Greater europePutin’s vision of EuroPEAn (dis)intEgrAtion

Marek Menkiszak

46

Greater europe Putin’s vision of EuroPEan (dis)intEgration

Marek Menkiszak

nuMBEr 46WarsaWoCtoBEr 2013

© Copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern studies

ContEnt Editorsolaf osica, adam Eberhardt

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Contents

SUMMARY /5

INTRODUCTION /7

I. GREATER EUROPE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT /8

1. Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home” (late 1980s) /8

2. Boris Yeltsin’s Greater Europe (1997) /93. Vladimir Putin’s Greater Europe (2001, 2005) /104. Putin’s concept of Greater Europe takes shape (2010–2012) /13

II. GREATER EUROPE: ATTEMPTS AT PUTTING THE CONCEPT INTO PRACTICE /18

1. The Russia-Germany-France Triangle: Greater Europe’s core that never came into being /18

2. Common spaces /192.1. The security space /192.2. The economic and energy space /222.3. The sphere of human contacts /28

3. European and Eurasian integration: convergence /31

III. CONCLUSIONS: GREATER EUROPE – HOw, wHY AND wHAT NExT? /34

1. The concept and the circumstances in which it was championed /34

2. Background of the concept’s objectives /353. Greater Europe: a realistic programme or a political utopia? /38

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SUMMARY

• Onseveraloccasionssince2001VladimirPutinhasraisedtheconceptofGreaterEurope–apartlyintegratedcommonspacecomprisingmain-lyRussiaandtheEuropeanUnion.Thisconcepthasnotemergedfromavoid:itisacontinuationofideaschampionedbyPutin’spredecessors:Boris Yeltsin andMikhail Gorbachev. It has re-emerged regularly asageneralpoliticalslogan,andwasconceptuallydevelopedonlyin2010.However,ithasneverbeenrecastintoadetailedpoliticalprogramme.It surfaced inperiodsof risingpoliticaldynamics in the relationsbe-tween theWest and Russia,which either offered hope thatMoscow’sproposals could become reality, or created a perception that Russia’sinterests, especially in theareaof theCommonwealthof IndependentStates,wereunderthreat.

• TheconcreteoutlinesoftheGreaterRussiaproject'sarchitecturegraduallytookshapebetween2002and2011.TheypresentedaGreaterEuropethatwouldconsistoftwointegrationblocs–theWesternblocoftheEuropeanUnion,withGermanyinthedominantrole,andtheEasternbloc,consist-ingoftheemergingEurasianUnion,withRussiainahegemonicposition.By signing agreements and establishing joint institutions, the two blocswouldformapartlyintegratedareaofsecurity,economicandenergyco-operation, andhumancontacts.However, the formationof suchanareawouldnotleadtoRussiaanditsneighboursgraduallyadoptingEuropeanvaluesandstandards,norwould it limitRussia’sroomformanoeuvre inforeignpolicyasagreatpowerbalancingbetweenvariousglobalcentresofpower.ThepriorityforKremlinwouldbetodeveloptheEasterncompo-nentofGreaterEurope,i.e.Eurasianintegrationwouldprecedeall-Euro-peanintegration.

• Inadvocatingthisconcept,VladimirPutin’sobjectivesincluded:

1. strengtheningthepotentialofRussia,throughcapitalandtechnologytransfersfromEurope,amongothermeasures;

2. strengtheningRussia’sinfluenceonEuropeanpoliticsandsecurity,andontheeconomiesofEuropeanstates,includingthroughthecreationofco-operativelinksandassetswaps;

3. underminingUSpresenceandinfluenceinEurope;

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4. consolidatingRussia’shegemonyintheCISarea,gettingEuropetorec-ognizethishegemonyandpreventingpoliticalandeconomicexpansionoftheEU,theUSaswellasChinaintheCISarea.

Whileithasbeenchampionedas"aEuropewithoutdividinglines",theGreater Europe concept would in practice permanently split Europeintotwogeopoliticalblocs.

• In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed atimplementingsomeelementsoftheGreaterEuropeconcept.Themostsig-nificantonesincluded:establishingaforumfordialoguebetweenRussia,GermanyandFrance(theTriangle);puttingforwardtheinitiativetosignanewEuropeanSecurityTreatyandproposingadrafttext;presenting(to-getherwithGermany)aproposal toestablishanEU-RussiaPolitical andSecurityCommittee;presentinganoutlineforanewEnergyCharter;andcomingupwithan initiativeand thedraft text to signanagreementonvisa-freemovementbetweentheEUandRussia.

• However,mostofRussia’sinitiativesaimedatultimatelycreatingGreat-erEuropehaveyettobecomereality.ThisshowsthelimitsofMoscow’sefficacy inpursuing theproject.Russia, it seems,hasoverestimated itsownattractivenessandthewillingnessofitsEuropeanpartnerstomakeconcessionswithregardtothefutureshapeofEurope’ssecurityandeco-nomic architecture. Due to deepening political differences andmount-ingcontradictionsbetweenvitaleconomicinterestsofthetwosides,theideaofGreaterEurope,andindeedanyotherconcepttobuildacommonEuropeanspaceinvolvingRussia,iscurrentlyapoliticalutopia.ThiswillnotchangeuntilRussiastartsaninternaltransformationtoespouseEu-ropeanstandards.

• Inthiscontext,oneshouldexpectRussia’spolicytofocusonimplementingitspriorityprojectofEurasianintegration,basedonthestructuresoftheCustomsUnion/theCommonEconomicSpace/theEurasianUnion.TheGreaterEuropeproject,ontheotherhand,willbepostponeduntilthetimewhen,asMoscowbelieves,theweakenedEUwillbereadytoacceptRus-sianproposals.

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INTRODUCTION

Overthelastfifteenyears,experts,officialsandpoliticiansinRussiahavebeenregularlyreferringtoGreaterEurope(Большая Европа in Russian).Thephrasehasbeenused invariousmeanings. Itwasemployed,especially in theearly2000s,bythoseRussianexpertswhoadvocatedcloserco-operationbetweenRussiaandtheWest. In thissense,GreaterEuropestoodforsome loose for-mulaofRussia’sintegrationwiththeEuropeanUnion.High-rankingRussianstateofficials(includingpresidentsandforeignministers)haveregularlyusedthetermeitherasanillustrationoftheclaimthatRussiais,historicallyandculturally,aEuropeanstate,or(ofteninthephrase“GreaterEuropewithoutdividinglines”)asacalltotheWesttoabandonitsallegedattemptsatisolatingRussiaor limiting its role inregulating theEuropeanorder (especiallywithregardtosecurity).Finally,thetermhasalsobeenusedinanarrowsenseasasynonymoftheEuropeanUnionenlargedin2004.

However,thenotionofGreaterEuropehasalsosometimesbeenusedbyRus-siandecisionmakersinawidersense–meaningtheideatocrateaneweco-nomicandsecuritycommunityofEuropeanstates,basedonamutualexchangeofbenefits,andwithRussiaasafullmember.Understoodinthisway,GreaterEurope is not a fully developed concept, but rather a slogan surrounded bylooseideasoutlinedinmajorpolicystatementsbyRussianpresidents.Russia’scurrentleaderVladimirPutinhasbeenparticularlyvocalonGreaterEuropeinthissense.

ThepresentpaperaimstoanalysetheideasandobjectivesbehindtheGreaterEuropeconcept,toshowhowitevolvedinrecentyears,andtoexamineitsim-pactonthepracticeofRussia’sforeignpolicy.Thetextendswithabriefreflec-tionontheprospectsofGreaterEuropebecomingreality.

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I. GREATER EUROPE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

1. Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home” (late 1980s)

The idea ofGreaterEurope,whichhas beenpresent inmajorpolicy state-mentsbyRussian leaderssincethemid-1990s,didnotemergefromavoid.ItclearlyparallelsanearlierconceptinSovietpolicy,thatofa“commonEu-ropeanhome”.

The idea of a “Common European Home” firstsurfacedinthesecondhalfofthe1980sasapoliticalsloganrelatedtothe“newthinking”intheSovietUnion’sforeignpolicy,startedbyMikhailGorbachev,themanwhobecameSecretaryGeneraloftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionin1985andthenthePresi-dentoftheSovietUnionin1988.Gorbachevincludedtheterminanumberofhismajorpolicystatementsininternationalforums1.Whiletheideawasnevertransformedintoadetailed,specificandcoherentconcept,itsgeneraloutlinescanbereconstructedonthebasisofGorbachev’sstatements. Itspointofde-parturelayintherealisationthattheColdWarbetweentwoantagonistblocs,i.e.theWestandtheSovietUnion,wasover,andtheconvictionthatrivalryshouldgivewaytoco-operationinthenameofsharedvalues,aimedatsolv-ingjointproblems,andespeciallyatensuringdurablesecurityandprosperity“fromVancouvertoVladivostok”.Overtime,thisgeneralideawasfollowedbymorespecificproposals fromtheSovietUnion: tocreateanewco-operativesecuritystructurebasedontheConferenceonSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(CSCE)process;torevisedefencestrategiesandreducearmamentsinEurope; to start co-operationbetweenNATOand theWarsawPact, andbe-tweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheCOMECON;andtoabolishexistingrestrictionsontechnologically-advancedexportstotheSovietUnionandthecountriesofSovietbloc(theCOCOMsystem)2.

1 Duringhisvisits toCzechoslovakia inApril 1987, toGermany in June 1989, toFrance inJuly1989andtoItalyinNovember1989,amongotheroccasions.Cf.“EuropeasaCommonHome”. AddressgivenbyMikhailGorbachevtotheCouncilofEurope,Strasbourg,6July1989,http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/gorbachev-speech-7-6-89_e3ccb87237.pdf

2 For a more comprehensive analysis of Gorbachev’s concept, see: Eugene B. Rumer, TheGermanQuestion inMoscow’s “CommonEuropeanHome”:ABackground to theRevolu-tions of 1989.ARANDnote,RANDCorp, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N3220.pdf

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Some of the Soviet proposalswere gradually put into practice, e.g. the CFETreatyonthereductionofconventional forces inEuropeandtheCharterofParis foraNewEuropeweresignedat theCSCEsummit inNovember1990,andinNovember1991NATOreviseditsdefencestrategyanddecidedontheestablishmentofformalcontactswiththeWarsawPact.However,thebreak-upoftheSovietblocanditsstructuresintheyears1989–1991,followedbythecollapseoftheSovietUnionitselfinDecember1991,renderedtheverybasisoftheCommonEuropeanHomeconcept,i.e.inter-blocco-operation,irrelevant.

2. Boris Yeltsin’s Greater Europe (1997)

Inthenew(geo)politicalconditions,theRussianFederationinfacttookoversome of the Soviet projects, in changed form, and concentrated its effortsmainly on preventing the geopolitical status quo in Europe from changingfurthertothebenefitoftheWest.SuchwastheintentofRussia’sproposalsconcerninganewEuropeansecurityarchitecture,presentedinthefirsthalfofthe1990s,asRussiaevermorevigorouslyobjectedtoNATO’seastwarden-largement(seebelow).

The idea of Greater Europe emergedinchangedcircumstances.FollowingthefiascoofitseffortstodevelopanewmodelofEuropeansecurityalternativetoNATO,Russiaseemedtohaveopenedanew,morepositivechapterinitsrelationswiththestatesandinstitutionsoftheEuro-Atlanticarea:itbecameamemberoftheCouncilofEurope(February1996);signedtheFoundingActonco-operationwithNATO,whichestablishedanew formatof relationsbetweenRussia andtheAlliance(May1997);andthe1994EU-RussiaPartnershipandCo-operationAgreemententeredintoforce(December1997),establishingabasiclegalandin-stitutionalframeworkforrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheEuropeanUnion.

