grgić, filip - 2002 - aristotle on the akratic's knowledge (phronesis)

7/28/2019 Grgić, Filip - 2002 - Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge (Phronesis)

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/grgic-filip-2002-aristotle-on-the-akratics-knowledge-phronesis 1/24

Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge

Author(s): Filip GrgićSource: Phronesis, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2002), pp. 336-358Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182707 .

Accessed: 13/08/2011 15:45

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182707?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182707?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap



Aristotle on the Akratic'sKnowledge

FILIPGRGRW

ABSTRACT

This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. Aristotle's dis-

cussion in this chapter s motivatedby the Socraticdoctrine,elaborated n Plato's

Protagoras, according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act

against this knowledge. Aristotlewants to rebut this doctrine and show that there

is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he

wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not meant to provide an expla-nation of akrasia, as is usually supposed by commentators.

Since the akraticknows that the action she is performing s not good for her,

and actions are particulars, he akratic'sknowledge is about a particular. arguethat Aristotle's discussion in EN 7.3 adds strengthto the idea that knowledge of

a particulars explainable only in terms of knowledge of a universal. Moredeter-

minately, knowledge of a particular s explainable in terms of the actualization

or use of knowledge of a universal, and such an actualization s in turn explain-

able by means of the syllogistic form. Thus, I argue that syllogisms in 7.3 (esp.

at 1146b35-1 147al10)are not "practical yllogisms",but that their function is epis-

temological: they are meant to reveal the structureand content of the akratic's

knowledge, not to explain her actions.

The akraticagent knows that what she is doing she should not be doing;that what she is doing is not good for her. What does it mean to say thatshe knows?Andwhat,exactly,is the contentof herknowledge?Aristotlediscusses these questions in his NicomacheanEthics 7.3, a chapterthathas been intensivelyscrutinizedby many scholars.'This essay is meantto be a modest contribution o the debate.

AcceptedDecember 2002I It is impossible here to survey the vast literatureon akrasia in Aristotle. I am

most indebted to A. Kenny, "ThePractical Syllogism and Incontinence",Phronesis I1

(1966), 163-184; Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (New Haven, 1979), 155-166,M. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good", in N. Sherman, ed., Aristotle's

Ethics: Critical Essays (Lanham/Oxford,1999), 205-230 (originally appeared n A. 0.

Rorty,ed., Essayson Aristotle'sEthics(Berkeley,1980), 69-92) and D. Charles,Aristotle's

Philosophy of Action (London, 1984), 109-196. For the epistemological issues, see

H. H. Joachim,Aristotle:The NicomacheanEthics, ed. by D. A. Rees (Oxford, 1951),219-233.

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2002 PhronesisXLVII14Also available online - www.brill.nl



ARISTOTLEON THE AKRATIC'S KNOWLEDGE 337

I. Introduction

Before addressing he problemswith the akratic'sknowledge,it is im-

portant o considerthe reasonswhy Aristotleis interested n them. He

is primarilymotivatedby the Socratic doctrine, elaboratedin Plato's

Protagoras,according o which it is impossible o know whatis good and

act against hisknowledge.Aristotlewantsto rebut hisdoctrineandshow

thatthere s a senseof "know" uch thatthisis possible.Interpreters,ow-

ever, usually assumethathis discussionof the akratic'sknowledge n EN

7.3 includesmorethana discussionof knowledgealone.Theyusuallytakeit that it includesan attemptto explain the phenomenonof akrasia. In

quitegeneral erms,anexplanation f akrasiathatwouldtaketheakratic's

knowledgeas its centralpointmightproceedas follows. If one wants to

understandwhat akrasia is, one has to consider what the akraticdoes.

Then one can notice that she, because of her emotionsand passions, is

not able to completethe so-calledpractical yllogismin a manner hat is

characteristicof a non-akratic.Thus, for instance, from "I should not

smoke cigarettes"and "This is a cigarette" he eitherdoes not infer "I

should not smoke this"or, on the alternativenterpretation,he does inferthis conclusionbut acts againstit. In eithercase, the explanationof her

failure is her epistemicdeficiency:her knowledgeof the minor,or par-

ticular, practical-syllogistic remiseis weakerthanknowledgeof a non-

akratic.Thus, it seems that if one managesto explain the structure nd

contentof herknowledge,one is fairlyclose to theunderstandingf akra-

sia itself.

The idea underlying his essay is thatAristotle's discussionin EN 7.3

is not meant to provide such a far-reachingconsequence.This idea is

basedon one generalassumptionaboutthe natureof Aristotle's

approachto the problemof akrasia, and on two more specific assumptionscon-

cerninghis proceduresn EN 7.3.

(1) Generally peaking, he explanationof akrasiacan by no means be

exhaustedby the explanationof the akratic's knowledge. It cannot be

exhaustedby the explanationof the akratic'saction either. For, having

discoveredthat the akratic s epistemicallydeficient,and havingdemon-

strated he natureof her deficiency,we still have to ask where her fail-

ures come from. Furthermore,avinganswered his questionby pointing,

aboveall, to the manner n which her emotionsandpassions nfluenceher

knowledge and her practical-syllogistic easoning,there still remainsa

reasonablequestionwhy she is so proneto such an influence.An answer

to this questionhas to includean accountof her state, that is to say, an



338 FILIPGRGle

accountof a type of personshe is. For,akrasiais, according o Aristotle,

a state (Et;) of the soul (7.8, 1151a27-28;7.9, 1151b28-30): although t

is not identicalwith virtueor vice, it does not belongto a differentgenus

either (7.1, 1145b1-2). Hence, it is plausible to suppose that the appropri-

ate explanationof akrasiashouldbe given in a manner hatcorresponds

to the appropriatexplanation f virtueor vice. Now, if we wantto under-

standwhat virtue is, it is not sufficient to consider the actions that are

broughtaboutby, andin accordancewith, some particular irtue;whatis

needed is the considerationof the E1t; of the agent who is performing

such actions,as

well ashow this

F%t;is

acquiredEN

2.4,1105a26-b12).

