guide dogs semiotics

8/9/2019 guide dogs semiotics

1/23

376 Riin Magnus

The role of trust in binding

the perspectives of guide dogs and

their visually impaired handlers

Riin Magnus

University of Tartu

Department of Semiotics

Jakobi 2, 51014, Tartu, Estonia

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. Building on anthropological discussions o perspectivism and (zoo)semi-otic accounts o sign use by humans and other animals, the article explores the coop-

eration o a guide dog and its visually impaired handler as contingent on the mutualadjustment o two individual perspectives. A perspective is deined as a point o view which comprises the meanings as well as the orms o objects that the subjectperceives and acts upon. On certain occasions, individual perspectives can be alli-gated to one another, resulting in a transormation o the meaningul worlds o thesubjects. hree types o connections between individual perspectives are delineatedin the paper, resulting in the ormation o mimetic, collaborative and comparativedouble perspectives. Although all o them bear relevance or the guide dog team’s

interactions, the collaborative double perspective is put under urther scrutiny. hemaintenance o the collaborative double perspective depends on the ormation otrust between the two individuals. While investigating the conditions or the estab-lishment o trust, a question is raised as to whether a shared communication systemcan serve as an ultimate ground or it.

Keywords:perspectivism, zoosemiotics, guide dogs, trust, interspecific communication

Introduction

Human encounters with animal gaze have given an impetus to critical accounts othe rationalist and modernist vision o humans’ position among other living beings

Sign Systems Studies 42(2/3), 2014, 376–398

http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2014.42.2-3.10


2/23

The role of trust in binding the perspectives of guide dogs 377

(see Derrida 2002; Haraway 2008: 19–27; Berger 1991: 3–28). However, humans,who receive and return the look o non-human beings, continue to be the organ-

izing point o departure or these contemplations. In contrast with the above-men-tioned encounters, the subjects handled in the current paper cannot exchange lookswith each other. Yet the presence o an animal gaze is undamental or the type ohuman-animal relation discussed in the ollowing parts o the article – namely, theinteractions o guide dogs and visually impaired persons. Looking also underlies theetymology o the central term o the paper: ʽperspectiveʼ (rom Latin per ʽthroughʼ + specere ʽto look ̓). Anthropological and semiotic paradigms converge at a defini-tion o a ʽperspectiveʼ as a point o view which comprises the meanings as well as the

orms o objects that the subject perceives and acts upon. Te term will be appliedin this sense throughout the paper in order to investigate the intersection o humanand animal perspectives, and more specifically, the role o trust in maintaining suchorms o collaboration.

Given the loose borders o the concept o trust, several attempts have been madeto define trust proceeding rom sociological grounds while distinguishing it romadjacent terms. Niklas Luhmann has thus distinguished trust rom confidence andamiliarity, while treating all o them as different types o sel-assurance and modes

o asserting expectations (Luhmann 1995: 99). Luhmann considers trust to be acorollary o risk and in this connection gives a unctional definition o trust as “thesolution or specific problems o risk” (Luhmann 1995: 95). In his account, the pre-conditions o trust entail individual choices, consideration o alternatives and therisk o being turned down as a result o one’s own decisions. Contesting Luhman’sclaim that unlike confidence, trust and risk-taking presume calculated weighingbetween alternatives, Anthony Giddens (1990: 29–36) discusses trust as rather a spe-cial type o confidence. In his view, the preconditions o trust entail the lack o ullinormation, contingency, and the entangled presence o risk and danger. Unlike theaccounts o the two previous authors, Francis Fukuyama’s sociological treatment otrust targets not so much the preconditions o trust, but the outcomes o the pres-ence or absence o trust or social organization (Fukuyama 1996). Fukuyama (1996:10) argues that trust is ultimately built on the shared values and norms o groups.Depending on the amount and scope o social capital in a given group, the lattercan be classified along the lines o high-trust or low-trust societies. A topic that runsthrough the texts o all three authors concerns the relations between personal andimpersonal orms o trust as well as impersonal trust as a distinguishing charac-

teristic o modern societies. In contrast, the current study brings the level o per-sonal trust relations to the oreground. Encompassing non-humans in a trust-basedrelationship raises urther questions about the means o maintaining trust on theseoccasions. Te second part o the paper will examine whether the presence o a


3/23

378 Riin Magnus

shared communication system, or language, is a precondition or the preservation otrust between individuals.

Although the ollowing investigation is largely theoretical, the impetus orexploring the role o trust in the cooperation between guide dogs and their visuallyimpaired handlers stems rom the interviews with guide dog handlers and fieldworkwith the guide dog teams. Te interviews were originally designed to investigate thesign use o the teams and the challenges related to that.1 In the interviews as well asin personal conversations with the guide dog handlers, trust was requently men-tioned as the cornerstone or good intra-team cooperation. Yet it seemed to deyurther explanations. My requests to expand on the topic were ofen returned with

sentences such as: “It’s really hard to put into words” or “It’s hard to explain what it’sabout”. Hence the need to look or urther explanations was raised. Relying on theanthropological investigations o perspectivism and relational personhood as well as(zoo)semiotic accounts o sign use by humans and other animals, the article there-ore explores the role o trust in binding human and non-human perspectives. Tetheoretical explorations will be substantiated with examples rom autobiographicbooks o guide dog handlers.

1. Perspectivist link between anthropology and

zoosemiotics

As a part o “new animist”2 approaches in anthropology (c. Harvey 2006: 17), dis-cussions about perspectivism as a particular quality o Amerindian cultural cos-mologies have entered the academic arena in the past decades. In anthropologi-cal parlance, the axiom has even been exploited to the extent that there is talk o“epidemic o perspectivism” (Halbmayer 2012: 11). According to Eduardo Viveiros

de Castro, one o the ounding figures o the perspectivism debates, perspectivismby the Amazonian cultures is based on the idea o a shared humanity and culture

1 C. Magnus, Riin 2014. Te unction, ormation and development o signs in the guidedog team’s work. Biosemiotics. Published online first: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12304-014-9199-7.2 Graham Harvey makes a distinction between the older ylorian and Durkheimian scientificaccounts o animism and what he calls a “new animism” o modern anthropology, with IrvingHallowell’s works as a point o change (Harvey 2006: 17). Te core o what Harvey outlines as“new animism” is echoed in the ollowing explanation: “Animists are people who recognisethat the world is ull o persons, only some o whom are human, and that lie is always lived inrelationship to others. Animism is lived out in various ways that are all about learning to actrespectully (careully and constructively) towards and among other persons” (Harvey 2006:xi).