TheRussianPresidentBorisYeltsinoutlinedhisvisionofGreaterEuropedur-ingaCouncilofEuropesummitinStrasbourgon10October1997.Hesaidonthatoccasion:

“We are now poised to begin building together a new greater Europe without di-viding lines; a Europe in which no single state will be able to impose its will on any other; a Europe in which large and small countries will be equal partners united by common democratic principles.

This Greater Europe can now become a powerful community of nations with a potential unequalled by any other region in the world and the

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ability to ensure its own security. It can draw on the experience of the cultur-al, national and historical legacies of all of Europe’s peoples. The road to greater Europe is a long and hard one but it is in the interest of all Europeans to take it. Russia will also help to realise this goal.”3

Somekeythoughtscanbedistilledfromthisemphaticstatement.Firstly,Rus-siashouldbeanequalmemberoftheemergingnewcommunityofEuropeanstates.Secondly, that community shouldbepowerful and independent, alsointermsofsecurity.SuchindependencewouldhavetoimplyendingEurope’sdependence on co-operation, and especially on security co-operation, withtheUnitedStates,andworkingmorecloselytogetherwithRussiaindifferentspheres.Andthis,itseems,wasthesubtextofthisinitiative.

3. Vladimir Putin’s Greater Europe (2001, 2005)

GreaterEuropere-emergedasatropeintheRussianleadership'srhetoricfouryearslater.Ithappenedinspecialcircumstances:whentheWesternworldwasshakenby the terrorattacks inNewYorkandWashingtonon 11September2001,andaglobalanti-terrorcoalitionledbytheUnitedStateswasforming,towhichRussiaalsoofferedpartialbacking.AtthatpointRussiaseemedtobepositivelyreassessing itsrelationswiththeWest (the“pro-Westernturn” intheRussianFederation’sforeignpolicy)4,whiletheWesterneliteswerestart-ingadebateonthenecessityofasimilarreassessmentoftheirrelationswithRussia(whichresulted,inthefollowingmonths,inthestrengtheningoftheinstitutionalframeworksofsecurityco-operationbetweenNATOandRussia,andbetweentheEUandRussia)5.

TheRussianpresidentVladimirPutinpresentedhisideaofGreaterEuropeinanaddressdelivered(mostlyinGerman!)totheGermanBundestagon25Sep-tember2011.Putinsaidonthatoccasion:

3 ThetextinRussianin:Diplomatichesky Vestnik,issue11,1997;thetextinEnglishat:http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=nosInvites&l=ca&sp=yeltsin.

4 Cf.MarekMenkiszak, The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Conse-quencesandProspects,"CESPolicyBriefs",OSW,Warsaw,October2002.

5 ThisrefersinparticulartotheestablishmentofamechanismofregularEU-Russiaconsul-tationsonsecuritybyadecisionofthesummitinBrusselsinOctober2001andthesigna-ture,attheNATO-RussiasummitinPraticadiMareinMay2002ofthedeclaration“NATO--Russia Relations: A New Quality” which established the NATO-Russia Council, amongothermeasures.

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“It is my firm conviction that in today's rapidly changing world, in a world wit-nessing truly dramatic demographic changes and an exceptionally high economic growth in some regions, Europe also has an immediate interest in promoting rela-tions with Russia. No one calls in question the great value of Europe's rela-tions with the United States. I am just of the opinion that Europe will re-inforce its reputation of a strong and truly independent centre of world politics soundly and for a long time if it succeeds in bringing together its own potential and that of Russia, including its human, territorial and natural resources and its economic, cultural and defence potential.”6

ThestatementinawayreiteratedandelaboratedonYeltsin’sidea.Thediffer-ence lay in the fact thatPutin leftaside the liberalanddemocraticrhetoric,andpointedtonationalinterestsinstead.Hestressedwhathebelievedwerethe shared challenges of Russia and Europe: the demographic developmentoftheMuslimworldandtheriseoftheeconomicmightandcompetitiveedgeofChinaandsomeotherAsianstates.ThecallforEurope’sindependence,infactaimedagainst theUnitedStates,wasonlyslightlymitigatedby theres-ervationsmade.On theotherhand,PutinclearlyoutlinedRussia’sassetsasapotentialmemberofthenewEuropeancommunity,andbydoingso,identi-fiedthekeyareasofproposedintegrationastheeconomy,societyanddefence.ItwasnoaccidentthatPutin’sstatementwasdeliveredinGermany.ItwasGer-many,alongwithFrance,thatRussiaregardedasitsprospectivemainpartnerinthepursuitoftheideaofGreaterEurope.

Indeed, Putin used the same rhetoric when addressing a French audience.InMay2005heplacedanop-edintheLe Figarodaily.Thecontextofthepub-lication is important. Several months before, Ukraine had undergone theOrangeRevolution,which theRussian leadership considered tohave in factbeenaWestern(US-led)geopoliticaloffensiveagainstRussiaandRussianin-fluenceintheCISarea.TheEUatthattimewasdebatingwaystomoreener-geticallybuildcloserrelationswithUkraineandtheotherEasternEuropeanparticipantsoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy,whichwasamajorsourceofconcernandvexationforMoscow.AlsoimportantintermsofthecontextofPutin'sarticlewas theagreementon theso-calledroadmaps for the fourcommonspacesbetweentheEUandRussia,reachedaftermonthsoftediousnegotiations,whichdefinedtheprinciples,directionsandsomegeneralobjec-tivesofEU-Russiaco-operationinthefieldsofeconomy,security,researchand

6 President Putin’s address to the Bundestag, 25.09.2001, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/09/25/0001_type82912type82914_138535.shtml

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culturalexchange(thedocumentswereofficiallysignedattheEU-Russiasum-mitinMoscowon10May2005)7.

Inthearticle,publishedon7May2005ontheoccasionofthe60thanniversaryofthevictoryoverNaziGermany,Putinwrote:

“I am deeply convinced: united Greater Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and in fact all the way to the Pacific Ocean, the existence of which will be based on universally recognised democratic principles, offers a unique chance for all the nations of the continent, including the Russian nation. Europeans can fully rely on Russia in the pursuit of this chance for a peaceful, prosperous and dignified future, as they could in the struggle against Nazism. We also believe that Russia’s efforts to develop integration bonds with both the EU mem-ber states and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are a single, organic process which should lead to a considerable expan-sion of harmonious common spaces of security, democracy and business co-operation in this gigantic region.”8

TheRussian leader suggested in thearticle thatGreaterEuropeshouldcon-sistoftwopillars:theWesternpillar,i.e.theEuropeanUnion,andtheEasternpillarmanagedbyRussia.ThereferencetodemocraticrhetorichereseemstohavebeendesignedtoconvincetheWesternaudiencethatnoexportofdemoc-racytotheEastwasnecessary,asRussiafullyrecognisedthebasicprinciplesinthisregard.However,thearticlewasprimarilyacallonEuropetorecognisethatRussia’shegemonicroleintheCISareadidnotcontradicttheideaofall-European integration.That thoughthadalreadybeenraisedbefore instate-mentsbyhigh-rankingRussianofficials(seebelow).

7 For the full text of the four roadmaps, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf

8 Статья Пре зи дента Российской Федерации В.В.Путина “Уроки победы над нацизмом: Через осмыс ление прошлого – к совместному строительству безопасного гуманного будущего”, опубликованная во французской газете “Фигаро” 7 мая 2005 года,http://www.mid.ru/ns-pobeda.nsf/304a70a9f8af4383c3256eda00378036/c3256eda00375761c3256ffb0030159b?OpenDocument;fortheFrenchversion,see:http://www.voltairenet.org/arti-cle17014.html

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4. Putin’s concept of Greater Europe takes shape (2010–2012)

On 25November 2010, on the occasion of his visit to Germany, VladimirPutinpublishedanothermajorpolicystatement:anarticleintheGermandailySüddeutsche ZeitunginwhichheelaboratedonhisconceptofGreaterEuropeinmuchmoredetail.Thecontextofthearticlewasdefined,ontheonehand,bytheefforts,especiallyintheEU,tofindwaystoavoidanewfinancial and economic crisis like the one in 2008-2009,which had alsoaffectedRussia, andon theother,by theprocessof economic integrationofsomeCISmembers,whichwasprogressingrapidlyunderpressurefromRussia,andwhichledtothecreation,inJuly2010,oftheCustomsUnionofRussia,BelarusandKazakhstan.Sinceeconomicchallengeswereseenasthemost important issueof theday,andsincePutinwasat that timetheprimeministerofRussia(inchargeofeconomicpolicy),thearticlefocusedontheeconomy.

Referring to the shared experience of the crisis in the EU and in Russiaamongotherthemes,Putinwrote:

“Europe needs its own vision of the future. We propose to shape it togeth-er, through a Russia-EU partnership. It would be our joint bid for success and competitiveness in the modern world. (…) To alter the situation, we should exploit the advantages and opportunities available to both Russia and the EU. This could be a truly organic synergy of two econ-omies – a classic and established EU model, and Russia's developing and new economy, with growth factors that complement each other well. We have modern technology, natural resources and capital for investment. Above all, we have unique human potential. Finally, Rus-sia and the EU have ample cooperation experience. And I am happy to say that Germany, the engine of European integration, is setting an example of leadership in this area.”9

9 Россия и Европа: от осмысления уроков кризиса – к новой повестке партнерства,ar-ticle by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25.11.2010, http://www.inosmi.ru/europe/20101125/164480740.html. For the German version, see: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/putin-plaedoyer-fuer-wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-von-lissab-on-bis-wladiwostok-1.1027908.FortheEnglishversionsee:http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/13088/

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Thatgeneraldeclarationwasonlyapreludetothepresentationofafive-pointplanforGreatEurope,whichPutinoutlinedinthearticle.Theplanenvisagedthefollowing:

1. “A harmonised community of economies, from Lisbon to Vladivostok”,whichinfuturecouldperhapstransformintoafreetradeareaorevenpur-suesomemoreadvancedformsofeconomicintegration.

ThiscommunitywouldbebuiltingradualstepsthatwouldincludeRussia’smembershipintheWTO,harmonisationoflegislation,customsproceduresandtechnologicalstandards,andeliminationofbottlenecksinpan-Euro-peantransportnetworks.

2. “A common industrial policy based on a synergy between the techno-logical and resource potentials of the EU and Russia”

Thispolicywouldbeimplementedthroughjointprojectstosupportsmallandmediumenterprisesand,evenmoreimportantly,“afreshwaveofin-dustrialisation”basedontheestablishmentofstrategicsectoralalliancesintheshipbuilding,automobile,aviation,space,medicalandpharmaceuticalindustries,nuclearenergyandlogistics.

3. “A common energy complex in Europe”

The complex would comprise extended energy infrastructure, the NordStreamandSouthStreamgaspipelines,andwouldbegovernedbynewreg-ulations,includinganewenergytreatyproposedbyRussia,whichwouldbalance the interestsof suppliers,buyersandfinal consumersof energy.RussianandEuropeancompanieswouldshareenergyassets,andco-oper-ationwouldbedevelopedatallstages(fromexplorationandextractiontodelivery toendconsumers).Co-operationwouldalsoextend toeducationandpersonneltraining,creationofengineeringcentres,andimplementa-tionofenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergyprojects.

