H. PARTS OF PLEADINGS[G.R. No. 129227. May 30, 2000]BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and CALVIN & ELSA ARCILLA,respondents.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA_REYES,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariof the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]in CA-G.R. CV No. 45891 entitled CALVIN S. ARCILLA and ELSA B. ARCILLA vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, ET. AL. which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Manila ordering BANCO FILIPINO to pay CALVIN and ELSA ARCILLA the amount of P126,139.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint.The undisputed facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:"Elsa Arcilla and her husband, Calvin Arcilla, the Appellees in the present recourse, secured, on three (3) occasions, loans from the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Appellant in the present recourse, in the total amount of P107,946.00 as evidenced by "Promissory Note" executed by the Appellees in favor of the Appellant. To secure the payment of said loans, the Appellees executed "Real Estate Mortgages" in favor of the Appellants over their parcels of land located in BF-Paraaque, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 444645, 450406, 450407 and 455410 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque (Annexes "B" to "B-2", Amended Complaint). Under said deeds, the Appellant may increase the rate of interest, on said loans, within the limits allowed by law, as Appellants Board of Directors may prescribe for its borrowers. At that time, under the Usury Law, Act 2655, as amended, the maximum rate of interest for loans secured by real estate mortgages was 12% per annum. On January 10, 1975, the Appellees and the Appellant executed a "Deed of Consolidation and Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage" whereby the aforementioned loans of the Appellees and the "Real Estate Mortgage" executed by them as security for the payment of said loans were consolidated (pages 33-35, Record). Likewise, under said deed, the loan of the Appellees from the Appellant was increased to P188,000.00. The Appellees executed a "Promissory Note", dated January 15, 1975, whereby they bound and obliged themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the Appellant the aforesaid amount of P188,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in nineteen (19) years from date thereof, in stated installments of P2,096.93 a month (page 32, Records).On January 2, 1976, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued Central Bank Circular No. 494, quotedinfra, as follows:x x x3. The maximum rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges on loans with maturity of more than seven hundred thirty (730) days, by banking institutions, including thrift banks, or by financial intermediaries authorized to engage in quasi-banking functions shall be nineteen percent (19%) per annum.x x x7. Except as provided in this Circular and Circular No. 493, loans or renewals thereof shall continue to be governed by the Usury Law, as amended. (idem,supra)In the meantime, the Skyline Builders, Inc., through its President, Appellee Calvin Arcilla, secured loans from the Bank of the Philippine Islands in the total amount of P450,000.00. To insure payment of the aforesaid loan, the FGU Insurance Corporation, issued PG Bond No. 1003 for the amount of P225,000.00 (pages 434-436, Records) in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Skyline Buildings, Inc., and the Appellees executed an "Agreement of Counter-Guaranty with Mortgage" in favor of the FGU Insurance Corporation covering the aforesaid parcels of land to assure payment of any amount that the insurance company may pay on account of said loans (pages 429-436, Records). The mortgage was annotated as Entry No. 58009 at the dorsal portion of Appellees titles.After October 30, 1978, the Appellant prepared and issued a "Statement of Account" to the Appellees on their loan account to the effect that, as of October 30, 1978, the balance of their loan account, inclusive of interests,computed at 17% per annum,amounted to 284,490.75 (page 555, Records). It turned out that the Appellant unilaterally increased the rate of interest on the loan account of the Appellees from 12% per annum, as covenanted in the "Real Estate Mortgage" and "Deed of Consolidated and Amended Real Estate Mortgage"to 17% per annum on the authority of the aforequoted Central Bank Circular.The Appellees failed to pay their monthly amortizations to Appellant. The latter forthwith filed, on April 3, 1979, a petition, with the Provincial Sheriff, for the extrajudicial foreclosure of Appellees "Real Esate Mortgage" in favor of the Appellant for the amount of P342,798.00inclusive of the 17% per annumwhich purportedly was the totality of Appellees account with the Appellant on their loans. The Appellant was the purchaser of the property at public auction for the aforesaid amount of P324,798.00. On May 25, 1979, the Sheriff executed a "Certificate of Sale" over the aforesaid properties in favor of the Appellant for the aforesaid amount (pages 37-38, Records).The Appellant filed a "Petition for a Writ of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court entitled "Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Elsa Arcilla, et al., LRC Case No. P-7757-P". On February 28, 1980, the Court rendered a Decision granting the Petition of the Appellant. The Appellees appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter Court, on June 29, 1985, promulgated a Decision affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (pages 190-198, Records).In the meantime, the FGU Insurance Corporation, Inc., redeemed the aforesaid properties from the Appellant by paying to the latter the amount of P389,289.41 inclusive of interest computed at 17% per annum. The Appellant and FGU Insurance Corp., Inc., executed, on May 27, 1980, a "Deed of Redemption" (pages 126-129, Records).On September 2, 1985, the Appellees filed a complaint in the Courta quofor the "Annulment of the Loan Contracts, Foreclose Sale with Prohibition and Injunction, Etc." entitled "Calvin Arcilla, et al. vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al." (pages 1-38, Records).The Appellees averred, in their complaint,inter alia, that the loan contracts and mortgages between the Appellees and the Appellant were null and void because: (a) the interests, charges, etc., were deducted in advance from the face value of the "Promissory Notes" executed by the Appellees; and (b) the rate of interests charged by the Appellant were usurious. The Appellees prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor as follows:"x x xWHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed a) Pending hearing on the prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, a restraining order be immediately issued against the defendants or anyone acting in their behalf from enforcing the writ of possession issued against the plaintiffs;b) After notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendants,particularly defendants FGU Insurance Corporation and the City Sheriff of Pasay City, MM, or any of his deputies or anyone acting in their behalffrom enforcing the writ of possession;c) After trial 1) To make the injunction permanent;2) Declare the loan contracts null and void;3) Declare the extrajudicial foreclosure null and void;4) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorney fees; and, costs of suit.PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises." (pages 88-89, Records)In its Answer to the Complaint, the Appellant averred that the interests charged by it on Appellees loan accounts and that the said loan contracts and mortgages were lawful. The Appellant further averred that the Appellees action had already prescribed.In the interim, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in the precedent - setting case of"Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Hon. Miguel Navarro, et al., 152 SCRA 346" where it declared that Central Bank Circular No. 494 was not the "law" envisaged in the mortgage deeds of borrowers of the Bank; that