greek civil war

8/6/2019 Greek Civil War

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AD-A284 240,Lulbi~lIHGeThe Greek Civil War, 1947-1949:lLessons for the Operational Artist

In Foreign Internal DefenseA Monograph

byMajor Frank J. AbbottMilitary Intelligence .LAC

1 31994

I Sil CLAVI$ VIC0t94-29073

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term AY 93-94

Approved ror Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited

I7UG~U.~-Y a~INSP 'TiD


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ABSTRACITH E GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947-1949: LESSONS FOR THEOPERATIONAL ARTIST IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE by MajorFrank J. Abbott, USA, 55 pages.

This monograph presents a case study of theefforts of the United States government in helpingGreece to defeat its Communist insurgency in the late1940s. The United States conducted a foreign internaldefense mission, providing th e Greeks economic andmilitary.aid, plus civilian and m ilitary advisors.This monograph centers on th e m ilitary advice thatth e United Stat.-s provided to th e Greek m ilitary duringth e period 1947-1949. It begins by reviewing thebuild-up of th e Greek Civil War and th e events thatlead to th e United States' involvement in that

conflict. The paper then examines the major campaignsof th e war and how political and m ilitary eventsimpacted on the outcome of those campaigns. Themonograph then concludes with recommendations fo roperational artists involved in future.


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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Frank J. AbbottTitle of Monograph: The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for

the Operational Artist in Foreign InternalDefense

Approved by;

SH. Monograph DirectorErnest H. Evans, Ph.D.

III (I>Deputy Director,Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D. School of AdvancedM ilitary Studies

_ _ " _ _ _ _ Director, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accesion ForNTIS CRA&WDTIC TABUnannouncedJustification

Accepted this 6th day of May 1994 DistributionAvailability C

Avaii .,iidDist SpecialI


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ABSTRACTTHE GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947-1949: LESSONS FOR THEOPERATIONAL ARTIST IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE by MajorFrank J. Abbott, USA, 55 pages.

This monograph presents a case study of theefforts of the United States government in helpingGreece to defeat its Communist insurgency in the late1940s. The United States conducted a foreign internaldefense mission, providing the Greeks economic andmilitary aid, plus civilian and military advisors.This monograph centers on th e military advice thatthe United States provided to the Greek military duringthe period 1947-1949. It begins by reviewing thebuild-up of the Greek Civil War and the events thatlead to the United States' involvement in that

conflict. The paper then examines the major campaignsof the war and ho w political and military eventsimpacted on the outcome of those campaigns. Themonograph then concludes with recommendations foroperational artists involved in future.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageI. Introduction ................ .................. 1II. The Birth of the Greek Civil W ar ....... 3III. The United States Takes the Lead ..... ....... 8IV. The Formation of JUSMAPG ...... ........... ..13V. The Campaigns

A. Operation Dawn ........ ............ .. 19B. Operation Crown . . . ..... .......... 21C. Operation Vitsi ..... ............ .. 23D. The Period of Transition--winter,

1948-1949.. . .............. 26E. Operation Pigeon ...... ........... .. 30F. Operat ion Pyravlos ........... 35G. Operation Torch--The Final Campaign. . 35

VI. Lessons for Today's Operational Artist . . .. 37VII. Conclusion ................ ................. 42Map of Greece ............... .................... ..44Endnotes ................ ...................... ..45Bibliography .............. .................... ..52


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1. INTRODUCTIONAfter World W ar II, the Greek nation, with its

ruined economy and unstable government, faced anincreasingly strong Communist insurgency. To helpGreece defeat this insurgency, the United Statesconducted its first foreign internal defense (FID)mission of the Cold War era. From 1947 to 1949, the USprovided over $600 million in economic and military aidto Greece, along with civilian and military advisors.With this assistance, the Greek government crushed theinsurgent forces.

The United States' FID mission during the Greekcivil War remains one of the least studied chapters inAmerican military history. From 1949 to 1969, onlythirteen articles appeared in professional militaryjournals on the topic.' This lack of attention may bebecause no US combat forces fought in Greece as theydid in Korea and Vietnam. The American militarymission in Greece provided only equipment, supplies,and advice. What is worthy of study, then, is howthese US servicemen helped the Greeks defeat theinsurgency without the use of US combat troops.

One may wonder why a study of such Fi'b missions isrelevant today. After all, the insurgencies of theCold War were Communist-inspired. With the SovietUnion gone and Communism discredited worldwide, what is

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the need fo r FID ct all?First, insurgencies will continue despite the tall

of Communism. Groups such as Peru's Shining Path arestill active., Other narcotics-related organizations inLatin America and South Asia may incite insurgencies inorder to replace an existing government with a regimethat will tolerate i l legal drug activities.Additionally, despite the fall of the Soviet Union,there are approximately twenty Communist terroristgroups worldwide that could instigate civil unrest.?Furthermore, the eruption of regional unrest throughoutEastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East may createnew nation-states with unstable governments.Insvrgency threats to these new governments may emergefrom ethnic, religious, or racial groups.

In any of these scenarios, the United States maydecide to support a threatened government, but may alsodetermine that the use of US combat forces to restoreorder is unfeasible or unsuitable. A foreign internaldefense mission, then, is a viable option in suchcases.

This monograph is a case study of a successfulAmerican FID program. The monograph first examines whythe civil war began, then reviews how the US becameinvolved. This paper then reviews the militarycampaigns of the Greek civil War and how political and

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military events impacted on the outcome of thosecampaigns. The monograph then conciudes with severalrecommendations for operational artists involved infuture FID missions.

II. THE BIRTH OF THE GREEK CIVIL WARFor an understanding of how the Greek Civil War

began, one must look to the politics of Greece in themid-1930s. King George, Greece's monarch, was fearfulof the reforms that the left-of-center parliament wouldinstitute. In August, 1936, the king dissolvedparliament and appointed General Joannes Metaxas asdictator.

Metaxas was able to rule with an iron hand, havingthe full support of the king, the army, and much of th eGreek bureaucracy. Metaxas instituted policies thatsuppressed all opposing political parties, especiallythe Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The KKE had toestablish a clandestine organization in order tosurvive.

Any popular opposition to Metaxas dissolvedquickly when Italy invaded Greece through Albania on 28October 1940. The Greek resistance, under the fieldcommand of General Alexander Papagos, caused theItalian offensive to stall within five days. A Greekcounterattack pushed the Italian torces well back intoAlbania.

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Nazi Germany, feeling compelled to come to Italy'said, invaded on 6 April 1941. The Greeks who hadperformed so valiantly against the Italians could nothold against the German onslaught. Within three weeks,the German army occupied all of Greece.

During the Nazi invasion, King George and th erightist Greek government fled the country. The KKE,which had been driven underground by Metaxas'spersecution, was no w in position to lead the Greekresistance. The KKE understood how to organize andoperate covertly.

The KKE first used its organizational skills toestablish the National Liberation Front (EAM). apolitical organization. Avoiding Communist rhetoric,the EAM appealed to Greek nationalism and called forthe expulsion of the German invaders. The EAM quicklyrecruited enough volunteers to form its military arm,the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), whichbegan guerrilla-style operations in early 1942.

During this same time, the National RepublicanGreek League (EDES) also emerged. Unlike the KKE, EDESsupported King George and the Greek government-in-exile. Lacking the organizational skills of the EAM,EDES remained relatively small and had to limit itsoperations to northwest Greece.

It did not take long fo r ELAS and EDES to develop4


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a bloody rivalry. Both organizations looked beyond theday of Greek liberation and realized that each would bevying fo r power. Members of EDES offered the Germansinformation that allowed them to track down ELASunits. ' ELAS units conducted small-scale attacks onEDES forces in December, 1942.

Skirmishes continued until October, 1943, whenELAS launched wide-spread attacks on EDES units. SinceELAS had a four-to-one superiority over EDES (20,000members versus 5,000), these initial attacks were verysuccessful. A combination of overextended ELAS supplylines and emergency British resupply of EDES unitsallowed EDES to counterattack. By February, 1944, EDEShad regained the territory it had lost four monthsearlier. Both sides then agreed to a truce.