4. Co-operation in science and education

Itwould include,amongothermeasures, the implementationof jointre-searchprojects,especiallyforapplicationsinhightechnologyindustries,basedonasharedfinancingeffort,aswellasexchangesofresearchersandstudents,traineeships,etc.

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5. Elimination of barriers impeding human and business contacts

ThisobjectivewouldbeachievedbyabolishingvisasfortravellersbetweentheEUandRussiabasedonaclearplananddefinitetimeschedule.

In theSüddeutsche Zeitung articlePutin ineffectpresentedaveryambitiousstrategicvisionforafutureintegratedEuropeanspaceinvolvingRussia,basedonextensiveindustrialandtechnologyco-operation,acommonenergysphereandcloserhumancontacts.ThestrategicpartnershipbetweenRussiaandGer-many,whichthetwostateshadbeenpursuingforyears,wouldbethemainaxisforthedevelopmentofthisspace.AtthesametimePutinmadeitclear(byreferring,ratherawkwardly,totheexampleofWestGermany’spolicytowardstheGermanDemocraticRepublicafterthefalloftheBerlinwall)thattheEu-ropeansideshouldnotexpectRussiatofirstadoptEuropeanstandards,andshouldintegratewithRussiaasitis.

ThevisionofGreaterEuropepresentedinGermanylackedaclearreferencetotheintegrationprocessesintheCISarea,ortheplacethatthecountriesofRussiaandtheEU’s“sharedneighbourhood”wouldoccupyinthenewEuro-peanarchitecture.Putinclosedthisgapinanotherpolicyarticlepublishedon4October2011intheIzvestiadaily.Thetext,devotedinprincipletotheideaofaEurasianUnionbasedonthealreadyexistingCustomsUnionofRussia,Bela-rusandKazakhstan,alsoincludedclearreferencestotheconceptofGreaterEuropeasaspacecomprisingtwoblocs.

Putinwrote:

“The Eurasian Union will be built on universal integration principles as an essential part of Greater Europe, united by shared values of freedom, democracy and marketlaws. (…) Soon, the Customs Union, and later the Eurasian Union, will join the dialogue with the EU. As a result, apart from bringing direct economic benefits, accession to the Eurasian Union will also help countries integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position. In addi-tion, a partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economi-cally consistent and balanced will prompt changes in the geopolitical and geoeconomic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global effect.(…) For example, take the two largest associations of our continent – the European Union and the Eurasian Union, currently under construction. In build-ing cooperation on the principles of free trade rules and compatible regulation systems, they are in a position to disseminate these principles, including through

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third parties and regional institutions, all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. They will thus create an area that will be economically harmonised, but that still remain diverse, when it comes to specific mechanisms and management solutions.”10

OneofthemainpointsofPutin’sarticlewasthatthecreationoftheEurasianUnionnotonlydidnotcontradicttheideaofEuropeanintegration(alsoofthe“sharedneighbourhood”countries),butwas infactan importantelementofsuchintegration.Putin’smessagewasaddressedtotheelitesofEUcountriesbutalso,especially,toUkraine.TheRussianleaderonceagainsuggestedthatthedevelopmentofGreaterEuropewouldbeofmajorsignificancefortheglob-alorder (meaning in fact its ability toeffectivelycompetewithotherglobalpowercentres,especiallytheUnitedStatesandChina).ThenoveltyinPutin’sarticlewastheemphasisontheargumentthatGreaterEuropeshouldbeinte-gratedeconomically,butnotpolitically.TheRussianleaderclearlysuggestedthatthecreationofanewcommunitycouldnotleadtoanyrestrictionsonRus-sia’sautonomytomakeitsowndecisionsasastateandtheleaderofitsinte-grationbloc.Theemphasison thisaspect seems tohavebeenrelated to theconcernsraisedintheKremlinbytherevolutionsinArabstates,whichstartedbreakingoutinearly2011,andwhichPutinandhisinnercircleregardedasyetanotherattemptatWashington-instigated“exportofdemocracy”, i.e. in factamanifestationofthegeopoliticalexpansionismoftheUnitedStates11.

TheGreater Europe conceptwas raised oncemore in another policy articlebyVladimirPutin,publishedintheMoskovskiye Novostidailyon27February201212.Theop-ed,writtenaspartofPutin’scampaignbeforethepresidentialelectionsscheduledinMarch2012,outlined,inquitepersonalandemotionaltoneattimes,theleader’sviewoftheinternationalsituation.ThefragmentonGreaterEuropeonlybrieflyrestatedthepointsmadeintheSüddeutsche Zeitung article.Itwasnotable,however,thatthelistofspheresinwhichtheconcept

10 Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня.article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Izvestia, 4October 2011, http://izvestia.ru/news/502761For the English version see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docu-ments/d-ru/dv/dru_2013_0320_06_/dru_2013_0320_06_en.pdf

11 Cf.M.Menkiszak,ResponsibilitytoProtectItself?Russia’sstrategytowardsthecrisisinSyria,FIIABriefingPaperNo.131,TheFinishInstituteofInternationalAffairs,http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/341/responsibility_to_protect..._itself/

12 Россия и меняющийся мир,articlebyPrimeMinisterVladimirPutininMoskovskiye Novo-sti,27February2012,http://mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html

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wassupposedtobeimplementedthistimedidnotincludecommonindustrialpolicy and closer co-operation in research and education. Partly, this couldhavebeenduetoadifferentchoiceofpriorities(infavourofenergy,tradeandvisa-freetravel),butPutincouldalsohaveconcludedthattheEuropeanUnion,slidingeverdeeperintoitscrisis,wouldnotbeinterestedinanextensiveofferfromRussiathatwouldincludemajorinvestmentsandassetswaps.

ThearticleforMoskovskiye Novostiincludedonenewthought:thatthedevelop-mentofGreaterEuropeortheUnionofEurope(Putinalsousedthisalterna-tivenameoftheproject,promotedmainlybythe influentialRussianexpertSergeiKaraganov13)wasdesigned,inter alia,tostrengthen Russia’s capabili-ties and position in its economic turn towards the “new Asia”.Giventhatthearticlejuxtaposedtwocontrastingimages:thecrisis-strickenEuropeandthedynamicgrowthofChina’smight, that couldbe interpretedasaway toinstrumentallyusetheRussian-Europeanco-operationinordertofurtherthedevelopmentofRussia’seconomicrelationswithChinaandotherAsianstates(whichVladimirPutinadvocatedinthearticle).

13 Cf. К Cоюзу Европы. Аналитический доклад российской группы международного дискуссионного клуба «Валдай», 31 August - 7 September 2010, http://www.svop.ru/files/meetings/m010613371680911.pdf The report claims that unless they join forces, the EUandRussiawillbecomemarginalisedglobally.Theauthors (S.Karaganov,T.Bordachev,I.Ivanov,F.LukyanovandM.Entin)callfortheconclusionofaTreatyontheUnionofEu-rope,followedbyaseriesofsectoralagreementstocreateasingleenergysystemandcom-monsecurity,economicandhumanrelationsspaces.

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II. GREATER EUROPE: ATTEMPTS AT PUTTING THE CONCEPT INTO PRACTICE

ThegeneralideaspresentintherhetoricofRussianleaderswhospokeaboutGreaterEuropewerenotdetachedfromRussia’sforeignpolicypracticeinEu-rope. Russian diplomacy formulated and tried to implement initiatives thatwereinlinewiththeGreaterEuropeconcept.

1. The Russia-Germany-France Triangle: Greater Europe’s core that never came into being

OneofthemosttangiblemanifestationsofRussia’GreaterEuropepolicycamewiththeattemptatcreatingaforumforregularpoliticaldialoguewithGer-manyandFrance,Moscow’smainpartnersinEuropeandthetwocountriesit perceived as thedriving force of theEuropeanUnion.TheRussianpresi-dentBorisYeltsinputforwardtheinitiativetoestablishsuchdialogueduringaCouncilofEuropesummitinOctober1997,i.e.atthesametimeheannouncedtheGreaterEuropeconcept,whichsuggeststhattheTrianglewasintendedasawaytofurthertheimplementationofGreaterEurope.TheGermanchancel-lorHelmutKohlandtheFrenchpresidentJacquesChiracacceptedYeltsin’sin-vitationandmethimon26March1998attheBorresidencenearMoscow.

TheTrianglewasintendedtonotonlybuildRussia’sprestige,butalsoserveasMoscow’s instrument to influenceEuropeanpolitics. InRussia’s intention, itsmeetingsweresupposedtotakeplaceregularlyandprovideaplatformthroughwhichRussiacouldinformallyco-decideonimportantEuropeanpolicyissues.Thepartners,however,didnotsharethisapproach,whichfounditsmostvisibleexpressioninthedisagreementsattheTrianglesummitinIstanbulinNovem-ber1999,whichYeltsinineffectbrokeoff14.ThenextmeetingintheTrianglefor-mattookplaceonlyinApril2003whenthesimilar,criticalattitudesofthethreestatestowardstheUS-BritisharmedinterventioninIraqprovidedagoodbasistoresumeconsultationsinthisformula.Fromthenon,theTrianglemeetingswouldusuallytakeplaceonceayear,withtheexceptionoftheyear2005when

14 ThemeetingbetweenPresidentBorisYeltsin,ChancellorGerhardSchröderandPresidentJacquesChiracattheOSCEsummitinIstanbulon18November1999formallytookplace,butlastedforlessthan10minutesbeforetheRussianpresidentostensiblyleftthesummitoverdisputesconcerningthewarinChechnya.

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theleadersmettwice15,butwerestoppedin2007afterNicolasSarkozycametopowerinFrance,andresumedagainonlyononeoccasion,in2010,whenDmi-triMedvedevwasthepresidentofRussia16.DuringtheTrianglemeetings,theleadersdiscussedthemostimportantinternationalissuesoftheday,EU-Russiarelationsandmultilateraleconomicco-operationprojects.However,noneoftheTrianglemeetingsbroughtaboutanymajornewinitiatives,andtheforumsonlysignificanceremainedasanimage-buildingmeasure.

2. Common spaces

Russia’s initiatives in thespheresof security, economic/energyco-operationandhumancontactswerealsopartoftheeffortstopracticallyimplementtheGreaterEuropeconcept.Theylargelyoverlappedwiththefourso-calledCom-monSpacesofRussiaandtheEU17,whichwerefirstformallymentionedattheEU-RussiasummitinSt.PetersburginMay2003,followedbythesignatureoftheRoadmapstotheimplementationoftheCommonSpacesattheEU-RussiasummitinMoscowinMay2005.

2.1. The security space

TheUSSRfirstcalledforthecreationofanew architecture of European se-curity backinthelate1980s.TheRussianFederationcontinuedthoseeffortsinthe1990s.Russia’sconceptofanall-Europeanpartnership,anditsproposalsforaninstitutionalreformoftheCSCE(1994)triggeredaformaldialogueonthesubject,whichledtotheadoptionoftheCharterforEuropeanSecurityattheOSCEsummitinIstanbulinNovember199918.However,contrarytoRus-sia’sinitialproposals,thedocumentwasnotlegallybindinganddidnotestab-lishanynewinstitutionsthroughwhichRussiacouldco-decideonEuropeansecurityissues.

