greece: 20 popular fallacies concerning the debt crisis

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  • 8/6/2019 Greece: 20 popular fallacies concerning the debt crisis

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    ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION

    Sell your islands,

    you bankruptGreeks

    20 POPULARFALLACIES

    CONCERNING

    THE DEBT CRISIS

    Headline in German newspaper,BILD, 27.10.2010

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    photo:

    MARIoSLoLoS/dpA

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    What is the crisis? False descriptions of the situation 31. Greecehastoomanydebts 3

    2. ThefnancialmarketsarescaredthatGreecewillgobankrupt 4

    How did the crisis come about?

    Inaccurate research into the causes 5

    3. TheGreeksarelazy 5

    4. TheGreeksareconstantlyonholiday 65. WearepayingluxurypensionstotheGreeks9 6

    6. TheGreekshavebeeneatheringtheirownnestwell 7

    7. TheGreekshavebeenlivingabovetheirmeans 8

    8. TheGreekstateisover-inated 9

    9. Greeceisnotcapableocompeting 9

    10. TheGreeksarecorrupt 10

    The way forward? False solutions 12

    11.TheGreeksshouldstartsavingbeorewehelpthemagain 12

    12. SellyourislandsyoubankruptGreeks!29 13

    13. Thecreditorsshouldootthebill! 13

    14. GreeceshouldgetoutotheEurozone 15

    15.Greecehastowinbackthetrustothefnancialmarkets 15

    The role of the Germans: False friends 17

    16. WewanttoberiendswiththeGreeks35 17

    17. Youshouldhelpyourriendsbutnotbailthemout 17

    18. NoGermantaxeurosorGreece!37 18

    19. WearethepaymastersoEurope40 19

    One last comment 2020.GreececheateditswayintotheEurozone

    Wearenowpayingthepriceorourindulgence 42 20

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

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    Its that time again! Greece needs more loans and the governmentsin Europe are arguing about whether its really necessary and who

    should oot the bill. There is widespread opinion in Germany that

    Greece itsel is to blame or the problems it now fnds itsel in. It

    frst o all cheated its way into the Eurozone, then the government

    spent too much and the governed worked too little, many believe.

    Latently nationalistic patters o interpretation o this kind have been

    nourished by German politicians and the media, who have no endo proposals or how to solve the crisis. For example, the Greeks

    should save more, work more and sell their public property and i

    all o these measures do not help, then Greece will just have to leave

    the Eurozone or declare itsel bankrupt. The stupid thing is, neither

    are the causes o the crisis that have been named actually correct,

    nor will the proposed ways out o the crisis achieve their goal.

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    3

    1. GREECE HAS TOO MANY DEBTS

    The acts:Becauseothefnancialcrisis,Greecesnationaldebtgrew

    between2007andtheendo2010rom115%to143%oeconomic

    perormance.Thisso-calleddebtratiowillprobablyclimbabovethe

    150%markin2011.Bywayocomparison:Germanysdebtratiois

    about85%.The way things are portrayed:Thehighdebtratioalonedoesnotex-

    plainGreecesproblems.Thedebtratiodoesnotreectthecorrect

    valueeitherintheoryorinpractice.1Italyhasadebtratioo120%,

    Japanhasevenreached200%oitseconomicperormance.Neither

    otheseisseentobebroke,whileGreeceis.Why?Becausethe

    fnancialmarketsarespeculatingonGreecebecomingbankrupt.This

    hasdriventheinterestrateornewdebtstosuchhighlevels,thatAth-enscannotborrowanynewmoney2.Bycomparison:Athensmustpay

    25%interestontwo-yearstateloans,Italyonly3%andJapanamere

    0.2%(asperendoMay2011).

    Theproblemthereorelieswiththeinterestratethathasbeenorced

    upwardsbyfnancemarketspeculations.TheMacroeconomicPolicy

    Institute(IMK)hascalculatedthat,itheaveragerateointerestor

    Greekstateloanswouldallto3%,thenthecountrysdebtratiowouldallto110%oeconomicperormancebytheyear2015.3However,

    itheinterestrateremainsashighasitis,Athenswillnotbeableto

    borrowanymoneyonthemarkets.Whetherornotitisthenbroke

    dependsonthewillingnessotheotherEuro-statestohelpitoutby

    providingloans.Thereore,thequestionobankruptcyisaquestion

    opoliticaldecisionsbystates.

    WHAT IS THE CRISIS?

