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Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia'sPan-European ExpectationsVictor-Yves Ghebali aa Graduate Institute of International Studies , GenevaPublished online: 21 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Victor-Yves Ghebali (2005) Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-EuropeanExpectations, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:3, 375-388, DOI: 10.1080/09557570500237938

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Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fallof Russia’s Pan-European Expectations

Victor-Yves GhebaliGraduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

Abstract After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into ademocratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsinadministration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE.However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO’s enlargementprojects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—nowrebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security(1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longerserved, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisationwould be ‘doomed to extinction’. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a numberof reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russiawhose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateralinstitutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate ofthe OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as wellas Russia’s wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its placeand role are fully legitimate.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Conference for Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) was assigned an important but implicit role, that ofstimulating and consolidating the efforts of the Russian Federation to overcomethe legacy of ‘Soviet legality’ and ‘international socialist law’—or, in other terms,to accelerate the transformation of a Soviet-style state into a member of themodern European family of nations, abiding domestically by the rule of law andexternally by standard international law. Initially, Russia concurred for a naturalreason: whereas the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) (two institutions inaccessible to Moscow) were becoming the poles ofattraction in Europe, the CSCE represented the single European securityorganisation in which Russia had a legitimate place and role. Thus, whenNATO envisaged its eastward enlargement, Moscow immediately considered thatonly the CSCE could procure damage limitation through the elaboration of a legalpan-European security system. However, Moscow’s basic objectives were sothwarted that Russia progressively felt that the OSCE (Organisation for Securityand Cooperation in Europe) was unfit to serve, or even just preserve, its nationalinterests. The present analysis offers an overview of the rise and fall of Russianexpectations (from the overall cooperative policy of the Yeltsin period to the

Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Volume 18, Number 3, October 2005

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/05/030375–14 q 2005 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557570500237938

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strategy of overt confrontation and intimidation of the Putin administration),as well as of the political crisis generated by Russia’s growing dissatisfaction withthe OSCE.

The Yeltsin Administration’s Love’s Labour’s Lost

Until NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo (1999), the Yeltsin administrationadopted a generally moderate and cooperative posture within the OSCE. Atseveral instances, it made significant concessions on questions pertaining toRussian direct interests as well as concerning some of Russia’s rare politicalclients.

At the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, Moscow subscribed to a statementrecommending the participating states, in oblique but clear language: ‘toconclude, without delay, appropriate bilateral agreements, for the early, orderlyand complete withdrawal of . . . foreign troops from the territories of the BalticStates’.1 Although not attributing a negotiating role to the OSCE, the pledge madeMoscow accountable to the latter until the full achievement of the withdrawal,which took place in 1994. Russia went even further when, in 1995, it accepted theinterference of the OSCE in the Chechnya intra-state conflict through an ‘OSCEAssistance Group’ mandated for political mediation, coordination of humanitar-ian assistance, promotion of human rights and support for the creation ofdemocratic mechanisms.2 Established for unlimited duration (contrary to allprevious similar missions), the Assistance Group did not remain inactive. Itcontributed to the brokering of the Kazaviurt Agreement of 31 August 1996 which(co-signed by the OSCE) ended the first Chechen war. It also organised andmonitored the January/February 1997 elections due to which Chechnya wasendowed with a president and parliament legitimate for the Chechens, Moscowand the OSCE.3 In a similar cooperative spirit, Moscow backed the collectiveposition adopted by the OSCE vis-a-vis two of its clients: the rump Yugoslavia(Serbia/Montenegro) and Belarus. In 1992, it concurred to the suspension ofYugoslavia’s membership from the OSCE, a move that it regretted later, sincesuspension turned out to be actual expulsion.4 In 1997, Russia’s support proved tobe instrumental in indulging Belarus to accept the establishment on its territory ofan ‘Advisory and Monitoring Group’ with a human dimension (democratisation)mandate.5

At the same time, however, the Russian policy towards the so-called ‘frozenconflicts’ of Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossetia (Georgia) andTransdniestria (Moldova) provided evidence that political and military hegemonyremained a high priority objective. Nevertheless, somewhat as a counterpart toMoscow’s overall cooperative attitude, the OSCE condoned such policy: in spite ofits bias for Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and its direct support to the breakaway

1 Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), Chapter 15.2 Mandate of the Assistance Group: PC.DEC/35 of 11 April 1995.3 On the role of the OSCE in the 1997 elections, see REF.OD/1/97 of 9 January 1997,

REF.OD/2/97 of 14 January 1997, PC.JOURNAL No. 97 of 16 January 1997 (Annex 1), andINF/17/97 of 29 January 1997.

4 Subsequently, Russia was to veto any further condemnation of Yugoslavia or just theBosnian Serbs.

5 Mandate of the Advisory and Monitoring Group: PC.DEC/185 of 18 September 1997.

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entities in Georgia and Moldova, Moscow was established as an official ‘mediator’in the settlement processes of frozen conflicts. Rubber-stamping took placebecause Western states were then reluctant to intervene themselves in such remoteplaces and tended to believe that the Yeltsin administration had the willingness toplay a constructive role in the post-Soviet space.