Likewise, one might expect that to explain akrasiait is not sufficient o

consider he akratic'sactions;a FRt;that bringsaboutsuch actions should

also be taken into account. Therefore, the discussion of the akratic's

knowledgecan only, to use Myles Burnyeat'sphrase,pinpointwhat is to

be explained,but it cannot countas the explanationof akrasia.2

(2) A further,and more specific, reason why we should be cautious n

assessing Aristotle's main target in 7.3 concernshis use of syllogistic

inferences.The reasonwhy many commentatorshink hat Aristotle's ask

in 7.3 is the ambitiousone of explainingakrasiaas such is that theymis-

understand, nd hence overrate, he role of these inferences.They are usu-

ally understood s practical inferences, hat is, as patternsof explanation

of humanaction.I do not wish to deny the importance hat practical yl-

logism has in Aristotle's philosophy.What I will try to show instead is

thatpracticalreasoning s not his primary oncern n 7.3. It seems to me

that he is facing the following problem.He wants to demonstrate ow it

is possible to say that the akraticacts knowinglyand what the contentof

her knowledge s. She knows thataction x she is performings not good

for her and, probably, hat the alternativeactiony she is not performingis good for her. To know that actionx is not good, or that action y is

good, is to possess knowledgeof a particular, or it is particular cts that

2 See Burnyeat, "Aristotleon Leaming to Be Good", 222: "I think many readers

feel that Aristotle's discussion of akrasia leaves unexplainedthe point most in need

of explanation. What they want to know is why the better syllogism is overcome. Not

finding an answer they look for one in what Aristotle says in 7.3 about the akratic's

knowledge and the way this is not used, not had, or draggedabout. And then they are

dissatisfied because no adequateanswer is to be found in the discussion of that issue,

for the good reason, I believe, that none is intended.The treatmentof knowledge pin-

points what is to be explained. It is not itself the explanation."




are done.3Thus, Aristotleneeds to show how it is possiblefor an akraticto possess knowledgeabouta particular act) and how herknowledgedif-

fers fromknowledgeof a non-akratic.To do this, he must show what it

means to possess knowledge of a particularn the firstplace. He is very

concise in this, but I take it that he assumes thatknowledge of a partic-

ular is explainableonly in termsof knowledgeof a universal.More deter-

minately, he assumes that knowledge of a particular s explainable in

terms of the actualizationor use of knowledgeof a universal,and such

an actualization s in turnexplainableby means of the syllogistic form.4

Thus, syllogisms in 7.3 are of interest primarily n the epistemological,not in the practicalsense. To be sure, at 1147a25-3 , he uses a syllogis-

tic formto clarifywhat is going on, not in knowing,but in acting.If my

readingof thispassage, given in sectionV below, is correct,even this syl-

logism has, in pointof fact, an epistemological unction.

One might objectthatpractical-syllogisticmodel is indispensablef we

want to account or the fact that the akraticabandonsherreasoningabout

what is good for her.My position s simplythat 7.3 cannothelp us much

concerning his issue. Aristotle'sview is that the akraticacts againsther

choice or deliberation.5 believe that the syllogismsin 7.3 do not displaythe process of deliberation. n otherwords, the akraticdoes act against

deliberativeconclusions,but these conclusionsare not underdiscussion

in 7.3.6

(3) Finally,Aristotlehimself does not say that he wants to explainthe

phenomenonof akrasia. His main objectiveis stated rathermodestlyat

7.1, 1145b2-7:

We must, as in other cases, set out the 9patv6ieva and, first, go throughthe puz-

zles. In this way we must prove, if possible, all the Cv`SoFa bout these affec-

tions or, if not all, then most of them and the most important.For if we resolve

the difficulties and leave the evao4a, we shall have proved the case adequately.

I See EN 3.1, lllOb6-7; 6.8, 1142al4-15; 6.9, 1143a29, 32; 7.3, 1147'3-4.

4Here I am heavily indebted o W. Leszl, "Knowledgeof the Universaland Knowledge

of the Particular n Aristotle",Review of Metaphysics26 (1972-73), 278-313. See also

Metaph. M.10, 1086b33-37;An. Pr. 2.21, 67a27-28 and section VI below.' For choice, see 7.3, 1146b22-24;7.4, 1148a9;7.8, 1151a6-7;7.10, 1152a15-17.For

deliberation, see 7.1, 1145b11-12: the akratic abandons her Xoytago';;but see 6.1,1139a12-13:PoviX4v6Oatis the same as kOyi?EaOat.

6 The akratic's abandoningher deliberationis actually discussed not in 7.3, but

rather in 7.8 and 7.9, 1151a29-b4.



340 FILIP GRGIC

The EvAo4a re,according o the Topics(1.1, 100b21-23), beliefs that areacceptedby everyoneor by the majorityor by the wise, thatis, by all, or

by the majorityor by the most notable and reputableof them,while the

meaning f (paLvo6gevaariesbetween"manifestacts"and"common eliefs"

abouta subjectunderdiscussion.What,then,are theCvAota, ndwhatthe

patvvo6evabout akrasia?For an answerwe mustlook at what Aristotle

says before and after the passage quoted.What he has done before, at

1145a15-33,may be called setting out the Ypaiv6pcva:e has pointedto

the fact that there s something ike vice, akrasia andbestiality, hat these

states are to be avoided,he has brieflydescribed heircontraries, tc. Onthe other hand, EvAo4aare things that people think (cf. 8ocei 1145b8) or

say (cf. (paxtv 1145 17, 18; X y6gevva 145b20) about these (pcTUVlva,

and some of them are listed at 1145b8-20: the akratic is the person who

knows his actions are bad, but does them because of his feelings; he is

temperate; e is not temperate; e can be practicallywise ((pp0vtio;);hecannot be practicallywise, etc.

Socrates'position,Aristotleays,contradictshe(pawvo6eva7.2, 1145b28),

not the Fv6Ao,a. f it contradicted the ?`Aota, this would mean that

Socrates nsists thatakrasia should be defined n a mannerradicallydif-ferentfromthe one acceptedby everyone,by themajorityor by the wise.

Socrates,however, denies the very existence of akrasia. His position isnot itself an ?vAo4ov; in the Topics terminology, it is a Olat;, a paradox-

ical belief of an eminentphilosopher 1.11, 104bl9-20). Here in EN it is

called an icnopkathe most important mongseveral&iropiatoncerningakrasia- that is to be resolved.7 n my opinion,the resolutionof this par-ticular&C'opias all that Aristotlewants to do in 7.3: he wants to demon-strate hatthere s a sense of "know" uch that t is possible to knowwhat

is good and act against this knowledge.This is clearlystated bothat thebeginning wherehe says thathe wantsto show "whether he akraticpeo-ple act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly", 1146b8-9) and

at the end of the chapter "so much, then,for knowingandnot knowing,and for the sense in which it is possible to know and act akratically",1147bl7-19).

One might protestagainstsuch a readingby sayingthat it too, just likemore usualreading hatI deny, overestimates he role of knowledge.Foris it really sufficient, n order to reject the Socraticposition, to demon-strate hatthere s a sense of "know" uch that it is possibleto know whatis good and do what is bad? Wouldn't a complete rejectionrequire he

7 See 7.2, 1146b6; see also 1145b21.




demonstrationhat there s a sense of "do"suchthat it is possible to knowwhat is good and do what is bad?

We should keep in mind, however,that Aristotle'sstartingpointis that

the existence of akrasiais beyond question.Whenwe see someoneacting

againstwhat she knows is good for her, we call this an akraticaction.

Socrateswould say thatit is not an akraticaction, but an actiondone by

ignorance. f we want to save the phenomenon f akrasia,we mustdemon-

strate hata person n questionreallyknows that what she is doing is not

good for her- and that's all. It was the Socraticposition,or Aristotlebe-

lieves so, thatreducedthe problemof akrasia to the problemof knowl-edge- by insistingthat theperson n questioncannotknow(7.2, 1145"22-

23).