    FALSE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SITUATION

    1 BHF-Bank economic service, 4.6.2011 2 One simplified example to demonstrate how this works: Greece

    borrows a loan of 1 million euros at a fixed rate of interest of 5 % p.a. (=50,000 euros). The loan is then traded

    on the stock exchange and crashes. Its price falls from 1 million euros to 500,000 euros. The interest rate of

    5 % (=50.000 euros) however remains unchanged. Ergo, the loan now has a return on investment for the lender

    of 10 % (50,000 euros from 500,000 euros). If Athens now wants to take out a new loan, the interest rate that

    it has to pay is based on the return on investment of the old loan. If it wants to borrow new money, this means

    that Greece must offer the lenders an interest rate of 10 %. 3 IMK: Debt cuts bring more disadvantages than

    advantages, May 2010.

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    2. THE FINANCIAL MARKETS ARE SCARED

    THAT GREECE WILL GO BANKRUPT

    The acts:Greekloanscrashedonthefnancialmarkets.Inversely,thereturnsoninvestmentortheseloans(seeootnote2)increased.

    The way things are portrayed:Thefnancialmarketsarescaredo

    nothing.Theyarenotahumanbeingwitheelingsandears.Andthey

    arealsonotanobjectiveentitythatanalysesthefnancialsituationo

    acountryinaactualmanner.Thefnancialmarketisnothingmore

    thantheentiretyotheinvestorswhotrytoearnasmuchmoneyas

    possiblewithfnancialinvestments.AnyonewhoisreallyscaredthatGreecewillgobankruptisnotinvestinginGreekgovernmentsecuri-

    ties.EveryoneelsehopesthatHellaswillbesavedandtheywillbeable

    torakeinhugeinterestprofts. 4

    4 Berliner Zeitung newspaper 27.4.2010

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    3. THE GREEKS ARE LAZY

    The acts:TheGreeksworkagreatdeal.Theactualweeklyworking

    hoursminuslunchbreaksbeorethecrisiswere44.3hoursaccord-

    ingtoEurostat.InGermany,thisfgurewas41hoursandtheEUaver-

    agewas41.7hours.5TheFrenchbankNatixisarrivedattotalaverage

    workinghoursperannuminGermanyo1,390hours,whiletheGreeksworkanaverageo2,119hoursperannum. 6

    The way things are portrayed:Germanyalsohashighdebtsbutwe

    canpaythemo,becausewegetupprettyearlyandworkallday.7

    ApartromtheactthattheGreeksworkalotandapartromtheact

    that leisure time isnot necessarilysomethingbad andwork isnot

    necessarilysomethinggooditisundamentallywrongtoseekthe

    causesoacrisisinacountrybycitingthelackohardworkamongitspopulation.TheGreeksdonothavetheoptionojustworkinglonger

    hourstoendthecrisis.Theoppositeistruebecauseothecrisis,

    manyGreekshavebeenorcedtonotworkatall.Theofcialunem-

    ploymentratewas16.5%inApril2011,andathirdoyoungpeople

    werewithoutapaidjobattheendo2010.Thenumberocivilserv-

    antshasbeenreducedby83,000inthelastmonths.Andsoitisclear,

    itisnotlazinessthatcreatescrises,butcrisesdestroyjobs.Thesitu-ationwasverydierentinGermany,wheretheupswingreducedthe

    unemploymentrateto6.0%inApril2011.

    HOW DID THE CRISIS COME ABOUT?

    INACCURATE RESEARCH INTO THE CAUSES

    5 Handelsblatt newspaper, 2.5.2005 6 Natixis, Flash Economie, 30.5.2011 7 BILD newspaper 5.3.2010

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    4. THE GREEKS ARE CONSTANTLY ON HOLIDAY

    The facts:AccordingtotheEUagencyEuroound,Greekemployees

    havearightto23daysholidayleaveonaverageperyear.TheGermansareintheluckypositionobeingabletoenjoy30daysholidayleavea

    fgurethatisrightatthetopinEurope.AndtheGermansarealsoright

    uptherewhenitcomestothenumberopublicholidaystheyhave.8

    The way things are portrayed:Wecannothaveonecurrency,when

    somehaveagreatdealoholidayleaveandothersverylittle,said

    Federal ChancellorAngelaMerkel in themiddle oMay2011.This

    isanotherversionothelazinessaccusation.Itisanotherattempttoblamethecrisisontheindividualsupposedlyalseconductothe

    Greeks. Conversely the Chancellor praises her own people, stating

    that,theactthatweareinagoodeconomicpositionisbecause

    wearesohard-working.

    5. WE ARE PAYING LUXURY PENSIONSTO THE GREEKS9

    The acts:AccordingtotheOECD,meninGermanyretireonaverage

    at61.8yearsoage,whileinGreeceitis61.9.Andwecannotinany

    sensetalkaboutluxurypensions:theaveragepensioninGreeceis

    about55%otheEurozoneaverage,whichamountedto617eurosin2007.Two-thirdsoGreekpensionershadtosurviveonlessthan600

    eurospermonth.

