gpsea - democracy in thailand the middle class thaksin king and military
TRANSCRIPT
1
Introduction
This essay seeks to demonstrate that although the Thai middle class deserves some
credit for deepening democracy in Thailand, it does not translate to Thailand being a
liberal democracy by any interpretation. The promulgation of the 1997 Constitution,
fondly referred to as the ‘People’s Constitution’ which was meant to usher in a
democraticerahasnotonlybeenabused,butrepealedandreplacedwithanoppressive
military-backedConstitutionin2007.
This paper approaches the question by analysing the different political players in
Thailand, and critically evaluating whether their actions or policies furthers
democratisationefforts,orerodesit.
Itissubmittedthatthispapernotonlyevaluatesproceduraldemocraticideals–namely,
free and fair elections – but also substantive democracy involving civil and political
rights.
Thaimiddleclass
InthispartoftheessayIwilldemonstratethroughtheeventsof1973,the1990s,and
the post-2006 Thaksin era, the Thai middle class does not subscribe to democratic
ideals.
Firstly, in the student-led uprising of 14 October 1973 where the Thai state was
confrontedwith the bourgeoisie resulted from socio-economic policies and expanded
nationaleducationscheme.ThisuprisingsubsequentlyleadtothedownfalloftheSarit,
Thanom, and Praphat military regime, and the establishment of a constitutional
democracy.However, this ‘victory fordemocracy’wasunderminedon6October1976
2
whenthemilitaryopenedfireonprotestorsatThammasatUniversitythatwasmetby
middle-classapathy.1
Although short lived, I will consider the quality of democracy during this three-year
periodtoseewhetherdemocraticidealswereembracedbythemiddleclass.Firstly,the
electocrats electedwere largely interested in short-term financial and factional gains.
For thisgroup, theestablishmentofparliamentarydemocracyservedasnothingmore
than a golden opportunity to convert their questionable wealth and influence into
national politics.2Tejapira submitted that this group treated politics as nothingmore
thanabusiness,oftentimessellingpublicpolicytothehighestbidder.3
Ockeyconsidersanalternativeangle,namelythatthe6Octobermassacreevidencesthe
‘lack of a unified middle class with a clear awareness of its interests’.4 Benedict
Anderson attributed this to the new middle class’ insecurity that their ‘ascent from
backstreetdustwouldendwhere ithadbegun’,andassuch, ‘thosewhohadsincerely
supportedthemassdemonstrationsin1973welcomedthereturntodictatorshipthree
yearslater’.5
Thisinterpretationofthe1973-1976eventsevidencesthatnotonlydidthemiddle-class
not demonstrate a comprehensive knowledgeof substantivedemocratic ideals; itwas
alsoalow-quality,andexclusionaryproceduraldemocracy.
1KasianTejapira,2006.‘TopplingThaksin’.InNewLeftReview39:122ibid3ibid:144JamesOckey,2004.‘Makingdemocracy:Leadership,class,gender,andpoliticalparticipationinThailand’(UniversityofHawaiiPress)page1605BenedictAnderson,1997.‘Withdrawalsymptoms:SocialandculturalaspectsoftheOctober6Coup.’InBulletinofConcernedAsianScholars9:19
3
TheThaieconomicboominthe1980s-1990sthroughthediversificationofitseconomy,
shift from traditional agricultural to industrialization oriented exports, and also a big
influx of foreign direct investment lead to many scholars of modernization theory
predictingthatthisnewurbanmiddleclasswillnurturedemocraticidealsinThailand.
However, as I will prove in this part of the paper, themiddle class actionswere not
alwaysmotivatedbygreateradoptionofdemocraticideals.