4/23


o all beings and their bodily and phenomenal differentiation (Viveiros de Castro1992; 1996; 1998).3 Te concept o humanity in the Amerindian understanding

entails a belie that all beings have a soul. Tis goes along with having a point o view or perspective, which defines a subject position (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 476).4 All beings, human as well as non-human, thereore see themselves as humans andapproach others primarily as predators or prey. Although the categories o meaningremain the same when we move rom one class o beings to another, it is the objectssubsumed under the categories and their phenomenal orms that undergo change.A classic example rom Viveiros de Castro’s work illustrates the principle: “[w]hatto us is blood, is maize beer to the jaguar; what to the souls o the dead is a rotting

corpse, to us is soaking manioc; what we see as a muddy waterhole, the tapirs see asa great ceremonial house” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 478). Moreover, he stresses theendonymic character o the categories o soul and humanity and their unction assel-reerential designators in Amerindian cultures, pointing to the need or a the-ory o signs in order to reach the core o those concepts (Viveiros de Castro 1998:476).5 In dialogue with Viveiros de Castro’s research, the idea o perspectivism hasbeen developed and discussed by several other anthropologists and social scientists,especially in the ramework o personhood studies (see e.g. Bird-David 1999, 2008;

Descola 2013; Fowler 2004; Harvey 2006; Hornborg 2006; Ingold 2000; Kohn 2013;Lima 1999; Pedersen 2001; Praet 2009; Willerslev 2007). Te specificity o perspec-tivism as an approach to personhood lies in its contention that a person is speci-fied through his/her phenomenal world. As will be outlined later, other accounts orelational personhood may not necessarily incorporate this premise. Instead, inter-actions and exchange between persons may be set to the oreground. In that case, itis the activities o a person, rather than the phenomenal world per se, which underliea personal ontology.

Perspectivism, i taken as a more general ontological paradigm extracted romthe initial rich cultural contexts, stands or an idea that a person is defined throughhis/her viewpoint on the world, and this applies to both humans and non-humans.A viewpoint is in turn construed as a way o relating to other subjects and objects,whereby they gain a particular meaning and orm. Tis means that a perspective isnot centriugally derived rom the characteristics o a person, but the person is him/

3 But see or specification, criticism and reutation o this claim by some other LowlandSouth American scholars e.g. Halbmayer 2012, Rival 2012, urner 2009.4 Philippe Descola has covered the same idea by saying: ““Perspectivism” thus expresses theidea that any being that occupies a reerential point o view, being in the position o subject,sees itsel as a member o human species” (Descola 2013: 139).5 “Amerindian souls, be they human or animal, are thus indexical categories, cosmologicaldeictics whose analysis calls not so much or an animist psychology or substantialist ontologyas or a theory o the sign or a perspectival pragmatics” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 476).


5/23

380 Riin Magnus

hersel ormed through the interactions with objects and subjects that are meaning-ul to him/her. Perspectivism in Amerindian cosmologies, as described by Viveiros

de Castro, Eduardo Kohn and others, largely presumes that each person is tied toone particular perspective, which also provides stability or identity. 6 On the otherhand, anthropological works discussing a broader phenomenon o “relational per-sonhood” have also pointed to the constant transormation o a person and his/herperspective through interpersonal transactions (Marriott 1976: 112; Bird-David1999, 2010; Fowler 2004). Both ideas about the person-perspective ties are relevantor understanding the cooperation o the guide dog team, as will be explained later.

A couple o anthropologists involved in the perspectivism discussions have

explicitly sought or the semiotics behind perspectivism, reerring thereby alsoto the works o Jakob von Uexküll (Hornborg 2006; Kohn 2013). Similarly to per-spectivist ontologies, the biologist Jakob von Uexküll joined different living beingsinto a common network o meanings, while distinguishing between them accordingto the signs they use and the objects they perceive and act upon. However, unlikethe indigenous cosmologies that do not ollow the western scientific distinctionsbetween living and non-living beings, Uexküll restricted the ability to use signs andto depart rom meanings to living organisms only (Uexküll 1982[1940]). Moreover,

i the perspectivist cosmologies associate a viewpoint with the presence o a soul,then no such entity is assumed by Uexküll. He takes biological existence to be thecondition and ground or a meaning-based apprehension o the world. Uexküll dis-cusses the interactions between species mainly using the examples o different non-human species. Research on the umwelt o dogs, which ineluctably has to considerhuman objects and meanings, is an exception, though (Uexküll, Sarris 1931). Also inlater times, zoosemiotic research has primarily ocused on the interactions o non-human animals or given comparative accounts o human and non-human semi-otic behaviour (see Maran et al. 2011b). However, rom the classics o zoosemiotics(Sebeok, Umiker-Sebeok 2011[1990]: 87–94; Hediger 1965, 1979) to the very recentpublications (e.g. ønnessen 2011; Martinelli 2010: 121–170), the contingency ohuman and non-human umwelten and their mutual influences have received atten-tion as well. Mutualistic human-animal interactions (Sebeok 1980: 3) and the orma-tion o aggregate umwelten and umwelt assemblages (sensu ønnessen 2011: 79)7 arethereby o primary importance or the human and assistance animal relationship.

6 Still, there might be „privileged“ groups o persons who are more flexible in terms o theirperspectives, e.g. the group o predators by Makuna (see Århem 1996: 190), or shamans byRuna (Kohn 2013), as indeed by many other animist cultures.7 ønnessen defines aggregate umwelten as umwelten which are not complete i takenindividually, and considers umwelt assemblages as their subcategory (ønnessen 2011: 79).