15 Themeetings tookplace on 11April 2003 inSt. Petersburg (Putin, Schröder,Chirac), on31August2004 inSochi,on 18March2005 inParis (thatmeetingalso included thenewSpanishPrimeMinisterJoseLuisZapatero,butSpaindidnotpermanentlyjointhegroup)andon3Julyin2005inSvetlogorsk.InthemeetinginCompiegneon23September2006thenewlyelectedChancellorAngelaMerkelrepresentedGermany.

16 On19October2010inDeauvilleChancellorMerkelandPresidentSarkozymetwithPresi-dentMedvedev.

17 Thisrefersto:theCommonEconomicSpace;CommonSpaceofFreedom,SecurityandJus-tice,theCommonSpaceofExternalSecurityandtheCommonSpaceofResearchandEdu-cation,includingculturalaspects.Cf.footnote7.

18 See: theCharter for EuropeanSecurity, Istanbul,November 1999, http://www.osce.org/mc/17502

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RussiamadeanotherefforttochangethisstateofaffairsinJune2008whenthenewlyelectedRussianpresidentDmitriMedvedevcameupwithaninitia-tivetocallanall-EuropeanconferencewithaviewtosigningatreatyonEu-ropeansecuritythatwouldestablishanewsecuritysysteminthecontinent.Russia’sdeclarationsinthisregard,whichwereinitiallyverygeneral,gradu-allygainedamoreconcreteshape,andultimately,inNovember2009,RussiapubliclypresenteditsdraftTreaty on European Security19.

Russia’s draft Treaty on European Security

Thedraftisafairlyshortandgeneraldocumentcomprisingfourteenar-ticles.Itcommitsallparties(potentially,thecountriesofNorthAmerica,Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, andmultilateralstructures:theEU,OSCE,NATO,CSTOandCIS)tofollowtheprinciplesofequalityandindivisibilityofsecurity(whichforbidsprotectingonemem-ber’ssecurityattheexpenseofothers).Thus,thedocumentobligatesthepartiestorefrain,individuallyandcollectively,fromanyactionthatcouldaffectthesecurityinterestsofothermembers;torefrainfromusingtheirrespectiveterritoriestocarryoutorassistarmedaggressionagainstanyothermember,andfromanyotheractionsthatcouldunderminethese-curityofothermembers;toseektoensurerespectfortheaboveprincipleswithinmultilateralorganisations;toprovide,attherequestofanyTreatymember, informationonanymeasures that couldaffect security; and torefrainfromacceptinginternationalcommitmentsthatruncountertotheprovisionsoftheTreaty.

Thedraftalsoprovidesforaconflictresolutionmechanism.Itenablesallmemberswhobelievethattheirsecurityinterestsareormightbeaffectedtocallaconsultationoftheothermembersconcernedand,oncesuchcon-sultationshavebeenheld,tocall(attherequestofatleasttwomembers)aconferenceofparties.Thedecisionsoftheconferencearebindingonthemembers ifat least two thirdsof the totalnumberofpartiesparticipateandthedecisionsareunanimous.Intheeventofarmedaggressionagainstamember,thepartythathasbeenattackedmaycallanextraordinarycon-ferenceofparties,whosedecisionswillbebindingifatleastfourfifthsofthetotalnumberofmembersparticipateandthedecisionsaretakenunan-imously.

19 Forthedrafttext,see:http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dos.nsf/europeansecurity

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TheTreatywouldbeopenforsignaturetocountriesofNorthAmerica,Eu-ropeandtheCISarea,aswellasthemultilateralorganisationsoftheEU,OSCE,NATO,CSTOandCIS,andwouldenterintoforceonceratifiedbyatleast25statesormultilateralorganisations.OtherstatesandmultilateralorganisationscouldaccedetotheTreatysubjecttotheconsentofallpar-ties.Thedraftprovidesthatanymembermightwithdrawfromthetreatyifitdeterminedthatextraordinarycircumstancesendangereditsinterests.

Thedocumentcontainsnodefinitionofasituationaffectingaparty’sse-curity,whichwouldinevitablyleadtofullydiscretionalandsubjectiveas-sessmentofthreats.Thus,iftheTreatywereadoptedintheoriginalform,anumberofsecurityissueswhicharecurrentlyconsideredtobeinternalaffairsofNATOoritsmembersandpartnerswouldbecomelegitimatesub-jectsofformaldebatewithRussia.WhileMoscowwouldnotnecessarilybeabletoblocksecuritydecisionsofNATO,theEUortheOSCE,itcouldusethemechanisms laiddownin theTreaty toeffectivelydiscouragedemo-craticWesternstatesfromundertakinginitiativesitfoundunacceptable.Formally,theWesternstatescouldapplysimilarmeasurestoRussia,butinpracticethatwouldbeineffectiveastheundemocraticRussiangovern-mentsaremuchlesssusceptibletopressurefromtheWest(especiallyastheTreatyallowsamembertowithdrawwithoutanyproblemsandwith-outhavingtomeetanyconditions).

TheRussiandraftalsoprovidesforanewmechanismforconflictresolu-tionbetweenstates,paralleltotheUNconflictresolutionsystem.However,itisdoomedtobeineffectivebecauseofthe–completelyunrealistic–re-quirementofunanimityindecision-making.Suchasystemwouldnotonlybeincapableofresolvinganyconflictsituations,butcouldalsohinderef-fectiveinvolvementofWesternstatesandsecuritystructuresintheregu-lationofconflictssuchastheRussian-Georgianconflictin2008.

The provisions of the Treaty were controversial; hence it was not surpris-ingthatWesternstatesgenerallyremainedreservedabouttheinitiative.Al-thoughregulardebateontheTreatywasformallylaunchedinJune2009undertheauspicesoftheOSCE(theso-calledCorfuProcess),ithasnotproducedanytangibleresults.

On the other hand, theRussia-EU Security Dialogue, initiated inOctober2000,didgainamoreinstitutionalisedcharacterayearlaterwiththelaunchofregularmeetingoftheTroikaoftheEUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee

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andrepresentativeofRussia.However,Russia’sproposalstocreateanewbody(council)forconsultationandco-ordinationofsecuritypoliciesbetweenRus-siaandtheEU,putforwardaftertheestablishment,in2002,oftheNATO-Rus-siaCouncilwhichMoscowviewedasapointofreference,metwithresistancefromalargenumberofEUmemberstates.ItwasonlyattheGerman-Russiansummit inMeseberg in June2010 that the informaldiscussionsfinally tooktheformofabilateralinitiativetoestablishaRussia-EUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee(meetingsbetweentheRussianministerforforeignaffairsandtheEUHighRepresentativefortheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,devotedtocurrentpolicyandinternationalsecurityissues,jointEU-Russiacrisisre-sponseoperationsandotherissuesrequiringco-operation,includingcrises)20.TheGermansideexpectedRussiatoadoptamoreconstructiveapproachtotheTransnistriancrisis (theMesebergmemorandumexplicitlyprovidedforco-operationon this issues),whichneverhappened,and therefore thechancesthattheinitiativewillbecomerealityatsomepointareslim.

2.2. The economic and energy space

TheideaofaCommon European Economic Space oftheEUandRussiawasfirstputforwardattheEU-RussiasummitinMay200121.Atthattime,however,thetwosidesrunintoseriousdifficultiestryingtodefineit.Aspecialwork-inggroupelaboratedtheconceptinNovember200322,however,thedocumentitproducedturnedouttobeverygeneral.TheroadmapsignedinMay2005providedonlyslightlymoredetail. In those twodocuments23Russiaand theEUdeclaredthattheywouldseektocreate“anopenandintegratedmarket”basedoncommonorcomparableprinciplesandregulations.Itwouldbebased

20 Memorandum(meetingbetweenChancellorAngelaMerkelandPresidentDmitriMedve-devon4and5June2010inMeseberg,Germany).ThedocumenthasbeenremovedfromtheGermangovernmentwebsite,availableintheauthor’sarchive.

21 Thenamewasfirstused,tothesurpriseofallsummitparticipants,bythethenPresidentoftheEuropeanCommissionRomanoProdi.TheRussiansidethentookitup.Thepartiesagreedtoestablishaspecialhigh-levelworkinggrouptodeveloptheconcept.

22 Itwastheresultofanintenseintellectualeffort, inwhichbothRussiaandtheEU,drewoncommissionedandnon-commissionedstudiesandexpertpapers.Formoreinformationaboutworksontheconceptandtheresultssee:EvgenyVinokurov,TheMakingoftheCon-ceptoftheEU–RussiaCommonEconomicSpace,ChairInterbrew–BailletLatourWork-ingPapersno.22,CatholicUniversityofLouvain,http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/ibl/docs_ibl/WP22-Vinokurov.pdf

23 See:TheCommonEuropeanEconomicSpace(CEES)ConceptPaper,Rome,6November2003,http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2003/11/55356.shtml;RoadMapfortheCommonEco-nomicSpace–BuildingBlocksforSustainedEconomicGrowth,Moscow,10.05.2005,http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf

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on the provisions of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement betweentheEUandRussia(PCA)andthetermsandconditionsofRussia’saccessiontotheWTO.TheCommonSpacewastoencompassselectedsectorsintheinitialphase,andthenbeextendedtoallbranchesoftheeconomy.Itsimplementa-tionmechanismwouldbebasedprimarilyon:gradualabolitionofbarrierstothefreeflowofgoods,services,capitalandworkers,gradualharmonisationofstandardsandprocedures,developmentoftransport infrastructures,andresearchandtechnologyco-operation.Thedetailedsolutionsthatweremiss-ingfromthetwodocumentsweretobeaddedinseparateActionPlansandnewsectoralagreementsorprotocolstothePCA.

Russia’s accession to the WTOwasakeyelementandapreconditionofthefuture gradual implementation of the Common European Economic Space.However,themarketaccessprotocolsignedbyRussiaandtheEUinMay2004failedtoresolveallthecontentiousissuesbetweenthetwosides,andittookmanyroundsoftediousnegotiationsandastringofunexpectedturns(includ-inganearlytwoyears-longimpasseintowhichthepartiesraninautumn2009afterRussiacalledfortheemergingCustomsUniontobeincludedinthene-gotiations)forRussiaandtheEUtoultimatelyreachanagreementinDecem-ber2011.ThatdealpavedthewaytoRussia’saccessiontotheWTO,formallysealedinAugust2012.Still,theEU’shopesfordeepertradeliberalisationandharmonisation of lawswith Russia after its accession (the so-calledWTO+)failedtomaterialise.Talksonthissubject,conductedaspartofthenegotia-tionsconcerningthenewEU-Russia legal framework,becamestalematedin2010whentheRussiansideinsistedthattheCommissionoftheCustomsUnion(transformedinearly2012intotheEurasianEconomicCommission)shouldbetheEuropeanCommission’spartnerat thenegotiating table.At thatpoint itbecameclearthatMoscowwastryingtoforcetheEuropeanUniontorecognisetheCustomsUnion,and,inthelongerterm,theCommonEconomicSpaceandtheEurasianUnion,asthepartnersfordialogueandconcludeformalagree-mentswith thebloc24. For theEU, thiswasproblematicnot onlypolitically,butalsolegally,astheothermembersoftheCustomsUnion,i.e.KazakhstanandBelarus,werenotWTOmembersandtheEurasianEconomicCommissioncouldnotmakelegallybindingcommitments.