II. Possessing knowledgeand exercisingknowledge

Having rejectedthe possibility that it is true belief against which the

akraticacts, Aristotleturnsto the assumption hat it must be knowledge

(7.3, 1146b24-31). He then introduces his well-known distinction between

active and passiveknowledge:

However, since we speak of knowing (FincrraoOat) n two ways (for both the

manwho has knowledgebut is not using it (xpW'gevo;) nd the man who is using

it are said to know), it will matter whether a man has the knowledge that he is

doing what he should not, without exercising (eowpoivta) his knowledge,or both

has it and exercises it. For the latter case seems strange(8ctvOv), but it does not

seem strangeif he does not exercise his knowledge. (1146b31-35)

If I have learned,say, to speak,write,read and understandFrench,then

I can be said to know French. In fact, there are two senses in which I

know it. WhenI speak it or read it, etc., then I know it in the sense of

using or exercisingmy knowledge.WhenI do not speak,write, or read

it, but I can do it whenever I want to, then I know French n the sense

of merely possessingknowledge.8The first thingwe would like to know

is why Aristotle introduces his distinctionwhen discussingthe akratic's

knowledge.

It seems that he does not introduce his distinction n orderto demon-

strate that it is possible for a personto do what she knows is not good

for her because "knows"here means"possessesknowledge",rather han

8 For the distinctionbetween active and passive knowledge, see, above all, EN 6.10,

1143'12-14; DA 2.1, 412a9-26; 2.5, 417a2l-418a6; Phys. 7.3, 247bl-248a9; EE 2.9,

1225bl 1-13.



342 FILIP GRGICe

"exercisesknowledge".That is to say, it seems that his view cannotbethat the akraticpossesses knowledgethat she shouldnot smoke a ciga-rettebutdoes not exerciseher knowledgeand smokes it. A quitegeneralreasonwhy this cannot be his view is the fact that active knowledgeis

knowledge n a stronger ense thenpassiveknowledge.9Supposethatwe

seek to reject the Socraticpositionby showing that there is a sense inwhich a personcan be said to know and act againstthis knowledgebut

leaving open the possibility hat there s a strongersense of "know" uchthat it is impossible hat she knows in this stronger ense and actsagainst

her knowledge. In that case, one mightinsist thatakrasia, afterall, maynot be possible. In ordereffectively to reject the Socraticposition weshould take as our startingpoint the strongestsense of "know"we cananddemonstratehat, given such a sense, it is possible to act againstyourknowledge. In Aristotle'scase, such stronger ense is given by his con-

cept of active knowledge.That is to say, if Aristotlewere to say simplythat the akraticknowspassivelybut notactively, he would haveto admit,as it were, that akrasia is impossible.Hence, it is active knowledgethatmustbe ascribed o the akratic.

Several rathergeneralconsiderations an show why it is reasonable oinsist thatthe akraticmustknow in an active sense. Knowledgeascribedto the akraticmust be knowledgeof a particular,ince what she does isa particular ct. If the akratic'sknowledgewere knowledgeof a univer-sal only, her action could not count as akratic; f she didn't know whoshe was, what she was doing,what she was doing it with, for whatresult,in whatway, etc., her action would be actiondone in ignorance EN 3.1,Ill l13-21). Now, the problemof knowledgeof particularss a notoriousproblemnAristoteliancholarship.'0tleastonething eemsclear,however:

as I have alreadynoted,what it means to have knowledgeof a particularis explainableonly in termsof knowledgeof a universal, hat is, in termsof the actualization, se or exercise of knowledgeof a universal.To knowthat a particularrianglehas the sum of its interiorangles equal to tworightangles (thatit has 2R, for short)is to exercise the knowledgethateverytrianglehas 2R;to knowthat I should not be smokingthiscigaretteis to exercise the knowledgethat I should not smokeany cigarette. f weaskedan akraticwho is smokinga cigarette:"Do you knowyou shouldn'tbe smokingthis cigarette?" he would reply: "Yes, I know, but I can't

I This follows simply from the general priorityof EvEpy&taver &UvaoS;Metaph.

e.8).10See above, note 4, and below, section VI, and note 26.




resist" she somehowactivelyknows that she should not be smoking hiscigarette.Her answering n this way is her exercisingher knowledge.The

assumptionthat the akratic actively knows that her action is wrong is

"strange" (&tv6v), as Aristotle says (1 146"35). "Strange" here does not

mean "impossible",but signals the need for an explanation; ignals that

akrasia is hard to understand nd thatthe problemAristotle s facedwith

is not trivial."To be sure, we are sometimesstronglyinclined to think

thatthe relationshipbetweenexercisingknowledgeand actingis so close

that the formerentails, or amountsto, the latter. Such a supposition s

wrong,however,if only becauseit is not knowledgethat is a mover,thatis to say, it cannotmovethe bodilyparts n theway necessary or action.'2

Of course,the akraticdoes not exerciseherknowledge n the sameway

in which a personwho is looking at a particularrianglesaying "It has

2R" exerciseshis mathematicalknowledge,or in which a personsaying

"J'aifaim" xerciseshisknowledgeof French.Theakratic,ouseAristotle's

comparison (1 147a20, b12), exercises her knowledge in a way in which a

drunken person exercises his knowledge when reciting the verses of

Empedocles. A drunkenperson may possess knowledge of the entire

Empedocles'poem - this is what in his case corresponds o knowledgeof a universal and he exercises this knowledgewhen recitinga partic-

ular verse. The same is with the akratic:she knows that no action of a

certaintype should be done and she exercisesher knowledgewhen she

performsan action of this type, saying "I know I should not be doing

this".What interestsAristotlein 7.3 is not why the akraticor the drunk

do whatthey do, but (1) how to accountfor the fact thattheyboth know,

not only passivelybut actively as well, and (2) how theiractive knowl-

edge differs from knowledgeof a sober or of a non-akraticperson.

III. Universal and particular knowledge

Besides, since thereare two types of propositions,nothing preventsa man's hav-

ing both and acting against knowledge, providedthat he is using only the uni-

versal, but not the particularproposition;for it is particularacts that are done.

(I 146b35-1 147'4)

" The alternative s to take 5etvov as ironic: Socrates says that it would be &tvOv

for knowledge to be presentin someone, but draggedaboutlike a slave (7.2, 1145b23-24). This, however, is actually happening to the akratic(7.3, 1147b16-17). In the same

vein, it would be t6vo'vif someone has active knowledge and acts against it - but

this is also happeningto the akratic.12 See, above all, DA 3.9, 432b26-433a8.



344 FILIPGRGKI

The akraticexercises her knowledgeby using only the universalproposi-tion. The firstthingwe shoulddo, then, is to considerwhat it means to

possess a universalpropositionand how it is possibleto use it.