6/23


Besides the ontological premises, Uexküllian zoosemiotics and Viveiros deCastro’s perspectivism also have an ideological agenda to share. Anthropological

debates about perspectivism and relational personhood allow us to question theontological premises as well as ethical consequences o a naturalist worldview(Descola 1996, 2013: 172–200; Viveiros de Castro 1998), “defined by the continuityo the physicalities o the entities o the world and the discontinuity o their respec-tive interiorities” (Descola 2013: 173). Te “interiorities” that are equated with thepresence o mind and consciousness in scientific parlance should endow humanswith a capacity or a conscious exchange o messages and an ability to provide trueresponses instead o simple reactions. In the same stroke, naturalism ejects most

non-humans rom the semiotic community while keeping them bound to humansthrough shared physical and organic orms o existence. Zoosemiotics joins in thecriticism o naturalism by opening up a common field o research or both humansand animals that is based on the premise that both are capable o semiotic activity.More specifically, it aims to explain how the lives o different organisms are built onsignification, communication and representation (Maran et al. 2011a: 1).

Te diversity o (living) beings is approached and explained in (Uexküllian) bio-semiotics as well as in the anthropological accounts o perspectivism as a diversity o

ways to perceive and act in the world. Tis comprises differences between subjects intheir attendance to objects as well as in the exploitation o signs which help to iden-tiy the objects. Te question o access to other minds also finds a somewhat similaranswer in both paradigms. In order to conceive o a diversity o perspectives, onedoes not have to perceive the world the way the others do. Cosmological knowledgeo the other perspectives is not tied to the ability to take on a perspective o anotherbeing just as knowledge about the umwelt o an animal and its sign relations doesnot presume perceiving the world in the way the animal does (Uexküll 1980[1921]:278). Yet this separation o the phenomenal and epistemological levels gets blurredin a human umwelt once an ethical dimension is added. Te presumption that oth-ers have a perspective as well bears relevance to how a person acts in respect withthem and how (s)he shapes the meanings that are to ground action. As ar as humanmeanings are ultimately tied to the rules o conduct and reerential meanings boundwith prescriptive meanings, one perspective cannot be cut off rom the related othersin the first place.


7/23

382 Riin Magnus

2. Metamorphic transformation of a perspective

Given that a perspective grounds the ontology o a person, a subsequent questionconcerns the preconditions and mechanisms o the transormation and exchangeo perspectives. Several anthropological portrayals o Amerindian cosmologiesdemonstrate that even i the tie between a person and a perspective is subjected tochange, the set o perspectives itsel is still relatively fixed. However, selected personstravel between different perspectival positions by putting on a different ‘clothing’ viametamorphosis (Århem 1996; Descola 2013: 135–138; Kohn 2013). Furthermore, ametamorphic shif to someone else’s perspective is pragmatically motivated – there

has to be a reason why the other’s point o view is sought. A transormation o theperspective might be undertaken or the sake o holding negotiations with the spir-its to establish stability in society, or healing a sick person, luring prey while hunt-ing, luring a member o another species, etc. (see e.g. Praet 2009; Willerslev 2013).In animist societies, not all persons share the perspective-shifing capacities to thesame extent. Te more powerul ones usually gain access to a wider variety o ormsand perspectives (Hallowell 1960; Århem 1996: 190).8 Perspective shifing might goalong with an acquisition o the language o the beings who naturally possess theperspective one has adopted, or a creation o a trans-species pidgin or communica-tion with beings belonging to another group (Kohn 2007: 14). Despite the act thatsuch cosmologies allow or a movement between perspectives, each class o beings isstill endowed with one proper perspective. It is the subject’s point o origin, a kind oa phenomenological home, to which he/she always returns. Tus, perspective shif-ing normally entails only temporary metamorphosis. rue and irreversible meta-morphosis goes along with the loss o the initial species adherence (Howell 1996:135).

Perspective shifing by the guide dog team cannot be discussed in the sense o a

true metamorphosis, or that would imply the handler’s adoption o canine qualiaand vice versa. But one can talk o an “imaginative metamorphosis” by the handler’sattempt to envisage how the dog would establish sign relations in a particular sit-uation. Based on the knowledge about the other’s semiotic preerences and habit-ual attendance to environmental cues, the handler can predict how the dog mightbehave in one or another circumstance. A guide dog user rom Germany, whomI interviewed or the study on the sign use o guide dog teams, 9 thus constantly

8 Te exchange o perspectives is ofen highly regulated and hierarchical, so that not allpersons have an equal ability or the necessary metamorphosis (see a brie summary about thepossibilities o transormation in Descola 2013: 136).9 See Magnus, Riin 2014. Te unction, ormation and development o signs in the guidedog team’s work. Biosemiotics. Published online first: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12304-014-9199-7.


8/23


9/23

384 Riin Magnus

3. Interactional perspective change

A transition rom one stable bodily orm to another might not be needed or aperspective change i the latter is taken to depend on the activities and exchangebetween persons (c. Fowler 2004). In these accounts, members o a society, includ-ing things and non-human beings, can adopt different identities that depend ontheir entrance to one or the other o the reversible and reciprocal social positions.A person can thus be either the one who owes a gif or is to receive one, the onewho is to respond or the one who is to pose a question. In their totality, the availablereciprocal positions unction as a cultural code, delimiting the number and kinds

o possibilities or the transfiguration o a person. Te possibility realized in eachparticular instance depends on the history o the previous activities, but also on thesituation at hand, which renders some activities relevant and others inappropriate.

Needless to say, the positions o two interacting individuals are not defined byreciprocal terms only, but depend on the network o social relations they are embed-ded in. For example, how a guide dog handler defines him/hersel in respect withthe dog depends on his/her status as a amily member, colleague, citizen, etc. Teintra-team positions change as do the contexts that rame the team’s activity. How asubject can take on one or the other o the reciprocal and reversible positions char-acteristic o the guide dog team is well explicated in the autobiography o MorrisFrank, the first guide dog handler in the USA. Frank describes how he is not greetedwith much enthusiasm, especially in public transportation, afer arriving romSwitzerland to the USA with his guide dog, Buddy. In this connection, Frank setsout the ollowing episode: “When I started to board the train, the conductor put arestraining hand on my arm and said, “You can’t bring that dog on the train.” “You’reright,” I told him. “Te dog is going to bring me on. Buddy, orward!” (Frank 1957:42). Te traditional positions o a human and a pet animal as a leader and a subser-

vient are thereby reversed, as expressed in Morris’ claim that it is the dog who takeshim to the train. On the other hand, by giving the dog a command to move orwardin the next sentence, the positions are reversed and the role o the controller o activ-ity is returned to the handler.