    The way things are portrayed:Itisimportantthat,incountrieslike

    Greece,SpainandPortugal,peopleshouldnotbeabletoretireearlier

    thaninGermany,ChancellorMerkelsaidinthemiddleoMay2011.

    AndyettheBILDnewspaperandtheChancellormustbeawareothe

    realsituationacingGreekpensioners.However,theyobviouslydonotcareaboutacts.Accordingtotheirwayothinking,everyyearore-

    tirementandeveryeuroorpensionsisaluxuryinacountrythatisin

    themiddleoacrisis.

    8 Spiegel-Online, 18.5.2011 9 BILD newspaper, 27.4.2010

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    6. THE GREEKS HAVE BEEN FEATHERING

    THEIR OWN NEST WELL

    The acts:ThewagelevelinGreeceisonly73%otheEurozoneaver-age.AccordingtoinormationprovidedbytheGermanInstituteor

    Labour,whichiscloselyassociatedwiththetradeunions,aquartero

    allGreekemployeesearnlessthan750eurospermonth. 10Teachers,

    orexample,ater15yearsinservice,earnabout40%lessthaninGer-

    many11andthatwasbeorethecrisis.AccordingtoEurostat,beore

    thecrisisafthoallGreekswerethreatenedbypovertyand25%o

    Greekslivedinapartmentsthatweretoosmallorthenumberopeo-plelivinginthem(inGermany:7%).

    The way things are portrayed:Here,whatwearelookingatisacrisis

    explanationthataddstheaccusationogluttonytotheoneolazi-

    ness.Aswasthecasewithallegationsolazinessandluxurypen-

    sions,anattemptisbeingmadetoapplyseeminglyplausiblecom-

    monsensetotheeconomyasawhole.Theimplicationis,wejusthave

    toworkhardandsavehardandeverythingwillbefne.Bothsmallandlargecrisescanbeexplainedinthisway.Weshouldhavejust

    askedanyhousewiewhohastobudgetherhousehold,Merkelad-

    vised.Shewouldhavegivenussomewordsowisdom:Onecannot

    liveaboveonesmeansorever.Thatiswhatliesattheheartothein-

    ternationalcrisis.12Andyetthedierencebetweenplatitudesandthe

    realityisclearenough.Workinghardwillnotbringaboutaboom,

    rathertheconverseistrueaboombringsaboutnewjobs.Frugalitycanleadtoruin(seeGreece)andnewdebts,bycomparison,canhelp

    onetogetbyindifculttimes(asinGermanyduringthemostrecent

    crisis).

    10 Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper, 25.7.2010 11 Ifo service 5/2007 12 Focus-online, 1.12.2008

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    7. THE GREEKS HAVE BEEN LIVING

    ABOVE THEIR MEANS

    The acts:Foryears,thegovernmentinAthenshasbeenspendingmorethanithasbeenbringingin.Between2000and2007,itsbudget

    defcitlaybetweenourandsevenpercentoeconomicperormance.

    The way things are portrayed:Almosteverygovernmentlivesabove

    itsmeans,thatis,spendsmorethanitbringsin.Assuch,thebudget

    defcitotheGermangovernmentbetween2000and2007wasbe-

    tween1.6%and4.0%oeconomicperormance.Theproblemwith

    Greecewasnotsomuchthenewdebt,buttheactthatthefnancialmarketsstartedtospeculateagainstAthensatsomepoint,pushing

    theinterestratesornewloanstoanunaordablelevelintheprocess

    (seeabove).Thiscanalsohappentoacountrywithoutalargedefcit,

    whichisshownintheexampleoIreland,whichdidnothavedefcits

    butmostlysurplusesinitsbudgetsothepastdecadeandyetitstill

    ellvictimtothefnancialmarketsandhadtoberescuedbytheEUand

    theIMFtothetuneo85billioneuros.Germanyalsohashighdebts,butweareabletopaythemobe-

    causewealwayssavepartoourincomeorarainyday,theBILD

    newspaperwrote.13TheBILDismistakeniitwantstoapplythisargu-

    menttothelevelothestate.TheGermangovernmenthasalsorun

    upanetdebtsituationandhasnotsavedinthepast.Iwelookat

    theeconomyasawhole,however,thereissometruthinit:TheGer-

    mannationaldebtoaround2,000billioneurosisbalancedbytotalassetsoaround7,400billioneuros.14However,thesearenotour

    assets,butaremainlyconcentratedinthehandsoaewrichpeople.

    Thiswouldonlybeosomeusetothestate,iithadaccesstothese

    undsthatis,iittaxedthem.However,thisisnotgoingtohappen,

    aspropertytaxwasabolishedin1997.

    13 BILD newspaper, 5.3.2010 14 DIW weekly report, 50/2010

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    8. THE GREEK STATE IS OVER-INFLATED

    The acts: Greekpublic spending in relation to the gross domestic

    product,theso-calledpublicspending-to-GDPratio,was48%in2008,whilethisfgurewasonly44%inGermany.