The British, in an attempt to resolve this Greekpolitical conflict, set up a conference in Lebanon inMay, 1944. Greek representatives from eight politicalparties and all resistance organizations attended th efour-day meeting. The resulting Lebanon Conferenceagreement granted EAM one-quarter of the post-warcabinet posts (a total of five). In a conference inItaly four months later, both ELAS and EDES agreed tobe under the command of a British general. 4

The Nazi occupiers began to witnaraw from ureecein autumn, 1944, mainly because Germany needed these

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troops elsewhere in Europe. The Greek resistanceorganizations, however, claimed credit for driving outthe Germans. British forces and the Greek government-in-exile arrived in Greece in October.

The political fighting among the Greeks, however,quickly began again. Since the government-in-exilefled when the Germans attacked, it lacked credibili tywith the Greek populace. To many, the returninggovernment was another Metaxas dictatorship and a merepuppet government of the British.

The KKE perceived an opportunity to seize power.Wishing to show its popular support, the EAM held ademonstration in Athens on 2 December despite agovernment ban. The event turned violent, and severalcivil police and EAM demonstrators were killed.

After the riot, the British ordered all ELAS unitsto withdraw from the Athens area within 72 hours. ELASresponded on 6 December by attacking governmentbuildings in A~hens and by attacking EDES units innorthern Greece. British soldiers had to restoreorder. However, within days ELAS gained control of allof Greece except in cities where British forces weregarrisoned. British Prime Minister Winston Churchillordered an offensive, which forced ELAS to request anarmistice on 11 January 1945.

In the negotiations that followed, ELAS agreed to6


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surrender its arms within two weeks in accordance withan established quota. In return, th e Greek governmentpromised to guarantee civil liberties, grant amnesty,hold free elections, and conduct a plebiscite to decidewhether King George would once again assume the throne.

Even though ELAS surrendered more than its quotaof weapons, it did not surrender all its arms. Brit ishand Greek troops discovered large caches for monthsafterward. Only later were Greek officials also todiscover tha t close to 40,000 ELAS members andsupporters were leaving Greece to receive m ili tarytraining in Yugoslavia.'

Meanwhile, British authori t ies in Greece were busyattempting to rebuild th e Greek economy and to halt theright-wing abuses of power. The Greek governmentsuppressed a Communist-inspired revolt in early 1945.A British Parliamentary Legal Mission reported in early1946 that th e Greek government had arrested over 50,000citizens "in the most arbitrary fashion."' It appearedthat "extremism of th e r ight had grown alongsideextremism of the left. There was no place formoderates in the political life of postwar Greece."'

The KKE chose to boycott the election3 held inMarch, 1946, perhaps knowing that it would not make astrong showing. The boycott handed the victory to theright-wing Populist Party. Leftist bands increased

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their violent activities in northern Greece during thesummer. Hoping that King George could restore order,the Greek people voted fo r the return of the king in aSeptember plebiscite. The fighting, however,continued.

The US and Great Britain, preferring a moremoderate Greek government, were not pleased with theGreek election results. Since an international team ofobservers certified the fairness of these elections,however, the American and British governments feltobliged to support the victorious candidates.'

III. THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE LEADIn early 1947, Great Britain announced that it no

longer could afford to support the Greek government'seconomic and military needs. The United Kingdom askedthe US to take over this financial burden immediately.

After consulting with several key members of hisadministration, President Harry Truman composed asweeping policy to gain the support of the Americanpeople and of the Congress. In his 12 March 1947speech before a joint session of Congress, th epresident announced what became the Truman Policy:

I believe that it must be the policy of theUnited States to support tree peoples who areresisting attempted subjugation by armedminorities or by outside pressures.'Truman went on to predict that if Greece fell to theCommunists, Turkey and the entire Middle East would

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fall as well. He asked for $400 million in aid forboth Greece and Turkey, along with the detailing of UScivilian and military personnel to help in Greece'sreconstruction effort and defense needs.

Upon congressional approval of Truman's request,the US War Department formed th e US Army Group, Greece(USAGG) to provide military assistance to the Greekgovernment. The law authorized US military personnelbroad advisory functions. At the time, however, theWar Department believed that the Greek military neededonly supplies and equipment, not operational advice.War Department officials, concerned that opponents ofthe aid program would accuse US military personnel ofcommanding Greek forces, also prohibited USAGG fromsending military observers to combat zones.`

USAGG was activated in April, 1947, as asubordinate element of the American Mission fo r Aid toGreece (AMAG). USAGG had the authority to coordinatedirectly with tha War Department on purely militarymatters, but had to request approval from AMAG chiefDwight Griswold for all matters dealing with broaderpolicy issues."

Griswold's mission was particularly delicate. Hewas never to appear to be intervening in the internalaffairs of the Greek government. However, he was tomake discreet suggestions about government policy and

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organization while allowing all to believe that Greekofficials were the true source of any reforms. IfGriswold found a senior Greek official to beincompetent or embarrassing, he was to quietly putpressure on the Greeks to force that official 'sremoval.1 " US military officers would later exercisethis same policy when dealing with the Greek militaryand its senior officers.

USAGG'S initial tasks were more straight-forward.The group was to determine the supply and equipmentneeds of the Greek forces and to begin procurementprocedures. The first USAGG officials arrived inGreece in May, 1947. Supplies and equipment began toarrive that autumn.

This initial US assistance, however, had nodeterrent effect on th e guerrilla forces, who nowcalled themselves the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG).When Congress debated the Greek-Turkish aid bill, th eUS estimated the guerrilla strength at 13,000. By thetime the first shipments of USAGG supplies arrived theguerrilla strength had almost doubled."= Theguerrillas, operating in bands of 70 - 100 men, werebecoming more aggressive in their raids and sabotage.They chose weakly defended targets, fought bravelyagainst the Greek armed forces, and ubully etayedGreek National Army (GNA) attempts to defeat them.

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The Greek General Staff (GGS) did have an overallmilitary strategy in 1947. Recognizing that Greece didnot have enough armed forces to conduct simultaneousoperations throughout the country, the GGS planned toconduct sequential operations from south to north.Each operation would have three phases. In the firstphase, Greek forces would conduct a pincer movement ina particular region to trap the guerrilla bands in th earea, thus forcing them to surrender or to fight. Thesecond phase, which was to take only a few days,involved mopping-up operations to defeat any remainingrebel elements in th e region. In the third phase, th ebulk of the armed forces would then proceed northwardto the next major region, and begin this process again.

This strategy failed miserably. As Greek forcesbegan an operation, the rebel bands either withdrewfrom the region or infiltrated out of the pincer trap.The local population refused to cooperate with theGreek army because they feared the guerrillas wouldreturn and wreak vengeance. The Greek army thus wasforced to create more and more stay-behind forces,which cut significantly into the strength available forsubsequent operations."4Greek government attempts to persuade th eguerrillas to stop fighting failed also. During 1947,the Greek government announced two amnesty periods.


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DAG forces interpreted these offers as a sign ofweakness. Furthermore, th e Greek government could notguarantee th e protection of a former guerrilla or hisfamily from possible rebel retribution."

Thus, the situation in th e autumn of 1947 appearedbleak. The GNA had so many troops dedicated to staticdefense missions that it could not pursue the rebelbands. Lacking an effective offensive capability, th eGreek armed forces were unable to achieve an outrightmilitary victory.

