton’s communications to

Kitchenerwere ‘uncomplaining, determined tomake themost ofwhat he hadand at the same time mealy-mouthed and highly detrimental to his army’.11However, as Hamilton confided to FieldMarshal Sir John French, there wasplentyofheavyfightingatGallipoli,but little toshowforitbeyond.HamiltonalsoobservedtoChurchill,theTurkswereonthedefensiveandnottheoffensiveand endangering Egypt.12 Clearly if both sides were fighting a defensive warwith the occasional slaughter for a few hundred yards, there was a desperateneedtobreakthroughthisimpasseanditwasfortheAlliestodiscoverhow,astheTurksseemedtobeabletodefendtheirpositionsforever,orsoitseemed.TheovertiredAllieswereslowlybeingbledtodeathontheGallipolipeninsulawith littleornothingforthcoming in thewayof replacements for thedeadandwoundedorevenrestandrespiteforthevastlyreducedAlliedbattalionstryingtoholdtheline.AttheendofJuneandbeginningofJuly1915,Hamiltonbegantofillinsome

of the blanks in his communiqués to Kitchener. In one dispatch he informedKitchenerthatthetroopsof42ndDivision(EastLancashire)weretiredandwereonthewholeyoungboyswhohadbeenfightingfornearlysixweekswithlittlesleep. At the same time he also requestedmore ammunition.13 Hamilton toldGeneralHenrySclater,theAdjutant-GeneraltotheForcesandamemberoftheBritishWar Council that even the much respected Gurkhas were suffering atGallipoli due to the exceptionallyheavy fighting there.Hamilton reported thattheGurkhas,bythebeginningofJuly1915,hadlostnearlyalloftheirofficersand he initially wrote ‘did a bolt night before last’ before correcting himselfwriting in ink along the typescript ‘not in these words at least’. Once moreHamiltonhadtocallon‘poorold29thDivision’toshoreupwheretheGurkhashadfailed.TheInniskillingFusiliersretooktheGurkhatrench,buttheyhavelostall of their officers except for two, but were willing to fight; however theGurkhas were ‘finished for (the) present’.14 This seemed ominous: if theGurkhaswere‘finished’,whatthenoftheremainderofHamilton’sforce?However,therewasanotherforceatworkwhichwastoundobothHamilton

and the entire Gallipoli campaign: the Press. The printed Press was the onlyavailablemediain1915anditwastocausemaximumdamagetoHamiltonasitsought toundermine themilitaryoperations inGallipoli, aswell as engineer adebate about the concept of conscription in theUK.Furthermore, it raised thequestion of the problem concerning the supply ofmunitions, not only for theMEFbut also for theWesternFront.At thebeginningof June1915Hamiltonmentioned to GeneralWolfeMurray that the British public knew little of his

work at Gallipoli and was grateful forWolfeMurray’s support.15 Hamilton’scommand at Gallipoli was about to be micro-examined by a committee ofignoramuseswhodidnotunderstandwarorthearmy,andbytheBritishgeneralpublicwhichisgenerallyungratefulnomatterthecircumstancesorsubjectoncearabble-rousingmediahasdoneitsill-consideredwork.WolfeMurraymadequiteanalarmingassessmentofthesituationfacingboth

him and Hamilton regarding manpower, as on 10 July 1915 he wrote toHamilton and told him that even though Hamilton had requested that 29thDivision shouldbekept to full establishment (‘kept full’), therewere tobenofurther replacements as there were not enough men to do so. What wasbecomingveryclearasKitchenerhadalreadysaidinhisMansionHousespeech,that if the voluntary system of recruitment failed, then conscription wouldfollow.WolfeMurrayalsomadetheobservationthatthequestionofamunitionsshortagewas a political conundrum as therewas very little point in having asteadysupplyofmunitions,butnotenoughmentofirethemoff.WolfeMurraywasconvincedthatDavidLloydGeorgewasplottingwiththeNorthcliffePressinordertotrytotripupKitcheneroverthequestionofmunitions,butwiththeintention of trying to unseat Herbert Asquith from the post of British PrimeMinister,asLloydGeorgehadambitionsforthishighoffice.16Hamilton surprisingly, given that hewas quite against conscription and not

muchof a realistmost of the time, confided toWolfeMurray that he thoughteventuallytheUKwouldbedriventointroducingconscriptionintheeventofalarge scale European war. He noted that his views had to be kept privateaccording to formerChiefsofStaff,anodperhaps todemocraticcivil-militaryrelations in which serving service personnel should not indulge in publicdiscourseconcerningpoliticaldecisionsmadebydemocraticallyelectedcivilianpoliticians. Hamilton’s former mentor, Lord Roberts, a generation earlier hadbeenquitevocalinhisdenunciationsofmilitaryreforms,butby1915thingshadchanged.HamiltontoldWolfeMurraythatthereshouldatleasthavebeensomeformof

registrationwhichmade itquiteclear toyoungmen thatgivenacertain setofcircumstances therewasaprobability that the statemightbe forced tocompelthemtoservetheircountry.17Thiswasprettyradicalthinking,asHamiltonasaprofessionalmilitaryofficerthoughtlittleoftheamateur‘civilian-soldier’whiletheaverageBritishcitizenwasmoreaccustomedtothestateleavingthemalone,andwithnocompulsiontoservetheirmonarchorcountry.Thedeficiencyintheestablishmentof29thDivision,whichHamiltondesperatelyneededtoaddressin

order to continue his campaign atGallipoli, had concentrated hismind as hisarmy was slowly being bled to death. As Hamilton remarked to Macready,officerswerebeingkilledatGallipolifasterthantheywereinFrance.18Hamilton, inhisprevious criticismof the ‘NewArmies’ soon learnt that he

hadbeenunfairasthesearmiesswiftlylearnttoadapttothenewcircumstancesof thewar.As he disclosed to FieldMarshalLordMethuen, theNewArmiesimpressedhimandthe13thDivisionwhichwascurrentlyinthetrenchesonthefront linesatGallipolihadquickly learnt the‘veryspecializedstyleofmodernfighting’ with the enemy being very close by; anything between 10 and 150yards separated theAllied trenches from those of their enemies.Theweaponsbeingusedwerechieflybombs(handgrenades)andbayonets.19Itcouldbeseenthattheso-called‘amateur’soldiersfromtheNewArmiesmighthavebeenmorereceptive to newmethods of warfare as they had not been indoctrinatedwithmodesoffightingwhichhadbeensuitableforpreviouswarssuchastheSecondAnglo-Boer War (1899–1902), which had been more about movement andattackdespiteseveralsiegesduringtheopeningweeksofthatwar.Thefightingat Gallipoli and on the Western Front was largely static with the occasionalattackonenemytrencheswhichweredefendedbymachineguns,while trenchraids sawbrutal hand-to-hand fighting using bayonets, knives and entrenchingtools. There had been a time when Hamilton had waxed lyrical about hisvolunteerforceandconsideredthatboththemenandofficerswouldhaveratherdied thangive in to theTurks,but the realityofGallipoli settledanyromanticnotionsofdeathorglory.20WithinafewdaysofhardfightingagainsttheTurks,Hamilton’swordsseemedfoolish,buttheoriginalsentimentwastypicalof theracismoftheBritishin1915.ThousandsofAlliedsoldiersweretodieoverthenextfewmonthsasaresultofsuchnonsense.A further concern for Hamilton was that of wounded officers who were

determined to avoid returning to theFront inGallipoli.Hamiltonwas alarmedthatmedicalboardswerebeing too lenient andmanyofficerswere allowed toreturn to theUKonmedical grounds. Itwas consideredbymanydoctors thatmanyofficerssufferedfrombattlefatigueandstressmuchmorethantheirmen.Hamiltonasaseasonedcampaignerconsideredthatitwastheotherwayaroundand as a result he became somewhat sceptical of the suitability of temporaryofficers being sent out to Gallipoli once compared with regular officers.However, there was a suspicion that General Hunter-Westonmay have had abreakdownowingtothestressofthefightingatGallipoli.Overall,Hamiltonwasdetermined to retainasmanyofficersaspossibleandstem thehaemorrhage.21

However it would seem that he failed in this as the problem became worselater.22Inaddition tohisperennialmanpower shortage,Hamiltonwas subject toan

investigationaswehaveseenbypoliticiansandcivilservants,evenontheeveof the second attempted landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Suvla Baylandingsbeginningat22:00hours,6August1915.Soonreportsfromex-RoyalMarine Lieutenant-ColonelMauriceHankey, and since 1912, Secretary to theCommitteeof ImperialDefence,weremadeknown followinghisobservationsof thebreakdownofoperationsatSuvlaBay.Hankey reported toAsquithandKitchenerthattroopsfightingatSuvlaBayhadbeenletdownbybadStaffworkand that Hamilton was dominated by his own Chief of Staff, GeneralWalterBraithwaite. Furthermore,Hankey opined thatGeneralBirdwood,Commanderof ANZAC, should have been given at least the entire northern area of theoperation tomanageashehadfirst rateStaffandwas theonlyGeneralon thepeninsulawhohadgainedanygreatsuccess,andhadbeenabletoimpress‘hispersonalityonhistroops’.HankeyreportedthatBraithwaitehadunderestimatedBirdwood and that Hamilton refused to promote the Australian General as aresult.23Hamiltonasweshallsee,didactuallyadmireBirdwoodandconsideredpromotinghim,butHankeywasquitewronginhisobservationofBirdwood,asRobert Rhodes James notes that Birdwood was stiff and constrained in hisconversationswithhismenandsoboredthemwhileequallytheyboredhim.24Hankey had reached his conclusions after only the briefest of visits. There

shouldalsobea suspicion thathehadalreadymadehismindupwhathewasgoingtofindatGallipoliandwhathisconclusionsshouldbe.GeneralBirdwoodmadetheobservationthatafterHamiltonhadbeensackedduringthemiddleofOctober1915,Kitchener tinkeredwith the ideaof anothernaval assault in theDardanelles area. Furthermore, Kitchener was against any consideration ofevacuating the peninsula. Birdwood had immediately cabledKitchener statinghisoppositiontoanysuchplan,whichBirdwoodconsideredcouldonlyendindisaster, if only due to the comingwinterweather.He soon got his reply andlearnt that Kitchener was coming to Gallipoli and indeed arrived on 10November 1915. Kitchener had feared that Birdwood had lost his nerve andneeded to be replaced. However, on arriving at ANZAC and seeing thebattlefield for himself Kitchener agreed with Birdwood. Kitchener consideredthattheAllieshaddoneverywellsinceApril,giventhecircumstancestheywereexpected to fight in. There was no more talk of further operations and fairlyswiftlythepeninsulawasevacuated.25HankeywasonlyinGallipolipolitically

meddlingand looking forascapegoat toblamerather than try to findwhy thecampaignwasfailing.Heshouldhavelookedathispoliticalmastersratherthanthesoldierssenttodieinordertotrytoobtainaverycheapvictory.Aside from theenemy,Hamilton’sgreatestproblematGallipoliwas thatof

theANZACormorespecificallytheAustraliansandthequestionofwhoshouldcommand them. The Governor-General of Australia, representing the Britishmonarch and government inAustralia toldHamilton that anythingwhichwasseenasaslightagainstthereputationofAustraliaanditssoldierswasamplifiedin theAustralianmedia.Thishad its repercussionswith theAustraliangeneralpublic and amongst Australian politicians. In Australia, quite rightly, peoplewereanxiousthatAustraliantroopsattheFrontshouldbecommandedandledby the best possible officers, but what was really meant was that Australiantroops should be led byAustralian officers rather thanBritish officers.MunroFerguson noted that like their British counterparts,Australian politicianswerequite ignorant of military affairs. He referred to the recent appointment ofGeneral Legge as Commander of both the Australian 1st Division and theAustralian Imperial Force following the death of their previous Commander,Major-General SirWilliamBridges, after being fatallywounded by a Turkishsniperon15May1915.MunroFergusonwassurprisedthattheWarOfficehadapprovedLegge’sappointmentwithoutreferringtoHamilton.26Legge’s appointmenthad indeedbeencontroversial andhad ruffled feathers

amongstAustralian commanders atGallipoli. HarveyBroadbent observes thatthe‘ANZAClegend’whichwasbeginningtogrowduring1915aroundeventsatGallipoliwaspartofAustraliansbeginning to forgeanational identitydistinctfromthatoftheUK,theso-called‘MotherCountry’.27Therefore,itcannotcomeasasurprisethattheAustralianPrimeMinister,AndrewFisher,stoodfirmwhentheAustralianGovernmentchoseLeggeasBridges’successor.Theproblemwasthat Legge was only a Colonel and that other Colonels actually fighting atGallipoli, Chauvel, McCay and Monash, were disappointed with Fisher’sdecision and considered that they had been passed over for promotion by anofficer who was their junior and furthermore had had no recent combatexperience. The three colonels protested to bothHamilton and Birdwood, butLegge’sappointmentwasconfirmedandhewaspromotedtoMajorGeneralon22June1915.LeggetriedtowinoverhissubordinatesafterarrivingatMudroson24June

1915,arrangingforthethreedisappointedcolonelstobepromotedtobrigadier-generals in linewith theBritish practice.However, he clashedwithBirdwood

over the plan for the August 1915 offensive at ANZAC Cove. Legge, likeBridges,had felt that theproposedassaultonLonePinewouldbebloodyandfutileunless thehighgroundabovewasseized first.Birdwoodconsidered thatonly an attack on a key position such asLonePinewould cause theTurks todivert from opposing the main offensive. Both men were proved right.Eventually,BirdwoodwasabletogetridofLeggeasBrigadierGeneralMcCay(oneofthepassedovercolonels)wasabouttotakecommandof2ndAustralianDivisionbeingformedinEgypt,butbeforehecouldtakeoverthispostMcCaybroke his leg. McCay was evacuated from Gallipoli on 11 July 1915 andBirdwoodsentLeggetoEgypttoreplaceMcCay.OnceLeggewasinEgypthiscommandoftheAIFlapsed.ItisnottotallyclearwhyFisher,borninScotland,should support the London East End boy (Legge was born in Hackney) overChauvelorMonash,whowereatleastborninAustralia,giventhat1915wasatimeofgrowingAustraliannationalawarenessandtryingtomakeabreakfromUK.AfterthefailureofthesecondmajorAlliedlandingsatGallipoliandshortly

before he was replaced, Hamilton discussed at length in a letter to MunroFerguson his feelings about Australian commanders. Throughout the entirecampaign at Gallipoli Hamilton had been impressed by the conduct of theAustralians and was not prejudiced against Australian officers commandingBritishtroopsatBrigadelevel.Heconsideredittobe‘simplyludicrous’topassoveramanforpromotionsimplybecausehewasanAustralian.HamiltonwasaddressinghimselftoMunroFerguson,asheknewastheBritishrepresentativein Australia he might be able to set the record straight regarding events atGallipoliandAustralianperceptionsofBritishcommandersthere.Hamiltonwaswell aware that the Australian press was extremely hostile towards anythingBritish,especially theBritishHighCommandand itsconsidered incompetenceatGallipoli,whichintheAustralianpopularmindhadresultedinanunnecessaryhighAustralian casualty rate.Hamilton did consider that there hadbeen somerealinjusticedoneinthepasttoAustraliansbytheBritishestablishment,buthebeggedMunroFerguson tobelieve thatatGallipoli ‘in thefaceofanyenemy,westartwithacleanslate’.28Regarding ANZAC casualties at Gallipoli, Robert Rhodes James notes that

manyAustralians remain ignorantof the fact that farmoreBritish,FrenchandIndian troopsdiedatGallipoli thanmembersofANZACandmosthaveneverheardofHellesorSuvlaBay.29Suchisthepowerofanationalmyth,especiallyonceitispronouncedastruebythemedia,regardlessofthetruth.

HamiltontriedtomakehispositionasamilitarycommandercleartoMunroFerguson.Inamannerentirelydevoidofemotion,popularizationornationalistcontent,Hamiltonsaidthatinhisopinionamilitaryofficerhadtobeeducatedinacertainmanner.HamiltonobservedthatduringtheAmericanCivilWar(onlyfiftyyearsearlier)almostalloftheofficerswhoacquiredgreatnessduringthatconflicthadbeenprofessionalsoldiers.Hamiltontookthelinethatittookalongtimetoproduceatruefunctioningmilitaryofficer,evenifonpaperitlookedsosimpleandeasy.WithoutdoubtHamiltonconcededthattherewastheoccasionalman who was a born leader and cited the New Zealand born but Sandhursttrained Andrew Russell, commanding a brigade and doing it ‘brilliantly’according toHamilton.Russellhadso impressedHamilton thathe toldMunroFergusonthatiftheoccasionarosehewouldwithoutanydifficultygivehimanArmy Corps to command and therefore the rank of Lieutenant General.However,Hamiltonhadreservationsaboutthecalibreofmilitaryofficerfoundin the Australian Army. He considered that the Australian Army was yet toproduceamanofRussell’scalibre,eventhoughtheAustraliansas‘fighters’hadbeenmagnificent.PartoftheproblemwasthatfightingintheAustraliansectorhadbeensointensethatithadbeendifficulttodecideontheparticularqualitiesofsomeofficers,astheyquicklybecamecasualties,Bridgesbeinganexample,but Hamilton had already decided that he lacked the necessary qualities tocommandaCorps.EventhoughHamiltonhadpraisedthefightingqualitiesoftheAustralians,his

reservationsconcerningappointingAustralianofficers toseniorpositionsarosefromthefact that theAustralianforcewas largelyamateurandonlywantedtofightandhadnointerestinpursuingmilitarycareersoncehostilitieshadended.Thisaccording toHamiltonmeant that toomanyAustralianofficers, includingBridges, whom Hamilton described as having been a ‘fine character, bravesoldier’, lacked character and selfconfidence when it came to managing ‘bigdecisions’. He also claimed that Bridges also lacked ‘personal magnetism’.30Thisisaqualityhardtomeasureorqualify.The choice of Legge as Bridges’ replacement, as pushed through by the

AustralianGovernment,HamiltonfinallyadmittedwastherightchoiceandthathehadbeenwronginhispreviousassessmentofLegge.InmitigationHamiltonclaimed that much of what he had written had been for the consumption ofMunro Ferguson and the WO alone, and was purely his assessment of thefighting qualities of theAustralians rather than of an individual officer. OnceLeggewasappointed,Hamiltongavehimthebenefitof thedoubt.Legge took

full advantage of this and proved himself to be quite a capable officer andcommander, but at the time of writing Legge had not had the opportunity ofprovinghimselfincombat.Hamilton reported that Legge was not content to sit back and accept

everythingbeingsaid.Instead,Leggeshowedthathehadideasofhisownandwaskeenonhiswork.HamiltonconsideredthatifLeggewastodisplaysuchanattitude in combat, should that occasion have arisen, his reputationwhich hadbeentarnishedwithaccusationsof‘self-seeking’would‘graduallywearaway’.Hamilton objected to a rumour, which was being spread amongst theAustralians,thatLegge’sdivisionwasabouttobesenttothefrontwiththehopethat hewould fail and thus sully his growing reputation. Hamilton beseechedMunroFergusonnottoallowthisrumourtospread,withtheobservationthata‘Commander in the field, fighting the enemies of his country’ would not beswayedbysuchpettyandspitefulthinking.OfotherAustraliancommanders,notablyChauvel,withwhomHamiltonnot

onlyclaimedfriendshipbutalso thatofChauvel’swife,Hamiltonwascritical.HamiltoninformedMunroFergusonthateventhoughChauvelhad‘ability,highcharacterandindustry’andwouldhavemadean‘excellentAdjutantGeneral’,asaCommanderattheFronthelackedcertainqualities.HamiltonmaintainedthatChauvelwasnotaggressiveenoughanddidnothavetheessentialenthusiasmtosee an operation through. Hamilton had noticed that when Chauvel becamedispirited, his health began to suffer and as Hamilton wrote ‘and, with thestrangemagnetismwhichisintheairwhencrowdsofmenarecollectedtogetherin times of danger, thewholemorale of his force follows him down the hill.That’s the long and short of it.’ Overall, Hamilton claimed that Chauvel willneverbea‘commanderofmen’.PartofthisHamiltonputdowntobackgroundaswell as education.31 So oftenHamilton comes over as an incorrigible snobwiththeconsiderationthatonlytheBritishupperclasseswereabletoleadwhileotherswere there to follow,but this isunfairasweviewhisactionsacenturylater. InmanywaysHamiltonwas typical of his time and of his class, but itshould also be considered that in 1915hewas considered to have been a freethinkerandattimesadangerousliberal.ThissethimapartfromofficialdomandarousedantipathyamongstsomeofficialsandthePresswhichrepresentedtheirviews.32Overall, Hamilton was extremely pleased with the fighting prowess of the

AustralianforceatGallipoli,eventhoughitwasdominatedbyvolunteers.TheAustralians had come toGallipoli to fight the enemies of the British Empire,

eveniftheyhadoriginallythoughtthattheyweregoingtofighttheGermansinEurope,butaboutninetypercentof thesemendidnotwant tobe takenawayfromtheirassociationsororiginalvolunteerforcewhichtheyhadchosentojoin,which meant that they did not seek promotion or want to serve in any Staffcapacity.Basically,mostAustraliantroopshadcometofightandwoulddosoaslongas theywerewell ledandstillneeded;asaconsequenceamilitarycareerwasofnorelevancetothevastmajorityofAustraliansservingatGallipoli.AsHamiltonreflected,‘ThereisnothalfasmuchtalkaboutBritishandAustraliansin the trenchesas there is inMelbourne.’Hamiltonhadconsidered ‘gettinganAustralian or two’ onto his GHQ Staff, but he could not find any who wereinterestedinjoiningifitmeantleavingtheirparentmilitaryunit.Hamilton reiterated toMunro Ferguson that theAustralians onlywanted to

fightandwhenthedaywasdoneandthefightingwasover,returntoAustraliaandresumetheircivilianoccupations.Itwasiftheyhadacontracttofulfil,butwithnoorlittleinterestbeyondthatfulfilment.ThereforetheaverageAustralianfightingatGallipoliwasbyandlargeanamateurdefendingtheBritishEmpirewithnothoughttowardsamilitarycareer.33Anotuntypicalincidentillustratingthe‘non-military’aspectofAustraliansoldieringconcernedan inspectionbyaBritishgeneralofAustraliantroops.TheAustralianCommandingOfficerhadtowarnhistroopsnottocallhim‘Jim’.34Hamilton’sobservationaboutthelackofinterest in a military career amongst Australians serving at Gallipoli wassomething that journalists, especially Australian journalists refused to accept.Furthermore, the Australian Government remained suspicious of Britishintentions asHamiltonwrote toLord Stamfordham, Private Secretary toKingGeorgeV.HamiltoncomplainedthattheAustralianGovernmentconsideredthatHamiltoncontinuallypushedBritishofficerstowardspostsonhisStaffandforsenior commands. Hamilton railed against this charge as he claimed that hewantedto‘pushAustraliansforward,eventotheextentofgivingoneofthemaBritishBrigadeiftherewereanyavailable.Butpracticallyallthebestmenhadbeenkilled,orarewoundedorhavegoneawaysick.’35Equally,Hamiltononthewholewasagainst‘leapfrogging’advancesintoStaffpositionsnomatterwhatgoodworkanofficermayhavedone.36HamiltonbyAugust1915waspresidingoveranotherdisasteratGallipolias

thesecondlandingatSuvlaBayandelsewherecontinuedtofailinbreakingthestout Turkish defences, and so the stalemate continued. But how was thisHamilton’s fault? As we have already seen Hamilton as ever was limited inscope,especiallygeographicallyastheterrainavailabletotheAlliestolandon

wasjust toosmall to landanymeaningfulmilitaryforce.At thesametimetheentire force was compromised by the need to feed theWestern Front, whichseemed to have an endless appetite for bothmen andmunitions. Furthermore,politically the Western Front was the most widely supported front as it wasconsidered by the chattering classes that it was only there that the Germanscouldbedefeatedandthewarwon.Hamiltonhadalreadyobservedthatcivilianpoliticians were attempting to win the war on the cheap as they expectedHamilton’smentochargeenemymachinegunsarmedonlywithriflesandwithlimitedornoartillerysupportatall.37ThiswasadisgracefulsituationandtheWOseemedunmovedbyHamilton’s

position and ignored his demands formore troops and ammunition. HamiltonalsonotedthatatGallipolihecouldnotaffordtowaitforanopportunemomentto attack as any delay gave the Turks times to reinforce their positions. ThismeantthatHamiltonandhisforcehadtobecontinuouslyontheoffensiveandharry theenemyatall times.HamiltonclaimedthataweekofpeaceandquietonlymeantthattheTurkscoulddoubletheirnumbersandentrenchdeeperandfurther than they had previously. Even Hunter-Weston or ‘Hunter-Bunter’ asHamilton referred to himunofficially, but still the fire-breathingCommandingOfficerof29thDivisionhad reservationsabout a furthermajoroffensiveafterthelessthanadequatelandingsof25April1915,andsotheBritishwereoftenlimitedtopre-dawnraidsonTurkishtrenches.38Hamiltonconfidedtohisdiaryon9May1915,‘Wearenowonourlastlegs.

ThebeautifulBattalionsofthe25thAprilarewastedskeletonsnow;shadowsofwhat they had been.’39 Clearly even the tiger-like Hamilton was totallydepressedwiththelackofprogressofhiscampaign.ThefactthatHamiltonstillhadtoorderhiseverdiminishingforce,reducedowingtoanincreasingcasualtyrate,withnoorlittlehopeofreceivingreplacements,toattacktheenemy,ifonlyto hold their tenuous positions on the beaches, depressed him. Hamiltonconsideredhispositiontohavebeensinful,buttherewasnothingthathecoulddoaboutit.40ApassagefromHamilton’sdiaryunderlinedthepatheticsituationatGallipoliinMay1915.On12May1915,Hamiltonwasmakinghiswaybacktothebeachesafter inspecting29thDivisionandhecameacrossthePlymouthBattalionof theRNDreturningfromthefront.Hamiltonwasfullofpraise forthisbattalionwhichhadjustbeenpartofsomeveryheavyfightingbuthewasshocked by the appearance of the Plymouth Battalion as they were not onlyphysically exhausted, but also theirmoralewas shattered.AsHamilton noted,notonemaninthebattalioncouldraiseasmile.Theofficersandmenhadbeen

utterly crushed by the fighting from which they were returning. This causedHamiltonconcern.41ItwasexperienceslikethiswhichemboldenedHamiltontopressKitchenerandtheWOforfurthermen,weapons,munitionsandequipmentratherthantheniggardlyamountshewasreceivingifhewaslucky.On17May1915,HamiltononcemorecabledKitchenerandagainsetouthis

needs andproblems in the vainhope that hemight get a sympathetic hearing.However, as we already know, Hamilton did not at the time realize thatKitchenerwasbasicallyignoringhisrequestsandcertainlywasnotsharingthemwith theBritishWarCabinet.Hamilton’s immediate problemwas the lack ofspaceon thepeninsulaashedidnothave toomuch roomto landmore troopsand equipment even if Kitchener did send them. Furthermore, as the weatherbegantowarmupatGallipoli, thesupplyofwaterbecamesomewhatpreciousand limited.Hamilton toldKitchener that he needed to advance the front lineanother 1,000 yards in order to ensure that the beaches could no longer beshelledbytheenemy,but thequestionremained,where toput theextra troopsnecessarytoadvancefurtherontotheGallipolipeninsula.Hamiltonhadan ideaof landing troopsonnearby islandsheldby theAllies

untilanoffensivewasreadyandthenthesetroopscouldbeusedlaterinfightingonthepeninsula.HamiltontriedtoexplaintoKitchener,whowasyettovisitthetheatreofoperations, that inorder toadvance,whilesufferingonlyhalfof thecasualties alreadyenduredby theAllies sinceApril 25, heneeded tokeephisforce entirely up to strength and have ‘a liberal supply of gun ammunition,especially of high explosive’. Hamilton had severe reservations aboutKitchener’s attitude and wondered if he would even receive half of what hewanted or needed. Hamilton recognized that Kitchener was valued as a greatmanintheUKasheorderedwarfromthesafetyofhisdeskattheWO.HealsorecognizedthatKitchenerhadbeeninstrumentalintheBritishvictoryinSouthAfrica just over a decade earlier even if his methods were questionable.Hamilton, a veteran of that conflict, also knew that the great man was quiteflawed and had room for evenmore such frailties. This botheredHamilton.42Kitchener’sreplywastocauseHamiltonfurtheranxiety.Kitchenerexpressed surpriseanddismay that theplans for the takingof the

enemy forts at the Dardanelles had not worked and that now Hamilton wasdemanding further reinforcements andmuchmore ammunition thanKitchenerfeltcomfortablewithsupplying.KitchenerexplainedtoHamiltonthatmuchofthemenandmaterialwhichhehad requested,was earmarked for theWesternFront and that there was precious little as it was. Furthermore, he begged

Hamilton to refrain from mentioning any consideration of withdrawal fromGallipoli unless his concerns were addressed. This alerted Hamilton thatKitchenerwas beginning to look politically vulnerable.Hamilton realized thatKitchenerwasaskinghimtohelphimbymakinglesserdemands,butHamiltonconsidered that the only way that he could help Kitchener was to win theGallipolicampaign.HewroteandtoldKitchenerthatifheseriouslythoughtthatthe Gallipoli Campaign could be won without fresh drafts of men, furthermunitions and another ArmyCorps, or in other words trying to bluff civilianpoliticiansatWhitehall,thatbluffwillbeveryshortlived.Hamiltonclaimedthathewaspleasedthat thesituationatGallipolihadbeenrealizedinasmuchthatthe Turk had not run away when his beard had been singed, but had indeeddefendedhishomeland.Therefore,aslongasKitchenerstoodbehindHamiltonandhis force,he in turnwoulddoeverythingpossible todefeat theTurksandnotaskformoreinthewayofreplacementsorequipmentthanwasnecessarytoachievethisgoal.43Overall, Hamilton considered that politicians and civil servants were

misreadinghisrequests;whetherthiswasdeliberateornot,wasnotcleartohim.However, at the time Hamilton was unaware of Kitchener’s duplicity inreporting communiqués which he had received from Hamilton to the WO.Hamilton considered that he had to be careful in how he requestedreinforcements and extra supplies; a direct request seemed to cause problemsandoftenresultinarefusaltomeethisrequests.Hamiltonwasastuteenoughtorealize thatheneeded to secureKitchener’s support inorder tomakeciviliansrealize that therewasagenuineneed forhis requirementsand thathewasnotmerelyempirebuilding.TherewasadefinitebreakdowninunderstandingduringMay1915regarding

thefuturedeploymentof4,500AustraliantroopsatthattimeinEgypt.KitchenerhadsomehowunderstoodthatHamiltondidnotneedthesetroops,butHamiltonin a carefully crafted reply made it quite clear that he did indeed need thesetroopsandsuggestedthatGeneralMaxwellmusthavemisinformedKitchenerinthis matter.44 This was unusual for Hamilton as he was quite friendly withMaxwell.However,whatHamiltonreallywantedwasforKitchenertocomeandvisittheoperationalareaandseeforhimselfwhatwasneededinordertobringthecampaigntoasuccessfulconclusion.HamiltonwascertainthatifKitchenercameout to theEasternMediterranean,hewouldbeable to return toLondon,snap his fingers at the WO and ensure that Hamilton received all of thenecessary men and equipment to complete the task at Gallipoli. However,

Hamiltonalsorealizedthatheneededtobequick;followingtheresignationsofChurchillandAdmiralJackieFisher,Kitchenerwasnolongerthemanhewasin1902andwasbeginning to look like abroken reedashebecame increasinglypoliticallyisolatedatWhitehall.On11June1915,Hamiltonbegantosketchouthislatestplansofhowtotry

todefeat theTurksaswellhow to introduce the reinforcements from theNewArmies onto the peninsula. Hamilton had already won over his CorpsCommanders,whichaccordingtoHamiltonwashalfthebattle,buteachoftheGenerals that he met was depressed with the lack of weapons and munitionsmadeavailabletothemandtheirtroops.TheANZACswereparticularlyfedupwith the lack of bombs available for their six trench mortars, especially asHamiltonhadmadeparticularrequestsforthese.TrenchmortarswereessentialatGallipoli andHamiltonconsidered thatmanufacturers shouldbeparticularlypressed to manufacture the bombs necessary for them.45 Five days laterHamilton, for aman of his passive persuasion,was extremely riled as he hadreceived a cable from theWOwhichmade it quite clear that theNewArmycoming out to the EasternMediterranean would not be bringing any 4.5-inchhowitzerswiththem.Indeed,theywerenotbringinganymodernhowitzerswiththem;insteadsixteenoutmoded5-inchhowitzershadbeendespatched.Hamilton noted that these ancient artillery pieces were actually inaccurate

guns used by theTerritorialReserve and had been introduced into theBritishArmyin1898duringtheOmdurmanCampaign.Duringthe1899-1902warinSouth Africa, these guns had been deemed as being useless. HamiltoncommentedthattheWOmighthaveatleastsentforty-eight4.5-inchhowitzersas a loan to his force. He recognized that theWestern Front was getting thelion’sshareofthemenandequipment,butheconsideredthatunlesstherewasamajor offensive being planned in France, such a loan would have beenreasonable and if they were needed in France could be returned in a ‘fastCruiser’.BynowHamiltonwasgettingquitebitterwiththeWOandwrotethatif the

GeneralStaffatWhitehallcannotmanagetosendhimthenecessaryequipmentandmen,butinsteadsendallequipmenttothewarinFrance,thenbasicallytheyhavehandedtherunningofaworldwartoasinglesectionoftheArmy.Insteadof claiming ‘death or victory’ Hamilton claimed that a more accurate motifconcerning the campaign at Gallipoli might be ‘howitzers or defeat’. In hisofficial missive to theWO, Hamilton was a bit more diplomatic and tried toexplainthat thehowitzerswereessential totheMEF,asTurkishtrencheswere

deep and narrow and the only effective artillery piece to deal with thesepositionswasthehowitzer.Healsoaddedthat trenchmortarsandbombswerealso essential to theoperations atGallipoli owing to thenatureof theTurkishdefences,asmissileshadtolandintheenemytrenchesinordertodestroythemandtheiroccupants.Hamiltonconcludedbysayingthatperhapshisrequestsforweaponsandammunitionwascrying for themoon,but ifhewasnot suppliedsoonwith theweaponsnecessary to clearTurkish trenches, theWOwill soonfinditfutile‘cryingforthecrescent’.46As thecrescentmoonwasassociated toTurkey,Hamiltonwaswarning that

withoutthenecessaryweaponsandmenhemightnotbeabletodefeattheTurksas theWOandGeneralStaffweredemanding thatheshould. In short,hehadreturnedtheballbacktoWO’scourt.ToexasperateHamiltonfurther, theWOinformedhim that a battery of 6-inchhowitzersmight be sent out to him, butwithnoammunition.Furthermore,ifheweretoaccepttheseguns,Hamiltonwasnot to complain about the ammunition shortage as he had done previously.Hamiltontoyedwiththeimageofthoseresponsibleforthislunacytobechainedtoarockonthepeninsula,whileTurkishgunsfromtheuntouchableAsiaticsideof the Turkish mainland rained down shells onto them. However, Hamiltonplacidasever,acceptedthegunsasreplacementsforpreviouslydamagedonesand hoped that the ammunition situation might right itself in due course.47Perhaps it could be argued thatHamiltonwas reckless or naive regarding theammunitionsituation,butthatiswithhindsight.In1915hehadnochoicebuttoaccept the little that he was getting. Hamilton was too far away from bothLondon and the Western Front to have any influence either militarily orpolitically, while his supporters in the shape ofKitchener andChurchill werebothflawedandalreadyseemedtobeyesterday’smen.Frustrationwiththesupplyofmortarweaponswasmadealltheworsebythe

fact that theWO imported them from Japan; the reasonwhyHamilton almostalways referred to themasJapanese trenchmortarsandbombs.A10,000-milelongsupplywasclearlyridiculousandHamilton’sfrustrationwiththesituationwasobvious.On22June1915hereceivedareplyfromtheWOconcerninghisrequests.HewasinformedthattenweeksfromthedaythathereceivedtheWOcable,1,000bombswouldbereadyfordespatchfromJapanwithanotherfiftyamonth later. Hamilton was in despair as he calculated that with delays andtransportbyseafromJapanitwouldbefourmonthsbeforehereceivedasinglebomb.Henotedthatthreemonthshadalreadypassedsincehefirstindentedforthese mortar bombs and that the British arms manufacturers in Birmingham

couldhave easilymade them rather than relyon averydistant and inefficientsupply from Japan.Hamilton, from hismarooned position in the desert as heviewedhissituationremarkedthatthewar,whichhewasbeingforcedtowage,wasoneofimprovisationborneoutofnecessity.Hamilton wondered how he was to continue to fight on without trench

mortars,howevertheRoyalNavycametoarescueofsortsashewasinformedthat the navalworkshops inMalta couldmake grenades for him.This at leastwent someway towards relieving the situation and soHamilton sent technicaldetailsofTurkishgrenadestoMalta.ItisinterestingtonotethatHamiltonsawfittouseaweaponbasedontheenemy’sdesign,buthewasonlytooawareoftheshatteringeffectthatthisbombhadhadwhentheTurkshadattackedAlliedpositionswiththem.48TheBritishwereyettosupplytheMEFwithanythingasgood.ClearlyHamilton’s view that armsmanufacturingplants shouldbe closer at

hand was justified if the somewhat limited resources of the Royal Navyworkshops inMalta could provide necessaryweapons rather thanwait for thefarcicalJapanesesupplytocomeupwiththegoods.Itwasjustfurtherevidenceof the incompetence of politicians and theGeneral Staff atWhitehallwhen itcametotheBritishArmywaginganythinglargerthanaminorcolonialwar.Asthe campaign atGallipoli became subject to political scrutiny in theHouse ofCommons,Hamiltonwasexpectedtowinthesamecampaignwithonehandtiedbehind his back as politicians and the General Staff considered that it wasacceptable thatAllied soldiers armedwith littlemore than rifles and bayonetsshouldattackwellduganddeepenemytrencheswhichwereprotectedbyheavyartillery.Hamilton often said that his position was like that of David and Goliath,

except theWOdidnotevensupply thestonesforDavid’ssling.However, thelackofprogressatGallipoli,whichaswehaveseenwasnotreallyHamilton’sfault,butthatofapoorsupplyline,hadcausedtheFrenchtobegintocomplain.TheFrench considered that the offensive against theDardanelle fortswasonethatateupbothmenandammunition,butwithlittlegain.Thisviewwaswidelyheld in France, especially amongst political circles in Paris. However, thereseemedtobenocallfor theFrenchtowithdrawtheirforcesorthat theBritishshould call off their offensive. Like the British, the French had imperialconsiderationsandwantedtoconsolidatetheirpositionfurtherinMorocco,andso in France it was considered that the ‘Dardanelles venture must be carriedthroughatallcosts’.49

Kitchener,aswellasbeingunable toguaranteeadecent supplyofmenandweapons to theMEF, then began to interferewith appointments and began towithhold suitable commanders from Hamilton. On 15 June 1915, Hamiltonwrote to Lord Kitchener ‘I should like to submit for your consideration thefollowingviewsonthequalitiesnecessaryinanArmyCorpsCommanderontheGallipoli Peninsula. In that position only men of good stiff constitution andnervewillbeabletodoanygood.Everythingisatsuchclosequartersthatmanymenwouldbeuselessinthesomewhatexposedheadquarterstheywouldhavetooccupy on this limited terrain, though they would do quite good work ifmoderately comfortable andaway fromconstant shell fire. I canonly thinkoftwo men, Byng and Rawlinson. Both possess the requisite qualities andseniorities; the latter does not seem happywhere he is and the formerwouldhavemorescopethanwithaCavalryCorpscangivehiminFrance.’50Kitchener’sreplywasalmostinstantandhedeniedHamiltonbothByngand