Firstly, this is evidenced when the middle class who firstly protested against the
Chatichaigovernment,which leadtoamilitarycoupthat instatedGeneralSuchindaas
theirleader.TheFarEasternEconomicReviewreportedatthetimethatthecoup“was
widely accepted” and “almost popular.”6. However, public opinion on the unelected
General Suchinda only changed when he ran for office, backtracking on his earlier
promisethathewasuninterested.Inresponsetothisevent,publicopiniononthe1991
coup-makerschanged.Nolongerweretheyviewedasselfless,butinsteadgreedy,self-
interestedandcorrupt.Onlyafterpublicopinionhadchangeddidproteststhatleadto
ejection of the military government started. Englehart argues that this clearly
demonstrates that the protests were more about ‘corruption than democracy in any
formal,proceduralform’.7
Englehart’s argument is corroborated by Girling and Voravidh’s submission that the
‘middleclasstendstobepragmatic,materialisticandself-interested–
Theyonlysupportdemocracyifthealternativeprovidesconditionsantitheticaltotheir
interests’.8
6RodneyTasker,1991.‘PopularPutsch’.FarEasternEconomicReviewpage177NeilEnglehart,2003.‘DemocracyandtheThaimiddleclass:Globalisation,modernization,andconstitutionalchange.InAsianSurvey(43)2:2618ErikKuhonta,2008.‘AresearchnoteonthemiddleclassanddemocracyinThailand’.<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=erik_kuhonta>accessed17thMarch2015
4
Englehartthenputsforthanalternativetheoryforthemainreasonfordemocratization
ofThailandinthe1990s.HeattributedthistotheliberalizationofThailand’seconomy
during this period, and Thailand’s reliance on foreign investment. How this lead to
democratization was due to the fact that foreign investors had preference for
democraticregimesasitwasviewedtobemorestable.However,Englehartmakesnote
that this analysis only impinged on local politics to the extent that it helped
democratizationeffortsalreadypursuedbyactivists.9
However,itisimportanttonotethatdemocraticactivistsatthetimeliketheCampaign
forPopularDemocracy(CPD)groupconsistedofawiderangeofplayersfromdifferent
backgrounds, and was not limited to middle-class participation. Furthermore,
monitoring groups like PollWatchwhich had been set up to ensure theMarch 1992
electionswere clean and fair, and to encourage democratic consciousness among the
populationplayedapivotalroleinthedeepeningofdemocracytoo.10
The third case study for themiddle-class’ role in democratisation efforts in Thailand
concerns the middle-class involvement in the People’s Alliance of Democracy (PAD),
morecommonlyknownasthe‘YellowShirts’.ThePADwasformedin2006,anditscore
leaders were Chamlong Srimaung, Sondi Limthongkul, Somsak Kosaisuk, Somekeit
Pongpaibul and Pipob Thongchai. The Yellow Shirts consisted of a loose grouping of
royalists,urbanmiddleclass,andultra-nationalists.11
OneofthefirstinstancesthatdemonstratetheYellowShirts’lackofdeferencetowards
thedemocratic rule of law is seen after theKinghad tasked the courts to resolve the
political crisis in 2007. After publically supporting the court’s decision to dissolve
9Englehart:2003:25410WilliamCallahan,1998.‘ImaginingDemocracy’(InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies)pages114-11711NickNostitz,2009.‘RedvsYellow:Thailand’scrisisofidentity’(WhiteLotusPress)page8
5
ThaksinShinawatra’sThaiRakThaiparty(TRT),andcallingforarespectfortheruleof
law– theysubsequentlydemonstrateddoublestandardswhenthecourtsubsequently
issuedarrestwarrantsfornineofthetopPADleaders.12
ThisIsubmitisoneofthemanyinstancesthatdemonstratestheYellowShirts,andthe
urbanmiddleclass’shypocriticalpositionwhenitcomestodemocracy.
After successfully forcingThaksin into exile, thePAD leader Sondhi launched the ‘last
whistleblow’ where the PAD would seek to takeover Government House to block a
meeting of the People’s Power Party (PPP) cabinet. After the PAD was successful in
doing so, PrimeMinister (PM) Samak Sundaravej offered to call for a referendum to
allow popular opinion to decide the next PM thatwas promptly rejected by the PAD.