Following NATO’s projects for eastward enlargement, Moscow realised thatan OSCE-based European security system was the only means it had at itsdisposal to impose limits on NATO’s growing influence in Europe. Accordingly, itadvocated the strengthening of what was then a mildly institutionalised CSCE inthree main directions.6 First, it requested the transformation of the CSCE processinto an international legal organisation directed by an ‘Executive Committee’composed of permanent as well as rotating members. Second, it called for thebeefing up of all three security dimensions of the CSCE, including the creation of avoluntary fund to finance ‘CIS peacekeeping activities’. Third, it suggested theestablishment of a division of labour between all existing European securityorganisations under the coordination of the CSCE by means of formal agreements.In short, Russia sought the upgrading of its status within a strengthened CSCEwhich it expected to become the overarching institution in the Eurasian region.

The Russian proposals received paltry response. At the 1994 Budapest ReviewConference and Summit, the participating states cosmetically rebaptised the CSCEas ‘OSCE’ as from 1st January 1995. They also agreed ‘to start a discussion of aModel . . . for a Common and Comprehensive Security for Europe for the twenty-first century’.7 After three years of painful debates (1995–97), the Security Modelexercise moved to the drafting of a Charter for European Security. During thatphase (1998–99), Russia requested a legally binding Charter providing ‘securityguarantees’ for states outside politico-military alliances and laying thefoundations of a pan-European security architecture ‘free of geopolitical dividinglines’.8 Retabling its former proposals with more sophistication, it advocated acomplete overhaul of OSCE’s structures, the imposition of straitjacket proceduresfor all OSCE bodies and instruments (in particular Long Term Missions [LTMs]),the upgrading of the political role of the Secretary General, the establishment of amechanism to cope with risks and challenges of an economic and environmentalnature and—in view of breaking NATO’s de facto monopoly in peacekeepingactivities—the development of OSCE’s own capacity for (non-coercive) peace-keeping operations.9

6 Russian proposals: CSCE/FSC/SC.23 of 28 October 1993, DOC.433 of 30 June 1994,DOC.621/94 of 30 August 1994 and DOC.645/94 of 2 September 1994.

7 Budapest Decisions 1994: Chapter 7.8 PC.SMC/98/98 of 25 September 1998, PC.DEL/491/98 of 12 November 1998,

PC.SMC/13/99 of 29 January 1999, PC.SMC/18/99 of 5 February 1999, PC.SMC/39/99 of10 March 1999 and PC.SMC/42/99 of 12 March 1999.

9 Russian proposals: PC.SMC/18/98 of 20 April 1998, PC.SMC/48/98 of 18 June 1998,PC.SMC/108/98 of 14 October 1998, PC.SMC/20/99 of 5 February 1999, PC.DEL/152/99of 25 March 1999, PC.SMC/67/99 of 4 June 1999 and PC.SMC/121/99 of 7 July 1999 (LongTerm Missions); PC.SMC/33/98 of 28 May 1998, PC.SMC/75/98 of 3 September 1998,PC.SMC/78/98 of 4 September 1998, PC.DEL/99/99 of 17 March 1999, PC.SMC/113/99 of1 July 1999 and PC.SMC/172/99 of 5 November 1999 (institutional overhaul);PC.SMC/42/98 of 4 June 1998 (economic dimension); PC.SMC/45/98 of 12 June 1998,PC.SMC/70/98 of 14 July 1998, PC.SMC/73/98 of 28 August 1998, PC.SMC/104/98 of 2October 1998, PC.SMC/28/99 of 12 February 1999 and SMC.PC/101/99 of 25 June 1999(coordinating role of the OSCE); PC.SMC/47/98 of 12 June 1998 (peacekeeping).

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With the exception of Belarus, no delegation supported Moscow’s claims. Thelatter backfired because of their anti-NATO bias and over-ambitious scope orpossible straitjacketing effect on OSCE’s flexibility. As a consequence, thenegotiation of the Charter for European Security represented for Russia a tryingand frustrating exercise. Moscow’s disappointment culminated in politicaltrauma when the OSCE was unable to prevent or condemn NATO’s militaryintervention in Kosovo (March–June 1999). With much noise, Russia denouncedthe ‘premature’ withdrawal of the ‘biased’ OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, adecision made by the Norwegian Chairmanship outside the consensus rule.10 Itattempted, to no avail, to get a condemnation of the intervention by the PermanentCouncil of the OSCE.11 The pathetic activation of a number of OSCE devices—the1990 Berlin Mechanism for emergency meetings, the 1989 Vienna Mechanism onthe Human Dimension and the Vienna Document 1994 on Confidence andSecurity-Building Measures (CSBMs)—proved as useless.12 The accumulation ofsetbacks pushed Moscow to reaffirm, through Cold War rhetoric, the Soviet-cherished principles of equal sovereignty of states, non-interference in internalaffairs and non-use of force contrary to the goals and purposes of the UnitedNations.

