7/28/2019 Grego v COMELEC Digest

1/2

Grego vs ComelecRomero (1997)

Facts:

In 1981, SC found Humberto Basco, then Deputy Sheriff of the City

Court of Manila, guilty of serious misconduct in an administrative complaintlodged by Nena Tordesillas. SC ordered Basco dismissed from service withforfeiture of all retirement benefits and w ith prejudice to reinstatement to

any position in the national or loca government, including its agencies andinstrumentalities, or GOCCs ("Tordesillas ruling").

Subsequently, Basco ran for and won as Councilor in the Second

District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local elections.

He sought reelection in the 1992 election and won again.

However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo

(another candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to beelected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaintswere filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG.

In 1995, Basco ran for the third time as councilor.

William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of District II, City of

Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for

Basco's disqualification, suspension of his proclamation, and declaration ofRomualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila'sSecond District. T

Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of

the Second District of Manila.

In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to

annul the illegal proclamation.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the

administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away andcondoned by the electorate who elected him.

Issue 1: WON Section 40 (b)

1

of Republic Act No. 7160 appliesretroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,1992.

Petitioner:

Although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b)

must nonetheless be given retroactive effect because the provision of thelaw as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal fromoffice of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach.

Hence, as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to

an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or priorto the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.

1 SEC. 40, LGC. Disqualifications . - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (b)Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; xxx

Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for

disqualification, the provision must have also referred to removal from officeoccurring prior to the effectivity of the Code

Held: NO. While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws whichdo not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it isequally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have aretroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is

expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of theenactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate thatthe same operates retroactively.2That the provision of the Code in question doesnot qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and that it is couched inthe past tense are noy deterrents to applying the law prospectively. The basictenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and notretroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be soconstrued as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before itspassage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward

Issue 2: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor ofManila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the

administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office.

Petitioner: According to Frivaldo v. COMELEC, a candidates disqualificationcannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot.

Held: ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT. Petitioner's argument proceeds on theassumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the threeprevious elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering thatBasco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of theLocal Government Code which, as said earlier, applies only to those removedfrom office on or after January 1, 1992.

Petitioners' allegations that (1) Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling and that(2) the term "any position" therein is broad enough to cover without distinctionboth appointive and local positions merit any consideration are unmeritorious.Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco fromrunning for any elective position. The term used was "reinstatement." Under theformer Civil Service Decree (PD 807), the law applicable at the time Basco wasadministratively dismissed, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning,referring only to an appointive position. Thus, what is contemplated by theprohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.

Issue 3: Is Basco's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995,while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC voidab initio?

2 Aguinaldo v COMELEC, reiterated in Reyes v COMELEC and Salalima v COMELEC.

7/28/2019 Grego v COMELEC Digest

2/2

Petitioner: Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) ofRepublic Act No. 71663, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 66464, as well as therulings in Duremdes v. COMELEC, Benito v. COMELECand Aguam v.COMELEC.

Held: NO. RA 7166 Section 20(i) does not apply considering that the samerefers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to

contested qualifications of a candidate.

On the other hand, RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contentionthat the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use ofthe word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merelydirectory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What ismerely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation ofthe trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Moreover, there is noreason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as thesixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in theelection returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamationof the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassersconcerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.

Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cited by petitioner are allirrelevant and inapplicable, These three cases do not in any manner refer tovoid proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.

Issue 4: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared awinning candidate

Held: NO. Basco was a duly qualified candidate. Petitioner's emphaticreference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception tothe rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, findsno application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence oftwo assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number ofvotes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of acandidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm ofnotoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligiblecandidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's

3 Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166: The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unlessauthorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any

proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the

election.

4 Section 6 of RA 6646: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and thevotes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be

disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continuewith the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the

pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the smallcommunity where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural.