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International olitical Science Review (1998), Vol. 19, No. 3, 251-267

The Effects of Incorporation into World-Systems on Ethnic Processes: Lessons from the

Ancient World for the Contemporary World

THOMAS D. HALL

ABSTRACT. This article discusses how incorporation into a world-system(ancient or contemporary) can create, transform, or destroy ethnic groups.It suggests that: (1) ethnically homogeneous states have never beencommon; (2) ethnicity has always been fluid with respect to identity,boundaries, cultural content, and membership; (3) ethnic processes cannotbe understood without careful consideration of their interstate, or world-systemic, context; (4) contemporary ethnic conflicts have contemporary

roots; (5) the differences between the contemporary and ancient worldsneed further study; (7) the origin of the ideal of the ethnically homoge-neous state and shifts in ethnic processes in the twentieth century lackadequate explanation.

[Italicized words prefixed by an asterisk (*) are explained in the Glossaryat the end of this issue.]

Introduction

I will argue two fundamental points in this article. First, the processes by whichethnic groups are created (*ethnogenesis), transformed, and destroyed cannot beunderstood without attending carefully to the larger, interstate context withinwhich these processes occur. Though the contextual setting is far from providinga complete explanation, it is vital to constructing such an explanation. For thoseclosely familiar with *world-system theory, this is a specific extension of the claimthat all local social processes are shaped by, and in turn shape, world-systemprocesses (Bach, 1980). Second, new insights into contemporary ethnic processesmay be gained by examining ancient, that is to say pre-fifteenth century processes.This examination will help distinguish new processes from old, and help untanglecomplex ethnic processes. I hasten to add that I see this article as merely one

0192-5121 (1998/07) 19:3, 251-267; 004015 ? 1998 International Political Science AssociationSAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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The Effects f Incorporation nto World-Systems n Ethnic Processes

statement in a continuing dialogue among students of ancient and contemporaryethnicity. I hope each group of scholars will learn from the other.

For several years I have collaborated with Christopher Chase-Dunn in studyingpre-capitalist, that is before the fifteenth century, world-systems. To do this we have

had to modify extensively the world-system models originally proposed by ImmanuelWallerstein (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). In particular I have elaborated the

concept of incorporation into a world-system of either a region or a group, or both

(Hall, 1986, 1987, 1989a: chap. 2; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: chap. 4). In thisarticle I focus on how world-systemic processes can create, transform, or destroyethnic groups, and how those processes are the same, and differ between ancientand contemporary world-systems.

In order to do so, I begin with a brief discussion of definitional issues, thensummarize the historic depth of ethnic-like relations. With the stage thus set I willsummarize the comparative world-systems approach to these issues. After notingtwo

remaining puzzles,I conclude with a few lessons from the

studyof ancient

ethnic conflicts for the study of contemporary ones.

Definitional Issues

When scholars, whose training and practice are rooted in different social science

disciplines, engage in discussions of common concerns, it is all too easy to getbogged down in all sorts of conceptual and definitional issues. I prefer to extendArthur Stinchcombe's (1978) dictum that counting is the last, not first step intheoretical and empirical investigation. Thus, definitions should emerge withintheoretical and empirical discussions. In order to forestall such confusion I presenta few garden variety definitions in order to begin the discussion.

I follow Wallerstein's definition of a world-system as an intersocietal systemmarked by a self-contained division of labor. It is largely self-contained and hassome degree of internal coherence and forms a complete unit (Wallerstein, 1974,1979, 1980, 1989). Hence the hyphen in the term which has, itself, become politi-cized (Thompson, 1983a, b; Wallerstein, 1983). Only in the twentieth century hasthis "world" become truly global. Similarly, the term is now often used in the plural,as I use it here, again with some contention (Wallerstein, 1993, 1995). While much

world-systems work-with or without the hyphen, with or without the plural-hasroots in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, his voluminous production is but a smallfraction of it

(Hall, 1996a, b).The word "modern" and its derivatives are similarly vexing. In this article I followthe usage of Fred Riggs (1998) and Anthony D. Smith (1994: 392): using "contem-

porary" or "recent" rather than *modern, and using modernity for the constellationof recent, more or less democratic, industrialized, national states. Still, I must pointout that for Wallerstein the "modern" in the "modern world-system" refers to

approximately the last 500 years-most of which many scholars would not label"modern," or "recent," or "contemporary." Thus, in this article I use "ancient" forthe period before circa 1500 CE. This, however, leaves the period from 1450 to ca.1800 problematic.

The most contentious terminological terrain is that relating to "ethnicity." I

begin with the following, typical, or garden variety meanings. I (and indeed all theauthors in this issue) refine and modify these definitions as we proceed. *Ethnicityis a publicly recognized, shared feeling of belonging to the same group defined bykinship or biology. Race is the same thing, but typically marked by one or more

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phenotypical manifestations. To anticipate many comments, these markers areclearly socially constructed. *Nationality is similar to ethnicity, but defined bycitizenship in or subjection to a state. Clearly, a nationality may encompass manyethnicities. In this discussion I will use ethnicity as a cover term, not because I wishto gloss over important distinctions, but for the more prosaic purpose of simplerexposition.

I must note here, however, that I have an important disagreement with the usageof Fred Riggs'. For me ethnicity existed in the ancient world, albeit in substantiallydifferent forms. Here I follow the discussions of Smith (1994: 191, 381) and Tamir(1995: 494) on nationalism. To study the emergence of a new or changing socialprocess we must be careful not to build explanations of those changes into ourconcepts. Let me hasten to add that I fully concur with Fred Riggs's claim that"modern," or contemporary ethnicity is very different from ancient ethnicity. Butprecisely because I seek to understand how the modern version emerged from the

ancient version, I do not wish to restrict the term "ethnicity" solely to the modernversion.These definitions are rather facile. In the late twentieth century due to increased

race-ethnic-national mixing-the Tiger Woods phenomenon-these distinctions canblur significantly. However, in ancient times the distinctions sometimes collapsedto the same thing, especially for non-state societies, where often-but not always-there was no difference between "primordialist" and "situational" definitions ofgroup identity.1

Further, the tension between biology and politics is significant throughout therange of phenomena that these three terms address. *Race s often seen as largelybiological, whereas nationality is typically seen as largely political. This is far fromaccidental, but rather is a manifestation of the shift from kin-ordered societies totributary or state-ordered societies (discussed below, and in Chase-Dunn and Hall,1997; Sanderson, 1955a; and Sanderson and Hall, 1995a). Furthermore, imputingbiological bases to political and social differences is an all-to-familiar strategy tomanipulate perceptions and to influence intergroup relations. To begin to under-stand and analyze the tension and confusion in these terms, I will briefly recap whatwe can learn from world history on the matter.

Polyethnicity Is Normal, Not National States

William H. McNeill claims that world history shows "polyethnicity as normal incivilized societies, whereas the ideal of an ethnically unitary state was exceptionalin theory and rarely approached in practice" (McNeill, 1986: 4). By *polyethnicityMcNeill means what sociologists conventionally call pluralist2 or multiculturalsocieties, without making any of the finer distinctions used by Fred Riggs (1994,1997a, 1998), and especially without reference to their "modernity" n Riggs's sense.McNeill couches his argument in terms of "civilization" and "barbarism," by whichhe means what Gerhard Lenski (Lenski, Nolan and Lenski, 1995) would call agrar-ian states and horticultural, pastoral, or foraging societies, or what I would calltributary and kin-ordered modes of accumulation (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, esp.chaps. 2 and 3).3 In short, the drive for nation-building, especially when focused onracial-ethnic-linguistic-cultural homogeneity, is an aberration of the last fewcenturies in the over 5 000 years of the history of states. The recent resurgence ofstates made up of multiple ethnic groups is a continuation of the historically naturalcondition of states.

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In a review of McNeill's book, Leslie Laczko (1990) questions McNeill's asser-tion that polyethnic hierarchy is on the rise everywhere. His denial does notgainsay the commonality of ethnic conflict. Laczko further notes that "the workdoes little to clear up the widespread conceptual confusion in the field when ituses the term national unity as a synonym for ethnic homogeneity, in much thesame way as all those nationalist thinkers have often done " (Laczko, 1990: 428).Still, McNeill's account underscores that multi-ethnic states are typical, andethnically homogeneous states have been very rare in both the ancient andcontemporary worlds. This fact raises two questions. First, why and how did anideal of an *ethnically homogeneous tate ever arise, especially in the face ofoverwhelming evidence that ethnic-racial-linguistic-cultural diversity remains thestatistical norm in states (see Gurr, 1993)? Indeed, why do some still hold on tothis ideal? This question I will defer until later. Second, why is ethnic diversity sopervasive? I will begin with McNeill's explanation, then turn to world-systems

elaborations of his explanation.McNeill argues that three fundamental processes constantly generate polyeth-nicity in states.4 Polyethnicity is common first and foremost because states, basedon agriculture for over 95 percent of their existence, are far more productive, havehigher population densities, and are much wealthier (even if very unequally distrib-uted) than non-state societies. Hence they often displace or conquer the others asthey spread into new territories, absorbing new peoples.

Second, this expansion is fueled by differentials in the occurrence of disease. AsMcNeill notes (1986: 12; and 1976), until the mid-nineteenth century cities werenet population sinks. Their populations always had to be replaced. Where this didnot occur voluntarily, it was accomplished through force. Slaves typically becamelowest ranking members of society. Occasionally, though, they were palace guards.Once in a while these palace guards took over the government (e.g., Mamluks inEgypt). In either case, the importation of new populations tended to generate andincrease polyethnicity.

Third, trade led to mixing. Some long-distance traders took up residence indistant lands, creating trade diasporas. This movement facilitated trade becausetraders knew that at the end of a long exchange (whether direct, or indirect) theywould be dealing with people who traded by the same rules. These communitiesmaintained their differences from their host populations and were often recognizedby host governments as having the right to govern their own affairs (Curtin, 1984).5

Later, when universal religions (Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism) united largeareas, ethnic enclaves were no longer as necessary as before. Trade diasporas gaveway to what Curtin (1984) calls trade ecumenes-that is, large areas where valueswere shared. Where trade diasporas persisted, members often adhered to a differ-ent world religion as well as being ethnically distinct. To sum up, McNeill'sargument is that polyethnicity is due to "the political, commercial, and epidemio-logic consequences of civilized social articulation" (McNeill, 1986: 25). Or put inmore conventional language, ethnic diversity is a necessary consequence of thenormal functioning of states. To be sure, this diversity is far from egalitarian.Typically it is hierarchical, often extremely so (Friedman [1998] makes the samepoint).

I now turn to an elaboration of this argument, or what might be called a "yes,but" critique. That is, I find McNeill's argument persuasive, but somewhat mis-specified in its emphasis on states. Rather, I argue that the generation of diversityalso inheres in world-systems.

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The Contribution of a World-System PerspectiveA key insight and finding of a world-system perspective is that the world-system isa fundamental unit of analysis within which all other social processes and relationsmust be studied (Bach, 1980). This does not mean that everything can be explainedby or from a world-system perspective. It only means that a world-system perspec-tive must be part of any broad explanation. Thus, my critique of McNeill's analysisof polyethnicity is not that it is wrong, but that it is incomplete.

Several scholars have modified and extended world-system theory into what istypically called *pre-modern, herein called "ancient," that is pre-1500 CE, settings.Though they disagree on a number of issues, they all agree that processes of long-term social change since at least 5 000 years ago require study from a world-systemperspective, as well as from conventional, civilizational, state, and local perspec-tives." At least two points from my work with Christopher Chase-Dunn are

especially germane here. First, all world-systems expand and "pulsate" (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, 1998), that is expand and contract, or expand rapidly thenmore slowly. Second, we argue that all world-systems have four boundaries demar-cated by sharp declines in different types of interactions: (a) those shaped by bulk

goods trade networks (BGN); (b) those shaped by political/military interactions

(PMN); (c) those shaped by prestige or luxury goods networks (PGN); and (d) those

shaped by information networks (IN) (see Figure 1).Often these are nested, as shown in Figure 1. It is only in very small, isolated

world-systems, as in islands, and in the late twentieth century when the world-

system becomes truly global, that these four boundaries coincide.

FIGURE . Nesting of the Boundaries f the Four Networks f Exchange.Source: Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Copyright ? 1997 Westview Press.

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The Effects of Incorporation nto World-Systems n Ethnic Processes

Expansion of world-systems involves gradually incorporating new regions and newpeoples into the system as it expands. When one world-system expands into theterritory of another, typically there is some type of merger, rather than full incor-poration (this is discussed in detail in Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). A key pointhere is that incorporation can occur along any of the four boundaries, and thesemay not coincide.

I have shown (Hall, 1986, 1989a) that incorporation is not simply a matter ofbeing in or out of the system, but rather is a matter of degree (Figure 2). I furtherargued that changes in a world-system itself can cause lessening of the degree ofincorporation, despite a general trend toward an increasingly tighter incorporation.The pulsation of world-systems is one of the causes of such reversals, as are changesin frontier policies and practices of states, and heightened resistance to incorpora-tion by those being engulfed. As Friedman shows, cycles of hegemony also shapeprocesses of incorporation and processes of ethnic change (Friedman, 1994, 1998).

Indeed, these shifting zones of incorporation make up many of the world'sfrontier regions.7 These are the places where the formation and transformation ofethnicity is most active as various peoples and regions are incorporated into world-systems. The process of incorporation varies with the type of world-system doingthe incorporation-tributary or capitalist world-systems-and with the type ofgroup being incorporated-state or non-state group. The difference between statesand non-state groups is a salient distinction, but not the only one."

Both tributary and capitalist world-systems have a range of subtypes. Tributarycan range from highly decentralized (feudal systems) to highly centralized

Strength of None Weak Moderate Strongincorporation

Impact of core None Strong Stronger Strongeston peripheryImpact of None Low Moderate Strongperipheryon core

Namesfor

types of peripheriesHall and Chase- External Contact Marginal or Full blown/Dunn and Hall arena region of refuge dependentWallerstein None External arena Incorporation PeripheralizationArrighi None Nominal Normal Effective or real

or formal or formalSherratt Margin Margin Periphery or

structuralinterdependence

Frank and Gills Hinterland Hinterland Periphery

FIGURE 2. Continuum f Incorporation modifiedfrom all, 1986, 1989a).Source: Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Copyright ? 1997 Westview Press.

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(something akin to Marx's oriental despotism, albeit not limited to or all thatcommon in Eastern Eurasia). Capitalist systems range from early mercantile systemsfrom the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries in Europe to a fully productivecapitalist system, the one that has increasingly dominated the world since the late

eighteenth century. This latter distinction overlaps somewhat with Riggs's (1997a,b, 1998) distinction between capitalism and industrialism, and shares his recognitionthat industrial states or *production apitalism differs in its social consequences signif-icantly from all early forms of states, and I would add, world-systems.

Of special concern here is how these processes differ in ancient settings, and whatwe may learn from them about ethnic relations and processes. In ancient settings,political considerations are as frequent as access to trade and resources as reasonsfor incorporation. These reasons remain common, if not the most frequent, forincorporation in early merchant capitalism. Encounters with a large variety of non-state societies were more common than in the modern world-system, although suchencounters have been common in what Wallerstein calls the "modern

world-system"(1450 to the present). What is distinctive, as McNeill (1986) argues, is that ancientsystems and state elites did not try to force ethnic uniformity. Rather, they toler-ated differences as long as their goals were met. This does not mean that therewere no forced changes in religion, governance, customs, and so forth. Only thatcomplete assimilation was almost never a goal. Polyethnicity, or multi-ethnic states,were acceptable. Furthermore, since most states were multi-ethnic, there is noreason to expect that subjects would find it odious to be conquered by yet anotherethnic elite, unless of course taxes increased or they were relocated forcibly orpressed into slavery. In that case their objections, and rare rebellions, would becouched in those terms, not ethnic terms.

Especially worthy of note are the transformative consequences of incorporation.Depending on a number of specific circumstances, incorporation can fragmentgroups, destroying fragile states and thereby engendering a number of "tribes."Other circumstances favor formation of states by amalgamating non-state societies.Both of these processes have occurred repeatedly among Central Asian pastoralists(Barfield, 1989; Hall, 1991; Frank, 1992; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: chap. 8).Chiefdoms may be formed from formerly band organized groups (Comanches in theAmerican Southwest [Hall, 1989a], or Araucanians in La Plata [Hall, forthcoming;Jones, forthcoming]. If there is prolonged interaction and interbreeding (andsometimes intermarriage) new hybrid groups may be formed, such as metisdescended from Native American women and male French fur

traders;or

genizarodescended from Native American and Hispanic populations in southwestern UnitedStates (Meyer, 1994; Hall, 1989a, b).

Frequently, incorporated groups lose former autonomy and become ethnicminorities. Native Americans in the United States and Canada are familiarexamples. This was also the fate of the Hispanic populations of New Mexico,California, and Texas after 1848 (see Hall, 1989a). Entirely new identities can becreated when groups are relocated and old identities stripped and replaced withnew ones, as happened to African slaves imported into the United States. Wherestates, or portions of states are absorbed, territorial minorities are created. Thiswas especially common in colonial areas. These absorbed groups give rise to manyethnic movements and civil wars in the contemporary world (Gurr and Harff, 1994).

The contemporary world differs significantly from the ancient world. First, states,for the most part, have become much larger, encompassing more minority groups.Second, states have increasingly emphasized national unity, often interpreted to

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mean ethnic unity, in their nation-building efforts. Third, the right to a separate,ethnically homogeneous state is often used to justify claims of independence.Erstwhile native peoples have been especially savvy in using the doctrine of sover-eignty to press such claims (Wilmer, 1993). Fourth, the frequency with which claimsof sovereignty are pressed directly contradicts all predictions of modernizationtheory. These occurrences appear to be much more common in the contemporaryworld.9

Finally, all of this suggests that there has been a fundamental shift in the natureof *ethnicity n the contemporary world from what it was in the ancient world. Inancient times a primordialist approach to ethnicity was at least plausible, and possi-bly more accurate. In the contemporary world, by contrast, situational, reactive, orinterest-based ethnicity seems to be far more common, rendering the primordial-ist approach almost untenable (Hall, 1984). Part and parcel of this change is theincreasing politicization of ethnicity, and identity in general (see Friedman, 1994,

1998). Indeed,much of the contention that attends discussions of

ethnicity and racederives from the new preponderance of situationally defined groups in confronta-tion with primordialist conceptions of what ethnicity and race mean.'?