Rawlinson and wrote ‘I am afraid that Sir John French would not spare theservicesofthetwoGeneralsyoumention,andtheyaremoreoverbothjuniortoMahon,whocommands the10thDivisionwhich is comingout toyou.Ewart,whoisveryfitandwell,woulddoIthink.Iamgoingtoseehimthedayaftertomorrow.Mahonraised the10thDivisionandhasproducedanexcellentunit.Heisquitefitandwell,andIdonotthinkthathecouldbeleftbehind.’InhisownhandHamiltonnotatedthatEwartwas‘agoodmanmorally,butold,veryfat;wasC-in-CinScotland.Wouldnothavestoodthestrainphysicallyforthreedays and nights.’51 One can only guess why Kitchener engaged in suchbehaviour,especiallysuchadeceitconcerningEwart,whichHamiltonknewtobeablatantlie.IndeedthestrainputoncommandersatGallipoliwastoproveintolerablefor

someaswasthecaseofBrigadierGeneralHendry,Commanderof157Brigade.HendrywasaTerritorialOfficerandhispromotiontoBrigadeCommanderhadbeenanexperimentwhichfailed,asotherofficersrefusedtoacceptandseemedjealous of him. He had proved himself to have been a satisfactory BrigadeCommander during the training period at the beginning of thewar, but in thecombat conditions he found himself in atGallipoli, he served on the crampedandexposedconditionsatCapeHelles,and found that itwasall toomuch forhim both mentally and physically and so lost his command.52 One can onlywonder at the attitude of the so-called professional officers in 1915, but thisincidentappeared tocreate in themindsetof theBritishOfficerCorps that thepart-time territorial soldiers and officers were not soldiers at all. The attitude

seemedtobethatTerritorialscouldnot‘hackit’astheyweretoofondoftheirciviliancreaturecomforts.ThenextmajoroperationattheDardanelleswastobethe undoing of several senior military professionals and once and for all thequestionoftheworthinessoftheterritorialforceswassetaside.Thefollowingyear,1916,conscriptionwasintroducedandsothequestionofprofessionalismversusamateurismbecameincreasinglyredundantasthe‘soldier-citizen’begantomakeitsmarkinthewartimeBritishArmy,astandardwhichwasfollowedin1939when conscription was reintroduced in the UK shortly before hostilitiesbrokeoutoncemorebetweenBritainandGermany.At the same time, Hamilton was still expected to perform some kind of

miracleontheGallipoliPeninsula,buthewasatleastsentsomereinforcements,but not enough. Basically, Hamilton was suffering for the failures on theWesternFrontwhichwaslikesomemonsterdevouringmenandsuppliesatanever increasing rate, while Hamilton was kept short at Gallipoli. At the firstmeetingof theDardanellesCommitteeon7June1915, itwasdecidedthat thethreeremainingdivisionsoftheNewArmyshouldbesentouttoGallipoliwiththe view of them taking part in a further offensive to take place during July1915.AdmiraldeRobeckwastoreceivetwolightCruisersofthe‘EdgarClass’fittedwith anti-torpedo defences,monitorswith heavy guns and two ‘E’ classsubmarines.53 As ever, Whitehall failed to take into consideration what localconditions were like at Gallipoli and how long it might actually take to gettroops and ships into the operational area. Soon it was realized that thereplacement troopswouldnotget into theEasternMediterranean in time foraJuly operation and so the new offensive was postponed until August 1915.54However, it had been observed that if the Committee had reached a decisionearlier,thenthenewdivisionscouldhavebeendeployedearlierandmighthavemade some headway before the summer heat atGallipoli became evenworsethanithadbeenduringtheSpring.55It was at this time that Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett began his campaign in the

British Press, as he briefed the general public against Hamilton and hiscommand of the Gallipoli campaign in general. In many respects Hamiltonconsidered thatheknewAshmead-Bartlettwell andactually likedhimandhiswork.IndeedHamiltonwasquiterelaxedwiththepresenceofthemediaattheDardanelles.HamiltontoldChurchillinaletterthathehadquitelikedAshmead-Bartlett until the journalist had become ‘very persistent’ in trying to get anarticlepublishedwhichAshmead-BartletthadtoldHamiltonwouldbringstrongpressure on the UK Government to supply Hamilton with the equipment

necessary tobring theGallipolioperation toasuccessfulconclusion.Hamiltonhad reservations as he feared that the articlemight have prevented Italy fromentering thewar on the side of theAllies, caused theBalkan states to changetheir minds about the Allies’ ability to defeat Turkey, while tipping off theenemythatafurtheroffensiveagainsttheGallipolipeninsulawasimminent.HamiltontoldChurchillthathehadnointentionofallowingAshmead-Bartlett

topublishthisarticleandthattodatehehadnotcensoredawordofanyofhisdespatches, but he was determined to prevent this piece of work entering thepublicdomain.HamiltonwassurprisedtolearnthatAshmead-Bartlett,whowassupposedtoinformHamiltonofhismoves,hadalreadygonetoMaltaandwason this way to the UK, however the bigger problem as far as Hamilton wasconcerned, was how journalists wrote their reports of the war. Hamiltonconsidered that the nature of military reports and terminology often left thereporters as outsiders, so that they wrote stories of human interest for theirreaders.Therefore,whenarenownedandrespectedreportersuchasAshmead-Bartlett gave a ‘coloured report’ it was ‘lapped up’ by the public because asHamilton suggested, it was the only news of the conflict which they weregetting.However,themajorpointthatHamiltonwishedtoconveytoChurchillwasthatheconsideredAshmead-BartletttobemoredangerousathomethanhewasontheGallipolipeninsula.56A few days later, Hamilton told Churchill that Ashmead-Bartlett was to be

‘hauledoverthecoals’byHamilton’sAdjutantGeneralforspeakingtoofreelywith officers of the Mediterranean Force of his interviews with Asquith, theBritishPrimeMinister.Ashmead-Bartletthadbeenquiteoutspokeninhisviewsconcerning the military operations at Gallipoli and of the commanders foundthere.Heclaimedthatinhisexperiencemilitarycommandersneversawbeyondthe length of their noses and this was the problem at Gallipoli and why thecampaign was going nowhere. He even ventured to say that a landing at thenarrowneckofBulairwouldhavebeenmorebeneficialthanthepoliciesbeingpursued by Hamilton and his fellow commanders. These reports had causeddismayandweredulyreportedatHamilton’sHQ.HamiltontoldChurchillthathewasgoingtogivetheerringjournalistjustonewarningandifhedisregardsit,‘PressornoPress,hegoesrighthome’.HamiltonalsoconfidedtoChurchillthattheBulairproposalwasonethatwouldoccurtoanybodylookingatamap,buton inspection of the geography of the area from both naval and militaryperspectives itwould be seen that any operation therewould be impossible.57GiventhattheentireGallipoliCampaignwasbasedonlookingatmapsbackin

Whitehallandstudyingafewoutofdatetravelguidesofthearea,itseemedabitrichthatHamiltonshouldmakesuchacondemnation.Ashmead-Bartlettcontinuedtospreadhisviewsfarandwideashetravelledto

theUK.TheReverendO.Creightonwroteinhisdiaryfor13May1915thathehad met Ashmead-Bartlett on HMS Implacable. He considered Ashmead-Bartletttobe‘mostpessimistic’andgavetheimpressionthatthebestthatcouldbe done on the Gallipoli peninsula was to evacuate it. Ashmead-Bartlett’sconsidered opinion was that the entire venture had developed into a majoroffensive, but the Allies lacked the troops to see it through to a successfulconclusion.Furthermore,heconsideredthataproposedmajoroffensiveagainstAchiBabawasunthinkableasitwouldtakemonthsofsiegewarfareagainsttheTurkishposition.58Thepointwas thatAshmead-Bartlettwasnotwrong inhisobservations; his sin was to go public with them. Ashmead-Bartlett’sproclamationscouldonlyhurttheAlliesandcausedismayamongstthetroopsatthefront,butgivetheenemyeverypossibleadvantageoflearningoftheAlliedsituation at Gallipoli. If Ashmead-Bartlett was as influential as he claimed, itmighthavebeenmoreprudentifhehadspokeninprivatetohismanyandvariedcontacts and so try to influence the outcome at Gallipoli via politicalbackchannelsratherthaninthepublicbroadsheets.However,partofAshmead-Bartlett’s motivation was probably financial as he sought financial securityfollowinghissecondbankruptcyon22December1914.Hehadpreviouslybeendeclaredbankruptin1908.59Ashmead-Bartlett’s return to the UK was nothing if not eventful. Charles

ListerwrotetohisfatherwithacertainamountofgleethatAshmead-Bartlettonhis way out, had been ‘blown up with theMajestic’. Lister seemed almostsorrowful that the journalisthadescapedwithhis life,butmanaged toconsolehimself with the fact that Ashmead-Bartlett’s notebooks complete withsuspected denunciations of those in authority had been lost with the ship.However, Lister feared thatAshmead-Bartlettwould ‘talk’ once he got home.Therewashope thatperhaps this loose talkmight influenceWhitehall to sendout more troops to Gallipoli, but given that much of such talk was generallypessimisticandexaggerated,ListeralsoconsideredthatAshmead-Bartlettmightbe ignored. Lister told his father that the Turks were exhausting themselvesattackingAlliedtrenchesandwerelosingmeninlargenumbers.HeconsideredthatwithafewmorementheAlliesmightbevictoriousatGallipoli.However,healsowarnedthatiftheAllieswithdrewfromGallipoliitwouldbe‘ahopelessloss of face’. This was what Lister fearedmight happen as a consequence of

Ashmead-Bartlett’s Jeremiah-like reporting theremight be a clamour from theBritishPress fora ‘completebunk’whichheconsideredwouldbe ‘appalling.’Oncemore,ListeremphasizedthatwithmorementhecampaignintheEasternMediterraneancouldstillbewonbytheAllies.60Hamiltonsought toputKitchener in thepictureregardingAshmead-Bartlett.

ItwouldseemthathehadsetouttoMaltaunderthepretenceofbuyinganewsuitandsohadgivenHamilton theslip. Justbeforehehadsetout, theBritishauthorities in the EasternMediterranean had refused to pass for publication atelegram and a letter from him as they were a ‘regular Jeremiad’ demandingmoremenandmunitions.Hamiltonhadalsotakentheprecautionof informingthe censor in Malta that no more of Ashmead-Bartlett’s reports were to bepassed.AsAshmead-Bartlettwas leavingMalta the samewarningwas sent toKitchener.HamiltonconcededthatAshmead-Bartlettwasagoodwriter,butwas‘apessimistofthefirstwater’andfurtherrequestedthathemightberetainedinthe UK and a correspondent of a more optimistic disposition be sent out toHamilton in replacement. Meanwhile, Compton Mackenzie, the writer and atthattimeanofficerintheRND,hadbeenappointedasatemporaryreplacementforAshmead-Bartlett.61Kitchener confirmed that precautions had been taken to prevent Ashmead-

Bartlett communication to the public via the Press. Ashmead-Bartlett hadundertakennottospeaktoanybodyotherthanhiseditorwhowasconsideredtobe totally trustworthy. However, there was a snag to this arrangement asAshmead-BartlettdidnotworkforjustonenewspaperbutfortheLondonPressin general, therefore any attempt to censor himwould have been problematic.Amazingly,Ashmead-Bartlettwasunaware thatHamiltonwasbriefingagainsthim and was looking forward to returning to Gallipoli.62 Hamilton had noobjectiontoAshmead-BartlettreturningtoGallipoli;hisobjectionhadbeenhisgoing to theUKmidway throughanoperationwithout informingHamiltonofhismovements.Hamilton’smainconcernwasthathehadhadnoguaranteethatAshmead-BartlettwouldnottalkaboutorpublishthetelegramwhichHamiltonhad already stopped butwhichAshmead-Bartlettwas anxious tomake public.Hamilton’s motivation in preventing Ashmead-Bartlett going public with hisconcerns was that he wished neutral and enemy countries receiving undulypessimisticviewsoftheAlliedsituationatGallipoli.63DuringJune1915,Hamiltonbegantorailmorefrequentlyagainstthepressas

it began to make unfair attacks against other people. He was particularlydismayedby an attack againstKitchener by elements of theNorthcliffePress,

which he considered to have been ‘a very disgusting revelation of a verydisgusting people’s mind’. Furthermore, he considered that ‘a nation gets thepressitdeservesbutsurelytheBritishEmpire,manyashavebeenitssins,hadanythingbad enough todeserve aNorthcliffe!’64Theproblemswith thePressweretomultiplyoncethefigureoftheAustralianjournalist,KeithMurdochwasintroduced to the scene. To the fury of Hamilton, Ashmead-Bartlett usedMurdoch to attempt to smuggle an uncensored dispatch back to the UK.Followingthisincident,totheregretofHamiltontherewasnoalternativebuttoexpel Ashmead-Bartlett from the EasternMediterranean. Hamilton oncemorestressed that he had always wanted to help the Press in their reporting ofoperations in the Eastern Mediterranean, which in his opinion wasunderreported,buthefeltcompelledtoexpelAshmead-Bartlettasitseemedtohavebeen‘thebestinthepublicinterest’.65After his own dismissal as Commander-in-Chief MEF, Hamilton wrote to

GeneralMaxwellwarninghimagainstbelievingwhatwaswritteninthePress.HamiltontoldMaxwellthat‘thetroopsintheDardanellesareperfectlyallright,butsomePresspeoplehavesetfootapanic,onebeingAshmead-Bartlettandtheother, that man Murdoch, who unfortunately, came over to see us from theAntipodes.’66 Much of Murdoch’s ire was typical of the young Australiannational feeling, as Australia tried to assert itself as a nation to be treatedseriously,but suffered theusual insecuritiesassociatedwith immaturityandsotended to lash out more than was necessary at anything which was notAustralian. Hamilton remarked in a letter to the British-born Commander ofANZAC,GeneralBirdwood,‘AstoMurdochonlyhavingsaidthingsabouttheStaff,hesaysofyouthatanArmyCorpsisyourlimit.This,howeverisabsolutefulsomepraisecomparedtowhathesaysaboutalmostanybodyelseexceptthereal,genuineAustralian.’67ItisinterestingtonotethateventheCommanderofANZAC,whowasinso

manywaysAustralian,wasnotgoodenoughfor theAustralian-bornMurdoch.However, one can only doubt if Murdoch was in any position to make anyjudgements about the military. General Monash, the Australian-born General,was critical about how the war was being perceived in Australia as aconsequence of poor reporting. This reflected that journalists, no matter howmany wars they had covered, still did not understand how a war should beconducted.MonashwroteduringJuly1915thatheandhismenwere‘amused’atthe‘totallackofperspective’oftheGallipolioffensivewhichtheAustralianpublichadacquiredowingtothepublicationofAshmead-Bartlett’sstoryofthe

originallandingsof25April1915.Henotedthatforalongwhileitwastheonlyaccount which the WO had allowed to be published and many Australiansthought that the fight had begun and ended with ‘the first rush ashore’. AsMonashobserved,itwasafterthis‘rush’thattherealworkbeganasheandhismenhadtoholdontotheirfrontof1,500yardswhilebeingoutnumberedfivetoone.68Whatmustbeaddressed iswhydidAshmead-Bartlettbehave in themanner

thathedid?Murdochcanbedismissedasachippy,youngAustraliantryingtomake a name for himself, but Ashmead-Bartlett is quite a different matter. Itwould have been quite an easymatter to resolve ifHamilton had been totallyagainst journalists being imbedded at Gallipoli, but he had no such qualms.Indeed,hewasalmostsorryonceAshmead-BartlettwasexpelledfromGallipoli.In a letter to the Honourable Harry Lawson, Hamilton admitted that heconsideredAshmead-Bartlett‘asarealvaluetothisforce’.HeadmittedthattheWO had already told him that Ashmead-Bartlett could be indiscreet inconversation, even before he had arrived at Gallipoli. However Hamilton,perhapsasarelativelyfreespirithimselfoncecomparedwiththoseofhisownbackground,waswilling to put this down to an artistic nature andwas in fulladmirationofAshmead-Bartlett’swork,whichheconsideredtobefirstrate.ForHamilton,Ashmead-Bartlett’scardinalsinwastobreakhiswordofhonour.ThiswasjusttoomuchforHamilton,aspersonalhonourwasacodethathelivedby.He could not understand anybody who broke it so coldly and deliberately.Hamilton was quite clear that there was nothing personal in his handling ofAshmead-Bartlett and that he even liked his articles. He just could no longertrust him once he broke his word and this was unforgivable in Hamilton’seyes.69DuringJuly1915,Hamilton,inanoteforcensors,madeitquiteclearthathe

wasnotoneforharshcensorshipandthattheidentitiesofindividuals,battalionsand brigades etc could be freely communicated and if therewas a reversal offortunesontheGallipolipeninsula,hewasnotgoingtohideitfromthepublic.Hamilton claimed that he was used to criticism, but he would not allow anycommunication to be published which raised the morale of the enemy andlowered that of his men.70 This was actually a good point, as why would amilitarycommanderofany rankallowhismen tobedefeatedbywordswhileallowingtheenemytorejoiceatthem?However,Hileynotesthatcertainlyatthebeginning of the Gallipoli offensive Ashmead-Bartlett’s despatches from thepeninsula were arriving in London days late, heavily censored and often not

being published.71 This no doubt was the origin of Ashmead-Bartlett’sfrustration and one of the reasonswhy hewas forced to deceiveHamilton asbothmentriedtodotheirrespectivejobsasbestastheycould.Ashmead-BartlettwantedtotellthetruthabouteventsatGallipoliandreport

that the campaign was going horribly wrong, but he blamed the wrong man.GeneralSirIanHamiltonwasindeedtheCommander-in-ChiefMEF,buthehadbeen handed an impossible task with inadequate resources and manpower.Ashmead-Bartlettfailedtorecognizethis.OncethesecondoffensiveatGallipolibegan in August 1915, with similar disastrous results as the April landing,Ashmead-BartlettseemedtohardenhisresolvetoinformtheworldofwhatwasgoingonatGallipoli.However,moreoftenthannothewasreportingtotheverypeopleresponsibleforthecatastropheatGallipolithroughwilfulignorance,andwith an element of deceit from theWO, denied Hamilton the very resourceswhichheneededtocompleteasuccessfuloperationatGallipoli.Later,Hamiltonwas to be the scapegoat which conveniently provided the excuse why theDardanelles offensive failed, as he was cast as an elderly, incompetent andoutmodedGeneraltryingtofightatwentiethcenturywarinanineteenthcenturymanner.Thiscouldnothavebeenmorewrong.ItwasWhitehallwho,tryingtofightatwentiethcenturywarbutinaneighteenthcenturymanner,hadnoideaofthe amount of materials realistically needed to fight a modern war and thenumbersofmenrequiredtofightthatwar.TheblameforfailureshouldsurelylieatthedoorsalongWhitehall.Bymid-August1915,thechickensofignorancewerecominghometoroostas

thenewlandingsatthebeginningofthemonthhadlargelyfailed.Itwasbacktostatictrenchwarfarewithmenbeingsenselesslyslaughteredforanadvanceofafewhundredyards.Hamiltonhadpredictedthatthiswouldhappenunlesshewasgiven suitable commanding officers, enough men and sufficient weapons. Hewas denied all of the above and the consequence was more unnecessarybloodshedandfailure.AnincidentinwhichsuitablecommandersweredeniedtoHamilton concerned the caseofGeneralSirFrederickStopford.HamiltonhadalreadysaidthathedidnotwanttheservicesofStopford,amanandanofficerwhom he liked personally, butwas foundwanting atGallipoli. Hamiltonwasquite frank about Stopford’s conduct there; hewas not good enough and hadonlyfoundfaultwitheveryoperationproposed.72HamiltonprobablywantedtosuggestthatStopfordwastoooldforseniorcommand,butcouldnotasStopfordwasactuallyayearyoungerthanHamilton.OnceHamiltonsackedStopford,thedismissedGeneralseemedrelieved,butlaterHamiltonadmittedthathehadlost

agoodfriendwhocouldnotunderstandwhyhehadbeendismissed.73However,asHamilton’sownnephewcommented fiftyyears later, allof theGeneralsof1915weretoooldbythestandardsoftheSecondWorldWar.74Ofthesecondmajoroffensive,Hamiltonwrotesomewhatmorefulsomelyto

LordHaldane: ‘We have taken our second great plunge and, in so far as ourplansandpreparationsandmachinerywent,thethingwentperfectly.’However,overallthewholeoperationhadnotruntoplanasobjectiveswerenottakenandtheoperationquicklyranveryshortof itsdesiredeffect.75Hamiltonexplainedpart of the problem to General Wingate, Sirdar or Military Commander atKhartoum.TheAllieshadgainedalotofground,especiallytheANZACswhohadtrebledtheirterritory,whiletheareaaroundtheBritishoffensive,SuvlaBayanditsenvironswereallnewgrounds,buttheaxisoftheoffensive,thestrategicheights of Sari Bair (921 feet above sea level) were not taken. This was notstrictly true as British infantry had captured the heights, but British artillerymistakenlyshelledthemandcausedthemtowithdraw.AfurtherconcernforHamiltonwasnotthatofhismen,whomheconsidered

to have been ‘fine’, but the calibre of their officers. He considered that theylacked‘moralenergy’andfailedtopushfurtheronintotheGallipolipeninsuladuring the second offensive. This was particularly vexing as at one point,twenty-twoAlliedbattalionsfacedonlythreeTurkishbattalions,buthadfailedto recognize their advantage. Furthermore, the Turks on the whole had beencaughtunawares,whichhadbeentheverypointoftheoperationatleast,butthelackofleadershiphadcausedthisadvantagenottobefollowedthrough.76ThisrathersuggeststhatHamiltonhadbeencorrectallalonginhisassertionsthatifhehadbeengiventhecommandersthathehadwantedaswellassufficientmenand equipment, he might have well carried the day and at least captured theGallipolipeninsula.WhetherthiswouldhavecausedthefallofConstantinopleisnotclear,butwithoutdoubtitwouldhavecausedtheTurkishArmytofallbacktowards their capital.A successful second landingmight also have influencedtheBalkansandencouragedthemtojointheAlliesinthewaragainsttheCentralPowers. Thememory of the Suvla Bay landings duringAugust 1915 and theperceivedinabilitytomovefromthebeachesandpushoninlandwasonewhichwas remembered by British commanders during the Falklands’War of 1982.British forces landingatSanCarlosWateronEastFalkland Island inorder toretake the island from an occupying Argentinian force were urged to moveinlandandgetoffthebeachesasswiftlyaspossible.77Thelessonhadbeenwell

learnt, but British forces in 1943 were also to get stopped on the beaches atAnzio,Italy.In an autopsy of the events relating to the August landings, it was quite

obvious thatmanycommanderswholandedwereclearlynotupto the jobandwere also very pessimistic about the chances of the landings even beingsuccessful.Defeatedbeforetheyhadstarted!GeneralStopford,commanding9thCorps,denied thathisCorpswasnot suitable toundertakeanadvanceandhisDivisionalGeneralsagreedwithhim.StopfordclaimedthatTurkishoppositionhadgonefromsnipingtoafullyorganizeddefensiveposition.Thosewhoheardthis opinion considered that Stopford did not actually understand whatoppositionreallywasonGallipoliashelackedunderstandingandexperienceofthe theatre of operations and therefore his opinion was not really valid. ForHamilton and his Chief of Staff, Major-General Walter Braithwaite, it wasdepressing tohearStopfordspeak,as itmerelyproved thatmanyof theseniorofficers at Gallipoli did not believe that there was any chance of victory and‘saw a Turk behind every bush, a battalion behind every hill and a brigadebehindeverymountain’.78Quitesimply thesecondoffensive, to thedismayofHamiltonandBraithwaite,failedowingtoalackofbeliefinit.Hamiltonalwaysconsideredthatthiswasduetothepoorcalibreandlackofmoraleamongstthemajority of theDivisionalGeneralswhowere supposed to have led theirmenandofficerstovictory,avictorywhichfewactuallyseemedtobelievein.Manycommandersonthegroundonthedayofthelandingstookissuewith

thosewhowerenotpresent,butmerelycommanding.Thesecommandersmadeobservationsonwhatwasreallyhappeningasopposedtowhatwasthoughttobehappeningorshouldhavebeenhappening.Brigadier-GeneralW.Sitwell,formerCommanderof34InfantryBrigade,followinghisdismissalprotestedtoMajorGeneralHammersley,CO11thDivision.SitwellsetouttheproblemswhichhehadfacedatSuvlaBayon7August1915.On6August1915,SitwellreceivedorderstolandhisbrigadeatSuvlaBayas

closeaspossibletoHill10.Fromthere,onebattalionwastobedetachedtotryto seize the heights aboveGhaziBaba andwork along toKiretchTepe.Afterthis,Sitwell’sordersweretowaitfortwobattalionsfrom32Brigade,buttowaitnolaterthan01:30hours,7August1915.Thentheyweretopushontotheroadjunction betweenAliBeyChesme and Sujalik using his own three battalions,seizeYilchinBurnu (ChocolateHill) andHill 50 and from there advance to aroadjunctionlocatedatmapreference105PandsecureIsmailOgluTepe.Theprimary objectives were Hill 10 and the Ghazi Heights followed by Yilchin

Burnu. Amazingly, all of these objectives were to be captured using onlybayonets;noriflesweretobefired.Thisallsoundedwellandgoodonpaper,butasSitwellcommented,therewereproblems.Sitwellwassackedfornotbeingable tocompletehisassignments,butfrom

theveryoutset therehadbeendifficulties.Beforeasinglemanhadsetfootonthebeaches, therehadbeenseveralcasualties,deadandwounded, in theboatstryingtobringthemashore.ThiscauseddelaysandsoSitwellandhismendidnotevengettothebeachesuntil03:30hoursatposition104B3;theywerehoursadrift. It was here that Sitwell found that the Manchester Regiment, afterattackingtheenemyonthenorthernslopeofLalaBaba,hadadvancedalongthebeach,seizedtheGhaziHeightsandhadthenmovedontowardsKarakolDagh,pushingtheenemybeforethem.At05:00hoursSitwellhadbeenabletocollectabout half of theDorsetRegiment and theNorthumberlandFusiliers andwiththemadvancednorthwards to thedunes.As they reached thedunes theenemyhadregainedHill10andwereattacking further.At leasthalfacompanyfromthe Lancashire Fusiliers had fallen back in disarray to position 117 WS. AcompanyfromtheNorthumberlandFusilierscounterattacked,killingsomeoftheenemyanddrovethembacktoHill10.At 06:30 hours, the Dorset Regiment followed by the York and Lancaster

Regiment, attacked from the area of 117 R 7 and the enemy retreated beforethem. The Northumberland Fusiliers had reoccupied Hill 10 and one of itscompanieshadmovedontothesouthernslopeofKarakolDagh.TherewasalsoconsiderablefightingontheridgetowardsKiretchTepe.ColonelHannay,COoftheDorsetRegiment,reportedthattheDorsetswerepressingtheenemyandhadreachedKuchukAnafarta.SitwellcouldactuallyseetheDorsetsatPoint28.Acompany from theNorthumberlandFusiliers on the slopeof the ridgewest ofPoint28wasfightingwhiletheduneswerepersistentlyshelled.Bythistime,theforenoonwaswell and truly advanced and any chance of a surprise attack onYilghinBurnuhadbeenlost.Colonel Malcolm of the General Staff joined Sitwell and told him that 31

BrigadewastoattackYilghinBurnufromthenorthusingsixbattalions.SitwelltoldMalcolm that32and34Brigadesonlyhad twobattalionsavailable,asheconsidered it imperative to cover the beach and hold it while blocking thegroundbetween theRidgeandHill10.According toSitwell,GeneralHillhadpreviously arrived and had claimed that he only had three battalions to attackwith,andonlearningthatSitwellonlyhadtwoavailablereturnedtoLalaBabatoreport thesituation.Thethreebattalionsfrom31Brigade,whichhadstarted

fromLalaBabaat13:30,hadadvanceddeeplyundershrapnelfireandsoSitwellstated that hewould support them in this advance, even though previously hehadassertedthattherewaslittlethathecoulddotosupportthem.This unsatisfactory state of affairs was further complicated as more orders

werereceivedbySitwell.ThefirsttwoordersreceivedbySitwelldemandedthatthe three battalions from 32nd Brigade attack Ismail Oglu Tepe and YilghinBurnu.AndthenathirdorderwasreceivedwhichplacedSitwellincommandofan attack againstYilghinBurnu.This attackwas to consist of 31Brigade andevery man who could be spared from 32 and 34 Brigades, as well as twobattalions from33Brigadewhichwere sent over to cover Sitwell’s offensive.Sitwellwasalsotoldthathewouldgetartillerysupportat17:15hours.BeforeSitwell had received this order, three battalions from 31 Brigade had alreadyturnedsouth.TheNorthumberlandFusiliersandtheYorksandLancasterswerefollowinginsupportwhiletheWestRidingRegimentfollowedthirdinline.TheWestYorkshireshadalreadytakenthelineofHill10totheCut.TheLancashireFusiliers, who had already taken large casualties in earlier fighting, were inreserve. Sitwell reported that the attack had been launched and that artillerysupportcouldcommencetwentyminutesearlierthanscheduled,butthiswasnotallowed.At17:10SitwellsenttheLincolnRegimentandtheBordersRegimenttotherightof31Brigade.From17:15until19:30hoursSitwellwatched theattackverycarefully.The

front line advanced very slowly as it neared the northern slopes of YilghinBurnu,wheretherewasveryheavyfighting.At18:30hoursthethirdline(WestYorkshireRiding)was heavily shelled by4.9-inchguns.At 19:00, the secondline(NorthumberlandFusilierswithYorksandLancasters)whoseleftflankandleft rear linehadbeen severelyharassedby theenemy,appeared tohavebeencounterattackedbytheTurksfrom105I.EvensotheBritishadvancecontinued.At 19:30 hours, just before it got too dark for Sitwell to see anymore, alodgementwasestablishedbytheBritishonthehillatabout105H7,wherethefront linehadgot as far as105L2.At19:45Sitwell toldGeneralHill thathethoughtthattheBritishmightwelltakethehill.At21:00hours,Sitwell toldHill thatoneof themmustgotoYilghinBurnu

anddecidedthathe(Sitwell)shouldgoasoneofhisbattalions,theManchesterswasstillengagedinheavyfightingonKiretchTepewhileanotherbattalionfromthe Dorsets was doing the same at Point 28. Sitwell considered that he wasresponsible for thesafetyof thebeachand that itwashisduty togo. In reply,Hillsaidthathehadsenthalfofhisreservebattalion,theDublinFusiliers,with

ammunitionandwiretothehillacrosstheSaltLakeandthathewaswaitingfora report from them. Sitwell received a telephone message from the LincolnRegiment and learnt that the troops were verymuchmixed, but were gettingtowardsthetopofthehill.At23:30hoursitwasreportedthatthehillhadbeencaptured earlier at 21:30. General Hill sent out for Yilghin Burnu just beforemidnight.Sitwell warnedHill to be prepared for a counterattack at daybreak. Sitwell

alsolearntthattherewasnotenoughroomformorethanthreebattalionsonthehillandsodirectedHilltosendtheotherfivebattalionstorejointheirbrigades.Battalionsfrom32and34Brigadeshadbeenunderfirefornearly twenty-fourhoursandall fivebattalionshadbeen for twonightswithout sleep.LieutenantColonelFishbourne,NorthumberlandFusiliers,whocommandedthesupportingunits,andhadbeenwoundedjustbeforeithadgotdark,reachedSitwellat21:00hours.Fishbournereportedthatfirefromtheleftflankhadbeenintense.Sitwellexplained his work of the daylight hours of 7 August 1915 up until he wasorderedtoattackYilghinBurnu.Hehadconsolidatedthegroundgainedandhadre-organized32and34Brigades,bothofwhichhadbeenfightingallnightandthe former had lost its commander. Sitwell also highlighted the problems ofcollecting tools and ammunition from the beaches, as this equipment cameashorefromsmallboatswhichwereshelled,andthen theyhadtobeunloadedandtheircargoescarriedthroughthedeepsandofthebeaches.AtthesametimeSitwellwastryingtore-organizetroopsreadyforthenextoffensive.Thiseffortalonehadcausedtroopstobecomemoredispersedthanbefore.This was something that Hammersley witnessed for himself when he met

Sitwellonthelandingbeachonthemorningof8August1915.Itwasduringthismeeting that Hammersley tried to convince Sitwell that there was no enemytowardsLalaBabaandhadaskedhimwhyhehadnottriedtogetthereandjoinGeneralHill. Sitwell observed that he had actually toldHammersley thatHillwas still at Yilghin Burnu and that Hammersley had actually spoken bytelephone toHill.Therefore,Hammersleyhad tohaveknownwhereHillwas.Later, during the morning the Manchester Regiment, after thirty hours offighting,rejoinedSitwellatthebeach.HammersleypromisedSitwellamountainartillerybrigade thatwouldarriveatnoon. It arrived threehours lateat15:00,and at 15:30 together with theDorset Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers,wasplacedatthedisposalofGeneralStopford,GOC10thDivision.On9August1915,HammersleyorderedSitwell’sBrigadelesstwobattalions,

toactasareserveto32and33BrigadesinanattackontheAnafartaposition.

OnreachingPoint118V6at16:00hours,Sitwellmetatfirstscoresofmenandeventuallywith 500men stragglingwith ‘extravagant tales of defeat.’ Sitwellralliedthesemen.OnhearingthattheWestRidingRegimentwasretiringonhisleft front, Sitwell directed them to join his left flank which was somewhatweakened and unstable. If he had continued with the advance at that time,Sitwell told Hammersley, it would have allowed 500 men to have left thebattlefield.Sitwellcontinuedtoarguehiscaseasheobservedthaton10August1915,a

messagesentbyHammersleytoSitwelltopreparetosupportanattackby53rdDivision took threehours to reachhim.Sitwellclaimed thathehadpersonallywarnedallofhisunits tobereadyforaction.Asecondmessagetosendeveryman,astheTurkswere‘bolting’,wascompliedwithinstantlywiththeretentionofasinglecompany.Thebattalionssent,afterassisting159Brigade,duginallnight and held the left of the front line until partially relieved on 11 August1915.Theyhadalsoclearedtheareaofenemysnipers.Duringthenightof11–12August 1915, theGOC158Brigade reported that he had taken over all ofSitwell’s front allotted to him, but Sitwell remained all night with a singlebattalion in immediate support of 158 Brigade as Sitwell considered that thesituationremainedserious.EvenwhenSitwellreturnedtothebeachatdawn12August1915,heleftacompanystillatthedisposaloftheGOC158Brigade.On 14 August 1915, Sitwell took over the line held by the Sherwood

Foresters; 105 Q 6 to 92 A 8. He also ensured that every order issued byHammersley concerning the strengthening and prolonging of the line wasfaithfullycarriedoutinadditiontothoseissuedbytheCorpsCommander.Aftertheseobservationsof the fightingandhisactionssince7August1915,Sitwelljustifiedhisactions.HetoldHammersleythaton7August1915fromthetimethethreebattalionsfrom32BrigadejoinedhimanduntilSitwellwasorderedtoattack Yilghin Burnu, he was not justified to send troops at his disposalunsupportedagainstthatobjectiveorIsmailTepe.Sitwellqualifiedthisassertionby noting the oppositionwhich he had alreadymetwith, the situation alreadyknowntohim,theoccupationofHill10,thedunesandPoint28allappearedtohimtohavebeenimperativeinordertosafeguardthebeachesonwhichalargedisembarkationoftroopswastotakeplace.AnattackonYilghinBurnubythreetiredbattalionsaccordingtoSitwell,wasinvitingacomprehensivedefeat,as iteventually took eight battalions to capture it. Sitwell bluntly toldHammersleythateventhoughtheattacksucceeded,thefightinghadbeenalotharderthanhehad been aware of.79 Sitwell was furious that he had been relieved of his

commandof34InfantryBrigadeon18August1915andwastryingtoexplainhisoperationalproblems,whichHammersleyseemedoblivioustoordidnotcareabout. From the very beginning, the August assaults went wrong and thetimetableslippeddramaticallybehindschedule.NoneofthiswasSitwell’sfault,but his testimony gave an insight into what was happening on the peninsula.Once Sitwell’s organization of his area of command is compared with thebloodlettingearlierbyHunter-Weston, thesuggestioncanbemadethatSitwellwasindeedunfairlytreatedbythestandardsof1915.The fighting for Lala Baba and Yilghin Burnu was extremely hard and

vicious.TheTurksputupa stubborndefenceand fought to thebitterend.6thBattalionYorkshireRegiment throughout its entire advance, under heavy riflefire,againstLalaBabahadtoscalealargeslopemorelikeaglacis,whichlackedanycover.Thisfailedtodeterthe6thYorkshires,which‘gallantlylead’bytheirofficers, and ignoring their heavy casualty rate, took the hill at bayonet point.TherewasevidenceofbayonetfightingintheTurkishtrenchesaswellasontheforwardedgeofthesametrenchesasTurkscameforwardtomeettheadvancingYorkshiremen.ThecaptureofLalaBabacost6thYorkshires15officersand250men. Amongst the dead was their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-ColonelChapman, while his Second-in-Command, Major Roberts, was mortallywounded.TheBattalionAdjutantwaswounded,aswastheMedicalOfficer.AllofficersexpectforthreeandmostoftheNCOswereeitherkilledorwounded.80However,asAspinall-Oglandercommentedmuchlater,oncethe6thYorkshireshadlostthemajorityoftheirofficersandwithnosignofthe9thYorkshireswhoweretofollowthem,thoseleftstoppedadvancingandstayedput,waitingtoseewhatmighthappennext.81Onecanhardlyblamethem.Thenextdaywasnobetterand theWarDiaryof32 InfantryBrigadebears

thisoutandillustrateswhatBrigadier-GeneralSitwellstillhadtodealwith.Theopening sentence proves that Sitwell had the worst of times. ‘The delay andconfusion which happened here and which is alluded to by General Sir IanHamilton in hisDespatcheswas due chiefly to the fact thatHILL 10was farmorestronglyheld thanwasexpected,andalso to thefact that the34InfantryBrigadehadnotbeenabletolandenoughmenduringthenight.’34Brigadeand32Brigadehadnotbeeninapositiontoattackthehilluntil theearlyhoursofthemorninganditwasonlyatdawnthatitwaspossibletoseethebestwaytoattack Hill 10. During the ensuing fighting theWest Yorkshire Regiment, 32Brigade, as it attacked Hill 10, lost nine officers killed or wounded. Theseactions were not recorded in the official despatches.82 Robert Rhodes James

observed that during the first night of theSuvlaBay landing,Hill 10was noteven located, far less captured. Furthermore, themoon that night light up thearea and gave the Turks a positive advantage, as the British obligingly worewhite armlets for identification purposes. This saw a heavy casualty rateamongst British officers and NCOs wherever they engaged the Turks thatnight.83Asurveyofoperationsof11thDivisionfrom30June1915to23August1915

discussestheheavyfightingforHill10andtheconsiderablelossesof9thWestYorkshireRegiment.Hill10hadbeenbetterdefendedthananticipated,whileallchances of surprise had been lost to the British. The Turks had dug well-constructed trenches which gave all round defence with no cover above theground. Furthermore, these defences were supplemented with two artilleryemplacements as well as with landmines. Once the attacking British hadsuccessfully negotiated past them and got to the enemy trenches, the Turksdefendedthesewellandmetoncominginfantryontheparapetsbeforebeingcutdownbymachine-gunfire;andthenothersimmediatelytooktheirplaces.84AseverwithGallipoli,itwasclosequartercarnage.Sitwellwascorrect inhisdecisionson thebattlefield; somuchof it seemed

futileandattimessuicidal,buthewasaGeneralandknewthatriskshadtoberun and perhaps should have hardened his heart towards casualties. However,whatistruewasthatattimesthedistancebetweentheGeneralStaffatGallipoliand the troops actually doing the fighting was breathtaking. At least once,Kitchener remarked to Hamilton that there had been a considerable flow ofunofficialcorrespondencefromGallipolitotheWOcriticizingHamilton’sStaff,andGHQbeingoutoftouchwiththemenatGallipoli.85TherowabouttheSuvlalandingsasweshallsee,wastorageforyearsafter

the events there. Hamilton’s problem was that once he had been sacked andreturned toLondonhebegan to lose thewarofwords against themuchmorearticulateAshmead-Bartlettwhowas also backed by public opinion and largesectionsofthemedia.HamiltoncouldonlyreplyusinganofficialreportwhichAshmead-BartlettdismissedinanarticleinTheWorld.Ashmead-Bartlettwroteon1February1916‘SirIanHamiltonmayattempttodeceivethegeneralpublic,buthecannotdeceivethosewhowereonthespotandintheknow.’86Buthereistherub;wasAshmead-Bartlettthereandwashe‘intheknow’?Aswithsomanyenquiries before that of theDardanelles Enquiry and others since on somanytopics, many if not most witnesses are usually quite embittered and thereforebiasedintheirevidenceanddonotgivecredibleaccountsofwhattheythought

that theymighthaveseenorexperienced.Therefore,muchevidenceshouldbediscountedfromanysuchprocess.In the case of Ashmead-Bartlett, he appeared to have been some kind of

political creature of the Lloyd George persuasion, while Keith Murdoch wasbasically anti-British and did not seem to care how he put over his evidence.Hamiltonwasquitenaiveinhisassessmentofhisownsituation,ashewrotetoCallwellduringNovember1915,followingapubliclecturegivenbyAshmead-Bartlett which Hamilton had already condemned in a letter to Kitchener ascontaining ‘some very inaccurate statements’. In his missive to Callwell,Hamilton claimed that when his despatch comes out ‘all the facts will beavailable.Why,with all the power of censorship inWarOffice hands, shouldsuchstatements,demonstrablyfalse,beallowedtogaincurrency?’87Hamiltonhadfailedtolearnthathisvaluesofagentlemanandhiswordwere

fromanalreadybygoneera–assuming that theyhadeverexisted.Theageofdeferencewasalsogoing,especiallyinAustraliawhereithadbarelytakenroot.Australian nationalistic values seemed to boil down to a hatred of the Britishupperclassesandananti-Britishstanceingeneral.Hamilton’sflawinhisletterto Callwell was that he was still trying to censor a very public argument.Ironically,hewasquiteafoeofunnecessarycensorshipandhadonlyaskedthatarticles and despatches did not aid the enemy or dishearten hismen. There isevidence that Ashmead-Bartlett’s articles from the Daily Telegraph, oncetranslatedintoTurkishandreadtoTurkishtroopsbytheirofficers,servedasamoraleboostertoTurkishforces.88Aswehavealreadyseen,personalcriticismHamiltoncouldlivewith,buthe

hated inaccurate, ill-informed and wild reporting. However, this had alreadybroughthimlowandwasabouttokickhischaracterandcareerintothegutter.Hamilton also made an interesting observation to Callwell. He noted that theBritishmediaonly ever spokeof theGallipoli stalemate, butnever referred tothat on theWestern Frontwhichwasworse and consumedmorematerial andlives,butwasrarelycriticizedin1915.89Thiswasyettocomeandcomeitdidduring1916aftertheunwarrantedslaughteroftheBattleoftheSomme.Even before his dismissal, Hamilton began to deal with Murdoch and his

criticismsoftheoperationsatGallipoli.Whatshouldhavebeenthe‘killerblow’,especiallyinthetermsof1915,washowMurdochgottotheGallipolipeninsula.Quite simply according to Hamilton, Murdoch lied about his credentials.Hamiltonwrotethaton17August1915,Murdochwrotea‘wheedlingletter’inwhichhefalselyclaimedtohaveaconnectiontoTheTimes(London),butfailed

to mention his connection to the Australian newspaper The Age. Amazingly,MurdochonlymadethebriefestvisitstoGallipolidespitebeinggrantedmoreorless full access to the peninsula, but he condemned everything he saw orotherwise. Furthermore, he had also agreed to obey the rules concerningcensorshipandtheregulationswhichentailedthisnecessity.90ThemainchargeagainstMurdochwasthathewasnotevenattheHellesarea

of operations and so could not have any genuine input on the situation, butinsteadcouldonlyrepeatwhathehadbeentoldandthenonlywhatsuitedhim.Some ofMurdoch’s chargesweremerely calculated to insult and had no realsubstance behind them, such as officers were ‘amateur, homesick andapprehensive’.Wellofcoursetheywere.Theywerealsomentryingtodealwithaterriblesituation,nothelpedbyMurdoch’slong-rangesniping.OneallegationmadebyMurdochwas thatHamiltonwasrarelyseenat theFrontand that theFrenchreferredtohimas‘thegeneralwholivesonanisland’.ItwasobservedthatMurdochnevermettheFrenchatGallipoli.91TheproblemforHamiltonwasthatMurdoch’sviewswerebeingacceptedas

genuine despite a lack of compelling evidence, which gave politicians andWhitehalltheveryexcuseandscapegoattodecidethattheonlywayforwardatGallipoliwasactuallythereverse,andcalledforanevacuationofthepeninsula,asHamilton andhisStaff had sobadlyhandled the campaign there.Hamiltonwas aware of this, but only when it was too late. He wrote to Colonel PeterPollen in 1916 when the Dardanelles Campaign was being dissected, ‘I shallmake avery strongpoint ofMurdoch’s letter beingused to influencepoliticalopinionuntilmyremovalwasaccomplished.’92ViceAdmiralSirJamesPorter,who had served as PrincipalHospital TransportOfficer for theMediterraneanStation had reservations concerning how the wounded had been treated atGallipoli, but observed that Murdoch’s words which had not been proved orotherwise had ‘already been elevated to the status of State papers and passedroundfromhandtohandandmouthtoearthroughthemostinfluentialcirclesintheland’.93Onthegroundoratsea,themenfightingintheAugustlandingshaddifferent

views of how thingswere, as opposed to the views of journalists sniping at adistance with the grand view of ignorance and prejudice. E.L. Berthon in hisdiarywroteof theAugust 1915 landings that toomuchhadbeen attempted atonce and so failed. It is interesting to note that he considered that the newoffensiveshouldhavebeendonebytheAustralians,whoinhisestimationwouldhavelovedtohavesmashedtheTurkishresistanceandtakengroundasaresult.

Berthonhowever,was critical ofKitchener’s ‘NewArmies’whichhe claimedhadinplacesbeencowardlyandhadrunaway.Asaresultsomemenhadtobeshot.Berthon’soverallthesiswasthattheAugustlandingsrequiredcontinuousmovement until objectives had been taken, but the ‘New Armies’ were ‘notsteadyenough’andthattheTurksworethemoutbyholdingthemup,especiallywith deadly bomb-throwing (throwing of hand grenades). Even though heconsideredthatsomeoftheofficershadbeencompletelyincompetent,Berthon’sassessment of Hamilton and of General Birdwood was that they were‘magnificentleaders’.94The airman Charles Montague Smith saw things differently and said of

Hamilton ‘Sir Ian Hamilton preferred the safety of the battleship QueenElizabethratherthangoingashoreandseeingthingsforhimself.’95Thiswasnotstrictly true, but it was a viewwhich gained currencywith its retelling. Eventhough Berthon admired the bravery of the Australians, Smith was moreobservant,ashenotedthateventhoughtheAustralianswereindeedverybrave,the fact remained that they lacked discipline – for example, in the case of acreepingartillerybarrage inwhich infantryhave toadvance in thewakeofanartillerybarrageduringwhichtiminganddistancearecritical.InsuchacasetheAustraliansmayhavebeenorderedtocaptureonetrenchinordertoavoidbeingcaught in their own artillery barrage; they ignored this order and took threetrenchesandsowerekilledwhentheirownartillerycaughtupwiththem.It isinteresting how two men serving in the same campaign reached differentconclusions about it, as Smith claimed that Winston Churchill was unfairlyblamed for the failure of theDardanelles offensive and that its failure shouldhavebeenlaidatthedooroftheServiceChiefs.96GeoffreyBromet,laterAirViceMarshalSirGeoffreyBromet,confidedinhis

diary that the initial failure of theAugust 1915 landingswasdue to the ‘NewArmy’ not doing their job and not advancing far enough. He noted that theGurkhasandtheANZACs,seasonedtroopsbyAugust1915,haddonewell,butthefresh troops lefta lot tobedesired.On27August1915Brometwrote thattheANZACscouldnotstandSirIanandhisStaffatGHQandrecorded‘Itwillnow takeSir IanHamilton andhisStaff all their time to justify theirmethods(past& present) in the eyes of theAustralians andNew Zealanders.’ Brometconsidered that thewronglandingplaceshadbeenselected,but italsoseemedimpertinenttocriticizeHamilton’splanofcampaignasitwasalltooeasytobeclever afterwards. However, the high casualty rates at Gallipoli continued toappalBromet.Henotedthattheyamountedto42,000bytheendofJune1915;

between 8August 1915 and 27August 1915 theAllies had suffered a further20,000 casualties for little gain, but continued tomuddle on in ‘The good oldEnglishway.’97OneofthosetryingtomuddlehiswaythroughwasSecondLieutenantDonald

Arthur Addams-Williams, a vicar’s son serving with the 4th South WalesBorderers. His letters home are very interesting. Addams-Williams was quiteblaséaboutbeingkilledashehadhad‘atanyrateaverypleasantsea journeyfirstclass,freeexceptfordrinks’.98ThiswashowhesawhisvoyageouttotheDardanelles.OncehearrivedatGallipolihewrote further letters tohis familyandhesparedthemnodetail.Hetoldhismotheroftheflies,heatandsweat.HedeclaredtheTurkstobe‘absolutedevilsatsniping’andprolificbombthrowers.Healsotoldherofbodies layingout innoman’s landaswellasbitsofbodiessuchasafootstillinaboot.Heassuredhismotherthatmostofthesebodiesorremainswerethoseoftheenemybutstillneededtobecollected.Itseemedthatthe flies and the swearing of his men were a problem for the young officer.Addams-Williams also gave an interesting insight into the fighting in thetrenchesatGallipoliwhenheaskedhismothertosendhimaperiscope.Hetoldhismother that one could not put one’s head over the parapet of a trench formore than three secondsbeforeaTurkish sniper ‘gets it’.99Nodoubthispoormotherwasmortified.Second LieutenantAddams-Williamswas killed on 11August 1915 during

thefightingfor‘ChocolateHill’(YilchinBurnu).Hehadbeenengagedintryingto clear Turkish snipers from the area. After being wounded three times, hefinallysuccumbedtohisinjuriesanddied.Severalofthemenwhoservedunderhimwrotetohismothertotrytoexplainhisdeath,howtherehadbeenahighcasualtyrateatChocolateHillandhowtheyhadgonestraightintoactionfromthe day they had landed at Gallipoli. They all expressed their admiration forAddams-Williams.Hewasnineteenyearsoldwhenhediedleadinghismenintobattle.100TheseweretheofficersleadingmenintobattleatGallipoli.A.H.K.Cobb,servingonHMSBacchantewroteinhisdiarythaton27July

1915therewererumoursflyingaroundthattherewasafreshlandingexpected.On 6August 1915,HMSBacchante landed 20,000Australians at Suvla Bay.CobbalsoleftarecordofhowmuchammunitionBacchantefiredfrom6August1915 as it supported the landings against Turkish artillery fire. The ship firedfiftyroundsof9.2-inchaswellasover1,3506-inchshellsattheenemy.By11August 1915 HMS Bacchante required more ammunition.101 One could only

wonderhowtheAllies,perpetuallydeprivedofthenecessaryammunition,couldbe expected to maintain such a rate of fire in order to conclude a successfuloperation. This interlude concerning HMS Bacchante alone should provideevidenceofhowmuchwasneededinthewayofmunitions, letalonemenandfurther equipment. It is also interesting tonote thatdespite the rumours flyingaroundconcerningan impending further landing,Hamiltonwasable to informKitchener that the Turks, despite their ‘excellent spy system’ were caught‘completely off guard’ at dawn 7 August 1915 when the Allies made theirsecond landingon theGallipoli peninsula.102 Indeed surprisewas so completethat a night assault at 00:30 hours 7 August 1915 when a force from 4thAustralianBrigadecrossedfromChailakDeretoAghylDerenotonlyweregunsandammunitiontakenfromtheTurks,buttwoTurkishofficerswerecapturedintheirpyjamas!103ThememoirsofAdmiralJ.H.GodfreyalsogiveanideaofeventsatGallipoli

duringAugust1915.Godfreywasoftheopinionthattheoffensivewasdoomedfromtheverybeginningowingtoitsstartdate,whichhadbeendelayedfromtherelativelycoolermonthofJunetotheinfernoofAugust.Furthermore,thetroopslandingwere on thewhole young and unseasoned. Godfrey also claimed thattherehadnotbeenaconferenceofCommandingOfficerspriortothelandings.Therewasalsoalackofdiscipline,asforexamplethetroopshadalreadydrunkall of theirwater in their canteens even before they had landed, but given theheat this was not really surprising. He also considered that the commandstructurewasweakandappearedtolackaggression.Overall,Godfreywasoftheview that the atmosphereon the transportswas ‘placid, indolent and fatuouslywishful’.OfKitchener’sArmies,Godfreysaidthat theywereentirelynewandlacked the ‘stiffening’ of experienced soldiers. He wrote ‘I had a gloomyforeboding that they would be unable to achieve their limited objectives (ofwhichtheywereignorantbeforelanding)muchlesstoovercometheresistanceofseasonedTurkisharmies.’GodfreysavedhisrealireforpoliticiansandofficialsbackinLondonwhose

procrastinationhaddelayedtheoperationuntil thehottestpartof theyear.Theresultwas thatmany troops tobe landedwereexhaustedevenbefore theyhadgotashore.HealsoconsideredthatitmighthavebeenbetterifHamiltonhadhadhisGHQclosertotheoperationsandonasmallercraftratherthanHMSQueenElizabeth and so could have taken a hands-on approach to the unfoldingoperation.104TheassertionthattherehadnotbeenaconferenceofCommandingOfficersiscontradictedintheofficialversionofthecampaignasitwasrecorded

that therewas such a conference at 14:30hours, 6August 1915duringwhichmapsofSuvlaBaywereissued.105TheperceivedremotenessofHamiltonwaswhatformedmuchofAshmead-

Bartlett’s criticism of him, as he observed that Birdwood shared the commondangers and discomforts with his men.106 Sir Henry Darlington wrote thatHamiltonhadobservedthattheauthoritieswouldnotallowseniorofficerssuchashimtoleadtroopsintobattle,buthadtobekeptintherear.Theirrolewastowatchandinfluencethebattleandkeepintouchfromthesafetyofthetelephonewith their commanders and Brigadiers.107 Two observations should be madehere;thefirstaswehaveseenwasthatin1915aprotocolexistedwhichmeantthatnomatterhowbadlya junior commandingofficerwasperforming, itwasnot correct for a senior officer such as Hamilton to interfere. Secondly, onceHamilton was compared with those Generals on the Western Front, he wasactually in far more danger and much closer to the front. Generals on theWestern Front sent men to their doom from the safety of grand houses andchateauxnormallyaboutfivemilesfromanydanger.Butin1915therewaslittleifanycriticismofthispractice.However, there were other reasons for negative feelings against Hamilton.

TherelationshipbetweenHamiltonandtheANZACswasparticularlydifficult.AubreyHerbert,anIntelligenceOfficernotedon16August1915,theneglectoftheANZACwounded.Henotedthatmanyhadbeenlefttolieoutinthesunforuptofourdayswithoutadequatewaterwhilearrangementsfortheirevacuationwerelessthanuseless.108ThisdidnothingtosoothetherelationshipbetweentheBritishStaffandtheANZACswhofeltvictimisedandsufferedtheworstfromtheinefficienciesofBritishseniorcommandersbothinLondonandatGallipoli.GeneralSirCharlesMonro,Hamilton’ssuccessor,on31October1915wrote

toKitchenerandtoldhimquitebluntlythatbetween6and10August1915theonlytroopstohavemadeanyheadwayattheSuvlaBaylandingswereANZAC,buteven theirprogresswas limitedowing to thehighcasualtiesamongst theirofficers and NCOs. Furthermore, on the beach there was limited ammunitionwhilst the Turks had plenty.Munro considered that the only way to beat theTurks was by a frontal assault or else an evacuation would have to beconsidered.109 However, as early as 8 September 1915 the British PrimeMinister, Herbert Asquith, was already in possession of the facts concerningGallipoliasrepresentedbyAshmead-BartlettvialetterusingKeithMurdochaspostman.110 Hamilton’s career as General Officer Commanding MEF was

alreadyendangered.

T

ChapterSeven

AnUnfairWithdrawal?

hedismissalofGeneralSir IanHamiltonand thesubsequentevacuationoftheGallipolipeninsulaweredrivenmainlybypoliticsandthewordof

two journalists, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and Keith Murdoch. However, asHamiltonobserved later, theDardanelleswasoneof the finest things to comeoutof the(1914–1918)war,‘butwhentheammunitionwasnotforthcomingitwas doomed’.1 Hamilton was largely correct in his assertion, but there wereotherfactorswhichhadalsocausedtheGallipolioperationtofailwhichperhapsHamilton could have addressed and ensured the success of the operation. Aconstant criticismwhich Hamilton failed to address was that of his Staff andhimself seemingly leading the entire operation at Gallipoli from safety andleaving others to take the risk. This view was quite prominent amongst theAustralianforcesservingatGallipoli.General JohnMonashwasquite cuttingaboutBritishStaff serving far from

the Front at Sarpi Camp on the island of Lemnos. In a letter home,Monashdescribedhowhesawthe‘cultofinefficiencyandmuddleandred-tapepractisedto a nicety’.He notedmany officers earning their campaignmedals on boardluxurious ships and wearing all manner of patches, armbands and lace withsomewhat dubious titles which he facetiously described as ‘deputy-assistant-acting-inspector-general-of-something-or-other’. Then taking a more serioustone,Monash considered the sacrifice of the Australian troops at Gallipoli inreferencetoadebateintheAustralianParliamentinwhichAustralianpoliticiansquestioned why Australian troops were being treated in ‘Tommy Hospitals’.Thiswas in reference toBritishmilitaryhospitals rather thanAustralian,New

Zealand or Canadian hospitals. The implication was that the British hospitalswere somewhat inferior and the ‘sooner they hang somebody for grossmismanagement the better’.2 Monash was thoroughly peeved with the entiresituationbetweentheBritishHighCommandandtheANZACs.Next,Monash attacked the entireDardanelles campaign.He considered that

theentireoperationwasflawedfromMarch1915whentheAllies launcheditsnavalassaultagainstTurkish fortsalong theDardanellesStraits.Thisgave theenemy adequate notice of where the Allies intended to land a military force.Furthermore,MonashclaimedthattheAllieshadmoreorlesstoldtheTurksthedate and place of the landings.3 TheBritish historian Peter Liddell noted thatsecrecywasnotapriorityoftheBritishin1915andthatatleastonesoldierfrom29thDivisionsentapostcardhomewiththenote‘leavingfortheDardanellesonTuesday.’4 Robert Rhodes James claims that the Allied naval attack anddestruction ofTurkish forts at Sedd-el-Behr on 3November 1914 also alertedtheTurkstotheintentionsoftheAllies.TheBritish,asaconsequenceof their‘effortless destruction’ of theTurkishguns,made themover confident in laterattacksontheTurks.5Oftheeventuallandings,Monashdescribedthemasonlybeingadequatetosecurealandingbaseandthenholditdefensively.Between25April1915and15August1915,accordingtoMonashittookthe

resources of the entireBritishEmpire to land a further three to four divisionswith thepurposeofmakinga further advance into the interiorof theGallipolipeninsula.Atthesametimetheenemywasabletosendthreetofourarmycorpsto the peninsula, and Allied advances were only possible when there wereenough troops available.Most of the time, owing to the depletion of numbersbecauseofcasualtiesandsickness,theAllieshadtobecontentwithholdingtheterritorieswhichtheyhadheldsincelateApril1915.InMonash’sopinionmuchofthefightingatGallipolifelltoDominiontroops(ANZAC)andthattheyhadsuffereddisproportionately.Atthetimeofwriting,September1915,Monashinformedhiscorrespondent

that nature was now against the Allies at Gallipoli. By then it was the wetseason,while the sea, fromwhere theyweredependent for supplies,wasnowrough and stormy. This meant further delays in the resupplying for anything,essential or otherwise. Furthermore, there seemed to be little if any chance ofreceiving any further reinforcements. To cap it all, Monash quoted the latestreportsfromEnglishnewspapers,whichclaimedthattheentireenterpriseattheDardanelleshadbeenablunder.TheBritishmediaconsideredthatinfuturetheentirewareffortshouldbefocussedonFlanders.Monashobservedthat15,000

Dominiontroopshadbeenkilledfornopurposeatall.ItwasnowonderthatheandtheANZACforcewerenot‘verycheerfulatall’.Theoverall toneofMonash’s précis of the situation at theDardanelleswas

chippy,but it isnot surprisinggiven themistakesmade.Ashewrote,withoutdoubtforthefirstforty-eighthoursafterthelandingsatSuvlaBay,theroadtotheDardanelleswasopen,withnoenemyforceofanyconsiderationahead.Ashe put it, an entire army corps sat down on the beaches while commandersquarrelledaboutquestionsofseniorityandprecedence.ItwasthisdelaywhichhadallowedtheTurkstobringuptheirstrategicreservesfromBulairandrenderthepurposeof theentireAllied landings, theprotectionof the left flankof theANZACadvance,futile.Thisfailureheldupallotherfurtheradvances.6Bytheendof1915,Monashmadeasnide remarkaboutStaffofficerswhohadneverseen the frontatGallipoli,but still receivedcampaignmedals for theirefforts,withclaspsfortherearstationsofImbrosandMudrosaswellasoneforChaos!7The bitterness ofMonash and others of theANZAC force against the BritishGeneralStaffwhoplottedthefightinginsafetyisunderstandable,especiallyastheirandotherssacrificeswerefornoughtandconsideredbytheBritishmediatohavebeenmisguidedaswell.Nodoubt it leftabitter taste inthemouthsoftheAustraliansandNewZealanders.Monash’s criticisms were largely justified, especially that of arguing over

seniority and precedence. An example was that of General Sir FrederickStopford, who as we have all ready seen, was clearly out of his depth as acommander atGallipoli.After the landings atSuvlaBay therewasnot only aquestion of replacing Stopford, but also Generals Mahon and Hammersley.KitchenermadeaninquiryofHamiltonaskingifhehadcompetentGeneralstoreplacethethreeincompetents.Kitchenerwasconcernedenoughtowrite‘thisisa young man’s war and we must have Commanding Officers that will takeadvantageofopportunitiesthatdonotoftenoccur.IwillsendyouanyGeneralsI have available.’8 Thiswas the beginning of a small episode inwhichman’svanity took precedence over the concerns of defeating the enemy. Kitchenerappointed Major General de Lisle to command 9th Corps with the rank ofLieutenant General, as he already had the necessary experience of fighting atGallipoli.KitchenertoldMahonthatHamiltonhadhopedthatMahon,whowascommanding10thDivision,wouldwaivehisseniorityandgivewaytodeLisleandcontinuetocommand10thDivisionforthenearfuture.9Kitchenerhadhisreply within a day, as Hamilton reported that Mahon refused to waive hisseniorityandinformedKitchenerthatMahonhadactuallywritten‘Irespectfully

declinetowaivemyseniorityandtoserveundertheofficeryouname.PleaseletmeknowtowhomthecommandoftheDivisionshouldbehandedoverbyme.’ThisplayedstraightintothehandsofHamiltonwhohadalreadydiscussedwithKitchener by cable the necessity of replacing Mahon as soon as possible.Hamilton appointedBrigadierGeneral F.F.Hill to temporarily command 10thDivisionandorderedMahontoMudrostoawaitordersandaskedKitchenertosendordersrelativetoMahon’sfuture.10However,itmustbenotedthatitwasMahonwhosuggestedHillashisreplacement.11Thisepisodeofpetulanceseemedtohaveplayedoutby20August1915when

Mahonwas due to leave for theUK, asHamilton related toKitchener on 18August1915.ThepreviousdayMahonhadsentHamiltona letter inwhichheexplained his behaviour, which seemed quite unprofessional and disobedient.Hamilton had told him that until recent events he had been satisfied withMahon’sworkasaDivisionalGeneral. It seemed thatMahonactuallyboreanundisclosedgrudgeagainstdeLisleandsorefusedtoserveunderhim.Itseemedthat it was a personal thing, as he claimed that he would have waived hisseniority and rank to anybody, but could not do it in the case of de Lisle.12However, as a result of a shortage of Divisional Commanders at Gallipoli,Hamilton reappointed Mahon Commander of 10th Division on 22 August1915.13Evensothiswasnottheendofthematter.Hamilton, at the end ofAugust 1915 in a letter, hadmore to tellKitchener

aboutMahon.HeremindedKitchenerofMahonrefusingtowaivehisseniorityas well as refusing to serve under De Lisle, but Hamilton had forgiven thistransgression of military order. However, he was having doubts about hisdecision, ashe requested thatKitchener should findMahonapostback in theUK, Ireland or anywhere. Hamilton was fully aware of the unsatisfactorysituation asMahon, in a fit of personal animosity against another officer,waswilling to leave the theatreofoperationsandhismen,whowere ‘still fightingfortheirlives’asHamiltonwrote.Hamiltonfearedthatifheshouldbekilledorwounded,MahonwouldclaimhisseniorityandassumecommandatGallipoli.InHamilton’sopinionMahonwasonlyfittocommandaDivision.14PerhapsifHamiltonhadseniorofficerstospare,hemighthavesentMahonpackinginsteadofputtingupwithhisshenanigans.AtGallipoli,Hamiltonhadalimitedpoolofmilitarytalenttodrawonandsoasever,hadto‘muddlethrough’withwhathehad.Evenso,heshowedsomemettleashesentMahonacopyoftheletterthathehadsenttoKitchenerandmadeitquiteclearthatthepresentarrangementsof

temporary commands could not continue indefinitely.15 Mahon however,continued in his assertion that hewould never serve under deLisle.Hamiltonrecommended to Kitchener that even though Mahon was doing well as adivisional commander, it would be too risky to give Mahon any furtherresponsibility.16ThisunsatisfactorysituationconcerningcompetentArmyCorpsCommanders for the Gallipoli campaign had been an issue that had burnedthroughoutthesummerof1915,asHamiltonasearlyasJune1915,hadtriedtoobtain decent commanders, but was refused by Whitehall.17 It was poordecisionslikethatwhichweretoensurethefailureoftheGallipolicampaign.The failure of executive command was one of the largest problems at

Gallipoli.HamiltonmayhaveseenthefaceofmodernwarasanobserveroftheRusso-JapaneseWaradecadeearlier,butmanyofhissubordinateshadlittleifany experience of modern war. Many of the commanders, both British andFrench, lacked convincing leadership, having only participated in limitedcolonialwarsagainstanoftenunder-armedenemy.AtGallipolithetableswereturned as theAllieswere now under-armed and still led unconvincingly. ThissadstateofaffairswasalltooobviousattheSuvlalandings.HamiltonpriortotheSuvlalandings,objectedtotheimpositionofLieutenant

General Sir Frederick Stopford as Commander of 9th Corps. Hamiltonconsidered Stopford to be unfit both physically and mentally for such acommandandhewasprovedright,asStopfordfailed toseizeanyinitiativeormakeanyrealprogress.HamiltoncommunicatedhisdespairwiththefailureofStopfordinacommuniquétotheCGSinahandwrittenmemorandum.Hamiltonconsideredthattherewaslittlepointin‘rubbingitin’thattherewerefewTurksopposingStopfordandthathehadbeentoocautious.Hamiltonobservedthatthemenandofficers landingon8August1915shouldhavebeenmadeawarethatthesuccessofthecampaigndependedongainingthehighgroundatAnafarta.18Hamiltonasfarashewasable,wasfuriouswithStopfordforfailingtodothis.Hamilton noted and sympathized that Stopford’s men and officers were

unfamiliarwiththetypeofwarfarebeingwagedatGallipoli,butevenso,hewasconcerned at the lack of ‘energy and push displayed by the 11th Division’.However,Hamiltonnotedthatevenso,therewaslittleexcuseas13thDivisionhadadvancedshowing‘dashandself-confidence’.Hamiltonalsoobservedthattherehadbeenverylittleinthewayofenemyoppositionandbluntlyaskedwhattheproblemwith11thDivisionwas,andaskedwasittheDivisionalGeneralortheBrigadiers?Hamilton claimed that he had a ‘first rate’MajorGeneral andtwo‘competentBrigadiers’availablewithhim.Hamiltonwasalsoquiteclearin

theobjectiveswhichhadtobecapturedtoensurethesafetyofSulvaBay.Thepremier objective was the Aja Liman Anafarta ridge, to be captured withoutdelay.DarklyStopfordwaswarnedthatifhedidnotdothis,theenemywouldandthathewastoimpresshispersonalityontohistroopstogetthisdoneandhewastohavenoqualmsaboutcasualties.Theyhadtobeborne.AsHamiltontoldStopford, every day’s delay in capturing this ridge meant higher casualties.Furthermore, Hamilton demanded the name of the Brigadier who had sent amessagestating thathis forceswere retiringowing toa strongattackand thenlater reported that this attack had never developed.19 Hamilton was clearlypeeved in the lack of zip in Stopford’s Divisionswhichwere supposed to beattackingandadvancing,butinsteadwerebecomingmoreandmorestatic.Stopford tried to explain his position to Hamilton. He claimed that he was

aware of the importance of the high ground east of Suvla Bay and hadunceasinglyimpressedonhisforcethenecessityofseizingthistarget.Stopfordexpressedhisregretthathehadfailedtocapturetheridgeandthatnowhewasnotonlyforcedintoadefensiveposition,butwasactuallystrugglingtoholdtheground already captured by his force. Stopford tried to find a suitable reasonwhyhisdivisionshadon thewholedonesopoorly,andsoblamedthe lackofwater.However,thiswasaproblemfortheentireattackingforceandeverybodypointed to a scarcity of water. This was to become a major question at theinquiryintotheeventsatGallipoli,butitstilldidlittletoexplainwhyStopford’smenhadnotcapturedtheirobjective.Stopfordwas astute enough to point towards the lack of preparation of his

menandofficers,astheyhadbeentrainedintrenchwarfareandnotinthetypeof fighting which required movement across open land and continuousadvancing.Quitesimplytheykneweverythingaboutdefenceandpreciouslittleabout attack.The dearth of experienced officersmeant that all cohesion of anattackwaslostandmenlackedorders,andinplacesjuststayedwheretheywereandfailedtoadvance.Stopfordalsocitedtheinadequateartillerysupportashismenwereexpectedtoadvanceagainstanenemywellversedindefence.Navalsupporting fire had proved to be less than useful and once it was lifted, theenemy were able to fire at the advancing British almost at will. Allied fieldartillerywas totally inadequate.As Stopfordwrote toHamilton, ‘givenwater,gunsandammunition,Ihavenodoubtaboutourbeingabletosecurethehills,whicharesovitaltous,but,forsuccess,morewaterandadequateartilleryareabsolutelyessential’.20WithoutdoubtHamiltonknewthis,butitwasnothelpfultoseeitwrittendownasheknewthattherewasnothingthathecoulddoabout

thesituation.In a further report toHamilton detailing the failure of theBritish offensive

againstAnafartaRidge,StopfordwasabletoidentifyanindividualDivisionasbeingcrucial intheunderstandingofitsfailure.Stopfordclaimedthat the53rdTerritorialDivision,theWelshDivisionhadbeenverydisillusionedandhad‘noattacking spirit at all’. He stated that 53rd Division had not come across anyheavyartilleryfireandhadonlyencounteredsomeriflefire,buthadwithdrawnat the first sign of provocation ‘and went back a long way’. The overallargumentwasthatthemenneededgoodleadershipanddidgoforwardonceledbyStaffofficersorregularofficers.StopfordmadethecasethattheNewArmyDivisions would come on well, but must be led by their own Divisional andBrigadierGenerals.TheoveralltonewasthattheTerritorialforcesandtheNewArmy still needed experienced officers to lead them, but in timewouldmakegood soldiers.21 However, Hamilton did not have the luxury of bringing oninexperiencedofficersandmenatGallipoli.Quitesimply,owingtothecockpitnatureoftheareaofoperationswherenobodywassafefromenemyartilleryfire,men serving at Gallipoli learnt the lessons of that particular arena or swiftlybecame a casualty, either dead or wounded. Fate did not care which. By 14August1915,StopfordwasreplacedwithMajorGeneral(withanactingrankofLieutenant General) de Lisle.22 It was at this point of the campaign thatHamilton was extremely desperate for decent commanders and Staff. He wasparticularlyhappytoreceivedeLisleashehadawideexperienceofthepresentwar,bothinFranceandinTurkey.MenexperiencedinthewaratGallipoliwereat a premium and Hamilton naturally preferred them over those whoseexperiencewaslimitedtothatoftheWesternFront.23Hamiltonwasnodoubtcorrect in trying togetdecentStaff inorder toplan

andexecuteasuccessfuloffensiveatGallipoli,buttherewasanaddedproblem.AsHamiltonwasnotgettingthetroopswhichhedeservedandneededtofulfilthewishes of his politicalmasters and knockTurkey out of thewar, themendoing the actual fighting at the Frontwereweakening.Amedical report fromColonel Purves Steward toHamiltonwas quite clear about the state of healthfoundamongstAustraliantroopsatANZAC.Thereportnotedthatthemenwhowereatthefrontwerenotsickmen,buthadbeenundercontinuousshellfireonaverage foreighteenweeks (since theoriginal landingson25April1915),butcouldnotbeconsideredfirst-ratetroops.Itwasreportedthatmanyofthesemenhad heartweaknesses and suffered from a shortness of breath.Thismade anyforced marches unthinkable. Thinking of the coming rainy season, Purves

Steward toldHamilton that epidemic disease such as pneumoniawould breakoutandcauseahighdeathrate.Theoverallappearanceofthemenwasafurtherindicationofunfitness.A solutionwas suggested, but it was clearly impossible given the situation

whichhaddevelopedatGallipoli.ItwasrecommendedthattroopswhohadbeenatANZACforfourmonthsormoreshouldbewithdrawnfromthepeninsulaandtakenelsewhereentirely for rest.ThiswasbecausePurvesStewardconsideredthat beingmerelywithdrawn to the rear lines atGallipoliwas inadequate.Wehave already seen that the enemy could shell at will any part of the AlliedpositionsatGallipoli.Whatwasdesiredwastotalrestwithplentyofsleepandagenerous diet. Ordinary camp rest with games and other entertainments wasconsidered unsuitable, as many of the men were too tired to play sports. Itfurther suggested that leave in a large city such as Alexandria was alsounsuitableasthereweretoomanydistractionsandafearthatmanyofthemenmight contract VD. The best option was two or three weeks home leave inAustraliaandthatmightevenprovetobearecruitingchance.Forothertroopswhoremainedfit,itwassuggestedthatcanteensshouldbeestablishedwherethemencouldsupplementtheirrationswithminorluxuriesoftheirownchoosing.24Overall,Hamilton largelyagreedwith themedical report;hehadalsonoted

muchofwhatthemedicalstaffhadnoticed.However,HamiltoncouldnotagreetothemenbeingsentbacktoAustraliaastheywouldbeabsentfromthefrontfor about threemonths owing to travelling as well as the length of the leaveperiod itself.Buthedidmention thatRedCrosscanteenswerebeingsetupatGallipoli.25Medicalconditionshadnotbeentakenintoaccountatthebeginningof1915when serious talkbeganabout an attack againstTurkey, andwas justanother factor undermining Hamilton and the entire campaign. However,Hamilton’s attitude was not as honest as it would seem, as in a circulardistributed to Medical Staff serving on hospital ships and with ambulancecarriers,hisattitudewas thatbasically theyshouldnotallow thewoundedandsicktolowertheirmoraleandreallyshouldnotlistentothem.26Bythebeginningof1916theinvestigationintoHamilton’sperformancewas

underway.FromtheverybeginningtheWarOfficedidnotlikehisdespatches,which were becoming available publicly and were contesting their contents.Hamilton,clearlycondemningtheevacuationoftheGallipolipeninsulawrotetohisformerChiefofStaff,GeneralWalterBraithwaite, ‘In timetheNationwillsee,what theAustraliansandNewZealandersnowunderstand, that itwas thecowardsattheheadoftheshowwhoranawayandnotthebravefellowsonthe

spot.’27 This was very unusual language from Hamilton who tended not todisplaysuchemotion.Hamiltonwas definitely under considerable pressure regarding his record at

Gallipoli,ashismilitaryrecordwasabouttobecastintothemudowingtotittle-tattle from journalists, as he saw it. Hamilton was also being betrayed, asKitchenerwastryingtogettheofficialrecordadulteratedtosuithisversionofevents and prevent his own record being sullied. General Sclater wrote toHamiltonrequestingthathealterapartofhisdespatchinwhichheclaimedthathe was kept short of 45,000 men which Hamilton deemed necessary for asuccessful completion of the Dardanelles operation. Sclater tried to infer thatperhaps Hamilton might have frittered the men away in Egypt or at Mudrosinsteadofdeployingthematthefront.HamiltonrecalledwhathadhappenedandtoldSclaterthathehadbeentoldbyKitchenerthathecoulddrawonunlimitedtroopsalreadyinEgypt.However,KitchenerknewwellthatifHamiltontriedtodoso,Maxwell,theMilitaryCommanderinEgyptwouldclaimthattheSenussi,aLibyantribewhichoftenrevoltedagainsttheBritish,wasadvancingtoattackandthatheneededeverysoldierthathecouldlayhishandsontodefendEgypt.Hamilton confided to Sclater that he feared that both Kitchener and theWOweretryingtotraphimintosayingthathehadbeenincompetent.28As theDardanellesCommissioncontinued to sit, itwas suggested that even

thoughKitchenerwas trying to shape theCommission into a formwhichmayhave suited him and his reputation, in fact his influencewas perhapswaning.Hamiltonconfided toColonelPeterPollenduringMarch1916 thathe thoughtthat this was the case. Hamilton made two observations of events after theevacuationoftheGallipoliPeninsulaattheendof1915andbeginningof1916.HenotedthatGeneralSirWilliamBirdwooddidnotgetcommandofanarmyafter theDardanelles and in fact lost some of theAustralianswhich had beenunderhiscommandatGallipoli.Furthermore,GeneralMaxwellwassenthomefromhispostinEgypt.AsHamiltonwrotetoPollen,‘Iwatchwithdeepinterestthesteadyrisingtideofopinionwhichholdsthatwehavemadethegranderrorof the campaign by our evacuation.’29 And this was the question; had theevacuationof theGallipolipeninsulabeennecessaryorhad itbeenamistake?Hamiltonconsideredthatithadbeenahugemistakeandthiswaswhathewastospendmuchoftheremainderofthewarrailingagainst.Butwhatwasthetruth?Militarily, things had gone wrong, while the poor provision of medical

suppliesandscarcityofwater inpartsof theAlliedFront lineexacerbatedthissituation. Poor hygiene also played its part, but how much of this was

Hamilton’s fault andhowpoliticalwashis dismissal inOctober1915?By theend of 1916, Hamilton was certainly aware that his dismissal had beenengineered using the suspect contents of Murdoch’s letter to Asquith as thedevicetoensurethatHamiltonwasdismissedandthatanevacuationofGallipoliwasensured,blamingHamiltonforthefailureofthecampaign.30Hamiltonhadbeen a convenient scapegoat as theBritishGovernmentwas able towithdrawfromitspreviouspositionconcerningGallipoli,blamingnotonlyHamilton,butallowing Churchill to serve as another scapegoat. It took no blame for notsupportingHamiltonwithmenandequipment,orforallowingKitchenertoruntheWar Office as his personal fiefdom and ignoring previous reforms of thedepartmentaswellashisownGeneralStaff.AllofthisallowedforthefailureatGallipoli.Kitchener,afterthedismissalofHamilton,wasinformedbyBirdwoodofthe

positionatGallipoli. Ina telegram,Birdwoodconfirmed that thesituationwasthesameasthatinFrance,asinfrontoftheAlliedpositionswasacontinuousfront of Turkish trenches. As the Turkish flanks could not be turned, as theycontinuedfromcoast tocoast,onlyfrontalassaultscouldbecarriedoutandsoanypossibilityofasurpriseattackwasmoreorlessimpossible.BirdwoodtoldKitchener that the Turks had 125,000 infantry on the peninsula with another85,000 troops available if necessary. TheBritish only had 85,000men on thepeninsulaorrestingonnearbyislands,withonlyanother5,000mencomingasreplacements. Birdwood also observed that sickness (rather thanwounds)wastaking its toll amongst theBritish.Theoverall ‘wastage’of dead,woundedorsick, was on average twenty per cent a month. Furthermore, many battalionsfoundthattheircompanieswerebeingcommandedbytemporaryofficers,oftenSecondLieutenants,whohadonlybeenintheArmyforfourmonths.Thisledtooperational problems as they were hampered by ‘indifferent companyleadership’.Strategically,theTurksheldvaluablehighgroundwhileBirdwood’srequest for more troops and equipment, which included 250,000 shells of allcalibres,ofwhichmostshouldbehighexplosive,200,000Stokesmortarshellsand25,000trenchhowitzer50lbbombs,nodoubtdismayedKitchener.31ItwasalltoomuchlikethoseofHamilton.During October 1915, for the first time the question of evacuating the

Gallipolipeninsulawas takenseriouslyandplansdiscussedaboutwhat shouldbe done.After an inspection of the peninsula, LieutenantGeneral Sir CharlesMonro,whohadbeenappointedasHamilton’ssuccessor,gavehisassessmentofthesituation.HetoldKitchener,‘ThetroopsonthePeninsula,withtheexception

of theAustralianandNewZealandCorps,arenotequal to thesustainedeffortowing to inexperienced officers, thewant of training ofmen and the depletedconditionsofmanyofourunits.WemerelyholdthefringesoftheshoreandareconfrontedbyTurksinveryformidableentrenchments,withall theadvantagesof position and power of observation of our movements. The beaches areexposedtoobservedartilleryfireandintherestrictedarea,allstoresareequallyexposed.’32 This report was damning and encouraged those who advocatedwithdrawalfromthepeninsula.Monro consulted with his Corps Commanders regarding withdrawal.