Against that dramatic background, an OSCE Summit was expected to takeplace in November 1999, in Istanbul, for the adoption of the long-awaited Charterfor European Security. No high-level meeting seemed then to be as unwarranted.Indeed, the Charter was empty by Russian standards. In addition, Moscow wasundertaking to recapture Chechnya by ruthless military means and consideredthat the OSCE’s political role in the breakaway republic had come to a natural end.A complex trade-off was nevertheless achieved in Istanbul. President Yeltsinagreed to sign the Istanbul Charter. As regards Chechnya, he admitted that a‘peaceful’ solution was conceivable and that an OSCE contribution remainedessential in this perspective. Last, but not least, the Russian President contracted anumber of military commitments related both to the Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia.Under those commitments, Russia agreed to destroy or withdraw its conventionalarmaments and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty in Moldova by the end of2001, as well as a complete withdrawal of its forces from Transdniestria by the endof 2002.13 In relation to Georgia, it pledged to reduce at certain specific levels theamount of its Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) by 31 December 2000 and towithdraw from the military bases at Gudauta (in Abkhazia) and Vaziani (nearTbilisi) by 1 July 2001; it also agreed that during the year 2000 the two sides wouldcomplete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of

10 RC.DEL/206/99 of 29 September 1999.11 SEC.DEL/86/99 and PC.DEL/153/99 of 25 March 1999, PC.DEL/161/99 and

PC.DD/10/99 of 26 March 1999.12 SEC.DEL/130/99 of 22 April 1999 and SEC.DEL/152/99 of 27 April 1999. Moscow

triggered the Vienna Document on CSBMs to inspect Albania and Macedonia, where NATOtroops were hosted (FSC.DEL/123/99 of 14 May 1999, FSC.DEL/127/99 of 19 May 1999,FSC.DEL/145/99 and FSC.DEL/146/99 of 2 June 1999, and FSC.DEL/157/99 of 9 June1999. It also failed to get a meeting to assess the conformity of the intervention with theCode of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security (FSC.DEL/194/99 of 29 June 1999).

13 Istanbul Summit Declaration (1999): Chapter 19.

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the Russian military bases at Batumi (Ajaria) and Akhalkalaki (near the Armenianborder).14

In exchange, Russia obtained two concessions. The first (and most important)was the signature, in Istanbul, of the adapted CFE Treaty—an instrument whoseprovisions were expected to limit the destabilising effects of NATO’s enlargementthrough the imposition of legal constraints on NATO’s Baltic flanks. Under thesecond concession, the participating states reaffirmed the territorial integrity ofRussia and condemned terrorism in Chechnya, with no reference whatsoever tothe atrocities committed by the Russian forces there.15

The Putin Administration’s Assault Against the OSCE

When it took over, the Putin administration opted for confrontation. At the ViennaMinisterial Council meeting of November 2000, the first major OSCE gatheringsince Yeltsin’s departure, it vetoed the adoption of a general ministerialdeclaration—a text supposed to summarise the OSCE’s positive achievements inthe current year and draw up a roadmap for subsequent work. Aimed at pre-empting criticisms on Chechnya and the non-fulfilment of the Istanbulcommitments (which were considered as having been extorted from anirresponsible leader), the move also served to raise the bidding to anunprecedented level: Moscow argued that the OSCE was following such a‘wrong direction’ that its relevance as a European security organisation hadbecome questionable and that its own interest in the OSCE would depend on theelimination of a host of political and institutional ‘dysfunctions’.16 Henceforth,it assaulted the OSCE on the basis of four major charges:

Lack of Clearly Established Institutional Rules of the Game

Russia complained that the OSCE’s activities were conducted on a pragmaticbasis, without real political control from its decision-making bodies or effectiveadministrative oversight from an otherwise weak and understaffed Secretariat.Therefore, it suggested the regulation of the powers and functions of all OSCEbodies through uniform rules of procedure (with stringent guidelines to stop the‘unchecked autonomy’ of the Long-Term Missions and the Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the drafting of a consolidated legalfounding instrument, the strengthening of the political role of the SecretaryGeneral, etc.17 Moscow considered that general rules of the game were not onlyneeded as a matter of principle, but also because their absence enabled the West to‘manipulate’ the OSCE under the guise of flexibility and pragmatism.

Double Standards

Russia argued that the policy under which the OSCE reserved field activities tostates located ‘East of Vienna’ (the former Soviet space and the Balkans), andnever to others, was creating a de facto new line of division between ‘state subjects’

14 Final Act of the Conference of the State Parties to the CFE Treaty (1999): Annex 14.15 Istanbul Summit Declaration (1999): Chapter 23.16 MC.DEL/148/00 of 28 November 2000.17 PC.DEL/3/01 of 8 January 2001, PC.DEL/195/01 of 26 March 2001, PC.DEL/322/01

of 22 May 2001 and PC.DEL/431/01 of 19 June 2001.

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and ‘state objects’18—or, in other words, that the OSCE was turning into anorganisation where a group of countries was able to teach lessons to and imposeunilateral obligations upon all others in clear breach of the principle of sovereignequality of states. Furthermore, it accused the ODIHR of applying differentstandards to monitored elections according to their venue ‘East’ or ‘West ofVienna’, through politicised assessments ignoring the ‘national culturalspecificities’ of states. Unfair geographical distribution of posts in the OSCE’sstructures and activities as well as an unfair scale of contributions were alsomentioned as aggravating instances of double standards.

Whilst the fault line argument contained a grain of truth, it overlooked the factthat intervention was not needed everywhere, but only in those places where therule of law had no firm grounding and where domestic institutions were noteffective enough or did not enjoy public confidence. In the same vein, while theOSCE’s Election Observation Missions did include almost exclusively English-speaking monitors, it was excessive (and incorrect) to accuse ODIHR of partiality.By contrast, the other charges were not unfounded. On the one hand, unequalgeographical distribution of posts (a direct consequence of the practice ofsecondment) could hardly be denied.19 On the other hand, based on politicalrather than economic criteria, the scale of contributions used by the OSCEimposed upon a number of participating states a financial burden higher than theUN and, anyhow, not commensurate with their actual capacity of payment.

‘Unbalanced’ Development of the Three Security Dimensions

A third major complaint concerned the ‘excessive’ share taken by the humandimension at the ‘expense’ of the politico-military dimension and the economic andenvironmental dimension (EED). Admittedly, the three dimensions differed interms of resources, political visibility and achievements—but for objective reasons.The politico-military dimension included a substantial political component(conflict management) and a weaker military one due to the inherent limits ofCSBMs—and also because the CFE Treaty regime has not been translated into directOSCE commitments. As for the EED, it performed as the Cinderella of the OSCEbecause its role has basically been conceived as that of a political ‘catalyst’ for theactivities of specialised organisations (such as the UN Economic Commission forEurope, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.); its shortcomings could not be metwithout the injection of a critical mass of human and financial resources.20 In sum,the imbalance denounced by Moscow was not related to an overgrowth of thehuman dimension, but to the intrinsic obstacles hampering the development of theother dimensions.

Marginalisation of the OSCE in the Landscape of European Security

Finally, the Putin administration contended that the OSCE was not addressingthe ‘real’ threats and challenges to European security (but only those of a

18 MC.DEL/127/00 of 28 November 2000.19 In 2002, for instance over 43% of the seconded staff were provided only by the United

States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France (SEC.INF/68/02 of 19 February 2002).20 Russian proposals on the EED: PC.DEL/254/01 of 25 April 2001.

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‘peripheral’ nature), while submitting to be the ‘maidservant’ of NATO and theEuropean Union as strikingly illustrated by its sidestepping in the 2001Macedonian crisis.21 Therefore, Russia pleaded for a new security agenda (fightagainst terrorism, anti-missile defence, political extremism, migration andstatelessness, etc.), as well as for the attribution to the OSCE of an upgradedstatus enabling it to cooperate on more equal footing with partnerorganisations. Although the Macedonian episode was not a glorious one, it isfair to note that the OSCE’s sidestepping occurred for accidental reasons. At aninitial stage, the OSCE did play an active mediation role in the crisis. Through aPersonal Representative of the Romanian Chairmanship, it offered acompromise solution enshrined in the Prizren Agreement of May 2001.Brokered between the leaders of the main ethnic Albanian political parties andthe Albanian insurgents, the agreement was rejected and the OSCE disqualifiedovernight. The European Union and NATO, which were active in parallel withthe OSCE, filled the vacuum and achieved—through the Ohrid FrameworkAgreement—a political settlement not so different from the Prizren Agreement.The latter just came too early, in the sense that in May 2001 no ethnicMacedonian political leader could afford a compromise with insurgentsperceived as ‘terrorists’. In any case, the circumvention of the OSCE proved tobe only provisional, since the organisation was given (along with the EuropeanUnion and NATO) a proactive role in the implementation of the OhridAgreement.

Admittedly, the OSCE has neither the military clout of NATO nor the economicmagnetic attraction of the European Union. Asymmetrical capacities are,however, matched by close complementary goals and ongoing joint ventures:partnership on a case-by-case basis has become—in time of crisis as well as in fairpolitical weather—general practice between the OSCE and institutional partners(including the Council of Europe), each one drawing on its own comparativeadvantages. Beyond this, it is not incorrect to argue, as Russia does, that the OSCEcan hardly cooperate on equal footing with partner organisations in the absence ofan international legal personality, a politically strong Secretary General and actualcapacity to perform peacekeeping operations.

The OSCE Response to the Putin Administration (2001–2004)

In reaction to the Putin administration’s demands, the majority of participatingstates expressed readiness to improve the working methods of the OSCE and thetransparency of its budgetary and administrative management, but not at theprice of undermining the flexibility of the organisation or the natural developmentof the human dimension. Feeling that its position was not taken seriously, Moscowwarned that without drastic reforms the OSCE would be ‘doomed to extinction’.22

However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States generatedsuch a conciliatory spirit from both sides that ‘OSCE reform’ became overnighta standing item on the agenda. As a consequence, three categories of decisionswere taken between 2001 and 2004:

21 PC.DEL/2/01 of 8 January 2001, PC.DEL/457/01 of 22 June 2001 andPC.DEL/480/01 of 28 June 2001.

22 PC.DEL/457/01 of 22 June 2001 and PC.DEL/480/01 of 28 June 2001.

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Decisions Increasing the Governments’ Control Over OSCE Institutions and Activities

Through a decision on ‘Fostering the role of the OSCE as a forum for politicaldialogue’, the participating states provided for a more careful preparation of theMinisterial Council’s meetings and the strengthening of the authority of thePermanent Council through a streamlined agenda refocused on ‘major issues‘.23