    The way things are portrayed:Beorethecrisis,thesituationwasvery

    dierent.TheGreekpublicspending-to-GDPratiosankbetween2000

    and2006rom47%to43%andremainedduringthisperiodbelow

    thelowGermanrate15.Thisdidnotchangeuntiltheeconomyslumped

    duringthefnancialcrisis.Andso,itwastherecessionthatwasto

    blame or the over-inatednature oGreekpublic spending, andnotHellenicextravagance.Andbesidesthis,Swedenhashadapublic

    spending-to-GDPratioobetween51%and55%ortenyearsnow

    andisnotbankrupt.

    9. GREECE IS NOT CAPABLE OF COMPETING

    The acts:Thismaybetrueiwelookatexports,whereGreecehas

    hadahighdefcitoryears,reaching14%oeconomicperormancein

    2009.ThismeansthatGreeceimportsmorethanitexports.Themain

    reasongivenorthiswashighwageincreases,whichiswhytheGreek

    wagelevelshouldallnow,inordertorenderthecountrycompetitive

    again.The way things are portrayed: Being capable o competing has

    nothingtodowithcapability.Thistermmerelydescribesaratio.As

    aact,theunitlabourcostsinGreecedidincreasebetween2000and

    2010byalmost40%16.Thiswasonlyaproblem,however,because

    theunitlabourcostsinothercountries increasedtoa lesserextent

    andthebusinessesinthesecountriesthereorehadacostadvantage

    ontheworldmarket.TheEuropeanexpertatwagesavingswasGer-many,wheretheunitlabourcostsonlyroseby5%thankstolower

    increasesachievedincollectivebargaining.Theresultwashighexport

    surplusesorGermanyandimportsurplusesorcountrieslikeGreece,

    15 Michael Schlecht: The Euro is burning. Position paper 21.5.2010 16 Commerzbank Research Note: Euro

    periphery facing a wage revolution? 1.4.2011

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    Portugal,IrelandorSpain.TheGermansuccesswasthereoremerely

    theinverseimageotheailureintheEuroperiphery,becauseGer-

    manywouldnothavegainedsurplusesiithadnotbeenorthedef-

    citsinGreece,SpainandPortugal.Andso,Germanysexportoensive

    allowedittofllitscoersattheexpenseoitsneighbours.Germanyhashealthycompanieswhoseproductsareindemandaroundthe

    globe,theBILDnewspapertriumphed17.Themouthpieceotheman

    onthestreetshouldnotorget,despiteitselation,thatGermanysex-

    portsuccesseswerefnancedbythepovertyotheworkers.Aswages

    sankoronlyincreasedslightly,privateconsumptionwithinGermany

    hashardlymovedaninchinthelasttenyears 18.Andonemorething:

    TheWorldEconomicForumdefnedbeingcapabletocompeteasacombination o institutions,policiesand actors that determine the

    productivityleveloacountryTheproductivitylevelalsodetermines

    thereturnsoninvestment19.Thatiswhatallstatesmeasurethem-

    selvesby:Wherecanthebestreturnsoninvestmentbegained?The

    questionis,however,whetherthisisanappropriateunitomeasure-

    mentorenablingpeopleworldwideagoodlie.

    10. THE GREEKS ARE CORRUPT

    The acts:Itistruethattaxraudandtaxavoidancearemorepreva-

    lentinGreecethaninothercountriesandthatcorruptionisevery-

    where20

    .Theshadoweconomyisestimatedtobeabout25%otheeconomy(bycomparison:inGermanythisfgureisapprox.15%21)and

    totaltaxraudamountsto20billioneurosperyear. 22

    The way things are portrayed:Taxraudandcorruptionreallyarea

    greatproblemorGreece.Threethingsmustbesaidinthisrespect:

    tax raud is akind o redistributionowealth rom thestate to the

    privatesector.Thereore,themoneyisnotgoneassuch.Andso,

    thisargumentdoesnothelpustoexplaintheGreekcrisis.Secondly,theormerPrimeMinisterKostasKaramanliswasresponsibleorthe

    Greekmess.HewasacloseallyoChancellorMerkelintheEU.With

    17 BILD newspaper, 5.3.2011 18 See in more detail in: Michael Schlecht: The Euro is burning. Position paper

    21.5.2010 19 WEF Competitiveness Report 2010 20 Spiegel-online, 10.3.2010 21 IAW press release,

    26.1.2010 22 The Standard, 11.2.2010

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    thehelpothewillingGreek,Merkelmanagedonvariousoccasionsto

    penetratetherontothesouthernnationsinimportantEUdecisions.