This lead to an impasse which the constitutional court resolved by finding Samak in
violationoftheconstitutionforparticipatinginatelevisioncookingshow.13
AsonlySamakwasbannedfrompolitics,thePPPtopbrasschoseSomchaiWongsawat,
whowasmarried to Thaksin’s younger sister Yaowapha as PM. In response, the PAD
implemented “King Taksin Operation” aimed at pressuring PM Somchai to resign
unconditionally. This lead to another intervention by the activist constitutional court
whichdissolvedthePPPforvotebuying,andbanningtheexecutives, includingthePM
frompoliticalparticipationforfiveyears.14
Followingthis,thePADannouncedvictory,andmoreworryinglythattheywouldreturn
tothestreetsifthenewgovernmentwasnottoitsliking.JamesOckeyarguedthatthe
greatestdamagedonebyPAD’sactionswasto thatof thedemocraticsystemitself.By
12DuncanMcCargo,2009.‘ThaipoliticsasrealityTV’.InTheJournalofAsianStudies(68)1:1413JamesOckey,2009.‘Thailandin2008:Democracyandstreetpolitics’.InSoutheastAsianAffairspage32314ibid:327
6
outrightly refusing to recognise democratic outcomes, and in promoting a coup and
greater involvement of the constitutional court in politics, the PAD had damaged the
foundationsofdemocracyinThailand.15
MarcSaxerprovidesaninsightfulanalysistothereasonswhytheThaimiddle-classdid
not democratise asmodernisation scholars predicted. Saxer attributes this to the fact
thatonce ‘democracywas institutionalised, they foundthemselves tobethestructural
minority’.Hewentontosubmitthat theThaimiddleclass feels liketheyweregetting
‘robbed’asitwastheirtaxrevenuesthatwerebeingusedbycorruptpoliticianstobuy
‘ruralvotes’insteadofupgradingpublicinfrastructure.16
Inthispartoftheessay,IhavedemonstratedthattheThaimiddle-classwassplitinthe
1970s,andwerenotacohesiveclassthatfoughtfordemocraticidealsaslaterprovenin
1976.However,themiddle-classdeservessomecreditforthedeepeningofdemocracy
inThailand in the1990s, although the economic crisis and civic society organisations
playedrolestoo.Inthepost-Thaksinera,theurbanmiddle-classwiththeirsupportfor
theYellowShirtshasultimatelyunderminedthefoundationsofdemocracyinThailand.
ThaksinShinawatra
The secondpart of this paperwill demonstrate thehighlydivisivebillionaireThaksin
Shinawatra playing an active role in blocking democratisation efforts in Thailand by
abusingtheConstitutionalamendmentsin1997.
The1997People’sConstitutionwas intended topromote transparency, accountability
and stability by strengthening the executive, establishing a fully elected bicameral
15ibid:33116MarcSaxer,2014.‘HowThailand’smiddleclassthreatensdemocracy’.<http://www.socialeurope.eu/2014/01/thailands-middle-class/>accessed16thMarch2015
7
legislature,introducinganewelectoralsystemthatfavouredlargermorestablepolitical
parties,andinstallingnewindependentagenciestoactaschecksandbalances.17
However,thisnobleintentionenabledtheriseofThaksin’sTRT.Thaksinwonthe2001
electionsandbecamethe firstPMtocompletea four-year term.Hesubsequentlywon
the2005 elections in a landslide victorywinning almost 61per cent of the votes and
almost three quarters of seats in elected Lower House. Prima facie this looks like
democraticrulehasfinallybeenestablishedinThailand.Howeveruponclosescrutiny,it
becomesevidentthatalthoughhederivedhis legitimacythroughelections,heruledin
anauthoritarianmanner.18
Moreover,Thaksin’smethodofgoverningwasanaffront to theprinciplesof the1997
Constitution. Under Thaksin, wealthy entrepreneurs played a key role in running the
country, and popular participation was, as Duncan McCargo described, ‘reduced to a
consumption mode: voters and citizens would merely be end users of products
developedbyatechnocraticandentrepreneurialelite’.Additionally,institutionsshould
nottempergovernmentpolicies.19
AlthoughwidelycreditedwithbringingThailandtotheworld’seconomicstage,itwasat
the expense of rampant cronyism and corruption. Critics accuse him of instituting
authoritarianrulebehindafaçadeofdemocraticlegitimacyflowingfromelections.20
Additionally, it is submitted that Thaksin also circumvents the 1997 constitution in
order to protect his personal interests and only invokes it when it benefits him. For
17ThitinanPongsudhirak,2008.‘ThailandSinceTheCoup’.InJournalforDemocracy(19)4:14118ibid:14219DuncanMcCargoandUkristPathmanand,2005.‘ThaksinisationofThailand’(NIASPress)page1420Pongsudhirak2008:143
8
example,Article110ofthe1997ConstitutionprohibitedanyMemberofParliamentto
ownacompanyholdingstateconcession.Thaksintransferredthebulkofhisassets to
wifeandchildrentocircumventthis.21
AnotherexampleofThaksinavoidinginstitutionalchecksandbalanceswasseenwhen
hemobilisedhisallieswiththeintentionofpressuringtheConstitutionalCourtwhowas
hearinghis corruption case. This interferencedemonstrates a lack of respect towards
theConstitutionalCourtandalsojudicialprocedures.22
WhentheCourtclearedhimofthecorruptionchargesinAugust2001,hetoldreporters
that he derives a greater legitimacy than the appointed independent bodies as he
received elevenmillion votes in the elections. According to this line of argument, the
TRT’s massive mandate grants them legitimacy to circumvent check and balance
institutionsthatweresetupunderthe1997Constitution.
Furthermore, a 2002 survey found that the newly consumerist Thai peasantry had
sufferedfromtheeconomiccrisis,andconsequentlybecameincreasinglydependenton
the local godfathers. Politically, these godfathers act as canvasserswhomobilise their
network for politicians in return for political favours. Thaksin’sTRT exploited this by
usinggovernmentbudgettobuyupthesecanvasserswholesale.23
Ontheotherhand,Thaksinusedhistermsinofficetodramaticallybolsterhisfamily’s
fortune. In1995,Thaksinhadputhis own fortune at 70billionbaht, andby2003, his
family-owned companies were valued at over 425billion baht – amounting to almost
21McCargoandPathmanand2005:1422McCargoandPathmanand2005:1523Tejapira2006:28
9
ninepercentofallthestockstradingontheThaistockmarket.24Besidesbolsteringhis
personalwealth,ThaksinalsoplunderedtherevenueoftheGovernmentLotteryOffice
(GLO).Promotinghis friend,SurasitSangkapongas itsDirectorGeneral,didthis.Since
theGLO’scofferswerenotsubjectedtoparliamentaryscrutiny,Thaksintreateditashis
personal cash cow to fundhiswildly populist policies designed to appeal to the rural
voters.Usingthisfundtoavoidparliamentaryscrutinyisarguedtobeanotherexample
ofThaksincircumventinganinstitutionsetupunderthe1997Constitution.
Additionally,Thaksinalsounderminedtheautonomyof thepolice forceby interfering
with promotions.However unlike his predecessors, Thaksinwent further through his
anti-drugs policy and suppression of ‘dark influences’. To carry out these policies,
Thaksinreliedonaninnercircleofseniorpoliceofficers.OneofThaksin’sobjectivesfor
introducingthesepolicieswastounderminethefinancialbaseofhispoliticalrivalswho
areoftentimes involved in thedrug trade.25Inexecuting thepolicies tounderminehis
politicalrivals,Thaksinauthorisedthenarcoticssuppressionofficersandpoliceto‘take
all necessary steps’ – including extra-judicial killings. These killings that began hours
before the launch of thewar on drugs, endedwith over three thousand people dead.