To possess a universalproposition, o take Aristotle's favorite exam-

ple, is to know, say, thatevery trianglehas 2R. To use this proposition

is, obviously, to infer from it some otherpropositions: or instance,the

propositionhatthisparticular rianglehas 2R, that scalenetriangleshave

2R, that some other mathematicalproposition holds, etc. What does

it mean o useonlytheuniversal, ndnotthe particular roposition? ristotle

neverexplicitlydiscusses thisquestion,but there s a passage n the PriorAnalytics2.21 (67a1 -21) that may be of help:

If someone knows that A belongs to everythingto which B belongs, then he also

knows thatit belongs to C. But nothing preventshim being ignorant hat C exists,

as, for example, if A is two right angles, B stands for triangle, and C standsfor

a perceptible triangle:for someone could believe C not to exist, while knowing

that every triangle has two right angles, and consequently,he will at the same

time know and be ignorantof the same thing.

For to know of every triangle that it has angles equal to two right angles is

not a simple matter, but ratherone way of knowing it is in virtueof having uni-

versal knowledge, and another way is in virtue of having the particularknowl-edge. In this way, then, i.e., by means of the universalknowledge, he knows C,

that it has two right angles; but he does not know it as by means of the partic-

ularknowledge;consequently, he will not possess contrarystates of knowledge.'"

In the first partof the passage(67a11-16), Aristotledescribesan apparent

paradox.A personwho knows thatevery trianglehas 2R (i.e. who pos-sesses a universalproposition) nd does not knowthat a particularrian-gle C exists at the same time knows and does not know that C has 2R:

he knows this because he knows thatevery trianglehas 2R, but he does

not know this because he does not even know that C exists. Thus, in asense, he knows and does not know the same thing at the same time.'4

13 Smith's translation;see Aristotle, Prior Analytics, translated,with introduction,

notes, and commentary,by R. Smith (Indianapolis/Cambridge, 989).14 The paradox is well discussed by M. Gifford, "Aristotleon PlatonicRecollection

and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B. 21 67a8-30", Phronesis

46 (1999), 1-29. A similar argumentis mentioned at An. Post. 1.1, 71a31-33. Both

arguments are related to Plato's doctrine of recollection in the Meno and their origin

is not clear. (They were perhapsused in discussionswithin Academy.) Aristotle would

probably call them sophistical (see An. Post. 1.5, 74a25-32), but they might be called

skeptical as well, since they are special cases of the skeptical argumentagainst deduc-

tion as is found in Sextus Empiricus,PH 2.195-197.




Aristotledoes not think there is a paradoxhere, for in the second partof the passage (67a16-21)he distinguishesbetween four levels of knowl-

edge or, rather,between four ways in which one can know that the prop-

erty of having 2R belongs to triangles.Thus one can:

(a) know that every trianglehas 2R in virtue of having universalknowl-

edge (Copiv -r -iv KaOoXolU"eXCVictlai"lv67 18);(b) know thatevery trianglehas 2R by virtueof having particular nowl-

edge (tiv icaO' C'aotov 7a18-19);

(c) know that C has 2R by means of universal knowledge (6; tn Ka0OXoX)018E X0F Orfl81o

6pOai67a19-20);(d) know that C has 2R by means of particular knowledge (60;& tf KaO'

'6cazatoviUIC0iv 67a20).

Knowledgeof the (a)-typeis knowledgeone possesses if one has learned

the mathematicalpropositionin question. By possessing this kind of

knowledgeone possesses knowledgeof the (c)-typeeven if one does not

know that a particular riangleC exists or does not recognize it as a tri-

angle:"Forinstance, f someone knows [knowledgeof the (a)-type]that

every trianglehas 2R, he knows in a sense [knowledgeof the (c)-type]ofthe isosceles too that it has 2R - potentially - even if one does not know

of the isosceles that it is a triangle"An.Post. 1.24, 86a25-27). f I know

that every trianglehas 2R, but do not know that a particular riangleC

exists, I still potentiallyknowthatC has 2R. Let us, then, supposethatI

do not know that C exists and am asked:"If C is a triangle,does it have

2R?" I would obviouslyanswer:"Yes",and my answering hatway can

be thoughtof as my exercisingor using my (a)-type knowledge- but an

exercisingor usingthe universalpremiseonly: I do not possess minor or

particularpremise,"C is a triangle". n this case, I know that C has 2Rby means of universalknowledge.'5Let us call this kind of knowledge,thatis, knowledgeof the (a)-typethat implies knowledgeof the (c)-type,

knowledgewithouta particular.Knowledgeof the (b)-typeseems morepuzzling.In my opinion,what

Aristotle has in mindis something ike this. I possess knowledgeof the

(a)-type simply by having learned hat every trianglehas 2R. I know that

"1It is in this way that we know particularswhen they are unavailable to percep-tion: "For we do not know any perceptible hing when it is outside our perception, not

even if we happen to have perceived it before, except as in virtue of possessing uni-

versal knowledge, or in virtue of possessing, but not exercising, its peculiar knowl-

edge" (An. Pr. 2.21, 67a39_b3, Smith's translation);see also EN 6.3, 1139b21-22.



346 FILIPGRGIC

irrespective f whetherI observeany triangle.However,I also knowthatwhen I am faced with a particularriangleC, when I recognize t as a tri-

angle, and when I use my knowledgeto say somethingabout this partic-

ular triangleC. (Or when I want to demonstratehatevery trianglehas

2R by using the triangle C.) My knowledgethat every trianglehas 2R

now differsfromknowledgethatevery trianglehas 2R thatI have when

I am not faced withany triangle (a)-typeknowledge).Now this is knowl-

edge with a particular: now I know that every triangle has 2R by virtue

of having particular nowledge((b)-typeknowledge)or, rather,by virtue

of having knowledgeof a particular: for whenever a particular ccurs,he knows in a way the universalsby the particular"Phys. 7.3, 247b5-7).

Besides, my knowledgethat C has 2R now also differs fromknowledge

that C has 2R thatI have when I am not faced with C ((c)-typeknowl-

edge). It is also active knowledge:I know that C has 2R because I use

my knowledge hatevery trianglehas 2R. Theknowledge nowuse, how-

ever, is not (a)-type knowledge,but (b)-type knowledge:when I say "I

know that C has 2R" (now this is a (d)-type knowledge),I use not only

the universalpremisebut also the minor,or particular, remise "C is a

triangle".To sum up:I have knowledgeof the (a)-typesimply by knowinga uni-

versal; by possessing knowledgeof the (a)-type I possess knowledge of

the (c)-type aboutany particularalling underthe universal n question(knowledgewithout a particular). have knowledge of the (b)-type if I

recognizea universal n a particular.By possessingknowledgeof the (b)-

type, I possess knowledgeof the (d)-typeaboutthe particularn question(knowledgewith a particular).Accordingly, here are two ways in whichit is possible to use the universalpremise, hat is, to exercise your knowl-

edge: without a minorpremise(knowledgeof the (a)-(c)-type,or knowl-edge without a particular)and via a minor premise (knowledgeof the

(b)-(d)-type,or knowledgewith a particular).Let us now return o our mainproblem.Which of these four kinds of

knowledgecan be ascribedto the akratic? t is clear that she possessesknowledge of the (a)-type: she knows that no action of a certain kindshould be done. Since she, as Aristotlesays, uses the universalproposi-tion, it turnsout thatshehas knowledgeof the (c)-typeas well: she knowsthata particular ctionof that kind should not be done. The precisecon-

tent of her knowledge s not yet clear,butI shall deal with this questionin the next section. It is clear,however, hatsince she usesonlythe univer-

sal propositionand not the particularproposition, he does not possessknowledgeof the (b)- and (d)-type. That is to say, she possessesknowl-

edge without a particular, but does not possess knowledge with a




particular.Herknowledge s of the samestatus as knowledgeof someonewho knowsthatthisparticularriangleC has 2R simplybecausehe knows

that every trianglehas 2R, albeit he does not know that C exists.