By means of another decision, they reduced the leeway enjoyed by the Chairman-in-Office, the Heads of Field Missions and the Heads of the OSCE Institutions inthe issuance of public statements.24 In an additional decision, they prescribed theSecretary General to produce an annual report offering a ‘factual’ and ‘unbiased’account of OSCE activities ‘in close consultation’ with the Chairmanship:although the annual report does not require approval by means of a formaldecision, the Secretary General is nevertheless bound to hand over a draft copy ofit to the Permanent Council’s Preparatory Committee four weeks prior topublication.25 An even more significant decision codified the functions that theChairmanship has been exercising according to customary practice and drew up‘guidelines’ ensuring that the latter’s actions will not be ‘inconsistent withpositions agreed by all the participating states’ and that ‘the whole spectrum ofopinions of participating States is taken account’.26 However, no consensus couldbe achieved on Long-Term Missions, the issue epitomising OSCE’s deadly sins asseen from Moscow’s perspective, and on which Russia tabled (with Belarus,Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) a vitriolic ‘food-for-thought’ paper in 2003.27 Thegovernments also failed to agree on rules of procedures applicable to all OSCEinstitutions by means of an updating of the 1973 ‘Final Recommendations of theHelsinki Consultations’.28

Decisions ‘Rebalancing’ the Three Security Dimensions

The strengthening of the EED inspired a number of measures of limited practicalimpact such as the creation (within the Permanent Council) of an informalsubcommittee for economic and environmental matters, the elaboration of ahollow ‘OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and EnvironmentalDimension’ and a slight improvement of the working conditions of the EconomicForum.29 The governments also created an ‘Annual Security Review Conference’for all politico-military activities and adopted a ‘Document on Stockpiles ofConventional Ammunition’ setting up a mechanism for the management of thesecurity risks attached to stockpiles of armaments, explosive material ordetonating devices.30 Upon Moscow’s insistence, an assessment of OSCE capacityto conduct peacekeeping operations did take place; after several months of

23 MC(9).DEC/3 of 4 December 2001.24 PC.DEC/485 of 28 June 2002.25 MC.DEC/1/03 of 24 October 2003. See also PC.DEC/495 of 5 September 2002 and

PC.DEC/562 of 2 October 2003.26 MC(10).DEC/8 of 7 December 2002.27 PC.DEL/986/03 of 4 September 2003.28 Proposed draft rules of procedures: MC.DD/18/04 of 26 November 2004. Russian

position: PC.DEL/461/04 of 1 June 2004.29 MC(9).DEC/3 of 3 December 2001 (§§ 11–13), MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 1 of 2

December 2003 and MC.DEC/10/04 of 7 December 2004.30 MC(10).DEC/3 of 7 December 2002 and MC.DEC/9/03 of 7 December 2003.

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discussion a decision was drafted in 2003, but Russia rejected it for falling far tooshort of its expectations.31 In the field of the human dimension, the participatingstates created a mechanism to assist governments concerned about humantrafficking and meant to operate in the whole OSCE area.32 They also authorisedthe designation of three Chairmanship’s Personal Representatives to deal withanti-Semitism, the fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination, and thepromotion of tolerance and media freedom on the internet.33 However, noconsensus was reached on election standards, an issue constantly raised by Russiaand Belarus since the 2000 American presidential elections.

Decisions Enhancing the Political and Security Relevance of the OSCE

The governments placed the fight against terrorism at the centre of OSCE’ssecurity agenda: hence, the successive adoption of the Bucharest Action Plan(2001), the Bishkek Action Plan (2001) and the Porto Charter (2002)—texts of adeclaratory nature which did not bring any added value either with regard to UNnorms or previous OSCE commitments.34 In parallel, they took a host of ‘micro-measures’ (the exchange of information on the use of the internet for terroristpurposes, the reporting of all lost and stolen travel documents to Interpol, controlof human-portable air defence systems, etc.) of limited impact. Particularly dear toRussia, the United States and some others, the fight against terrorism (the mostconsensual item on OSCE’s agenda) has literally become an obsessive mantra. Thegovernments also adopted an ‘OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security in the21st Century’ (2003).35 According to conventional wisdom, a strategy is supposedto provide an action plan outlining how, on the basis of specific resources andmeans, a number of medium- and long-term objectives are to be achieved withoptimal effectiveness and efficiency. However, the OSCE document offered aninventory of problems to be solved and tools to be used, rather than guidelines forconcrete action. Finally, the governments agreed on a slight upgrading of theSecretary General’s role. Beside codifying customary practices, a decision adoptedin 2004 authorised the Secretary General to provide expert and advisory advice insupport of the Chairmanship, to make public statements on behalf of the OSCE, toparticipate in the meetings of OSCE Troikas (that of the Chairmanship and theForum for Security Cooperation) and also to oversee the management of fieldoperations and coordinate their work. More innovatively, it entitled the SecretaryGeneral to countersign letters of appointment for Heads of Missions, who (as wellas the Heads of OSCE Institutions) will exercise their responsibility towards thePermanent Council via the Secretary General, to support the process of politicaldialogue and negotiations among participating states and to bring to the attention

31 Draft decision on peacekeeping: PC.DEL/815/03 of 9 July 2003,PC.DEL/815/03/Rev.1 of 21 October 2003 and PC.DEL/815/03/Rev.2 of 12 November2003. Russian initial proposals: PC.DEL/480/02 of 28 June 2002 and FSC.DEL/449/02 of 17July 2002.

32 MC.DEC/2/03 of 2 December 2003.33 MC.DEC/12/04 of 7 December 2004.34 Bucharest Action Plan: MC(9).DEC/1 of 4 December 2001); Bishkek Action Plan:

SEC.GAL/289/01 of 19 December 2001; Porto Charter: MC(10)JOUR/2, Annex 1 of 7December 2002.

35 MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 3 of 2 December 2003.

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of the OSCE decision-making bodies any matter relevant to these Heads’mandate.

Be it from an overall perspective or in terms of basic demands(peacekeeping, LTMs and election standards), it must be admitted that thereform process has brought little benefit to Russia. Moscow’s reaction was toseek support from the members of the Commonwealth of Independent Stateswho were outraged by the OSCE’s critical assessments of their own humanrights record. The strategy succeeded, since two devastating collectivestatements were issued in 2004 on behalf of those countries: the Moscowinformal Summit Declaration regarding the state of affairs in the OSCE (3 July2004) and the Astana appeal to the OSCE partners (15 September 2004). In thefirst text, the CIS member states (except Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmeni-stan) declared that the OSCE was unable ‘to adapt itself to the demands of achanging world and ensure an effective solution to the problems of securityand co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic area’ and, thus, no longer met theirinterest nor vital needs; they warned that their support to the OSCE would besubject to the ability of the latter to adapt itself properly to the new conditionsand to the degree to which it is receptive to their concerns. In the secondstatement (not endorsed by the three above-mentioned countries or Moldova),the dissatisfied states advocated the elimination of the obstacles hindering thedevelopment of a ‘politically relevant OSCE’ and the strengthening of thetwo lagging dimensions (with particular emphasis on anti-terrorist activities).Beyond well-known complaints, the most striking element of both statementswas their regressive connotation through a plea for a return to the spiritand patterns of cooperation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act: respect for theprinciples of non-interference in internal affairs and equal sovereignty ofstates, facilitation of business contacts, implementation of projects of commoninterest in energy and transport, exchanges in the area of science, expansionof educational and scientific ties, dissemination of ‘cultural values’ as well asimprovement of freedom of movement and contacts between people.36

In any event, the publication of the two statements allowed Moscow to arguethat the OSCE was confronted with a collective CIS challenge, not just aRussian one.

In response, the participating states decided to set up a small panel of eminentpersons to review the effectiveness of the OSCE and to recommend appropriatemeasures in the perspective of the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act andthe tenth anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Issued in June2005, the panel’s report acknowledged a number of Russian major concerns. Itadvocated the elaboration of ‘a concise Charter of the OSCE’, the attribution to theOSCE of legal personality through an international convention, the ‘introductionof a committee structure made up of three pillars corresponding to the traditionaldimensions’ of the Organisation, the codification and updating of the latter’s rulesof procedures and, above all, the upgrading of the status and powers of theSecretary General.37

36 Moscow Declaration: PC.DEL/630 of 8 July 2004; Astana appeal: SEC.DEL/225 of 16September 2004.

37 Text of the Panel’s Report: CIO.GAL/100/05 of 27 June 2005.

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The Putin Administration’s Ongoing Setbacks at the OSCE

While the debate on reform was going on, the Putin administration encountered anumber of political setbacks that exacerbated Moscow’s frustration and angeragainst the OSCE. First, at the end of 2001, the Long-Term Missions in Estonia andLatvia were abruptly closed (on the ground that the two host countries refusedany new mandate prolongation) in total disregard for Russia’s concerns.38 Second,Moscow failed to obtain approval for its ‘normalisation’ policy in Chechnya. TheOSCE refused to condone the 23 March 2003 referendum through which Russiaoffered the Chechens a draft constitution and electoral legislation: a limitedODIHR observation mission assessed the consultation’s result against thebackground of omnipresent military deployment (including in the votingbureaux), intimidation measures, artificial expansion of the electoral lists andother irregularities39 (the referendum was followed by presidential elections on 5October 2003, which the OSCE also declined to observe). Third, in the frameworkof the monitoring of the Russian presidential election of 14 March 2004, the OSCEignited President Putin’s personal anger when the ODIHR issued a reportunderscoring that ‘the process overall did not adequately reflect principlesnecessary for a healthy democratic election’ because of its failure ‘to meetimportant commitments concerning treatment of candidates by the state-controlled media on a non-discriminatory basis, equal opportunities for allcandidates and secrecy of the ballot’.40

An additional and humiliating setback (but a largely self-inflicted one)concerned frozen conflicts. It is worth recalling that from the Budapest Summit(1994) to the Porto Ministerial (2002), the West regularly paid tribute to Moscow’s‘mediating’ efforts as well as the ‘positive’ role of Russian-led self-styled‘peacekeepers’ in the Caucasus and Transdniestria. It did not care to condemneither the massive granting of Russian citizenship to the populations of SouthOssetia and Abkhazia or the re-establishment of a railway connection betweenSochi and Sokhumi decided without the Georgian government’s consent—measures amounting to de facto annexation. It also went even so far in 2002 as toendorse, through the OSCE, a Russian project on the federalisation of Moldova(Kiev Protocol). As Vladimir Socor put it, the project represented an insult todemocracy as well as to federalism: it would have legalised a non-recognisedbreakaway mafia-type regime, attributed to its Soviet-style leadership (composedof Russian citizens) a constitutional right to block Moldova’s evolution towardsthe West and transformed Moldova into a Russian protectorate.41 The West finallydecided to react when, in November 2003, Russia unilaterally produced a newversion of the federalisation scheme (the Kozak Memorandum on the ‘BasicPrinciples of the State Structure of a United States’) providing inter alia for themaintenance of Russian troops—as guarantors of the federative arrangement—fora period of 15 years. On behalf of the OSCE, the Dutch Chairmanship rejected theproject as unacceptable.42 The parallel mobilisation of civil society opposition

38 Russia’s reaction: PC.DEL/985/01 of 13 December 2001 and PC.DEL/1002/01 of 18December 2001.

39 ODIHR’s report: PC.DEL/304/03 of 28 March 2003.40 ODIHR’s report: ODIHR.GAL/39/04 of 2 June 2004.41 Vladimir Socor: ‘How to Discredit Democracy and Federalism’, Wall Street Journal

(European edition), 6 June 2003. Text of the Kiev Protocol: CIO.GAL/52/02 of 4 July 2002.42 SEC.PR/679/03 of 24 November 2003.

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groups (emboldened by the ousting of President Shevardnadze in Georgia)pushed Moldova’s Communist leadership to call for a change in the tripartiteMoscow-dominated mediation format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE) through theinvolvement of the United States and the European Union.43 In Soviet-style ColdWar language, Moscow rejected the idea and accused ‘certain states, politicalorganisations and institutions’ of having torpedoed the settlement of theTransdniestrian conflict and ‘thwarted’ the withdrawal of Russian military forcesfrom Moldova.44 In 2004, it refused to endorse a ‘Declaration on the stability andthe security of the Republic of Moldova’ on the pretext that the document was just‘an attempt to emasculate the contents of the basic element of the settlement [ofthe Transdniestrian conflict] and to exclude from the process one of the sides, anattempt which is in conflict with all the decisions already taken and indeed withplain common sense’.45

With regard to Georgia, Russia also overplayed its hand. While declaring itsreadiness to improve relations between the two countries, it overtly convened,soon after the ousting of Shevardnadze and just before the Maastricht Ministerial,a meeting in Moscow of the separatist leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—aswell as Ajaria, a yet non-secessionist region. In 2004, it opposed any furtherextension of the mandate of OSCE’s Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) inGeorgia. The move was crystal clear: operating along several segments of theGeorgian-Russian border, the BMO has regularly been defusing the Russiancharges of Chechen terrorist operations conducted from Georgia, whileconfirming (in veiled diplomatic language) Russian incursions into Georgianairspace.

As a matter of fact, Moscow’s policy with regard to frozen conflicts ismotivated by the objective of securing the southern flank of the RussianFederation by means of an old-fashioned long-term military presence in Georgia,as well as transforming Moldova into an outpost military base at the outskirts ofthe former Soviet space—the latter situation offering the additional advantages ofincreasing pressure on neighbouring Ukraine. In any case, Russia’s interests are tocontain military violence below an escalation level, and also to maintain sufficienttension to justify its continuous ‘mediation’ role and military presence.

Russia took an uncompromising posture on the Istanbul military commit-ments, an issue on which the West has also been displaying a rare indulgence,since it never formally condemned Moscow’s continuous military presence inMoldova and Georgia against the will of the hosting states. Driven by its interestfor a rapid entry of force of the adapted CFE Treaty, Russia cared to honour onlythose elements of the Istanbul commitments directly related to the Treaty, but not theothers—viz. the completion during 2000 of negotiations on the duration of thefunctioning of two Russian military bases in Georgia, as well as the effectivewithdrawal from two other bases in Georgia by 1 July 2001 and fromTransdniestria by the end of 2002.46 At the Porto Ministerial Council meeting(December 2002), with considerable complacency, the OSCE just noted Russia’s

43 PC.DEL/1162/04 of 26 November 2004 and PC.DEL/1193/04 of 6 December 2004.44 PC.DEL/1438/03 of 28 November 2003.45 MC.DEL/61/04 of 7 December 2004.46 Russia closed and handed over the Vaziani base to Georgia in due time. It also

withdrew its military equipment from the Gudauta base in 2001, but did not close the latter,on the pretext of the opposition of the Abkhaz population.