    Karamanliswasalwaystheretomakedeals.Inreturn,theGreekdidnot

    havetoworryaboutanyover-criticalquestionsconcerninghissloppy

    fnancialpolicies.ThisquotecomesromtheormerEditor-in-ChieoGermaneconomicmagazine,theHandelsblatt.23Thirdly,largeGer-

    mancompaniesalsoproftedromthebackhandercultureintheGreek

    economy.Since2008,severallegaldisputeshavedocumentedthat

    theGermancompaniesSiemens,Ferrostaal-MANandDeutscheBahn

    AGboughtGreekpoliticiansingreatstyleandfnancedpoliticaldeci-

    sionsintheiravour.Inthisway,theSiemensGroupaloneinvested

    almost15millioneurosperyearinGreeceoveraperiodotenyearsromthemiddleothe1990sinordertowinoverandinuencepoliti-

    ciansromthetwoimportantparties,NeaDimokratiaandPASOK. 24

    23 Michael Schlecht: The Euro is burning. Position paper 21.5.2010 24 Greece, the IMF and EU dictate and

    German responsibility, position paper issued by the scientific advisory board of Attac Germany.

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    11. THE GREEKS SHOULD START SAVING

    BEFORE WE HELP THEM AGAIN

    The acts:In2010,Greecesbudgetdefcitwasabout10.5%oeco-

    nomic perormance.Athens promised tobring thisdefcit down to

    7.5%in2011.Thiswillunlikelysucceed,andtheconsequenceisthat

    theinterestrateorloansonthecapitalmarketwillnotsink,Greecewillremaincutoromthecapitalmarketandunabletoborrownew

    undsasplannedin2012.Thatiswhynewstatesupportisbeingtaken

    intoconsiderationtohelpAthensavoidbeingunabletopay.

    The way things are portrayed:ItisnotrighttodeducethatGreece

    doesnotsave,justbecauseothehighdefcitin2011.Greeceisnot

    onlysaving,butisdoingsoatanextremelevel.Becauseotheausterity

    measures,theGreekshavelostalmost20%otheirincomeonaveragesincethebeginningo201025.Nootherindustrialnationhasreduced

    itsstructuraldefcitbysomuchwithinoneyearinthelast25years,

    ratingagencyFitchhasevenadmitted26.AndtheBerenbergBanksees

    Athensprogrammeoausteritymeasuresasprobablythehardestfs-

    caladjustmentevertohavebeenmadebyaWesterncountry.27

    Theactthatthedefcitwilllikelybehigherthanplannedin2011does

    nothavetodowithextravaganceinAthens.Spendingisnottoohighincomeistoolow.This,inturn,hastodowiththeharshausterity

    measures.Asthestateissaving,andreducingwagesandpensions,

    economicperormanceissuering.Privateconsumption, or exam-

    ple,was18%lowerinMarch2011thanoneyearbeoreand,inthe

    sameperiod,65,000companieswentbankrupt.Areductioningross

    nationalproductoalmost4%isexpectedortheyearasawhole.The

    resultothisisthatlesstaxisbeingpaid.BetweenJanuaryandApril2011,revenueromtaxeswas7%belowthepreviousyearsfgureor

    thesameperiod.Allinall,theGreektaxauthoritieshavetakenin1.2

    billioneuroslessthanestimated.Andso,itisnotexcessivespending

    THE WAY FORWARD? FALSE SOLUTIONS

    25 FAZ newspaper, 25.5.2011 26 Financial Times Germany, 26.5.2011 27 Berenberg Bank, Macro Views,

    20.5.2011

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    thatistheprobleminAthens,buttheausteritymeasuresthemselves.

    WedoubtthattheGreekeconomycanwithstandanaggressiveand

    prolongedfscaladjustment.28

    12. SELL YOUR ISLANDS

    YOU BANKRUPT GREEKS!29

    The acts:TheGreekstateownspropertywithanestimatedvalueo

    270to300billioneuros.Thesearemainlyrealestateproperties,also

    ontheislands.The way things are portrayed:ThegovernmentinAthensisnotjust

    sittingonitsortune.Ithasalreadystartedoabroadprogrammeo

    privatisation,withtelecommunicationscompanies,electricitysuppli-

    ers,portsanda largequantityorealestatepropertiesonoer.By

    doingthis,Athensaimstobringin50billioneurosbytheyear2015.

    However,therearemanysnagsinthisprogramme.AsGreeceisbe-

    ingorcedtosell,itwillonlyreceivebadpricesoritsproperty.Thebuyersinternationalcorporationswilltrytoexploittheemergency

    situationinGreece.Secondly,ithestatesellsproftablecompanies,

    thentheincomeromthesewillbegone.Theresult:Theexperience

    gainedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)incountlessstabilisa-

    tionprogrammeshasshownthat(privatisation)isanextremelyrisky

    strategyIttakesaverylongtimetomakesurethatsuchprocedures

    arecarriedoutinanorderlyashion,andtimeissomethingthatGreecedoesnothaveatpresent.Privatisationsarethereorenotverywellsuit-

    edasemergencymeasures.30

    28 Societ Generale, The Economic News, 5.4.2011 29 BILD newspaper, 27.10.2010 30 VP Bank, Investment

    News, 1.6.2011

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    13. THE CREDITORS SHOULD FOOT THE BILL!

