gp 24-10 12 december 2005

Guidance on Practice for Fire Protection - Onshore

GP 24-10

BP GROUP ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES

Document No. GP 24-10 Applicability Group Date 12 December 2005

12 December 2005 GP 24-10 Guidance on Practice for Fire Protection - Onshore

Downloaded Date: 6/17/2008 10:31:55 PM The latest update of this document is located in the BP ETP and Projects Library

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Foreword

This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 24-10. This Guidance on Practice (GP) is based on parts of heritage documents from the merged BP companies as follows:

British Petroleum (Pre 1999) RP 24-1 Fire Protection Onshore.

Amoco A PS-FES-00-G Process SafetyFire Extinguishing SystemsGuide. A PS-FES-00-E Process SafetyFire Extinguishing SystemsEngineering Specification.

ARCO Std 803 Fire proofing.

Copyright 2005, BP Group. All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document was supplied to the recipients organization. None of the information contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipients own organization without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.



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Table of Contents Page Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ 2 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 6 1. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 7 2. Normative references............................................................................................................. 7 3. Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 9 4. Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................. 11 5. Fire hazard management philosophy ................................................................................... 12

5.1. General..................................................................................................................... 12 5.2. Philosophy ................................................................................................................ 12 5.3. Strategy choices ....................................................................................................... 16 5.4. Strategy goals........................................................................................................... 17 5.5. Benefits of the FEHMP process ................................................................................ 17 5.6. Caution on the use of this procedure......................................................................... 18

6. Hazard identification and listing ........................................................................................... 18 6.1. Identification of Hazards............................................................................................ 18 6.2. Information requirements .......................................................................................... 18 6.3. Information sources .................................................................................................. 19 6.4. Fire scenario development........................................................................................ 19 6.5. Fire-scenario envelope.............................................................................................. 20 6.6. Needs analysis ......................................................................................................... 20 6.7. Fire types.................................................................................................................. 21

7. Selection of fire hazard management strategy - design fire cases........................................ 21 7.1. General..................................................................................................................... 21 7.2. Fire prevention.......................................................................................................... 22 7.3. Fire containment and prevention of escalation .......................................................... 22 7.4. Fire and mitigation planning ...................................................................................... 22 7.5. Acceptance of consequential damage....................................................................... 22 7.6. Controlled burn ......................................................................................................... 23

8. Hazard quantification ........................................................................................................... 23 8.1. General..................................................................................................................... 23 8.2. Method...................................................................................................................... 23 8.3. Variables................................................................................................................... 24 8.4. Analysis Results ....................................................................................................... 24

9. Prevention ........................................................................................................................... 25 10. Hazard minimisation and control measures ......................................................................... 26

10.1. General..................................................................................................................... 26 10.2. Inventory minimisation .............................................................................................. 26



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10.3. Optimisation of release location ................................................................................ 26 10.4. Control of the rate of release..................................................................................... 27 10.5. Control of liquid releases by bunding ........................................................................ 27 10.6. Control of fire spread by fire walls ............................................................................. 28

11. Protection and mitigation methods ....................................................................................... 28 11.1. General..................................................................................................................... 28 11.2. Protection measures ................................................................................................. 28

12. Implementation and documentation ..................................................................................... 30 12.1. Communication plan ................................................................................................. 30 12.2. Information................................................................................................................ 30 12.3. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 31 12.4. FEHMP ..................................................................................................................... 31 12.5. FEHMP for safety case ............................................................................................. 32

13. Process areas...................................................................................................................... 32 13.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 32 13.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 32 13.3. Exposure protection .................................................................................................. 33 13.4. Extinguishment ......................................................................................................... 35

14. Storage areas (excluding class 0 petroleum and petrochemical products) ........................... 36 14.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 36 14.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 36 14.3. Exposure protection .................................................................................................. 37 14.4. Extinguishment ......................................................................................................... 38

15. Handling areas..................................................................................................................... 40 15.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 40 15.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 40 15.3. Exposure protection .................................................................................................. 40 15.4. Extinguishment ......................................................................................................... 41

16. Class 0 petroleum and petrochemical products production and storage areas..................... 43 16.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 43 16.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 43 16.3. Exposure protection .................................................................................................. 43 16.4. Extinguishment ......................................................................................................... 43 16.5. Spill control ............................................................................................................... 43

17. Utilities areas ....................................................................................................................... 44 17.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 44 17.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 44 17.3. Exposure protection .................................................................................................. 44

18. Pumping stations ................................................................................................................. 46 18.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 46 18.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 46 18.3. Fire protection........................................................................................................... 46

19. Buildings .............................................................................................................................. 46



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19.1. Hazard identification ................................................................................................. 46 19.2. Hazard quantification ................................................................................................ 47 19.3. Fire protection........................................................................................................... 47