Some of the difference may be an artifact of differing time scales. For instancethe formation of a new ethnic group, say metis or genizaro, takes several genera-tions, whereas many contemporary conflicts focus around shorter-term issues.Similarly, it took decades, or even centuries, of interaction among nomadic peoplesand with Spaniards and Anglos to create or transform the loosely connected "bands"of nomadic peoples inhabiting what is now the southwestern United States into theIndian nations we know today.

Our understanding of these differences is not helped by the propensity of manysuch movements to impute deeply ancient roots to relatively recent events. Someof Vine Deloria's remarks (1995) about Lakota people always having been in whatare now the Dakotas come to mind, and recent controversies about the Bering Straittheory of the population of the Americas."

According to Malcolm (1994), various partisans in Bosnia have sought to manip-ulate and use ancient conflicts to excuse or even obscure current motivations in thewar there.

The biggest obstacle to understanding the conflict is the assumption that whathas happened in that country is the product-natural, spontaneous and at thesame time necessary-of forces lying within Bosnia's own internal history. That

is the myth which was carefully propagated by those who caused the conflict,who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gunmen were doingwas done not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable historical forces beyondanyone's control (Malcolm, 1994: xix).

Malcolm makes two points that are germane here. First, that external factorsshaped the conflict (Serbian manipulations and the misunderstandings by theWestern powers of the nature of the conflict). Second, that the roots of the conflictare not ancient, but quintessentially modern. Rather, ancient conflicts have beenmanipulated as a rationalization for the seizure of property and power by whatevermeans. Malcolm notes in support of this analysis the efforts to bomb archives, as

specific targets, in order to destroy earlier history-all the better to revise it to suitcurrent purposes.This is precisely what Fred Riggs (1997a, b, 1998) has called a "para-modern"

process: the harmful side of modernization. Contemporary ethnic conflicts have

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contemporary causes. As Riggs puts it, "If anyone living today could claim descentfrom the Philistines, they would have plenty to fight about-primordial wars meannothing today except in the minds of those who can use the myths to buttress theircontemporary struggles" (Riggs, 1997b: 9). Majid Tehranian (1998) makes much

the same argument when he claims that contemporary fundamentalist movementsare not holdovers or reactionary, but post-traditionalist.

The Western powers have, themselves, fallen victim to the ancient rootsargument. However, some observers have noted that the conflicts in central Africaare not necessarily ethnic or tribal, but about scarce resources. Ethnic differencesare the excuse for depriving some people of their resources and/or eliminating themas competitors. Thus, ethnicity has become the "rationalization of choice" for a widevariety of conflicts. The irony here is that such conflicts may, themselves, be ethno-genetic, creating the very groups whose existence is imputed to have been the rootof the conflict.

Conflict as a cause ofethnogenesis,

however, is not limited to the modern world.Conflicts between Burmese language groups and Thai language groups helped formBurma and Siam out of loose federations of what appear to have been chiefdoms.Still, the groups today are clearly distinct in culture and state structure. However,the constant taking of prisoners in centuries of warfare insures that neither groupis genetically pure, or even distinct. This, however, does not seem to hold as stronglyfor the numerous "hill tribes" in those two states.'2

As Fred Riggs argues (1997a: 7), cleavages, which occur when "a communityrejects that identity [of the conqueror] and demands recognition of its sovereigntyas an independent or autonomous people," often give rise to violence in the contem-porary world. Under this definition, cleavages were extremely rare in the ancient

world. Rather, diversity was common. As Riggs notes, the presence of democracyand nationalism in the modern world (along with industrialism) creates conditionswhich not only foments cleavages, but promotes violent ethnonationalist movementswhen democratic means cannot achieve sufficient autonomy.

Before turning to the conclusions that may be drawn from this discussion, I wantto comment on two puzzles it raises, but does not solve.

TWo Puzzles

As alluded to earlier, this analysis of polyethnicity or multi-ethnic states generatestwo

puzzles: (1) whythe ideal of ethnic

homogeneity emergedand flourished in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and (2) why ethnic conflict has become socommon in the late twentieth century.