    The acts:TheGreekstatehasaround350billioneurosindebt.The

    creditorsare:Greekbanks(23%),otherGreekcreditors(20%),gov-ernmentsintheEurozone(12%),theEuropeanCentralBank(18%),

    theInternationalMonetaryFund(4%),otheroreigncreditors/banks

    (23%).31Themoneylenderscouldwaivesomeotheloansissuedin

    ordertosaveGreece.

    The way things are portrayed:Thatsoundsair,becauseithishap-

    pened the fnancial investors would then play a role in reducing

    Greecesdebt.Atthesametime,itinvolvesseriousrisks.Firstoall,itwouldleadtosignifcantlossesorthebanks.Idebtswerecutby50

    percentinGreece,thiswouldmeanaburdeno25billioneurosorthe

    Germanbanksalone(IMK:debtcutsbringmoredisadvantagesthan

    advantages,May2010).Secondly,thiswouldbetheruinothemain

    creditors,theGreekbanks.Thirdly,itheEurozoneallowsacountry

    togobankruptinitsmidst,otherstateswouldalsolosetheircredit

    standing.TheworryaboutGreececouldowovertootherperipherystatesandleadtoasell-outotheirbonds(DZBank,Interestmarkets,

    9.5.2011).TheproblemcouldthenspreadtostateslikeSpain,andits

    economyismorethantwicethesizeotheeconomiesoGreece,Por-

    tugalandIrelandputtogether32.Thiswouldcertainlybetheendothe

    Eurozone,whichisthebackboneotheGermaneconomy.Aswecan

    see,aslongasEuropeisdependentonthegoodwillofnancialinves-

    tors,itwillremaindifculttomaketheseinvestorspaytogetGreeceoutoitsdebtsituation.Onemorecomment:TheGreeknationaldebt

    isnotamajorproblemortheEurozone.Atatotalo350billioneuros,

    itisamere3.7%otheEurozoneseconomicstrength.

    31 VP Bank, Investment News, 1.6.2011 32 This would mean further risks for the banks. According to the

    Bank for International Settlements, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain owed the European banks 1,340 billion

    euros at the end of 2010. A quarter of these were German banks (http://bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1106.

    pdf#page=100)

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    14. GREECE SHOULD GET OUT OF THE EUROZONE

    The acts:TheEurozonecouldattempttogetridotheGreekproblem

    byexcluding/dischargingGreeceromtheEuroregionandsoprotecttheproblemromspreadingtoothercountries.Greece,ontheother

    hand,couldre-introducetheDrachmaanddevalueitscurrency.This

    wouldmakeGreekexportscheaperandthecountrycouldtrytoexport

    itseloutothecrisis.

    The way things are portrayed:Thiswouldhavetwoseriousdisadvan-

    tages.Firstly,iAthensre-introducestheDrachma,thiswoulddevalue

    drasticallyagainsttheEuro.However,thegovernment(aswellastheGreekbanks,companiesandprivatehouseholds)wouldcontinueto

    havetheirdebtineuros.Asaresult,thedebtswouldincreaserapidly

    invalueandthedebtsituationwouldexplode.Thiswouldmeanthef-

    nancialruinoGreeceandthebankingsystemwouldalmostcertainly

    collapse.33Inthiscase,Greecesoreigncreditorsaboveall,German

    andFrenchbankswouldhavetowriteothedebtstheyhaveissued.

    Secondly,excludingGreecewouldmeangivinguptheimplicitguaran-teeocontinuanceotheEurozoneandwouldopenuptheoodgates

    orspeculationagainsttheEuro.TheplanocreatingintheEuro

    aworldcurrencythatcancompetewiththeUSDollarwouldthenhave

    ailed.34

    33 DZ Bank, Interest markets, 9.5.2011 34 Berliner Zeitung 27.4.2010. Concerning the advantages in the

    status of a leading world currency, see AK 561, 20.5.2011. http://www.akweb.de/ak_s/ak561/23.htm

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    16

    15. GREECE HAS TO WIN BACK THE TRUST

    OF THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

    The acts:ToregainaccesstoloansandbecomeindependentoEUaid,Athensmustreceivemoneyromthefnancialmarketsataord-

    ableinterestrates.Todoso,theinvestorsmustagainbelievethattheir

    moneyissaeandproftableinGreece,thatis,thattheycanearngood

    moneythere.