20. Active fire protection ............................................................................................................ 48 20.1. General..................................................................................................................... 48 20.2. Fire fighting water systems ....................................................................................... 48 20.3. Fixed foam systems .................................................................................................. 60 20.4. Gaseous extinguishants............................................................................................ 63 20.5. Chemical dry powder ................................................................................................ 68 20.6. Fine water mist ......................................................................................................... 68 20.7. Others....................................................................................................................... 68

21. Passive fire protection (fireproofing)..................................................................................... 68 21.1. Design and Selection ................................................................................................ 68 21.2. Installation of PFP..................................................................................................... 68

List of Tables

Table 1 - Hazard identification (example data) .............................................................................. 32 Table 2 - Associated hazards (example data) ............................................................................... 32 Table 3 - Hazard quantification (example data)............................................................................. 33 Table 4 - Exposure protection method risk sources: equipment having fire potential..................... 35 Table 5 - Choice of active protection methods - utilities................................................................. 45 Table 6 - Typical firewater demands ............................................................................................. 49 Table 7 - Fixed water spray applications ....................................................................................... 57 Table 8 - Suitability of types of foam ............................................................................................. 60 Table 9 - Firewater and foam supply requirements (hydrocarbon liquid, maximum polar solvent

content 10%)........................................................................................................................ 61

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Hazard management process outline............................................................................ 14 Figure 2 (Sheet 1) - Hazard management process detail .............................................................. 15 Figure 2 (Sheet 2) - Hazard management process detail .............................................................. 16 Figure 3 General arrangement of steam lance, hose and support .............................................. 66 Figure 4 Typical process steam lance ........................................................................................ 67



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Introduction

Value of this Guidance on Practice

This is an approach for early analysis of fire hazards and mitigation of those hazards through appropriate levels of active and passive fire protection. Such an approach allows project teams to adequately design active and passive fire protection systems at an early stage of a project.

Application

Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information that supports the requirements of the GP, and may discuss alternative options. It also gives guidance on the implementation of any Specification or Approval actions.

This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the responsibility to ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies with the user. The user should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for the specific application.

Feedback and Further Information

Users are invited to feedback any comments and to detail experiences in the application of BP GPs, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement. Please use the ETP Library comment feature or the ETP Shared Learning System to provide feedback regarding issues with this document. You may access both systems through this link http://etp.bpweb.bp.com/.



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1. Scope

This Guidance on Practice gives advice for development of an appropriate philosophy for the mitigation of fires in onshore plants and facilities. The GP discusses methods for identification, characterisation and quantification of hazards and also gives technical requirements for active and passive fire protection systems.

This GP shall be applied to the design of new onshore plants and facilities, and used for assessment and modification of existing plants and facilities.

a. The GP specifies BP requirements for the design of active and passive fire protection systems for onshore facilities, utilising fire hazard assessments. The GP matches fire protection to the potential fire hazard based on BPs operating experience.

b. More detail on fire hazard management and fire mitigation options can be found in GN 24-10 and GN 24-11, respectively.

c. The GP discusses the following installations: refinery facilities, petroleum terminals, pipeline tankage facilities, bulk plants, lube blending and packaging facilities, asphalt plants, and aviation service facilities. Excluded from this GP are: retail facilities, tanks and vessels less than 5 m3 (180 ft3) in storage capacity, and offshore facilities.

d. The GP addresses hazard identification, minimisation, and assessment. It addresses the appropriate choice of active and passive fire protection measures to contain and, where practicable, extinguish potential fires.

e. The GP further addresses additional considerations specific certain types of facilities and gives guidance on the choice of exposure protection, taking into account fire type and equipment or structure to be protected.

f. Lastly, the GP addresses the technical requirements for selection of active and passive fire protection systems. This part of the document is intended for use with appropriate design guides and codes, e.g. BS, NFPA, and API.

g. This GP does not cover explosion hazards. The design of buildings and structures to withstand blast loading shall be in accordance with GP 04-30.

The Steel Construction Institute interim guidance notes, while relating to offshore structures, provide useful information for onshore plant.

h. Requirements for offshore facilities are given in GP 24-20, GP 24-23 and GP 24-24 which discuss Offshore Fire and Explosion Hazard Management, Active Fire Protection and Passive Fire Protection, respectively.

i. The design philosophy for fire and gas detection and control systems is given in GP 30-85. j. The Plant Layout document GP 44-10 shall be used to minimise hazards in the Select stage

or the Define Stage of a project, as required. k. To minimise hazards in the early stages or during the Appraise and Select Stages of a

project, the Inherently Safer Design document GP 24-03 shall be used.

2. Normative references

The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text, constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies.



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BP GP 04-10 Guidance on Practice for Drainage Systems and Sewers. GP 04-30 Guidance on Practice for Design of Buildings Subject to Blast Loading. GP 06-60 Guidance on Practice for Painting of Metal Surfaces and Equipment. GP 12-10 Guidance on Practice for Switchgear and Control Gear. GIS 24-233 Guidance on Industry Standard for Fire Water Pumps and System Design GIS 24-072 Guidance on Industry Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishment

Systems GN 24-10 Guidance Notes on Fire and Explosion Management - Onshore GN 24-11 Guidance Notes on Fire Risk Reduction Options Onshore GP 24-03 Guidance on Practice for Concept Selection for Inherently Safer Design GP 24-07 Guidance on Practice for Fire Fighting Suppressants- Alternatives to

Halon GP 24-20 Guidance on Practice for Offshore Fire & Explosion Hazard Management GP 24-23 Guidance on Practice for Active Fire Protection Offshore GP 24-24 Guidance on Practice for Passive Fire Protection - Offshore GP 30-65 Guidance on Practice for Control Panels. GP 30-85 Guidance on Practice for Fire and Gas Detection. GP 42-10 Guidance on Practice for Metallic Piping Systems ASME B31.3. GP 44-10 Guidance on Practice for Plant Layout. GP 44-80 Guidance on Practice for Design Guidelines for Relief Disposal Systems. GP 48-02 Guidance on Practice for Hazard and Operability Studies GP 48-50 Guidance on Practice for Major Accident Risk Process GP 52-10 Guidance on Practice for Thermal Insulation. GP 62-01 Guidance on Practice for Valve Selection. BP Group Fire booklet series; Liquid hydrocarbon storage tanks: prevention and fire fighting

(2003) Link to Booklet BP Group Fire booklet series; Passive fire protection: types and applications (Jan 2004) Link

to Booklet

American Petroleum Institute (API) API 2218 Fire Proofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing

Plants.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) ASME B31.3 Process Piping.

American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) ASTM C150 Specification for Portland Cement. ASTM E119 Method for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials. ASTM E1529 Standard Test Methods for Determining Effects of Large Hydrocarbon

Pool Fires on Structural Members and Assemblies. ASTM G26 Standard Practice for Operating Light-Exposure Apparatus (Xenon-Arc

Type) with and without Water for Exposure of Nonmetallic Materials.



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British Standards Institute (BSI) BS 476 Fire tests on building materials and structures Part 5 - Method of test for

ignitability Part 8 - Test methods and criteria for the fire resistance of elements of building construction.

BS 5306 Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises Part 2 - Specification for sprinkler systems Part 4 - Specification for carbon dioxide systems.

BS 5950 Structural use of steelwork in building. Part 8 - Code of practice for fire resistant design.

BS 8110 Structural use of concrete Part 1 - Code of practice for design and construction.

UK Department of Energy (DEn) DEn Hydrocarbon fire resistance tests for elements of construction for

Offshore Installations -Test specification - Test procedure.

Institute of Petroleum (IP) IP Part 9 Model code of safe practice in the petroleum industry. Part 9. Montreal Protocol Montreal Protocol Assessment II of the Halons Technical Options

Committee.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) NFPA 11 Foam extinguishing systems. NFPA 12 Carbon dioxide extinguishing systems. NFPA 13 Installation of sprinkler systems. NFPA 15 Water spray fixed systems for fire protection. NFPA 16 Deluge foam-water sprinkler and spray systems. NFPA 17 Dry chemical extinguishing systems. NFPA 20 Centrifugal fire pumps. NFPA 24 Service mains and their appurtenances, private. NFPA 86 Ovens and furnaces. NFPA 101 Life Safety Code.

Steel Construction Institute (SCI) Steel Construction Institute Interim guidance notes for the design and protection of topside

structures against explosion and fire. Fire and blast information group - updates.

Underwriters Laboratories (UL) UL 1709 Standard for Safety Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for

Structural Steel.

3. Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:



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Active Fire Protection A system for fire prevention and control requiring moving parts and mechanical system that may or may not require human intervention to initiate. These include water deluge and foam systems, monitors, systems, fire extinguishers etc..

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) In some cases if hydrocarbon containing vessels become very hot in a fire situation and then fail with a resulting loss of containment, the expanding burning vapour results in a BLEVE.

Client Organisation for which fire protection facilities are provided. Within BP this will normally be a Business Unit.

Fire Exposed Envelope The space into which fire potential equipment can release combustible fluids that can cause substantial fire damage.

Fire Scenario Envelopes Fire-scenario envelopes are three-dimensional spaces into which fire potential equipment can release flammable or combustible fluids that if ignited will burn for sufficient time and intensity to inflict escalation.

Fire Potential Applicable to plant and equipment (but excluding pipe work) that contains combustible fluids (See API 2218).