Gradual harmonisation of legal regulations and standards betweentheEUandRussiawassupposedtobeatthecoreofthedevelopmentoftheCommon

24 VladimirPutinpubliclysuggestedthismuchduringtheEU-RussiasummitinYekaterin-burgon4-5June2013.

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European Economic Space. The EU's understanding of thiswas that RussiawouldadoptpartsoftheEUacquis,oratleastregulationsmodelledonit25.Rus-sia’sposition,ontheotherhand,wasunclear.Whiledeclarativelysupportingtheharmonisationofregulatoryframeworks,theRussiansideseemedtoas-sume that the twopartieswould jointly formulatenewregulatory solutionsand/orthatRussiawouldadoptthemoreuniversalregulatoryframeworks(es-peciallyoftheWTOandtheOECD).NolegalorinstitutionalmechanismwaseverestablishedinRussiatoexaminethecompatibilityofRussianlegislationwiththeEUrules.Thepartiesmerelyexchangedselectedinformationonnew-ly-adoptedrulesduringirregularmeetingsofworkinggroupsandsubgroups26.Someofthemeetingsconcernedtheharmonisationoftechnicalstandardsandtook partwithin the framework of a project implemented under the TACISprogramme,andafter2010–withintheframeworkofprojectsimplementedunder theauspicesof thePartnership forModernisation (seebelow)27. EventhoughRussia occasionallymadepositive declarations about itswillingnesstoharmoniseregulations,therealeffectsofdialogueinthissphereremainedverylimited28.

EnergyissueshavebeenthehighestpriorityforRussiawhenitcomestoeco-nomicrelationswiththeEU.ThereasonforthisliesintheobjectivefactthatRussianexportstotheEUaredominatedbyenergyresources(oilandnatural

25 Such an understanding was suggested already in the EU-Russia Partnership and Co--operationAgreement (PCA)of 1994 (especiallyArticle 55).ThePCA includedprovisionsonpossiblefutureestablishmentofafreetradeareabetweentheEUandRussia(Article1,Article3).See:theAgreementonPartnershipandCooperation,establishingapartnershipbetweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheirMemberStates,ofonepart,andtheRussianFederation,ontheotherpart,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN:HTML

26 Suchmeetingsshouldhavetakenplaceatleasttwiceayear,butinpracticesomegroupsandsubgroupsfailedtomeetfortwoconsecutiveyears,andsomeheldnomeetingsatall.See:theEU-RussiaCommonSpacesProgressReport2012,Brussels,March2013,http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2012_en.pdf

27 The project "Approximation of EU and Russian Federation technical regulation, stand-ardisation and certification systems"worth € 2.5million, implemented betweenAugust2009andDecember2011.See:http://eu-rf.org/InMay2013,twonewprojectswereinau-gurated concerning technical standardisationwithin the framework of Partnership forModernisation. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20130523_en.htm

28 EventheEuropeanCommissionadmittedthisofficiallyinitsreports,whichidentifiedonlyoneconcreteachievementoftheprocess,i.e.theharmonisationofRussianphytosanitarystandardsconcerningthepresenceof20chemicalsubstancesinplantprotectionproducts.See:the EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2012, op.cit. Cf. EU-Russia CommonSpaces Progress Report 2010, Brussels, March 2011, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2010_en.pdf

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gas)whichalsoconstitutethemainsourceofrevenuefortheRussianbudget29.The Energy Dialogue between Russia and the EU becameformalisedinOc-tober2000. Itproducedanumberofagreementsandarrangement,manyofwhichwerebeneficialforRussia.Theyconcerned,amongotherissues,supportfor the development of energy-efficient technologies, honouring of existinglong-termcontractsforthesuppliesofRussiannaturalgasandnuclearfuelstoselectedEUmemberstates,andtheinclusionofselectedinfrastructuralpro-jectsbackedbyRussiaintotheEUlistofpriorityprojects.

Overtime,however,theEU-Russiadialoguerevealedmoreandmoreconten-tiousissues.RussianotonlyfailedtoratifytheEnergyCharterTreaty(ECT)regulatingtheEuropeanand,inthelongerterm,globalenergyco-operation,whichithadsignedin1994,butinJuly2009officiallywithdrewitssignatureundertheTreaty.TheRussiansidewasdissatisfiedmainlywiththeTreaty’sprovisionsonguaranteesofthird-partyaccesstotransportinfrastructureandthe absence of provisions imposingheavier obligations on the transit coun-tries,whichRussiahadcalledfor.

Shortlybefore,inApril2009,Russiapresenteditsowndraftoutlineofthepro-jectednewagreement.Thedocument,titledConcept of a new legal basis for inter-national energy co-operation (objectives and principles),repeatedanumberofECTprovisions,butputmoreemphasisonrespectingtheinterestsoftheenergy-producingcountriesandtheprincipleof“securityofdemand”30.

Russia’s proposals for a new Energy Charter

The short, five-page document consisted of the principal text outliningtheobjectivesandguidingprinciplesofthenewagreement,andtwoan-nexes:adraftofnewprovisionsconcerningtransitguarantees,andalistof energy resources and products. Russia’smain declared objectivewastocreateanew,universaland legallybindingagreement to regulateen-ergyco-operation,onethatwouldbeopen,comprehensive,equalandnon--discriminatory.Itshouldbebased,amongotherthings,ontheprinciples

29 Energyresourcesaccountedfor76.5%ofRussianexportstotheEUin2012.Formoreinfor-mationonEU-Russiatrade,see:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-13-83_en.htmRevenuefromenergyexportsaccountedfor70.4%oftotalexportrevenue,50.5%ofbudgetrevenueandaround17%ofRussianGDPin2012.

30 The document was delivered to the European Commission, as well as the G8, G20 andCIS countries on 20 April 2009. For the full text, see: http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/04/215303.shtml

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ofindivisibilityofenergysecurity,mutualresponsibilityofsuppliers,buy-ersandtransitcountries,securityofsupplyaswellasdemand,respectforthesovereigntyofenergyresources,andnon-discriminationinaccesstoenergymarkets and technologies, support for asset swaps and researchand technology co-operation, protection of investments and infrastruc-ture, and the obligation to consult and co-ordinate energy policies andregulations.Theagreementwould imposeawide rangeof commitmentsonthetransitcountries,includingaprohibitiontostoptransitorinterferewithit,liabilityforlossessufferedasaresultofnon-performanceoftransitagreements,anobligationtoestablishbodiestoregulatecrisissituationswithequalparticipationofallstakeholders,anobligationtogiveprioritytodiplomaticdisputeresolutionratherthanjudicialmechanisms,andapro-hibitiontomakereservationstothesignedagreement.

ThecontentofthedocumentreflectedRussia'sspecificinterests,relatedinparticular toMoscow'sconflictswithUkraineover the termsandcondi-tionsofsuppliesandtransitofnaturalgas.IfadoptedintheformproposedbyRussia, the treatywouldcreateanasymmetry in favourofRussia. Inpracticeitwouldconsiderablyunderminethepositionofthetransitstates,orevenpartly incapacitate them. ItwouldofferRussiaan instrument tointerferewiththeenergypoliciesandenergylegislationofboththetransitstatesandtheenergybuyersintheEU.Itcouldunderminethefundamen-talobjectivesoftheEU’senergymarketliberalisationpolicyorevenlimitcompetitioninthatmarket31.

The EU side took note of Russia’s proposals and discussed themwithin theframeworkoftheenergydialogue,butthedifferencesbetweenthetwosidescouldnotbeovercomeeither there, or in thewider international forum (inmeetingsoftheECTsignatories).

ThosedifferenceswerealsoreflectedinthedisputeovertheimplementationoftheEU’sthirdenergypackage,whichconcernedthegasandelectricitymar-kets.TheRussiansideclaimedthatthepackage,andespeciallytheregulationsrequiring unrestricted access to transport infrastructures for third partiesandatleastpartialseparationoftheownershipofenergytransportanddis-tributionbusinesses,contradictedtheprinciplesofinvestmentprotectionand

31 Cf.EwaPaszyc,Moscow'sresponsetotheEnergyCharterTreaty,Eastweek,OSW,29April2009,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2009-04-29/moscows-response-to-energy-charter-treaty

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non-discriminatorymarketaccess,andinfringedtheinterestsofRussiancom-paniesoperatingintheEUmarket32.

Despitethosedifferences,RussiahasconsistentlypressuredtheEUtodeveloplong-termrulesforco-operationinenergywithaviewtocreatinganEU-Russiacommonenergyspace(whichwouldinfactalsoincludethetransitcountriesintheCISarea).Talksonthesubject,launchedinFebruary2011,ledtothesigna-ture,inMarch2013,ofaRoadmapforUE-RussiaEnergyCo-operationuntil2050.This generaldocumentoutlinedavision for creating,within this timeframe,apan-Europeanenergyareawith integrated infrastructuresandharmonisedlegalandtechnicalregulations.However,itdidnotestablishanybindingcom-mitments,andphrasedtheobjectivesandtasksinsuchgenerallanguagethatitwouldbedifficulttoassessiftheyhavebeenimplementedornot33.

RussiaalsotriedtopursuesomeelementsofitsGreaterEuropeconceptbyim-plementingmultilateral co-operation projects, especially in the energy sector.Themostnotableexamples included theconstruction,byaRussian-German-French-Dutch consortiumwithGazprom in the leading role, of theNordStreamgaspipelineundertheBalticSeabedfromRussia toGermany,and the creation of a Russian-Italian-French consortium led byGazprom tobuildtheSouthStreamgaspipelineunderthebottomoftheBlackSea,toex-portRussiangasmainlytotheBalkanstatesandItaly34.

Asfarasother,energy-unrelated areas of economic dialogue and co-opera-tion areconcerned,theRussiansidehasshownsomeinterestintheautomobile

32 See:AgataŁoskot-Strachota,EwaPaszyc,Rosja-UE:spórounijnyrynekgazu,TydzieńnaWschodzie, OSW, 2.03.2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2011-03-02/rosja-ue-spor-o-unijny-rynek-gazu

33 Thedocumentoutlinedavisionofco-operationintheelectricity,gas,oilandrenewableenergysectorsandenergy-efficiencytechnologies.Forthevarioussectorsitusuallyprovidedthatfea-sibilitystudieswouldbecarriedoutandco-operationprojectsprepareduntil2020,thatprojectswouldbeimplementeduntil2030andthatanintegratedenergyspacewouldbecreateduntil2050.See:RoadMapEU–RussiaEnergyCooperationuntil2050,Brussels,March2013,http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/doc/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf

34 Formoreinformationsee:EwaPaszyc,NordandSouthStreamwon'tsaveGazprom,OSWCom-mentary, 28 January2010,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-01-28/nord-and-south-stream-wont-save-gazprom; Ewa Paszyc, Russia: Gazprom has activatedNord Stream’s second pipeline, Eastweek, OSW, 10.10.2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-likacje/eastweek/2012-10-10/russia-gazprom-has-activated-nord-stream-s-second-pipeline;SzymonKardaś,EwaPaszyc,Atanyprice:RussiaisembarkingontheconstructionofSouthStream, OSW Commentary, 7.12.2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-tary/2012-12-07/any-price-russia-embarking-construction-south-stream

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andlightindustries,andinco-operationintheareasofspacetechnologyandsatellitenavigation(thelattertwosphereswerediscussedoutsidetheframe-workofdialoguewiththeEuropeanCommission).Dialogueonfisheriesandphytosanitaryissueshasalsodevelopedquiterobustly.Asfortheotherpoten-tialareasofdialogue,Russiahasshownlittleornointerest35.