In an attempt to remedy th e situation, the USapproved a Greek request to increase the GNA by 10,000men. USAGG then proposed what became one of the mostsignificant decisions of th e conflict--the formation ofth e National Defense Corps (NDC). The proposal was todivert th e funds allocated for th e GNA increase tocreate twenty 500-man battalions. These battalions,regionally based, were to take over all static defensemissions. With th e NDC defending towns and criticalassets, th e GNA would be free to concentrate onoffensive missions. Additionally, the local populationwould become more involved in defending themselvesrather than relying on th e GNA. The US and Greekgovernments approved the idea; by th e end of 1947,plans called for 100 NDC battalions.1 6

The potential for a Communist victory in Greece,12


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however, remained great. The Greek military neededmore than just equipment and supplies. The sending ofUS combat troops to fight alongside the GNA was out ofthe question, since th e Truman Administration hadassured Congress that there was no intent to do so.The US State Department also ruled out the sending ofUS troops after a Communist takeover since the worldwould consider such a move as an invasion.' 7

The problem therefore became how to reverse thegrave situation without US combat forces. AMAG chiefGriswold and the Greek prime minister proposed thatMajor General William Livesay, the USAGG commander, beprovided a planning staff to give operational advice tothe Greek military. After studying the issue, the USWar Department, State Department, and National SecurityCouncil (NSC) supported th e idea."' Truman approvedthe recommendation in November, 1947.

IV. THE FORMATION OF JUTSMAPGUpon Truman's approval, th e Joint Chiefs of Staff

established the Joint United States M ilitary Advisoryand Planning Group (JUSMAPG) on 31 December 1947.General Livesay served as both commander of USAGG anddirector of JUSMAPG. JUSMAPG provided advisory teamsto the GGS as well as teams to the Greek First Armyheadquarters, to the three Greek corps headquarters,and to the headquarters of th e seven Greek divisions.

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During this period the guerrillas were not idle.On Christmas Eve, 1947, the guerrilla leader MarkosVafiades announced the establishment of the FirstProvisional Democratic Government of Free Greece indirect defiance to Athens. Since the rebels dominatedmuch of northwest Greece, they held and defendedterritory that they could call "Free Greece". Thisannouncement, coupled with the failed amnesty programs,convinced both the Greek and US governments that th econflict had "to be settled by military means."'o

Therefore, even though JUSMAPG was less than onemonth old, many in Washington believed that someonebiesides General Livesay needed to be the group'sdirector. In late January, 1948, Secretary of StateGeorge C. Marshall informed Griswold of Marshall'sintent to nominate Major General James A. Van Fleet toreplace Livesay. Marshall believed Van Fleet to be "amore impressive personality" since he was "one of theoutstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders" inthe European theater of World War 11.20 General DwightD. Eisenhower, agreeing with Marshall, stated that VanFleet was "definitely na the intellectual type, but[was] direct and forceful and [had] a fighting recordthat would make anyone respect him.2' '

After receiving Congressional confirmation and apromotion to lieutenant general, Van Fleet flew to

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Athens in mid-February. There were some positivedevelopments. The US and British military missions inGreece had just concluded an agreement on dividingresponsibilities. The US would advise on matters ofsupply, logistics, and operations; the British wouldoversee matters of Greek military organization andtraining. Additionally, the British government's banon British soldiers going into operational areas waslifted. Fifty British field grade officers were soonserving alongside American officers as observers atGreek division and corps levels.

Van Fleet's challenges, however, were many. Ashistorian Howard Jones writes, "The outcome [of th eGreek Civil War] rested almost as much on bureaucraticprocedures as on successful combat."'23 Van Fleetattempted to spend at least half his time in the field,visiting the Greek soldiers to bolster their fightingspirit. His position, however, demanded that he be inAthens to attend meetings hosted by the US embassy,AMAG, or one of the Greek ministries.2

Dealing with th e Greek authorities presented manysecurity problems. Since th e liberation of Greece,Communists and their sympathizers occupied positionswithin the Greek government bureaucracy and in theGreek military. Hiding their political affiliations,these subversives passed government secrets to

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guerrilla forces and thwarted government functions.Government information often did not reach its intendeddestination. The bureaucracy was riddled withineptness and inefficiency. Subversives in th e Greekmilitary "were instructed to stay in the Army units andgradually erode them."' 2"

The Truman Administration was to find that it hadsecurity problems of its own, however. In February,1948, Truman approved a National Security Councilrecommendation to continue study on the question ofsending US combat troops to Greece." 5 The followingmonth, a US magazine reported that the Americanmilitary was preparing plans to send up to 25,000 USsoldiers and Harines to Greece."'

The belief that the US would eventually send itsow n combat troops to fight in the Greek Civil Warcreated many problems. US officials attempted toconvince the American public and the Greek governmentthat the US was not taking over the war. During hisNovember, 1947 announcement of the extension ofoperational advice to the Greeks, Griswold stated thatUS officers would "not be taking command" of Greekforces, but that the intent was to help the Greeks "sothat they can pick up the job and do it themselves."'"

Despite such efforts, however, many Greeks stillexpected the US to send combat forces into the

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conflict. One press report noted that the Greek armedforces were not being aggressive "on the theory thatthe U.S. is committed and will be forced to do the realfighting for them.'' 2" Another article quoted a Greeklieutenant's response to the question of why his troopslacked fighting spirit:

This war in Greece is a battle between theUnited States and Russia. It happens thatit's being fought here. That is our badluck. But you can't expect us to fight yourbattle single-handed--at least not with theold spirit."'The Greeks' perception that they were fightingAmerica's war would continue to cause problems fo r atleast anotner year.

The problem in Greece was, of course, not the onlyforeign policy challenge for the US in earlr 1948. Inaddition to Greece's civil war, there was a Soviet-ledcoup in Czechoslovakia, unrest in Palestine, a civilwar in China, an increasingly tense situation inBerlin, and the demands of rebuilding the economies ofWestern Europe. On the domestic front, a publicopinion poll showed that 60% of Americans favored th econtinuation of US aid to Greece, but only 25% favoredthe dispatching of US troops to Greece even if aCommunist takeover were imminent. 30

The United States, therefore, could not afford tooverextend itself in Greece. The TrumanAdministration, however, decided not to inform the

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Greek government of its aversion to sending US combattroops. Secretary of State Marshall had grave concernsthat Greek morale would plummet." The Greeks,therefore, continued to believe that the TrumanDoctrine had no limits.

Among General Van Fleet's greatest challenges,then, was how to instill a fighting spirit in adispirited fighting force. The morale of the Greekofficer corps was very low due to guerrilla successesand internal Greek politics. Polit ical factions withinGreece were attempting to gain control of the GNA togain political power. Many officers felt "insecure intheir positions." 32 Other officers had become heavilyinvolved in politics to ensure that certain politicalparties would win office and thus promote them. 3" Theresult was that Greek commanders dared not take anyrisks for fear of being fired. They therefore wereoverly cautious. This lack of aggressiveness couldcause an entire campaign to fail, but at least no blamecould be pinned on them. 3 4

Within this environment, Van Fleet prepared anoperational plan for 1948. Van Fleet's concept calledfor sequential campaigns. First, the GNA was to clearthe Roumeli region of rebel bands, then launch attacksinto the Grammos area by early June. Once the Greekarmy had cleared Grammos, it would conduct commando

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operations to clear DAG forces from the Peloponnese.Next, the GNA would ready itself fo r a winter campaignin the north (the Vitsi area). Van Fleet, expressingoptimism about his plan, stated that as long as noCommunist nation intervened with troops, "w e will mopup everything in Greece right up to the border thisyear. ,,s

V. THE CAMPAIGNSA. OPERATION DAWN`'

By mid-April, a force of 2,000 guerrillascontrolled the Roumeli region. Guerrilla control ofthis area cut Athens off from the rest of Greece. GNAcontrol of the region would restore Athens' links withthe rest of the country and would allow for theisolation of rebel units in the Peloponnese.

The plan was fo r the Greek "A" Corps, commandingthree divisions and two commando groups, to conduct theoperation. On 15 April, the three divisions were toattack abreast from north to south. The two commandogroups had the mission to block mountain passes toprevent the guerrillas from escaping northward.

The night before Operation Dawn began, a guerrillaforce attacked during a heavy rain and broke throughthe "B" Commando Group's lines. The guerrillas escapedto the north.

The operation proceeded at a painfully slow pace;19


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"A" Corps required a full month 'o clear an area 90 by50 kilometers. Large numbers of guerrillas had managedto escape "A" Corps' advancing units. However, th eoperation did succeed in chasing the guerrilla elementsout of Roumeli. Most of all, though, the GNA receivedwhat it needed most--the chance to claim a victory.

The celebration did not last long, however.During the final days of Operation Dawn, the body of USjournalist George Polk was discovered; he had clearlybeen executed.2 7 Right-wing political elements inGreece had declared Polk a KKE sympathizer.Indications were that Polk was en route to conduct aclandestine interview with DAG commander Markos. Didthe right-wing kill Polk as a warning to othercorrespondents? Or, did the KKE murder him in anattempt to smear the Greek government's reputation?

One thing was certain: "In the United Statesnothing harmed the Greek cause more during this periodthan the Polk case."ia The American public could notunderstand why the murderers could not be caught.

After some months, Greek officials arrested aCommunist sympathizer and convicted him of being anaccessory after the fact. The Greek yovernment triedand convicted in absentia two hardened Communists ofthe actual murder. American journalists, suspecting acover-up, were irate.

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Back in Washington, the Truman Administration wasonce again examining the question of sending US combattroops to Greece. The NSC, citing improvements in theGreek military, recommended against such a deployment.However, the council stated, it would relook the issuebefore November, 1948 or if the situation in Greeceworsened.'9

__QPERATION CQROWENOperation Crown began on 20 June 1948 wita the

intent of breaking "the back of th e bandit gangs thisyear."' 0 Its objective was to gain complete control ofthe Grammos Mountain region, the "nerve center of theCommunist military forces in Greece." Greekintelligence sources indicated that the estimated 7,500guerrillas in the area would defend at a ll costs. 41

The operation had three phases. First, GNA forceswere to clear areas near the guerrilla main base. Whenthese clearing efforts were complete, th e Greek armywas then to attack and occupy positions along the DAG'souter defensive line. In the third phase, GNA unitswere to cut the lines of communication between Grammosand Albania, then conduct a general offensive from alldirections against DAG's second defensive line.4 2

Markos, however, knew of the GNA's plans well inadvance and reinforced the two defensive lines. In theEpirus region, he kept a 3,000 man force; its mission

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was to cut the GNA's supply lines once the GNA launchedits offensive."3

The GNA launched its attack on 20 June. The goingwas tough and slow--the Greek army was battling overmountainous terrain against a well-prepared defense.Markos's Epirus force harassed the GNA rear areas,forcing the GNA to dedicate units to hunt the raiders.

Nonetheless, Van Fleet determined that th eslowness of the operation was due to the incompetenceof the "B" Corps commander. On 27 July, Van Fleetrecommended that a new corps commander be appointed.The Greek prime minister concurred, but then asked VanFleet himself to name the new commander Van Fleet,perhaps knowingly accepting the prime minister'schallenge, nominated the GGS chief of operations,Lieutenant General Stylianos Kitrilakis. GGS agreed.

On the seventeenth day of Operation Crown, the GNAfinally seized the outer defensive line; phase threecould at last begin. After twelve more days of hardfighting, Markos ordered a retreat. The overwhelmingnumbers of the GNA were at last threatening him fromboth flanks. Some rebels fled to Albania, while thebulk of th e rebel force, some 8,000 men, headed towardsVitsi. 4 4 The GNA's inability to rapidly close aplanned pincer movement once again allowed DAG forcesto escape.

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Despite the slowness of the operation and theescape of the guerrillas, there was much optimism inthe US government after Operation Crown. Van Fleetwarned, however, that 17,000 rebels remained in Greece.The war was not yet over."s

On 21 August Operation Crown officially ended.The GNA left one division in Grammos to preventguerrilla reoccupation of th e area. One reinforceddivision attacked guerrilla fortifications in theMourghana region. The next major fight, however, wasagainst DAG forces near Mount Vitsi.' 6

C. OPERATION VITSIMost of the guerrillas that escaped from the GNA!s

Grammos operation assembled in the area surroundingMount Vitsi. The Vitsi area offered good rebel supplyroutes coming out of Albania and Yugoslavia. Theregion's mountainous terrain favored a guerrillastronghold defense. Both the GGS and JUSMAPG agreedthat if the DAG forces were not expelled from the Vitsiarea before winter, the rebels could hold out therewell into the spring of 1949..7

Elements of "B" Corps, under LTG Kitrilakis,advanced into the Vitsi area and prepared fo r an attackagainst the 4,500 guerrillas there. The plan was forthe division to attack trom the south and trom tfeeast. The GGS expected "B" Corps to complete the

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operation in forty days.The initial attack, begun on 30 August, started

very slowly due to strong enemy resistance and badweather. The GGS dispatched two additional brigadesand another division headquarters to the region in anattempt to achieve a breakthrough. The attackgradually moved forward; on 5 September GNA units werewithin two kilometers of cutting off the rebel supplyline to Albania.

The situation then changed quickly. DAG forcesmounted a strong counterattack and forced the GNA "toretreat in disorder to their original positions."4 'The GGS responded by dispatching another divisin tn"B" Corps. Before "B" Corps could attack again,however, th e rebels launched a spoiling attack thatpushed GNA units back three kilometers. "B" Corpsregained this ground after two days of fighting.General Van Fleet was not pleased. LTG Kitrilakiswas the man Van Fleet had chosen to instill anaggressive spirit into "B" Corps. Now Kitrilakis'"cautious attitude" was destroying the GNA's chances ofclearing the Vitsi region before winter. Van Fleet andthe GGS agreed that Kitrilakis had to be relieved. 4'Kitrilakis' replacement, however, could not producevictory either.

As "B" Corps prepared fo r another attack, DAG24


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forces took advantage of the time available. Theguerrillas continued to strengthen their defensivepositions. Partly through the forced recruiting ofvillages in the area, the guerrillas' strength hadgrown to 7,000 by 1 October.5

GNA forces launched two more major offensives inOctober. Both attempts were dismal failures, althoughthe Commando Groups did record some sterling successes.By the month's end the GNA suspended any furtheroffensives. The situation in Vitsi had ended instalemate. DAG, now with a 6,500 man force, stillcontrolled the region.

The American observers in Vitsi concluded that th eVitsi failure was due primarily to the lack ofaggressive leadership in the GNA. Brigade and divisioncommanders at times requested permission to withdrawwhen they met enemy resistance. At other times, GNAunits retreated in disorder when DAG unitscounterattacked. One US officer concluded that GNAofficers were either unwilling or unable to commandtheir troops. 5' Furthermore, simply relieving acommander did not solve the problem--"B" Corps hadthree commanders in three months.

As 1948 came to a close, there was little reasonto r optimism. Wfile the GNA tried in vain to clear theVitsi area, guerrilla bands increased their activities

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in the Thessaly and Peloponnese regions. The rate offorced recruiting replaced almost all of DAG's lossesduring th e year. Therefore, despite suffering 24,000casualties in 1948, DAG's overall strength wasvirtually the same as when th e year began.5

D. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION--WINTER. 1948-1949Given the failure at Vitsi, Van Fleet reassessed

the entire situation in Greece. 5" He knew he had toimprove the GNA so that it could defeat th e rebels, butthe time required to do so was not available. To relaxthe pressure on the DAG would only allow the guerrillasto grow stronger. Meanwhile, many in the US Congresswere calling for significant cuts in th^e Greek aidprogram. The war had to be won quickly.

A necessary step in winning quickly was to closethe guerrilla supply routes from Albania andYugoslavia. To cut off these routes, however, requiredeither a fast-paced offensive or a drastic increase inthe size of the GNA. The speedy assault, of course,was a task the GNA had proven that it could not do. AGNA size increase was a move Washington would notapprove; besides, a larger GNA may not have been anymore competent than the present one.

In addition, the Truman Administration hadreconfirmed its policy of no US combat troops inGreece. 5 4 Van Fleet, therefore, could not rely on

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using American forces to defeat the Communists. He hadno option but to continue to provide military aid andoperational advice, and hope that the Greeks could finda way to win the war themselves.

Tensions between Greek and American officials grewin late 1948. Upset at the GNA's failures in Vitsi,Van Fleet told several senior Greek officers that hehad doubts whether US aid to Greece should continue.5The new US ambassador to Greece, Henry Grady, notedthat Greek polit ical and military leaders continued tobelieve that the Greek Civil War was really aninternational problem, not a Greek internal conflict.Grady recognized that he had to break the Greek belietthat Greece "can expect to live indefinitely onAmerican bounty."" When a US journalist asked ifGrady believed that the Greeks were "holding back" intheir war efforts "in order to get more dollars fromthe U.S.," Grady responded, "No comment."'5

Meanwhile, the guerrillas were far from idle.While the situation in Vitsi remained a stalemate, DAGslowly reinfiltrated into the Grammos area through twoGNA divisions. At least three guerrilla brigades hadestablished strongholds there by late 1948.In the rest of Greece, guerrilla raids wereJJVUL. I Uj L =%L UAI= ~AAIA MUWJL~ ;*JjL1= Va MJ~L XLJLAJLNDC units were able to defeat some raids, others were

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spectacularly successful. From December 1948 toFebruary 1949, the rebels forcibly recruited over 5,000Greeks" and executed local officials. A Greek womantold a US journalist, "You Americans must put an end tothis war--or leave us to the Russians. Between you weare being crucified!"'"

In early 1949, then, the situation in Greecelooked bleak. The gu-rril las had a firm hold on th eGrammos and Vitsi regions and held th e initiativeelsewhere in Greece. The US media published gloomyreports, citing the rebels' advantages and theapparently ineffective US aid program. The fortunes ofthis war, however, were about to change.

On 21 January 1949, General Alexander Papagos, thehero of th e Greek-Italian War, was appointed commander-in-chief (CINC) of all Greek armed forces. The idea tobring Papagos out of retirement first came up duringthe previous October. Although he had the advantagesof his prestige and his lack of political partyaffiliation, Grady expressed concern that a "sort ofdictatorship [was] being set up."" As th e situationin Greece deteriorated, however, Grady saw th e need foran effective and efficient Greek government, which was"more important than preserving all traditionaldemocratic forms.""' The day after another Greekcabinet reshuffle, Papagos took command.

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Papagos immediately took drastic measures. Hisfirst Order of the Day called for an offensive spiritand stated that failure would not be tolerated.' 2 Hefollowed this order with proclamations thatirresponsible or passive commanders would be courtmartialed. He further authorized commanders to shootanyone who demonstrated cowardice. lie also decreedthat no unit could pull back from its position withoutthe authorization of its higher headquarters. 63 Hethen appointed an inspector general "to investigate thetactical errors of commanders."' 4

Relations between Papagos and US officials,however, did not proceed smoothly. At a 5 February WarCouncil meeting, Papagos stated that the Greek armedforces were too small "to do the job which Greece's'allies' are expecting of Greece." The comment wasdirected at Grady, who was in attendance. Papagos wenton to demand that the GNA be expanded from 132,000 to250,000 within four months, or he would resign."Although Washington refused to fund such an increaseand Papagos did not carry out his threat, the incidentdemonstrated how Papagos, along with many otherprominent Greeks, continued to believe that the war inGreece was in reality a US-USSR conflict.

While Papagos was assuming nis new duties as CINC,an operation designed to clear the rebel forces from

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the Peloponnese region was already underway. Code-named Operation Pigeon, this effort provided just th edecisive victory that the Greek armed forces needed.

B, OPERATION PIGEONWhile the Greek armed forces were conducting their

operations in the Grammos and Vitsi regions, DAG wasslowly building its forces elsewhere in Greece. Onesuch build-up was in the Peloponnese region. USofficials noted that the Peloponnese was Greece's"sacred homeland," and that the security of that regionwas essential to the morale of the Greek soldier."

In early 1948 there were only 800 guerrillas inthe region; by the end of the year that figure hadgrown to 4,000. The intensity of the fighting in th eGrammos and Vitsi regions did not allow the GNA to sendreinforcements into the Peloponnese. This realitycaused conflict within the Greek government; somePeloponnese government officials res-igned in nrntest.6 7

The winter stalemate in the northern areas offeredth e chance to clear th e Peloponnese region. Theoperation began on 19 December 1948 with GNA forcessecuring the coast along the Gulf of Corinth to preventthe guerrilla bands from being resupplied by sea. TheGreek "A" Corps commander then made his most decisivemove; he ordered the arrest of some 4,500 suspectedcommunist collaborators in the area. These arrests

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deprived the guerrilla bands of their principal meansof supplies and intelligence. The mass arrests alsohelped to gain the cooperation of the local population,which had been reluctant to provide information to theGreek armed forces for fear of guerrilla reprisals.A

Since "A" Corps did not have enough troops toconduct simultaneous operations throughout the region,Operation Pigeon had two main phases. In the firstphase, the main effort was to clear the northern partof the region and a supporting effort aimed toneutralize guerrilla activity in the south. The secondphase called for the main effort to begin to clear theregion from north to south. During both phases, theGreek navy was to conduct a sea blockade to prevent th erebel bands from receiving reinforcements by sea and toprevent a rebel withdrawal by sea. 69

The execution of Operation Pigeon was virtuallyflawless. The rebel bands, cut off from theirintelligence sources, had great difficulty trying toavoid GNA forces. Although some bands had limitedsuc-ess conducting counterattacks, "A" Corps unitsrelentlessly pressured and pursued these bands. Theoperation was deliberately slow and methodical in orderto allow no rebel escape. By the end of March, only250 !L-b iu .itd ino... . iii th'u .L"y~i t.t

The tide was turning in the war. Apparently31


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disturbed by th e GNA's success in th e Peloponnese, DAGlaunched an attack on the town of Karpenissi on 19January. The rebels occupied th e town in an obviouseffort to tempt Papagos to divert units from thePeloponnese. Papagos would not take the bait; the townremained under DAG occupation for 15 days until GNAunits from other areas ejected the rebels."

on 27 January, while Karpenissi was still underoccupation, the Provisional Government of Free Greecemade a radio broadcast announcing a peace proposal.The proposal called for a cease-fire, a generalamnesty, and negotiations to form a new government thatwould hold elections within two months.' 2 At first,this announcement seemed to be a logical step after th eaggressive raiding that DAG had conducted over theprevious two months--they could now, theoretically,bargain from a position of strength.One week later, however, another ProvisionalGovernment broadcast announced that Markos, theguerrilla leader, had been relieved of all his militaryand KKE duties because of his ill health. Days later,another broadcast stated that six high ranking DAGleaders had been removed for their "opportunism.'' 7Clearly, Markos and his followers were being purged.

What US and Greek government officials did notfully understand at th e time was that there existed a

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great personal animosity between Markos, the militarycommander, and Nikos Zahariadis, the head of the KKE.Markos had been a proponent of keeping DAG a guerrilla-based force, conducting raids and avoiding decisivecombat with Greek armed forces. Zahariadis, however,pushed fo r converting DAG into a conventional forcethat could seize and hold terrain and could engage anddefeat the GNA. Another point of contention was theissue of Macedonia; Zahariadis favored an autonomousMacedonia, while Markos opposed that policy.?' WithMarkos and his followers out of the KKE and the DAG,Zahariadis now had free reign.

Zahariadis' initial step was to announce the newKKE policy that Macedonia should be independent withinthe framework of a Balkan federation. The immediateresult was a large increase in volunteers of Macedonianorigin. The influx of these volunteers brought thetotal of Slavo-Macedonians in DAG to 14,000, or two-thirds of the rebel army's strength. 7 ' However, "thetruly popular basis of the Greek guerrilla movement[was] destroyed.' t " The rebels were no longer fightingfor a better Greece, but to divide Greece.