the escalation clause incorporated in said deeds giving authority to the Appellant to increase the rate of interests without the corresponding deescalation clause should not be given effect because of its one-sidedness in favor of the Appellant; that the aforesaid Central Bank Circular did not apply to loans secured by real estate mortgages, and that, therefore, the Appellant cannot rely said Circular as authority for it to unilaterally increase the rate of interests on loans secured by Real Estate Mortgages.In the meantime, the FGU Insurance Corp., Inc., filed a "Motion for Substitution" with the Regional Trial Court, in LRC Case No. Pq-7757-P praying that it be substituted as the Petitioner in said case (pages 354-356, Records). The Appellees were served with a copy of said motion and filed their Opposition thereto. However, on November 10, 1987, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision granting the motion of FGU Insurance Company (page 369, Records)On December 3, 1987, the Appellees filed a Motion, with the Courta quo, for leave to file an "Amended Complaint" to implead FGU Insurance Corporation as party defendant (pages 83-129, Records). The Court granted said motion and admitted Appellees Amended Complaint.After the requisite pre-trial, the Courta quoissued a Pre-Trial Order which defined,inter alia, Appellees action against the Appellant, and the latters defenses, to wit:"x x xOn the part of the defendants Banco Filipino Savings to simplify the case, it seeks to declare as null and void plaintiffs loan contract with Banco Filipino obtained in May 1974, on the ground that the interest agreed in the contract was usurious. Plaintiffs also seek to declare as null and void the foreclosure of their mortgage by Banco Filipino on the ground that the loan with the said mortgagee foreclosure maybe validly done.D E F E N S E S1. Prescription2. Laches3. Estoppel" (page 496, Records)In the meantime, the Appellees and FGU Insurance Corporation entered into and forged a "Compromise Agreement." The Courta quopromulgated a Decision, dated April 3, 1991, based on said "Compromise Agreement." Under the "Compromise Agreement", the Appellees bound and obliged themselves, jointly and severally, to pay to FGU Insurance Corporation the amount of P1,964,117.00 in three (3) equal installments and that:"x x x6. Upon faithful compliance by plaintiffs Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla with their Agreement, defendant FGU Insurance Corporation shall renounce in their favor all its rights, interests and claims to the four (4) parcels of land mentioned in paragraph No. 4 of this Compromise Agreement, together with all the improvements thereon, and plaintiffs Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla shall be subrogated to all such rights, interests and claims. In addition, defendant FGU Insurance Corporation shall execute in favor of plaintiffs Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla a deed of cancellation of the real estate mortgage constituted in its favor on the above-mentioned four (4) parcels of land, together with all the improvements thereon. All documentary stamps and expenses for registration of the said deed of cancellation of mortgage shall be for the account of plaintiffs Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla.7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph No. 4 of this Compromise Agreement, the execution of this Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the prosecution of the claims of plaintiffs Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla. (pages 543-544, Records)Thereafter, the Appellees and the Appellant agreed, upon the prodding of the Courta quo, that the only issue to be resolved by the Courta quowas, whether or not the Appellees were entitled to the refund, under the Decision of the Supreme Court in "Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Hon. Miguel Navarro, et al.," supra. On November 8, 1991,the Appellees filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" appending thereto,inter alia, the Affidavit of Appellee Calvin S. Arcilla and the appendages thereof (pages 550-555, Records). Appellant filed its Opposition but did not append any affidavit to said Opposition. On March 26, 1993, the Courta quopromulgated a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant Banco Filipino ordering defendant Banco Filipino to pay spouses Calvin S. Arcilla and Elsa B. Arcilla the sum of P126,139.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint.SO ORDERED. (pages 584-585, Records)"[2]Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the RTC the dispositive portion of which reads:"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Appellants appeal is DISMISSED. With costs against the Appellant.SO ORDERED."[3]Their Motion for Reconsideration[4]was denied hence this petition where the petitioner assigns the following errors:"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ACCRUED ON OCTOBER 30, 1978, AND THEREFORE THE FILING OF THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THEIR LOAN CONTRACTS WITH THE PETITIONER IN 1985 WAS NOT YET BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT WERE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE RELIEFS GRANTED TO THEM BY THE LOWER COURT, PATICULARLY THE REFUND OF P126,139.00 REPRESENTING ALLEGED EXCESS INTEREST PAID ON THEIR LOAN.III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE SAID REFUND OF P126,139.00 CLAIMED BY THEM."[5]The petitioner maintains that the complaint filed by herein private respondents was an action for Annulment of Loan Contracts, foreclosure sale with prohibition and injunction. It is contended that these causes of action accrued on the date of the execution of the promissory note and deed of mortgage on January 15, 1975 and not October 30, 1978 as found by the Court of Appeals. Thus, private respondents cause of action has already prescribed inasmuch as the case was filed on September 2, 1985 or more than ten years thereafter. Petitioner further contends that private respondents cannot rely on the ruling in the case ofBanco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs. Navarro[6]considering that they were not parties to said case. Petitioner also maintains that the order of the lower court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals ordering the petitioner to refund the excess interest paid by private respondents in the amount of P126,318.00 was without any legal basis since private respondents never raised the issue of interest nor prayed for any relief with respect thereto. Moreover, the private respondents never paid said amount to the petitioner. While the amount was included in the bid price of the bank when it bought the mortgaged properties during the public auction, said bid price did not prejudice the private respondents because when the private respondents repurchased the properties, the amount they paid was different and independent of the redemption price of the bank. Besides, the agreement between the private respondents and FGU Insurance Corporation was one of sale and not redemption. Thus, any amount paid by the private respondents to FGU was voluntarily entered into by them and was not a consequence of the foreclosure of the mortgage properties.Conversely, private respondents allege that their action has not prescribed considering that prescription begins to run from the day the action may be brought; the date their right of action accrued. It is their contention that the period of prescription of their action should commence to run from October 30, 1978 when the petitioner unilaterally increased the rate of interest on private respondents loan to 17% per annum. Thus, when private respondents filed their action against the petitioner on September 2, 1985 or almost eight years thereafter, their action had not yet prescribed. Moreover, private respondents aver that they are entitled to the refund inasmuch as the escalation clause incorporated in the loan contracts do not have a corresponding de-escalation clause and is therefore illegal.The appeal is unmeritorious.There are only two issues, which must be resolved in the present appeal. First, has the action of the private respondents prescribed; and second, are the respondents entitled to the refund of the alleged interest overpayments.Petitioners claim that the action of the private respondents has prescribed is bereft of merit. Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Thus, the period of prescription of any cause of action is reckoned only from the date the cause of action accrued.[7]And a cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done.[8]The period should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the contract on January 15, 1975 as claimed by the petitioner for at that time, there would be no way for the respondents to know of the violation of their rights.[9]The Court of Appeals therefore correctly found that respondents cause of action accrued on October 30, 1978, the date they received the statement of account showing the increased rate of interest, for it was only from that moment that they discovered the petitioners unilateral increase thereof. We quote with approval the pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals decision as follows:"It is the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription (Constancia C. Telentino vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 162 SCRA 66). In fine, the ten-year prescriptive period is to be reckoned from the accrual of Appellees right of action, not necessarily on the very date of the execution of the contracts subject of the action (Naga Telepone Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 230 SCRA 351). A partys right of action accrues only when the confluence of the following elements is established:"xxx: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff (Cole vs. Vda. de Gregorio, 116 SCRA 670 [1982]; Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., 58 SCRA 559 [1974]; Vda. de Enriquez vs. Dela Cruz, 54 SCRA 1 [1973]. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen (Cole vs. Vda. De Gregorio, supra)" (Maria U. Espaol vs. Chairman, etc., et al.,, 137 SCRA 314, page 318)More, the aggrieved must have either actual or presumptive knowledge of the violation, by the guilty party of his rights either by an act or omission. The question that now comes to the fore is when the Appellees became precisely aware of the unilateral increase, by the Appellant, of the rate of interest on their loan account to 17% per annum. As can be ascertained from the records, the Appellees discovered or should have discovered, for the first time, the unilateral increase by the Appellant of the rate of interest to 17% per annum when they received the "Statement of Account" of the Appellant as of October 30, 1978. Hence, it was only then that the prescriptive period for the Appellees to institute their action in the Court a quo commenced. Since the Appellees filed their complaint in the Courtaquoon September 2, 1985, the same was seasonably filed within the ten-year prescriptive period."[10]Anent the second issue as to whether the respondents are entitled to recover the alleged overpayments of interest, we find that they are despite the absence of any prayer therefor. This Court has ruled that it is the material allegations of fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion made therein or the prayer that determines the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled.[11]It is the allegations of the pleading which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.[12]Thus, even if the complaint seeks the declaration of nullity of the contract, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the factual allegations contained therein ultimately seek the return of the excess interests paid.The amended complaint[13]of herein private respondents specifically allege that the contracts of loan entered into by them and the petitioner were contrary to and signed in violation of the Usury Law[14]and consequentially pray that said contracts be declared null and void. The amended complaint reads:"6. The aforementioned loansgranted by defendant Banco Filipino tothe plaintiffs as stated on the face of the promissory note and real estate mortgage (Annexes "B" to "D", inclusive) were not actually received by the plaintiffs because interests, charges, etc. were deducted in advance from the face value of the loansnot in accordance with the contracts;7.Even the loan contracts (Annexes "B" to "D", inclusive) required by defendant Banco Filipino to be signed by the plaintiffs were contrary to and in violation of the then Usury Law, as amended;8.Assuming arguendo that the loan contracts between plaintiffs and defendant Banco Filipino are valid, the extra-judicial foreclosure of the properties of the plaintiffs on May 24, 1979 was null and void for having been conducted in clear violation of the law (Act 3135), namely: a) lack of roper notice to the plaintiffs; b) lack of proper publication and posting as required by law; c) the alleged sale was conducted at the place other than that prescribed by law, among others;9.On May 27, 1990, defendant Banco Filipino purportedly executed in favor of defendant FGU Insurance Corporation a Deed of Redemption over the foreclosed properties of the plaintiffs, again, without notice to the latter, as evidenced by the said Deed of Redemption, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "F".10.The Deed of Redemption (Annex "F") is clearly null and void for having been executed in violation of Rule 39, Rules of Court, and other related provisions of the Rules of Court."[15]The loan contracts with real estate mortgage entered into by and between the petitioner and respondent stated that the petitioner may increase the interest on said loans, within the limits allowed by law, as petitioners Board of Directors may prescribe for its borrowers. At the time the contracts were entered into, said escalation clause was valid.[16]It was only pursuant to P.D. No. 1684 which became effective March 17, 1980 wherein to be valid, escalation clauses should provide: 1.) that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary Board; and 2.) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must include a provision for the reduction of the stipulated interest in the event that the maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board.[17]Given the validity of the escalation clause, could the petitioner increase the stipulated interest pursuant to the Central Bank Circular 494 from 12% to 17%.We rule that it may not.The escalation clause in the loan contracts reads as follows:"xxx g) The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured by this mortgage, as well as the interest on the amount which may have been advanced by the Mortgagee in accordance with paragraph (b) and (d) hereof, shall be subject, during the terms of this contract, to such an increase,within the limits allowed by law, as the Board of Directors of the Mortgagee may prescribe for its debtors; xxx" (emphasis supplied)[18]InBanco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs. Navarro,[19]which involved a similar escalation clause[20],we ruled that Central Bank Circular 494, although it has the force and effect of law, is not a law and is not the law contemplated by the parties which authorizes the petitioner to unilaterally raise the interest rate of the loan.[21]Consequently, the reliance by the petitioner on Central Bank Circular 494 to unilaterally raise the interest rates on the loan in question was without any legal basis.Petitioners argument that theBanco Filipinocase cannot be applied to the present case since the respondents were not intervenors therein is flawed. Only the judgment in said case cannot bind the respondents as they were not parties thereto, however, the doctrine enunciated therein is a judicial decision and forms part of the legal system of the land.[22]It forms a precedent, which must be adhered to under the doctrine ofstare decisis.[23]Thus, even if the respondents were not parties to the above-mentioned case, the doctrine enunciated therein may be applied to the present case.