SinceitwasimportantforRussiatoimplementmoreprojectsthatwouldpro-moteatransferofEuropeancapitalandtechnologytoRussiaandhelpexpandthepresenceofRussianbusinessesintheEUmarketandcreateofinfrastruc-turalandco-operative links,MoscowwelcomedtheEuropeanUnion’sPart-nership for Modernisation initiative.Thisco-operationprogramme,initiat-edonabilateralbasisbyGermanyin2008,takenoverbytheEUinNovember2009andofficiallyinauguratedattheEU-RussiasummitinRostov-on-Donon31May–1June2010,envisagedprojectsthatwouldfosterthemodernisationofRussia’seconomyandpromoteclosereconomicco-operationbetweentheEUandRussia.Sinceitslaunch,thePartnershipforModernisationhasbeenthemain framework forRussia-EUdialogueon the implementationof theCom-monSpaces(exceptfortheExternalSecuritySpace),andforbilateralprojectswiththeEUmemberstates(twenty-threeofwhichhavesignedseparatedocu-mentsonPartnershipforModernisationwithRussia).However,thepracticaleffectsofthisco-operationhaveremainedverylimited36.

In addition to the above,Russian operators undertook or planned manyotherinitiatives in the EU market, aimed at acquiring or exchanging as-sets, whichwerealsoinlinewiththeGreaterEuropeconceptasformulatedbyVladimirPutininhisSüddeutsche Zeitung article37.

2.3. The sphere of human contacts

In the sphere of broadly understood people's relations, Russia’s efforts havebeenfocusedontwoobjectives:closerco-operationinresearchandeducation,andvisa-freetravelbetweenRussiaandtheEU.

35 See:theEU-RussiaCommonSpacesProgressReport2012,op.cit.36 See:http://formodernisation.com/en/info/37 Thesubjectistoobroadtobecomprehensivelycoveredinthispaper.Formoreinformation,

seethetextsincludedintheCESProjectReport"AktywnośćgospodarczaRosjizagranicąw latach 2004-2010”, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/raport-osw/2011-08-17/akty-wnosc-gospodarcza-rosji-za-granica-w-latach-20042010

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Asregardsresearch and education,whichaccountedforthebiggerpartoftherespectiveRoadmap'scontent38,considerableprogresshasbeenmadeastherehad been no significant differences of interests between the parties and thesubjectmatterwasnon-political.Inparticular,RussiabecameactivelyinvolvedintheimplementationoftheBolognaprocess(thedevelopmentofasystemofEuropeaneducationalstandards,co-operationamonguniversities,studentandlecturerexchanges,etc.)andthesuccessiveEUFrameworkProgrammes(forre-searchprojects).Ithasbecomethemostactivenon-EUparticipantintheFrame-workProgrammes,andoneofthegreatestbeneficiariesofEUresearchfunding.TheRussiansidehasbeenmostlyinterestedinresearchprojectsinthespheresofaviation,spaceresearch,medicine,environmentalprotection,newmaterials,andinformationandtelecommunicationtechnologies39.

Thepictureisquitedifferentwhenitcomestothefree movement of peo-ple (visa-free travel)betweenRussiaandtheEU.Dialogueonthissubjectgainedmomentumonlyin2002,inthecourseoftheRussia-EUcrisisovertheKaliningradOblast.FacingtheplansofPolandandLithuaniatointroducevi-sasforRussiannationalsasof2003,andthetwocountries'subsequentacces-siontotheEUon1May2004,theRussiansidedemanded,inearly2002,thatvisa-free travel shouldremainavailable to those traveling toand fromtheKaliningradexclave.This,however,wouldhavebeenagainsttheEUregula-tions.As thedisputebetweenRussia and theEUescalated,Moscowunex-pectedlysuggestedaradicalwayout:inAugust2002theRussianpresidentVladimirPutinsendalettertotheEuropeanCommissionPresidentandtheheadsofEUstates, inwhichheproposedopeningnegotiationswithaviewto concludinganagreementon complete abolitionofvisasbetweenRussiaandthe(enlarging)EU.EventhoughacompromiseontheKaliningradtran-sitwasreachedinNovember2002(providingforasystemofspecialtravel

38 RoadMapfortheCommonSpaceofResearchandEducation,IncludingCulturalAspects,Moscow10May2005,http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf

39 Underthe6thFrameworkProgrammeoftheEU(2002–2006),Russianresearcherspartici-patedintheworksof310internationalconsortiums,takingpartinprojectsworthatotalof€2billion.See:CompendiumofScienceandTechnologyCooperationbetweentheEurope-anUnion,theEUMemberStatesandtheRussianFederation,Moscow,August2011,http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/more_info/compendium_of_science_tech-nology_cooperation_between_eu_and_russia_2011_en.pdfUnderthe7thFrameworkPro-grammeoftheEU(2007–2013)440teamsfromRussiaparticipatedinresearchprojects.See:http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120711_en.htmAccordingtoothersources,atotalof463Russianresearchinstitutionsparticipatedin291projectsthatbenefitedfromatotalof€63millionofEUfinancing.See:theEU-RussiaCommonSpacesProgressReport2012, op.cit.

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documentsthatformallywerenotvisas)theRussiansidecontinueditsdiplo-maticoffensiveforvisa-freetravel,hopingthatagreementcouldbereachedbeforetheEUenlargementintoCentralEuropeinMay2004.AlthoughattheEU-Russiasummit inMay2003theEUagreedtosetvisa-freetravelasthelong-term objective, Russia's pressure to achieve a quick political decisionprovedineffective.InMay2006,thetwosidesmanagedtosignanagreementonvisaliberalisationwhichfacilitatedthevisarulesforselectedcategoriesoftravellers40.Itcameintoforcein2007.

Intheyearsthatfollowed,Russiasetanotherunofficialdeadlinefortheintro-ductionofvisa-freetravel,i.e.theWinterOlympicsinSochiinFebruary2014.Asthisdateapproached,Russiasteppedupitsdiplomaticoffensive.Aspartofthatoffensive,Moscowpresentedadraftagreementof theabolitionofvisasforshort-termstayson1June2010attheEU-RussiasummitinRostov-on-Don.However,thenegotiatorsonceagainonlymanagedtoagreeonfurtherliber-alisationof thevisaregimeanda listof “commonsteps” (in factconditionssetby theEU) tograduallywork towardsvisa-free travel (December2011)41.ThesignatureofthevisaliberalisationagreementwasthendelayedbecauseofthecontroversiesoverRussia'sproposaltoabolishvisasfortheholdersofser-vicepassports42.Ontheotherhand,MoscowwelcomedtheagreementonsmallbordertrafficbetweentheKaliningradoblastandselecteddistrictsofnorth-easternPoland,whichwassignedinDecember2011andenteredintoforceinJuly201243.

40 See:theAgreementbetweentheEuropeanCommunityandtheRussianFederationonthefacilitationoftheissuanceofvisastothecitizensoftheEuropeanUnionandtheRussianFederation,Sochi,25June2006,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:129:0027:0034:EN:PDF

41 See:Commonstepstowardsvisafreeshort-termtravelofRussianandEUcitizens,http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf

42 Russiamade the signatureof theagreementon further liberalisationof thevisa regimeconditionalon theabolitionof thevisa requirement for theholdersof servicepassports(around150.000peopleinRussia,mostlyofficials,militaryandfunctionariesofthesecuri-tyforces).Apreliminarycompromisewasworkedoutduringthenegotiations,whichstat-tedthatthevisarequirementswouldbeabolishedonlyfortheholdersofbiometricservicepassports(whichwouldsignificantlyreducethenumberofeligiblecandidates).However,theissueremainedcontroversialwithintheEUbecauseofthepotentiallynegativeimpres-sionthatsuchadecisioncouldmakeinviewofthemountinghumanandcivilrightsviola-tionsinRussia.

43 See:theAgreementbetweenthegovernmentoftheRepublicofPolandandthegovernmentoftheRussianFederationregulatingsmallbordertraffic,Moscow,14.12.2011,http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/fb5bab23-463d-4be2-8c2b-2bc549a4e647

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Thevisanegotiationsexposedanumberofproblemsnotonlyintherelationsbetween theEUandRussia, but also inside theUnion and inRussia.WhileMoscowtreatedthevisaquestionasapurelypolitical issueandaccusedtheEUoflackofgoodwillanddoublestandards,theEUlookedattheissueinthecontextoflegal,securityandtechnicalproblems.TherewasnoconsensusonthevisaquestionintheEU,andtheproblemwasexacerbatedbypublicsenti-mentsinanumberofmemberstatesthatwereagainstanyfurtheropeningoftheEUborders,fearingexcessivemigration,includingillegalmigration,andsoftsecuritythreatssuchascrime,drugstrafficking,humantrafficking,etc.).OtherproblemsconcernedthedifferencesbetweenregulationsandpracticesrelatedtomigrationandresidentregistrationandintheEUandRussia,andtheincreasinglynegativeEuropeanperceptionsofthehumanrightssituationandtheruleoflawinRussia.

3. European and Eurasian integration: convergence

ShortlyafterPresidentVladimirPutinpubliclyformulatedhisnewversionoftheGreaterEuropeconcept(2001)asacommonspaceofRussiaandtheEU,theRussiansidestartedsendingclearsignalsthatitdidnotseetheprojectasanalternativetoitsowneffortsaimedateconomic,politicalanddefenceintegra-tioninthepost-Sovietarea.Instead,high-rankingRussianofficialsarguedthattheprocessathandwasabouttheconvergenceoftwointegrationprocesses.

As early asMay 2002, President Putin called for co-operation between theEUandtheEurasianEconomicCommunity44 (establishedin2000byRussia,Belarus,Kazakhstan,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan,andformallyjoinedbyUz-bekistaninearly2006).Overtime,however,adifferentprojectbecamemoreimportantforMoscow:thatoftheCommonEconomicSpace(CES)ofRussia,Belarus,UkraineandKazakhstan.ThecountriesinitiatedtheprojectinFeb-ruary2003andmadeformalarrangementsforitinSeptemberthatyear.Evenbeforethathappened,inJune2003,thethenRussiandeputyprimeministerViktorKhristenkosentalettertoBrusselswithaproposaltoanalysethecom-patibilityofintegrationprocessesinWestern(theEU)andEasternEurope(theCES)45.At thesametime,KhristenkopublishedanarticledevotedmainlytothisquestionofcompatibilityintheRossiyskaya Gazeta daily.Hewrote:

44 RIA-Novosti,13May2002.45 Informationobtainedbytheauthorin2003fromsourcesintheEuropeaninstitutions.

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“Russia is interested in integration with its neighbours in the CIS and in developing relations with the European Union. These two are not alterna-tive directions – they mutually complement each other: an alliance of post-Soviet republics will be better positioned to develop relations with Europe. (…) It is obvious that creating an economic space will be beneficial for Russia both in the Eastern (the CIS) and the Western dimension (the EU). These two processes could progress in isolation, or on the contrary, they could be linked, and thus mutually enrich themselves and gradually consolidate a sphere of economic integration which, in terms of the size of its population, would be three times as big as Russia. We think that for us [Russia] the second variant is preferable and more realistic. Such is the conclusion from our re-cent experience of consultations with our partners in the two formats – the Com-mon Economic Space with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the Common European Economic Space (CEES). (…) Integration processes involving the CIS countries may progress faster than the formation of the CEES – our countries represent more similar levels of economic development and competition, and much has already been done for the mutual opening of markets, while our economic regulations are still being made and are therefore easier to harmonise. It is therefore all the more important to carefully consider some of the necessary measures, so that in future they can be applied in dialogue with the European Un-ion. (…) The establishment of a single economic space with Russia and our neighbours in the East and the West is a long-term objective. Its individual inter-state elements may develop faster than others, depending on the real readi-ness of each state to pursue deeper integration. An analogy to a ‘multi-speed Eu-rope’ is quite justified here. (…) As this ‘trans-European space’ develops, its gravity will increase, attracting more and more CIS countries and our other neighbours. This will create a new quality of economic collaboration in the vast terri-tory of Eurasia, which may become a key growth factor.”46