Te concept o a person is better captured by dividualistic rather than individ-ualistic terms, i constant transormation through activities o exchange is takento be constitutive o a person (Bird-David 2008). Te term “dividual” was initiallycoined by the anthropologist McKim Marriott in the 1970s in his research on the

Indian caste system and the meaning o a person in this context (c. Fowler 2004:24). Marriott claims that “boundary overflows”, characteristic o Hindu thought, alsoapply to their notions about a person. Tus, rather than being a bounded entity, aperson is divisible due to his/her giving and taking o material influences (Marriott


10/23


1976: 111). Archaeologist Chris Fowler has defined a dividual person as ollows:“Te dividual eature o the person stresses that each person is a composite o the

substances and actions o others, which means that each person encompasses multi-ple constituent things and relations received rom other people” (Fowler 2004: 26). Ithe totality o meanings circulating in a particular culture is taken into account, thendividuality appears on multiple layers o interpersonal relations. One can herebydiscern between the more literal and metaphoric reality o relations that constitutea person. In Eduardo Kohn’s rendition, or example, the Amazonian Runa people’srelation to their dogs parallels the white colonists’ relation to the Runa and the or-est spirits’ relation to the orest animals (Kohn 2013). On the one hand, they are

all instances o certain kind o social hierarchies, but on the other hand, the literalencounters o humans and dogs are figuratively transposed to other orms o socialencounters. In Michael Hingson’s autobiographic book Tunder Dog: Te rue Storyo a Blind Man, His Guide Dog, and the riumph o rust at Ground Zero, Hingsoninterprets his relationship with his guide dog through the biblical moti o a shep-herd and sheep, stating that: “I she doesn’t trust me as her shepherd and respondto my tugs on her harness or my verbal commands, our relationship can’t work”(Hingson 2011: 114). Also a number o other relationships, in the light o which

the intra-team cooperation is construed, come up throughout Hingson’s text – romthe interactions o a married couple to surgical teams and police partners. Tus,although each person can be identified through some primary or literal perspectives,the latter also unction as tokens o certain types o social hierarchies.

Te primacy o the dividuality o a person does not preclude the person’s individual eatures being highlighted rom time to time (Fowler 2004: 26). However, cul-tural conflicts may result i in the same situation one group relies on individualis-tic premises, whereas another party takes on a dividualistic stance. Te separationo the guide dog and the handler in cases in which they are turned down in publicplaces is a good example o that. Te offence taken by the handlers is related to theeeling o a violent tearing o a dividual unit into its individual constituent parts. Terelationship with the handler, which determines the meaning o a guide dog, is over-riden in these situations, and the meaning o the dog as a non-human and the han-dler as a disabled person with limited access to public places is accentuated.

4. Building of double perspectives

As was pointed out above, anthropological as well as biosemiotic accounts covermainly transormations o perspectives which result either rom the subject’sacquisition o novel attributes, his/her engagement in a different activity or his/


11/23

386 Riin Magnus

her encounters with a new environment. Yet an individual perspective can also beshifed via the adoption o the other’s perspective as a counterpart to one’s own. Tis

appears to be essential or the cooperation o visually impaired persons and theirguide dogs. Te two members o the guide dog team have entered the partnershipwith their own systems o signs, stemming rom their phylogenetic as well as ontoge-netic histories. At the same time, they have been trained, and during their work theyalso develop new signs that are specific to the rationale o their cooperation. Teperspective o the one is thereore shaped by the presence o the other’s perspective.An individual umwelt is thereby “opened up” to environmental cues attainable withthe help o the other team member.

Different principles might be at work in the binding o the perspectives o twoindividuals. In what ollows, three possibilities and principles or building a pairedperspective will be introduced. Tey will be called a mimetic double, a collabora-tive double and a comparative double, respectively. Each o them captures in its ownway the differences between a coupled and an individual perspective. Tose types obonds should not be taken as alternatives, though, as they can easily serve as supple-ments to one another.

A mimetic double perspective is reached through the imitation o the other sub-

ject’s habits and behaviour. Anthropologist Rane Willerslev has explored the phe-nomenon through his fieldwork among the Yukaghir hunters in North-EasternSiberia (Willerslev 2007). Willerslev studies the shaping o two perspectives in thereciprocal imitations o a hunter and his prey animal (Willerslev 2007: 99). Whiletrying to take on the appearance o an elk, the hunter imitates the animal’s behav-iour. At the same time, he sees in the elk’s response a reflection o his own activity.Hence, it is as i the hunter moves back and orth between the viewpoint o a humanand an elk. In semiotic terms, there are usually two senders (the model and themimic) and a receiver in mimicry (Maran 2007: 224; Maran 2011: 244). However,in this instance the roles o the receiver and the model are embodied by the sameperson (an elk), and a mimic (hunter) mediates between the two roles. Whether themimic will succeed depends on whether the receiver (the elk) can detect the Other(hunter) behind the image o an animal presented to it. Te elk moreover has dia-metrically opposite options or reaction – to escape or to approach – depending onwhether an enemy or a member o the same species is detected behind the activity othe mimic (c. also Maran 2007: 231).

Although mimicing the game animal is characterized by a constant shifing o

perspectives, it is at the same time important to preserve awareness o one’s pri-mary position as a human being (Willerslev 2007: 89–118). Te human perspec-tive is bracketed when the animal’s perspective is adopted, but the hunter always hasto retain and return to his initial position, lest his own perspective be won over bythe one he is imitating. Te multiplicity o perspectives in this instance is temporal