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45891 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146089.December 13, 2001]VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPU-LAPU REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION, MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. MERCEDES GOCHAN, ALFREDO GOCHAN, ANGELINA GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO GOCHAN, JR., and MARLON GOCHAN,respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49084,[1]as well as its Resolution[2]dated November 22, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration.Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation.Sometime in 1996, respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban Gochan, for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000.00.Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents.Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the necessary Receipts.[3]In addition, respondents executed their respective Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,[4]wherein they undertook that they would not initiate any suit, action or complaint against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.In turn, respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a promissory note,[5]undertaking not to divulge the actual consideration they paid for the shares of stock.For this purpose, Crispo Gochan, Jr. drafted a document entitled promissory note in his own handwriting and had the same signed by Felix Gochan, III, Louise Gochan andEsteban Gochan, Jr.Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the promissory note a phrase that says, Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale.[6]On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-21854.Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares in the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development Corporation; and that they executed a Provisional Memorandum of Agreement, wherein they enumerated the following as consideration for the sale:1.Pesos:Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)2.Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan compound, Mabolo, Lot 4F-2-B3.Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Cebu4.Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in Mactan, Cebu5.Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.[7]Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the aforementioned properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received from petitioners.Further, respondents prayed for moral damages of P15,000,000.00, exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00, attorneys fees of P14,000,000.00, and litigation expenses of P2,000,000.00.Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses:(a) lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees; (b) unenforceability of the obligation to convey real properties due to lack of a written memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds; (c) extinguishment of the obligation by payment; (d) waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent of all their claims against petitioners; and (e) non-joinder of indispensable parties.On August 7, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses.In an Order dated August 11, 1998, the trial court denied the motion, ruling as follows:As the grant of said motion lies in the discretion of the court under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court in the exercise of its discretion, hereby denies the said motion because the matters sought to be preliminarily heard do not appear to be tenable.For one, the statute of frauds does not apply in this case because the contract which is the subject matter of this case is already an executed contract.The statute of frauds applies only to executory contracts.According to Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, a leading authority in civil law, since the statute of frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds, it should not be made the instrument to further them.Thus, where one party has performed his obligation under a contract, equity would agree that all evidence should be admitted to prove the alleged agreement (PNB vs. Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, 49 Phil. 897).For another, the contention of the defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are already extinguished by full payment thereof does not appear to be indubitable because the plaintiffs denied under oath the due execution and genuineness of the receipts which are attached as Annexes 1-A, 1-B and 1-C of defendants answer.This issue therefore has to be determined on the basis of preponderance of evidence to be adduced by both parties.Then, still for another, the contention that the complaint is defective because it allegedly has failed to implead indispensable parties appears to be wanting in merit because the parties to the memorandum of agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in this case.Then the matter of payment of docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case because the record shows that the plaintiffs had paid at least P165,000.00 plus in the form of filing and docketing fees.Finally, regarding exerting earnest efforts toward a compromise by the plaintiffs, the defendants cannot say that there is an absence of an allegation to this effect in the complaint because paragraph 11 of the complaint precisely states that before filing this case, earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made.Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied by the trial court on September 11, 1998.Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49084.On September 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition on the ground that respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the affirmative defenses.[8]Again, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution of November 22, 2000.[9]Petitioners, thus, brought the present petition for review anchored on the following grounds:I.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND PALPABLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES HAVE BEEN PAID.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT THE PMOA WAS A PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT AND HENCE NOT COVERED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DECIDING THAT THE CLAIMS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENT OR FULL SETTLEMENT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF RECEIPTS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHOWING THE CONTRARY.IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RESOLVING THAT FELIX GOCHAN III AND ESTEBAN GOCHAN, JR. ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AND THEREFORE NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED AS PARTIES.[10]Respondents filed their Comment,[11]arguing, in fine, that petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; and that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.The instant petition has merit.The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.In the case ofSun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[12]this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.Respondents maintain that they paid the correct docket fees in the amount of P165,000.00 when they filed the complaint with the trial court.Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees.The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for specific performance and incapable of pecuniary estimation.We do not agree.It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor.In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.[13]The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for specific performance and damages. The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement.Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.In the case ofHernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,[14]this Court held that a real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action.In such a case, the action must be filed in the proper court where the property is located:In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance, and, therefore, personal and transitory in nature.This very issue was considered and decided by this Court in the case ofManuel B. Ruiz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al.,L-18692, promulgated 31 January 1963.There the Court, by unanimous vote of all the Justices, held as follows:This contention has no merit.Although appellants complaint is entitled to be one for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering said parcel of land be issued to him shows that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership.Hence, the action must be commenced in the province where the property is situated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.[15]In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance.Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, provides:Section 7.Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.-x x x(b)xxxIn a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case ofSun Insurance,[16]to the effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period.However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied in the case ofSun Insurancecannot apply to the instant case as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees.Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint.Thus, it was stated in the case ofSun Insurance:[17]The principle inManchestercould very well be applied in the present case.The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.However, inManchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.Thus, inManchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the courta quodid not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlikeManchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.The promulgation of the decision inManchestermust have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions before the Court of Appeals.Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there was no forum-shopping as there was no identity of issues or identity of reliefs sought in the two petitions.We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping.The deplorable practice of forum-shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort to two different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one.In the case ofGolangco v. Court of Appeals,[18]we laid down the following test to determine whether there is forum-shopping:Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a person who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum shopping cannot be said to exist in the case at bar.Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar.The first petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.The second petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854.More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals.In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge in his stead.True, the trial court has the discretion to conduct a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses.In the case at bar, however, the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it denied the motion for preliminary hearing.As we have discussed above, some of these defenses, which petitioners invoked as grounds for the dismissal of the action, appeared to be indubitable, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court.Indeed, the abuse of discretion it committed amounted to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,[19]which would have warranted the extraordinary writ of certiorari.Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED.This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, which is directed to forthwith conduct the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority,Petitioner,vs.KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision1and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default,2predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,3it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion.4It found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidenceex parte.The Republic presented its evidenceex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari5seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the answer6and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement.7Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him.8This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.9By adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;10(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;11(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;12(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make13or(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.14Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its implications, as follows:1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment15and memorandum it submitted to this Court.Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must besignedby the party or counsel representing him.Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.16Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer17but cannot do soin favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons,18something the law strongly proscribes.Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidenceex parte.Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own validraison d etrein the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.19The Courts pronouncement inGarbo v. Court of Appeals20is relevant:Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.21In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyGRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDEand the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is herebyREINSTATED.Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.SO ORDERED.

CEFERINA ARGALLON-JOCSONand RODOLFO TUISING,Petitioners,- versus -COURT OF APPEALS,HON. BONIFACIO T. ONG, in his capacity as the acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORP., and MARCELO STEEL CORP.,Respondents.G.R. No. 162836Present:PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,CORONA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBERSAMIN,JJ.Promulgated:July 30, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition for review[1]of the Decision[2]dated 16 January 2004 and the Resolution dated 25 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79179. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 14 April 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23 (trial court), in Civil Case No. Br. 23-377.The FactsOn 10 August 1992, petitioner Ceferina Argallon-Jocson (Jocson) filed a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel Corporation and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), which were represented by Jose Marcelo as president of both companies.On 24 February 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Jocson] and against the defendants [Marcelo Steel Corporation and MCFC]: (1) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the balance ofP2,004,810.42, with legal interest from 1976 up to the present; (2) attorneys fees in the amount ofP20,000.00; and (3) to pay the costs.[3]Marcelo Steel Corporation and MCFC (private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision. Private respondents did not appeal the Court of Appeals decision, which became final and executory. Jocson then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On 9 December 2002, the trial court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the tenor of the decision.On 20 December 2002, a Writ of Execution[4](writ) was issued to the Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Manila, commanding the Sheriff to implement the writ upon private respondents in accordance with the tenor of the decision. The writ was indorsed to Sheriffs Levy Duka, Luis Alina, Andreil Garcia, and Nathaniel Abaya, who levied upon the properties ofMarcelo Steel Corporation in full satisfaction of the judgment debt. The execution sale was then scheduled on 17 February 2003. On 14 February 2003, Midas International Development Corporation (Midas Corp.) filed a third-party claim, alleging that some of the levied properties were previously mortgaged to Midas Corp. The execution sale was postponed to 21 February 2003. On 20 February 2003, Jocsonposted aP36 million indemnity bond[5]so that the levied properties would not be released to claimant Midas Corp. The Sheriffs then proceeded with the execution sale on 21 February 2003 and sold the properties ofMarcelo Steel Corporation for the full satisfaction of the judgment against private respondents. A certificate of sale[6]was issued to petitioner Rodolfo Tuising (Tuising), who was the highest bidder at the auction sale forP9.9 million.On 28 February 2003, Jocson filed with the trial court aVery Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Break-Open Order and Petition for Contempt of Court.