ThecircumstancesofKhristenko’sstatementarenoteworthy.ItwaspublishedtwomonthsaftertheEuropeanCommissionadoptedacommunicationontheEu-ropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(theEU’sfirstpublicconceptdocumentonthesub-ject),andonedayaftertheEUCounciladopteditsConclusionsontheENP,whichmarkedthepoliticaldecisiontolaunchthisnewpoliticalinitiativeaddressedto

46 Единое экономическое пространство: политические амбиции или экономическая целесообразность? Статья заместителя Председателя Правительства России В.Б. Христ енко, опубликованная в «Российской газете» 17 июня 2003 года под заголовком «Станет ли «четвёрка» единицей?»,17June2003,http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rsng.nsf/0e82a568fbb5b2c043256a65002f56c2/c325749c004f293343256d48002acc15!OpenDocument

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theUnion’seasternpartnersamongothers47.ItisclearthatKhristenkohadbeenauthorisedtosendaclearpoliticalsignaltotheEU.Itwasintendedtobereadasfollows:RussiadoesnotobjecttocontactsbetweentheEUandtheCIScoun-tries,butsuchcontactsshouldbemediatedbyRussiaandtakeplaceunder itssupervision;andtheCommonEconomicSpaceofRussia,Ukraine,BelarusandKazakhstan(andinthelongerterm,itssuccessivenewCISmembers)shouldbetheEuropeanUnion’spartnerfordialogue,co-operation,andsubsequently,par-tialintegration.ThetextofthearticlealsosuggestedthatinMoscow’sview,Eura-sianintegrationshouldcomebeforeRussia’sintegrationwiththeEuropeanarea.

DeclarationssuchasthisshowedthatforMoscow,theEU’srecognitionofRus-siaasthecentreofitsownregionalintegrationprojectintheCISwasinfactapreconditionfortheformationofGreaterEurope.Onecouldgoevenfurtherandargue that thevery initiativeofGreaterEuropehademerged inpartasaresponsetotheEuropeanUnion’srisingactivityintheeasternneighbour-hood,whichRussiaperceivedasachallenge.

This reasoningwas visible in particular in the statementsmade by the thenDeputyForeignMinisterofRussia,VladimirChizhov,madeduringthecourseof2004.Chizhovcriticised,sometimesharshly,thedevelopingEuropeanNeigh-bourhoodPolicy, even to thepointofaccusing theEUofattemptsatbuildinga cordon sanitaire of subordinated countries (March 2004, Bratislava). On theotherhand,Chizhovcalledforthesynchronisationandco-ordinationof inte-grationprocessesintheEUandtheCIS,andproposedtheestablishmentofclosecontactsbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheCommonwealthofIndependentStates.Indoingso,herepeatedKhristenko’sargumentthatthetwointegrationprocesseswerecomplementary,andthattheprocessofcreatingasinglespaceintheCISdidtakeEUnormsandstandardsintoaccount(November2004,Berlin)48.

47 See‘CommunicationfromtheEuropeanCommissiontotheCouncilandtheEuropeanPar-liament.WiderEurope-Neighbourhood:ANewFrameworkforRelationswithourEasternand SouthernNeighbours, Brussels’, 11March 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf;‘CouncilConclusionsonWiderEurope-NewNeighbourhood’,Brussels16June2003,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/cc06_03.pdf

48 Выступление заместителя министра иностранных дел России В. А. Чижова на конференции “Расширяющаяся Европа: новая повестка дня” по теме “Черноморское и кавказское соседство Европы” Братислава, 19 марта,19March2004,http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/5cab9ebee9ab1fb1c3256e9b0033c3ae!OpenDocument;“Европейский Союз и СНГ: Новые Контуры Сотрудничества”.State-mentbydeputyministerV.Chizhovatthe“VisionofEurope”conference,Berlin19Novem-ber2004,http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dos.nsf/162979df2beb9880432569e70041fd1e/432569d800223f34c3256f520055371a!OpenDocument

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III. CONCLUSIONS: GREATER EUROPE – HOW, WHY AND WHAT NExT?

1. The concept and the circumstances in which it was championed

By analysingRussia’s declarations aswell as its actions, one can roughlyreconstructthe Russian idea of Greater Europe.Thisshouldbeacommonspace foundedon twopillars: theEUarea,withadominant role forGer-many(theWesternpillar),andtheareaoftheRussian-controlledEurasianUnion.Thetwoareaswouldbeinterlinkedthroughanetworkofpolitical,economicandsecurity institutions.Thepartly integratedcommonspace,foundedonharmonisednormsandregulations,shouldensurefreedomofmovementforpeopleandgoodsand–perhapswithsomerestrictions–la-bourforceandcapital.Themostimportantdecisionsconcerningitsdevel-opmentwouldbetakenunanimously(whichwouldofferRussiatheabilitytode facto influencethepoliciesofthe ‘Westernsphere’countries),butatthesametimetheparties,andRussiainparticular,wouldkeeptheirfree-domandautonomytodecideoninternalaffairsandexternalrelationswithothercountriesandregions.

ItisworthnotingthecircumstancesinwhichtheRussiandeclarationsonGreat-erEuropewerevoiced.Theseweremomentsthat–fromRussia’spointofview–weresignificant,orsometimesevenrepresentedbreakthroughs,intermsofitsEuropeanpolicy,moreofteninthepositivesense,asopportunitiesforRussia,butsometimesalsointhenegativeway,asnewchallengesforMoscow.Theseincluded the normalisation and institutionalisation of Russian-Western rela-tionsin1996–1997afterthetemporarycrisisoverthewarsinChechnyaandBos-nia&Herzegovina(1994–1996);theterrorattacksof11September2001andthetransient ‘pro-Westernturn’inRussia’spolicythatledtotheestablishmentofcloserco-operationwiththeWestin2001;theRussian-WesternclashovertheEUneighbourhoodpolicyandthe‘colourrevolutions’intheCISin2003–2005,but also the reactivation of the Russia-Germany-France triangle against thebackgroundoftheIraqwarin2003–2005;anothernormalisationofRussia-Westrelations in 2009-2011 after the temporary crisis engenderedby theRussian-Georgianwar(2008–2009),andtheemergencefromthefinancialandeconomiccrisisin2008–2009.ThedeclarationswerevoicesinthedebatesofthedayintheWest,includingdebatesontherelationswithRussia.

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2. Background of the concept’s objectives

TheconceptofGreaterEuropecannotbeanalysedinisolationfromtheRussianelite’sperceptionsofrealityanditsdiagnosisoftheinternationalsituation,ortheforeignpolicystrategiesbuiltonthatbasis.Inthiscontextthefollowingelementsshouldbeunderlined:

The United States remainsthemainpointofreferenceforRussia.TheKremlinconsiderstheUSasadecliningglobalpower,butonewhichneverthelessstillposes themainchallenge to the interestsof theRussianFederation.StandinguptowhatMoscowbelievestobetheUnitedStates’effortstoestablishglobalhegemonyhasbeenandremainsthemainimperativeofRussia’sforeignpolicy.

Fromthispointofview,theGreaterEuropeconceptisclearlyanti-American.ItsmainobjectiveistocreateaRussian-EuropeanalliancetorivaltheUnitedStatesinthepoliticalandeconomicdimension.ItshouldservetobuildEurope’s‘independence’fromtheUnitedStates,whichinpracticeshouldentailtheero-sionoftrans-Atlanticrelationsandstructures(especiallyNATO)andpushtheUSawayfromEurope.ItisnoaccidentthatRussia’sdeclarationsweremainlyaddressed toEuropeancountrieswhich, likeGermanyandFrance,haddis-tancedthemselvesfromUSpolicyonvariousoccasions,seekingtoreinforcetheirownpositionsininternationalpolitics.

The European Union isRussia’smaineconomicpartner,andinparticular itsmainmarketfortheenergyresourceswhicharethecornerstoneofRussia’secon-omy.However,RussiahasneverperceivedortreatedtheEUasarealcommu-nity.Rather,ithasviewedtheEUasaconcertofEuropeanpowerswithGermany,France,theUKandItalyintheleadingroles.Moscowhasbeendevelopingpar-ticularlycloseco-operationwiththisgroup(inwhichtheUKisarelativelyrecentarrival)whilestimulatingcompetitionamong itsmembers forprivilegedrela-tionswithRussia.InparticularGermanyandFrance,thetwocountriesRussiabelievestobethepoliticalengineoftheEU,havebeengivenspecialtreatment,alsoastheaddresseesoftheGreaterEuropeconceptforwhichtheMoscow-Ber-lin-Paristrianglewassupposedtobeoneofthemaintoolsforimplementation.Thefinancialandeconomiccrisisof2008–9hasstrengthenedGermany’sdomi-nantpositioninEurope,andinthiswayalsoaugmentedthecountry’sroleasthekeypartnerforthedevelopmentofGreaterEuropeinMoscow’seyes.

TheEuropeanpowers,andGermanyinparticular,weresupposedtobethemain promoters of economic, energy, political and security deals between

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EuropeandRussia,duetotheirswayovertheEuropeanstructures.Ontheother hand, bilateral energy, industrial and defence deals with Germany,FranceandItalyweresupposedtoconstitutetheverynetworkofrelationswhichwouldbe the substanceof the emergingGreaterEurope.BothwereintendedtohelpexpandRussia’sinfluenceonprocessesanddecisionsinEu-ropeanpolitics,economyandsecurity;first informally,andthen(withtheappropriateinstitutionsinplace)formallyaswell.InthiswayRussiahopedto expand its economic presence in Europe, gainwider access to EUmar-kets,createandcontroltransnationalholdingsbyexchangingbusinessas-setswithEUcountries,andobtaincapital&hightechnologytransfersfromthe leading European countries. Interestingly, Moscow seemed to believethat such deepening Russian-European interdependence could in fact be-comeasymmetricinRussia’sfavour,andthatRussiawouldretainnotonlyfullfreedomininternalpolitics,butalsounrestrictedroomformanoeuvreinforeignpolicy.ThepurposeofGreaterEuropewasnotforRussiasomehowto‘dissolve’intothenewpolitical,economicandsecuritystructure;onthecontrary, itwastostrengthenthepotentialand independenceofRussiaasagreatglobalpower.ThenetworkofrelationsbuiltaspartofGreaterEuropewassupposedtoofferRussiainstrumentstoinfluenceEuropeanpoliticsinlinewithitsowninterests,whileatthesametimepreventingEuropeanac-torsfromtryingtoinfluenceRussia’sinternalandforeignpolicy.