Why Equate States with Ethnic Homogeneity?In the 1950s and early 1960s modernization theory dominated the social sciencesand was more or less taken for granted by many historians. Those who acceptedthe claim by modernization theory that ethnic homogeneity was an inevitable conse-quence of modernization were dismayed by the proliferation of ethnic conflictsaround the world. One of McNeill's goals in his 1985 lectures was to chide histori-

ans for accepting this view uncritically. While few people adhere to modernizationtheory uncritically, and it is close to dead (Wallerstein, 1976), it still has a consid-erable hold on the popular imagination. This is all too evident in the many claimson the need for ethnic unity in order to have a strong state. It is also a widely held

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view among contemporary beginning college students-as those of us who teachabout ethnicity know too well.

McNeill's answer is again rooted in ancient history, and partially instructive. Intheir

very early stagesof formation Rome and Athens were, indeed,

ethnicallyhomogeneous. But as they grew they became more diverse. Writers from that transi-tional period saw this as a problem and wrote nostalgically about the glorious(presumably ethnically pure) past (Friedman's quotation from Seneca illustratesthis nicely). In the late middle ages Northern European thinkers were reading theseancients and presumed that to be the way to greatness.

John Bartlett in the Making of Europe 1993) argues that the Norman culture ofknighthood spread throughout the western end of the Eurasian land mass, creatingthe idea, and the actuality of Europe as a distinctive region. The highly variegatedterrain of western Eurasia favored small, and hence relatively homogeneous states.Thus, the intellectuals reading the ancients found themselves in much the same

situation as the ancient writers. They lived in hitherto homogeneous states whichwere becoming diverse.

Increasing communication and trade created pressure for developing standard-ized languages and uniform practices. The world-wide burst in population growthin the mid-eighteenth century made it easier for cities to recruit workers fromthe same, rather than from different, ethnic groups. This facilitated the devel-opment of national languages, and made the ideal of ethnic homogeneity seemfeasible.

The key in both McNeill's and my own view was the growing need for largerarmies. As the need for infantry grew, state elites had to devise a way of recruit-

ingmore soldiers without

raisingthe

dangersinherent in

arming peasants.The

boon of citizenship proved to be the answer. Citizenship, however, carried with ita right to participation (democracy in some form) and thus further heightenedpressures for cultural uniformity.

This is far from a sufficient explanation for the rise of the ideal of the ethnicallyhomogeneous state. There is much more to it. As Yael Tamir (1995: 438) observes,"It is truly ironic that the power of nationalism depends precisely on those aspectsof the nation's image least supported by research evidence," that is, its antiquity.What remains a puzzle is how such a clearly empirically incorrect view ever tookhold, and why its hold has persisted so long despite overwhelmingly contradictoryevidence.

Why the Rise in Ethnic Conflict?McNeill claims the European-based deal of the ethnically pure state began to erodearound the time of World War I. He attributes this to the waves of decolonizationand the realization by the imperial powers that ethnic homogeneity was neitherpossible nor necessary. This account of the rise and demise of the ideal of ethni-cally homogeneous nationalism is far from satisfactory. But to explicate it fullywould take far more time and space than is appropriate here. Clearly though, asthe Bosnian example shows, *ethnonationalism emains a convenient ideology for

rationalizingseizure of power and

property.That is, the ideal of

ethnically homoge-neous states can be marshalled for other political causes. Be that as it may, we canconclude with McNeill (1986: 36) that: "The accelerated mingling of diverse peopleswithin state boundaries that we everywhere witness in our own time, and specifi-cally since World War I, is therefore a return to normal as far as Western European

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nations are concerned." Though I agree that recent increases in ethnic conflict area return to "normal," this does not fully explain the timing of the rise.

I will leave aside the puzzles of why the chimera of ethnically homogeneous statespersists, despite its obvious everyday empirical contradictions, and the timing of theresurgence of ethnic conflict. I turn to the conclusions that emerge from the analy-sis of ancient states and world-systems.

ConclusionsThe first, and possibly most important conclusion is that ethnically homogeneousstates have been rare since the first formation of states. When they do occur theyare peculiar accidents of history, or brief phases on the way to ethnic diversity. Thisconclusion not only reframes the problem from Why so much ethnic unrest today?to Why should anyone seriously have expected otherwise? It also suggests radical

changes in policies regarding ethnicity, the main one being that we should continueto criticize the drive for ethnic purity as fundamentally unnecessary, in Bosnia,Rwanda, Canada, the United States, and everywhere else. Furthermore, there is noreal need for assimilationist policies. Multi-ethnicity, or in sociological terms,pluralism, is not only possible, but preferable. However, this interpretation does notgive any guidelines for making it workable.