IV. Whatdoes the akraticknow?

If we follow this line of reasoning, t turnsout thatwhat the akraticknows

is that she shouldnot be smokingthis particular igarette.A non-akratic

also knows that she should not be smokingthis particular igarette,but

she knows this by virtueof knowledgewith a particular(b)- and(d)-typeknowledge),while the akratic'sknowledgeis without a particular.That

this is the accuratecharacterizationf the contentof the akratic'sknowl-

edge is seen from 1147a4-7:

In addition, there are differentkinds of universal:one refers to the agent, while

the other refers to the object. For instance, a man knows that dry foods benefit

every humanbeing and that he himself is a human being or that such and such

a food is dry; but he either does not have or does not activate the knowledge

that this particular ood is such and such.

This passage is neither about akratic's action nor about action at all. It isabout knowledge of a particular act: Aristotle wants to explain what it

means to know that this particular food you are eating benefits you. To

do this, he must analyze your knowledge, and a complete analysis would

reveal that if you know that this particular food you are eating benefits

you, you also know four further propositions: two universal propositions:

"Dry foods benefit every human being" and "Such and such a food is

dry"; and two particular propositions: "I am a human being" and "This

particularfood is such and such".16 According to our discussion in the pre-

vious section, there are two ways in which you can know that this par-ticular food you are eating benefits you, depending on whether your

knowledge is mediated through particular proposition "This particular

food is such and such" or not. Two things are of interest here: first, what

this passage can tell us about the content of the akratic's knowledge, and

second, what it means to have knowledge that is not mediated through a

particularproposition.

16 When Aristotle says that one kind of universalrefers to the agent, and the other

to the object, this implies also that one kind of particular efers to the subject, and the

other to the object. Hence, "I am a human being" is a separate particularpremise,and

not a partof the universal premise"Dry foods benefit every human being".



348 FILIPGRGle

(a) Supposethere are two universalpremises:"Refrainingromsmok-ingtobacco s goodforeveryhumanbeing"and"Cigarettesontainobacco";and two particular remises:"I am a humanbeing"and "This is a ciga-rette". It is clear that the akraticpossesses the first universalpremise,hence:

(1) She knows that refraining rom smokingtobacco is good for everyhumanbeing.

She knows, in addition, he other universalpremise,namely:

(2) She knows thatcigarettescontain tobacco.

Thus, it follows that:

(3) She knows thatrefraining rom smokingcigarettes s good for everyhumanbeing.

Theakratic,however,mustknowmore thanwhat is indicatedn (3), sinceshe mustpossess knowledgeof a particular.t is certain hat

(4) She knows that she is a humanbeingand, therefore from(3) and (4)),

(5) She knows thatrefraining romsmokingcigarettes s good for her.

This is indeedknowledge of a particular,but not of the requiredkind;what is lacking is knowledge of a particularhing that is the object ofaction. In addition, he akraticshould use only the universalpremise: 5)shouldfollow directlyfrom (3), and not via (4), thatis to say, (5) shouldrefer to knowledgewithout a particular. t seems, however,that this is

impossible.'7 t turnsout, then, thatit is

(6) She knowsthatrefrainingromsmokingthis cigarette s good for her

thatproperlydescribes he contentof the akratic'sknowledge.She knowsthaton the basis of (5) alone, and not via the minorpremise"This is acigarette",as opposedto the case of a non-akratic.

(b) Let us now turn to the second, and moredifficult,question.Whatdoes it mean to know by virtue of knowledgewithout a particularf the

'" This might seem controversial. That (5) refers to the knowledge without a par-ticularmeans that the agent either does not know or does not use the premise "I am

a humanbeing". It is clearly impossible that he does not know it ("How could he notknow himself?",EN 3.1, 111l8). Is it possible that he does not use it? I think not.




contentof your knowledge s an action done here and now? In the trian-gle example, it is easily explainablehow it is possible to have knowledge

without a particular:t is sufficient hat you are ignorantabout C's exist-

ence or about ts being a triangle.The case with practicalknowledge,and

especiallywith the akratic'sknowledge, is more complicated.Aristotle's

positionis stated in the following passages:

He eitherdoes not have or does not activate o6ic isXt 'i ovix?ivepyr) theknowledge that this particular ood is such and such. (1147'6-7)

Since the last proposition eX?uaxiac npo6'raat) is a belief abouta perceptible

object and controlsour actions, he, being affected, either does not have it or has

it in such a way that his having is not knowing, but only saying (" o1ur 'E'x ...

i1 OuTo) ?X?t &OK iv T6 i%ewVFtiaGOat &XX&kntv). (1 147b9-12)

Besides, human beings may have knowledge in anothersense than those we

havejust described;for in havingbut not using (ev t) yap 'xsXv ev 1il Xpiia0a)we see a difference in state; hence, some people, for instance those who are

asleep, mad or drunk, both have knowledge in a sense and do not have it.

Moreover, those affected by feelings are disposed in such a way. For emotions,

sexual appetites and some affections of these sorts clearly disturb the body as

well, and in some men even produce fits of madness.It is obvious, then, that we

should say that akratic people are in a condition similar to these. Saying the

words that come from knowledge proves nothing;for people affected in this way

even recite demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who have

learned a subject for the first time connect together its propositions,but do not

yet know it; for it has to become part of themselves,and that needs time. Hence,

we must suppose that akratic people say the words just like actors on the stage.

(1 147a10-24)

It seems that there are three situations possible: (1) you are ignorant about

the minorpremise(do not have it); (2) you know it (have it), but do not

activateor use it; and (3) you have it, but in such a way thatyour hav-

ing cannot count as knowing. The akratic s prone to (2) and (3) (whichin her case actuallyamount o the same),while (1) is a moregeneralfail-

ure that does not applyto the akratic'scase.

(1) Aristotle's problem at 1147a4-7,as I said, is quite general:he is

concerned o show what it means to know that this particularood you

areeatingbenefitsyou. It is obviousthatyou may not knowthatthis par-ticular ood is such andsuch, so thatyour epistemiccondition s the same

as the epistemicconditionof the man in the triangleexample. Therefore,Aristotlemay safely say "eitherdo not have or do not activate", ince in

his exampleboth alternativesare open.'8The same holds for 114719-12.