The KKE's Macedonian policy also had internationalrepercussions. The move angered Yugoslavia to thepuinL LhaL Titu, th t htctd uf th e Yugoslaviangovernment, began to cut off support to DAG. The

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decrease was not significant until spring 1949, but byJune there was no aid at all. On 10 July, Titoannounced that his border with Greece was closed.7

As these events unfolded, JUSMAPG worked tocompose its campaign plans for 1949. In late March,Van Fleet hosted a conference with the British MilitaryMission. Van Fleet's proposal was to shift the focusfrom clearing regions to defeating DAG formations. Hisproposal included changing from sequential tosimultaneous operations "over a wide area in order toprevent the enemy from evading the GNA attacks." Thenext major offensive, he argued, should be an attack onguerrilla units in central Greece, then an offensiveagainst DAG forces in the Grammos-Vitsi area. VanFleet emphasized that once the enemy forces had beendefeated in a region, that region must remain clearedso that refugees could return home and rebuildingprojects could begin.

Representatives from the British Military Mission"violently opposed" Van Fleet's plan, urging iasteadthat initial offensives should be aimed at cutting th eguerrilla supply lines from the Soviet satellitecountries. Van Fleet persuaded the GGS to adopt hisplan.7" The Greek armed forces' first spring operationwas an offensive in central Greece.

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Grammos-Vitsi region. Operation Torch began on 2August, while the mopping-up phase of OperationPyravlos continued.

DAG's situation in the summer of 1949 was grim.Zahariadis, reversing his stand on building aconventional force, attempted to revert to guerrillawarfare. He ordered that eight training centerslocated in satellite countries be shut down and themanpower from those camps be formed into guerrillabands. These bands infiltrated into northern Greece,but failed to win the support of the local population.The Greek citizens reported these bands to governmentauthorities. With this public support, NDC units andcivil police were able to hunt the guerrillas down."'

Meanwhile, DAG forces in the Grammos-Vitsi areawitnessed the GNA's build-up for Operation Torch.Zahariadis opted to fight from his defensive positionsrather than pull back into Albania. His hope was tohold the terrain until winter, when the weather wouldonce again halt any GNA offensive. DAG could thenrenew its efforts in the spring of 1950."8

The GNA launched Operation Torch with adiversionary attack on Grammos. The intent was toconvince DAG to deploy its reserves to the Grammosarea; the actual main attack would then be on Vitsi.The deception worked. With DAG reserves dispatched to


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Grammos, the main attack began in Vitsi on 10 August.The Greek armed forces were victorious in five days.

After the fall of the Vitsi region, Zahariadisdecided to continue to defend in Grammos. The GNA'sfinal assault began on 25 August with the support of 50Helldiver aircraft that the US had just delivered. TheGNA overran the Grammos positions in three days.Sporadic fighting continued until the end of Augustwhile remnants of DAG forces escaped into Albania.

One week later, the Albanian head of state, EnverHoxha, announced that any Greek citizen in his countrywould be disarmed and detained. Hoxha, gravelyconcerned about a Greek invasion, did not wish to offerthe Greeks any legitimate excuse. Coupled withYugoslavia's decision to cut off aid, Hoxha'sannouncement signified the end of the Greek Civil War.

V1. LESSONS FOR TODAY'S OPERATIONAL ARTISTGeneral Van Fleet and his JUSMAPG staff worked at

the operational level of war. JUSMAPG composedcampaign plans for the Greek military in 1948 and 1949that attempted to achieve US strategic goals--thedefeat of the Greek insurgency and the stabilization ofthe Greek government--with tactical actions. One ofJUSMAPG's chief roles, then, was to achieve this linkbeLweij sti:atey afid ta tics. JUSMAPG's expeience inGreece demonstrates several lessons for future FID

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missions.First is the issue of leverage. Since the

announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the United Statesput the Greek Civil War in terms of being part of agreater East-West conflict. The Greeks perceived thatthe United States was fully committed to winning th ewar. Therefore, the Greeks believed that the US wouldprovide ever-increasing funds or would send Americancombat troops to Greece if the rebels appeared to beclose to final victory. Greek soldiers, from th elowest to highest rank, did not feel the need to beaggressive. Why should they risk their lives when th eUS would eventually arrive and fight for them?"'

US strategic policy thus had a negative impact onthe tactical level of the Greek Civil War. USofficials tried to instill an aggressive, fightingspirit in the Greek soldiers. They failed. Thesituation required an indigenous leader like GeneralPapagos to perform this task. Papagos had theauthority, power, and, above all, th e iron will toforce an end to the war.

The first lesson, then, is that the US mustclearly state the limits of its involvement. TheTruman Administration lost its leverage with Athensupon the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, whichpromised "to support free peoples who are resisting


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attempted subjugation . .. There were no limits andno exceptions.8 3 Compounding this problem was th edecision not to inform the Greeks of theadministration's aversion to send American combatforces even if a Communist takeover were imminent.

Secondly, US officials conducting a FID missionshould actively search for competent officers to headthe host nation's military. The talents of any seniorUS officers are necessary to win the respect of th ehost nation government, but on the battlefield suchtalents do not matter. Van Fleet could compose th egreatest of campaign plans, but the Greek armed forceshad to execute those plans. in the long run, a nationrequires one of its ow n to spark the drive to victory.Papagos' aggressive leadership was a key to Greeksuccess.

The retired Papagos was available throughout th eGreek Civil War, but no one called upon him until th eGreek government's situation turned bleak in late 1948.Both Greek and US officials identified him as the manwho could energize the Greek military, but hisappointment was held up fo r four months over concernsthat another Metaxas-style dictatorship would emerge.US Ambassador Grady finally concluded that Papagos wasEtecessary "despie any t-h~reat" to C-rock.- dcmocracy iflorder to instill efficiency in the Greek acmed forces.

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US officials, then, may need to tolerate a less thandemocratic form of government in the host nation inorder to defeat an insurgency.

There is, therefore, a curious balancing act incounterinsurgency warfare. If an unstable, democraticgovernment threatened by an insurgency continues to beinefficient, the population may turn to the guerrillasout of sheer desperation. If the government becomestoo repressive in its attempts to be more efficient,the population may become alienated and give itssupport to the insurgency. US officers conducting aFID mission must be aware of this fine balance and actaccordingly.

The key is to retain legitimacy. The US Armydefines legitimacy as "the willing acceptance by thepeople of the right of th e government to govern or of agroup or agency to make or carry out decisions.""* TheGreek government, therefore, needed the Greek people togrant it legitimacy in order for it to governeffectively. If the Greek population withdrew thatlegitimacy, then the government would have been morevulnerable to being overthrown.

The US mission in Greece, however, was also inneed of legitimacy. The perception of many Greeks wasthat the East-West conflict was being fought on Greeksoil. The US government needed the support of the

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Greek people in order to accomplish its aims in its FIDmission. JUSMAPG would not have accomplished itsmissions without the Greek people's acceptance of itsauthority in Greece.

In addition, the Greek government needed thelegitimacy of the American public. If the Americanpeople withdrew their support of the Greek govcrnment,the US funding would cease. That legitimacy was atrisk whenever an article appeared in the US press thatdescribed the Polk killing, the Greek government'scorruption and ineptness, and the Greek's scandalousattempts to gain as much US aid as possible.

The operational artist, therefore, must be awareof such legitimacy issues. He must understand that theUS FID mission requires the support of the host nationgovernment and citizenry. He must also communicate tothe host government that certain actions may cause aloss of US public support. The Greek government,however, appeared unconcerned, since the US governmenthad strongly committed itself to defeating theCommunists in Greece.

In addition to the issues of leverage andlegitimacy, the operational artist may find himselfproviding advice on force structure issues of the hostnation's military. One ot the most important decisionsthe US made in the Greek Civil War was the

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establishment of the National Defense Corps. Theseunits, dedicated to static defense, allowed the GNA toconduct offensive operations. The creation of the NDCalso provided a method for allowing the Greek citizensto defend themselves and their community. When thesecitizens conducted violent acts on behalf of theirgovernment, any link to the guerrillas weakened.45

The active support of the population, of course,is critical to the success of any counterinsurgencyoperation. The creation of the NDC battalions helped,but in many regions the Greek population did not feelsecure. Once the Greek population became convincedthat they were protected and that they were not subjectto guerrilla retribution, they freely offeredinformation to the GNA. This information played a keyrole in the GNA's successes in 1949. The mass arrestspreceding the Peloponnese operation were certainly notin the best traditions of a democratic society. Thearrests, however, were necessary fo r the people's senseof security, and thus necessary for the success of theoperation.