    The way things are portrayed:Whathasbeenoutlinedaboveispretty

    muchthecaseandclearlydemonstratesthepowerbalancethree

    yearsaterthefnancialcrisis.Today,allindustrialnationsareattempt-ing to regain the trust o the fnancial markets by implementing

    austeritymeasures,wagereductions,taxincreasesandanincrease

    incompetitiveness.Thisshowsthatthepowerothemarketsisin-

    tact.While,atthebeginningothefnancialcrisis,itwassaidthatthe

    fnancialmarketswouldhavetoberestrainedorplacedinchains,

    nowthedemandsmadebythefnancialinvestorswithrespecttothe

    proftabilityandstabilityostatesisonceagainthemeasuringstickwhichthecountriesthemselvesgoby.Themarketsruleandpolitics

    bendstomeettheirdemands.

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    17

    16. WE WANT TO BE FRIENDS WITH THE GREEKS35

    Friendshipisaeelingbetweenpeople,notadefningactorinthere-

    lationshipbetweenpoliticalapparatuses.Ocourse,oneotenspeaks

    fgurativelyoberiendedstates.However,thisreerslesstobonds

    oriendshipandhasmoretodowiththesharedinterestspursuedby

    somestates.TheinterestthatGreeceandGermanyshareinthiscasecanbeoundprettyast:itisthejointcurrency,theEuro.However,

    whileAthenshastopreventitseconomyromcollapsing,theGerman

    governmentistryingtogetoutotheGreekproblemasinexpensively

    aspossible.Whenitcomestomoney,riendshipgoesoutthewindow.

    17. YOU SHOULD HELP YOUR FRIENDS BUT NOT BAIL THEM OUT

    The acts:15May2011,Sundayevening,talkshowonGermantelevi-

    sionwithAnneWill,thesubject:BillionsorthepoorEurowretches

    isthegovernmentriskingourmoney?.Theprogrammestartsoby

    questioningpeopleonthestreet.Theollowingquestionsareasked:Wouldyouhelpyourneighboursorriendsitheywereinafnancial

    mess?Mostothosequestionedanswered:Yes.Theanswertothe

    nextquestionWouldyoualsooerthemcollateraloraloan?how-

    everismostlyNo.Thistakestheviewerstotheeveningsmainques-

    tion:Shouldpoliticiansbeallowedtodosomethingwewouldnever

    doinourprivate lie, thatis, provide large-scalecollateralor loans

    takenoutbyothers?From2013,Germanywillprovidealmost168bil-lioneurosinguaranteesandalmost22billionincashinjectionsaspart

    othelong-termEuropeanStabilityMechanism(ESM);thesumsareto

    bepaidingraduallybetween2013and2017.

    THE ROLE OF THE GERMANS: FALSE FRIENDS

    35 BILD newspaper, 5.3.2010

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    18

    The way things are portrayed:WeGermansshouldthereorenot

    giveguaranteesortheGreeks.Andyetweareconstantlygiving

    guarantees,withoutanyoneasking us iwewant to. For example,

    orthedomesticcrediteconomy.Thiswasshownbythelastfnan-

    cialcrisis:whenthecreditratingotheGermanbankswasindanger,thepublicauthoritiesjumpedinwithaidandguarantees.Whilethe

    GermanshareinthefnancialaidtoGreecehasbeenapprox.24bil-

    lioneurostodate,theaidgiventotheGermanbankswassignifcantly

    higher.AccordingtotheGermanBundesbank,thesupportgivento

    thefnancialsectoralonein2010increasedthenationaldebtby241

    billioneuros.36

    18. NO GERMAN TAX EUROS FOR GREECE!37

    The acts:ThefrstaidpackageorGreeceromtheyear2010con-

    tainedaGermanshareoaround22billioneuros.

    The way things are portrayed:Dobrindtisright.Itisnotthemuch-quotedtaxpayerwhoishelpingGreece.TheGermangovernment

    doesnottakethemoneyorAthensromthenationalbudgetorrom

    taxincome,butborrowsthismoneyatinterestrateso2%to3%and

    lendsiturthertocountriesinastateocrisisincludingpenaltyinter-

    est.Athensmustpay4.2%orthisaid,whileIrelandpays5.8%and

    Portugalbetween5.5%and6%.Thisisagoodbusinessproposition

    ortheGermantaxpayer.Thedierenceininterestmeansthatanestimated500millioneuroswillowintothecountry 38underthe

    proviso,however,thatthecrisisstatescanpaybacktheirdebts.As

    such,theBILDnewspaperisrightwhenitheadlineswithYouGreeks

    aregettingnothingromus!39.Itstheotherwayrounditisactually

    Greecewhowillootthebillintheend.