18 Charles has proposed to adopt the text of some manuscripts(Kb and Mb) that

delete the first i' in i oi c `i 'i oUKc VEpyEt and suggested that what remains "may



350 FILIPGRGKe

This passage preparesAristotle'sadmission hatSocrateswas partlyright.He goes on:

Since the last term does not seem to be universal nor expressive of knowledge

as the universal, the result Socrateswas looking for actuallyseems to come about.

For knowledgethat is presentwhen someone is affectedand that is draggedabout

because of the affection is not the sort that seems to be knowledge in the strict

sense, but perceptualknowledge. (1l47bl3-17)

Generally speaking, you possess knowledge without a particularwhen you

eitherdo not have the minorpremiseor have it in a special,non-standard

way (see (3) below). The latter is characteristic of the akratic. For, if she

did not have the minorpremise, herewould be nothing eft to be dragged

about- since the knowledgeof the major premiseis retainedthrough-

out - and therewould be no sense in which Socratescouldbe right.

(2) In Aristotle'sexample at 1147a4-7, t is possiblethat you have the

minorpremisebut do notactivateor use it. Let us supposethatyou know

all four premises,includingthe minor premise "This particularood is

such and such". Let us suppose, however,thatyou know a furtherpar-

ticularpropositionhat refers to the objectof action, saying,for instance,

thatthisparticularood you areeatingis such andsuch*. Let us also sup-

pose, finally, thatyou know anotheruniversalproposition hat refersto

the object of action,namely, that foods that are such and such* benefit

every humanbeing. In this case it is possible that your knowledge that

what you are eatingbenefitsyou is knowledgewith a particular,but with

a particular saying that this food is such and such*, and not with a par-

ticular saying that this food is such and such. You can say: "Why this

food benefits me? Well, because it is such and such*". Thus, you do not

activateor exercisetheproposition Thisfood is suchandsuch",although

you have it, andhence one can say that you know it.

An example along similar lines is found at An. Pr. 2.21, 67a33-37,

where Aristotle discusses what he calls an "error in accordance with a

middle term":

Nothing prevents someone who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B,

and that this, in turn, belongs to C, from thinking that A does not belong to C

(for example, knowingthatevery female mule is infertileand thatthis is a female

be translated This he does not possess, or ratherdoes not exercise' where 'or rather'

is added to qualify the sense in which he does not possess it" (Aristotle'sPhilosophy

of Action, 126). According to the interpretation iven above, Bywater's text may stand

as it is.




mule but thinking that this is pregnant): or he does not know that A belongs toC, if he does not simultaneouslyreflect on the term related to each one (pil O'UV-

O0c)pCOVo KaO' caxTepov).'9

It is possible that a personthinksthat this animal n front of him is preg-

nant even though he knows that all mules are infertile (major premise)

andthat this animal n frontof him is a mule (minorpremise).He knows,

to be sure, by virtueof knowledgewithouta particular,hat the animal in

front of him is infertile he knows this simply by knowing that all mules

are infertile- but he does not know this by virtueof knowledgewith a

particular nd thusmakesan opposite assumption.Since he possesses theminor premise he sees a mule and recognizes it as a mule- an expla-

nation shouldbe lookedfor in the fact thathe does not exercise or acti-

vate this premise.Aristotlesays that he aii vvropOV 'toicaO'KaTEpoV

(a36-37). OEopeiv s sometimes used by Aristotle in the sense of "exercis-

ing knowledge".20husouveOp*pevOcaO'CXac6Epovightreferto exer-

cising knowledgeof minor and major premise together, or, to be more

precise, to exercising knowledge of mules foundin these premisestaken

together.This means that a personpossesses knowledgewith a particular

if he exercises his knowledgein this way. Both the akraticand the per-son in this example fail to do this. An explanationof the latter's failure

may be given by using the same conjectureas in the previousexample.A personthinksthat this animalin front of him is pregnantor, rather,he

thinkshe knows that this animal is pregnant.He thinks he knows this

becausehe possesses a universalproposition uch as "Everything aving

the characteristic is pregnant",hat entails this. However,he also has

or, rather, hinkshe has, a particular roposition"This animalin front of

me has the characteristicF", and he exercises his knowledgeof these

premises taken together. He has two particularpremises, but exercisesonly one of them.

(3) The comparisonwith the person mad, drunkor asleep at 1147aJO_

24 illustrates he idea thathaving but not exercisingis a sign of havingin a sense and not having,or rather,havingbut not knowing and this

is the case thatmost specificallyappliesto the akratic.2' f you knowthat

19 Smith's translation.20

See DA 2.1, 412a1l0-11,22-23; Metaph. 0.8, 1050a35-36;EN 7.3, 1146b33-35;EE2.1, 121 a16-17.

21 Note the ascending structureof Aristotle's argument in 7.3: it becomes increas-

ingly specific. First, it is stated that the akratic must possess active knowledge

(1146b31-35). As an answer to Socrates, however, this is too general, for the akratic's



352 FILIP GRGle

p, but you are unable,becauseof your state,to put yourknowledgethatp into use, then, in a sense, you bothknow anddo not knowthatp. The

comparisonpointsalso to the fact thateven when you know thatp, but

you are unable, becauseof your state,to putyourknowledgethatp into

use, you may behave as if you wereputting your knowledge hatp into

use, and your behavingthatway may even, in a sense, be called your

putting your knowledge that p into use, that is, your exercising yourknowledge.A drunken erson,or nstance,mayknow heentireEmpedocles'

poem but, becauseof his state,be unable to put this knowledge nto use

when asked.Thus he, in a sense, both has anddoes not have the knowl-edge of Empedocles'poem.On the otherhand,he mayreciteEmpedocles'verses, and his reciting is his behaving as if he was puttinghis knowl-

edge into use, althoughhe is not. Likewise,the akraticknows the minorpremisethatsays "This is a cigarette",but is unable to exercise it. How-ever, when she says "I knowthatI shouldnot be smokingthis cigarette",she behaves as if she was exercising it, although she is exercisingher

knowledgeof the universalpremiseonly.

V. A "scientific" ccount of the akratic'sknowledge

So far, the akratic'sknowledgehas beendescribed n purelyepistemicor

general22erms, without any appeal to psychologicalconsiderations r tothe structure f humanaction. At 1147a24-25,Aristotleproposesto lookat the problem roma different tandpoint:

Besides, we may also view the cause (aiTia) in the following way, in the man-

ner of naturalphilosophy ((PqtKC&;).

It is usually assumed that this sentence introduces a scientific explanationof the phenomenon of akrasia itself, as opposed to the more formal

active knowledge is of a peculiar kind. With 'xj (I 146b35) a furtherspecification isintroduced: here is a kind of active knowledge such that a knower uses the universal

premise only, so that he either does not have or does not activate the minorpremise.

This is also too general, since it applies to the non-akraticcases as well. Therefore,a

furtherspecification is needed, which is introducedby XTtagain (1147'10): thereis akind of active knowledge such that a knower uses the universal premiseonly, and he

does have the minor premise, but in such a way that his having it cannot count as

knowing in the normal sense. The final i%Tt1 147'24) introduces a final, "scientific"specificationof the akratic'sknowledge. Thus, there is only one argument n 7.3, andnot, as is more commonly supposed, four.