HumansRightsWatchcondemnedthispolicy,chargingittobeaviolationofdueprocess
thateveryhumanbeingisentitledto,andalsoaviolationofbasichumanrights.26
All thiscoupledwith the fact thathemade themilitaryhis long-termpoliticalbaseby
promotinghisrelativesandclassmatesfromtheArmedForcesAcademiesPreparatory
School Class 10 had effectively created an elaborate network entirely dependent, and
subordinatedtoThaksin.27
24McCargoandPathmanand2005:21625McCargoandPathmanand2005:22726‘Humanrightsabusesandthewarondrugs’.<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm>accessed19thMarch201527McCargoandPathmanand2005:147
10
Although he derived his legitimacy from elections, his consolidation of power while
underminingthe independentbodies issubmittedtobeanaffront togooddemocratic
practice. Thaksin’s government effectively amounts to an authoritarian rule with no
spaceformeaningfulopposition.
Monarchy
This section of the paper seeks to demonstrate that although absolute monarchy in
Thailandended in1932,KingBhumibol, throughaculturalpassivecounter-revolution
hasestablishedhimselfasthemosthegemonicmonarchinmodernThaihistory.28
McCargosuggeststhattheroyalinstitutionoperatesona‘networkmonarchy’–aform
of semi-monarchical rule ‘underpinned by nostalgia for pre-1932 absolute monarchy
while being temperedby a reluctant recognition that nomodernThaiKing canbe an
absoluteruler’.Themain featuresof thisnetworkmonarchyare that theKinghas the
final say in political decisions in times of crisis, he is the ultimate source of national
legitimacyandmostimportantly,isintimatelyinvolvedinpolitics.29
Generallywhena leader isunable tobe anautocrat, hehas an incentive to cooperate
with others in the formation of a non-autocratic government. However in Thailand,
althoughtheKingpermitstheformationofapparentlyrepresentativegovernments,he
laterutilitieshisnetworkstounderminethem.30
The 1973 events demonstrate this, where frustrated with the shortcomings of the
military, bureaucratic and political leadership, he supported the student-led uprising
28Tejapira2006:1729DuncanMcCargo,2005.‘NetworkMonarchy’.InThePacificReview(18)4:500-50130ibid:502
11
againsttheThanomKittikachornandPraphasCharusathienmilitaryregime.31However,
merelythreeyearslaterin1976thepalacegavetacitsupporttothebloodyeventsof6
October.Appearingonradiotwodaysafterthemassacreofstudentdemonstrators,the
kingexpressedastrongendorsementforthemilitarycoup.32
On theotherhand,whenChatichaiChoonavan succeededPremTinsulanondasPrime
Ministerin1988,ChatichaitriedtodismantletheundemocraticnetworkstheKingand
Premhadbuilt.However,asthiswasagainsttheKing’sinterest,thepalacehadnotonly
supportedthemilitarycoupagainsthimin1991,butalsogiventhecoupleadersprior
consent.33In relation to themuch-criticised draft constitutionwritten by themilitary
regime forallowinganunelectedperson tobePM, theKingweighed inandurged the
people to accept it as it was ‘reasonable’ and could ‘gradually be amended the
democraticway’.34
ThisIsubmitdemonstratesthattheKingisnotonlysupportingamilitaryregimeatthe
expense of democratic ideals, he does not conform with the traditional model of a
constitutionalmonarchywhoissupposedtobeabovepolitics.
Additionally in 2006when themilitary overthrew the democratically electedThaksin
government, theKing gave themilitary-appointed government a royal blessing. In his
birthday speech, theKingapplauded the ‘personal sacrifice’madeby thenewCabinet
membersto‘salvage’thecountry.35
31MichaelConnors,2003.‘DemocracyandNationalIdentityinThailand’(RoutledgeCurzon)page13032Tejapira2006:1233KevinHewison,1997.‘PoliticaloppositionsandregimechangeinThailand’.InPoliticalOppositionsinIndustrialisingAsia(Routledge)page7034KevinHewison,1997.‘Themonarchyanddemocratisation’.InPoliticalChangeinThailand(Routledge)page7035‘Thailand’skingendorsesthecoup’,2006.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailands-king-endorses-the-coup/>accessed12March2015
12
The wording used by the King in his birthday speech aptly demonstrates how little
deferencehehastowardsademocraticallyelectedgovernment(albeitonebeingridden
withcorruptionandcronyism).Hewisonsuggeststhatthis isduetotheKingreferring
to himself as ‘elected king’, on the basis of the palace’s enormous popularity. Ergo,
conferring upon him a ‘super-mandate’ from the people that then justifies his
interventions in thepolitics.Thisestablishes thathehas littleregard forwhatMorrell
andChai-Anancallthe‘politicalnoiseofrepresentativeprocesses’.36
This form of picking whoever suits his interest most is submitted to be inherently
illiberal as it marginalises formal political institutions and procedures. It also
underminesdemocraticprinciplessuchastheruleoflawandpopularsovereignty.37
WhilescholarssuggeststhatmonarchiesinSoutheastAsiacanprovidespecialassetsto
supportdemocratictransition,itisarguedherethatinThailand,themonarchyhaslong
beendedicatedtoresistingdemocraticchange,embracingthecauseofpoliticalreform
onlybelatedlyandreluctantly.38KingBhumibol,andtheroyalinstitutioninThailandis
undoubtedlyoneofthepartiesguiltyofblockingdemocratisationeffortsinthecountry.