    36 Bundesbank press release, 13.4.2011 37 Alexander Dobrindt, CSU, in BILD newspaper, 5.3.2010 38 Finan-

    cial Times Germany, 20.5.2011 39 BILD newspaper, 5.3.2010

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    19

    19. WE ARE THE PAYMASTERS OF EUROPE40

    The acts:Seeitems17and18

    The way things are portrayed: As theGerman governmentgrantsGreeceaidintheormoloans,thismoneyhasnotbeengivenaway.

    Itwillcomebackagainplusinterest.However,thedebtcrisisacing

    someperiphery states hasmore advantages orGermany, because

    Germangovernmentbondsareseenassaeamonginvestors.The

    result is thatall investors areeagertobuyupGermangovernment

    bonds.WhichiswhytheGermangovernmenthasnoproblemfnding

    fnancialbackers,iitwantstoborrowmoney.TheresultothisisthattheinteresttheGermangovernmenthastopaytoitscreditorsisvery

    low.Inearlierphaseswheretherewasaneconomicupswing,theGer-

    mangovernmenthadtopayitscreditorssignifcantlyhigherinterest.

    Now,however,theEurocrisisismakingGermangovernmentbonds

    attractive,whichreducestherateointerestandsavestheGerman

    MinisteroFinancemoney.Theestimatedannualsavingsromthisare

    3.5billioneuros.41

    TheaidorstateslikeGreece,IrelandorPortugal,bytheway,isnotadonationandnotanactoriendship.Inreality,

    themoneyisnotowinginordertohelptheGreeks,butinorderto

    preventothercountriesromdamage.TheEuroGroupormulatedthis

    explicitlyintheresolutionotheESM,theEurospermanentprotec-

    tor,inMarch2011:ThememberstatesthathavetheEuroastheir

    currencyshallestablishastabilitymechanism,whichwillbeactivated

    whenthisisunavoidabletosecurethestabilityotheEurozoneasawhole.Thismeansthattheloansgivenasaidtocountriesinastateo

    crisisarenottheretohelptheoverindebtedcountry,buttoprotectthe

    restotheEurozoneromtheconsequencesothisoverindebtedness.

    Itistheretoprotectthecreditorsromthedebtors.

    40 BILD newspaper, 25.2.2011 41 Financial Times Germany, 20.5.2011

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    20

    ONE LAST COMMENT

    20. GREECE CHEATED ITS WAY INTO

    THE EUROZONE WE ARE NOW PAYING THE PRICE

    FOR OUR INDULGENCE42

    The acts:TheGreekdefcithasactuallybeencontinuouslyabovethe

    EUupperlimitothreepercentogrossdomesticproductsince1997

    evenduringtheyears1997to1999,whichweredecisiveorentrytotheEurozone.

    The way things are portrayed:ThecheatingotheGreekswasal-

    readyknownaboutandofcialin2004.However,thecountrywasnot

    excludedromthecurrencyunionnorwereanytreatyviolationpro-

    ceedingsorsanctionsundertaken,suchascutsinEUaid.Whynot?

    Thisissomethingwecanonlypostulateon.Greecewasgovernedby

    KostasKaramanlisrom2004onwards,andheisacloseallyoGer-manChancellorAngelaMerkel(seeitem10TheGreeksarecorrupt).

    Whatismore,itwasthegoalothemainpowerswithintheEurozone

    suchasGermanyandFrance,inprinciple,toacceptasmanycoun-

    triesaspossible,inordertolendthecurrencyunionmoreeconomic

    cloutaterall,theEuroisacompetitiveprojectagainstthedollar,

    behindwhichtherearetheUSAandaquarterotheworldeconomy.

    Inaddition,withGreecesentry,theEurozonespreadgeopoliticallyto-wardstheimportantMiddleEastregion.ThismaybewhytheIMFand

    theEUexcludedGreecesweaponsbudgettoagreatextentromthe

    austeritymeasuresin2010.Despitetheactthatthis(asapercentage

    otheentirebudget)istwo-and-a-haltimeshigherthantheGerman

    andtwiceashighastheEUaverage.FrenchandGermanweapons

    manuacturersinparticularaswellasthegovernmentsinParisandin

    Bonn,orlaterBerlin,havebeensupportingasystematicarmsbuild-up

    inTurkeyandGreecesincethe1980s.43

    42 Brse online, 7.1.2010 43 Greece, the IMF and EU dictate and German responsibility, position paper issued

    by the scientific advisory board of Attac Germany

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    Author

    Stephan Kaufmann

    IllustrAtIon of front pAge

    Lutz Kbelbck

    drawn up as a result of the project: Lets talk about alternatives ,

    in cooperation with the press epartment of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Founation

    ContACt

    Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung

    dr. Sabine Nuss, dr. Lutz Brangsch

    Franz-Mehring-latz 1, 10243 Berlin

    hone 030 44310-448, www.rosalux.e

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