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intention to achieve withdrawal from Moldova, ‘provided necessary conditionsare in place’ by 31st December 2003 and, as regards Georgia, only acknowledged‘the desire of the parties to complete negotiations regarding the duration andmodalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi andAkhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia’.47

In any case, OSCE’s indulgence was not rewarded: at the Ministerial Councilmeetings held in Maastricht (December 2003) and Sofia (December 2004), Russiarefused to reconfirm its withdrawal commitments. It pretended that theagreements reached at Istanbul with Moldova and Georgia were of a bilateralnature and did not imply any legal obligations for Moscow with regard to thirdcountries. It also stated that it will only continue with the implementation of bothagreements ‘provided necessary conditions are in place’ and subject to Georgia’sand Moldova’s own compliance with these agreements. Finally, Russia (which hasratified the Adapted CFE Treaty) stigmatised the political linkage between theIstanbul commitments and the ratification process—a prerequisite raised byNATO since 2000—as ‘illegitimate’, and stressed that delaying ratification on such‘groundless pretexts’ did not serve European security.48 The argumentationnegated the integrity of the Istanbul commitments, their unconditional characterand their timetable. In sum, Russia is at odds with the overwhelming majority ofthe other participating states on the status of the Istanbul commitments and theratification process of the adapted CFE Treaty.49

Conclusion

Obviously seeking to restore a lost superpower status, post-Soviet Russiadismisses not only NATO enlargement and the ‘neighbourhood policy’ of theexpanded European Union, but also the current evolution of the OSCE. Withinthe latter, Moscow emotionally resents its political isolation and, as in the Sovietera, refers to the mantras of non-interference in internal affairs and sovereignequality. Its political isolation is no wonder: Russia conducts an old-fashionedhegemonic policy without, otherwise, being able to offer anything appealing tothe surrounding states in democratic and economic transition. In defiance withthe right of friendly interference in internal affairs (which represents the bedrockof OSCE’s cooperative security approach) it rejects any criticism issued by theOSCE, while expecting it to rubber-stamp its policy vis-a-vis the former SovietRepublics. Its plea for sovereign equality concerns equality of status among bigpowers, with no due account (as demonstrated by frozen conflicts) to the basicinterests of small states. Given that international institutions serve both asinstruments of foreign policy and as frameworks for multilateral cooperation, it isnot illegitimate for Russia to seek to achieve national goals through theinstrumentality of the OSCE. However, its negative global record in terms ofOSCE’s norms, standards and commitments gives it no credentials for that.

47 Porto Ministerial Council’s ‘Statements’ (2002): Chapter 6 and Chapter 9 of Section 5.48 MC(12).JOUR/2 Annex 9 of 7 December 2004. Apart from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus

and Kazakhstan have also ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty.49 Russian position: MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 4 of 2 December 2003 and MC(12).JOUR/2

Annex 9 of 7 December 2004. Position of NATO member states and other state parties:MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 6 of 2 December 2003. Apart from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus andKazakhstan have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty.

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Besides repudiation of democracy at domestic level and opposition to the spreadof democracy in the post-Soviet space (i.e. in Georgia and Ukraine), there are theongoing atrocities in Chechnya, the stationing of Russia troops in Moldova andGeorgia against the will of the host states,50 the non-implementation of theIstanbul package and, last and not least, the support for breakaway regimesemanating from a officially ‘mediator’ party.

The crisis generated by Russia within the OSCE is serious. No OSCE summithas been held since 1999 (because no such gathering could decently take placewithout addressing Chechnya’s ordeal and the incomplete fulfilment of theIstanbul military commitments) and the OSCE’s foreign ministers have not beenable to reach consensus on high politics issues for two years in a row—inMaastricht (2003) and Sofia (2004). Because of a Russian veto, the OSCE wascompelled to operate without a regular budget from January to May 2005. Whataggravates the crisis is that the unlawful invasion and occupation of Iraq,followed by egregious abuses of human rights there, have deprived someWestern countries of the basis to teach lessons of morality: in all fairness, thepolicy of the American-led coalition in Iraq is no less undemocratic than that ofRussia in the post-Soviet space. In any event, Russia is subjecting thecontinuation of its cooperation with the OSCE to drastic reforms. This raises aserious dilemma. Dismissing Moscow’s concerns (whether legitimate or not)would be unwise, since the OSCE’s own relevance is linked to Russia’s fullparticipation as well as the democratic evolution of that country: clearly,European security cannot be achieved without Russia’s contribution. On theother hand, bowing to Moscow’s blackmailing would entail adverse con-sequences for the OSCE’s institutional creativity and political credibility.

In fact, the OSCE does need some basic reforms aimed at establishing clearerdiplomatic rules of the game, enhancing the external visibility of the organisationand improving the performance of the three security dimensions. If it did notresult in straitjacket procedures or a downgrading of the organisation’snormative standards and commitments, that type of change would be mostpositive. However, the majority of participating states do not seem ready tosatisfy Russia’s central demands or, even, to agree on such common-sensemeasures as a substantial revision of the scale of contributions, the application ofequitable geographical distribution to staffing and the attribution to the OSCE ofan international legal capacity. The trouble also is that Russia has (for the reasonsdeveloped in the present analysis) lost genuine interest in the OSCE, all the morethat its obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateralinstitutional devices with NATO and the European Union devices. In the presentcircumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the real political value that theWest attaches to that organisation, as well as on Russia’s wisdom not to break thesingle European security organisation where its place and role are fullylegitimate.

50 In June 2005, a deal was publicly announced concerning the withdrawal of Russiantroops from two bases in Georgia by 2008: see the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia DailyMonitor, 10 June 2005.

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