Military
The last section of this paper will demonstrate that from the outset of modern Thai
politico-history, themilitaryhasacted in its interest at theexpenseofdemocracyand
thetraditionalseparationofmilitaryandcivilianpolitics.
36DavidMorrellandChai-AnanSamudavinija,1981.‘PoliticalconflictinThailand:Reform,reaction,revolution’(Oelgeschlager,Gunn&Hain)page27137McCargo2005:50138McCargo2005:504
13
The 1932 coup d’étatwhich lead to the firstwritten constitution in Thailandwas no
matter howbeautifullywritten, a document to consolidate power in the hands of the
militaryelite.39
In 1991, after the military overthrew the Chatichai elected government on alleged
grounds of rampant corruption, the coup-makers formed the National Peace Keeping
Council(NPKC)torunthecountry.TheleadersappointedAnandPanyarachunasPM.At
first, the military-lead leadership gained popular support in Thailand due to its
undemocraticnatureashewasseenastobenotbeholdentowardsanypartyorinterest
group.Howeverwhen they sensed that oppositionwasbuilding towards their regime
following the election of General Suchinda to PM, and the hunger strikes by Chalart
Vorachart and Chamlong Srimaung – the military opened fire upon the protestors
leadingtotheeventsof‘BloodyMay1992’.Itissubmittedthatthequellingoflegitimate
dissentisinfringinguponthecivillibertiesoftheThaipeople.40
Followingthe2006coupagainstThaksin, themilitary formedtheCouncil forNational
Security (CNS) in order to govern the country. The CNS then formed a separate
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), assigning them the responsibility to draft a
Constitution within six months. This process however was lacking any semblance of
democracyastheCNShadissuedbindingguidelinesonthecontentoftheConstitution,
and also had ignored any meaningful public consultation. Additionally, although the
draftConstitutionwasofferedbeforepublicreferendum,themilitaryhadcautionedthe
electoratethatiftheyrejectedthedraftConstitution,themilitarywouldpickoneofthe
previousseventeenconstitutions.41
39KobkuaSuwannathat-Pian,2003.‘Kings,CountryandConstitutions’(RoutledgeCurzon)page3640Englehart,2003:25641BjornDressel,2009.‘Thailand’selusivequestforaworkableconstitution’.InContemporarySoutheastAsia31(2):303
14
Moreover,thecompositionoftheConstitutiondraftersdrewquestionsoflegitimacyof
thedraftingprocess.AccordingtoArticles19-25ofthemilitary’sinterimconstitution–
Two-hundredCDAmemberswouldbeelectedfromthemilitaryappointed2000-strong
NationalPeople’sAssembly(NPA).Fromthispooloftwohundredcandidates, theCNS
willshortlistahundredcandidatesfortheCDA,whowillsubsequentlyelecttwenty-five
members to the Constitution Drafting Committee. The problem with this selection
processisthatalloftheinitialcandidatesareappointedbythemilitary,whichwillhave
considerable influence on the drafting process removing any sort of democratic
elements.42
Furthermore,thenominationprocessatthefirststagewasunderminedbyballotsbeing
circulated hours before voting which invited lobbying, bloc voting and more
importantly, vote buying.43As a consequence of these efforts, the military’s interests
were significantly better represented in the Constitution Drafting Committee as
comparedtothepeople’sinterests.