12/23


and involves, in a sense, handing over one’s position as a subject to the other being.Nevertheless, the Other as a subject is still in the end subjugated to the Sel as a

subject.What guarantees that the identity proper to the particular subject is not lost

in such an oscillation between perspectives? Anthropologists Morten Pedersenand Rane Willerslev have explained the preservation o the sel in the imitation oanother being with the partiality o imitation (Willerslev 2007: 11; Pedersen 2001:416). It is the difference between the imitator and the imitated that excludes themerging o the imitator with the one imitated and that keeps the imitator in theposition o control (Willerslev 2007: 11). Te difference between the imitator and

imitated is instantiated or the sake o retaining the imitator’s initial identity and itis instrumentally incorporated to the motivations o the imitator. Using GregoryBateson’s phrasing, the partial identification with the Other in imitation is based ona different ontological status o a statement and a metastatement (Bateson, Ruesch1951: 194–196). Tis ontological hierarchy is captured in the hunter imagining (met-astatement) that he is an elk (statement). However, the imagination, as it acquires abodily orm in imitation, is not merely fictive and to a certain sense it enables see-ing reality rom a standpoint o the animal (Willerslev 2007: 106). Remaining sel-

reflective throughout all the perspective shifing and not conflating the statementand metastatement are still crucial or the preservation o the hunter’s selood.Gregory Bateson has explicitly spelled out the necessity or a third term to

explain how one perspective can influence another – it is my awareness o the otherperson perceiving me that helps to maintain the subjectivity in my position. Batesonthereafer differentiated between those beings who are defined by the awareness obeing perceived by others (above all mammals), rom beings that are determined bymutual irritability and responsiveness (Bateson, Ruesch 1951: 208).11 Bateson alsomaintained that deception is possible only i such an awareness is present. Such adeceptive behaviour o the guide dog might be observed on occasions when the han-dler is inconspicuously taken to a place that is o interest to the dog. Although thismight be related to the handler’s inattentiveness, one cannot exclude the possibilitythat the dog has “deceived” the handler by heading or an object in a manner whichkeeps the handler ignorant about the change in the dog’s behaviour. Te dog in asense carries out an imitation o its expected behaviour in those instances.

11 He also suggests an observational method or telling whether the interaction o twoentities is based on an awareness o the other’s perception or not: “Operationally, to determinewhether a group is o this higher order, it would be necessary at least to observe whether eachparticipant modifies his emission o the signals in a sel-corrective manner according to hisknowledge o whether the signals are likely to be audible, visible, or intelligible to the otherparticipants” (Bateson, Ruesch 1951: 209).


13/23

388 Riin Magnus

A collaborative principle underlies the building o a double perspective i a goalis to be reached through the cooperative interactions o two individuals. Several eth-

ological studies have targeted the question o whether non-humans are also capa-ble o building shared goals and intentions with other beings. Although the abilityto provide non-rewarded instrumental help to humans as well as conspecifics hasbeen demonstrated by non-human primates (Warneken, omasello 2009; Melis et al.2011) and by dogs helping their owners (Bräuer et al. 2013), shared intentionalityhas still been discussed as tied to human cognition only (omasello et al. 2005). Tisimplies that non-humans are capable o comprehending the goals o another beingand they can provide help to achieve the goal, but despite the great variety o col-

laborative activities in the animal kingdom, they do not exhibit the motivation toshare the psychological states o others (omasello et al. 2005; Call 2009). Despitethe incongruence o human and non-human cognitive capacities to build sharedintentions, the binding o perspectives or instrumental reasons (e.g. to carry outsome task) might still rely on the inter-individual coordination and transormationo sign use.

Paul Patton has noted that in the training o horses, setting a goal is asymmetricalor the two subjects, as the task is ormulated by the handler (Patton 2003: 90). Te

same holds true or the guide dog teams, but although the task and goal is ormu-lated by one member o the team, it is done in a manner which makes it possible toreach the target via two participating subjects. In order to master the task, both sub-

jects have to shif the individual system o values12 by taking into account the other’sdifference rom onesel. When planning a route rom point A to point B, guide doghandlers make the choices with the dog’s capacities in mind. So do dogs who inter-pret the handler’s command in conjunction with the assessment o the possibilitiesor the team’s movement in the environment. Te latter also reveals that perspectivesdo not depend upon perception only. Te actions and the possibilities or actionscontribute to the shaping o a perspective just as much. Tis was already noted byJakob von Uexküll in his claim that the umwelt o an animal is comprised o a worldo perceptions as well as actions ( Merkwelt & Wirkwelt) (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934).

Besides the consideration o the other’s bodily presence when making choices ormovement, taking into account the other’s habitual preerences is especially impor-tant or the guide dog team’s cooperation. Accepting or even planning a detour toplaces on the route that are o no use or the handler, but that serve the interestso the dog and thereby motivate it to work urther, are important or reaching the

12 Te term “value system” is used here ollowing the definition o Gregory Bateson: “Te value system, as organized in terms o preerence, constitutes a network in which certain itemsare selected and others passed over or rejected, and this network embraces everything in lie”(Bateson, Ruesch 1951: 176).


14/23


final target place. In this regard, Sheila Hocken describes in her book, Emma & I:Te Beautiul Labrador Who Saved My Lie, how she used to plan her shopping tours

with her guide dog as the dog “made the rules” or the shopping. A pet shop was tobe visited first and a butcher’s never missed – i the handler accepted those ew rules,she was also gladly taken to the other places that were o interest to her and not somuch to the dog (Hocken 2011[1977]: 122–123).

A third possibility or the building o a double perspective lies in the compari-son o two perspectives, termed a double description by Gregory Bateson (1988). Iawareness o the other’s perspective o onesel belonged to only certain organisms,then double description is something much more undamental. In this case, subject

A does not shif its perspective due to the presence o subject B, but the two perspec-tives together yield a different perception o the environment than each would doindividually. Bateson even claims that any relationship results rom a double descrip-tion (Bateson 1988: 142) and inormation is always produced in the comparisono two perspectives. Tis is so in case o binocular vision, where a new dimensiono depth is added to the monocular perspective in the perception o the environ-ment (Bateson 1988: 74). For the collaborative double, there is also something newattained via the co-existence o two perspectives. In contrast with the collaborative

double, the “new” results rom a comparison o two perspectives and is not neces-sarily itsel the reason why another perspective was adopted. A double descriptionand the comparative double perspective as its corollary is hence rather a prerequisiteor the collaborative double perspective. Te latter is reached when the parties areactively looking or a different dimension o inormation to ace a task which cannotbe mastered through individual perspectives only.

5. Trust, language and the maintenanceof double perspectives

Once the individual perspectives have been tied in any o the above-mentionedmanners, a question can be raised about the conditions o the maintenance o thatbond. While ocusing on the collaborative double perspective, the ollowing sectionsexplore the type o human and non-human relationships in which the maintenanceo a bond between two individuals depends on trust. Relations that are characterizedby trust entail a belie that another being makes choices and departs rom meanings

which do not undermine those o one’s own. In the interactions o a guide dog anda visually impaired person, the ormation o human trust in the animal can be seenas based on the ollowing premises: (1) a guide dog is an autonomous being withits own needs and perception o the world; (2) a guide dog is capable o learning to


15/23


16/23


language (Hearne 2000). It has to be noted, though, that Hearne does not considerthe ormal characteristics o language when she uses the concept and rather desig-

nates as language any system o signs that allows or understanding between individ-uals. Despite the vagueness o terms, Hearne’s work gives an impetus to question thepredictive properties o (shared) signs and their use or controlling or determiningbehaviour. Te latter was proposed by Charles Morris as one o the primary unc-tions o signs: “Signs in general serve to control behavior in the way something elsewould exercise control i it were present” (Morris 1971: 174).

Using examples o animals obeying the commands o humans, Hearne explicateshow the misconclusion about the attachment o trust to language might be reached

(Hearne 2000[1987]). Her rendition o the misplaced overlap o trust and languagequa system o communication can be summed up with the ollowing inductive lineo thought. I the other is perceived to have really understood something that wascommunicated to him/her and to have thereby captured the other’s intentions, (s)heis endowed with the capacity to command language and hence, to be an understand-ing being. Moreover, by responding adequately to one sign, the other is bestowedwith the ability to access the whole sign system in which the sign was produced.Hearne tells o a rustration encountered in training i that appears not to be the

case: “Tese come about because the ability to utter, “Joe, sit!” creates the illusionthat Joe can know thereby exactly who we are, that we can penetrate his otherness,that he can through the phrase alone share our vision o the Sit exercise” (Hearne2000[1987]: 31).

Hearne suggests that as a device o predicting the other’s behaviour, languagemight create the oundation or trust. I trust is put under question due to someunexpected activities o the other, so is the authority o language as a device ounderstanding. In this connection, Hearne describes her visit to Gentle Jungle, awild-animal training acility, to meet the chimpanzee Washoe – the first chimpanzeewho was taught Ameslan, the American language or the dea (Hearne 2000[1987]:18–41). By observing the interactions between Washoe and her caretaker, Hearneconcludes that Washoe is indeed making use o language and having a conversationwith the caretaker. However, given the premise that language should allow or nego-tiations and the predictability o the other’s behaviour, why is the chimpanzee heldin a cage and why do the caretakers take along chains and sticks when they go towalk with her? Te precautionary devices are used because the animal can attack hercaretaker as well as those passing by, despite her ability to talk, listen, understand,

and adequately respond. Hence, language does not appear to guarantee the kind oreciprocity assumed or trust. Hearne writes: “What is offended is the dog trainer’sassumption that language or something like vocabulary gives mutual autonomyand trust. I grieve, but not or Washoe behind her bars. It is language I grieve or”


17/23

392 Riin Magnus

(Hearne 2000[1987]: 34). I language cannot serve as a oundation or trust, then itis deprived o a significant part o its power – to regulate the relationships between

individuals and to assure the possibility or a shared way o living. In consequence,the reconciliatory unction o language has been turned down – not everything isnegotiable. In cases similar to what Hearne experienced at the training acility, it isthus easier to solve the conflict by denying the use o language by an animal than toacknowledge the limits o language. Te conclusion can be thereore drawn that theanimal’s “[...] lack o common language, its silence, guarantees its distance, its dis-tinctness, its exclusion, rom and o man” (Berger 1991[1980]: 6).

Te presumption about the possibility o total understanding is related to the

expectations o the language system as a code. Language, when taken as a media-tor o understanding, should virtually guarantee that everything expressed in it iscomprehensible, and that each individual speech act metonymically instantiatesthe totality o the language system. Tis is a presumption that has been captured inthe notion o enlogic understanding by the Estonian philosopher and semioticianAndres Luure. He explains enlogic understanding as an understanding by rules olanguage: “I understand you beore you ever say anything – because I understandwhatever you could say – provided you ollow the rules o a language common to us”

(Luure 2006: 68).13

At the same time, the subjugative use o enlogic understandingcan lead to the loss o trust between two individuals. Te presumption that the othermakes use o a sign system that is ully compatible with one’s own might be easily eltby the other as a deprivation o its autonomy. One o the two premises essential ortrust is thereby eliminated.

In his autobiography written together with Betty White, om Sullivan gives a tell-ing example o the consequences o treating the other as a means o enhancing one’sown autonomy (White, Sullivan 1991). Sullivan describes how, having just receivedhis first guide dog Dinah, he heads or a run on a bike path. Being ignorant o thedog’s physical limits, he pushes her to the limits o her physical capabilities. Aferhaving a crash with a bicycle, Sullivan decides to head or home, without a aint-est clue, where it might be. He eels that asking or help would take him rom theindependence that he thinks he has reached with the guide dog back to depend-ence. Tereore he asks the dog to find home without being able to give any direc-tions to her: “And the Lady did. [...] She had no idea where she was taking me, butI was encouraging her to work, and she would go on until she dropped dead romexhaustion” (Sullivan, White 1991: 72–73). Following the trauma, the dog reuses to

13 Luure discusses enlogic understanding in opposition to another type o understanding –empathic understanding. Empathic understanding corresponds to “having significance” and isdirected to obtaining something which is outside o onesel. It entails approaching the otherwith the image o what I want to become (Luure 2006: 68).


18/23


work or weeks and the intervention o the trainer is needed to get her back to work.Troughout the book, the theme o gaining and achieving independence and ree-

dom is raised, and as seen rom the instance above, the dog is thereby taken as achannel or achieving this. Te lesson taught by the trainer and the experiences withthe dog lead Sullivan to finally accept his state o interdependence, instead o push-ing or ultimate and absolute independence (Sullivan, White 1991: 81). Tis accept-ance o his state o interdependence also goes along with opening up to the signs othe dog, previously overriden by his own intentions. Only afer that could the dogenhance the perception o the handler and provide accessibility to novel objects.

o sum up the arguments o the chapter, trust can be built on dialogue, but only

i neither individuals are tied to an expectation o ull reciprocity between them.Hence, unpredictability o the other’s behaviour, arising rom his/her autonomy, is

just as essential and ineluctable or trust and communication, as is a dependence onthe other’s avourable response.