Birdwoodwasagainstevacuation,asitwouldgivetheimpressionofacompleteTurkish victory which may well have consequences throughout the Islamicworld. He also argued that it would also release Turkish troops for otheroperations; against the Russians in the Caucasus or against the British inMesopotamia (modern Iraq).On the other hand,General Byng pressed for anevacuationofthepeninsula.33Inturn,KitchenerbriefedtheBritishPrimeMinister,HerbertAsquith,ofthe

situationatGallipoli.He toldAsquith that landings thereaswintercamewereprecariousandoftenimpossibleowingtoroughseasandthewantofharbours.ThebaseatMudroswastoofarfromthefront,whichagaincausedaproblemforresupply.However,KitchenerconsideredthatAlliedtrencheswerewelldugandbombproofandthatthemenandofficersholdingthemwereconvincedthattheycouldholdoutforthewinter.Thismayhavebeentrue,butKitchenerconsideredthatthedepthoftheAlliedfrontagewasnotdeepenoughandwouldbeunabletoholdoutiftheGermansweretosendaGermanforcetotheareatoattacktheAlliedpositions.Asaresult thepreparationforcarefulandsecretplansbegan.Theoverall conclusionwas that an evacuationwouldbe a lossof face for theBritish,buttheyhadlittlechoicebuttodoso.34WinstonChurchillaseverstooddefiantlyagainstthenotionofevacuationandconsideredthatthepoliticiansandhighcommandwerepanickingandurged that theAlliedpositions atGallipolishould be defended and the offensive continued.35 Churchill’s viewwas verymuch in theminorityandhis lonevoicewas tobecomeafeatureofhiscareeruntil1940.Thenatureof theDardanellesEnquirywas seenby someas a virtual lynch

mob, asHamilton remarked toAspinall that the enquiry seemed to have been‘rather taking the shapeof disgruntledWelshmen, Irishmen andAustralians (Iwon’t sayNewZealanders because they are perfectly alright) eachhavinggotputon to it for themainpurposeofhavingsomebody’sbloodforanymilitary

mishapwhichmayhavebefallen their compatriot contingent’.36ColonelCecilAllansonmadeafurtherobservationoftheCommissionashenotedthatonthedayofhisquestioning,onlythreemembersoftheCommissionwerepresentandwithoutdoubtnoneofthemweresoldiers.InAllanson’sopinionnoneofthetriowouldhavehad any idea aboutmilitary tactics, especially thoseneeded at theDardanelles. There had been two points at Allanson’s questioning; how hadBritishtroopsdoneattheDardanellesand‘whetherthefailureatSuvlawasthereal cause of the loss of the SariBair’.Allanson’s replywas, ‘Inmy opinionregular troops, or troops who had had longer training would certainly havecapturedSariBair as far asHillQwithout reference towhathadhappenedatSuvlaBay.’37Aspinall,laterasAspinall-OglandertowritetheofficialhistoryoftheGallipoliCampaignandsoimposehisownviewsasfact,washowever,asaformer member of theMEF General Staff, an important witness to events atGallipoli.InastatementtotheDardanellesEnquiryheconfirmedthedifficultiesexperiencedbyHamiltonandhisStaffonleavingLondonatthebeginningofthecampaign,especiallythelackofintelligenceabouttheenemyandtopographyoftheareatobeinvaded.38ForHamilton the stumbling block atGallipoliwas how the SuvlaBay and

ANZAClandingsofAugust1915hadbeenconducted.Hamiltonwasdesperateto prove that he was not alone in the planning of these operations and thatKitchenerhadknownofthemandhadapprovedthem.HamiltonaskedAspinallif there was any record of this as both Hamilton and his Chief of Staff,Braithwaite,werecertain thatKitchenerhadcabled to themhisanticipationofwhat they were about to attempt. In 1917 Hamilton still could not find thistelegramandevenwonderedifthiscable‘hadbeenhelpedtodisappear’.39Thiswould seem thatHamiltonwasbecomingparanoidand feelingpersecuted,butthetaleofthemissingtelegramwouldsuggestthathehadindeedreceivedsuchatelegram,whichhadindeedgonemissing–deliberatelyorotherwiseisquiteanotherquestion.InapostscriptincorrespondencewithBirdwood,Hamiltonnotedevidenceof

Kitchener’s pre-approval of the Suvla operations remainedmissing.Hamilton,Braithwaite and Aspinall were all certain that such a cable from Kitchenerapproving the operations had been received back atGallipoli.40 It had alreadybeen noted by the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, MajorGeneralSirCharlesCallwell,thatKitchenerhadbeenverysecretiveandthathehadno recollectionof telegramspassingbetweenHamilton andKitchener.He

alsonotedthatpartofHamilton’sproblemwasthatKitchenerwasnowdeadandthereforecouldnotbesummonedtogiveevidenceat theEnquiry.41Hamilton,shortlyafterKitchener’sdeathatsea,inalettertoBirdwoodnotedthatafterthetragedy he heard ‘on the highest authority (literally so) that Lord K. himselfthoughtthatIhadbeenverybadlytreatedandhadwishedtore-employme.’42Thiswasprobablytrue,butasHamiltonwastoquicklyrealize,adeadKitchenerwasofnohelp tohimatall,whilehismemory remainedsacredand thereforecouldnotbeblamedforthefailedGallipolioffensive;ashewrotetoChurchill,‘Asamatteroffact,Idon’tmeantoattackKitcheneratallalthoughthefigureswill prove that, wittingly or unwittingly, he did me very badly.’43 However,Aspinall was quite confident thatKitchener had ‘suggested practically for theidenticalSuvlaandAnzacschemewhichwehadcarriedout–justashealsohitupon your scheme for the original landings; and I am sure that the telegramsmust be in existence somewhere’.44 Eventually a paper did turn up in thehandwritingofMajorGeneralEllisonheaded‘InterviewwithLordK.11/7/15.Paragraph three of the paper said, ‘He (Kitchener) wants Sir Ian to considerpossibility of push against Maidos when three New Army Divisions arrive –doubtsnecessityofwaiting for the twoT.F. (TerritorialForce)Divisions.’45 Itseemed thatKitchenerdidsupportHamilton’sproposal for theSuvla landings,butaswehavealreadyseen,Kitchenerwasadeadherowhosememorycouldnotbebesmirched.Thepoint of the enquiry thoughwasnot aboutwhatKitchener haddoneor

may have, butwhy theGallipoliCampaignwent so badlywrong.TheBritishGovernmentdiditsbesttodistanceitselffromthefailure,asHamiltonnotedtotheFrenchGeneralD’Amade, theexpeditionwouldhave‘certainlysucceeded’if the MEF had been prepared in secret and launched as a surprise attack.Furthermore,iftheMEFhadlandedon19March1915,thedayafterthenavalassault against the forts on theDardanelles, therewas also a strong chance ofsuccess. Equally, Hamilton claimed that with adequate troops to replacecasualties immediately at the time of the 25April 1915 landings, this assaultwould haveworked.Hamilton in 1917 also asserted that theMEF could havelasted out thewinter of 1915–1916.46 However, thiswas to overlookmedicalreportswhichwerequite clear that if theMEF remainedatGallipoli, sicknesswouldhavetakenitstolloftheforce,whiletherewasvirtuallynothingavailableinthewayofreplacingthesecasualties.Hamilton could not hide the fact that the Suvla Bay landings had been a

disaster. The British Government was aware of this from the findings ofLieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey who had toured the area. Hankey, aftervisiting the beaches at Suvla Bay, had thought that the offensive had beensuccessful as he found soldiers lounging around, swimming naked in the sea,while there was no firing. He quickly discovered that there was nobody inauthorityandwhenhewentfurtherinlanditwasfoundthattheadvancehadnotgoneveryfar.Hankey,uponinquirydiscoveredthattherewasnoreasonfortheadvancetohavehalted.GeneralStopford,stillathisHQonHMSJonquil,wasjusthappy thathismenwereashoreand that theyshould restandadvance thenext day. Aspinall had tried to make the case for rapidity, but was largelyignored.47 This was the core of the enquiry – why had people notmoved onduringamajorassault–but theproblemwas that theCommissionhad little ifany military experience and certainly did not understand the nature of thefighting at Gallipoli. As a consequence expert witnesses such as Hamilton,Birdwood and Aspinall were ignored as the Commission sought a politicalanswertoitsproblemandwasquitewillingtosacrificeHamilton.Birdwood, ina letter, toldHamilton thathewasgoing to followHamilton’s

line regarding the Commission and bring out the extreme shortage ofammunitionandthe‘disastrouseffectoftheabsenceofacanteenonourmen’.48Later, Birdwood told Hamilton that he had ‘rubbed in well’ the ammunitionshortageatGallipoli,especiallyhowitzershells.SinceservinginFrancewiththeANZACs, following their evacuation from Gallipoli Birdwood had seen thehuge numbers of trenchmortars available there and the unlimited ammunitionfor them.Hismenhad said tohim that if theyhadhad suchequipment at theDardanelles ‘we should have gone right through with it’. Birdwood had alsocriticized the lack of canteen stores, which would have halved the rate ofsickness at Gallipoli. He noted the lack ofmoralewhenever numbers ofmenwere low and considered that they had done enough fighting. If the battalionswerefull,themenclamouredtoattack.49However, Hamilton began to feel that he was not getting Birdwood’s one

hundredpercentsupportasheconsideredthatBirdwoodhesitatedinsupportinghimoutright and possibly supportedMonro’s evacuation.50As ever,Hamiltonwas being distracted by the antics of Ashmead-Bartlett, as his word wasbecoming state policy while ignoring the testimony of the soldiers who hadserved at Gallipoli. He also denied ever having received a single letter fromKitchener during the entire time that he had served at Gallipoli.51 However,

Walter Braithwaite remained convinced that Kitchener had the same idea asHamilton regarding the plan for attack at Sulva Bay and so he queried howanybodyafter6August1915couldbecriticalofHamiltonifKitchenersharedhisideas.52BraithwaitealsoquestionedwhyanybodyshouldonlycriticizeSulvabut not ANZAC; perhaps it was sacrosanct as it was the work of theAustralians.53 However, it must be said that the Australians did acquitthemselveswellintheirareaofoperationsunliketheirBritishcounterparts.NotallwaslosttoHamilton,asaWarCabinetMemorandumread‘Itmustbe

rememberedthattheCommander-in-ChiefofthisExpedition,SirIanHamilton,was removed from his command and has since been excluded from allemployment.Itwouldbeunjusttothisofficer,whohasbeenavictimofsuchill-usageatthehandsofhissuperiors,thatthetruthshouldnotbeknownandthatheshouldcontinuetobethescapegoatoftheextraordinarydelaysandneglectsonthepartofthewholeGovernmentwhichledtothefailureoftheenterprise.’54Indeed the decision to evacuate the peninsula had been taken and carried outswiftlycomparedwiththelengthoftheinvestigationintotheentireoffensive.InfacttheevacuationofGallipoliwasthemostsuccessfuloperationcarriedthereduring1915.However,theentireenterprisestankofpoliticsandlittletodowithmilitarymerit,buthadtheurgentclamourofpopulistjournalismasdirectedbyAshmead-Bartlett.Hamilton understood that hewas beingmade a scapegoat and that the two

journalists, Ashmead-Bartlett and Murdoch were the principal agents of this,especiallyMurdoch.Initially,hehadunderestimatedMurdoch,butlaterrealizedthatofthetwojournalistsMurdochwasthemorepowerful,asitwasallegedthat‘it wasMurdoch’s penwhich kept Fisher in power during his Premiership inAustralia’. Murdoch by 1917 was also beginning to influence senior Britishpoliticians, as he briefed against Hamilton and other senior officers who hadservedatGallipoli.HamiltonrelatedtoChurchillthathehadlunchedwithLloydGeorgewith theviewof tacklinghimover the issueofusingMurdoch’s letterforpoliticalgainwithoutascertainingiftherewasanytruthinitscontents.OnceattableLloydGeorgeindicatedanemptychairtoHamiltontellinghimthathehad invitedMurdoch to join them, but he had failed to keep the date, whichratherrevealedsomethingofMurdoch’snature.AsHamiltonnoted,theideaofinvitingMurdoch to join him andLloydGeorgewas ‘brilliant’ and that if theinjurydone to theDardanelles offensive hadbeen limited to a personal attackagainsthim,allmighthavebeenwell.However, asMurdoch seemed todamnthe entire British force under his command, thenMurdoch’s wordswere ‘too

blacktobeforgiven’.55DespiteHamilton’sproteststhejournalismofMurdochandAshmead-Bartlett

continued to sway the judgements of the Commission as it continued not toaccept theversionofeventsgiven to thembymenwhohadactually servedatGallipoliandunderstoodwarandthenatureofthefightingatGallipoli.PerhapsHamiltonprotestedtoolongandloud,while theBritishGovernmentcontinuedtodistanceitselffromtheentireGallipolioffensive.HamiltoncomplainedtoSirGrimwood Mears, the Secretary of the Dardanelles Commission, that theCommissionwasbeing ledby thePress in their findings, andoverall ignoringwhathadreallyhappened.Hamiltoncitedtheexampleoftheallegationthathehad lost the confidence of his own troops as claimed by Ashmead-Bartlett.Hamilton told Mears that when his ship, HMS Chatham, cleared KephalosHarbourtakingHamiltonawayfromtheEasternMediterranean,crewsfromtheentirefleetturnedoutandgavehim‘heartycheers.’Thisnewshadbeencabledhome to the Press, but had not appeared owing to censorship.56 This isinteresting asHamilton does notmentionwhat his soldiers thought and aswehaveseenearlier,RoyalMarinesreturningfromtheFrontweresoshatteredbythe demands of the fighting atGallipoli that they ignored the presence of theGOC.Hamiltonevenremarkedon thisashewasused to rousingcheerswhensoldiers under his commandmetwith him. In this incident itwas sailorswhocheered him, but the fact that the report was censored does suggest that theBritishGovernment andPresswereunwilling togiveHamiltonany support atall.However,Hamiltonwasalsonotinclinedtodiscusscertainthings,especially

thequestionofBritishofficersshootingretreatingBritishsoldiers.Aswehavealready seen there was the case of the youthful British officer who had shotseveral soldiers before hewas able to stem a rout. The officerwas decoratedwiththeVictoriaCrossforeventsaroundthisevent,butnotforshootingBritishsoldiers.Murdoch hadmade the allegation at the enquiry that British officershadbeenorderedtoshootanysoldierswholaggedorloiteredinanadvance.Hisevidenceheclaimedwas in thediaryof theBritish journalistNevinson.He inturndeniedhavingkept adiary (unusualperhaps for a journalist) andclaimednever tohaveheardofanysuchorder toofficers to shoot theirmen.57Suchadreadful order might have not beenmade, but there is a piece of overlookedevidence in thediaryofaNewZealander,PrivateJamesFyfewhowroteon7August1915,‘entrenchlowerdownandmachinegunssetupbehindKitchener’sArmy to prevent their running away.’58 Individual actions of officers taking

perhapsapersonalriskisonething,butwhatPrivateFyfedescribedwasclearlyorderedandconsidered tohavebeennecessary.Therefore, therewasat leastakerneloftruthinMurdoch’saccusation.MurdochinhislettertoFisherclaimedthat a British soldier was executed at Helles, shot at dawn for cowardice.59However, only two soldiers from the MEF were ever executed after a CourtMartial between25April 1915and31December1915, even though101menweresentencedtodeath;HamiltonrefusedtoconfirmanyofthedeathsentenceswhilsthewasC-in-Candhissuccessor,GeneralMonroonlyconfirmedthetwocarried out.60 Furthermore, Australian troops, unlike their British and NewZealandcounterparts,werenotsubjecttothedeathpenaltyundermilitarylaw.61Here the discussion should be why was this piece of ‘evidence’ accepted as‘truth’andnotdismissedasatbestmistaken.ItisobviousthattheBritishWarCabinet and theWOwere more interested in distancing themselves from theGallipoliCampaignandplacingalloftheblameontothehaplessHamilton.In his correspondence with Fisher,Murdoch gave his opinion and findings

concerningHamilton’sothercommandersatGallipoli.Of theoriginal landingsMurdochsaidthatLondonhadexpectedtoomuchofthe‘floatingartillery’orinother words naval bombardment and were only later to realize that the flattrajectoryofanavalgunwasoflittleuseagainstthenarrowTurkishtrenches.OftheAugustlandings,ofwhichMurdochwasmostcertainlypresent,hewasmoreforthrightinhisobservations.Hesaidthatthelandingandfightingofbetween6and 12August 1915 had been a ‘costly and bloody fiasco’.Murdoch claimedthat it had been the result of ‘wretched Staffwork’while the troops sent hadbeeninadequateandofthemost‘unevenquality’.MurdochwrotethathehadvisitedmostpartsofANZACandSuvlaBayand

had ‘walkedmanymiles through the trenches’.He claimed to have spoken tobothseniorandjuniorofficersatthesepositions,butcouldnotvisitHelles.Fromthese visits he formed his opinions of the commanders at Gallipoli.Murdochreckoned that the Divisional Commanders gave no definite orders and lackedknowledgeofthecountryside,whilewaterwasinshortsupply.HewrotethatthemenhadfaithinBirdwood,WalkerandLeggewhilehavinglittleinGodley.OfBirdwood,Murdochclaimed thathewasagoodArmyCorpsCommanderbutnothing beyond that,whileWalkerwas a ‘plain hard-hitting soldier’.When itcame tocriticizingHamilton,Murdochclaimed thathehadnothingpersonallyagainstthegeneralwhomheconsideredtobekindlyandasajournalistadmiredhim, but as a strategist was a complete failure. He alsowrote that Australiansoldiers and officers had nothing but contempt for Hamilton and his General

Staff, which they expressed ‘fearlessly’. Murdoch however, claimed that thisattitudewasnotpeculiarforANZACandthat‘seditionistalkedroundeverytinofbullybeefonthepeninsulaanditisonlyloyalty(towhatorwhomisunclear)thatholdstheforcetogether’.At times Murdoch said things which defied conventional wisdom, such as

when he commented that the MEF (and no doubt other military formations)needed a younger leader.Murdoch suggested that such aman should have nopast andbe someonearoundwhomofficerscould rally.Murdochclaimed thattheArmyatGallipolihadlostfaith inHamilton,whoinMurdoch’sestimationwas seldomatANZACand instead lived at Imbros.Aswehave already seenMurdochclaimedthattheFrenchreferredtoHamiltonas‘theGeneralwholivedon an island’. Equally we have already seen this claim refuted by Hamilton.MurdochalsoclaimedthattheArmywidelybelievedthatHamiltonleftSuvlaon21August1915,remarking‘everythinghangsinthebalance;theYeomanryareabouttocharge’.MurdochassertedthatanArmylaughsataGeneralwholeavesthe battlefield when everything hung in the balance.62 The case may be asMurdochsuggested,butthememoirsofanAustralianofficer,SecondLieutenantC.Parkesrevealthatevenbeforethelandingsof25April1915AustraliantroopswereatastageofnearmutinyandsomeordersgiventoAustraliantroopswereignored by the men. As a result of this ‘mutiny’ Parkes, then serving in theranks,wasdemotedfromLanceCorporalbacktoPrivate.Healsosaidthattherehad been some foolish talk of shooting every second soldier as a way ofdefeatinganyfurthermutinousaction.Overall, theentireaffairwasstupidandoncethelandingsstarted,thewholeincidentblewoverandlifemovedon.63Ofcourse there was no provision for the death penalty in the Australian armedforces; the British Army and New Zealand forces still retained the right toexecuteitssoldiersifnecessary.MuchoftheproblemwiththeAustraliantroopswasthattheyweretiredofbeingcoopeduponshipsandcouldnotwaittogetashoretofight.64Hamilton,inlinewithhismilitarybackground,counterattackedandrefutedall

of Murdoch’s charges and his background at Gallipoli. Hamilton noted thatMurdoch,despitebeinggrantedaccesstoallareasatGallipoliincludingHelles,hardlyvisitedtheareaeventhoughtransportwaslaidontoaccommodatehim.HamiltonalsoobservedthatMurdochseemedtocriticizeeverythingatGallipoliexceptanythingconnectedtoAustralia.The British born ANZAC commander, General Birdwood, was not spared

from Murdoch’s ire. Murdoch at times seems to have a complete sense of

insecurity about beingAustralian, comparing the physique and intelligence ofboth the Australian and Turkish troops favourably with that of British troopswhom he considered to have been runts, underdeveloped both physically andmentally.Itseemedacheap,unnecessaryandirrelevantshotbyAustralianallies,while ignoring the fact thatmost ‘Australians’were actuallyBritish born.65 ItmustbeagreedthoughthatevenHamiltonwassomewhatdismayedwiththesizeof someof theTerritorial soldiers sentout tohim. Ina letter toFieldMarshalMethuen,GovernorandC-in-C,Malta,Hamiltonconsideredthenatureofhand-to-hand fighting wheremen wrestled and even throttled each other; often theTurks were far bigger men than the British territorials who were oftenmalnourishedas children,havingbeen raised innorthern industrial city slums.Hamiltonmadeanobservationforthefuture:‘Onegreatlessonofthiswariswemust see to the children and that we should not produce these undersizedindividuals.’66Alesson,acenturylaterforgottenbyso-calledsocialreformers.However,HamiltonwascorrectinhisobservationthatMurdochwasveryanti-British,buthis allegations, ill foundedornot,wereveryuseful for theBritishGovernmentasitcouldblameHamiltonforthefailuresatGallipoliandevacuatethepeninsula.TheentirestoryofGallipolihungonthereportingofit.Ashmead-Bartlettand

Murdoch,inHamilton’sopinionwereallowedtofilecopythatwasattimesofadubious nature. Often exaggerated, while later, Murdoch at the DardanellesEnquiry was quite selective in what he could or could not remember of theDardanelles. Perhaps a family trait was established here. The problem forHamilton, as we have already seen, was the death of Kitchener. It is quiteobviousthatKitchenershouldhavebeenhauledoverthecoalsforhisfailurestosupport Hamilton and the MEF in a campaign which was largely that ofKitchener’s,but itseemedthatattackingadeadherowasnot the‘done thing’.ThisleftHamiltontoshoulderalloftheblameforthefailingsofGallipolianditmustbeaddedthathedidhavequiteaburdentocarryastherewasalotthathecould be blamed for. Equally, if he was able to suggest that both Ashmead-Bartlett and Murdoch were less than truthful in some of their reporting,HamiltonwasonlytryingtothrowdustintotheeyesofthosewhowerelookingintoeventsatGallipoli,ashewasalsolessthanhonestinsomeofhisassertionswhen refuting some of the charges made by Murdoch in his letter to theAustralianPrimeMinister,AndrewFisher.WhatMurdochhadrevealedwasthattheDardanellesoffensivewasindeeda

wasteoftimeandlifeifithadbeenallowedtocontinue.TheGermansmaywell

havereinforcedTurkeyduring1916aswaswitnessedduringtheSecondWorldWarwhenGermanysent troops toNorthAfrica to shoreup theirweakerally,Italy,whichwaslosingacampaignthereagainsttheBritishArmysupportedbyBritish Commonwealth and Imperial forces. It was a very similar scenario.Having said this, a British intelligence report considered information receivedwhichnoted that theTurkshadsentamission toBerlin to inform theGermanGovernmentthatunlesstheysent‘effectiveassistancefromGermany’theTurkswould find it extremely difficult to continue fighting at the Dardanelles. Thiscaused consternation in Germany as it was considered that it was probablyimpossibletosupportTurkeyanyfurther.67However,bythisstageofthewarasweshallsee,owingtotheinfluenceofLieutenantColonelHankey,suchreportswere being disregarded if they did not suit British Government policyconcerningtheevacuationoftheGallipolipeninsula.ThisattitudewasfurtheredbyMurdoch’sreportswhichhadtheconcernsofhisfellowcountrymenatheartwhenhewrotetoFisher.ThereliabilityofhisreportswerefurtherenhancedastheBritishGovernmentwaswillingtogivethemcredenceastheygaveBritishpoliticianstheescaperoutetheyneededfromtheEasternMediterranean.DuringJune 1916 Hamilton said that the WO ‘are absolutely finished now withGallipoli’. He added that the WO ‘never wish to hear the word (Gallipoli)again’.68Inhisenforcedretirement,Hamiltonhadtimetowriteandconsiderwhathad

happened at Gallipoli. In a letter to Lord Curzon, Hamilton railed againstMurdoch’s ‘lying letter’beingcirculatedas if itwasa ‘StatePaper’.Hamiltonalsosaidthat‘themanwhoinitiatedthatprocedurebeingutterlyrecklessofthecareerofanybodywhohappenedtolieinthepathofhisambitions’.69WhatevertheminutiaeandthetruthoftheargumentsaroundGallipoli, theboldfactsarethese.SirIanHamiltonwassackedon16October1915;Kitcheneraftervisitingthepeninsulaordereditsevacuation.The long-term future of theGallipoli campaignhadbeendoubtful since the

failure of the SuvlaBay landings, aswitnessed by an assessment byHankey,written at the endofAugust 1915.Hankeywroteof theneed toprepare for awintercampaign,butthesubtextsuggestedsomethingdifferentasheseemedtosuggest that the Turks might eventually have the upper hand. Hankey in hisreportmadeitveryclearthatdespiteBritishintelligenceclaimingthattheTurkssuffered from low morale, this was not true. Hankey noted that the Turkscontinued to fight well and were well equipped. Furthermore, Turkishinfantrymenhadplentyofsmallarmsammunition,evenifthereappearedtobe

thebeginningofashortageofartilleryshells.Thefightingwasconsideredtobe‘straight’; no gaswas usedwhile hospitals and hospital shipswere respected.Regarding the Turkish soldier, Hankey concluded that he should be takenseriously. Hankey was less complimentary about British troops who heconsideredtobea‘mixture’,butonthewholenotverydisciplined.Thisheputdowntoalackofexperiencedofficers,butwas‘notacauseformisgiving’.Hedidnotethaton6August1915newtroopsorfreshtroopsleftthefronttoseekwater.HankeyfailedtogivehisblessingtotheBritishArmyatGallipoli,butdidseemtosuggest that theTurkshad theedgeas theywere‘onhomeground’.70

Hamilton agreed with Hankey’s findings.71 There was an interesting BritishintelligencereportattheendofAugust1915whichclaimedthattheTurkswerefinding it difficult to arm conscripts and were reduced to arming them withoutmoded guns, in some cases ordinary sports guns. Furthermore, it wassuggested that theTurkswerebeginning to runoutof rawmetalsand thatoldmachineryat theTurkishAdmiraltywasbeingbrokenupfor thecopperthat itcontained.72Butaswehaveseen,Hankeywasscepticaloftheaccuracyofsuchreports.Hamilton’sreplacement,GeneralSirCharlesMonroarrivedatImbroswhere

hisGeneralStaffbriefedhim.ThemaintopicwaswhethertheMEFstayorgo.Monro’s Staff said that 400,000 troops would be needed for a successfulinvasion,whichcouldgoaheadinApril1916.Therewasafearthathalfoftheexistingforcemightbelostiftherewasanevacuation.ThenextdayKitchenercabled Monro demanding to know whether Monro recommended staying orgoing.MonrodecidedtogooutandseewhatwashappeningattheFront;whatthesituationactuallywas.On30October1915,MonroarrivedatANZACCoveandtouredtheareaashetriedtoworkoutaplanofactionforthefutureoftheGallipolioffensive.Heinterviewedallthecommanderstotrytounderstandthepotentialforfurtheroffensivesandtheabilitytohangonthroughthewinter.HethenreturnedtohisHQtopreparehisreplytoKitchener.Monrowasswiftinhisreply and did notmince hiswords and bluntly toldKitchener and the BritishGovernment that all troops on Gallipoli peninsula should be evacuated. AsMonrosawit, theAlliesmerelyheld the fringesof theshoreswhile theTurksheldthehighgroundandalloftheadvantagesassociatedwithsuchahold.Allthatwasneededwas theblessing fromKitchener for theevacuation,while theconceptofevacuationsomeconsiderremainedasecret formuchofNovember1915, but there was talk of evacuation. The London Press predicted anevacuationwhiletheAustralianjournalistandlaterofficialhistorianofANZAC,

Charles Bean claimed that he believed that Birdwood was against leavingGallipoli.AsNovember1915progressed, thesituationatGallipolideterioratedfurther

asthewinterweathersetin.ThecoldandheavyrainbegantotakeitstolloftheAlliedsoldiers.Mostofthetroopswerestillintheirsummerkhakiuniformsandthe ANZACs, unaccustomed to such conditions, begun to die like flies.Furthermore theTurks,with help fromGerman officers, had acquired heavierandmoreaccuratehowitzerswhichblewtheANZACtrenchestopieces.Finally,on13November1915,KitchenerarrivedatGallipoliandbeganhisinspectionofthe front.On 22November 1915, after long and difficult discussionswith theBritishWarCommittee,KitchenerfinallyrecommendedevacuationofGallipoli.All that was needed was the agreement of the British Cabinet to begin thisaction.On7December1915,theBritishCabinetfinallyendorsedtheevacuationoftheGallipolipeninsula.73Hamilton’sworkwascompletelyundonewithinsixweeks,andtheAlliespreparedtoevacuatethepeninsulaleavingtheremainsofthousands of their comrades there. It seemed that there was no other courseexcept for furtherwaste of life for no gain, unless theBritishwerewilling tosendhundredsofthousandsofmentoreinforcetheMEFandthiswasnotgoingtohappen.EvenGeneralBirdwoodhadtoagreetotheplanforevacuation,asitwas‘theonlysensiblecourse’.74

H

ChapterEight

Conclusion

amilton arrived back in the UK. His return was misunderstood; somethought that he had returned for consultation for a renewed attack at

Gallipoli.Othersthoughtthathehadbeensenthomeindisgrace.LloydGeorgeavoidedhim,buteventuallydidmeethimandbluntlytoldHamiltonthatmanyintheCabinetbelievedthathehadchosenStopfordforcommandatSuvlaashewas a personal friend of Hamilton. When Lloyd George learnt the truth andknewthatKitchenerhadsaidnothing tocorrect thismisunderstanding,hesaidthatpoliticiansarequitecapableofagreatmanymeantricks,butconsideredthatKitchenerwasabovethis.LloydGeorgetoldHamiltonthathecouldneverfeelthesameforKitcheneragain.1ThiswassomecompensationforwhatHamiltonhadsufferedatthehandsofpoliticians,butaswehaveseen,thingsdidnotreallygetanybetterforHamilton.Hemightaswellhavebeensenthomeindisgrace,ashehadbeenonahidingtonothingsinceApril1915.Hamiltonhadagreatmanyfaults,butgivingupwasnotoneofthemandhe

spent the remainder of the war trying to force the truth of Gallipoli onto anunwilling public and an unforgiving British establishment. Hamilton still hadsupporterswhosoughttohelphimasheproceededtogatherevidencethatmayhavehelpedhiminthequesttoclearhisnameandreputation.However,hehada mountain to climb as journalists Ashmead-Bartlett and Keith Murdoch hadbeengivenapublicplatformforfartoolong.Asaconsequence,theirversionsofevents ofGallipoli had been accepted by the public as the truth. Sowhat hadbeenthetruth?The truth was never really defined; as Ashmead-Bartlett observed the

DardanellesCommissionneverreallydecidedwhathadhappenedandthatwastheproblemfortheentiremisguidedventure.2Nobodyreallyknewwhatwastohappenorwhy.Therehadbeennoclearobjectives.Ithadbeenall‘maybeandperhaps’while the overarching problemhad been thatmilitarymodernitywasmeeting military tradition for the first time in large numbers and in that, theAllieshadbeenfoundwanting.Colonel Michael Hickey in his study of the Gallipoli offensive gives a

comprehensive list of eight ‘crucial ingredients’ for a successful amphibiouslanding. The first ingredient was ‘sound, unambiguous political and strategicdirection’.3ThisandtheothersevenwereignoredprincipallybyLordKitchenerwhoasSecretaryofState forWarwas totallyoutofhisdepth.Asa result theMEFsailedawaytotheEasternMediterraneanwithlittleideaofwhattheyweresupposed todo,aswellasbeingundermannedandunder resourced.Themainprincipalwas that theTurkswere tobe smashed inorder tohelp theRussianswhowereperformingbadlyon theEasternFront.TheBritishand theirFrenchAlliesseemedtohavedeludedthemselvesenoughtoconsiderthattheTurksasnon-Europeans,non-Christiansandnon-whitewouldeasilybedefeated.AllthattheAllieshadtodowastoshowupinTurkishwaters,bombardthefortsattheDardanellesandtheTurkswouldthensurrenderandwithdrawfromthewar.TheAlliesratheroverlookedthefactthattheTurkshadbeenfightinginEuropeandNorth Africa for more than a decade as they tried to defend their imperialpossessions.TheyalsooverlookedthatGermanadvisershadcontinuedtoadvisethe Turkish Army since 1913, while in 1908 there had been an internalrevolutioninTurkeyandthattherewasanairofmodernitytakingholdandthatcenturiesof tradition,butoutmodedmethodology,was in theprocessofbeingsweptaway,especially in themoreurbanareas inTurkey.Thisrevolution, theso-called ‘Young Turks’ Revolution’ caused a schism in the Turkish OfficerCorps, whilst the presence of German officers or advisers within the Turkishmilitary also had political consequences, including assassinations. It is quitenoticeablethattheBritishfailedtotakeadvantageofthepoliticaltangleswithinTurkeyandfailedtoplaythetwosidesoffoneanother.TheBritishintelligenceservice seemed to sidestep Turkish political intrigue, while as we have seen,LieutenantColonelMauriceHankey,whenreportingtotheBritishGovernmentduringAugust1915,dismissedintelligencereportsasinaccurate.HartobservesthatHankey,withFirstSeaLordSirJohn‘Jackie’FisherandCIGSLieutenant-General Wolfe Murray, were all responsible for the failure at Gallipoli forallowing the use of obsolete ships in case the operation went wrong. Hart is

correct in his assertion that this was all a disgrace. One either goes onto theoffensiveandreallymeanitordon’tbother.Thousandsofliveswereputatriskandindeedthousandsdiddieowingtothiscausalapproachtowar.4ItsuitedtheBritishGovernment,whichwas trying to disassociate itself from theGallipolioffensivewithoutlosingtoomuchface.Therefore,onecanonlyspeculateastowhyGeneral Sir IanHamiltonwas appointed asGOCMEF in the first place.One feels that the British Government with the War Office only wanted anelderlygentlemanwithamilitarybackground togoout toTurkey to seewhatmight be done there. And Kitchener knew just the man – General Sir IanHamilton.Aswehaveseenthroughoutthiswork,Hamiltonwasathoughtful,intelligent

andforearlytwentiethcenturymilitarycircles,quiteliberal.Hewasalsoasnob.However, likesomanyFirstWorldWarBritishGenerals,oncecomparedwiththose of the SecondWorldWar hewas elderly and had basically finished hismilitarycareer.Attheageofsixty-twohewasunlikelytohavefoundasecondcareerandcouldquiteeasilyhaveretired.Asaresult,insomanywayshehadnothingtoproveanymore,buthehadneverexpectedtohavefailedsobadlyortohavebeenseentohavefailedsobadly,andthiswastheveryreasonwhyhesoughttoclearhisname.Afurtherquestionthatshouldalsobeaskedisjustwhythe Allies bothered to attack Turkey at the Dardanelles if they refused tomaintaintheMEF,assuchmakingHamilton’staskimpossible.AtanumberoflevelsHamilton,asAmericanparlancemighthaveit,wasthe

‘perfect patsy’ as he was seen to have been an uncomplaining man, mild bynatureandinkeepingwiththeperceptionofbeingBritishwouldtrytomuddlethrough somehow. It shouldbe seen that the entireDardanelles adventurewasjust that, an adventure as the Allies tried to intimidate a supposedly inferiorenemyandsoacquireacheapvictory.ItallwentwrongastheTurkswerebetterpreparedthanhadbeenexpected,whilst theAllieswerewhollyunpreparedforsuchaventure. In1911WinstonChurchill considered that suchaventurewasimpossible,thereforeitisincrediblethatin1915hewassoenthusiastictoattackthe forts on the shores of theDardanelles.Nodoubt hewas all toowilling toconsiderthattheBritishandtheFrenchthoughtthatallwouldfallbeforethem.ThisattitudeisnotunlikethatoftheUSAduringtheVietnamWarandlateratthebeginningof the twenty-firstcentury in itsownmuddledadventures in theMiddleEast.ThesituationinTurkeybetween1908and1915hadbeentotallyoverlooked

byBritishandFrenchintelligence,probablyasitwasofnosignificancetothem,

as the first decade of the twentieth century had seen the British peoplepreoccupiedwiththethreatofaGermaninvasiononsomelonelystretchofcoastwhile it was only during the reign of King Edward VII that the British andFrenchGovernmentshadformalizedgoodworkingrelationsbetween their twostates.PriortothistheBritishatleasthadtreatedtheFrenchwithgreatsuspicionandcaution.ItstoodthatTurkeyanditsempire,theTurkbeing‘thesickmanofEurope’ was losing relevance to the Chancelleries of the European capitals,exceptofcourse in theGermancapitalBerlin.TheGermansstealthilyaccruedinfluence after 1908 in Turkey principally in the shape of one man, GeneralLimonvonSanders,whohadbeensenttoTurkeybytheGermanGovernmenttohead a reinforced German military mission in the Turkish capital,Constantinople.5TheBritish lackedsucha figure inTurkey.Quite simply, theAlliesfailedtodoorrefusedtodotheirhomeworkonTurkey,asituationwhichled toHamilton being despatched to the EasternMediterraneanwith a touristguide,afewout-datedmapsandplentyofpromises.ItwaspossiblyherethattheBritish using intriguemight have been able to cause a riftwithin the TurkishOfficerCorpsagainsttheGermanadviserspresentinTurkeyafter1913,leadingtotheTurkishArmybeingunmanageableasTurksstroveagainsttheGermans.But the British intelligence service seemed inept and incapable of performingsuch a delicate operation. Instead the blunt instruments of bombardment andinvasionwerechosen,whiletheentireoffensivewasenteredwithanunrealairof old schoolBritish amateurism.This canbe seen at the beginningofMarch1915whenHamiltontoldChurchill thathewasoff totheDardanellesandhadnoinstructionsorStaff,butmeant tobeoff toMarseillesassoonaspossible.6Evenas late as July1915when the campaignwasongoing andwas about tobecomeevenmoreofadisaster,amateurswerestilltryingtogetaplaceinthefighting as correspondence between Hamilton and one F.S. Tatham reveals.Tatham,aBoerWarveteranwhohadservedinthearmedforcesbetween1880and1907andknewHamilton,wastryingtousethisacquaintanceinordertogetinvolvedintheDardanellesoffensive.HamiltonwasquiteencouragingsolongasTathamcouldfindpassagetotheMediterranean.7ItisobviousthatthegoodTatham would have been a man of years, while Hamilton should be seen asirresponsible in encouraging him, asHamilton certainly knew the type ofwarbeingwagedatGallipoli;itwasayoungman’swar.Tatham’sattitudewaslikethatofsomanyprior to theBattleof theSomme,whenfinally theBritish losttheir innocence, but until then therewas an attitude that the Britishwere justwaitingtoaroundto‘seeofftheHun’orinthecaseofGallipoli‘JohnnyTurk’.