Byanalysingthedebatesonthe2007constitution,onecansubsumethatitwasfocussed
oninstitutionalarrangementstopreventaconcentrationofexecutivepowerandsingle-
partydominancethroughthereinforcementoftheindependentoversightagenciesand
thejudiciary.Thisexercisereinforcedthetrendtowards‘judicialising’Thaipoliticsthat
hadbegunwiththe1997Constitution.44
Theseprovisionsareobviously intendedtominimise theroleThaksinShinawatraand
his Thai Rak Thai politicians play in Thai politics by removing their legal and moral
42Ibid:30343‘200shortlistedtodraftnewCharter,butaccusationsmadeofimproperNPAvote’,BangkokPost,20December200644Dressel2009:304
15
legitimacy gained through popular elections. By creating these dubious institutions, it
wouldbeeasierforthemilitary,orthebureaucratstotakeextra-democraticmeasures
tooustanelectedPrimeMinister.45
Prior to the constitutional referendum, Somkid Lertpaitoon, the CDC Secretary had
warned theThaipeople that if they reject thedraft constitution, itwouldbe replaced
with a CNS-drafted version. Additionally, the military junta passed legislation
prohibiting criticismof thedraft constitution,making thosewhodoso liable toheavy
finesorimprisonment.Thishadtheeffectofmuzzlingdissent,whileindirectlycoercing
thepopulationtoadopttheConstitution.Thisseverelyhamperedtherighttoautonomy
ofchoiceanotherwisedemocraticregimewouldprovide.46
The2007Constitutionhadtheeffectofunderminingtheexecutivebypreventingsingle-
party dominance. This was achieved by altering critical institutional arrangements,
resultinginadispersionofpoliticalpower,hencediminishingtheimpactofdemocratic
electoral process. Also, by reverting from single-member to multi-member
constituencies, itfragmentsthevotethatpreventsaconcentrationofvotesforasingle
popularparty.Additionally,thisblocvotingprovidesindividualpoliticiansincentivesto
pursue personal interests rather than collective party strategies, further undermining
partysolidarityinParliament.47
Moreover, the number of Senatorswas also dropped from200 to 150,with 76 being
directly elected while the remaining 74 being appointed by a seven-member Senate
Selection Committee consisting of heads of independent agencies and judges. As the
senatorsareresponsiblefortheappointmentoftheindependentagenciesandjudges,it
45Dressel2009:30546Dressel2009:30647Dressel2009:310-311
16
presents a clear conflict interest that not only undermines the Senate, but also the
legitimacyandindependenceoftheagenciesandcourts.48
The revision of Article 237(2) of the Constitution allows the Constitution Court to
dissolveanentirepoliticalparty if oneof itsmembers is foundviolatingelection law.
This confers upon the judges’ far-reaching powers in the Thai political process. In a
liberaldemocraticgovernment,aprovisionlikethisservesasagreatprotectoragainst
corruptpoliticalpractices.However,aswasestablishedintheprecedingparagraph,the
‘independent’ bodies and courts in Thailand in 2007 suffers from a lack of
independence. Dressel concludes that these ‘further judicialisation’ of Thai politics is
meanttocontaintheinfluenceoftheurbanandruralpoorwhomconstitutethemajority
oftheelectorateinThailand.49
Moreover,Article309ofthe2007Constitutiongrantedblanketamnestytoallactorsin
the2006coup,and2006-2007militaryadministrations.Thevaguewordingusedleaves
apossibilityforwiderinterpretationofamnestytoalsocoverfuturemilitaryactions.50
Byanalysingtheconstitutionalchangespromotedbythemilitary,itisobviousthatthe
military is acting in its own interests, despite the fact that it claims otherwise.When
comparedtothemilitarycoupin1992,itisalsoevidentthatthemilitary’sroleinThai
politics is not on the wane, but instead it is constantly increasing with the military
systematicallyconsolidatingpowerintheThaipoliticalrealm.