22 "General" ranslatesXoytCo;.See Charles,Aristotle'sPhilosophy of Action, 128,note 27.



ARISTOTLEON THE AKRATC'S KNOWLEDGE 353

account that has hitherto been given. As I have already stated in myIntroduction, owever, it is only the akratic'sknowledgethat Aristotle s

discussing throughout he chapter,and there is no reason to suppose thathe wants to change his subjectat this point of the discussion. His inten-

tion is rather o show how a naturalphilosopherwould account for the

fact thatthe akraticacts knowingly. What would he say about the aiticaof the akratic'sknowledge?

The axita of the akratic'sknowledgemustbe basedon what might becalledherrationality.To say of an agentthat she is a rationalbeing is to

say thatshe has a universalbelief (caO6Xou0'oa1147a25), eason(Xoyo;1147b1), correct eason 6p8o; X6yo;1147b3),oruniversaludgmentic(6ok)u

Vt0XiiWt; 1147b4-5), wherebyshe is markedoff from irrationalanimals

(1147b3-5). Indeed,the latter are incapableof being akraticprecisely because

they lack universal udgment ibid.).The fact that the agent is a rational

being is a scientificcounterpartf the fact thatagent possesses universal

knowledgeor universalproposition,which has been the startingpoint in

the generalaccountof the akratic'sknowledge.It seems,however,that in

performingan akraticact the akraticabandonsher rationality,and by

abandoning errationality, he looses hercapacity o be a knowingbeing.Equally,fromthe standpoint f the general account, t seems that akratic

abandonsher universalknowledge.The point of the general accounthas

been to show that in spite of this, the akraticsomehowretains her uni-versalknowledgeby possessingwhatwe called knowledgewithouta par-ticular.Thus, t seemsthata student f naturemustanswer hecorresponding

question:how does the akraticretainher rationality?He will show not

only that she retainsher rationalitybut also thather akraticact is some-

how basedon her rationality just as her knowledge s basedon her uni-

versalknowledge).In non-akratic, r standard, ases, universalknowledgeis retainedby

the agent's possessing knowledgewith a particular: niversalknowledgeis transmitted, ia the minorpremise,to the conclusion.The same holdsin the accountof a non-akratic,or standard,action: universal belief is

combinedwith a belief about a particular bject, and the conclusionis

action:23

The one belief is universal, the other is about particulars,which are undercon-

trol of perception.When a single belief results from these, it is necessary, in one

case, for the soul to confirmwhat has been concluded,while in beliefs aboutpro-duction to act immediately.(1147'25-28)

23 This is a controversial ssue, but irrelevantfor my readingof the passage.



354 FILIP GRGKe

This is a clearpractical-syllogisticmodel known fromthe De MotuAni-malium 7. Here it has a special function. A studentof nature, f askedabout the ai'a of the akratic'sknowledge,woulduse the sameexplana-torymodel that has been used in the generalaccount.That is to say, theexplanationof what is going on in actingcorrespondso the explanationof one's havingknowledgeof a particular. o explainakraticcases, a stu-dent of naturewould also use the same model:

Suppose, then, that the universal belief is present n a man that hinders him from

tasting, and that there is also a second belief that everything sweet is pleasantand <a belief that> this is sweet (this belief is active (E'vpyci)); suppose, also,thatappetite(C'nt0ugia) s presentin him. Then one belief tells him to avoid this,but appetiteleads him towardsit; for it can move each of the bodily parts. Henceit turnsout that, in a way, reason and belief make him act akratically- but thebelief not contrary n itself, butonly incidentally(icara 0upjEP3.K6';)for it is theappetite,not the belief, that is contrary) o the correct reason.It also follows thatthis is the reason why beasts are not akratic,namely, because they have no uni-versal judgment, but only imaginationand memory of particulars. I 147a31b5)

Herewe have two "syllogisms":

(I) (II)

Nothingsweet shouldbe tasted. Everything weet is pleasant.This is sweet. This is sweet.This should not be tasted. Eating.[Or,according o a general

account: This is pleasant.]24

24 Some explanation is needed concerningthese syllogisms and theirelements.Thatit is two syllogisms thatAristotle has in mind is clear from 1147a31-32,wherehe men-

tions two universal beliefs (pace Kenny, "The PracticalSyllogism and Incontinence",179-181, and Aristotle's Theoryof the Will, 159). The problem,however, is with "Thisis sweet" (1147a33). It can be understoodas a separateminor premisethat is attachedto both universalpremises, as we have supposed,or as a part of "Everything weet ispleasant". In the latter case, the words "this belief is active" would refer not to theminorpremise, but to "Everything weet is pleasantand this is sweet".This, however,must be wrong. For it contradicts the account given at 1147a25-28, where Aristotleinsisted that action proceeds from coming togetherof a universalbelief and a beliefabout a particular.Since the akratic does eat some particularsweets, he must haveboth beliefs. In addition,the belief that this is sweet is indeed active, not in the con-text of the first, but of the second syllogism.

Neither of the conclusions is fully stated. Grammatically t might be more plausi-ble to construeiI piv oiUvX-Yet qrXrye1vTobro (1 147a34)as referring o the universalproposition (that is, to i9 l.tv 1147a31), in spite of Irwin's objection that "[nothingsweet should be tasted]hardlytells him to avoid this particularhing"(Aristotle, Nico-machean Ethics, translatedby T. Irwin (Indianapolis, 1985), 352). It does tell him




If we read these syllogismsfromthe generalpoint of view, what we getis identical o what is foundin the muleexample(except for the fact that

here the minorpremise s the same is bothsyllogisms).The akratic,even

thoughshe is eating sweets, knows that she shouldnot be eating them:

her universalknowledgeof the major premiseof the first syllogism is

somehowretained.

A studentof nature s faced with a corresponding, ut more difficult,

task. He sees the akratic eating sweets and what he wants to know is

whethershe is behavingrationally.Aristotle'sposition s this. It turnsout

that there are two universalbeliefs present n the akratic,and eithermayserve as a principleof her action.Only one of them,however,is the cor-

rect reason (4p06; X6yo;1147b3) that governs action, that is, the princi-

ple on the basis of which the (ppovtjo;would act in this situation.25his

principle s statedas the majorpremiseof the first syllogism.The akratic

does not act on this principle: he has nevercompleted he firstsyllogism.

There s anotherprinciple,however,which is notcorrectreason,butwhich

is neverthelessuniversalbelief andreason,andit is this principle hat gov-

erns the akratic'saction. It is statedas the majorpremiseof the second

syllogism,which has been completedby the akratic.The akratic,there-fore, does act according o some principle.Takenby itself, however,this

fact does not make surethat she has retainedher rationality.For,the two

principles hat are present n her seem to be contrary o each other,since

one resultsin avoidance,and another n tasting.Aristotle'sanswer s that

they are not contrary n themselves: he belief thatnothingsweet should

be tasted is not contraryo the belief thateverything weet is pleasantas

long as no appetiteis attachedto the latter.When it is attached,these

beliefs are contrary iacac augPePqx0';, the avgpepl3rco;being the appetite.