Second, there are many criteria by which groups have been distinguished. Thesecriteria rise and fall in salience with world-systemic changes. Key differences followthe four world-system boundaries: bulk goods networks, political/military networks,prestige goods networks, and information networks. Hence there are different incor-poration processes, or trajectories of incorporation, as well as varying degrees ofincorporation along each of these boundaries. All give rise to different kinds ofethnic minorities. In the modern world-system, as these four boundaries have cometo coincide, the mechanisms which generate ethnic groups have changed. Whetherthey have become fewer remains unclear. That they are different, however, isinescapable. Similarly, as Jonathan Friedman shows, cycles of hegemony in theworld-system also transform identity politics in important ways.

Thus, third, ethnic phenomena and relations cannot be understood solely byreference to local processes, but must always be studied within their broadernational and international contexts. This is true for both ancient and moderninstances. Yet those contexts are, themselves, significantly different in the ancient

and modern worlds. In short, lessons from the ancient world must be used withcaution.Fourth, world-systems, as well as states, create diversity. More often they trans-

form it, primarily, but not exclusively, by incorporation. The processes are part andparcel of the normal functioning of states and world-systems. Thus, ethnic diversityis normal. Similarly, cycles in the world-system (e.g., hegemony, as argued by Fried-man) shape and transform identity politics in systematic ways.

Fifth, ethnicity has always been somewhat fluid with respect to identity, bound-aries, cultural content, and membership. It changes through time. It is imperma-nent. It is this fluidity, as Tamir (1995) argues, that generates a need to imputedeep historical roots-precisely to solidify that which is inherently ephemeral.

Sixth, a major difference between the modern world and the ancient is volumeand velocity of ethnic processes and the pervasiveness of states. In short, while aprimordialist approach may have made sense in many ancient contexts, it very seldomdoes in the contemporary world. Phrased differently, the very nature of *modern

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ethnicity has changed in the contemporary world. This is precisely why there is somuch contention about what it is and means, and why it is subject to so much

postmodern deconstruction and reconstruction. This difference is the basis of Fred

Riggs's argument that ethnicity is a (para-)modern social phenomenon.Seventh, in the case of non-state societies, and even some states, incorporation

into a world-system, or even a state, transforms formerly autonomous social organi-zations into sub-parts of a larger whole. That is, "tribes" become minority groups.

Eighth, the drive for sovereignty by such groups is an attempt to regain that

autonomy. Formerly non-state societies have been especially adept at manipulatingthe concept of sovereignty to their own advantage. As Franke Wilmer (1993)observes, to deny their claims to sovereignty is to deny validity of the concept of

sovereignty itself.Ninth, the processes creating ethnic conflicts are part and parcel of modernity.

That is, not only did modernization theory err in predicting the demise of ethnic-

ity (and status markers generally), it failed utterly to understand that modernitycreates such ethnic conflicts. As Fred Riggs has put it (1997a, b, 1998), modernityhas its downsides, ethnic conflict being the major one. I would amend his argumentonly slightly to note (as in the third point) that this downside of modernity is a

property of the world-system, not of states. Thus, explanations of its workings mustattend the forces driving world-system processes.

Finally, the pursuit of ethnic homogeneity is a chimera, often used to justifypursuit of other goals, like wealth and power. It is a rationalization. Like all ratio-nalizations, it works better if there is some plausible factual basis upon which it

might draw. Thus, the policy recommendations listed under the first item above.In terms of praxis, it is

hightime that the concept of the ethnically pure state be

constantly and harshly criticized. This, however, does not mean that claims for

equal treatment should be ignored. Rather, it means that the task at hand for socialscientists, politicians, and citizens is to devise ways in which states and societies

may function while differences are supported and even celebrated. This, to be sure,is a daunting task.

Notes1. For typical definitions of these approaches see, for instance, Gurr and Harff (1994: 78ff.).2. The term *pluralism as used by sociologists and anthropologists, refers to societies

composed of more than one ethnic group who share some, but not all, institutions.Sometimes a further distinction is drawn between cultural pluralism (a situation in whichonly some, but not all cultural attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyles are shared) and structuralpluralism (where groups share only some, but not all institutions) (see Farley, 1995:166-167 for a typical sociological discussion). This "pluralism" s very different fromJ.S.Furnivall's infelicitous concept of "plural society," by which he means a society "compris-ing two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling,in one political unit" (Furnivall, 1939: 446). Furnivall's concept at best would be anextreme form of pluralism. Indeed, if one pushed the sociological analysis further andnoted that assimilation, pluralism, and separatism delineate a continuum of adaptationof one group to another ranging from complete to minimal, Furnivall's "plural society"would be placed very close to the separatism pole of the continuum. To be fair, Furni-vall

developedhis

conceptfor

dealingwith the

peculiaritiesof the colonial situation.

Indeed, I argue that his plural society is a characteristic of a certain degree and type ofincorporation which cannot be explained solely from colonial society.

3. This terminological difference reflects roots in history as a profession and a civilizationalapproach to history as opposed to various social science approaches. The differences are

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more than terminological. For discussion see Sanderson (1995b), especially chapters byMcNeill and Melko, and Sanderson's introductory essays. For purposes of this article,however, these equivalencies are adequate.

4. I use polyethnicity, in accord with McNeill's usage, to mean any sort of

racial-ethnic-cultural-linguistic mixing. Note, in my view religion is subsumed underculture.

5. Kotkin (1993) makes much of the trading "tribes" in the contemporary world. To besure, his point that they remain important today is well taken. He is mistaken, however,in seeing them as something new. They are as ancient as long distance trade itself.

6. For reviews of this literature see Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: chaps. 1-3), Frank andGills (1993), Peregrine (1996a, b); Hall (1996a, b); and Sanderson (1995b). An entiresubsection of the section on International Political Economy, the World HistoricalSystems subsection, has been formed around this subject.

7. I have addressed the issue of frontier dynamics elsewhere. See Hall (forthcoming a, b,1996a, b).

8. I want topoint

out that therange

oftypes

and variation withintypes isfar greater amongnon-state societies than state societies. While vitally important to understanding both

long-term social change and incorporation processes, discussion of these differenceswould detract from the discussion at hand. These issue are discussed in detail in Hall(1989a) and Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997).

9. This, however, could be an artifact of our lack of detailed knowledge of ancient historywith respect to ethnic movements. At this time, the preponderance of evidence stronglysuggests that this is a real difference and not an artifact of selective knowledge. Still,further research on this subject could substantiate this claim more robustly.

10. Fred Riggs (1994, 1997a, b, 1998) comes to a similar conclusion, that contemporaryethnicity differs significantly from ancient forms of ethnicity. He also draws a numberof useful distinctions among types of ethnicity and movements that warrant closer exami-

nation than I give them here.11. For instance, the virtual discussion group, Native-L carried a great deal of debate aboutthis issue. With some participants attributing anthropological/archaeological explana-tions of the peopling of the Americas via the Bering land bridge as an attempt to under-mine and degrade indigenous religions.

12. This discussion of Southeast Asia merely glosses over very complex processes. Theseremarks are meant to be suggestive, not definitive. It is based on the following sources:Aung-Thwin, 1985; Cady, 1966; Chutintaranond, 1995; Chutintaranond and Tun, 1995;Coedes, 1966, 1968; K.R. Hall, 1985; Kulke, 1986; Marr and Milner, 1986; Penth, 1994;Vickery, 1986; Wang, 1986; Wicks, 1992; Wyatt, 1984, 1994. Wang and Chutintaranondespecially argue that the concepts of state and empire need to be rethought in the South-east Asian context. Their discussions of the "mandala" of statelets resonates

quitewell

with the discussion of marcher states, and state formation in Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997,esp. chap. 5.

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Biographical Note:

THOMAS D. HALL is Lester M. Jones Professor of Sociology and Coordinator ofConflict Studies at DePauw University. He is the author of Social Change n the South-west, 1350-1880 (1989) and along with Christopher Chase-Dunn, author of Rise andDemise: Comparing World-Systems 1997). ADDRESS:Department of Sociology & Anthro-pology, DePauw University, Greencastle, IN 46135-0037, USA. [email:

[email protected]]

Acknowledgements.This s a revised version [29 May and 6 Oct 1997] of a paper presented atthe panel on Insecurity: Migration (Refugees) and Ethnic Nationalism As Symptoms of World

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Systemic Crisis, at the International Studies Association meeting, Toronto, March 1997.Figures 1 and 2 are copyright ? 1997 Westview Press, and are reprinted by permission ofWestview Press. I thank the commentators and panelists for their insightful comments. LeslieS. Laczko also made useful comments. At DePauw University thanks are due to colleagues

Eric Silverman and Thomas Ewing for inviting me to present an earlier version of this paperat the Faculty Research Colloquium, and to the John and Janice Fisher Fund for FacultyDevelopment for assistance in attending the International Studies Conference and inpreparation of this paper. Last, but not least, to the considerable efforts of Fred Riggs inorganizing and editing this collection. As usual, despite all this good will, I bear fullresponsibility for any errors.

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