The fact that the military’s Internal Security Operations Command had passed the
InternalSecurityAct2008substantiatesthisclaim.ThisActconferswidediscretionto
48Dressel2009:31149Dressel2009:311-31350PaulChambers,2010.‘Thailandonthebrink’.InAsianSurvey(50)5:847
17
the top military officers to define what constitutes an internal security threat, and
allowing indefinitely arrests and detentions without warrants, while preventing the
prosecution of soldiers for human rights violations.51This Act is submitted to be an
affronttotheruleoflawasitcircumventstheappropriatejudicialproceduresandthe
right todueprocess.Additionally, this legislationprovidesnosafeguards forThaicivil
liberties.52
OnMay222014,theNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO)toppledtheelected
government of Yingluck Shinawatra. The establishment of martial law and further
deterioration of Thai democratic rights followed quickly behind. Under martial law,
political activitiesarebanned,public assembliesofmore than fivepeoplearedeemed
illegal, the media is heavily censored, police are given wide discretion to search and
seize items, andpeople canbe summoned anddetained for up to sevendayswithout
charge.53
Furthermore, the NCPO leader Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha is able to
orderanycriminalcasetobeheldinamilitarycourt.HumanRightsWatchcriticizesthis
tobeagainsttheprinciplesofafairtrialasthereisnoassurancethatthosechargedwill
be given an equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice. This is
submittedtobeafurthererosionoftheThaijudiciary,andalsodemocraticrights.54
51InternalSecurityAct2008.<http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0342.pdfaccessed>15March201552PaulChambers,2010.‘Thailandonthebrink:Resurgentmilitary,erodeddemocracy’.InAsianSurvey50(5):848-84953‘MultipletargetsThaimartiallaw’,2015.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-targets-thailand-martial-law/>accessed19March201554‘Thailand:Endmilitarydetentionofcivilians’,2015.<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians>accessed19March2015
18
The fact that 73peoplehave faced trial before themilitary courts for participation in
anti-coupprotests, 23 people for lèsemajesté under the Computer CrimeAct, and54
people for charges of committing acts of terrorism further evidences the fact that
martial law in 2014 was meant to silent military regime opposition.55Furthermore,
HumanRightsWatchhascriticizedthisdetentionofciviliansasbeinganinfringementof
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that ensures due
processandarbitraryarrestordetention.56
In this section of the essay, I have critically analysed the key events inmodern Thai
historywhere themilitary had played a role in. In each event I have proven that the
military does not act ‘for the greater good’ of the nation as it proudly proclaims, but
insteadtoprotectitsowninterests.
Conclusion
TheThaimiddleclassdeservescreditforthedemocratisationofThailandinthe1990s
thatleadtothecreationofvariousindependentmonitoringinstitutions.Nevertheless,it
is important to note that the contribution towards democracy made by the Asian
FinancialCrisis,andotheractivistsduringthatperiod.However,Iarguethatthemiddle
classnow isoneof thebiggestobstacles towards furtherdemocratisation inThailand.
Through its participationwith the PAD, it has set a dangerous precedent of claiming
vetooverthedemocraticprocessandreservingforitselfmoralauthoritytodecidethe
PM.This,IsubmiterodesthefoundationsofThaidemocracy.
55‘MultipletargetsThaimartiallaw’,2015.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-targets-thailand-martial-law/>accessed19March201556‘Thailand:Endmilitarydetentionofcivilians’,2015.<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians>accessed19March2015
19
However, it is also important to note the role played by other political players in
blocking Thai democracy. For example, ex-PM Thaksin who although derived his
legitimacy from elections, consolidated power for himself while undermining the
monitoringbodies.TheKingisalsoguiltyasheplaysanactiverolebyabusinghismoral
legitimacy to influence political outcomes. Lastly, the military through either its
military-backedconstitutions,declarationsofmartiallaw,orabusesofhumanrightsis
arguedtobethebiggestobstaclefordemocratisationdeepeninginThailand.
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