Conclusion

Scant contact between theories o umwelt and perspectivism have made the firststeps toward bringing zoosemiotic and anthropological research into dialogue.However, this has been only episodic so ar. Among other topics, their urtherintegration might tackle the environments where humans and non-humans sharethe same objects while attributing the same or contrasting meanings to them; thediverse ways that people involved with animals in their daily lives (trainers, pet own-ers, armers, hunters, etc.) address and communicate with their animals and vice

versa; and the social contexts that rame the meaning o animals and the role o ani-mals in defining the boundaries o human space and society. None o those research

agendas really conorms to the models o naturalism, proposed as a dominant modelo human-environment relations in the modern western world (c. Descola 2013), asthey presume semiotic activity rom humans as well as non-humans. Te phenome-non discussed in this paper – the cooperation o a guide dog and a visually impairedhandler – is a case which in principle provides material or all those subtopics.

However, in this article, the guide dog team’s cooperation was taken as a casethat can supplement the existent descriptions o the change and transormation oumwelten (see e.g. ønnessen 2011) and perspectives (see e.g. Kohn 2013; Willerslev

2007, Viveiros de Castro 1998) o different living beings. Te perspectives o themembers o the guide dog team are not moulded by individual meanings and per-ception only, but get their final orm by incorporating and subsuming part o theother member’s perspective. Te materials o the current paper cannot lead to


19/23

394 Riin Magnus

grounding the arguments on detailed cognitive grounds. Yet such a bond betweentwo perspectives can be detected through the environmental cues that the members

o the team attend to, as well as the changes in individual behaviour which appearto result rom the eedback received rom the partner. Guide dog team’s work is aninstance o interspecific mutualism characterized by the ollowing activities: (1) or-mulation o a task by one member o the team; (2) development o the means oulfilling the task via reciprocal adaptation to each other’s body plans as well as valuesystems (sensu Bateson, Ruesch 1951: 176); (3) the corresponding adjustment o theperspectives and umwelten, considering the task and environment, as well as thepresence o the other subject; (4) dialogic interaction, which should ensure predict-

ability o the other’s behaviour and allow them to speciy the plans o action.Te dialogic interactions, based on language or some other system o commu-

nication, can never guarantee a ull overlap o the intentions o two counterparts.Tis also means that ull confidence in the beneficial effect o the other’s activi-ties in respect with onesel cannot be reached via any orm o communication.Tereore a component o risk that the other will respond in an unpredictable man-ner is immanent to dialogue. Although the deprivation o language rom its ulti-mate reconciliatory unction can lead to its disempowerment, the unpredictability

o response also underlies the establishment o trust between individuals. Tis isso because the unexpected response is at the same time a token o the other’s auto-nomy. Acknowledgement o the latter appears to be just as essential or the work oan assistance animal as are the expectations or the animal’s compliance with thehandler’s wishes. By making detours and agreeing to approach objects that are o nointerest to the handler, the dog is afforded places where its autonomy can be articu-lated. Tis appears to be a way to avoid its outburst as a dissentive sel-assertion insituations where it might have an unavourable effect or both members o the team.Te guide dog team’s work ultimately exhibits an entanglement o autonomy anddependence characteristic o any true cooperative interactions.14

References

Århem, Kaj 1996. Te cosmic ood web: Human-nature relatedness in the Northwest AmazonIn: Descola, Philippe; Pálsson, Gisli (eds.), Nature and Society: Anthropological Perspectives. London, New York: Routledge, 185–204.

Bateson, Gregory 1988. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. oronto, New York: BantamBooks.

14 Acknowledgments: Tis research was supported by the European Union through theEuropean Regional Development Fund (Centre o Excellence CEC, Estonia), and by researchgrant IU2-44 and Estonian-Norwegian grant EMP151.


20/23


21/23

396 Riin Magnus

Howell, Signe 1996. Nature in culture or culture in nature? Chewong ideas o ʽhumans’ and otherspecies: In: Descola, Philippe; Pálsson, Gisli (eds.), Nature and Society: Anthropological per-

spectives. London, New York: Routledge, 127–144.Ingold, im 1994. From trust to domination: An alternative history o human-animal rela-tions. In: Manning, Aubrey; Serpell, James (eds.), Animals and Human Society: ChangingPerspective. London: Routledge, 1–22.

– 2000. Te Perception o the Environment : Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London/New York: Routledge.

Kohn, Eduardo 2007. How dogs dream: Amazonian natures and the politics o transspeciesengagement. American Ethnologist 34(1): 3–24.

– 2013. How Forests Tink: oward an Anthropology beyond the Human. Berkley etc.:University o Caliornia Press.

Lima, ânia Stolze 1999. Te two and its many: Reflections on perspectivism in a upi cosmol-ogy. Ethnos 64(1): 107–31.

Luhmann, Niklas 1988. Familiarity, confidence, trust: problems and alternatives. In: Gambetta,Diego (ed.) rust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxord: Basil Blackwell;94–107.

Luure, Andres 2006. Te duality o understanding and the understanding o duality in semiot-ics. Sign Systems Studies 34(1): 67–81.

Maran, imo 2007. Semiotic interpretations o biological mimicry. Semiotica 167(1/4):223–248.

– 2011. Becoming a sign: Te mimic’s activity in biological mimicry. Biosemiotics 4: 243–257.Maran, imo; Martinelli, Dario; urovski, Aleksei 2011a. Readings in zoosemiotics. In: Maran,imo; Martinelli, Dario; urovski, Aleksei (eds.), Readings in Zoosemiotics. Berlin: DeGruyter Mouton, 1–20.

Maran, imo; Martinelli, Dario; urovski, Aleksei (eds.) 2011b. Readings in Zoosemiotics.Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Martinelli, Dario 2010. A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics: People, Paths, Ideas. New York:Springer.

Marriott, McKim 1976. Hindu transactions: Diversity without dualism. In: Kaperer, Bruce(ed.), ransactions and Meaning: Directons in the Anthropology o Exchange and SymbolicBehavior. Philadelphia: Institute or the Study o Human Issues, 109–142.