VI. Concludingremarks

Aristotle'sdiscussion of the akratic'sknowledgemay bringan important

light to some deeper problemsof his philosophy.I have alreadyreferred

to the notoriousproblemwith knowledgeof particulars.Roughlyspeak-

ing, this problemmightbe stated as follows. Aristotle,as is well known,

somehow, however; for if he knows that, he knows, by virtue of knowledge without

a particular, hat he should avoid this particular hing. However, Toiro refers to a par-

ticular, so that the phrase should be taken as conclusion.25 See EN 6.1, 1138b18-34; 6.13, 1144b21-28.



356 FILIPGRGI(

requires hatknowledgeshouldbe of universals.However, aced withcon-

sequencesof his theoryof substanceas it is putforward speciallyin theMetaphysicsZ, he seems to qualifythis requirement nd admit thatthereis a sense in whichknowledge s of what is not universal,viz. of the par-ticular,as well. His modifiedtheoryis most fully expounded n Metaph.M.10. Regardlessof whether his claim that there is a sense in whichknowledge s of what is not universal s only a modificationof his stan-dardclaimsof knowledgeor is just an appendix o them,theproblemwithMetaph.M.10 is that it leaves too manyissues unexplained,nsofaras thepossibilityof therebeing knowledgethat has the particular s its objectis in dangerof remainingobscure. It seems to me thatthe most seriousproblem s the fact that in Metaph.M.10 Aristotle nsists thatknowledgethat has what is universalas its objectis justa potentialknowledge,whileknowledgethat has a TO'&rt and a ptlOgEVOv as its objectis knowledgein the sense of activityor actuality 1087a15-21).Since activity is prior opotentiality,capacityor mere possession, one might conclude from thisthat the knowledge ca0O6kouf what holds ica06Xou,which is the formofknowledgeunderdiscussion n thePosteriorAnalytics, s secondary o theknowledgeof what is not KaOokou.

These difficultieshave been regardedas a seriousproblemfor Aris-totles' metaphysics.Varioussolutions have been offered,bothmetaphys-ical and epistemological.26 he discussion in EN 7.3 can by no meanssupply a definitesolution,if only because it leaves untouched he meta-physicalside of the problem.Nevertheless, t can providesome importantinsights.As I have triedto show, it addsstrengtho the ideathat a propo-sition stating somethingabout a particular hing can be the object ofknowledgeonly if it can be conceived as the conclusionof the syllogism

of a type we considered.This is the positionAristotleholds in Metaph.M.10 as well: "Besides,the elements will not be even knowable<if theyareparticulars>;or they are notuniversal,whileknowledge s of the uni-versal. This is obviousfromdemonstrations nddefinitions; orwe do notconcludethat this particularrianglehas 2R, unlesseverytrianglehas 2R,nor thatthis particularman is an animal,unlessevery man is an animal"(1086b32-37). There are some more general points, however, that one may

26 On this, see, above all, W. Leszl, "Knowledgeof the Universal and Knowledgeof the Particular n Aristotle";R. Heinaman, "Knowledgeof Substance in Aristotle",Journal of Hellenic Studies 101 (1981), 63-77; J. Lear, "Active Episteme", inA. Graeser, ed., Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle (Bern/Stuttgart,1987),149-174.




learnfromthe manner n which Aristotleapproaches he problemof theakratic'sknowledge.

Aristotlecomparesthe epistemicconditionof the akraticnot only to

the epistemiccondition f the drunkenwhorecites he versesof Empedocles,

but also to the conditionof those whom he calls np&rovgac06vte; EN

7.3, 1147a21). They are studentswho are at the less maturestageof their

intellectualdevelopment, ay at the earlierstage of a systematicmaster-

ing of a body of natural cience. They know boththe conclusionsof their

science and the procedure or connectingtogetherthe propositions ead-

ing to these conclusions.They have also learnedthe universalprinciplesof their science. Theirknowledge,however,is similarto what we called

knowledgewithouta particular. he mannern which a youngAristotelian

zoologist, for instance,knows that a certainkind of animal has certain

properties, r rather, hatthis particular nimalhas certainproperties, or-

responds o the manner n which the akraticknows that she is doingwhat

she should not be doing. It correspondsalso to the manner n which a

young man who has gaineda knowledgeof universalprinciplesof action

by attending lectures in political philosophy (or in Aristotle's Nico-

macheanEthics,for thatmatter)knows that this particular ctionshouldbe done: his knowledgeof universalprinciplesbringshim no profit(1.3,

1O95a2-1 .27

These similaritiesbetweenan akraticand a young scientistwitnessnot

only Aristotle'sideas about the unity of, or at least the parallelismbe-

tween, moral and intellectualdevelopment. f we pursuethe comparison

between theoreticaland practicalknowledge still further,we may note

Aristotle'sbelief that,while a personcan act againsthis knowledge, t is

impossible for him to possess pp6vnt; and be akratic.28Given that

ppovTos; is about particulars aboutparticularactions that have to bedone here and now29 we may conjecture hatfor a fully formedscien-

tist, say, for a matureAristotelian oologist, it is simplyimpossibleto be

epistemicallyweak with regard o what we called knowledgewith a par-

ticular,as opposedto an apprenticeearner.It is only at the level of a

ppOvIqo; or, rather,his theoretical ounterpart,he "fullyformed scien-

tist"- that the metaphysicalquestionaboutknowledgeof particularsmay

27

See also 6.8, 1142a1 -30: the principlesof wisdom and naturalscience have theirorigin in experience and "young people have no conviction in them, but only say the

words" (l142al9-20; compare 7.3, 1147b12).

28 See 7.2, 1146a4-9; 7.10, 1152a6-15.29 See 6.7, 1141b14-23; 6.8, 1142 11-30; 6.11, 1143a28-35;7.2, 1146a7-9.



358 FILIPGRGI(

await its completeanswer.30 inally,what also seems to follow fromthisis that an attempt o understand he type of knowledgeAristotle s mostinterested n - unconditionalor demonstrativeknowledge- as the ';t;

modeledby the Ft; of a gpovtgIo;may provemorefruitful han it mightseem at firstglance.3'

Instituteof Philosophy,Zagreb

30 See the reference to a grammarian Metaph.M. 10, 1087a20-2 1; DA 2.5, 4177a24-

29) or an arithmetician DA, ibid.) who has knowledge of a particular.31 Earlierversions of this paperwere presented at the Departmentof Philosophy,

University of Rijeka, and at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities,University of Edinburgh. am gratefulto the audience on bothoccasions for theircrit-icisms. My gratitude is also due to Prof. C. J. Rowe and Mr. P. Gregoric for theirhelpful suggestions.

grgić, filip - 2002 - aristotle on the akratic's knowledge (phronesis)

Documents