This isallverypatronisingandracist seen through theeyesof the twenty-firstcentury reader, but not untypical of those raised in the virtues of the BritishEmpireduring theVictorianandEdwardianera.TheBritishwhitemanwouldalwaysprevailbecausehewasBritishandthiswasthebigmistakeatGallipoli,as underHamilton there seemed to have been no consideration that theTurksmightjustdefeattheAllies.InearlierprivatecorrespondencewithamannamedasGrove,Hamilton did describe the nature of the heavy fighting atGallipoli.GrovehadduringMay1915assertedthat150,000coulddefeat300,000menatGallipoli.Hamiltonobservedthathecouldnotseehow100,000mencouldturnout 150,000 men on the peninsula.8 It was outright amateurism and wishfulthinkingsuchasthatofGroveandthefactthatHamiltonneverputthetruecaseofGallipoli to his politicalmasterswhich helped to seal the fate of theMEF.Hamiltonshouldhaverealized thepowerofpoliticsandnoteschewedit. Ifhehadmadethisrealization,madebetterpoliticalconnectionsandgainedinfluenceoutside of military circles, Hamilton might have been able to obtain thenecessarymenandequipmentneededtodefeattheTurksatGallipoli.Politics had always been at the heart of the Dardanelles offensive as the

British and French governments tried to keep Russia in the war, which wassufferingdefeatafterdefeatatthetime,byofferingsomethingthattheydidnotpossess:Constantinople.9Butoverall,theAllieswereseekingacheapandswiftsolution to the problems of the stalemate on the Western Front and had notexpectedtheEasternFronttoturnoutthesame,ifnotworse,giventheminiaturescaleofthefrontatGallipoli.Thediminutivesizeofthefrontexposedthepoorplanningoftheoperation,as

Hamilton reported toKitchener a fullmonth before anyAllied troops had setfootontothepeninsula.Onseeingthepeninsulainsitu,HamiltontoldKitchenerthat it all looked different than it had on themaps back atWhitehall and thatcertaingroundnecessaryforanylandinghadnotbeenclearedofenemytroops,but in fact had been reinforced by the enemy.10 Kitchener, the British WarCabinet and theWOhad been so desperate to try to create a diversion to theWesternFront, relieve theRussians from their travails and try to find a cheapandeasyendtothewar,theyfailedtotakeintoconsiderationthatperhapsthingsattheDardanelleswerenotastheysawit,buthadinsteadduringthespringof1915becomeanimpregnableposition,andthatHamiltonwasexpectedtodealwiththislackofplanning.Thelackofforesightandplanningswiftlybegantomanifestitselfevenbefore

thecampaignhadhardlygotgoing.Asplanswerebeingpreparedforamilitary

attack against the Gallipoli peninsula, Hamilton not unreasonably requestedreserves of ammunition, especially for howitzerswhichwere so necessary fordestroyingTurkishtrenches.HamiltonprotestedthelengthofthesupplylinetoGallipoliwiththenearestbasesavailabletohimbeinginEgypt.Furthermore,healsohadconcernsaboutwatersupplyandhadconcernsabouttheweatherwhichwas quite changeable, especially at sea, which could also disrupt his supplylines,whileprolongedhotweatherwouldmakewatersuppliestothefrontlineevenmore urgent as summer came to the EasternMediterranean.11 KitchenerignoredallofHamilton’spleasandaswehaveseen,failedtoevensubmitmostof Hamilton’s correspondence to the British War Cabinet, and so HamiltonmighthavewellbeenthrowinghiscommunicationstothewindsfortheamountofinfluencetheywerehavingonKitchener.TheresultwastheFrontatGallipolisufferedaperennial shortageofmunitions,while thequestionofwater supplywastobecomeapoliticalissue.AttheDardanellesInquiry,Hamiltonwasneverreallygiventheopportunitytoaddressitproperlyordefendhimself,asBritishcivil andmilitary authoritieswho had not been to the Front atGallipoliwereallowingjournalistsandpopularopiniontoactastheirguidesandbriefingnotes.It shouldbe seen that the so-calledexperts,bothBritishandFrench,hadbeensurprisedby the influenceofGermanmilitary adviserswhoweremodernizingtheTurkishArmy.AmajorconcernfortheAllieswastheabilityoftheTurkishArmy to return to the offensive even after having taken a severe mauling or‘severehandling’fromAlliedforces.EvenifHamiltonconsideredthatperhapsthe Turks could not sustain such counteroffensives after extremely aggressiveattacks on their trenches, it remained a concern for the Allies.12 No doubtKitchener failed tomake this report available to others, aswas hiswont. Formuchof theGallipoli campaign itwasobvious thatHamiltonwasatwarwithKitchener,buthadfailedtorealizetheextentofhismaster’streachery.LifeforHamilton as GOCMEF was never going to be easy. Equally, Hamilton wasdismayedthroughouttheentirecampaignthathismenandofficersweredoomedtosuffertheshortfallsofWhitehall,theBritishWarCabinetandespeciallythoseofKitchener.OfcourseHamilton in1915was totallyunawareof thedeceitofKitchener.Later,whenHamiltonwas trying togivea truthfulaccountofwhathappenedattheDardanelles,Kitchenerobjectedtogivingthefiguresofthemenin theDardanellesArmy.MajorGeneralCallwell at theWOsaid toHamiltonthat Kitchener’s attitude did not surprise him ‘as he always did his best toconceal from his colleagues how lamentably depleted your divisions were’.13CarlyondescribesKitchenerasbeingbyinstinctadictatorandaloner.Hemade

therulesupashewentalong,didnotbelieveindelegationorexplanation.WiththeblessingsofAsquithandtheBritishWarCabinet,KitchenerasSecretaryofStateforWarbehavedlikeafeudalbaron.Hemighthavealsobeenmad.14ThiswastheverymanwhowasrunningtheBritishwarmachineandHamiltonhadtodeal with him at a distance almost daily. It is not really surprising that theGallipolioffensivefailed.The fighting depressed Hamilton, especially as he saw it become bogged

downandremainstatic.Inmanywaysithadbecomeaseriesofminisiegesaseachsidecouldnotoutflanktheotherandsatdowntotrytoweareachotherout.HamiltoncouldseethattheGallipoliFrontbyearlyJune1915resembledthatofthe front in France but with a difference. On theWestern Front soldiers andofficerscouldberotatedandsoafterperiodsofservingattheFrontcouldretireto the rear lines in rotation and so rest and recover from their ordeal.Occasionally,thoseservingontheWesternFrontwereabletogohomeonleave,toFranceinthecaseoftheFrenchArmyortotheUKinthecaseoftheBritish.There was no such luxury at Gallipoli as even the rest lines were subject toenemy artillery attacks. As a result Allied troops serving on the peninsulabecame overtired and ‘jumpy’. The enemy at Gallipoli was able to rotate itstroops and give them adequate rest as well as being well supplied.15 It isinteresting to note that a few days later, Hamilton wrote a personal letter toKitchenerdeclaringhisloyaltytohimfollowingattacksagainstKitchenerintheBritish Press. Hamilton declared that Harmsworth, the proprietor of thenewspapers attacking Kitchener, was a traitor and that he would shoot himhimself given the chance.16 Hamilton’s loyalty to Kitchener is touchingespeciallyaslaterhewasstillunwillingtothinktoodarklyofKitchenerandhismemory. The future Air Vice Marshal Sir Geoffrey Bromet, in 1915 but ahumble Flight Lieutenant, was also critical of the Press attacks againstKitchener.BrometwroteinhisjournalthattheattacksbytheeditorsoftheDailyMailshouldbeimprisonedimmediately.Brometclaimedthatthepressisneverglorifiedbeyond the limitsofFleetStreet, the thenhomeof theLondonPress.Bromet claimed, perhaps with some justification that cuts made by the WObeforeKitchenertookovertherein1914weretheproblemandthatnowBritainwasatwar,ithadtobedealtwith.Inshort,civilianshadhamperedtheArmyinpeacetimeandwerenowexpecting it topull the ironsof faileddiplomacyandpoliticsoutof thefire.Thedifferencebetweenciviliansandservicemenis laidbare in Bromet’s journal when he wrote ‘a crooked politician does not get asailor’s or a soldier’s sympathybut a straight andbrilliantGeneral does’.17 In

spirit and morally, Bromet was correct; this was also Hamilton’s code, butrealisticallythecrookedpoliticianwasmorethanlikelytowintheargumentasthey normally can spin their story or yarn in naval parlancemore effectively.Thetruthwasusuallynotahindrancetothegeneralpublicsolongasitwasaneasilydigestedversionwhichsuitedthepublicmood.Brometrealizedthiswhenon24June1915hewrotethatthepublicimageoftheDardanelleswasallwrongand he considered that the public was being hoodwinked by the Press andpoliticians.18AgainBrometwas correct inhis assertion,butwhat couldhedoaboutthesituationasamereFlightLieutenantservinghundredsofmilesawayfrom London? No more than General Sir Ian Hamilton could, as Hamilton’spaperswerequietlyarchivedbyKitchenerwhentheyweretooinconvenient tobetrue.ThestraightGeneralwasbeinghoodwinkedbytheever-politicalFieldMarshal,whohadperhapsrealizedhisfollyoverGallipoli,butwaswillingtodonothingaboutitexceptdeceiveanddisassemble.At all times Hamilton tried to inform Kitchener of the situation that

confrontedhim.On19June1915,hecabledKitchenerofthatday’sfighting.Itratherunderlinedtheneedforheavyartillery,especiallyhowitzerswhichhewasnever adequately supplied with throughout the campaign. Having receivedreinforcementson18May1915,theTurkslaunchedanattackagainsttheBritish87th InfantryBattalionduring the eveningon19May1915.TheTurksbeganthis assault with a huge artillery bombardment using large artillery pieces,howitzers and field artillery.Hamilton realized the necessity of howitzers andtheir ability to destroy trenches as the Turks had been able to do during theattackagainst87thInfantryBattalion.Hemadeitquiteclearthatfieldartillerycould be ignored.19 Despite his petitions for howitzers and trench mortarsneeded to destroy Turkish trenches which were deep and narrow, Hamiltonreceivednoor inadequate suppliesof these,butdid receivea largenumberoffield guns, mainly 18-pounders which were of little value in the fighting atGallipoli.At times, Hamilton was a victim of his own snobbery as the above report

illustratedinthedescriptionoftheinfantryfightingwhichfollowedtheTurkishartillerybombardment. Infantry fightingcontinueduntil21:00hours;Hamiltonclaimed that the Turks did not like bayonet fighting. A while later the EastLancashireBrigadeattackedandtriedtocaptureaTurkishtrenchtotheleftofthe 42nd Division, but were repelled. A Turkish counterattack worsened theBritishpositionandestablishedalodgementinabouteightyyardsoftheeastendof42ndDivision’sline.ThisincidentrevealedsomeofHamilton’ssnobberyas

heconsideredthattheEastLancashireBrigadewere‘notquitetrustworthy’.Hedidconsiderthatthemenwere‘perfectlyallright,’buthadhisdoubtsabouttheofficers.HisattitudewasthatastheEastLancashireBrigadecameonthewholefrom the ‘purelymanufacturingparts of the country’ theydid not have ‘manygentlemen’todrawon.20Hamilton’sfixationonclasswaspartofhisundoing.Hetrustedtoomuchin

theclass thathebelonged toandadmiredand failed tosee that theworldwaschanging. Even infantry warfare had become mechanized and was becomingmorereliantonofficers,especiallytemporaryofficersnecessarytofightthewar,who had a technical or manufacturing background. Officers with a huntin’,fishin’ and shootin’ backgroundwere increasingly unreliable and irrelevant tomodernwarfare. Itwas to take anotherworldwar before thiswas completelyunderstood.Amonthlater,evenHamiltonwasbeginningtoshowsympathyfortheEastLancashireBrigade.HewrotetoKitchenerthatmanyfromthisbrigadewere very tired. They were largely young boys who had been fightingcontinuously for nearly six weeks.21 A month later, Hamilton even saw anopportunitytotrytocaptureenemyterritorybutrealizedthattheEastLancashireBrigadeandtheLowlandDivisionwerenotuptothejobanymoreandsodidnotpursuehisplanfurther;suchwasthestateofhisforcesthathadnotbeengivenanyrespitesincetheylandedinApril1915.22It was around this time that Hamilton also began to criticize some of the

journalists at Gallipoli. One, Moseley, from the Central News Agency, wasuseless and afraid. Hamilton claimed that Moseley never went to the Front;indeedhereportedfromsixteenmilesfromtheFrontLine.ThesereportsweregenerallyrubbishandignorantofthesituationatGallipoli.HamiltononcewrotetoBradeofMoseleythathejustateand‘heeatsgoodrationsandwhatIhavetoaskmyselfiswhetherIamjustifiedinkeepingafraudofthatsort.OfcourseiftheCentralNewsAgency are satisfiedwithwhat he is sending them I do notreally care, but it seems a pity to have a rotter herewhen somanygoodmenmustbeinthemarket.’23Hamiltonwascorrectthattherewerebetterwritersonthe peninsula; one he greatly admired was Ashmead-Bartlett, his nemesis. Itmight have been better if he had contented himself with the mediocrity ofMoseley.Hamilton’sconsiderationthatMoseley’sworkwasignoranthighlightsone of the problems of reporting from Gallipoli, which Ashmead-Bartlettcorrected and filled this gap in information with his more colourful brand ofwriting,whichHamiltonconsideredwaspartofthelicenceofatalentedwriterandalsobeinganartist.

Itmust be noted that even if the Presswas the ruin ofHamilton’smilitarycareer,hecouldnotclaimthathewasignorantofthesituation;hewasputinthepicture by the CIGS, General Wolfe Murray, who informed him that DavidLloydGeorge,theBritishChancelloroftheExchequer,hadfurtherambitionandwanted the Prime Minister’s job and so was plotting against the incumbent,Herbert Asquith. Wolfe Murray noted that Lloyd George was using theNorthcliffe Press to brief against Asquith who had lost the confidence of theCoalitionGovernmentwhich hewas leading. Furthermore, he considered thatLloydGeorgewasalsoplanningtoattackKitchenerinthePressbyaskinghimquestions regarding a munitions shortage which was beginning to affectoperationsontheWesternFrontaswellasatGallipoli.WolfeMurrayalsoaskedaquestionwhichhadnot been askedbefore:whatwas the point in producingmore munitions if there were not enough men to use them? Wolfe MurraythoughtthatiftheBritishwerenotcareful,atapoliticallevel,theymightendupfightingeachother.Ashesaid,‘thesituationisdecidedlydisquieting’.24In hismemoirs LloydGeorgewas quite cutting in his criticism of theWO

oncewarwasdeclared.Quitesimplyitwasnotreadyandhadamindsetthatwasmoreprepared to fight theCrimeanWarof the1850swith somemodificationfrom the ‘irrelevant experiences of theAfricanveldt’.25 In a half sentence thecivilianpoliticianLloydGeorgewas able todismiss theWOand themilitary.TheWO and the British military no doubt were unprepared for a large-scalecontinentalwarofsomeduration,butLloydGeorgecertainlydidnotunderstandthisorwhy.Hewasmerelytryingtotakeadvantageofpopularopinionandsawan opportunity to enhance his career by taking advantage of the perceivedmunitions shortageand theweaknessesof theBritishArmy, andespecially itssenior commanders such as Kitchener and Hamilton. Kitchener, sitting in hisofficeinWhitehall,wouldhavebeenawareofthesituationbutprobablytriedtoignoreit,butHamiltonhadtowaitforsecond-handinformationtodiscoverwhatmight be happening inLondon.Even then he only got a version ofwhatwashappening, as hewas dependent on his correspondent’s view of events ratherthangaininghisownunderstandingofwhatwasoccurringinhighlevelBritishpolitics.HamiltonwastotallyisolatedatGallipoliandunabletoinfluenceeventsat Whitehall. Hamilton’s isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean was a hugehandicapforhim,whiletheabilityforjournalistssuchasAshmead-BartlettandKeithMurdoch to get themselves and their copy to London and so influenceBritish politics and opinion served to exasperate Hamilton’s ever-decreasingmajesty.

LloydGeorgeobservedthatattheoutbreakofwartheBritishArmy,owingtoitscommandersbeinglargelycavalrycommandersorinthecaseofKitchener,asapper,hadlargelyoverlookedtheriseintheprominenceofheavyartilleryandespecially the high-explosive shell; the Germans had not. He noted that thewrong lessons had been learnt from theRusso-JapaneseWar of 1904 – 1905,which had seen the Japanese Army outflank Russian defences by just goingaroundthem.LloydGeorgeunfairlysuggested thatBritishcommanders lackedthe vision of a trench hundreds of miles long from Switzerland to the sea inFrance.26 But nobody, including Lloyd George, had foreseen this; it justhappenedassoldiersfrombothsidesontheWesternFrontdugintotakeshelterfrom each other’s fire. It was easier to defend than to attack and everybodydiscovered thisat the same time,as theyall tried tooutdigandoutflankeachother in 1914. The lack of preparation for modern warfare, Lloyd Georgeconceded,wasnotthefaultoftheWOatthebeginningofthewar,butdidplacetheblamefortherecurringshortagesofmunitionsontheWO,asitfailedtoliftred tape and continued in its usualmanner of hampering all and failed to co-operate with industrialists who were offering to produce the necessarymunitions.MuchofthisLloydGeorgeattributedtothetraditionalmistrustandcontempt by themilitary of all businessmen not on theWarOffice register.27This without doubt was true; we have already seen Hamilton’s contempt forofficers from industrial areas as theywereunlikely tobegentlemen,whateverthatmeant.Amoreseriousmistake,whichhadbeenmadeintheearlydaysofthewar,wasthatessentialandskilledmennecessaryforindustry,especiallythatof turning out arms had either been drafted into the Territorials or hadvolunteeredforKitchener’sArmies.BythetimetheMinistryofMunitionshadbeen formed inMay 1915,many of thesemen had already been killed in theopeningand‘futilebattles’asLloydGeorgereferredtothem.Manyofthemhaddied because they lacked the arms and munitions they could have helped toprovide,includingatGallipoli.As a result and the mistaken method of recruiting in 1914, munitions

productionsufferedheavilyowingtotheshortfallofskilledmen.28ItmighthavehelpedifseniorcommanderssuchasHamiltonhadnotsettheirfacessofirmlyagainst conscription in the UK. If there had been conscription then skilledworkerswouldhavebeensparedastheywereintheSecondWorldWarasbeingessentialtothewareffort.Onceitwasdiscoveredhowamodernwarshouldbefought, including the concept of aHomeFrontwhichmeant that industry andagriculture was as important as fighting men, it became easier to supply the

fightingmanwithweaponsandammunition.Evenso,itwastheAmericanswiththeir mass production techniques which provided the backbone to supplies ofwarmaterial to theUK and the Soviet Union during the SecondWorldWar.However,in1915thequestionofstateinterferenceintothelivesoftheprivatecitizen remained open. The private citizen could still choosewhether to servetheir country or not. The WO at times seemed not to understand that some,includingindustrialistsdidactuallywanttohelptheircountry.Perhapstoanold-fashioned military officer, money and profit was a dirty subject never to bediscussed, but that was all hypocrisy. Hamilton, in trying to denounce atechnicallymindedofficerasnotbeingagentleman,revealedhissnobberyandthe foolishness of the military caste of which he was a member. The use ofvolunteerserviceproved tobeablunt instrument,as thebestand thebrightestwerewastedintheopeningbattlesofthewar.Conscriptionprovedtobeamorepreciseinstrumentasmenwithessentialskillswereretainedinengineeringandweaponsproduction.By1915, timeswere indeedchangingashideboundideaswerebeingsweptawayaslessthanuseless.ThegreatestscandaloftheentireGallipoliCampaignwasnotthefirstsetof

landings,whichwerelamentable,butgiventhelackofpreparationwentaswellas could have been expected. However, the second landings at ANZAC andHellesduringAugust1915wereadisgraceasthelayofthelandtobetakenwasknown, the Turkish methodology of fighting had been experienced and thereshouldhavebeennogreatshocks,buttheyfailedallthesame.Thereasonswhyweremany,andwereresponsiblefortheneedlessdeathsofyoungofficerssuchasSecondLieutenantAddams-WilliamsatChocolateHill.Itwasnotthefaultofthetroopslanding,tryingtostruggleashoreandadvanceinland;thefaultsweregreater than that and gave plenty of scope for journalists to gripe, report andmisrepresent the facts until they became policy for at least two governments.Indeed one contemporary diary noted on 27 August 1915 that the ANZACscouldnotstandHamiltonandtheGHQ,asthediaristnoted‘itwillnowtakeSirIan Hamilton and his Staff all their time to justify their methods (past andpresent) in the eyes of the Australians and New Zealanders’. The writerconsideredthatpossibly thewronglandingplaceshadbeenselectedandthatalanding at Bulair might have been better. However, nobody really seemed tounderstand the situationand that isprobablywhyaconcession ismadeby thediarist, as hewrote that itwas an impertinence to criticizeHamilton’s plan asanybody can be clever afterwards. It was the high casualty rates whichmadedismalreading;42,000deadandwoundedbytheendofJune1915;by8August

1915therehadbeenover20,000casualtiesbutforverylittlegain.29IncorrespondencewithWolfMurray,Hamiltondiscussedthematteroftrying

to get the 29th Division, one of the few reliable divisions in his estimationavailabletohim,uptofullstrengthwithafurthertenpercenttocovercasualtiesandsickness.Atthetime,HamiltonwastryingtoprepareaplanforthesecondsetofmajorlandingsatGallipoli.HetoldWolfMurraythathehadlongthoughtthat eventually some form of conscription would become necessary and hadconsideredaplantoatleastproduceaNationalRegisterofmenwhowouldbeavailable for conscription should the occasion arise. The then Chiefs of theGeneralStaff refused to allowHamilton to publish such a document.Equally,Hamilton expressed his dismay ‘at the hints you let drop about politicalwire-pulling and worry’. Hamilton clearly thought little of Northcliffe whom heconsideredwas trying to set up a ‘moral dictatorship’which he considered inparenthesestobe‘worsethanadictatorshipmaintainedbyphysicalforce’overwhatHamiltonconsideredtobe‘thehalf-educatedmasses’.HeconsideredthatgivenhalfachancehewouldhavebombedNorthcliffe‘outofexistencewithouttheslightestscruple’.30ItisnotclearifHamiltonwasawareatthetimethatthePress would have its own way regarding the Gallipoli campaign and hiscommandoftheoperationoncetheBritishauthoritiesdecidedthatanevacuationwasnecessarylaterduring1915andthatHamiltonwasthenecessaryscapegoattopoint theblameat. It is also interesting that similar things can still happen,often referred to as ‘spin’when news ismisreported,while theBritish publicseems to remain as unsophisticated as in 1915, and at least onemedia familyremain at the core of many of the travails regarding reporting in the BritishPress.In1915,modernitywasdestroyingHamilton’scareerandreputationandmodernityneverfinishes.A further concern as we have seen in this text was that Hamilton was not

allowedtochoosehisowncommandersandinsteadhadsomequiteuselessandunfit(mentallyandphysically)officersfoisteduponhimbyLordKitchener.AsSecretary of State forWar,Kitchener actedmore like amedieval baron as hedecided anddictatedwhatwasgoing tohappen in thewarwithout taking anycouncil.Hedidnottrustpeopleandsocommandersatthefrontsuffered,butnomorethanHamilton.ThemostnotoriousexamplebeingthesendingofGeneralSirFrederickStopfordouttotheDardanellesasoneofthecommandersfortheSulvaBay landings.Churchill describedStopford as ‘a placid, elderlyEnglishgentleman’.31 Clearly somebody of no value at Gallipoli and Hamilton hadalready warned against sending out Stopford, having already made his own

choice of commanders, but Kitchener ignored Hamilton and sent out theoverweight,outof touchandhaplessStopford toGallipoli.Stopfordwasnotaleaderofmenandhadallowedhisforcetodallyonthelandingbeachesandhadnotmadethemadvancetoofarinland.ForHamiltonthiswasthelaststrawandhe quickly sacked the unhappy Stopford.32 The lack of ‘dash’ as HamiltonreferredtothenecessaryactionrequiredatSuvlaBaywaslamentedinalettertoLordHaldane, especially once the actions of theAustralianswere considered.TheAustralianshadpusheddeeper into thepositionsatANZACwhileBritishtroopshaddonelittleregardingadvancingontotheirobjectives.33Theyhadbeenpoorly led by over cautious commanders; commanders that Hamilton had notwantedsentouttohim,butwasoverruledbythemegalomaniacandsuspiciousKitchener.Hamilton had a further problemwith the calibre of the officers sent out to

him. A major concern for Hamilton was that officers were suspected ofmalingering and spreading rumours against the Gallipoli campaign. As everHamilton,followingaletterfromGeneralMaxwell,consideredthathehadthesituationundercontrolandthatmuchof therumourspreadinghadmuchtodowith disaffection amongst officers.34 Hamilton actually sent Maxwell a letterwith an order enclosed which instructed against medical staff spreading‘alarmingrumours’learntfromsickandwoundedofficers.Theywereofficiallytold that they were to keep an optimistic note.35 Earlier Hamilton was quitesurprised thatseniormedicalofficersconsidered thatofficersweremore likelytosuffermentallyfromthefightingratherthanthemenwhotheycommanded.Hamilton considered that it was more likely that the men would suffer someformof breakdown as a result of the fighting.Hewas somewhat dismayed atwhat he considered to have been undue leniency towards officers at medicalboards when a man’s health was reviewed. This perceived leniency towardsofficerswas at the expenseof themenwhowere sentback to theFrontmorereadily than in thecaseofofficers.36OfcourseneitherMaxwellnorHamiltonconsideredwhatmighthavebeencausingsuchdisaffectionamongstofficers.Nodoubt Hamilton considered it was amongst those officers who could not beconsidered to be ‘gentlemen’ that such an attitude was rife. He was later todiscover the hardway that thiswas not the case and that discontent could befoundamongstmanyofficers,includingGenerals.Itwasthenatureofprolongedexposure to modern warfare which was causing such dismay. Indeed thereminiscences of Captain Oswald Hallifax DSO, a submariner from the

submarine E.7 recalled in 1934 that on HMSHuntsend bound for the UK inearly September 1915, there were 350 men with dysentery as well as manyofficerswithdysenteryandsufferingfromnervousshock.37Thesemenwerenotshamming their illnesses; they were genuinely confined owing to theunacceptableconditionsfoundontheGallipolipeninsulawheresanitationbrokedown and men were exposed to prolonged periods of shell fire and the everpresent threatofenemyattacks. InFrance,menwererotated in their front linedutiesandwereneverexpectedtoremainatthefrontforweeksandmonthsatatime.EvenwhenmenwerereturnedfromthefronttotherearlinesatGallipoli,theywerestillsubjecttoenemylong-rangeartilleryfire.NowhereintheAllies’positionswassafe fromenemyfireand thisgraduallygroundmendownmorethanphysicalillnesses.However,aswinterbegantoapproachthepeninsula,atleast one naval officer was able to take at least a crumb of comfort as thetemperatures began to fall as Lieutenant J.M. Heath serving on HMS Albionwrylywrotehometohisfatherthatwinterwascoming,butautumngetsridofthe flies.38 Just about every veteran of the Gallipoli campaign complainedbitterly about the flies during the dry months of summer, which were everpresent, settling on food and on hands and mouths having previously beensettlingonhumanwasteanddecomposingbodies.Itwasnowonderthatdiseasewas ever present atGallipoli, especially during the summer.SergeantWilliamJohnson Shaw of the Royal Marine Light Infantry wrote on 18 July 1915,‘terrible smell from firing trenches (front line) – scores of dead bodies out infront of us’.39 Evenwinning fire fights during the summer atGallipoliwas adouble-edgedswordowingtotheinabilitytoburyordisposeofthedeadwhichmounted up in front of trenches or festered in no-man’s land. Earlier in thefighting, aswe have seen therewas an official ceasefire in order to clear thebattlefieldsofcorpses,notonlytoburythedeadwithreverence,butalsojusttopreventwholesalediseasesbreakingout.Nodoubt therewereotherceasefires,eveniftheywereunofficial;menmayhavebeenchargedwithkillingeachotherbuttherewasnoneedtosufferunnecessarilyso.The question of officers went beyond that of malingering and rumour

spreadingasHamiltonbecameconcernedwith thosewhowere trying toavoidthe front and get onto his Staff. This was something which angered theAustralianJohnMonash.ThequestionofthecalibreofnewofficersalsovexedGeneralCallwellwhowasalsocriticaloftheSulvaBayoffensive.Hewrotethatthe ‘NewArmies’ even though the men were ‘splendid’, suffered fromweakofficers.ThiswasbestillustratedbythefailureofthoselandingatSulvaBayto

push on, while bad Staff work also damned the entire operation and juniorofficersatcompanylevelalsodoomedtheoperationowingtotheiruninspiringleadership and lack of authority. Callwell also noted the lack of enemyoppositionon thedayof the landings, asdid theTurks.An intelligence reportreferred to information taken from a Turkish Staff officer and was dated 3September 1915.Regarding the landing at SuvlaBay, theTurks criticized theslownessof theAlliedadvancewhichtheyattributedtothe‘foolishtendernessofheart inpickingupandtakingcareof thewoundedinsteadofdrivinghomeour (the British) attack’. This Turkish officer claimed that there had beennothing to prevent the Allies from advancing from Suvla Bay and across thepeninsula.TheTurkshadunderestimatedthestrengthoftheBritishlandingsinAugust1915andsohadonlyleft‘amiserableforceofGendarmes’todefendthearea.40 It is quite clear that this offensive should have been an unqualifiedsuccess; therewasnothingwrongwith theplanning,butmuchwrongwith thecommanders on the ground.Commanders such as Stopford thatHamilton hadnotwanted,butKitchenerhad insistedweresentout toGallipoli.TheTurkishofficer’sobservationsareinteresting,especiallythatof tendingtothewoundedinsteadofadvancing;apurelyhumanresponsewhichmenhadtobedisciplinedintoignoring;alsoawayofreturningtotherearlinesandoutofthelineoffire.This is also another purely human and sane response to danger. AsHamiltonnoted, officers atGallipoliwerebeingkilled at a faster rate than theywere inFrance.41 Even the bombastic Hunter-Weston succumbed to the strains ofGallipoli. Hamilton wrote of Hunter-Weston’s mental and physical condition,whichhadbecomesourgentthathewasreturnedtotheUKasbeing‘simplyacase of over-strain after night and day exertions’.42 In his diary, Hamiltonreferred toHunter-Weston’s ‘breakdown following a cable fromKitchener’.43The nature of the fighting at Gallipoli had become more than had ever beenexpected and every member of the MEF at the Front was vulnerable to itsunrelentingdemands.ButasHamiltonruefullywrotetoMajorGeneralStanton‘wewerewithinanaceofwindingupthewholeaffairtheotherday,butinawaramissisasgoodasamile’.44HamiltonexplainedpartofwhathadhappenedtoHunter-Westonconcerninghisownactions.HamiltonhadbeenunabletogotowheretheBritishhadlandedowingtothefightingatANZAC.Whenhearrivedat SulvaBay at 17:00 on the second day of operations he discovered that theBritishhadnointentionofmovinginlanduntilthefollowingmorning.HamiltonorderedaBrigadetoadvanceinlandatnightfall,whichtheydidandadvancedas

far as Tekke Tepe just above Anafarta village before coming back. The nextmorning, the enemy returned with artillery support and any further Britishadvance could no longer be considered. Hamilton considered that the ‘NewArmies’neededmoreexperienceandneeded tobegradually introduced to theharshnessofthefightingfront,supportedbyveterantroops.45ForHamiltonitmusthavebeengallingtoknowthatbutforthesakeofsome

decent commanders, the Gallipoli campaign might have been closed duringAugust 1915. However, it was not to be as correspondence between GeneralBirdwood,CommanderoftheANZACforcesandCaptainPollenrevealsfurtherthedearthofdecentofficers.BoththeBritishandANZAClackedgoodqualityreplacement officers, as talentedmen including Staff officerswere lost in thefighting.Birdwoodwasalsofrustratedat the lackof informationfromhisownStaff,whotookadvantageofhisabsencewhenhewasdirectingthefightingatthe front, and so easily manipulated the flow of information received byBirdwood.Quite simply,when hewas at the Front, the Staff in the rear linesmonitored the cables sent to Birdwood and only showed him those that theywantedhimtosee.46Hamilton,ashisdismissalwasapproaching,alsoseemedtodespair as he wrote to Lord Derby telling him that the ‘old Generals havecrackedup, right, left andcentreandgonehome’.Henoted thatyoungermenhadarrived to take their places, but thiswasnot tobeof anyvalue if enoughsuitable men were not sent out to Gallipoli to make up the losses. However,Hamilton was still certain that given the necessary numbers of troops theGallipolipeninsulamightyetbecaptured,howeverwiththeobservationthatheneededexperiencedmen.HamiltonspokeofthetypeofreservesoldiersthathewasusingatGallipoli,namelytheYeomanrywhoheconsideredtobethe‘finesttypeofmanEnglandcanproduce’buthadfailedatSulvaBayowingtoalackofexperience. TheYeomanry had got lost, thought that theywere close to theirobjectivebutwere amileout.Despite suffering900casualties theyneverhadgot togripswith theenemy,butHamiltonwascertain that ifwellcommandedtheymightdobetteronanotheroccasion.47ThiswastypicalHamilton;hemightseerealitybutonlyashewantedtoseeit.Heremainedconvincedthatwithwell-led,decentandseasonedtroops,Gallipolicouldstillbeconquered.48Hislackofreality was that there was no longer any real political will to carry on theoffensiveastheBritishGovernmentbegantoadoptjournalismasthetruthasitsoughttodistanceitselffromtheentireventure,beforelookingforaconvenientexcusetoevacuatethepeninsula.MauriceHankey, inhiscritiqueofoperationsatSulvaBay, summedup the

mistakesmadethereandseemedtoabsolveHamiltonofanyblame,butthatwasnottobe.EvenifittooksometimebeforeanythinglikeevidenceofKitcheneragreeingwithHamilton’splanforthelandingsatSulvaBayandatANZACwasuncovered,Hankey’sreportplacedtheblameforthefailureoftheoperationatsome distance fromHamilton’s door. Hankey identified threemain classes ofmistakes.ThefirstwasmistakesfromtheUKinsendingoutthetroopsfortheSuvlaBayoperation;secondly,mistakesmadeatSuvlaBaywhichHamiltonhadexplained;andthirdly,themostmajoraccordingtoHankey,‘mistakesinherentinourmilitarysystemwhich,Ibelieve,arethemostseriousofall,andhavebeenthecauseofmostofourfailuresinthiswar’.OrsoHankeybelieved.Ofthefirstmistake,HankeyreckonedthattheworseofitwasthatHamilton

was led to believe by the authorities in theUK that theDivisions of theNewArmy were ‘first line troops’. It was given that they were good soldiers, butlackedexperienceofwarand thereforeuntil thishadbeenamended theywereonly suitable for the SecondLine.Hankey noted that before the fighting of 6August 1915, the lack of preparation of the new divisions should have beenrealized as experience of theWestern Front in France had supposedly alreadytaught this lesson.Hankey admitted that the consequence of thismistakewasthat Hamilton attempted to launch a major offensive with what were at thatpoint,secondratetroopswhohadneverseenactionbefore.Hankeyconsideredthat ifHamiltonhadnotbeenmisledbyWhitehallhewouldnothaveusedthenewdivisions,butinsteaddeployedseasonedtroopsatSulvaBay.ThisbroughtHankeytohisnextpointconcerningthequestionof thetiming

ofsendingouttroopstoGallipoli,asHankeyconsideredthattheyweresentouttoo late.Thismeant that therehadbeenno time toacclimatize themen to theconditions at Gallipoli. Even Hankey had realized from his brief visit to thepeninsula that new troops needed up to a fortnight to get used to their newenvironmentbeforetheywerereadytofight.HankeynotedhowsomeDivisionshad performed better than others at Sulva Bay owing to varying degrees ofpreviousexposuretotheconditionsatGallipoli.Henotedtheabsolutefailureof53rdDivision,whichhadnothadanytimetogetusedtotheirnewsurroundingsandwerepitcheddirectlyintobattlefromtheirnavaltransports.HankeyclaimedthathewasgoingtorequestthatKitchenerensurethatreinforcementssentouttoGallipoliinthefutureshouldbedespatchedsoonerratherthanlater,inordertogive time toadjust to theconditionsofwarfareand thoseatGallipoli.HankeyadmittedthatitmayprovetobedifficulttoconvinceKitchenerofthisnecessity,but he remainedhopeful that hemight be able toprovehis case toKitchener.

Hankey, in the case ofmistakes at a local level, was generous enough not tocomment upon, asHamilton had explained in fullwhat had happened and theconsequences. Hankey basically deferred to Hamilton as being in a betterpositiontocommentashehadbeenpresentatthelandings.HankeythenwentontoaddressthematterofhowtheBritishArmyin1915

organizeditself.AmajorprobleminHankey’sopinionandobservationwasthatregimentalofficersandthemenwerenotawareofwhatwasexpectedofthem.Hankey,duringhisvisittoGallipoliandwhilstwalkingaroundSuvlaBay,metandspoketoyoungStaffofficersandregimentalofficers.Hewasleftwiththeimpression that perhaps more might have been gained if these men actuallyknew what was expected of them once they had landed. It would have beenbeneficialiftheobjectivesoftheoffensivehadbeensharedwiththemandthattheyhad some idea ofwhere theywere going andwhy.As if to reinforce hispoint,whenHankeyarrivedbackin theUK,a letterwaswaitingforhimfromhisbrotherwhohadservedforseveralmonthsasaPrivatewiththeNewArmiesinFranceandhadcomehomeseverelywounded.ForHankey,hisbrother’swordswereofvaluebeyondthatofsiblinglove,but

alsothatofprofessionalopinion,aspriortoservingasaprivatesoldierhehadbeen an officer in the Garrison Artillery. Hankey’s brother opened hisobservations of the British Army by noting that in his opinion, in the NewArmies, discipline had largely destroyed the individual. This meant that menwererobbedoftheirabilitytothink.Soldierswerewillingtodoanythingiftheyweretoldtodoso,butwishtheydidnothavetodoso.Theproblemwas,thatmeant they became docile and lacked individual thought as theArmy did notpermit this.Furthermore,officers failed to take theirmen into theirconfidenceanddidnotallowthemtoknowwhattheyweresupposedtobedoingwhentheywere taking part in an offensive. Hankey’s brother considered that it shouldbecome necessary in the modern armies that every man should know hisobjective,someofthereasonswhyanoperationwasbeingundertakenandwhatwere‘thebigissuesatstake’.ThisseemedtounderlinewhatHankeyhadmetatSuvlaBaywhen regimentalofficers said that theyhadno ideawhy theywerethere.Hankey had also seen correspondence from both officers andmenwhohadbeenatSuvlaBaywhoexpressedthesamesentiment.49ItshouldbenotedthattheforeveryouthfulSecondLieutenantAddams-Williamsofthe4thSouthWalesBorderswaspitchedwithhismenstraightintobattleoncetheyarrivedatGallipoli.HewaskilledattheageofnineteenatChocolateHill.50AdmiralJ.H.Godfreyduring1964,madeobservationsofthetypeofmenand

howtheywerelandedandtreatedatSuvlaBayinAugust1915.Hehadhelpedto ferry troops fromPort Iero toSuvla.He remembered thatmany troops hademptied their water bottles before they had landed. However, he was morecriticaloftheofficerswhowereabouttoleadthesemenintobattleonceashore;Godfrey detected a sense ofweakness.The command structurewasweak andtherewas a lack of ‘aggressive leadership’. The atmosphere on the transportstaking the troops to shore according to Godfrey was ‘placid, indolent andfatuously wishful’. Therefore a total lack of zip, and get up and go. OfKitchener’sArmieshe said that theywereentirelynewwithno ‘stiffening’ofexperiencedsoldiers.Godfreyconfessedtoa‘gloomyforebodingthatthey(thelandingsoldiers)wouldbeunable toachieve their limitedobjectives(ofwhichthey were ignorant before landing) much less to overcome the resistance ofseasoned Turkish armies’. Furthermore, he considered that the change ofGovernment in the UK and then its procrastination as to whether to launchanotheroffensiveandwhen,haddelayed the landingsatSuvlaBay.When thelandingswerefinallyunderwayitwasAugustandthehottest timeof theyear.As a resultmany soldierswere exhaustedbefore they landed.Even at brigadelevel, according toGodfrey itwas uncertain amongst commanderswhere theywere actually going, who also only had one map lent to them by a CaptainBurmester.MapshadbeenissuedoftheAsiaticsideofTurkey,buttheyservednopurposeotherthantoconfusetheenemyifcaptured.51Itwasnotsurprisingthatlater,HamiltonandHankeybothfoundmensittingontheinvasionbeacheswaitingforordersandclarity.Perhaps if themen at Suvla Bay had been confided in and there had been

briefingrightdowntothelowestandyoungestsoldier,perhapstheywouldhaveadvanced inland andoverrunGallipoli insteadofwaiting for orders. In a laterwaritwasclearthatallsoldiersneededtobebriefedsothattheyknewwhattheyweredoingandwhy.52HamiltonoverallbasicallyagreedwithHankeyandwaspleased that hehadwrittenhis observations in suchplain and conciseEnglishwhich could not bemisinterpreted.53 There is evidence thatBirdwood tried toconvinceStopfordoftheneedofeverymanlandingatSuvlaBayaswellasatANZAC to know his exact orders and objectives. Birdwood argued, quiterightly,thatwithsuchforeknowledge,unitslandingwouldracestraightfortheirobjectives and not hang about.54 However, it is without doubt that Stopforddemurred.Hamiltonalsomusthavehadhis reservationsabout tellingordinarymenof theobjectivesofanoperationashewasaproductofhis time;hewasclass conscious and a snob. I have to disagreewithCarlyon at this pointwho

claimed thatHamiltonhad littleclassconsciousness. Iwillconcede thatas thefighting at Gallipoli developed, Hamilton did seem to develop some socialawarenessashemet theworkingclasses,especially thosewithanindustrialorurbanbackgroundincloseproximityinlargernumbersthanhehadpreviously.55However,heneverseemed tohave toomuchfaith in theofficers,whichcamefromsuchabackgroundassimplytheywerenotoftheofficerclass.Herarelyifeverbelievedthatanythingcouldbeachievedbythosestrataofsocietythatfellbelowhim.Onlyagentlemanwasworthconfidingin.Evenworse,theSecretaryof State forWar, LordKitchener, saw no reason to confide or brief anybodyunlessheneeded toand that included theCIGS. Itwasabadhabitof the lateVictorianArmy,whichhadnotbeenbrokenby1915.All of these things as outlined in this overview of theGallipoli Campaign,

underthecommandofGeneralSirIanHamilton,weretoconspireagainsthim.Hamiltonmayhaveconsideredthathewasintouchwithmodernitythroughhisfriends and acquaintances inWhitehall and beyond, but the truthwas hewassadly out of touch and out of the loop; the loop made by politicians andjournalists.Every man has his agenda and both Ashmead-Bartlett and Keith Murdoch

bothhadtheirs.ItwasunfortunateforHamiltonthatbothmenhadthepublicearvia their newspapers and that of politicianswhowere on themake. It is quitesurprisingthatAshmead-Bartlettwastakenalmostathiswordbytheauthorities,ashemadeassertionsthatwentuncheckedbytheauthoritiesinLondon.Thereshould have at least been some checking on his presentations and his reportscollaboratedbymorethanoneotherperson.CharlesLister,writingtohisfather,LordRibblesdale,noted thatAshmead-Bartlettonhiswayback to theUKhadbeen ‘blown up on theMajestic’. There is almost a sense of regret that thejournalist escaped with his life, but there was some comfort for Lister as itseemedthatAshmead-Bartlett’snotebookscontaining‘scathingdenunciationsofallofthoseinauthority’hadbeenlostwhentheshipwassunk.Evenso,ListerwascertainthatAshmead-Bartlettwould‘talkwhenhegetshome’.Therewasaforlornhope that the result ofAshmead-Bartlett ‘talking’might getmoremensentouttoGallipoli,andthecondemnationofAshmead-Bartlettcontinuedashewasdenounced aspessimistic andhis statements exaggerations.As a result ofthis, Lister also feared thatmany people in authoritywould ignoreAshmead-Bartlett.ListerexpressedthefearthatmanysupportersoftheGallipolicampaignhad;thatifAshmead-Bartlettwaslistenedtoandtakenseriouslytheremightbeaclamourforawithdrawalfromthepeninsula.Atthattime,June1915,itmight

still be claimed that there was a possibility that the Allies, if adequatelyreinforced,mightstillbeabletoadvanceandsuccessfullyconcludetheGallipolioffensive.56 For many, this was an appalling prospect both politically andmilitarily.Hamilton,indealingwiththePresswasreasonablyliberal,butthereappeared

tohavebeennoguidelinesandforawhileheallowedAshmead-Bartletttohaveafreereinandtheirrelationshipwasquiteamiable,indeedHamiltonsaidthathehadnothingagainstAshmead-Bartlett and likedhis articlesbut couldnot trusthim when he broke his word. Hamilton remarked that if he had not sentAshmead-Bartlett away he would have had ‘to change the whole system (ofreporting from Gallipoli) and restrict the opportunities of correspondents’.57Hamilton considered that some of Ashmead-Bartlett’s writing was perhaps alittletooliberalandperhapsattimeslightlyexaggerated,butheputthisdowntowhatheperceivedtobeawriter’sartisticflair,whileHamiltonwasconsiderablyopposedtocensorshipforthesakeofit.ThereismoreevidencetosuggestthatAshmead-Bartlett, who was perpetually short of money, was motivated byfinancial gain and he knew that sensationalist reporting in the absence of anyreal information coming from the peninsula could well be his meal ticket. Itshould also be recognized that by March 1915 the London Press was alsosuffering a drop in income. Since the outbreak of war a third of commercialadvertisinginthePresswaslostowingtothewar,thereforeifasinglejournalistcould turn their fortunes aroundwith some colourful reporting, so be it in theeyesofthePressinLondon.58Hamilton and Ashmead-Bartlett only seemed to fall out when Ashmead-