VII. CONCLUSIONThe Greek Civil War offers a valid case study in

US FID operations. As with any case study, the lessonshere are not universal. However, many of these lessonscan be applied in future FID missions.

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First, th e role of leverage and th e need fordefined limits of US involvement is critical. Sincethese limits may rule out the use of US combat force,US FID officials should encourge th e host nationgovernment to appoint th e best indigenous leaders forthe host nation's military. The key is to set th econditions fo r th e indigenous forces, with US help, todefeat the insurgency themselves.

Secondly, operational artists in a FID missionmust recognize th e delicate balance involved in aninsurgency situation. Both an inefficient, butdemocratic government and an efficient, but repressiveregime can lose the populat-ion's support. 141challenge is to be efficient without being to orepressive.

In addition, legitimacy in a FID operation mayinvolve more than just the relationship between theindigenous people and their government, but also thepeoples and governments of other nations.

Finally, th e operational artist should considermethods to not only protect th e local population, butalso encourage the people to participate in thecounterinsurgency effort. The NDC battalions offeredth e Greek people the chance to defend themselves. Oncethe Greek government coul-d assure the people'sprotection, the insurgency died.

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1. Data is from a review of the article listings inAir University Periodical Index (Maxwell Air ForceBase, AL: Air University Library), a publication thatindexes articles from approximately 80 professionalmilitary journals. In the years immediately after th eGreek Civil War (late 1949 through 1952) there weremore articles on such topics as gliders, insurance, andthe War of 1812 than on the US military involvement inGreece.2. See US Department of State, Patterns of GlobalTgerrorism. 1992 (n.p., 1993), 29-54. This publicationlists twenty terrorist groups as Communist, Marxist-Leninist, or Maoist.3. D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure ofU.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1988), 169.4. History of the United States Army Group (Greece).Volume1, 44-45. Hereafter referred to as U[ G

5. Ibid., 51.6. Cited in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits ofPower: The World and United States Foreign Policyv1.945195 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972),221.7. John C. Campbell, et. al., The United States inWorld Affairs. 1947-1948 (New York and London: Harper &Brothers, 1948), 29.8. Ibid., 29.9. Quoted in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner,eds., Doc1umnts on American Foreign Relations. VolumeIX . January I - December 31. 1947 (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1949), 649.10. USAGG History. Volume I, 75-76.11. Interestingly, Dwight Griswold answered directlyto the Secretary of State, not to the US Ambassador inrealized the problems that this working arrangementcreated and made AMAG subordinate to the US ambassador.

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12. Howard Jones, "A New Kind of War": America'sGlobal Strategy and the TrumanD tl inGreece (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1989), 72.13. Estimated guerrilla strength was 18,000 by th esummer of 1947, then grew to 25,000 by autumn. SeeKolko, 406. Official US estimates assessed guerrillastrength at only 20,000 by the end of 1947 (seeCampbell, 472). The fact remains, however, that theguerrilla strength increased sharply despite theannounced US aid effort.14 . See Alexander Papagos, "Guerrilla Warfare,"Foreign Affairs, January 1952, 223-225.15 . See USAGG History. Volume I, 59; USAGG History.VoQ34fj11, 1; and Jones, 65. John C. Campbell statesthat these amnesty programs failed due to "Communistdiscipline and control" over the guerrillas. SeeCampbell, 476.16 . See History of the Joint United States M ilitaryAdvisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), 28, (hereafterreferred to as JUSMAPG History) and USAGG History.VLumea11, 12, 14-15.17. See US Department of State, Policy Planning Staff,The State Department Policy Planning Staff Pacers.Volume I. 1947 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983),93-96. (Hereafter referred to as MQa).18. After Griswold's initial suggestion that USAGGbegin to offer operational advice to the Greek armedforces, the US War Department sent Major General S. J.Chamberlin on a fact-finding trip to Greece.Chamberlin returned in full support of the proposal toprovide to Greek tactical units US observers "with theduties of energizing operational action, restoring th eoffensive spirit and advising on planning andoperations." See "Report of MG S. J. Chamberlin to CSA(Eisenhower), 20 October 1947," in US Department ofState, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947.Volume V. The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC:GPO, 1971), 376-377. (Hereafter referred to as EQS).19 . Campbell, 476-477.20. Telegram, Secretary or state (Marsidil) Lu LieAmerican Mission for Aid to Greece (Griswold), 26January 1948, in EES.J1948, 36-37. General Livesaywas initially to continue his logistical duties in

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Greece. At Livesay's request, however, he wasreassigned to the United States since the Greekofficials would have perceived him as being disgraced.Van Fleet, born in 1892, graduated from the UnitedStates Military Academy (West Point) in 1915. In WorldWar II he served as a regimental commander in 4thInfantry Division during the Normandy landings. Hewent on to command at the division and corps level.21. Quoted in Jones, 136.22. Ibid., 157.23. See Ibid., 137, 157-158. Compounding Van Fleet'sproblems was the challenge of coordinating with th eBritish in Greece. The British had five agenciesoperating in Greece that were independent of eachother, requiring Van Fleet or his staff to deal withall five. Such coordination was necessary in order forthe Americans and the British military missions topresent a unified opinion to the Greek authorities.24. Jones, 152-153, and Papagos, 222. During thewinter of 1946-1947, the Greek army began a program toidcnify Com-munist sympathizers wi4hin -its trnk and toplace them in special camps. Known as Category "C"personnel, these soldiers received instruction on th eevils of Communism. Once Greek army officials wereconvinced that a soldier had repudiated Communistideology, that soldier was returned to a regular unit.25. "A Report to the President by the NationalSecurity Council on the Position of the United Stateswith Respect to Greece," NSC 5/2, 12 February 1948, 7-8. The council studied four options: first, to send a"token armed force" to Greece; second, to send a forcenecessary to prevent a Communist victory (sizeunspecified); third, to strengthen the US militaryposture in the Mediterranean area outside of Greece;and, fourth, to initiate a partial mobilization as ademonstration of US resolve.26. "War Risks in Greek-Aid Plans," The United StatesNews-World Report, 5 March 1948, 30-31. The articlestated that commitment was "unlikely any time soon"unless both the US Congress and the United Nationssanctioned such a deployment. Although the use of UScombat troops would be "a last resort," the articlestated that if the GNA failed, US servicemen "may goback into combat before the year's end."

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27. Quoted in Jones, 108, 110. Other senior US StateDepartment officials echoed th e same theme, warningGreece that it must defend itself and not rely to o muchon US assistance. See, for example, FE!,.D1948, 54.In a February, 1948 speech, Loy Henderson, Director ofNear Eastern and African Affairs, stated that "it wouldbe extremely difficult for the United Nations or anymember of th e United Nations to save Greece" should th eGreeks themselves falter in their own defense. In aprivate conversation, a Greek official questionedHenderson about th e remark. Henderson replied thatGreece had to defend itself. The US would help, headded, but the American public perception was thatGreece was not doing all it could to save itself.28. "War Risks in Greek-Aid Plans," The United StasteNews-World Report, 5 March 1948, 30-31.29. Tjia, 5 April 1948, 26.30. Jones, 123 and 137.31. Ibid., 156.32. Memorandum of Conversation, by th e Action Chier otth e Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs(Jernegen), 26 December 1947, in EJS.1247, 466.Comments are General Livesay's.33. JUSMAPG History, 23.34. J. C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War," in T. N.Greene, ed., The Guerril la and How to Fight Him:Selections from the Marin Corps Gazette (New York:Praeger, 1962), 94-95.35. Jones, 160.36. JUSMAPG History, 59-79.37. For a more detailed account of th e Polk murder,see Jones, 161-167, and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, flZFire and Axe (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers,1978), 265-266.38. Averoff, 266.39. "A Report to the President by th e Nationalsecurity council on th e Position of th e United Stateswith Respect to the Use of U.S. M ilitary Power inGreece," NSC 5/4, 3 June 1948, 2, 5-6. The NationalSecurity Council noted that th e GNA had improved