Melis, Alicia P.; Warneken, Felix; Jensen, Keith; Schneider, Anna-Claire; Call, Josep; omasello,Michael 2011. Chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain ood and non-ood items. Proceedingso the Royal Society B 278: 1405–1413.

Morris, Charles 1971. Writings on the General Teory o Signs. Te Hague, Paris: Mouton.Patton, Paul R. 2003 Language, power, and the training o horses. In: Wole, Cary (ed.)

Zoontologies: Te Question o the Animal . Minneapolis: University o Minnesota Press,83–99.

Pedersen, Morten A. 2001. otemism , animism and North Asian indigenous ontologies.

Journal o the Royal Anthropological Institute 7(3): 411–427.Praet, Istvan. 2009. Shamanism and ritual in South America: An inquiry into Amerindian

shape-shifing. Journal o the Royal Anthropological Society 15: 737–54. Rival, Laura 2012. Te materiality o lie: Revisiting the anthropology o nature in Amazonia.

Indiana 29: 127–43.


22/23


Sebeok, Tomas 2011[1990]. “alking” with animals: Zoosemiotics explained. In: Maran,imo; Martinelli, Dario; urovski, Aleksei (eds.), Readings in Zoosemiotics. Berlin: De

Gruyter Mouton, 87–94.Sebeok, Tomas A.; Umiker-Sebeok, Jean 1980. Introduction: Questioning apes. In: Sebeok,Tomas A.; Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (eds.) Speaking o Apes: A Critical Anthology o wo-wayCommunication with Man. New York, London: Plenum Press, 1–59.

omasello, Michael; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Behne, anya; Moll, Henrike 2005.Understanding and sharing intentions: Te origins o cultural cognition. Behavioral andbrain sciences 28: 675–735.

ønnessen, Morten 2011. Umwelt ransition and Uexküllian Phenomenology. An Ecosemiotic Analysis o Norwegian Wol Management. (= Dissertationes Semioticae Universitatisartuensis 16). Doctoral dissertation. artu: artu University Press.

urner, erry S. 2009. Te crisis o late structuralism. Perspectivism and animism: Rethinkingculture, nature, spirit, and bodiliness. ipití: Journal o the Society or the Anthropology oLowland South America 7(1): 3–42.

Uexküll, Jakob von 1980. Der Beobachter In: Uexküll, Ture von (ed.) 1980. Jakob von Uexküll.Kompositionslehre der Natur: Biologie als undogmatische Naturwissenschaf. Ausgewählte

Schrifen. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Ture von Uexküll . Frankurt am Main: VerlagUllstein, 278–282.

– 1982[1940]. Te theory o meaning. Semiotica 42(1): 25–82.Uexküll, Jakob von; Kriszat, Georg 1934. Streizüge durch die Umwelten von ieren und

Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Berlin: J. SpringerUexküll, Jakob von.; Sarris, Emanuel Georg von 1931. Der Führhund der Blinden. Die Umschau35(51): 1014–1016.

Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo 1992. From the Enemy’s Point o View: Humanity and Divinity inan Amazonian Society. Chicago: University O Chicago Press.

– 1996. Images o nature and society in Amazonian ethnology. Annual Review o Anthropology 25: 179–200.

– 1998. Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism. Te Journal o the Royal Anthropological Institute 4(3): 469–488.

Warneken, Felix; omasello, Michael 2009. Te roots o human altruism. British Journal oPsychology 100: 455–471.

White, Betty; Sullivan, om 1991. Te Leading Lady: Dinah’s Story . New York: Bantam Books.Willerslev, Rane 2007. Soul Hunters: Hunting, Animism, and Personhood among the Siberian

Yukaghirs. Berkley etc.: University o Caliornia Press.


23/23

398 Riin Magnus

Роль доверия в связывании перспектив собак-поводырей и

их незрячих хозяев

Взяв за основу антропологические подходы к перспективизму и (зоо)семиотическиеисследования об использовании знаков людьми и животными, автор статьи рассматри-вает сотрудничество собаки-поводыря и человека в зависимости от взаимной совме-стимости двух индивидуальных перспектив. Перспектива дефинируется как точка зре-ния, охватывающая как значения, так и формы объектов, которые субъект ощущаети, исходя из которых, действует. В некоторых случаях индивидуальные перспективымогут быть связаны между собой, в результате чего изменяются означивающие системысубъектов. В статье выделены три типа связей между индивидуальными перспекти-вами: копирующие, связанные со сотрудничеством, а также основанные на сравнении

двойные перспективы. Хотя все три типа важны, в статье подробнее рассматриваетсядвойная перспектива, связанная со сотрудничеством. Исследуя условия создания дове-рия, автор ставит вопрос, может ли основой этих условий быть разделенная (shared )коммуникационная система.

Usalduse roll juhtkoerte ning nende nägemispuudega

peremeeste perspektiivide sidumisel

Võttes aluseks antropoloogilised lähenemised perspektivismile ja (zoo)semiootilised käsitlused

inimeste ja teiste loomade märgikasutusest, vaadeldakse käesolevas artiklis juhtkoera ja näge-mispuudega inimese koostööd sõltuvana kahe individuaalse perspektiivi vastastikusest sobi-tumisest. Perspektiivi defineeritakse kui vaatepunkti, mis hõlmab nii objektide tähendusi kuika vorme, mida subjekt tajub ja millest lähtudes toimib. eatud juhtudel võivad individuaalsedperspektiivid olla üksteisega seotud, mille tulemuseks on subjektide tähenduslike maailmadeteisenemine. Artiklis visandatakse kolme tüüpi seoseid individuaalsete perspektiivide vahel,mille tulemusena moodustuvad matkivad, koostööga seotud ning võrdlusel põhinevad kak-sikperspektiivid. Kuigi kõik nad on juhtkoeratandemi koostegutsemise jaoks olulised, vaadel-dakse lähemalt koostööga seotud kaksikperspektiivi. Koostööga seotud kaksikperspektiivi säi-

litamine sõltub usalduse loomisest kahe indiviidi vahel. Uurides usalduse loomise tingimusi,tõstatatakse küsimus, kas selle lõplikuks aluseks saab olla jagatud kommunikatsioonisüsteem.

guide dogs semiotics

Documents