BartlettbegantowritenegativelyabouttheGallipoliCampaign.ThiswaswhenHamiltonbegantotrytoenforceameasureofcensorshipandwasquiterightlyangeredwhentheerringjournaliststartedtodefyhimbyevadingthecensor,andlaterbegantotrytosmugglecopybacktotheUK.However,theBritishmilitaryauthoritieswhotriedtocontrolAshmead-Bartlettfoundthathisfreelancestatusmadeitdifficulttoconfinehisoutput.IfAshmead-Bartletthadbeenwritingandcontractedtoasinglenewspaper,pressuremighthavebeenappliedtohiseditorin an attempt to prevent his work appearing. But as Kitchener observed,Ashmead-Bartlett didnotwork for a onenewspaperbut for all of theLondonPressandthisposeddifficultiesintryingtocensorhim,butanattempttotrytoworksomethingoutwith theNewspapersProprietors’Associationwas tried.59However, Hamilton’s relationship with Ashmead-Bartlett continued to festerthroughoutthesummerof1915.ThebotchedlandingatSuvlaBayonlyserved

to make Ashmead-Bartlett, despite promises made to Hamilton of goodbehaviour in the future,more determined towrite uncensored and try to senddispatchesbacktoLondon.DuringSeptember1915thesituationdeterioratedasAshmead-Bartlett, using theAustralian journalistKeithMurdoch, attempted tosmuggle an uncensored despatch back to London with the view of getting itpublished. This plan was thwarted and Murdoch was apprehended with adespatchforAsquith,theBritishPrimeMinister.Thedespatchcriticizedmilitaryoperations at Gallipoli, but there was nothing for the Press in London.60 Thegamewhich the two journalistsplayedhadmovedon frommerelywriting forthePress,tobriefingpoliticiansandinfluencingpoliticalmanoeuvringregardingthe outcome of the Gallipoli campaign, as the BritishWar Cabinet sought todistanceitselffromthefailuresatGallipoliandsoughtawayoutwhichwouldsave face. Itwasalsosuggested thatMurdoch’spenkept theAustralianPrimeMinister inpower.EventhoughAshmead-BartlettwasbanishedfromGallipoliattheendofSeptember1915,hisinfluencewasnotdiminished,infactitseemedto grow. Hamilton’s diary does shed a little light onto Ashmead-Bartlett’sseemingly ever-desperate necessity to get uncensored despatches out fromGallipoli.Aswehave seen,Ashmead-Bartlettwas perpetually short ofmoneyand inmid-July1915,Hamiltonnoted thatmore journalistshadarrivedon thepeninsula and that he had told them that they could do as they ‘d----d wellplease’.Asaresult,Ashmead-BartlettaccordingtoHamilton,was‘vexedathismonopolybeingspoiled’.61NodoubtthewretchedmancouldseehissomewhatinsecureincomebeingsteadilydiminishedasothersweregrantedashareofthenewsoutofGallipoli, thereforehehad to take amore radical andunorthodoxline in his further reporting, even if itwas not exactly honest. The influentialAustralian journalist and later official historian of ANZAC, Charles Beanlamented Ashmead-Bartlett’s expulsion. He considered that the ANZACs hadlost a good friendwho always fought lost causes andwas ‘a rebel against thestupidityoftheforeignoffice’.HehadadifferentopinionofAshmead-Bartlett,ashesaidofhim,‘whosebrilliantdispatchesarefulloflifeandcolour,hithard,andgiveabrilliant ideawhich is remarkably true’.62Quiteadifferentviewofthe British journalist from his Australian counterpart, but without doubt themilitaryandthePresshaddifferingagendaandsawthingsandacteddifferently.ItisinterestingtonotethatBean,astheofficialANZAChistorian,wasabletoinfluencethehistoriographyofGallipoli,inAustraliaandNewZealandatleast.However, as Bean noted after Murdoch had been intercepted, Ashmead-Bartlett’slettertoAsquithstartedtheballrollingwhichledtotheevacuationof

thepeninsulaattheendof1915.ThiswasinconjunctionwithMurdoch’sreportto his Prime Minister in Australia. Both men claimed the responsibility forensuring that theGallipoli peninsulawas eventually evacuated, as themilitarysituationtherefortheAllieswasoneofdisasterabouttobecomecatastrophe.63In a letter to Kitchener, Hamilton complained that Ashmead-Bartlett had

recently made in public ‘some very inaccurate statements’ about Gallipoli.HamiltonwasrailingagainsttheaccusationthatnoarrangementsweremadetosupplytroopswithfreshwateratSulvaBay.64Thetruthwasthattherehadbeenanattempt tosupplywater,but itwasquite inadequate. Inanother lettera fewdays later, Hamilton again complained about the water issue, this time toCallwell. As Hamilton had feared, Ashmead-Bartlett’s words were gainingcurrencyinLondon.Hamiltonstillclungtohisbelief thatoncehewasable tospeak, thepublicwouldrealizethatAshmead-Bartlettwaslying.65ThehaplessHamiltondidnotunderstandthatthepublicwouldnotbeswayedbyhiswordsand that the age of deference in theUKwas beginning to come to an end. InAustraliaithadneverreallytakenholdandMurdochcontinuedtobeathorninHamilton’sside.As if to underline the failure of Hamilton to understand that society was

changingand thathiswordasagentlemanandanofficerwasno longergoodenough,Ashmead-Bartlettwaseasilyable todismissHamilton. Inanarticle inThe World published on 1 February 1916, Ashmead-Bartlett was able todenounceHamilton’s reportasdeception.Ashmead-Bartlettwrote that ‘Sir IanHamiltonmayattempttodeceivethegeneralpublic,buthecannotdeceivethosewho were on the spot and in the know.’ He then threw up many questionsconcerning tactics and thenumbersofmendeployed.66 Itwas always a cheapjibe thatHamiltonwasnotat thefront line;heoftenwas,andwhocouldhavebeenmoreintheknowthanHamilton?Ashmead-Bartlett,nomatterhowmuchhetriedtogivetheimpressionthatheknewbestwhatwasneededatGallipoli,was always only an observer. Hemay have seenmany things and sawmanymistakes, but he never really knew much about the operation. Even thoughHamilton gave him a very free rein, he never tookAshmead-Bartlett into hisconfidence.After all, hewas not an officer or a gentleman and thatwas howHamiltonmeasuredtheworld.Callwellwasalso to showhowoutof touchHamiltonwaswhenhebluntly

told him that Ashmead-Bartlett’s lectures could hardly be censored. In theopinion of Callwell, censorship could only be confined to the question ofsuppressingthepublicationofanyinformationthatmaybeofusetotheenemy,

orcausedtheAlliestobecomediscouragedinfightingthewar.Therefore,eventhough Ashmead-Bartlett was wrong in his ‘statements of fact’, as it hadhappened, three months earlier it was not subject to this form of censorship.Therewas sympathy forHamilton in thatAshmead-Bartlett had been given aheadstart inthisbattleofwords.ThematterwastoberaisedintheHousesofParliamentwith theobject of officially denyingAshmead-Bartlett’s assertions,but overallHamiltonwas losing the battle for public support.67By the endof1915 the evacuation of Gallipoli, which Hamilton and his supporters hadopposed,wasfactandtheBritishpublichadacceptedit.68The worst of the journalistic bile was to come from Keith Murdoch who

verged on the personal insult that was calculated to wound in his work. Hiscommentswerealso tingedwith thenewlydiscoveredAustralianNationalism,which cameclose to racism.Murdoch couldonly seegood inAustralians andAustralia.Hewasnot tookeenonAustralianswhowerenotborninAustralia,which included the Commander of the ANZAC force, General WilliamBirdwood.Callwell,at theWO,reported toHamiltonona letter thatMurdochhadwrittenontheconditionsandconductoftheoperationsat theDardanelles.Murdoch had worked himself into a lather on what he saw as the ‘ghastlybunglingovertheDardanellesenterprise’.TheblameforthisbunglingMurdochquite firmly placed onto the British General Staff. Murdoch considered thatBritishStaffofficersor ‘red feathermen’werewholly incompetent,consistingof‘countlesshighofficersandconceitedyoungcubswhowereplainlyplayingatwar’.Murdochcontinuedinhislineofstereotyping,asheconsideredthattheseofficershad‘neverworkedseriously,whohadlivedfortheirappearanceandforsocialdistinctionandself-satisfactionandwhoarenowcalledon toconductagigantic war’. Just after this statement Murdoch indulged in a piece ofunnecessaryxenophobia,asheconsideredthattheAustralianofficers(whowerenearly allBritishborn)werenotguiltyof the sinsof theBritishStaff officersand that ‘Australians now loathe and detest anyEnglishmanwearing red’.Hefurtheredhisassertionabout the ‘purity’ofAustralians, aswithout theiryouthandability,whichshouldcometothetop,thecampaignatGallipolicouldnotbewon.69Ascanbeimagined,thispieceofself-indulgencecauseddismayandoffence

withinBritishmilitary circles andMurdoch’s chargeswere rejected.Themostobvious thing was that Hamilton and others were furious that a man such asMurdochhadstoodonthesidelinesdoingnothingbutcriticizeandhadfailedtosee officerswho had been killed or seriouslywounded leading theirmen into

battle. Murdoch, who had never visited the fighting front especially whereBritishtroopswerepositioned,couldnotsayonewordaboutthis.AsHamiltonremarked,‘Couldanythingbemorecruellyungenerousorunjust?’ButHamiltonaseverrevealshisAchillesHeel,asheisstillrootedinthepastwhenusingthewordsofLordDerbyconcerninganother,but lesserattackagainst theGeneralStaff in France, and who wrote ‘No gentleman would have said it and nogentleman would believe it.’70 This single letter of Murdoch’s to his PrimeMinister, Andrew Fisher, was endlessly debated and caused angst throughoutBritishmilitary and political circles until the end of thewar. ForHamilton itprobablyhauntedhimuntilhisdeath.IndeedanentryinLadyHamilton’sdiaryfor 1921 showed how much Murdoch’s ruining of her husband’s careerillustratedhow this episodewasnever togo away inhermind, at least as sheprotested against Northcliffe who had given a lunch for Murdoch. LadyHamilton wrote ‘He could still put up a bogus Australian.’71 It is trulyextraordinary to realize thatwhenHamilton firstbecameaware thatAshmead-Bartlett andMurdochwere trying to influence in London, events atGallipoli,and insinuating thatHamilton shouldbe removed asCommanderof theMEF,HamiltonthoughtthatAsquithwouldhavenothingtodowiththetwojournalistsandtheirtittle-tattle.72HamiltonfailedtotakeintoaccountthatAsquithandhispoliticalclasswerewillingtoallowthePresstohaveafreereinwhenitcametoHamiltonandGallipoli.TheydidsoastheBritishestablishmentandthegeneralpublicinthewholewerelookingforawayoutofanembarrassingsituation;thisbeingmilitaryfailureatGallipoli.SuchbehaviourdidnotevenenterHamilton’sthoughtprocesses,ashewasunawareofthepoliticalsituationathomeowingtohis isolation at Gallipoli. As a result he was wholly dependent on tit-bits ofgossipandsometimesreasoneddebatefromfriends,buthewasnotatallalivetothemilitary-political situationas itwasviewed inLondonuntilhewassackedandreturnedhome.EventhenHamiltonformuchofthetimeseemsquiteobtusetoreality,ashestillthoughtthatagentlemanwillalwaysbesupportedbyothergentlemen.Again hewas quitewrong in this assumption.Hamilton’s nephewgivesapreciseprécisofthereactionsofAsquithandLloydGeorgetothispieceof sensational journalism and how it could be used politically to theiradvantages.Of courseHamiltonwas totally dumbfounded and dismayed onceAsquith took this document and shamefully elevated it to the statusof aStatePaperwithoutthedecencyofallowingeitherHamiltonorKitchenerachanceofdefending the reputation of British officers or the men who served and diedunderthem.73Itwasadisgraceandextremelyshamefulofthepoliticians.

WhatreallyhurtHamiltonwasnotthepersonalattacksagainsthimselfandhisreputation.Onegets the impression that thiswasof little consequence tohim,but to attack officers who had been killed or gravely wounded infuriatedHamilton.MurdochattackedthembecausetheywerenotAustralianandfornootherreason.Therehadbeenincompetenceallroundandallsidessuffered,butMurdochasHamiltonobserved,couldnothavehadanyknowledgeofthisashehadspentlittletimeintheareaofoperations,buthadcondemnedeverythingthathehadnotseen.DespiteMurdoch’s inaccuracies,BritishcommandersstillhadtodealwiththelettertoFisherwhichhadbeenmadepublic.ViceAdmiralSirJames Porter, who as Chief British Medical Officer at the Dardanelles, hadreservationsabout theprovisionofmedicalaid for thewounded,washoweverdisdainful ofMurdoch and his reporting of theDardanelles.Hewrote that hewas‘donewithMr.Murdoch’.ThereasonforthiswasthatonceSirJameshadreturnedfromtheDardanelleshediscoveredthateverywhere,hisown‘soldierlyreputationhadbeenundermined’.Hewasnotslowtorealize thatmuchof thishad to do with phrases published in the Committee of Imperial DefenceMemorandum.LikeHamilton,SirJameswasalsoextremelyangrythatMurdochhad been allowed to spread rumour and write untested evidence against theoverallrunningoftheGallipoliexpedition.SirJameswasfuriousthataBritishGeneral andMember of the Committee of Imperial Defence had circulated amemorandumamongstotherofficers thatcastaspersionsagainst thehonourofSirJamesandcommittedlibelsagainsthistroops.SirJameshadnotbeengivenanychancetodefendhimselfagainstthesechargesoreventotrytoillustrateatleast that therewas no validity in them, butweremerely attacks byMurdochwiththepurposeofself-promotion,asinwritingsuchapolemichecouldmakeaname for himself. Murdoch certainly did this because as Sir James noted, afortnightbeforehehadevengotwindthatsuchadocumentexisted,itwasbeingpassedaround‘fromhandtohandandmouthtoearthroughthemostinfluentialcircles in the land’. Sir James respectfully requested that his remarks also bemadeaspubliclyavailabletoallthose‘whohavereadthevilificationofBritishGenerals, Staff and Regiments penned to his Prime Minister by K.A.Murdoch’.74 The fact thatMurdoch’s letter to Fisher had become the ‘officialtruth’wasahugeobstacletothetruthaboutwhathadhappenedatGallipoliandonethathasneverreallybeensurmounted,especiallyinAustralia.RegardingtherelationshipbetweentheAustraliansandHamilton’ssuccessor,

LieutenantGeneralMonro toldKitchener that theonly troopson thepeninsulaequal to sustainedeffortwere theANZACs,ashecompletedhis reporton the

wretchedsituationof theMEFat theendofOctober1915.75OfcourseMonrowas reporting to the very man responsible for the deplorable situation of theMEFatGallipoli.TheenquiryintotheeventsatGallipoliwasjustaswretched,asitshouldbe

seen that it had alreadymade up its collectivemind; the entire enterprisewasmisguided and Hamilton was to blame. And that was it. The soldiers wereexaminedbythemembersoftheexaminingcommissionwhointhemainlackedmilitarybackgroundsandsowouldneverunderstandhowthemilitaryworksorthe sort of problems an offensive throws up. Furthermore, if they were notfamiliar with the Dardanelles and its difficult terrain, it added a strand ofdifficulty as they sought to find the ‘truth’ concerning Gallipoli.76 Earlier,Hamilton had complained that the Dardanelles Enquiry seemed to consist of‘disgruntled Welshmen, Irishmen and Australians’ who were out to getsomebody for themistakesmade atGallipoli, even though themistakes couldhave happened to anybody.77 Hamilton’s main problem was that the failedoffensive at Sulva Bay had been widely approved by supporters includingKitchener and the well-past-his-sell-by-date, Stopford, but come the inquirynobodyseemedtowanttocometoHamilton’sdefence.As ever, the problem was Ashmead-Bartlett who in 1917 was allowed to

returntotheCommission,the‘devilishCommission’inHamilton’swords,andwasallowed‘toputinanimmensemassoffakedevidencecoveringthewholeof operations from start to finish’. Hamilton noted that broadly speaking nosoldier came out well at the hands of Ashmead-Bartlett.78 As we have seen,muchdependedonHamiltonbeingabletoprovideevidencethatLordKitchenerhad supported the Sulva Bay offensive and that it was not a misguided plandevisedbyHamilton.Bythetimetherewassuchevidence,Kitchener,whohadbeenbetrayingHamilton,wasalreadydeadandHamiltonrealizedthattherewaslittle if any point in sullying, rightly or not, a dead hero’s reputation and soHamiltonwasleftundoneasjournalisticcopybecamegovernmentpolicy.Evenso,alltoolateitseemedthatevenKitchenerconsideredthatHamiltonhadbeenbadly treated and hadwanted to re-employ him.Butwhen this came to light,Kitchenerwasdeadandhiswordscouldnotbeproved.79HamiltoncontinuedtoclingontohisbeliefthateventuallyAshmead-Bartlettwouldbeproventobealiar and that Ashmead-Bartlett’s testimony to the Commission would serveHamiltonwell,ratherthanmakeAshmead-Bartlett’scase.80Hamiltonwasyettorealize that the Commission were determined to accept Ashmead-Bartlett’s

assertionsasfactandthatHamiltonwasthefallguy.Hamiltonwasevenable toprove thatpartsofAshmead-Bartlett’s testimony

was not even exaggerated, but completely made up. An example being thatAshmead-Bartletthadclaimedthat‘GrantoftheCanopus’hadlandedapartyofRoyalMarines at Bulair on 25 April 1915. As Hamilton noted to Birdwood,clearlyAshmead-BartletthadthoughtthatGrantwasstillintheMediterranean.InfactatthetimeinquestionGrantwasinDoverandwasquitedisgustedthatAshmead-Bartlett had put words into his mouth, referring to the journalist as‘thatpoisonousvillain’.Furthermore,evenifanactionsuchasthelandingofthemarines had taken place as claimed, Grant said that Ashmead-Bartlett wouldhavebeenthelastpersonhewouldhavediscussedtheactionwith.81FromhereitcanbeseenthatAshmead-Bartlett’stestimonywasflawedandthereforetherewasevenlessreasontotakethewordofKeithMurdochasbeinganylessthantruthful. Both men had other agendas, money and political power. At theDardanelles Inquiry Murdoch was a less than satisfactory witness and histestimonywasnotveryconvincing,especiallyashebegantheMurdochfamilytraitofonlyrememberingnameswhenitsuitedhimtodoso.82Murdoch’sappetiteforpoliticalinfluencebecamethesubjectofaletterfrom

General Birdwood to Hamilton during 1918, as Birdwood detected a ‘semi-political undercurrent headed byMurdoch in London to get rid ofme and toreplace me (Birdwood) with an Australian officer. Birdwood considered thatMurdochdidnotholdanypersonalanimosityagainsthim,butconsidered thatwhathewastryingtodowasinAustralianinterests.BirdwoodlamentedthefactthatinMurdoch,Australiawasabouttopermita‘CommonwealthNorthcliffetobesetupintheformofMurdoch’.83QuitesimplyBirdwoodfearedthatasintheUK,Australian politicswas about to be run at the behest of the Press led byMurdochandhisownagenda.Amazingly,Hamilton actually saw throughMurdoch and his ambitions, but

thenhehadbeenatwarwithjournalistslongerthanhehadbeenwiththeTurksandfoundthemnottohisliking.Hecouldunderstandamanwhofoughtfromatrench and behind a machine gun, but somebody who hid behind politicians,wordsandtypewriterswasbeyondhisken.InhisreplytoBirdwood,Hamiltonwarned him not to be so naive. Murdoch, according to Hamilton, was notmotivated by what was best for Australia, but what was good for KeithMurdoch, who was willing to take advantage of the new sense of Australiannationalismwhichhadbeguntoflourishsincetheturnofthetwentiethcenturywhen Australia and Australians began to make definite breaks from the UK.

HamiltonadmitstobeingfuriousinthemissivehewassendingtoBirdwoodashe could see that both Ashmead-Bartlett and Murdoch were still allowed toexercisetheirinfluence,asMurdochwasbytheninFrance.InHamilton’smindbothjournalistshaddestroyedtheGallipolioffensivebybriefingagainst itandcausingdismayamongstpoliticiansandattheWO.Hewasfurtherdismayedtosee thatbothmenwere ‘still at their filthybusiness’.84Hamiltonnoted thatasMurdochhadbeentoFrancehiswordswouldhaveauthority.AsHamiltonsawit, theAustralianPrimeMinister in 1918,Hughes,was a civilianwhodid notunderstand themilitary; neither didMurdoch.However,whatHamilton fearedwas that Hughes might feel that as Murdoch had been out to France, heunderstood the feelings of the soldiers, and what he reported back was theauthenticvoiceoftheAustraliansoldiersservinginFlanders.HamiltonhopedtotrytodinewithHughes,butasheputit,ifMurdochandFisherpreventedthis,hewouldgoandseeHughesashe‘gotonquitewellwiththelittleman’;85quitepatronizing,butat leastHamiltonwas fighting,using influence rather than theoutmodedideaofdecencyandhonesty.ItwasnotagamethateitherAshmead-Bartlett or Murdoch understood. By such a late date it must have also beendawning on Hamilton that he was not going to win this particular battle andshouldperhapstryanexerciseindamagelimitation.Hamiltonshouldhavebeenalivetothisearlierthanin1918,asMajorGeneralEllisonhadwrittentohiminearly1916,thatifAshmead-BartletthadbeenwritingabouttheWesternFrontinthe manner that he was about Gallipoli, then the Censor Office would haveprevented ‘the evil vapourings of such a pervertedmind’.86 It just seemed toEllisonthattheauthoritieswerewillingtotoleratethereportingonGallipoli,asit suited them to do so. It should be noted that during August 1915, evenHamiltonisconcernedwiththecensor,asheseemedtoindicatethatitwasoverzealous,which thenprovidedameanly reportedwar.Thisperhaps couldhavebeencounteredifmorefactswereavailableabouteventsatGallipoliratherthansomeofAshmead-Bartlett’smorecolourfulpronouncements.Hamilton,tongue-in-cheek, discusses shooting his ‘friend’ the Censor andwriting some articleshimself.87SixtyyearsafterGallipoli,oneof itsveterans,CaptainM.ParkerBuchanan,

reflectedonthefailureoftheoffensive,notingthatdespitethe‘supremecourageandcountless instancesofpersonalbravery’of thosewhotookpart, it isasadfactthatheroismalonedoesnotwinbattles.ParkerBuchanansaidthatGallipoliwasa failure simplybecause itdidnotachieve itspurposeand that thepublicdoes not likemilitary failure. The Press took advantage of this andwrote the

storieswhichtheyconsideredthatthepublicwantedandneeded.ThejobofthePresswasandistosellnewspapers‘andnottruthfullycontributingtohistory’.ParkerBuchananisquitewitheringinhisputdownofbothAshmead-BartlettandMurdoch, the only two journalists that he came across personally. He said ofthem that, ‘Neither had any access to technical detail and were thereforeincompetenttocommentonthisimportantaspectofthecampaign.’88AnAussiewhohadfoughtatANZACwrote tohismotherfromhishospitalbed.HewasalsoconvincedthatthePresswerelyingintheirreportsconcerningGallipoli.89AtastrokeallofthewritingofAshmead-BartlettandofMurdochisexposedastheinaccurateandpopulistmisinformationthatitwas.ItwasnotHamiltonthatlost theGallipoli campaign but a combination of theBritishWarCabinet, theWO, especially Lord Kitchener, using the self-serving newsprint columns ofAshmead-BartlettandMurdochasevidence. It seemed that themenwhowerenot at Gallipoli were influenced by the men who were so very nearly atGallipoli;whilst thosesufferingfromtheenemy’sbulletsandshellsaswellasfromtheheatandsickness,were ignored.Theirevidencewas inconvenientforthosetryingtowithdrawfromthepeninsulawhilsttryingtosavepoliticalface.Another veteran, Lennox Boswell, in 1977 told the British historian, PeterLiddle, that the assault on the Dardanelles was the best idea produced byanybodythroughoutthe1914–1918War,butitlackedtechnique.BoswellnotedthatinJanuary1915,theAllieswerenotreallycompetenttodothejob.90Thiswas true andwhenHamilton initially landed his troops the incompetencewasexposed, but even so, advances were made, notably by the Australians.However,HamiltonwascontinuouslyletdownbyLondonaswheneverhetriedto get the necessary equipment, especially hand grenades, trenchmortars andhowitzers,allsuitableforblastingtheenemyfromtheirtrenches,hewasdeniedthistypeofequipment.ItwasthesamestorywheneverhetriedtogetmoremenfortheMEF.EverythingwasgoingtothebloodystalemateinFranceandso‘thestep-childamongstBritishmilitaryenterprises justhadtogowithout,andwithdireresults’.91HamiltonwrotethatitwasthelackofartillerythatfinallycausedStopfordtodonothingatSulvaBay,whichledtothefailureoftheoffensive,asimpetuswaslostandlittleornoadvancewasmade.92GeneralSirAlexanderJ.Godley, theNewZealandcommander,wrotethathowitzerswerethesavingofan offensive on 2 May 1915, as 18-pounder field guns were of little use atGallipoli, while there was never enough artillery at Gallipoli.93 Godley waswriting to theNewZealandMinisterofDefenceduring the first twoweeksof

May1915.ThepositionregardingartilleryatGallipolineverreallyimprovedasthelion’sshareofgunsandmunitionsweresentouttotheWesternFront.By late autumn 1915, the long fuse that had been lit by Murdoch and

Ashmead-Bartlett began to take effect. They had provided the excuses forevacuationandsothepoliticiansandthebrasshatsatWhitehallbegantoprepareforsuchaneventuality.Butfirst,totrytosavesomefaceandputamodicumofexpertise in place,LordKitchener deigned to visit theGallipoli peninsula andclaimed tohavebeenappalledbywhathesaw.Theevacuationpaved thewayfora retreat toSalonika; theflavourof themonth in1916asfarasanEasternFront went. However, Carlyon considers that Hamilton may have cooked hisparticular goose at Gallipoli when for once he sent Kitchener a lengthy anddetailed report on the situation on the peninsula during August 1915. In thisreport he outlined that the entire enterprise was doomed to failure unless hereceived immediate reinforcements. The Turks in Hamilton’s estimation had110,000troopstohis95,000.Hamiltonrequested45,000meninordertobringhis existing divisions up to full establishment and a further 50,000 as freshdivisions. As Carlyon remarks, people who tell half-truths are one thing, butthose who tell the whole truth are worse. London began to wonder aboutHamilton and his conduct atGallipoli. Thiswas to getworse asAugust 1915progressed. The failure of the August 1915 offensive had caused the BritishKing, George V to lose faith in Hamilton, while Stopford who had alreadyreturned to the UK had filed charges with theWO against Hamilton and hisStaff. Kitchener ordered an investigation into the charges, without givingHamilton a chance to read them.Hankeyhad also handed in his reportwhichwasnottoobadandmoderateintone.Evenso,AsquithreadthereportandtoldKitchenerthattheGeneralsandStaffinvolvedintheSuvlaBayoperationshouldbecourt-martialledandcashiered.HewantedHamiltonandhisStaffthrownoutoftheArmy.94Interestingly,HamiltonsentareporttoKitcheneron17August1915concerningthefightingatbothANZACandSulvaBay.HetoldKitchenerthattheenemywasresistingtheAlliedoffensivesandheneededreinforcementsinordertoensuresuccessatthesetwoplaces.AsquithwrotetoKingGeorgeVthatthismatterwouldbediscussedlater,asKitchenerwasabsent.95Thiswasanincredible situation that would not have happened if it had been theWesternFront.IneffecttheMinisterofWarwasnotavailableduringamajoroffensiveand the PrimeMinister coolly tells his monarch that Hamilton can wait untilKitchenerreturns.ThistinyexchangeillustratesjusthowunimportantHamiltonandtheMEFweretotheauthoritieswhohadoriginallyconceivedtheoperation

earlierthatyear;oncetheoffensivefailed,thepoliticalestablishmentwerequitehappy toallowthesituation tohanguntilsomethingcameup.Asweshallseesomethingdidcomeup:evacuation.Thiswasaninterestingstateofaffairs,asthecivilianPrimeMinisterwhono

doubt did not know one end of a rifle from another, was giving themegalomaniacKitchenertheopportunitytoinvestigatehimselfandreportonhisownincompetence,suchasbeingabsentfromhisdeskduringamajoroperation.It was also a very good time to rid himself of a general whom hemay haveconsideredshouldhavebeencompliantowingtohis,foraprofessionalsoldier,placid disposition. Instead, incredibly Hamilton decided to tell Kitchener thetruth;therewasnochanceofvictoryatGallipoliunlesscertainconditionsweremet.Quitesimplyadequate troops, reservesandequipmentneeded tobemadeimmediately available to theMEF.Kitchener knew that thiswas not possibleowingtotheprevailingtrendinmilitary-politics,whichrequiredthateverythingshould be sent to feed the bloody stalemate on theWestern Front at France.Hamiltonhadunwittinglysigned,nothisowndeathsentence,butcertainlyhisownletterofresignation.HewasthefallguyasKitchenerhadnointentionsofadmittinghispartinthefailureatGallipoli.TheoverviewofeventsastheyhappenedinbothLondonandtheDardanelles,

aswellasinTurkeyasawhole,wasrevisitedinthefirsthalfofthischapterandit is obvious that Hamilton alone could not be blamed for the failure of thecampaignatGallipoli.ThefaultlaywiththefactthattheBritishArmywasnotpreparedtofightafullEuropeanstylecontinentalwar.Itwasnottrainedtodosoand lacked thenumbers to so.Even theverymodest reformsof theBritishmilitaryconcerningdemocratic civilianoversight faileduntil1916, and then ittook the death ofLordKitchener at sea before such reforms could really takeroot.ItwasthesamewiththeestablishmentofaGeneralStaff;untilKitchenerwasdead,itwasquiteineffectual.Kitchenerruledallbeforehim.TherewasnotasinglecommanderintheBritishArmyuntil1916whowascapableofleadingalarge-scalemilitary campaign and it is arguable that therewas one after 1916oncethehugelossesat theSommecouldnolongerbehiddenfromthepublic.Thesecretwasout;warwasnotgloriousbutmerelyaterribleslaughter,andfornothing.RobertRhodesJamesnotesthatittookalittlewhilebeforeitwasrealizedthe

SuvlaBayoffensivehadfailed.EvenHamiltonaslateas17August1915,hadnot really understood just how firmly and tightly his forcewas hemmed in astheycouldnotadvanceveryfarastheylackedtheresourcesandmen.96Evenso,

tendays later,27August1915, theBritishWarCabinet includingAsquithandKitchener, was still seemingly supporting the Gallipoli offensive, but crackswere beginning to appear. Winston Churchill, usually the most eloquentsupporter of the entire Mediterranean offensive, continued to maintain hissupport of bothHamilton and theMEF, but his influencewas on thewane.97Asquith andKitchener had to support the offensive at present, as they had nochoice but to do so, but aswe have seenwere looking for away out and thePress provided it in spades within a few weeks. But even so, a conclusionreachedby theBritishWarCabinetwas‘thatno lineof futurepolicycouldbeframedforthepresent,butthatSirIanHamiltonshoulddohisbesttoholdthegroundthathehadgained,andbeaskedforhisappreciationastofuturepolicyandtherequirementstocarryitout’.98Sothereitwas;Hamiltonhadtoholdoutagainstgreaternumbersofenemy thanhepossessedatGallipoli.Hehadbeencast adrift. A week earlier the British War Cabinet had denied him thereinforcementshehadpreviouslyaskedfor,astheywereneededfor‘operationalcommitmentsinFrance’.99TheunderhandmethodofAshmead-BartlettwiththeuseofKeithMurdochin

briefing Asquith in a version of events at Dardanelles, without doubt wasinfamous,buttherewerealsosometruthsthatwerebeingkeptfromtheBritishPrimeMinisterandmuchoftheWarCabinet.MuchofthiswasduetoKitchenercontrolling the flow of information made available to the civilian politicians.BothAshmead-BartlettandMurdochlaidwideopensomeveryunpleasanttruthsabouteventsatGallipoli,buttheyblamedthewrongmanandthewrongpeople–Hamilton andhisStaff trying tomuddle throughon thegroundatGallipoli.Furthermore, if there is any justice to be had, Murdoch was so briefly atGallipoli that he wrote from a point of ignorance as well as his own blindprejudiceofallthingsBritish.Ashmead-Bartlett’sworkismorecoherentandheatleasthadspenttimeatGallipoli.Some ofMurdoch’s criticism of the British Staff at Gallipoli was justified.

There was a suspicion that General Walter Braithwaite, Hamilton’s Chief ofStaff,wastryingtopullinadifferentdirectionfromtheonethatHamiltonwastryingto.ThisledtomuddledworkatStafflevelaslinesofcommunicationsgotcrossed.100 There was a definite lack of clarity at Suvla Bay about what wasexpected;attimesitseemedthateventheDivisionalCommanderswereunsureofwhat theyweresupposed tobedoingorof theirobjectives. It shouldbenosurprisethattheirtroopssatonthebeacheswaitingforfurtherorders.Ofcoursesomepushedonaheadanddied.Murdochalsodiscussedthemarkeddifferences

between life on some of the ships from which members of the GHQ Staffworked,oncecontrastedwiththatofthenursesandpatientsofNo.3AustralianGeneral Hospital who were sleeping on the ground and eating tinned cornedbeef, ‘bully beef’, but were only a mile away from Staff officers living inrelative comfort.101Of course comparedwith Staff officers serving in France,those at Gallipoli were ‘roughing it’ as Staff on the Western Front weregenerally housed in a decent chateau or mansion about five miles from thefighting Front. In contrast, Turkish artillery could shell Allied positions atGallipolialmostatwillwithlittleprospectofanyrealretaliationunlessanavalshipgotluckyandlandedadirecthitonaTurkishartilleryposition.MuchofthetimeTurkish artillerywas eitherwell positioned and hidden ormobile and sodifficult to attack. The Allies never had enough artillery power, either innumbersorsuitabilitytodislodgeenemyartilleryforlong.ThiscomplaintfromMurdoch was illustrative of how he could tell a truth, but not reallyunderstanding what he was saying. He was an unskilled and inexperiencedwitness,whichledtomischieflater.However,regardingthestateofthemedicalfacilities at Gallipoli, a more reliable witness was available: the AustralianGeneral JohnMonash who wrote home to his wife and daughter asking whyAustralianswerebeingsacrificedinsuchlargenumbersat theDardanellesandthat the British hospitals were markedly bad compared with Australian, NewZealand and Canadian hospitals. Monash commented, ‘but as to the Britishhospitals,here,well thesooner theyhangsomebody forgrossmismanagementthe better’.102 He also told his family of things that did not go not into theofficialbulletins.Onewasthecontentiousissueofwhetherornottherewasanopen road to the Dardanelles during the first forty-eight hours of the Sulvalandings. Monash was of the view that there was and that there was nooppositionworthtalkingaboutbeforetheinvadingAllies.AccordingtoMonashanentireArmyCorpssaton thebeachwhile itsCommandersquarrelledaboutseniority and precedence. This caused a forty-eight hour delay in advancinginlandandasaconsequencetheTurkswereabletobringforwardtheirstrategicreservesfromBulairandmadetheobjectiveoftheentirelanding,theprotectionof the left flank of the ANZAC advance meaningless.103 When GeneralBirdwood visited Turkey during 1936, he asked one of his former enemies,FahreteinPasha,whathethoughtofthesecondlandingatSuvlainAugust1915.FahreteinPashareplied,‘Whenwesawyourtroopslandingthereweweretakenutterlybysurprise,andwewiredtoConstantinopleadvisingtheGovernmenttoevacuate thecapital,as theBritishwouldbe through!’Birdwoodrecorded that

bothheandFahreteinPashabothagreedthattheAlliesshouldhavegotthroughtotheTurkishcapital.104Therefore,itwastruethattheBritishwereundonebythe lack of reforms and the limited implementation of those which had goneahead;theresultwastroopsandofficerssittingonthelandingbeacheswaitingforfurtherorders. Ifeverybodyhadknownwhat theobjectiveswere,nodoubtjuniorofficerswouldhavecontinuedtotheirobjectivesandovercomeobstacles,suchastheywere,astheymetthem.Theevidence seems tobe that theymerelyneeded toadvance towards their

targetsandthenperhapsexplorefurthertoseewhatlayahead.Thelackoftrustand information within the British Command structure made this impossible.However, Prior notes that the failure of both Stopford and Hammersley on 8August 1915 to advance inland and seize objectives was seized upon by theAustraliansastheofficialANZACversionofevents.Priorclaimsthisdeflectedaway fromwhat he refers to as the ‘considerable defects’ ofBirdwood’s ownplans.HealsoclaimsthatblamingStopfordandHammersleyforthe‘ruinationof the Gallipoli operation’ reflected the contempt of the ANZACs forKitchener’sArmiesheldupatSuvlaBay.Anotherinterestingpointistheracismof Australians at the time, as Bean, (no doubt suffering from an inferioritycomplex) wrote the ANZAC history and seemed to be slightly obsessedwitheugenics.Heofcoursewasnotaloneduring the interwarperiodof taking thispuerile ‘science’ seriously.Of course, like all believers of hokum, he becamesomewhat absurd when trying to convince that the clean-living countryside-dwellingAustraliansweresomewhatsuperiortotheBritishwhotendedtosuffer‘the evil effects of big-city living’. It should also be added for the sake offairnessthatBeanwasnotaloneinwritingthehistoryoftheGallipolicampaign.During the 1920s as ‘Aspinall-Oglander’, Aspinall wrote the official Britishhistoryofthecampaignandsowaslefttoblameorpromotewhoeverhewanted;hecertainlywithcauseblamedStopford.105HamiltonandAspinalldevisedtheplansfortheSuvlaBaylandings.MurdochwaspoisedandreadytoraiseMonash’sconcernsaboutconditions

atGallipoli.Hisrevelationswereshockingtosomebutconvenienttoothers,asthey sought a way out of the morass, which Gallipoli was perceived to havebecome.MonashalsohintedatafurtherproblematGallipoli;thecomingwinterandtheweatheritmightbringtoGallipoli.106LieutenantColonelHankeyinhisreport of the Gallipoli peninsula following his visit also observed that if theAllied offensive was to be prolonged into the winter of 1915 and into 1916,adequateprovisionshouldbemadeforwinterwarfareandtheharshnessthatthis

would see. There would be a need for suitable clothing, food supply and thetrenchesprepared for thecold thatwaswinter atGallipoli.HankeyconsideredthattheGovernmentshouldquestionwhetherthecampaignshouldbecontinuedintothewinterowingto the‘tremendoustollonthecountryinhumanlifeandmaterial resources’. The entire offensive was considered by Hankey to be a‘runningsore’whichsappedtheenergyofthewareffort.HepointedtowhatheclaimedtohavebeenthedenialoffivedivisionsandammunitiondesignatedfortheWesternFrontwhich had failed to bring victory atGallipoli.He proposedwithdrawalasHankeyconsideredthatawintercampaignatGallipoliwouldbeboth dangerous and speculative, as he feared that little if anything might begained from continuing the offensive. Hankey noted that two questions aroseconcerning this: tacticsandpolitics.Hewasquiteafraidof themessage that awithdrawalfromGallipolimightsendout.107Ofcoursehewasafraid,as fromthe very beginning there had been a suspicion that this venture might end infailure, which would damage British prestige all over the world whileencouragingMoslems to revolt against European imperial rule in both NorthAfrica and in India. Thiswould be a nightmare situation for both France andBritain,whileHamiltonwasleftmaroonedatGallipoli tryingtoredeemAlliedmilitary prestige as best he could.Monro feared awithdrawal, and he quotedGeneralBirdwood’sfearsconcerningthisasherecommendedtoKitchenerthatthe peninsula should be evacuated;Birdwood also agreed that evacuationwastheonlywayofsavingtheMEF,butfearedthatitwouldbe‘anentireMoslemvictoryandthismayhaveconsequencesfortheEmpire’.108In a strangeway,British andpossiblyFrenchblusheswerenearly savedby