[7]On 3 March 2003, Marcelo Steel Corporation filed anExtremely Urgent Omnibus Motion,[8]praying for the annulment of the execution sale and for the issuance of an order directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the properties sold to Tuising pending resolution of Marcelo Steel Corporations motion.Marcelo Steel Corporation alleged that its obligation was merely joint with MCFC and that the total price of the properties sold on execution was unconscionably inadequate.On 14 April 2003, the trial court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the execution sale of the properties of the defendant Marcelo Steel Corporation, namely: Seven (7) dilapidated warehouses, detachable metal structural steel with scattered machineries, metal scraps, metal G.I. Pipes, wires and post, held on February 21, 2003, is hereby declared null and void and the Certificate of Sale dated February 21, 2003 issued pursuant thereto is hereby set aside and cancelled.The motion for the issuance of a break-open order is hereby denied for lack of merit and basis.[9]Jocson moved for reconsideration of the trial courts order, claiming that the nature of the obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price was solidary.Tuising filed aMotion for Intervention with Leave of Court with Motion for Reconsideration and Entry of Appearance. On the other hand,Marcelo Steel Corporation filed, on 7 May 2003, aManifestation and Motion on Satisfaction of Judgment, depositing with the trial court a Managers Check in the amount ofP4,260,198.11 representing full satisfaction of Marcelo Steel Corporations obligation to Jocson. On 14 July 2003, the trial court denied Jocsons motion for reconsideration and Tuisingsmotion for intervention and reconsideration, and granted Marcelo Steel Corporations prayer for entry of satisfaction of judgment on its behalf.[10]On 18 August 2003, Jocson filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal, which she later withdrew on 4 September 2003, and in lieu thereof, petitioners Jocson and Tuising filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the Court of Appeals.[11]The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Jocson and Tuising filed a motion for reconsideration,[12]which the Court of Appeals denied on 25 March 2004. Hence, this petition.Meanwhile, on 23 February2004, Jocson filed with the trial court aMotion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Executionto implement the decision as against MCFC, stating that in view of the Court of Appeals decision, there is a need to executethe decision as against the other defendant MCFC.[13]The Trial Courts RulingIn its Order dated 14 April 2003, the trial court ruled that the liability of Marcelo Steel Corporation was limited to its proportional share in the entire money judgment. Considering that the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 24 February 1999 in this case did not state that the obligation of private respondents was solidary, then their obligation was merely joint.Citing the case ofPH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14]the trial court held that being made to pay for an obligation in its entirety when ones liability is merely for a portion is a sufficient ground to contest an execution sale. It would be the height of inequity if we allow judgment obligors to shoulder entire monetary judgments when their legal liabilities are limited only to their proportionate shares in the entire obligation.The Court of Appeals RulingThe Court of Appeals held that in consonance with Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[15]certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that the assigned issues were factual issues not proper in a petition for certiorari, which is limited to the issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals held that the obligation of private respondents to Jocson was merely joint. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial courts Decision dated 24 February 1999 was silent as to the nature of the liability. Solidary obligations are not presumed in the absence of an express determination thereof in the judgment. When the judgment does not provide that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain amount of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said judgment.The Court of Appeals found that the Sheriffs disregarded the trial courts 24 February 1999 Decision, and deviated from the trial courts Order dated 9 December 2002 and the writ of execution dated 20 December 2002, which directed them to execute the writ in accordance with the tenor of the decision.The IssuesPetitioners contend that:1.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THAT PETITIONERS WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL AND SUBSTITUTING IT BY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS PROCEDURALLY IMPERMISSIBLE.2.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE DECLARED THE OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 23-377 AS JOINT AND NOT SOLIDARY.3.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN [NOT] DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR A BREAK-OPEN AND DECLARING THE EXECUTION SALE CONDUCTED ON FEBRUARY 21, 2003 NULL AND VOID AND THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE AWARDED TO PETITIONER TUISING CANCELLED.4.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT DESPITE RECEIPT OF PETITIONER JOCSON OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE AS EVIDENCED BY THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT.5.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME AS PROINTERESSE SUO.[16]The Ruling of the CourtWe find the petition without merit.At the outset, the Court notes that the petition supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and Tuising was not signed by Jocsons counsel. It was Tuisings counsel who signed in behalf of Jocsons counsel. Tuisingscounsel had no authority to sign the petition in behalf of Jocson. The records are bereft of any proof that Jocson ever authorized Tuisings counsel to be her counsel or to act in her behalf. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[17]every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect.Furthermore, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum Shopping. Jocson did not sign the Verification and Certification. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the petition for review on certiorari to be verified.[18]A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.[19]Although Tuising belatedly filed on 24 September 2004 a Special Power of Attorney allegedly signed by Jocson and authorizing Tuising to file the petition for review and to verify and to certify the petition,no explanation was given by Tuising why the Special Power of Attorney was belatedly filed four months after the petition for review was filedon 12 May 2004. The lack of a certification against forum shopping or a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special circumstances or for compelling reasons.[20]We find no compelling reason for a liberal application of the rules especially in this case where the petitioner who did not sign the verification and certification for non-forum shopping already filed with the trial court aMotion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution. By filing theMotion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution, Jocson was in effect abiding by the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 January 2004.InAthena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes,[21]the Court held that the appellate court was correct in dismissing the petition where the verification and certification for non-forum shopping were signed by only one of the two petitioners. The Court held:The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner.Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct to his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athenas duly authorized representative.InDocena v. Lapesura,we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requirespersonal knowledgeby the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.[22]In this case, the flaw is fatal considering that Jocson, the co-petitioner who did not sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and whose counsel did not sign the petition, was the principal party in the original case.Jocson was the plaintiff in the trial court who sought reconveyance of her properties while her co-petitioner Tuising was not a party in the original case but was merely the highest bidder in the execution sale which was declared void by the trial court.The certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, such act being detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.[23]The petition, signed only by Tuisings counsel, conveniently failed to mention the fact that on 23 February 2004, prior to the filing of the petition, Jocson already filedwith the trial court aMotion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Executionwhich reads:MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTIONPLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully states:1.The Court of Appeals had ruled finally that the DECISION can be implemented only as against defendant Marcelo Steel Corporation and the RTC Sheriff of Manila, in levying the properties of the two defendant corporations, violated the dispositive portion of the decision because there is no showing that their liability is solidary.(CA-G.R. SP-No. 79179);2.There is need, therefore, to execute the decision as against the other defendant MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION.WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION be issued to implement the decision as against defendant MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION.[24]Clearly, such an action is incompatible with this petition for review. Even at the appellate courts level, the Motion for Reconsideration[25]supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and Tuising on 3 February 2004 was also signed by Tuisings counsel only.[26]Jocsons filing of aMotion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Executionto implement the decision as against MCFC clearly indicates that she already acceded to the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16 January 2004 and no longer intended to move for its reconsideration, much less appeal to this Court.Besides, a party should not be allowed to abuse and make a mockery of the judicial process by pursuing simultaneous and incompatible remedies in different courts.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 16 January 2004 and the Resolution dated 25 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79179.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 157195. April 22, 2005]VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARMELITA V. LIM,petitioners, vs.FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (now BPI LEASING CORPORATION),respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Once more, the Court stresses that procedural rules must be used to promote, not obstruct, substantial justice. The failure to attach the Resolution authorizing herein individual petitioner to represent herein corporate petitioner is, under the circumstances, excusable. The immediate correction of the defect should have been deemed sufficient compliance with the rules.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside two Resolutions[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 23, 2002[3]and February 7, 2003,[4]in CA-GR SP No. 73117. The earlier Resolution reads:The instant petition forcertiorariis hereby DISMISSED for lack of proper verification and certification against forum shopping as the same was executed by Carmelita V. Lim, one of the petitioners, without showing any authority from petitioner corporation to sign for and on its behalf.[5]The second assailed Resolution denied petitioners Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate.The FactsThis controversy originated from a Complaint[6]for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint[7]against Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a lease-back provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them back.[8]For the total loan ofP30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid FEB an aggregate amount ofP19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of aboutP22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300 square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale producedP17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have been applied to its loans.In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition forCertioraribefore the Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject equipment.Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate. Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion in this wise:The belated filing by the petitioners of the Certification of their Corporate Secretary, to the effect that petitioner Carmelita Lim has been duly authorized by petitioner corporation to file the subject petition forcertiorari, did not cure the defect of said petition. Absent any compelling reason for petitioners failure to comply at the first instance with the required certification, we cannot, therefore, accept their subsequent compliance.[9]Hence, this Petition.[10]The IssuesPetitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:A.Whether compelling reasons exist which warrant the liberal construction of the Petition forCertiorari.B.Whether petitioners subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.C.Whether the policy of the law is to afford a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his case.[11]In short, the principal issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition forCertiorari.The Courts RulingThe present Petition for Review is meritorious.Main Issue:Propriety of Summary DismissalPetitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute, for and on behalf of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against forum shopping. Attached to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was the Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the authorization and affirmation, as follows:x x x. I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc. x x x.This statement was supported by Vicars board of directors, who unanimously approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002, which reads thus:NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation be authorized to file a Petition forCertioraribefore the Court of Appeals for the purpose of annulling or setting aside the Orders dated 2 August 2002 and 30 September 2002 rendered by Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in connection with Civil Case No. 02-357 entitled FEB Leasing & Finance Corporation, Plaintiff vs. Vicar International Construction, Inc. et al., Defendants.RESOLVED further, that the President/General Manager Carmelita V. Lim is hereby authorized to execute and sign any and all documents necessary for filing of the Petition forCertiorari, including the verification and certification against forum shopping.[12]Petitioners candidly admit that they inadvertently failed to attach the above Resolution to their CA Petition. In preparing the Petition, their counsel supposedly worked overnight without sleep. She wanted to file it immediately to avoid the trial courts quashal of their counterbond and, thus, the immediate seizure of their equipment -- their only means of livelihood.Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretarys Certificate was attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the October 23, 2002 CA Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in filing the following day their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate.Petitioners submit that the foregoing circumstances constitute compelling reasons to justify setting aside the procedural defect, pursuant toRamos v. Court of Appeals.[13]Further, citingYap v. Baldado,[14]they contend that their posthaste submission of the secretarys Certificate, albeit after the filing of their Petition, constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Finally, they aver that pursuant to the policy of the law to afford parties the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, the CA should have given due course to their Petition.On the other hand, Respondent FEB asserts that the CAs dismissal of the Petition -- arising from petitioners failure to attach a duly executed verification and certification against forum shopping -- is well within the appellate courts authority, pursuant to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.[15]Respondent also claims that petitioners present action before this Court seeks to correct a perceived erroneous application by the CA of a procedural rule that is not correctible bycertiorari.Finally, respondent alleges that the instant Petition, being based on the ground of excusable negligence, is actually a motion for new trial. As such, the Petition must allegedly fail, because petitioners did not execute and attach an affidavit of merits.The issue before us is not novel; neither are the factual circumstances that gave rise to it.InShipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[16]the petitioner had not attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the Verification and the non-forum shopping Certification, as a consequence of which the Petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Subsequent to the dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which was already attached a Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that, prior to the filing of the Petition, the resident manager had been authorized by the board of directors to file the Petition.Citing several cases[17]excusing noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping, the Court held that with more reason should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. The Court further said that the subsequent submission of the Secretarys Certificate, attesting that the signatory to the certification was authorized to file the action on behalf of petitioner,mitigatedthe oversight.Similarly, inGeneral Milling Corporation v. NLRC,[18]the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition, which was not accompanied by any board resolution or certification by the corporate secretary showing that the person who had signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized to represent the petitioner-corporation in the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the petitioner attached a board Resolution stating that the signatory of the Certification had been duly authorized to do so.Under those circumstances, the Court held that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements, except that the petition was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretarys certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case.[19]Also, inBA Savings Bank v. Sia,[20]the Court of Appeals denied due course to a Petition forcertiorarifiled by BA Savings Bank. The CAs action was grounded on the fact that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the Petition had been signed merely by the banks counsel, not by a duly authorized representative, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. Subsequently filed by the petitioner was a Motion for Reconsideration, to which was attached a Certificate issued by the corporate secretary. The Certificate showed that the Resolution promulgated by the board of directors had authorized the lawyers of petitioner to represent it in any action or proceeding before any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the certificate of non-forum shopping, among others. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion on the ground that Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 requires that it is the petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the facts and undertakings required therein.The Court again reversed the appellate court and ruled thus:Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. We see no circumvention of this rationale if the certificate was signed by the corporations specifically authorized counsel, who had personal knowledge of the matters required in the Circular. InBernardo v. NLRC,[21]we explained that a literal interpretation of the Circular should be avoided if doing so would subvert its very rationale. Said the Court:x x x. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping.[22]Guided by the above pronouncements, the Court deems it proper and justifiable to grant the present Petition. Clearly, petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC Circular 28-91. In fact, a Verification/Certification, stating the information required under the Circular, was attached to the Petition forCertiorarifiled before the CA. In that Verification/Certification signed by Petitioner Lim, she attested as follows:1. x x x I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc.2. In my personal capacity and as a duly authorized representative of Vicar International Construction, Inc., I caused the preparation of the foregoing Petition forCertiorari.x x x x x x x x xPetitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicars board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to execute and sign x x x the verification and certification against forum shopping.The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretarys Certificate to their Petition forCertiorari.In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[23]Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions areREVERSEDandSETASIDE. The case isREMANDEDto the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 73117 with deliberate speed. No costs.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135042.September 23, 1999]ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997.Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or modified.Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the property owner.The CaseBefore us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]promulgated February 27, 1998 and its Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which (1) dismissed the action forcertiorariand preliminary injunction filed by Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for brevity); and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997; September 11, 1997; and November 5, 1997) and the Writ of Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 25356-97.The assailed Decision disposed as follows:[2]IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the instant petition is orderedDISMISSED.Costs against the petitioner.In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in this manner:[3]There being no compelling reason to modify, reverse or reconsider the Decision rendered in the case dated February 27, 1998[;] the Motion for Reconsideration posted by petitioner on March 23, 1998 isDENIED, it appearing further that the arguments raised therein were already considered and passed upon in the aforesaid Decision.The FactsThe following facts are undisputed.1.Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the National Power Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.2.On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern.[4]Instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss,[5]alleging (a) that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar properties available within the area.3.Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree No. 42.On July 9, 1997, NPC depositedP6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB Savings Account No. 385-560728-9.[6]4.In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied the petitioner's