Chinais,ontheonehand,akeypartnerforMoscow,andontheother,ama-jorchallenge to it.Russiahasbeenobserving thedynamicriseofChina'spowerandinternationalcloutwithsomeconcern,andhasoptedforcloserco-operationwithBeijingasthemainelementofitspoliticaltactics.Atthesame time,Russiaobsessively fearsattemptsby theUnitedStates to takeadvantageofthetensionsandclashesofinterestsbetweenitselfandChina.Still,Moscowhasbeen seeking to strengthen itspositionvis-à-visChinaandtobalancetherisingpowerofthelatter.Itsco-operationwiththekeyEuropeanpartnersisonewayofdoingthis,andundoubtedlythecreationofGreaterEuropewasalsointendedaspartofthisstrategy.AndeventhoughRussianevernamesChinadirectlyasoneofthereasonsforitspursuitofGreaterEurope,itsrivalrywiththeMiddleKingdomundoubtedlystronglycolours the subtext of this initiative. Paradoxically, thishasnot changedevenwithRussia’s‘turntowardsAsia’,whichMoscowhasbeenpromotingparticularly actively since 2012, andwhichwas inpart a response to theanalogous policy of theUnited States. That is because in seeking to playa greater role in theAsia-Pacific region,Russia intends to strengthen itsposition through co-operation with Europe, among other measures. On

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theotherhanditisclearlynoticeable,especiallyintheenergysphere,thatMoscowistryingtoplaythe‘Chinesecard’andusetheprospectsofferedbytheAsianmarketstomobiliseitsEuropeanpartnersinordertotryhardertodevelopgoodrelationswithRussia.

Russiatreatsthe CIS area asitsnaturalsphereofinfluence,oneofthefun-damentsandhallmarksof its statusasaglobalpower. Ithas longsought totransformthisareaintoaRussian-managedcentreofpolitical,economicandsecurityintegration.Mostimportantly,however,Moscowdoesnotwantanyotheractors(whetherstatesorintegrationstructures),suchastheUS,EUorChina,tochallengeitsstrategiccontrolofthearea.Russiasteppedupitsin-tegrationeffortsin2009,pushingforthecreationoftheCustomsUnionandsubsequently,theCommonEconomicSpace,whichisultimatelytobecometheEurasianUnion.

TheGreaterEuropeconceptcouldatfirstseemtoofferanalternativetothepolicyofRussiaasoutlinedabove;but this isnot thecase,at least inviewof theconcept'soriginalassumptions.As theconceptdeveloped, itbecameincreasinglyclearthatRussia'sobjectivewasnotonlytobuildlinksbetweenitselfandtheEU,butindeedtocreateatwo-blocstructurethatwouldbindtogethertwoareasofintegration–theEuropeanUnionintheWest,andtheEurasian Union in the East. Thus, the implementation of Greater EuropewouldinfactpermanentlysplitEurope,largelyalongtheformerSovietbor-ders(exceptingtheBalticstates).Itwouldalsolegitimiseandinstitutionalisethissplit.Westerncountries,andtheEUinparticular,wouldineffecthavetogiveupanyattemptsatintegratingthecountriesofthesharedneighbour-hood, especiallyUkraine, into theEuropean spacebased onEU legislationandstandards,andacceptRussia'shegemonyinthisarea.Russiawouldbetheonetoregulate–throughthebodiesoftheEurasianUnion–thepoliticalandeconomicrelationsofcountriesinEasternEurope,theSouthCaucasusandCentralAsiawiththeEuropeanUnion.InpracticeitwouldbeMoscowwhodeterminedwhether,andtowhatextent,Europeanstandardscouldbeimplementedinthisarea.

IfimplementationoftheGreaterEuropeconcepthasultimatelyprovedunfea-sible,theEurasianUnioncouldbecomearealalternativetoit.Problemsincre-atingtheEurasianUnion,ontheotherhand,wouldmobiliseRussiatohampertheEuropeanUnion'spolicyeffortsinthesharedneighbourhood.

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3. Greater Europe: a realistic programme or a political utopia?

GreaterEuropehasalwaysappearedinthestatementsbyRussianleaders,andespeciallyVladimirPutin,asaslogan.Ithasneverbeenelaboratedonindetail,inanymoreorlessformaldocument.VladimirPutin'sarticlepublishedintheSüddeutsche ZeitunginNovember2010remainsitssinglemostspecificpublicformulation,buteventhattextoffersonlyageneralindicationoftheconcept'sobjectivesandmethodsofimplementation.

Ontheotherhand,itisevidentthatanumberofinitiativesRussiahasunder-takenwithintheframeworkofitspolicytowardstheEUandEuropeancoun-triesare in linewith thedeclaredobjectivesof theGreaterEuropeconcept.Thus,GreaterEuropeisnotmerelyanemptyslogan,butratherapoliticalpro-gramme,evenifstatedinasyetrathergeneralterms.TheideahasregularlyrecurredinmomentsofrisingdynamicsinRussia'sinteractionswiththekeyEuropeanstates,i.e.attimesofupheavalsandturningpointsininternationalpoliticsandtheeconomy.

YetifonelooksattheresultsoftheRussianinitiativesaimedatputtingsomeelementsoftheGreaterEuropeconceptintopractice,onecannothelpbutno-ticethattheyarenegligible.Inthe security sphere,nonewEuropeansecuritysystemthatwouldchallengethedominationofNATOandletRussiaco-decidehasbeencreated,despitemanyyearsofsystematiceffortsonRussia’spart.TheideaofconcludinganewEuropeansecuritytreatyhasendedinfailure.

Inthe economy,RussiafinallyaccededtotheWTOin2012.However,onceitdidso, it focused itseffortsonexploiting loopholesandseparate interpreta-tionsinthedetailedtermsofitsaccessiontoobstructtheremovaloftradebar-riers,includingbarriersintradewiththeEU.TheprospectofaDeepandCom-prehensiveFreeTradeAgreementbetweentheEUandRussiahasbecomeevenmoredistant, insteadofcomingcloser. It is truethatRussianandEuropeancompanieshavesignedanumberofco-operationagreements,acoupleofbusi-nessesinEuropehavebeenacquiredbyRussiancompanies,andinsomecasesRussianandEUcompanieshaveswappedassets.Howeverthishasnotcreatedanybreakthroughsinindustrialortechnologyco-operation.

As regardsenergy, there is a growing impression that not only is theRus-sian-proposed single European energy space based on rules different fromtheEnergyCharterTreatyan impossibleproject,but also the energy inter-estsoftheEUandRussiaareincreasinglycontradictory.Thedisputeaboutthe

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implementationoftheThirdEnergyPackageandtheEuropeanCommission'sinvestigationofGazprom’sallegedillegalmonopolisticpracticesareonlythemostimportantexamplesofthisclash.

Inthesphereofhuman relations, aseriesofsmallstepshavebeenmadeto-wardsliberalisingthevisaregimebetweenRussiaandtheEU,butthepros-pectsofcompleteabolitionofvisasremainsuncertain,despiteimmensepoliti-calpressurefromRussia.

Finally, in the political sphere,nonewpermanentbodyhasbeenestablishedtoserveasaforumforRussiaandtheEUtoarrangeconsultationsanddeci-sion-makingonpoliticalandsecurityissues,despiteMoscow'slobbying.TheMoscow-Berlin-Paristrianglemeetsonlyirregularly,andhasservedmoreasan image-buildingmeasure than any real decision-making centre.Moscowhasalso failed topersuade theEUand itsmember states to formally recog-nise theCustomsUnionsor theCommonEconomicSpaceofRussia,BelarusandKazakhstanasapartnerwithwhomtoconcludeagreements.Aftermanyyearsofnegotiations,RussiaandtheEUhavenotevenbeenabletoagreeontheprovisionsofanewframeworkagreementfortheirmutualrelations,theso-calledPCA2.

Russia'sbiggestfrustrationhasprobablybeentheattitudeofthegovernmentofGermany,whichMoscowhopedwouldbe itsmainpartner in the imple-mentationoftheGreaterEuropeproject.AlthoughBerlinhasalwaysbeenattheforefrontofEuropeaneconomicandenergyco-operationwithRussia,ten-sionsanddifferencesoncertain important issueshave increasinglybecomeapparent between the two sides, especially since 2012.While Germany hascalledfortheestablishmentofanewconsultationbodybetweentheEUandRussia alongsidewithMoscow, it seems that the Russianswere dissatisfiedwithBerlin’sfailuretoensureconsensusonthisintheEU.Germanyhasfa-vouredfurther liberalisationofthevisaregimebetweentheEUandRussia,butithasalsobeenclearlyreluctanttosetanydeadlinesforthecompleteaboli-tionofvisas.IncreasinglyfrequentGermancriticismofcivilrightsviolationsinRussiahasalsobeenvexingMoscow.Furthermore,theKremlinalsoholdsagrudgeagainstGermanyover thestrongsupportprovidedby theGermanEUenergycommissionerGüntherOettinger toUkraineas itdefended itselfagainst pressure fromRussia. TheKremlin apparently suspects that BerlinwasbehindtheEuropeanCommission’sinvestigationofGazprom,seeingthisasawaytoforceRussiatoreducethepriceofitsgasexports.Finally,Germanywasthemaindecision-makerduringtheCypruscrisis inspring2013,when

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thedealbetween theEurogroupandCyprus (whichhadnotbeenconsultedwithRussia)deliveredablowto theextensivebusiness interestsofRussianoligarchsandcompaniesinthatcountry.

ThisleadstotheconclusionthatiftheRussianleadershipreallybelievedthatitwouldfindstrongpartnersintheEUtoputatleastsomeoftheobjectivesofGreaterEuropeintopractice, thiswasamistakencalculation.Twodifferentapproachesclashedhere.Russiasoughttoconcludeaseriesofstrategicagree-mentswiththeEUbasedonnew,jointlynegotiatedprinciples,andfillthemwithspecificcontent lateron.MeanwhileEuropewantedtopullRussiaintotheEuropeansystemofnormsandstandards,andpursuepragmaticco-oper-ationwherethetwosides’interestscoincided.

Moscowunderestimatedthestrengthoftrans-Atlanticrelationsandtheaver-sionofEuropeanstatestotheideaofconsiderablyrevisingtheEuropeaninsti-tutionalorder,andoverestimateditsattractivenessasapartnerforco-opera-tioninkeyspheres.Mostimportantly,however,evenduringtheshortperiodsinwhichitwaswillingtoco-operatewithEuropemoreintensely,itwasnotprepared toundergo real internal transformation, includingpolitical trans-formation,withoutwhichbuildingacommonEuropeanspacewithRussiaisimpossible.Russia'scurrentpolicycourseis infactdrivingitawayfromEu-rope.Untilthatchanges,notonlywilltheideaofGreaterEurope,whichseemsimpossibletocarryoutintheformintendedbyRussia,remainapoliticaluto-pia,butsowillanyotherformofpartialEuropeanintegrationofRussia.

In this situation,Russia is likely to focus itspolitical energyon implement-ingitspriorityprojectofEurasianintegration,basedonthestructuresoftheCustomsUnion/CommonEconomicSpace/theEurasianUnion.Moscow'skeyshort-termobjectiveinthiscontextwillbetomakeUkrainepartoftheprocess.TheimplementationofthemoreambitiousGreaterEuropeproject–unlessitisscrappedaltogether–willbepostponeduntilthetimewhen,astheRussianleadersbelieve,aweakenedEuropeanUnionwillbecomemoreinclinedtotakeupRussia'sproposals.

MAREk MENkISzAk

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