theinterventionoftheMurdochlettertotheAustralianPrimeMinister,whichatleast provided some excuse for leaving the Gallipoli peninsula. It was notbecauseBritishmilitarypolicywasflawedbutbecauseofonemanwhowasnotup to the job: General Sir Ian Hamilton. Kitchener assembled a number ofGeneralstoconsiderreportsonGallipoliandtheywereunitedintheirfindings:itwasallthefaultofGeneralSirIanHamiltonandhisfailedlandingsatSulvaBayduringAugust1915;109theveryonesthatlateritwasshownKitchenerhadapproved of, but when this was noted, Kitchener was dead and kicking deadheroeswasnotdoneatthetime.However,itshouldbenotedthatbehindthescenesMurdoch’swordwasnot

takenasgospel.AsquithhadsaidtoKitchenerthatitwas‘ratherdisturbing’butwas astute enough to notice the manner in which it was written. The BritishPrimeMinisterhadseen that itwas ‘abitterdocumentand itwasconspicuous

fortheomissionofanypraiseforanybodyoranythingattheDardanelles’.Thiswasaverygoodobservation.AsquithalreadyknewfromHankeythattheletterwas‘fullofseriousmisstatementsoffacts’orinotherwordsasadocumentoffact, more or less useless; certainly unreliable as it was full of lies. Asquithsuggested that Murdoch should be crossexamined by two members of theDardanelles Committee in detail regarding his report and his allegations. Hediscovered that this had already been done andMurdoch had been unable tosubstantiatehis statements.Theproblemwas thatFisher, theAustralianPrimeMinister, had already seen the letter.110 Fisher appeared to have swallowedMurdoch’smissive,hook,lineandsinker.DespitethepainfulpossibilitythattheMurdochpolemicwasmoreorlessadeceit,theBritishWarCabinetuseditandAshmead-Bartlett’sworkasevidenceoftheincompetenceofHamilton.Itwouldhave also been awkward to try to deny publiclyMurdoch’s letter, as itwouldhave led to an open riftwith theAustralianGovernment at a timewhen theirtroopsweretheonlyonesreallydoinganygoodatGallipoli.By14October1915,theBritishGeneralStafffinallydecidedthatthedecisive

theatrewas inFrance.111ApreviouspaperoriginatingfromtheAdmiraltyhadalreadyconcludedthatthesecurityofFranceandtheUKwasthemostimportantmattertobeconsideredand‘aprimarynecessityandnoeffortthatwecanmakeelsewherecanpossiblyalterthatfact’.112Thisledsomeveryrapidpreparationsfor the evacuation of the peninsula including a telegram sent byKitchener toGeneral Birdwood to prepare for schemes for withdrawal which combinedrearguardactionsandtheinstructionthateverymethodfordelayingtheenemyshouldbeconsideredincludingtheuseofpoisonousgas.113Thankfully,thiswaseventualitywasneverrealized.Thefactremainedthatthepeninsulawastobeevacuatedandquickly,under

thecommandofGeneralMunro,Hamilton’ssuccessor.TherewascriticismoverthisascanbeseenintheprivatepapersofAdmiralSirRogerKeyes,whowrotethatMonrohadonlybeenon thepeninsula twice, for twentyminutesatSuvlaandthesameatAnzac.Monro,fromthesetwobriefvisitsaccordingtoKeyes,wasdeterminedtoevacuate.InfairnessMonromadeapointtoKitchenerwhichHamilton had previouslymade.Monro toldKitchener that ‘on purelymilitarygrounds, therefore in consequence of the grave daily wastage of officers andmenwhichoccurs,andowingtothelackofprospectofbeingabletodrawtheTurks from their entrenched positions, I recommend the evacuation of thePeninsula’.114AfactkeptfromtheBritishauthoritieswasthat justprior to the

evacuation,Turksweresurrenderinginbatches(oneof500).115ThisseemedtohintthatperhapstheTurkswerebeingworndown,buttheAlliesblinkedfirstatGallipoli.TheproblemwasthatatoneleveltheGovernmentcouldnotsanctionadvanceorwithdrawal,butasBeannoted,thethreatofwinterconcentratedtheirminds.116BirdwoodnotesinhisautobiographythateventhoughheagreedwithMonro

aboutthenecessityforevacuatingtheGallipolipeninsula,heurgedKitchenertocome out to the Dardanelles and see the position for himself. He wantedKitchenertobecertainofthesituationtherebeforeanyevacuationwasordered.ThisnearlybackfiredasKitcheneratfirstconsideredthatBirdwoodhadlosthisnerve(hewouldnothavebeenthefirstGeneralatGallipolitohavedoneso)andthatheshouldbereplaced.Evenaslateas4November1915,afterHamiltonhadbeen sacked, therewas still a plan for theNavy to try oncemore to force thefortsontheDardanellesaswellaslandingamilitaryforceintheareaoftheGulfofXeros.Birdwoodhadbeenhandpicked to lead this forcedestined forXerosandhewasextremelyunhappywiththeprospect.Hehadgoodreasonsforthis.Themainonewas that onceKitchenerhadmadeuphismind, it took a lot toshift him away from his decision. Birdwood knew that any landing at Xeroswouldfail,asheknewthecountrythereandthelocalconditions.KitchenerhadnoideaofwhatitwaslikeatXeros.Birdwoodalsoknewthatitwastoolateinthe year to launch such an offensive, as winter was already in the air andtemperatureshadplummeted.Healsoknew that therewerenot sufficientmenavailable for the attack. Birdwood had just suffered an attack of dysentery,whichwascommonacrosstheAlliedpositionsatGallipoli,andheknewthatthemenavailablewerealso just as sickashewas.Heknew that a furtherassaultagainstTurkishpositionswouldbehighlyspeculativeifnothingshortofsuicide.OnlydisasterlayaheadifanassaultonXeroswasattempted.117Kitchener arrived to inspect theANZACbattlefield on 13November 1915.

TheANZACShadbeenmoreorlessinthesamepositionfortwenty-nineweeks,havingnotadvancedmuchbeyondthepositionstheyhadgainedinthefirstfewdays of landing back in April 1915. There was no way forward except for asuicidalfrontalassaultonenemytrenches.Everybodyknewthattheonlyanswerwasevacuationbeforewintersetin.Amazingly,KitchenerwaswellreceivedbythenormallydisrespectfulAussiesandasCharlesBeannoted,theyevencheeredhim,something that theyhadneverdoneforHamilton.118Clearly theydidnotknoworcaretoknowthatbutforKitchenertheymighthaveenjoyedthefruitsofvictory;allthattheANZACscouldreallyseeinKitchenerbyNovember1915

was that he was the only chance they had of getting away from the by now,pestilentpeninsula.HamiltonwasassociatedwithallofthebadluckandfailureatGallipoli and nobody likes a loser, especially soldierswho had been at thefrontforfartoolongandforsolittlegain,butplentyofhurt.ItdidnoharmtocheerKitchenerifhewastheticketawayfromGallipoli,buttowherewasnotclearatthetimealthoughSalonikawassuspected.Twodayslater,KitchenercabledbacktotheUKthathehadbeenmistakenin

whathehadbelievedabout the terrain locallyatGallipoli.Hamiltonmayhavebeen trying to tell him since March 1915 about local conditions, but clearlyKitchenerhadnotbelievedhimormorethanlikely,simplyignoredhimasthetruth was inconvenient for him and for Whitehall, let alone Parliament.Kitchener appeared to have been amazed by what he saw and indeed said toBirdwood, ‘ThankGod,Birdie, I came to see this formyself.Youwere quiteright,Ihadnoideaofthedifficultiesyouwereupagainst.Ithinkyouhavealldone wonders.’119 He seemed to have understood for the first time that theTurkishpositions couldnot be takenby surprise and expressedhis admirationforwhathadbeenaccomplishedsofar,especiallyholdingthelittleterritorythatthe Allies had held since April. Kitchener was still holding out for anotherassaultagainstthepeninsula,butrecommendedevacuationasthemostplausibleaction. The British War Cabinet accepted his recommendation as the onlyacceptableremedyandvotedthattheMEFshouldberemovedfromtheGallipoliarea.120Kitchener’s apparent sudden realization of the situation atGallipoli isquite fantastic, ashehadbeenbriefedbyHamilton sinceMarch1915 that thelocalsituationwasnothing likeKitchenerand theWOdreamt that itwas like.As winter approached Gallipoli, it suddenly became politically convenient toKitchener, the WO and the British War Cabinet to recommend and vote forevacuation and to let Hamilton take the blame for all of the mistakes of theproceeding sinceApril 1915.Hewas their fall guy.Hamilton’s nephewnotedthat after the failure of the Dardanelles Campaign, Hamilton served as thescapegoat for the entire expedition for the following four or five years. Thepoliticiansdidnotwant thepublic toknow the reasonswhy theoffensivehadfailed. The military-political establishment refused to vindicate Hamiltonpublicly and suppressed the evidence of the Dardanelles as well as providing‘slipperyanswers’toallofthosetryingtodefendhim.121OfcoursetheinquirywasallaboutclearingKitchenerandtheBritishWarCabinetofincompetence;ithad very little to do with finding the truth. And as we have seen, HamiltontrustedKitchenerrathertoomuch.

EquallyAsquith,evenifhewassubjecttocensorshipbyKitcheneraswellasinterpreting information sent tohimbyHamilton, couldnot claim thathewasignorant of the predicament faced by Hamilton and the MEF as winterapproached.HamiltontoldAsquiththatifhisArmywasuptostrengthitcoulddefeattheTurksashehaddetectedthatTurkishmoralewasgone,butsomanyof his Army were sick with diarrhoea and dysentery. As Hamilton observed,thesemaladiesdidnotkillhismen,butonce they left theFrontatGallipoli itwas months before they returned and sometimes they were never seen again.Hamilton had long considered that thiswas the fault ofmedical staffwho heconsidered to be soft hearted, and hisCorpsCommanders shared this feeling.GeneralBirdwoodhadevenconsideredsendingoneofhisownmedicalofficersfrom ANZAC to the hospitals in Egypt to see the situation for himself, butGeneralMaxwell, themilitarycommander thereconsidered that itwouldhavebeenaninfringementonhisauthority.Theideaofinspectingthehospitalswasdropped. This did absolutely nothing to address the manpower problems atGallipoli. Hamilton clearly toldAsquith that theMEFwas 60,000men understrengthandthateventhoughDivisionswerespokenofatGallipoli,therealitywasthattheDivisions,owingtothelossofmenthroughsicknessaswellasthecasualties of the fighting,were in fact ofBrigade size; quite a different thing.HamiltonmaintainedthatgivensufficientnumbersofmenhecouldstillwinatGallipoli. A victory there could change the tide of the war, as he remainedconvincedthattheGermanscouldnotbebrokenontheWesternFront.122Thiswas something that neither Asquith or anybody atWhitehall wanted to hear;demandsformoremenwiththesuggestionthattheyweredeliberatelydenyingtheMEFastheFrontinFrancewasthemostimportantifnottheonlyoneworthconsidering. Gallipoli was by the end of September 1915 merely a failedsideshow. The maintenance of full Divisions with reserves to immediatelyreplace casualties and the sick was an aspiration which Hamilton desiredthroughouttheGallipolicampaign.Hewasdeniedthisfromtheverybeginningowing to the ill-judged importance of the Western Front. Hamilton, inconversationwithhisChiefofMedicalStaff,askedwhyitseemedthatthemenwhowerefightingatGallipolipressedtoreturntotheFrontafterbeingsickorwoundedwhile those of theWesternFront tended to try to avoid returning toFrance.Thegooddoctor replied that inFrance themenfelt that ‘theywereupagainst a stonewall that couldnot be forcedby flesh andbloodwhereas here(Gallipoli)theyfeltthattheyhadatleastasportingchance’.Hamiltonwasnotcertainifthisassertionwascorrect,butconsideredittohavebeenaninteresting

analysis of the situation at Gallipoli.123 Hamilton was correct to doubt themedic’sdescriptionof thefightingatGallipoli;earlierHamiltonhadexpressedhis horror at the bloodshed and casualties when frontal assaults had beenattempted but there was probably something in what the doctor had said, asmuch of the time the ordinary soldiers said that if there were more or betterweaponsandenoughmen, then theTurkscouldbedefeatedon theirownsoil.There never seemed to be any real despair atGallipoli; everybody tried to dotheirbestunder themost testingofcircumstances.Later,Hamiltonreceivedaninteresting communiqué fromMaxwellwhich reported the contents of a letterfromGeneralCallwell,whoclaimedthatiftheoffensiveinFranceissuccessful,everymanavailablewastobepushedouttotheWesternFronttofollowuponthatsuccess.However,iftheoffensiveontheWesternFrontwasunsuccessful,thenbothBritainandFrancewill turn theirattention toGallipoliandSalonikaand try tomake themsuccesses.Thecommuniqué reflected that itwasknownthattheAlliedpositionintheEasternMediterraneanwasweakanddesperatelyneeded re-supplying with everything. Overall, Maxwell considered that therewasanundisguisedairoffailureatGallipoliandintheBalkansingeneral.124ItwaslackofdecisionanddirectionfromthetopwhichnodoubtfrayedthenervesofHamilton,Maxwell and theirCommanders.Once thedecisionwasmade toevacuatethepeninsula,evenifsomehadseverereservationsaboutdoingso,formost itmust have been a great relief as finally the fate of theMEFhad beendecided. For many, the order to evacuate must have been disappointing, butfinallysomedirectionregardingthefutureoftheexpeditionhadbeenmade.TheonlythingthatreallywentwellfrombeginningtoendatGallipoliwasits

evacuation by the Allies. Hamilton claimed that the ‘general opinion in theTurkish Army was that the English got off Gallipoli Peninsula without lossbecausetheTurksneverimaginedthattheBritishwouldgo’.125Evenbeforetheofficial order came for evacuation, troopswere beingmoved away from theirpositionsasHamiltonremarkedtoMaxwellduringearlyOctober1915that10thDivision(Irish)andtheFrenchDivisionhad‘gotaway’andthattheTurkscouldnothaveknownanythingaboutthismoveorelsetheywouldhaveopenedfire.However,hedidconsiderthattheTurksmighthaveknownthatsomethingwasup as Turkish aircraft dropped proclamations one morning amongst ‘nativetroops’ i.e. colonial troops, stating that they had been deserted by the whitetroopsandwerefoolstostayastheirthroatswouldbecutforthesakeof‘whiteslave-drivers’. The assumption was that the Turks had spies behind Alliedlines.126InalettertoLordStamfordham,thePrivateSecretarytoKingGeorge

V, it became clear that these two divisions were being removed for rest andrelaxation.Of the Irish troops,Hamilton displayed all of the prejudices of theEnglishagainstthem.Heremarkedthattheycouldnotreallymanagewithoutadrink or awoman for long and in a somewhat bewildering statement claimedthat‘moreover,theyarethemostdisreputablecrowdyoucanpossiblyimagine.Somehowtheyseemtowearouttheirclothesfasterthanothertroops,andtheyareinragsandburntquiteblackbythesun.’AccordingtoHamilton,oncenewuniformsandequipmentwereprovided,aslongastheseIrishtroopswerekeptawayfromdrinktheylookedquitesmart.127Hamiltonprobablymeantnoharminhisobservations,butnodoubttheIrishwouldhaveresentedthemiftheyhadgottohearofthem.ItwasonlysixmonthslaterthatIrishrepublicansroseupinDublin against British rule. Irish resentment of the English was alwayssimmering away. In Egypt, away from the distractions of the Irish question,MaxwellwasacutelyawareofthedangerofdisaffectedMoslems,evenifmuchofthetimeheexaggeratedtheprobleminEgypt,butstillhewrotetoHamiltonthatinEgyptthereweretwelvemillionMoslems,‘themajorityofwhomdonotlove us’.128 However, the episode in which the Irish and French managed toleavetheFrontsecretlyandquietlywasevidencethatperhapsafullevacuationofthepeninsulawithoutalertingtheenemytotheAllies’intentionwaspossible.AsiftheAlliesneededanyencouragementtoevacuatethepeninsula,Mother

NatureaddedtotheargumentforleavingassheventedherfullwinterfuryuponGallipoli. Storms blew in as if from nowhere, destroying as much as waspossibleaswellasdisinterringhumanandanimalremainslightlyburiedinthesand.Despiteflooding,theANZACSbegantosufferfromalackoffreshwater,while the food supplywaswretched as it became evenworse.Men could notrememberwhen they last had fresh bread ormeat; their diet was virtually anunrelenting issue of tinned foods. As the wild storms continued, the ANZACpositionbecameacrossbetweenanopensewerandamorgue,asdecomposedbodieswereunearthedbytheunrelentingweather.129Plansfortheevacuationwerebeingputintoplacewithaconferenceofsenior

commandersatGallipolibeingheldon22November1915.Thesoldiers tobeevacuatedknewnothingoftheplansuntilthelastmoment.Unlikethebeginningof theGallipoli campaign the evacuation planswere kept secret, no doubt theAllies had learnt their lessons about the Turkish spy network and finallyunderstood that interpreters and so on could not be trusted.Even if theywereGreek, normally sworn enemies of theTurk, somany had passed informationback toConstantinople. The conclusions of the conferencewere not happy as

some Commanders predicted a fifty per cent casualty rate for those beingevacuatedandthelossofaboutsixty-sixpercentofAlliedguns.GeneralWhitewaschargedwithplanningtheevacuationandhehadcomeupwithaningeniousplan;the‘SilentRuse.’130The Silent Ruse called for a series of ‘silent stunts’ which accustomed the

TurkstoobservingtheAlliedfrontlines,notfiringforlongerandlongerperiodseachday,evento thepointofnotreturningfirewhenattacked.Theperiodsofsilencewere extendeddaily.This allowed theAllies toquietlywithdraw fromtheirlineswhilemaintainingskeletonstaffattheFront.131Thefirstofthesilentstuntsbeganon24November1915whenGeneralWhiteorderedallartilleryandinfantryfiretoceasefortwodaysunlesstheTurkslaunchedamajoroffensive.As the enemy became accustomed to the lack of activity in the Allied lines,Whitebegantothinouthislinesastheevacuationwasprepared.Itseemedthateventhetroopsinvolvedintheevacuationwerefooledintotherealintentionsofthe silent periods.Someeven thought theTurkswerebeing lulled into a falsesense of security and that theywould attack only to find that theAllieswerewaitingforthemandcounterattack.132Once again the weather at Gallipoli took a lively interest in the events of

mankind there and a huge gale developedwhich turned into a cyclone beforetransformingintoablizzard. It took threedaysfor theweather tofinish toyingwiththeunfortunatesoldiersonthepeninsula.Their lineswerewrecked.Oncemore the trencheswere floodedwith allmanner of filth and therewas fear ofdisease.ThefallingsnowmayhaveamusedandamazedsomeoftheANZACsasitwasthefirsttimethattheyhadseensuchanaturalphenomenoncommoninthenorthernhemisphere,butrareinmuchofAustralia.However,itchilledandfroze them to the bone. Quickly the fascination wore off. The AustralianjournalistCharlesBeanwasdisgustedbythenaturaldisasterofthestormasherealized justhowunprepared theMEFwasforawintercampaign.Beanwrotethatwithoutpiersandlandingstagesthetroopscouldnotbesuppliedandevenwondered,ifitcametoanevacuation,justhowweremenexpectedtobetakenoffthebeachesbyboat,astheseawasnowveryroughandconditionsextremelycold.Bean thought thatAllied troopsatGallipoliwereworseoff than those inEuropebecauseonce theygotwet theycouldnotgetdry again. InFrance thetroops,intheestimationofBean,werenevermorethanfourdaysfromawarmbath and a dry house as they were rotated through their turns serving on theWesternFront.AtGallipoli,menhadlearnttosurvivewiththebareminimum,butBeanwondered how theywere to live through the comingwintermonths

which had so brutally introduced themselves to the Aussies so used to moresunnierclimes.133During December 1915, the Gallipoli peninsula was quietly evacuated;

literally, silence was its main strength and the operation was successfullycompleted in three parts. In the first stage, troops, animals andmunitions notnecessary for maintaining the bridgeheads were evacuated, then the garrisonswerewithdrawntoabareminimumandthenfinally theremainingtroopsovertheweekendof18–19December1915,with thehope that theentireoperationwillhavebeencompletedbythemorningof20December1915.However, thesecret nature of the evacuation and the implementation of ‘Silent Ruse’ wasgratingonthenervesofAlliedsoldierswhodidnotknowwhatwashappening,but merely saw that the Turks appeared to be shelling Allied positions withimpunity as there was no retaliation. A Turkish bombardment using 12-inchshellsagainstLonePinekilled100officersandmenandwoundedafurther200.Frostbitewasalsoplaying itspart in theAlliedmisery in the finaldaysof thecampaign. Men, in their ignorance of ‘Silent Ruse’ were bitter at such largelossesof life, includingCaptainBillKnoxwhocomplained that ‘It is rotten tojusthavetotakeitallanddonothinginretaliationaswearegettingprettyhottedup lately by the Turks aggressive measures, but our tactics are defensive notoffensive; they have bombed us heavily for days and blown up ourcommunications tunnels with huge shells and pretty heavy losses.’134 Giventhesetwoexamplesitwasnotsurprisingthatmennotintheknowbecamebitteratwhattheysawaspacificationinthefaceofextremelynakedaggressionbytheenemy. Bill Knox was furthered angered by what can only be seen as thestupidity of certain British officers, who on a Sunday seemed to have beenhangingaroundANZAClines.Knoxobservedthatwaterandfreshfoodorfoodingeneralwasbeingsuppliedintermittently,whichcausedhisfellowAussiestomoan or ‘growl’ but what really angered themwas the sight of these Britishofficersdressed immaculately in their ‘Sundaybest’uniforms,washed, freshlyshavedandasking‘sillydamnedquestions’.Knox,playfully,begantoconvincehimself that he was beginning to turn socialist. An earlier incident had alsocauseddismayamongsttheANZACsandthepolicyofnoretaliation,ofwhichtheywere ignorantof the reasons,whenTurkish shellshit ahospital, the16thC.C. and blew it to bits along with sick and wounded men. Private Lennierecordedthattherewere‘Legsandarmsallovertheplace.’135Likeeverythingelse at Gallipoli, the Allies were paying in blood, even as they began theevacuationplan.

Finally,aftera lotofpoliticalwrangling, theevacuationbecameofficialandon8December1915theevacuationbeganinearnest.Evenso,thetrueintentionwasyettobedisclosedasitwasgivenoutthatofficersandmenembarkingfromGallipoli were merely going to nearby islands and would be returned to thepeninsulasometimeinthefuture.AsintheearlydaysoftheGallipolicampaign,theTurks had reinforced their positions at night, so theAllieswithdrew fromtheirsnocturnally.Therusewasverysuccessful,asnotonlywereself-firingrifleandlongfuseslefttofireandexplode,whichservedtoconvincethattheAlliedtrencheswerestillfullymanned,butalsothestealthoftheretreatingtroopsgavethe Turks no reason to believe that the Allies were withdrawing. Indeed theTurkswere so unaware of thewithdrawal that they still dropped leaflets overAllied positions urging them to surrender, promising themparadise in Persiangardensand soon.Turkish troopswere still surrendering to theAllies as theycouldnotstandthecoldandeverpresentdanger.ItalladdedtothemixedandconfusedpictureastheGallipolicampaigndrewtoanend.SoconfusedwasthesituationatGallipolithatwhenPrivateLenniereceivedorderstopackupandbereadytomovewithintwenty-fourhours,hethought,despitetheevacuationorderbeingofficial,thathewasonlygoingawayforafortnight’sleaveandrest.TheCommandersatGallipoliwerenottoldofficiallyoftherealevacuationuntil12December1915; this includedColonelJohnMonashwhohad ledhis troopsatBrigade level at various points of the campaign, but was not consulted aboutevacuationuntilalmosttheend.CharlesBeandidnotfindoutuntil14December1915, fourdaysbefore the final evacuation.Officersof the rankofMajor andbelowweremoreorlesslefttoworkoutwhatwasreallygoingonastheyslowlyinturnandbydesign,madetheirwaybacktothebeacheswheretheyhadlandedweeks,ifnotmonthsearlier,butnevertoadvancefurtherfrom,despitethehugelossoflifeasaresultoftheireffortsinlateSpringormid-Summer1915.Itallseemedtohavebeeninvainastheywereleaving,havingaccomplishednothing.Onthefinaldayofevacuation,Birdwoodtriedtoliftthespiritsofhismenas

hesaidthatnobodyshouldfeeldisheartenedastheyallknewthattheyhadnotbeenbeatenandfurthermorehadprevented‘theGermansusingthebestfightingtroops of the Turkish Army elsewhere’.136 Birdwood was not wrong in thisassertion,butitwasveryhardformenwhohadfoughtatGallipolitoleavetheirdeadcomradesonthepeninsulawithoutanyapparentvictory.Thedeathtollhadbeen quite appalling. In total one million men had fought at Gallipoli on allsides. The British lost 21, 255 dead; the French 10,000 dead; the Australians8,709 dead; theNewZealanders 2,701 dead and theTurks, 86,692 dead.137 It

hadbeenappallingcarnage.Even before the peninsula had been evacuated, as we have seen the

recriminations had begun. General Sir Ian Hamilton’s reputation had alreadybeenquestionedandbesmirched.In1916thepost-mortemoftheentireventureon the EasternMediterranean began and it was not pretty as the BritishWarCabinetwasdeterminedtoabsolveitselfofallblameofthefailingsattachedtotheDardanellesadventure.TheMEFhadbeensentouttotheDardanellesalmostinasenseofspeculationofwhatmighthappen ifoneattacked theTurk inhisownbackyard.TheAllies soon found out he fought like a tiger andwaswellequipped to do so. In contrast to the original despatch of theMEF out to theMediterranean, more thought went into the closing of the campaign and thebrilliantwayinwhichtheMEFwasbroughtoffthepeninsulaandtothesafetyofthenearbyislandswithlittleifanycasualties.Itwasastrokeofgenius,whiletheweatheralsowascharitablecomparedwiththefewdaysearlierwhengaleshad howled and blizzards raged. Twenty-five years later in 1940, a similarevacuation had to be carried out in the full sight of the enemywhen anotherBritish Expeditionary Force had to be evacuated from a foreign shore atDunkirk.Concerning the end of Hamilton’s career, so unfairly finished at Gallipoli.

B.H.LiddellHartwrote‘Whateverthejudgementonhimasacommander,hisright to be remembered as one of the most clear-sighted military prophets iscertain… To him in personality, as in appearance might well be appliedGallieni’sfavouritephrase,‘Headhighhefacedtheworld.’138AndthatishowHamilton should be remembered; as a young man he faced death on thebattlefield.Hewasaverybravemanand twice recommended for theVictoriaCross,butcircumstancesconspiredagainsthim.Between1915and1918,oncemore circumstances conspired against him. As Kitchener complimentedBirdwood on the good work done at Gallipoli in the most dreadful ofcircumstances,thensurelyhealsomeantHamiltonhadperformedsterlingwork;buthecouldnot,ashewasoneoftheconspiratorswhohadcausedHamilton’sillegitimate downfall and had known since March 1915 of the reality at theDardanelles. For his part, Hamilton never seemed possessed by the need torehabilitate himself but to pursue the truth, and was more often than notdismayed. He was never furious with unfair accusations made against someCommanders at Gallipoli. He tried to be loyal to his superiors, namelyKitchener,butthiswasdifficultasKitchenerwasverysecretiveandcapableofgreat deceit. At times it seemed that Kitchener was slightly insane. It was

Kitchenerwhodestroyed theGallipoliCampaign; he should have supported itproperly and briefed the BritishWar Cabinet statingHamilton’s requirementsandwhytheyshouldbesent.Orheshouldhaverecommendedevacuationmuchearlier,before theSulvaBayandANZACCove landingsduringAugust1915,duringtheheatofthehighTurkishsummer.Insteadheallowedthecampaigntocontinue, but left it bereft of the necessarymen and equipment.Men sufferedbecauseofthiscallousdisregardfortheirlivesandHamiltonalsosuffered.ItdidnotmatterwhetherHamiltonwasatthefront,servinginatrenchatGallipoliormilesawayononeofhisfabledyachts.ItmadenodifferencetoKitchener,whoonly submitted information to be discussed as he saw fit, and so most ofHamilton’srecommendationswereignored.PerhapsifhehadbeeninFrance,hemighthavemadethejourneybacktoWhitehall,hoursawaybytrainandboat,butat theDardanelleshewasvirtuallycutoff frominformationand influence.Hamiltonwaslefttodothebestthathecouldwithinadequatenumbersofmen,lessthanamplesuppliesandthewrongartillerypieces.Heaskedforhowitzersandreceivedfieldartillery.ThatwashowKitchenerandLondonperceivedthefightatGallipoli;itwasnotofanyrealimportancetothem;everythinghadtogoto France. Hamilton had tried to make the case that his fight at Gallipolistatisticallymadesense ifonecandiscount thehumancostofbattle.HamiltonobservedthatifhehadhadtwentypercentofthemenandarmswastedinthebattlesofLoosandChampagne,bothontheWesternFront,itwouldhavebeenenoughtohaveforcedtheDardanellesandsuccessfullyconcludetheoffensive.At worst it would have seen an advance of several miles at a time whensuccessful advances in France were measured in yards.139 However, it wasHamilton’s nemesis, Ashmead-Bartlett who was probably the most astuteconcerning what was happening in London, as by 1928 he was much morecircumspectinhisopinionsconcerningGallipoliwhenitmadenodifferenceatall. Ashmead-Bartlett observed that the distribution of British military unitsbetween 1914 and 1916 seemed to have been largely thewhim of politicians.Thiswasduetoalackofcentralcontroloftheoverallplanningandprojectionofthewarandsocommanderscouldmakeclaimsandcounterclaimsforequipmentandmennecessaryforthevariousfronts.Ashmead-Bartletttooktheopinionthat‘Everystatesmanhadhisfavouritefrontandeveryfrontitsfavouritestatesman.’He also remarked that fronts became popular and then less so. By 1928Ashmead-BartlettseemedmoresympathetictowardsHamilton,ashenotedthatEgypt was jealous of the Dardanelles and as a result maintained a vast armyagainsta‘non-existentdanger’.AfurtherobservationofAshmead-Bartlettwas

thatitwasonlyafterthedeathofKitchenerin1916thataproperGeneralStaffwascreated.140ItwasnotstrictlytruethattherewasnothreatordangertoEgyptastheTurks

had launched a number of limited attacks on the crucial sea route, the SuezCanal,avitalmaritimearteryfortheBritish,astheycouldmovetroopstoandfromIndia,themostprizedpossessionoftheBritishEmpire.ThesetroopscouldreinforceIndiaintheeventoftroublethereormovetroopsfromIndiaperhapstofighttheTurkseitheratSuezorGallipoli,oranywhereelseinthefightagainsttheTurks, as fighting also took place in Palestine,Mesopotamia (modern dayIraq) and on the Arabian peninsula, largely modern Saudi Arabia. The fightagainsttheTurkswasofcourseagainsttheentireOttomanEmpire,wherevertheTurks and Allies clashed. A further consideration was that of the EgyptianwesternfrontierandthepossibilityofanincursionbytheSenussitribeinvadingfromLibya.Overall thiswouldhavebeenaminor, if inconvenientinterruptionto the British occupation of Egypt and no doubt could have been dealt withreasonablyeasily.However,theItalianshadsufferedtwoshockdefeatsinAfricasince 1896, so therewas an element ofworry for theBritish living in Egypt.Perhapstheyhadoverlookedsomething,astheItaliansmusthave,inordertobedefeatedbynon-Europeans.Overall, itwould seem thatGeneralMaxwellwasalsoempirebuildingandwasreluctanttoallowHamiltontohavesufficientmenfor Gallipoli from the Egyptian garrison. Both men as we have seen werereluctanttohavetheirgarrisonsmannedentirelybyMoslemtroopswhilstfacingMoslem foes.Equally, theAllies feared losing atGallipoli as both theFrenchandBritishruledoverlargenumbersofMoslems.IftheTurksweretodefeattheAlliesitwasfearedthatthismightsendamessagetootherMoslemstoriseupagainst the imperial powers. Ashmead-Bartlett’s remarks concerning theestablishment of a genuineGeneral Staff after the death ofKitchener are alsoworthconsidering,becauseaswehaveseen,KitchenerrantheWOasapersonalfiefdomandsharedtheofficewithnobodyunlessheconcludedthatheneededtoshare information. It should be remembered that even his Chief of Staff wasignorantofanimpendingexpeditiontotheDardanellesuntilHamiltonwasfirstconsulted on it at Whitehall during March 1915. It is not surprising that theentire expedition ended in failure if that was the attitude of the most seniorBritishsoldier-politicianin1915.WhatisirksomeiswhyAshmead-Bartlettdidnotmakefreewith theseobservationsbetween1915and1918?Theanswerofcourse was money; he needed it and so did the London Press, which wassufferingacontractioninitsincomefromadvertisingsincetheoutbreakofwar

inAugust1915.MoneywassomethingthatHamiltondidnotunderstandashehadplentyofit;eventhefuturegreatWinstonChurchillsufferedfromalackofmoney;hewasnotpoor,buthecouldbefinanciallyembarrassedcomparedwithhis contemporaries. Money, that great division in society, was probably thereasonwhytherichbutniceHamiltoncouldneverrelatetothosewhowerenotso fortunate, and so lived their lives in the pursuit of filthy lucre. That wasprobablywhyHamiltoncouldnotperceivethemasgentlemen.Laterinthewar,Hamilton could not really acceptmenwhowere in trade and held temporarycommissions–theywerenotgentlemenandthereforenotrealofficers.HewasforeverstuckinthewealthytwilightoflateVictorianandEdwardianBritain.Hewasamanoutofstepwithmodernitynomatterhownicehewas,andthatwasafailing.Hamiltonneverretrievedhispreviousinfluenceasamilitarycommander,but

he was overdue for retirement anyway. However, a successful campaign nodoubt would have seen him elevated to the House of Lords as an Earl ofsomewhere,probablyinScotland,withasubstantialfinancialreward.Onevery11November,theBritishwouldhaverememberedhimforhisgreattriumphandforshorteningthewar,butinsteadthisdidnothappenaswehaveseen.Insteadhe was betrayed, vilified unjustly and left to fend for himself. Unbowed, hecontinuedtakingagreatinterestinmanythingsincludinghisoldregiment,theGordonHighlanders.Bythetimehediedin1947aged94,hehadseenanotherworldwar,oncemoreduetoGermanaggression.Healsolivedtoseetheonlyuse to date of nuclear weapons when the Americans destroyed the JapanesecitiesofHiroshimaandNagasakiusingatomicbombs.Hamiltonlivedalonglifeandsawwarmovefromtheuseofthecannonandmusketreinforcedbycavalrychargestothatofthebeginningoftheuseofmissilesagainstciviliantargets;theGermanuseof theV1andV2rocketsaswellas theadventofnuclearwar. Itwasnotwarashehadunderstoodit,butthenhewasoutmodedby1915whenasoldier could be outmanoeuvred by politicians, journalists and uninformedpopular opinion. Hamilton was a goodman, but never destined to be a greatman.Thatishislegacy–goodbutnevergreat.

Notes

Chapter1 1. ‘CivilMilitaryRelations in a PeriodwithoutMajorWars, 1855–1885’, Edgar Feuchtwanger and

William J. Philpot inGovernment and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856–1990, (ed) Paul Smith,London,TheHambledonPress,1996,pp.1–9.

2.EdwardM.Spiers,TheLateVictorianArmy,1868–1902,Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,1992,p.9.

3.Ibid.p.18.4.IanKnight,ZuluRising:TheEpicStoryofIsandlwanaandRorke’sDrift,London,Pan,2012,p.156.5.IanB.M.Hamilton,TheHappyWarrior:ALifeofGeneralSirIanHamilton,London,Cassell,1966,

p.17.ThisworkhereafterwillbereferredtoasHappyWarrior.6.Ibid.7.Ibid.p.19.8.Ibid.9.Ibid.10.Ibid.p.5.11.Ibid,pp.24–25.12.Ibid.p.25.13.TheTimes,8August1879.14.HappyWarrior,pp.37–40.15.Ibid.p.41.TheTimes,7February1881.16.HappyWarrior,p.41.17.TheTimes,28February1881,1March1881,7March1881,19March1881. 18. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, (LHCMA) The Hamilton

Collection,Hamilton8/1/11,Birdwood.19.HappyWarrior,pp.45–46.20.Ibid.pp.44–46.21.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/4,LetterstoLadyHamilton,HamiltontoLadyHamilton,13July1915.22.GeneralSirIanHamilton,CompulsoryService.AStudyoftheQuestionintheLightofExperience,

2ndEdition,London,JohnMurray,1911,pp.11–13.23.Ibid.p.106.24.ChrisBellamy,TheGurkhas:SpecialForce,London,JohnMurray,2011,pp.326–327.25.Hamilton,CompulsoryService,pp.146–147.26.HappyWarrior,p.52.27.Ibid.28.Ibid.pp.110,121.29.Ibid.p.123.30.Ibid.p.127.31.Ibid.pp.130–131.ThomasPakenham,TheBoerWar,London,Abacus,2004,pp.134–135.32.HappyWarrior,pp.131–133;Pakenham,pp.134–139.33.HappyWarrior,p.179.34.Pakenham,pp.274–275.35.HappyWarrior,p.135.36.Pakenham,p.536.37.Ibid.pp.560–563.38.EdwardM.Spiers,Haldane:AnArmyReformer.Edinburgh,EdinburghUniversityPress,1980,pp.

116–117.39.HappyWarrior,pp.194–195. 40. GeneralSir IanHamilton,AStaffOfficer’sScrap-BookDuring theRusso-JapaneseWar,London,

EdwardArnold,1912,pp.11,18,229,317.41.Ibid.p.72.42.Ibid.p.73.43.Ibid.p.86.44.SirIanHamilton,TheSoulandBodyofanArmy,Aldershot,GreggRevivals,1991,p.120.

Chapter2 1. TheNational Archives, Kew, London, CAB 42/1,War Committee, Subjects for Discussion and

Conclusions,August51914toOctober301915,CAB42/1/8,CommitteeofImperialDefence.TheWar.SuggestionsastotheMilitaryPosition.MemorandumbyDavidLloydGeorge,ChancelloroftheExchequer,1January1915.

2.TheTimes,5August1914.3.Ibid,13August1914;15August1915.4.Ibid,17July1914.5.Ibid,22October1914.6.Ibid,31October1914. 7. LimonVonSanders,FiveYears inTurkey,London,Baillière,Tindall&Cox,1927,pp.8–9.Von

SandersconfirmedthattheGermanpresenceinTurkeybytheoutbreakofwarhadrisenfromforty-twotoseventymembersof theGermanarmedservicesandbytheendof thewarhadrisento800.Ibid,p.20.

8.Ibid.p.25.9.TheTimes,4November1914.10.HappyWarrior,p.271.11.TheTimes,16December1914;19December1914.12.EdwardDelage,TheTragedyoftheDardanelles,London,JohnLane,1932,p.24.13.TNA,CAB37/128/13,DardanellesOperations,May1915,WinstonChurchill,IntroductoryNote.14.TNA,CAB42/1/26,Secretary’sNotesofaMeetingoftheWarCabinet,28January1915. 15. TNA,CAB42/1/32,Committeeof ImperialDefence,TheWar,TheDardanelles,Letter fromMr.

JulianCorbetttoColonelHankey,5February1915. 16. Dan Van Der Vat, The Dardanelles Disaster. Winston Churchill’s Greatest Failure, New York,

DuckworthOverlook,2009,p.88.17.DailyExpress,2January1915.18.Ibid.4January1915.19.VonSanders,p.53.20.DailyExpress,28January1915,4February1915,5February1915,6February1915and9February

1915.21.TNA,CAB42/1/36,WarCabinetMeeting,19February1915.22.DailyExpress,22February1915;24February1915.23.TNA,CAB42/1/42,MeetingofWarCabinet,TheDardanellesandMesopotamia,24February1915.24.Ibid. 25. Liddle Collection, 1914–1918, (LC) Leeds Special Collections, Brotherton Library,University of

Leeds,AIR50,Bromet,G.R.26.LC,AIR310,Taylor,JGT,RNVRRNAS/RAF,Lt.Surgeon,RN,Typescript.27.LC,RN/RM,RecollectionsE.Evans,May1974.28.LC,RNRM/Braham/1,Journal.29.LC,GALL/RN120EnglandHughT,LetterfromLieutenant-CommanderT.H.EnglandtoLieutenant

theHonourableP.G.E.C.Achison,HMSInflexible,9September1915.30.TNA,CAB42/1/42,MeetingofWarCabinet,TheDardanellesandMesopotamia,24January1915.31.HappyWarrior,p.271. 32. TNA, CAB 42/1/44, Committee of Imperial Defence – TheWar – The Dardanelles and Balkan

Operations.MemorandumbyMr.A.J.Balfour,24February1915.