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considerably. In addition, US intelligence hadindications of an emerging rift between Markos and theUSSR. The NSC's conclusion was that Soviet policy hadchanged; the Kremlin no longer wanted to place Markosin power, but did wish to use the DAG to drain USeconomic strength.40. Telegram, Griswold to Secretary of State, 16 June1948, in fQ&USj194, 107-108.41. JUSMAPG History., 84 .42. Averoff, 282.43. Ibid., 281.44. Ibid., 290.45. Some in the US State Department even suggestedthat the US could begin looking at reducing the Greekarmed forces. A spirited debate, through telegrams andmemorandums, about possible reductions of the Greekarmed forces after the Grammos operation is in EUS,194, 125-143.46. Averoff, 292.47. JUSMAPG History, p. 100.48. Ibid., 102.49. Ibid., 102-103.50. Ibid., 103.51. ibid., 104.52. See P. 1948, 499. In March, 1948, the estimatedguerrilla strength was 26,400; in November, it was24,500.53 . Jones, 184.54. RPS_94.4, 518.55 . Averoff, 298.56 . See FRU 1248, 168-170, 190. Grady also believedi.L afcessary to a ... .. - *Greek government officials and at the Greek people toconvince them that the guerrilla war was a Greekproblem, that there were limits to US assistance, and

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that th e Greeks themselves must redouble their effortsto end th e war.57. USJews and World RepQrt, 29 October 1948, 24.58. JUSMAPG History, 165.59. Time, 31 January 1949, 27.60. FRj.J1_48, 176.61. Ibid., 186-187.62. J7JSMAPG History, 119.63. Ibid., 126.64. Ibid., 120.65. FRISJ.19_4, 246.66. BLI._J194, 425.67. Murray. 101.68. See Averoff, 311-312, and JUSMAPG History, 135-137.69. JUSMAPG History, 136.70. USAGG History. Vol III, 6.71. Averoff, 325-326.72. Ibid., 315-316. The proposal also called for theremoval of all foreign military forces, foreignmissions, and foreign influences from Greece.73. Ibid., 317.74. Jones, 190 and 200. See also Constantine Poulos,"Greece: Betrayal as Usual," Natkn, 29 October 1949,412.75. Jones, 200.76. Poulos, 412.77. Averoff, 278-279. Averoff maintains that rito wasin th e process of cutting off th e DAG even beforeZahariadis' policy announcement. Tito's rift with th eSoviet Union forced hi.m to look to th e West for help in

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BIBLIOGRAPHYDQQOKSAsprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in

UJtoaE. Vol. II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday &Company, Inc., 1975.Averoff-Tossizza, By Fire and Axe. New Rochelle, NY:Caratzas Brothers, 1978.The Brookings Institution. Major Problems of UnitedStates Foreign Policy 1948-42: A Study Guide.Volume 2. Menasha, WI: George Banta PublishingCompany, 1948.

,.Major Problems of United States ForeignPolicy 1949-1950. Volume 3. Menasha, WI: GeorgeBanta Publishing Company, 1949.

Campbell, John C., et. al. The United States in WorldAffairs 1947-1948. New York: Harper & Brothers,1948.Chaliand, Gerard, ed. Guerrilla Strategies: AnHistorical Anthology from the Long March toAfghanistan. Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1982.Clogg, Richard. h Short History of Modern Greect.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.Dennett, Raymond and Robert K. Turner, eds. Documentson American Foreign Relations. Volume IX , jnUaryI - e emher 11.194. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1949.Ellis, John. A Short Histor" of Guerrilla Warfare.New York: St. Martins Press, 1976.Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. Counterinsurgency: Some"Problems nd "Impltions. New York: Council onReligion and International Affairs, 1966.Gaddis, John Lewis. Th Uit States and the Originsof tLle Cold WK,9a4.1i1947. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1972.Greene, T. N., ed. TheGuerril14r-An&Ji9 tQ Fijght-Him; Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette.New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.


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latrides, John 0., ed. AUsador MacVeaqh Reports:Greece. 1933-1947. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980.Jones, Howard. "A New Kind of War": America's GlobalStrategy and the Truman Doctrine- n Greece. New

York: Oxford University Press, 1989.Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. The Limits of Power:The World and United States Foreian Policy, 1945-1954. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.Kousoulas, Dimitrios George. Revolution and Defeat:The Story of the Greek Communist Party. London:Oxford University Press, 1965.LaFeber, Walter, ed. America in the Cold War: TwentyYears of Revolution and R2esonse. 1947-1967. NewYork: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.McNeill, William Hardy. The Greek Dilemma: War andAftela . Philadelphia: J. B. LippincottCompany, 1947.Miscambie, Wilsoni D. Gearge-F. Kgpjnen and the Makingof American Foreign Policy. 1947-1950. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.O'Ballance, Edgar. Th= Greek Civil War. 1944-1949.New York: Praeger, 1966.Roubatis, Yiannis P. Tanglad Webs: The U.S. in Greece.

1 -1 . New York: Pella Publishing Company,Inc., 1987.Shafer, D. MI:hael. c-adigmsi The Failure ofU.S. CounterinsurM glicy.. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1988.Vlavianos, Haris. Greece. 1941-49: From Resistance toCivil War: The Strateav of the Greek CommunistP . New York: St. M artin's Press, 1992.Wittner, Lawrence S. .rCan litervention in Greece,.1943-1949. New York: Columbia University Press,

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PERIODICALS"Greece." Tj!=, 31 January 1949, 26-27.Kendrick, Alexander. "Greece's Ultimate Solution."New Republic, 7 March 1949, 14-16.Papagos, Alexander. "Guerrilla Warfare." ForeignAffaim, January 1952, 215-230."Scant Results from U.S. Aid to the Greeks." USNewand World Report, 29 Ocober 1948, 24."Showdown in Greek War: U.S. Dollars for New Drive."

US News and World Report, 25 June 1948, 30."So Long, Fella." =, 3 January 1949, 20."War Risks in Greek-Aid Plans." US News and World

EgpQr, 5 March 1948, 30-31.US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONSUS Army. F. 100-5. Operations. Washington, DC:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993.US Department of State. A Decade of American Forei*nPolicy: Basic Documents. 1941-1949. Washington,DC: GPO, 1985.

Foreign Relations of the United States.1247. Vol. V, The Near East and Africa.Washington, DC: GPO, 1971._ _ . Foreign Relat ions of th e United States,1948. Vol. IV, Eastern Eurooe: The Soviet Union.Washington, DC: GPO, 1974.

_ . Foreign Relat ions of the United States.1949. Vol. VI, The Near East. South Asia. andAfrica. Washington, DC: GPO, 1977._. ...... _. Patterns of Global Terrorism. 1992. n.p.,1993.

Policy Planning Staff. TDepartment Policy Plaining Staff Papers. 1947-1949. 3 vols. New York: Garland Publishing,i983.

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Secretary's File (PSF), Box 256.. "Possible Consequences of CommunistControl of Greece in the Absence of USCounteraction." ORE 69, 9 February 1948. PSF Box256.. "Review of th e World Situation as itRelates to the Security of the United States."CIA 3, 17 December 1947. PSF Box 203." _ "Review of th e World Situation as itRelates to the Security of the United States."

CIA 4, 12 January 1948. PSF Box 203.National Security Council. "A Report to the Presidentby the National Security Council on the Positionof the United States with Respect to Greece." NSC5/2, 12 February 1948. PSF Box 203.

". "A Report to the President by the NationalSecurity council on the Position of the UnitedStates with Respect to the Use of U.S. MilitaryPower in Greece." NSC 5/4, 3 June 1948. PSF Box203.US Army. History of the Joint United States M ilitaryAdvisory and Planning GrouI (JUSMARPG. UnitedStates Army Unit Diaries, Histories and Reports,Miscellaneous Units, Box 39.

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