33. Ashley Jackson,TheBritishEmpireand theSecondWorldWar,London,HambledonContinuum,2006,p.28.

34.LC,ANZAC(AUST)BirdwoodW.R.LettertoJ.E.Pearson,24January1915.35.PeterHart,Gallipoli,London,Profile,2013,p.49.36.LC,GS0858,Jerram,C.F.,Lt.Col.TheLifeofLieut.ColonelCharlesFrederickJerram,CMG,DSO,

Typescript,p.66. 37. ColonelMichaelHickey (Rtd) ‘Gallipoli:TheConstantinopleExpeditionaryForce,April1915’ in

AmphibiousAssault:ManoeuvrefromtheSea,TristanLovering(Ed)Woodbridge,Suffolk,Seafarer,2007,pp.7–22.

38.VonSanders,p.47. 39. CecilAspinall-Oglander,RogerKeyes.Being theBiographyofAdmiralof theFleetLordKeyesof

ZeebruggeandDover,London,TheHogarthPress,1951,pp.125–127.40.Ibid.pp.122–123.41.RoyJenkins,Churchill,London,Macmillan,2001,pp.254–276.42.Hickey,pp.21–22. 43. LC,RN/MN,BinneyTH,RN/MN/Binney/6,TheDiaryofHMSQueenElizabeth,January toMay

1915,PrivateCirculationtoOfficersandMen,PermissionofAdmiralty,1919.44.LC,RNMNBuchananAG,Item1,JournalofuseofMidshipmen,HMSPrinceGeorge,entrydate,13

March1915.45.LC,RN/MN/Binney/6.46.LC,RNMN/Binney/17–Dardanelles,R.H.Williams,‘ExtractfromUSWarCollegeReports:Turkey,

BombardmentoftheDardanelles’:13April1915.47.LC,AIR50,Bromet,GR.48.LC,GALL121/1-14V.Froggit.Froggitiswronginrecording17March1915;itwas18March1915.49.LC,GALL122/1,A.Graham.50.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/3,D’Amade,HamiltonnotestoD’Amade,2February1917. 51. LordKitchenerandWinstonChurchill.TheDardanellesCommission,Part1,1914–1915,London,

HMSO,AbridgedVersion,firstpublished1917,pp.142–153.52.Ibid.53.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/11,Notes:ConferenceonMarch171915onboardHMSQueenElizabethat

Tenedos.54.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/8,DeRobeck,NavalSignals,CopyofTelegramfromVAEMS(ViceAdmiral

EasternMediterraneanShips)toSNO(SeniorNavalOfficer)Mudros,18March1915.55.LC,GALL117/7D.J.Claris.56.LC,RNMNBerthonE.L.,Box1,Item3,PrivateDiaryoftheWar,VolumeIII,Friday19February

1915–Thursday22April1915.57.LordKitchenerandWinstonChurchill,pp.142–153.58.LC,AIR293,SmithC.M.,RNAS/RAF.59.LC,GALL153/1,Capt.M.ParkerBuchanan.

Chapter3 1. GeneralSirIanHamilton,GallipoliDiary,Volume1,Gloucester,DodoPress,2009,p.2.Hereafter

knownasDiary1.2.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/3,InstructionsforGOCMEF,Dardanelles,12March1915.3.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/15Callwell,CallwelltoHamilton,25May1917.4.Ibid.5.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/6Churchill,HamiltontoChurchill,13July1916.6.Diary1,pp.1–2.7.Ibid.p.3.8.Ibid.9.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/7.10.Diary1,p.5.11.MarkUrban,Generals:TenBritishCommandersWhoShapedtheWorld,London,FaberandFaber,

2006,p.209.12.Diary1,p.5.13.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/1,LetterstoWinstonChurchill,HamiltontoChurchill,10March1915.14.Ibid,HamiltontoChurchill,12March1915. 15. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/4/2,Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913, London,

HMSO,1913.16.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,18March1915.17.LC,TurksTU01,PeterLiddleinterviewwithGeneralOlanBeri(retired),TurkishArmy,July1972.18.Ibid.19.Diary1,p.5.20.Ibid,pp.9–13.21.Ibid.p.17.22.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,TheDardanelles–TelegramsRegardingtheMilitaryOperations,Hamilton

toKitchener,18March1915.23.Diary1,pp.16–17.24.Hart,p.188.25.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,30March1915.26.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,27March1915.27.Ibid,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,7April1915.28.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/13,HamiltontoMarsh,3April1915.29.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/14,AnAppreciation–manuscript–C.F.Aspinall,23March1915.30.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/15,AppreciationoftheSituationintheDardanellesaccordingtoinformation

receivedupto25March1915,thedateofleavingMalta–Major-GeneralHunter-Weston.31.LC,RN/MN,Binney.32.LHCMA,Hamilton7/5/1ForceOrderNo.1.13April1915.33.LHCMA,Hamilton7/5/5ForceOrderNo.4.22April1915.34.TheTimes,8April1915.35.LC,RNMN/Bampton/1,JournalEntry,27April1915.36.TNA,CAB17/184,DardanellesCommission,1916–17,LordKitchenertoSirIanHamilton,drafted

atCabinet,23March1915.37.KevinFewster,ATurkishViewofGallipoli:Çanakkale,Victoria,Australia,Hohja,1987,p.52.38.LH,RNMN,Falconer,J.,Diaryfrom17March1915ofHMSTalbotbyJ.Falconer,5Mess.

39.Diary1,entriesfor21and22April1915,p.84.40.GeorgeCassar,Kitchener’sWar:BritishStrategyfrom1914–1916,WashingtonDC,Brassey’s,2004,

p.268.41.TheDardanellesCommissionPart1,pp.142–153.

Chapter41.Hart,p.vii.2.CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,London,Penguin,1982,p.402.3.Hart,pp.46–47.4.Ibid.p.63.5.HarveyBroadbent,Gallipoli:TheFatalShore,Sydney,PenguinGroup(Australia),2009,pp.34–35.6.Diary1,pp.89–90.7.LC,RNMNHaywardR.J.,PeterLiddleinterviewwithCommanderJackHayward,July1977.8.LC,Gall117/1,D.J.Claris.9.LC,RNMNBerthon,E.L.Diary4,23April1915–16July1915.10.LC,RN/MN,Binney,T.H.11.LC,AIR50,Bromet,G.R.12.DavidW.Cameron,25April1915:TheDaytheANZACLegendwasBorn,NewSouthWales,Allen

&Unwin,2007,p.72.13.LC,AIR310,Taylor,J.G.T.RNVRRNAS/RAF. 14. LC,AIR321,TraillT.C.RN/RFC/RAF,AirViceMarshallT.Traill, interviewedbyPeterLiddle,

September1972.15.LC,RNMNTate,H.,April1974,Tape214,transcript.16.LC,AIR310,TaylorJ.G.T.17.LC,Gall126/1-2,K.S.Muskett.18.Ibid.19.LC,RNMN/CobbAHK/1.20.LC,RNMNGodfreyJ.H.(Admiral)TheMemoirsofAdmiralJHGodfrey,DardanellesCommentary

andAegeanDiaryEgypt&EastIndies,MediterraneanandBlackSea,Vol.II,1915–1919,Hailsham,EverybodiesSecretaryService,Typed,DuplicatedandBound,1964,pp.1–18.(Selfpublished).

21.Broadbent,p.87.22.Ibid.p.207.23.Ashmead-Bartlett,E.TheUncensoredDardanelles,London,Hutchinson&Co,1928,p.163.24.Lee,John,GeneralSirIanHamilton1853–1947.ASoldier’sLife,Oxford,Macmillan,2000,p.222.25.King,Jonathan,GallipoliDiaries.TheAnzacs’OwnStoryDaybyDay,Sydney,Simon&Schuster

(Australia),2008,13July1915&20July1915,pp.137&142.26.RobinPrior,Gallipoli:TheEndofaMyth,London,Yale,2009,p.139.27.LC,RNMNGodfreyJ.H.(Admiral)TheMemoirsofAdmiralJHGodfrey.pp.1–18.28.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/4,LetterstoLadyHamilton,Hamilton7/1/4,HamiltontoLadyHamilton,3

May1915.29.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/4,HamiltontoLadyHamilton,9May1915.30.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,30April1915.31.Ibid.FornotesonSariBairseeHart,Gallipoli,p.67andindex.32.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,30April1915.33.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,5May1915.34.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,21May1915.35.LHCMA,Hamilton7/5/11,ForceOrderno.11,13May1915.36.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,7May1915.37.TNA,WO159/13DespatchestoLordKitchenerfromCommandingGenerals,HamiltontoKitchener,

3May1915.

38.Ibid.HamiltontoKitchener,17May1915.39.Diary1,25April1915,pp.90–94.40.Laffin,Jonathan,BritishButchersandBunglersofWorldWarOne,Stroud,Gloucestershire,Budding,

1997,pp.43–44.41.Ibid.p.95.SeealsoforareconstructionofthelandingatVbeach:‘LandingatVBeach’24/4/2012.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKuEC2FCo76caccessed19April2013.42.Aspinall-Oglander,C.F.,MilitaryOperations:Gallipoli.Volume1,InceptionoftheCampaignuntil

May1915,London,WilliamHeinemann,1929,p.218.43.Ibid.p.221. 44. FieldMarshalLordBirdwood,Khaki andGown:AnAutobiography, London,Ward,Lock&Co,

1941,pp.265–266.45.Ibid.46.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,20May1915.47.LC,RNMN,Berthon,E.L.Diary4,23April1915–16July1915,diaryentry,19May1915.48.LC,RNMN,AIR50Bromet,G.R.Journalentry,21May1915. 49. Aspinall-Oglander, C.F.,MilitaryOperations: Gallipoli. Volume 2,May 1915 to the Evacuation,

London,WilliamHeinemann,1932,pp.20–22. 50. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,Letters toFieldMarshalLordMethuen,GovernorandCommander–in-

Chief,Malta,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,24May1915.51.LC,Bromet,Journalentry,27May1915.52.LC,RNMN/Braham/1,Journalentry,24May1915.53.LC,RNMN/COBB,AHK/1,Journalentries,21May1915;22May1915;24May1915.54.GallipoliDiaries,20–24May1915,pp.79–85.55.LC,TurksTU01,CaptainA.OzgenwithPeterLiddle,July1972.56.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,7June1915.57.Ibid. 58. Ibid. See also Broadbent, p. 196 which gives detail of a very young infantry officer, Second

LieutenantDallasMoor,3rdReserveBattalionHampshireRegiment,whoattheageofeighteenyearsafterfivedaysof‘incessantbattle’wasby6June1915theonlyofficerleftaliveatFirTreeWood.At03:00theTurkscounterattackedtheBritishpositionwhichwasbeingheldoffbutwas indangerofcollapsing.Moor leapt fromhis trenchand racedacrossopen landwithhis revolver inhishand toconfrontBritishsoldiersabouttoretreat.Itisrecordedthat‘hewasforcedtoshootseveral’ofthemenandthenheledtheremainderfromthereandrecapturedatrenchpreviouslylosttotheTurks.MoorwasawardedtheVictoriaCrossforbraveryandresourcefulness.EvensoahighlyquestionableactionandonethatHamiltonmusthavebeenawareofgiventhatMoorwontheVictoriaCross.

59.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/46,HamiltontoMr.GrimwoodMears,6March1917.60.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoLordKitchener,7June1915.61.TNA,WO159/13,HamiltontoKitchener,3May1915.62.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/9,HamiltontoWigram,3June1915.63.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/17,LetterstoGeneralEllison,HamiltontoEllison,11June1915.64.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/22,MiscellaneousLetters,HamiltontoMacready,23June1915.65.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/35,LetterstoLordDerby,HamiltontoKG(Derby)13July1915.66.Ibid,HamiltontoKG,18July1915.67.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/55,Operationsfrom30thJune1915to23rdAugust1915.Aspinall-Oglander,

Gallipoli:Vol.2,pp.230–234.68.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/11,IntelligenceReport,13June1915.69.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/23,IntelligenceReport,25June1915.

Chapter51.Diary1,16June1915,p.213.2.Lee,p.231.3.Diary1,27June1915,p.234.4.Delage,Edward,TheTragedyoftheDardanelles,London,JohnLane,1932,p.24.5.TNA,CAB37/129/1,WinstonChurchill,ANoteontheGeneralSituation,1June1915.6.TNA,CAB37/129/21,AsquithtoKingGeorgeV,9June1915.7.TNA,CAB42/3,ConclusionsofMeetingsoftheDardanellesCommittee,CAB42/3/1,Conclusionof

aMeetingoftheDardanellesCommittee,7June1915.8.TNA,CAB37/137/19,ChurchilltoKitchener,15June1915.9.TNA,CAB42/3/3,TheDardanelles,16June1915.10.TNA,CAB42/3/7,ConclusionsofMeetingoftheDardanellesCommittee,5July1915.11.TNA,ADM116/3491,DardanellesOperation–CollectedPapers,Letter,HankeytoAsquith,August

1915.12.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/4,HamiltontoLadyHamilton,20May1915.13.Ibid.23June1915. 14. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,CorrespondencewithGeneralWolfeMurray (CIGS),Hamilton7/1/12,

WolfeMurraytoHamilton,10July1915.15.Ibid.HamiltontoWolfeMurray,20July1915. 16. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,CorrespondencewithGeneralMaxwell,Hamilton7/1/15,Hamilton to

Maxwell,7May1915.17.Ibid.MaxwelltoHamilton,8May1915.18.RobertRhodesJames,Gallipoli,London,Pimlico,1999,p.16.19.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,MaxwelltoHamilton,8May1915.20.Ibid.21.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,14May1915.22.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,23May1915.23.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,MaxwelltoHamilton,29May1915.24.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,8June1915.25.LC,RNMNBanksH/1,Diaryentry,15May1915.26.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,MaxwelltoHamilton,17June1915.27.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,23July1915. 28. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/1/34, Correspondence with Lord Selborne, Hamilton 7/1/34, Selborne to

Hamilton,11July1915.29.Ibid.30.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/34,HamiltontoSelborne,27July1915.31.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/34,SelbornetoHamilton,7August1915.32.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,TheDardanelles,TelegramsRegardingtheMilitaryOperations,Hamilton

7/4/8,HamiltontoKitchener,29May1915.33.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,HamiltontoKitchener,telegram,7June1915.34.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,BaseCommandant,MediterraneanForcetoWarOffice,Telegram,11June

1915.35.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,HamiltontoKitchener,Telegram,9July1915.36.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,23July1915.37.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,WarOfficetoGeneralHeadquartersMEF,Telegram,22July1915.

38. Bean, C.E.W., The Story of ANZAC: From 4 May 1915, To The Evacuation Of The GallipoliPeninsula,St.Lucia,Queensland,UniversityofQueenslandPress,1981(firstprinted1924)pp.822–823.

39.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,SecretaryofStateforWartoHamilton,Telegram,3August1915. 40. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/4/33, Hankey’s Memorandum, 30 August 1915. Committee of Imperial

Defence.TheDardanelles.MemorandumontheSituation,August301915.41.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,F.M.Cutlack(Ed)Sydney,Australia,AngusandRobertson,1935,p.

54.42.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/2,4June1915.43.Ibid.44.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/3,IntelligenceBulletin,5June1915.45.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/11,IntelligenceBulletin,13June1915.46.Ibid.47.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/15,IntelligenceBulletin,17June1915.48.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/16,IntelligenceBulletin,19June1915.49.Ibid.50.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/24,IntelligenceBulletin,26June1915.51.Ibid. 52. LHCMA, Intelligence Reports, Hamilton 7/6/16, 19 June 1915; Hamilton 7/6/17, 19 June 1915;

Hamilton7/6/24,26June1915;Hamilton7/6/33,7July1915.53.Bean,TheStoryofANZAC,pp.321–322.54.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/34,IntelligenceReport,8July1915;Hamilton7/6/35,IntelligenceReport,9

July1915.55.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/39,IntelligenceReport,13July1915.56.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/51,IntelligenceReport,25July1915.57.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/53,IntelligenceReport,27July1915.58.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/59,IntelligenceReport,3August1915.59.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/62,IntelligenceReport,6August1915.60.Ibid.61.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/65,IntelligenceBulletin,7August1915.62.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/66,IntelligenceBulletin,8August1915.63.Ashmead-Bartlett,Ellis,DespatchesfromtheDardanelles,London,GeorgeNewnes,1916,p.135.64.Bean,C.E.W.,GallipoliMission,CrowNest,NSW,Australia,AustralianBroadcastingCorporation,

1991(firstpublished1948)foreword,BillGammage,p.278.65.TNA,ADM137/1144Dardanelles,VariousPapers,ADM137/1144,6July1915.66.LC,RN/MN,Hallifax,Oswald,ReminiscencesofCaptainOswaldHallifax,DSO.Writtenin1934and

based on his privateWar Diary and Reports of Proceedings, Volume 7, 28May 1915–16August1915.P.64,entrydate,25July1915.

Chapter61.Prior,p.145.2.LC,TheNavalMemoirsofAdmiralJ.H.Godfrey,p.21.3.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/1,HamiltontoChurchill,18June1915.4.Diary1,p.153,12May1915.5.Ibid,p.155,13May1915.6.LC,RNMN,FalconerJ.,Diary,14May1915.7.Diary1,pp.155–156.8.Hart,p.276.9.Diary1,p.156.10.Bellamy,pp.171–172.11.Prior,p.139. 12. LHCMA,Hamilton 7/1/2,Letters to FieldMarshal Sir JohnFrench,Hamilton 7/1/2,Hamilton to

French,17June1915.13.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,27June1915.14.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/7,HamiltontoSclater,3July1915.15.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,1June1915.16.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,WolfeMurraytoHamilton,10July1915.17.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,20July1915.18.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/22,MiscellaneousLetters–GeneralSirIanHamilton–20May1915to10

July1915,HamiltontoMacready,23June1915.19.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,LetterstoFieldMarshalLordMethuen–GovernorandCommander-in-

Chief,Malta,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,23July1915.20.Diary1,p.97.25April1915.21.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,26July1915.22.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,23September1915.23.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,TheDardanelles–TelegramsRegardingtheMilitaryOperations,Hamilton

7/4/8,Vice-Admiral,EasternMediterranean, toAdmiralty, 14August1915,ForKitchener andPMfromLieutenant-ColonelHankey.

24.James,p.181.25.Birdwood,pp.278–280. 26. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/1/42, Letters to Sir R.C.Munro Ferguson, Governor-General of Australia,

FergusontoHamilton,23August1915.27.Broadbent,p.ix.28.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/42,HamiltontoMunroFerguson,6October1915.29.James,p.xiv.30.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/42,HamiltontoMunroFerguson,6October1915.31.Ibid.32.HenryW.Nevinson,TheDardanellesCampaign,London,Nisbet&Co.Ltd,1918,p.67. 33. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/1/42, Hamilton to Munro Ferguson, 6 October 1915. Melbourne was the

Australiancapitalin1915.34.LC,AIR293SmithC.M.,RNAS/RAF,WorldWar1,1914–1918.MyImpressionsandExperiences. 35. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/45,Stamfordham.Hamilton7/1/45,Hamilton toStamfordham,12October

1915.36.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/44,BraithwaitetoGeneralOfficerCommandingAustralian&NewZealand

ArmyCorps,15September1915.BraithwaitewasGeneralWalterBraithwaite,ChiefofHamilton’sStaff.

37.Diary1,p.137,5May1915.38.Ibid.p.139.39.Ibid.p.145.40.Ibid.41.Ibid.p.152,12May1915.42.Ibid.pp.160–161,17May1915.43.Ibid.p.163,19May1915.44.Ibid,pp.163–164,19May1915.45.Ibid.p.198,11June1915.46.Ibid.pp.212–213,16June1915.47.Ibid.pp.213–214,17June1915.48.Ibid,p.225,22June1915. 49. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/1/32, Correspondence with Le Roy Lewis, BritishMilitary Attaché, Paris.

Hamilton7/1/32,LeRoyLewistoHamilton,3August1915.50.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/4,HamiltontoLordKitchener,15June1915.51.Ibid,LordKitchenertoHamilton(No.5501cipher)15June1915. 52. LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/6,Brig.GeneralHendryComdg.157thBrigade.MemorandumfromMajor

Egerton,29July1915;Major-GeneralEgertontoColonelPollen,6October1915.53.HappyWarrior,p.335.54.Ibid.55.Ibid.p.336.56.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/1,HamiltontoChurchill,26June1915.57.Ibid.HamiltontoChurchill,30June1915. 58. LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,Ashmead-Bartlett,Hamilton7/3/1,ExtractfromWithintheTwenty-ninth

Division in Gallipoli by the Rev. O. Creighton C.F. Extract from his diary of May 13th ’15(handwritten).

59.NicholasHiley(1993)‘EnoughGloryforAll’:EllisAshmead-BartlettandSirIanHamilton,JournalofStrategicStudies,16:2,240–264.

60. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/3/1, Extract from a letter dated 3 June 1915 written to his father, LordRibblesdale.

61.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,HamiltontoLordKitchener(secretandpersonal)3June1915.62.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,LordKitchenertoHamilton,7June1915,no.5201Cipher.63.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,HamiltontoKitchener,8June1915.64.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/17,LetterstoGeneralEllison,HamiltontoEllison,11June1915.65.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/45,HamiltontoStamfordham,PartTwo,13October1915.66.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/51,FarewellMessagestoGeneralSirIanHamilton,HamiltontoMaxwell,21

October1915.67.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/51,HamiltontoBirdwood(‘Birdie’)13November1915.68.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,18July1915,p.55. 69. LHCMA,Hamilton 7/3/2,Letters to theHon.HarryLawson,Hamilton toLawson, 30September

1915;Hamilton7/4/8,HamiltontoWarOffice,4October1915.70.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/2,HamiltontoLawson,24July1915.71.Hiley,p.248.72.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,16August1915.73.Ibid;HamiltontoWolfeMurray,14September1915.74.HappyWarrior,p.342.75.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/14,HamiltontoLordHaldane,19August1915.76.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/26,CorrespondencewithGeneralFRWingate(SirdarKhartoum)Hamiltonto

Wingate,17August1915.77.James,pp.xi-xii. 78. LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/24,1915August13–14.Notesofan interviewwhich tookplaceonboard

HMSTriadbetween6and7pmon13August1915betweenGeneralCommanderandSirFrederickStopford,Commanding9thCorps.

79.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/30,BrigadierGeneralW.Sitwell,lateCommander34thInfantryBrigadetoMajorGeneralHammersley,Co11thDivision,22August1915.

80.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/37,WarDiary32ndInfantryBrigade11thNorthernDivisionwithGeneralSirIanHamilton’sRemarks.Hamilton7/2/37,Friday6thAugust1915.

81.Aspinall-Oglander,GallipoliVol.2,p.237.82.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/37,WarDiary32ndInfantryBrigade,Saturday7thAugust1915.83.James,pp.278–279.84.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/55,Operationsof11thDivisionfrom30thJune1915to23rdAugust1915.85.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/46,LordKitchenertoHamilton(8515)undated.86.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1. 87. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/3/1, Letter, Hamilton to Lord Kitchener, 29 October 1915; Hamilton to

Callwell,3November1915.88.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,HamiltontoSecretaryoftheDardanellesCommission,15January1917.89.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/3,Callwell(WO)HamiltontoCallwell,13September1915.90.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/7,OfficialPaper–MemorandumbyGeneralSirIanHamilton,28September

1915. 91. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/3/4, Notes on Mr. Murdoch’s letter to Mr. Fisher (Andrew Fisher, Prime

MinisterofAustralia),23September1915.92.LHCMA,Hamilton7/7/37,CorrespondencedealingwithwitnessesattheDardanellesCommission,

Hamilton7/7/37,HamiltontoPollen,10November1916.93.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/8,SirJamesPorter,26November1915.94.LC,Berthon,Box2,Diary5.95.LC,AIR293,SmithC.M.,RNAS/RAF.96.Ibid.97.LC,AIR50,BrometG.R.DiaryEntries,14August1915;27August1915. 98. LC, Gall1/1-64, Addams-Williams, D.A., Gall 1/25, Letter to his father (Rev. Herbert Addams-

Williams)9July1915.99.LC,Gall1/28,Lettertomother(GraceAddams-Williams)18–19July1915.100.LC,Gall1/35a,SergeantH.WorthingtontoGraceAddams-Williams,4November1915;Gall1/144,

PrivateE.JamestoGraceAddams-Williams,24November1915;Gall1/64,LettertoMrs.Addams-Williams,nodate,signatureillegible.TheTimes,Obituary,20August1915.

101.LC,RMMN/COBBAHK/1–Bacchante.102. The Tragic Story of theDardanelles. IanHamilton’s FinalDespatches, London,GeorgeNewnes,

1916.HamiltontoKitchener,7August1915,pp.23–24.103.Ibid.p.54.104.LC,TheNavalMemoirsofAdmiralJ.H.Godfrey,pp.21&30.105.Aspinall-Oglander,Gallipoli,Vol.2,p.236.106.E.Ashmead-Bartlett,TheUncensoredDardanelles,p.56.107.SirHenryDarlington,LettersfromHelles,London,Longmans,Green&Co,1936,p.8.108.Ashmead-Bartlett,TheUncensoredDardanelles,p.201.109.Ibid.110.Ibid.pp.240–243.

Chapter71.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/42,MajorGeneralMarshalltoHamilton,22January1918.2.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,25September1915,pp.69–70.3.Ibid.26September1915,pp.70–71. 4. PeterLiddle,MenofGallipoli.TheDardanellesandGallipoliExperienceAugust1914toJanuary

1916,London,AllenLane,1976,p.71.5.James,p.14.6.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,26September1915,pp.70–71.7.Ibid.30December1915,pp.103–104.8.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3LettersfromLieutenant-GeneralSirB.Mahon.LordKitchenertoSirIan

Hamilton,6977Cipher,14August1915.9.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,C.G.S.toLieutenant-GeneralMahon,15August1915.10.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,HamiltontoLordKitchener,15August1915.11.Ibid.GeneralCommanding10thDivisiontoC.G.S.15August1915.12.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,HamiltontoLordKitchener,18August1915;MahontoHamilton,Letter,

17August1915.13.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,HamiltontoTROOPERS,LONDON,23August1915.14.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,HamiltontoKitchener,30August1915.15.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,HamiltontoMahon,2September1915. 16. LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/3,Mahon toHamilton,3September1915;Hamilton toLordKitchener, 8

September1915.17.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/4HamiltontoLordKitchener,15June1915;LordKitchener,15June1915

(No.5501,cipher).18.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/13,1915August9–11,HamiltontoC.G.S.9August1915,Memorandum.19.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/13,TelegramG.O.C.9thCorpsNo.B.218,9August1915.20.Ibid.21.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/13,StopfordtoHamilton,11August1915.22.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/22,TelegramCorrespondencebetweenHamiltonandFieldMarshalHoratio

HerbertKitchener,11August1915–15September1915,Major-GeneralWPMarthwaster,ChiefofGeneralStaffMEFtoLieutenant-GeneralSirF.W.Stopford,14August1915.

23.LHCMA,Hamilton7/2/22-23,HamiltontoLordKitchener,14August1915. 24. LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/36,MedicalArrangements.ReportofColonelPurvesStewart;Lieutenant-

Colonel Sir Courtauld Thomson. Hamilton 7/4/36, Purves Stewart to Hamilton, Mudros, 18September1915.

25.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/36,HamiltontoColonelPurvesStewart,1October1915. 26. LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/37,MediterraneanExpeditionaryForce.CircularMemorandumtoMedical

OfficersandNursesonHospitalShipsandAmbulanceCarriers,5October1915.27.LHCMA,Hamiltonto7/7/36,HamiltontoBraithwaite,1January1916.28.Ibid.29.LHCMA,Hamilton7/7/37CorrespondenceDealingwithWitnessesattheDardanellesCommission,

Hamilton7/7/37,HamiltontoColonelPeterPollen,16March1916.30.Hamilton7/7/37,HamiltontoPollen,10November1916.31.TNA,WO106/1467,RecommendationoftheGeneralStaffontheQuestionoftheActiontobeTaken

atGallipoli,WO106/1467,TelegramfromLieutenant-GeneralSirW.BirdwoodtoEarlKitchener,21October1915.

32.TNA,WO106/1467,Lieutenant-GeneralSirC.MonrotoEarlKitchener,31October1915.33.TNA,WO106/1467,Lieutenant-GeneralSirC.MonrotoEarlKitchener,2November1915.34.TNA,WO106/1467,EarlKitchenertoPrimeMinister,15November1915.35.TNA,WO106/1539,Gallipoli,Mr.Churchill’sViews,October1915.36.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,Aspinall,Hamilton8/1/4,HamiltontoAspinall,letter,29July1916.37.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/1,ColonelAllansontoHamilton,6February1917.38.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,StatementbyLieutenant-ColonelC.F.Aspinall,lateGeneralStaff,MEF.

Undated.39.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,HamiltontoAspinall,23May1917.40.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11(Birdwood),Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,7June1917.41.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/15,(Callwell),Hamilton8/1/15,CallwelltoHamilton,25May1917.42.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,4August1916.43.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/16,Churchill,Hamilton8/1/16HamiltontoChurchill,11November1916.44.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,CecilAspinalltoHamilton,27May1917.45.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/21,Ellison,Hamilton8/1/21,HamiltontoEllison,1June1917.46.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/3,D’Amade,Hamilton8/1/3,HamiltontoD’Amade,2February1917.47.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,statementfromLieutenant-ColonelC.F.Aspinall.48.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,BirdwoodtoHamilton,4December1916.49.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,BirdwoodtoHamilton(Letter)14December1916.50.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,3February1917.51.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,BirdwoodtoHamilton(letter)26May1917.52.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/13,BraithwaitetoHamilton,15August1916.53.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/13,BraithwaitetoHamilton,25August1916.54.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/16WarCabinetMemorandum,30October1917.55.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/16,HamiltontoChurchill,26January1917.56.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/46,TheSecretary,Dardanelles,Hamilton8/1/46,HamiltontoSirGrimwood

Mears,18July1917.57.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/46,HamiltontoGrimwoodMears,6March1917.58.LC,ANZACNZ/J.Fyfe/1,DiaryofJamesFyfe,OtagoMountedRiflesattachedtoMaoriBattalion,

Gallipoli,1915.59.LC,ANZAC(AUS)K.A.Murdoch,MurdochtoFisher,letter,23September1915.60.CathrynCorns,JohnHughes-Wilson,BlindfoldandAlone.BritishMilitaryExecutionsintheGreat

War,London,Cassel&Co,2001,pp.125–128.61.Ibid.p.382.62.LC,ANZAC(AUS)K.A.Murdoch.63.LC,ANZAC(AUST)C.Parkes,SecondLieutenant,1stBattalion,‘D’Company,InterviewwithPeter

Liddle,Tape238,May1974.64.Ashmead-Bartlett,DespatchesfromtheDardanelles,p.38.65.LC,ANZAC(AUS)K.A.Murdoch,Hamilton’sreply,26November1915.66.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,23September1915.67.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/104,IntelligenceReport,18September1915.68.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/51,HamiltontoHill,6June1916.69.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/53,HamiltontoLordCurzon,9December1915. 70. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/4/33, Hankey’s Memorandum, Committee of Imperial Defence. The

Dardanelles.MemorandumontheSituation,30August1915.71.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/34,Correspondencere:Hankey’sReport,HamiltontoHankey,16September

1915.72.LHCMA,Hamilton7/6/82,IntelligenceReport,27August1915.73.GallipoliDiaries,pp.253–295.74.Birdwood,p.281.

Chapter81.HappyWarrior,p.404.2.TheUncensoredDardanelles,p.11.3.AmphibiousAssault,(ed)Barnett,p.8.4.Hart,Gallipoli,p.18.5.DavidStevenson,1914–1918:TheHistoryoftheFirstWorldWar,London,PenguinBooks,2005,p.

24.6.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/1,HamiltontoChurchill,10March1915.7.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/5,Hamilton,LettertoF.S.Tatham,23July1915.8.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/5,HamiltontoGrove,22June1915. 9. G.D.Clayton,Britainand theEasternQuestion:Missolonghi toGallipoli,London,LionLibrary,

1974,p.12.10.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,18March1915.11. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,30March1915;HamiltontoKitchener,30April

1915.12.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,5May1915.13.LHCMA,Hamilton7/7/12,WarOffice1915–1916,Hamilton7/7/12,Chas.E.CallwelltoHamilton,5

January1916.14.L.A.Carlyon,Gallipoli,London,Doubleday,2002,p.22.15.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,7June1915.16.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,ExtractofaletterbyGeneralSirIanHamiltontoEarlKitchener,9June

1915.17.LC,AIR50BrometG.R.JournalEntry,2June1915.18.Ibid,24June1915.19.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,19June1915.20.Ibid.21.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,27June1915.22.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/6,HamiltontoKitchener,15July1915.23.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/7,HamiltontoBrade,24July1915;4August1915.24.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,WolfeMurraytoHamilton,10July1915. 25. David Lloyd George,WarMemoirs of David Lloyd George: Volume 1, London, Odhams Press

Limited,undated,p.75.26.Ibid.p.77.27.Ibid.pp.77–83.28.Ibid.pp.91–92.29.SP,AIR50,Bromet,G.R.Diary2,27August1915.30.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,20July1915.31.Carlyon,p.335.32.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/12,HamiltontoWolfeMurray,16August1915.33.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/14,HamiltontoLordHaldane,19August1915.34.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,MaxwelltoHamilton,17June1915.35.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoMaxwell,24September1915.36.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,26July1915.37.LC,RN/MN,Hallifax,Oswald,ReminiscencesofCaptainOswaldHallifaxDSO,writtenin1934and

basedonhisprivatewardiaryandreportsofproceedings,Volume8,16August1915to12September

1915,4September1915,p.14.38.LC,RN/MNHeath,J.M.,Box5,LettertoFather,13September1915.39.LC,ShawWJ(File1)DiaryofSergeantWilliamJohnsonShaw,RMLI,18July1915.40.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,MaxwelltoHamilton,8September1915,LetterfromGeneralCallwell,

19August1915.41.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/22,HamiltontoMacready,23June1915.42.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/23,HamiltontoMethuen,23July1915. 43. GeneralSir IanHamilton,GallipoliDiary,Volume2,Gloucester,DodoPress,2009,p.2428July

1915.HereafterreferredtoasDiary2. 44. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/24,Semi-OfficialCorrespondence,CaptainS.H.Pollen,AssistantMilitary

Secretary (AMS) to Sir Ian Hamilton, Hamilton 7/1/24, Hamilton to Major-General Stanton, 17August1915.

45.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/33,HamiltontoHunterWeston,26August1915. 46. LHCMA,Hamilton 7/1/24,Birdwood toPollen, 26August 1915;Pollen toBirdwood, 27August

1915.47.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/35,HamiltontoK.G.4September1915. 48. LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/37MiscellaneousLetters–GeneralSir IanHamilton–13July1915–13

September1915,HamiltontoMaddocks,11September1915.49.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/44,HankeytoHamilton,9September1915.50.LC,Gall1/144,PrivateE.JamestoMrs.GraceAddams-Williams,letter,24November1915.51.LC,RNMN,Godfrey,JH.52.HughMcManners,GulfWarOne:RealVoicesfromtheFrontLine,London,EburyPress,2011,p.

154.53.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/44,HamiltontoHankey,16September1915.54.James,p.468.55.Carlyon,p.17. 56. LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1, extract froma letterdated3 June1915writtenbyCharlesLister tohis

father,LordRibblesdale.57.LHCMA,Hamilton7/4/8,HamiltontoWarOffice,Telegram,4October1915.58.‘Enoughgloryforall’p.244.59.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,LordKitchenertoHamilton,no.5201Cipher,7June1915.60.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,WarOfficetoGeneralHeadquartersMediterraneanExpeditionaryForce,

No.8350Cipher,29September1915.61.Hamilton,Diary2,13July1915,p.6.62.GallipoliDiaries,2October1915,p.227.63.Ibid.23September,p.214;29September1915,pp.220–221.64.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,HamiltontoLordKitchener,29October1915.65.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,HamiltontoCallwell,3November1915. 66. LHCMA, Hamilton 7/3/1, The World, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett on Sir Ian Hamilton’s Report, 1

February1916.67.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/3,Callwell(WarOffice)Hamilton7/3/3,CallwelltoHamilton,3November

1915.68.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/1,SundayTimes,26December1915,‘CabinetandtheDardanelles’WestF

deWendFenton.69.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/3,CallwelltoHamilton,29November1915.70.Ibid.71.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/9,DiaryentrycopyfromLadyHamilton’sdiary,6July1921.72.Diary2,30September1915,p.162.73.HappyWarrior,pp.397–398.74.LHCMA,Hamilton7/3/8,SirJamesPorter,26November1915.

75.TNA,WO106/1467,Lieutenant-GeneralSirC.MonrotoEarlKitchener,31October1915.76.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/1,ColonelCecilAllansontoHamilton,6February1917.77.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,HamiltontoAspinall,Letter,29July1916.78.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/4,HamiltontoAspinall,23May1917.79.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,4August1916.80.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,7June1917.81.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,25June1917.82.TNA,ADM116/1437B,2September1916.83.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,BirdwoodtoHamilton,29May1918.84.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,5June1918.85.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/11,HamiltontoBirdwood,12June1918.86.LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/21,Major-GeneralEllisontoHamilton,Letter,3February1916.87.Diary2,24August1915,p.100.88.LC,Gall153/1CaptainM.Parker-Buchanan.89.LC,ANZAC(AUST)Evans,M.C.3rdAuxiliaryHospital,Heliopolis,LettertoMother,21September

1915.90.LC,RN/MNBoswell/191.StairGillon,TheStoryofthe29thDivision.ARecordofGallantDeeds,London,ThomasNelsonand

SonsLtd,1925,p.52.92.TheTragicStoryoftheDardanelles,pp.94–95. 93. LC, ANZAC NZ, General Sir Alexander J. Godley, 1/C Australian and New Zealand Division,

(Source: National Archives, Wellington, New Zealand). Godley to Colonel Allen, Minister ofDefence,NewZealand,Reportonfightingsince25April1915,ANZACCove,6May1915.

94.Carlyon,pp.479&492.95.TNA,CAB37/132/27,AsquithtoKingGeorgeV,19August1915.96.James,p.766.97.Ibid,pp.768&780.98.TNA,CAB42/3/17,27August1915.99.TNA,CAB42/3/16,20August1915.100.James,p.782.101.Ibid.102.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,SarpiCamp,Lemnos,22September1915.pp.69–70.103.Ibid.26September1915,pp.70–71.104.Birdwood,p.276.105.Prior,pp.207–209.106.WarLettersofGeneralMonash,26September1915,pp.70–71.107. TNA, CAB 42/3/19, Committee of Imperial Defence – The Dardanelles – Memorandum on the

Situation30August1915,PreparedbySecretaryafterapersonalvisit.108.TNA,ADM116/1437B,Lieutenant-GeneralMonroetoEarlKitchener,2November1915.109.TNA,CAB42/4/3,6October1915.110.Ibid.111.TNA,CAB42/4/6,14October1915.112.TNA,ADM137/1145,8October1915.113.TNA,CAB42/4/16,23October1915;CAB42/5/3,5November1915.114.TNA,ADM116/1437B,Lieutenant-GeneralMonroetoEarlKitchener,31October1915.115. TNA,CAB45/268Part1–PrivateAccountsofOperations.AdmiralSirRogerKeyes’Papers,E.

Mediterranean,1915.SirJulianCorbett–PrécisofConversationwithAd.Keyes,29November1915.116.C.E.W.Bean,TheStoryofANZAC:From4May1915totheEvacuationoftheGallipoliPeninsula,

St.Lucia,Queensland,UniversityofQueenslandPress,1981,firstpublished1924,p.830.117.Birdwood,pp.278–280.

118.GallipoliDiaries,13November1915,pp.269–270.119.Birdwood,p.280.120.GallipoliDiaries,15November1915,p.272.121.HappyWarrior,pp.451–452.122.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/11,HamiltontoAsquith,30September1915.123.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoGeneralMaxwell,10September1915.124.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,GeneralMaxwelltoHamilton,13October1915.125. LHCMA,Hamilton8/1/46,Hamilton toTheSecretary,DardanellesCommission, letter,15January

1917.126.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,HamiltontoGeneralMaxwell,8October1915.127.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/45,HamiltontoStamfordham,7October1915.128.LHCMA,Hamilton7/1/15,GeneralMaxwelltoHamilton,24September1915.129.GallipoliDiaries,14&15November1915,pp.271–273.130.Ibid.22November1915,p.277.131.Ibid.132.Ibid,24November1915–26November1915,pp.279–281.133.Ibid,26November1915–30November1915,pp.281–285.134.Ibid,1&2December1915,pp.286–290.135.Ibid,5December1915,pp.292–293.136.Ibid,11December1915–18December1915,pp.301–309.137.Ibid.p.319.138.HappyWarrior,p.452.139.James,p.784.140.Ashmead-Bartlett,TheUncensoredDardanelles,pp.15–16.