Fire Proofing Materials or application of materials to provide a degree of fire resistance to protect substrates.

Fire Resistance Ability to resist fire for a given time when tested under defined conditions.

Fixed Systems See section 20.3.1.

Flammable Liquid Any liquid having a flash point below 37,8C (100F) and a vapour pressure not exceeding 2,76 bar abs at 37,8C (40 psia at 100F).

Flash fire A flash fire occurs when the combustion of a flammable liquid and vapour results in a flame that passes through the mixture at less than sonic velocity such that damaging overpressures are negligible.

Integrated Safe Design or Inherently Safe Design Incorporation of design safety features on an inter-disciplinary basis, encouraging a coordinated approach to safety in the overall design process.

Jet fire A jet fire is a stable jet of flame produced when a high velocity discharge catches fire. The flame gives off little smoke as a considerable amount of air entrainment takes place during discharge.



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Operator Organisation responsible for safe operation of the Clients plant. Within BP this would be an Operating Unit.

Passive Fire Protection Fire protection which does not require power sources or initiation in order to achieve its aim. This is generally applied to firewalls and systems which protect the plant and structures by preventing the transfer of heat and temperature fires for a defined period. It may include systems which react to the fire; e.g. intumescent paints.

Petroleum Liquids Class 0: Ethane, ethylene, propylene, LPG, and LNG. Class I: Liquids that have a flashpoint below 21C. Class II: Liquids that have a flashpoint from 21C to 55C (70F to 131F) inclusive. Class III: Liquids that have a flashpoint above 55C (131F) up to and including 100C (212F). Class II or III liquids can be further subdivided. Class II(1) or III(1) liquids are those that are handled below their flashpoints. Class II(2) or III(2) liquids are those that are handled at or above their flashpoints.

Pool fire A pool fire involves the combustion of hydrocarbons evaporating from a layer of liquid. A pool fire may occur within a clearly defined boundary, e.g. the bunding below a vessel. A pool fire may also be unconfined and the spread then depends on numerous factors such as the nature of the surface, the presence of drains, and the presence of water surfaces. The flames are often accompanied by large quantities of smoke with both flames and smoke orientated downwind.

Unclassified Liquids Liquids that have a flashpoint above 100C (212F).

4. Symbols and abbreviations

For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:

AFFF Aqueous film forming foam.

ALARP As low as reasonably practical.

BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.

CBA Cost benefit analysis.

CDP Computer data processing.

CO2 Carbon dioxide.

DNV Det Norske Veritas.

EAE Extreme accidental event.

ESD Emergency shutdown.

FEHMP Fire and explosion hazard management plan.

FFFP Film forming fluoroprotein.

FMEA Fault free and failure modes and effects analysis



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FP Fluoroprotein.

FRA Fire Risk Analysis.

GRP Glass reinforced plastic.

HAZID Hazard identification.

HAZOP Hazard and operability

HVAC Heating, ventilating and air conditioning

LNG Liquefied natural gas.

LPG Liquefied petroleum gas.

NPS Nominal pipe size (inches)

NPSHA Net positive suction head available

P&ID Piping and instrument diagram.

PCM Prevention, control and mitigation.

QRA Quantitative risk assessment.

5. Fire hazard management philosophy

5.1. General a. BP sites and projects shall determine the risks to their plants, facilities, and personnel

associated with fires, explosions, toxic inhalation, and environmental damage. Unwarranted releases leading to fire hazards shall be mitigated to minimise personnel exposure, preserve life, minimise injury, and limit business losses.

b. This GP shall be used in conjunction with other BP Group HSSE and BP Group ETPs, assessments, guidelines, and standards to mitigate the risks associated with environmental releases from fire and explosion hazards.

Both environmental protection and fire protection share common goals. If the flammable or combustible material is kept contained the probability of either a fire or environmental incident is greatly reduced. Many of the comments in this document may also be applicable background for environmental releases.

5.2. Philosophy a. Each facility shall have a fire hazard management philosophy that is developed in the early

design (Select, Define) stages of a project. b. The philosophy shall:

1. Identify fire hazards at an early stage in design. 2. Select a strategy to deal with the hazards. 3. Optimise the design to minimise frequency, scale and consequence. 4. Provide systems to control the hazards. 5. Implement the strategy and maintain the systems.



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6. Update the strategy throughout the life of the installation. c. This should be developed as a Fire and Explosion Hazard Management Plan (FEHMP) that

is agreed with the operator of the installation, fully documented, and included in the operating procedures.

d. Since hydrocarbon releases are hazardous as potential fuels for both fires and explosions, it is sensible to embrace both aspects in the FEHMP. However, this GP does not advise on the specific design requirements for explosion hazards (see 1.g).

e. The recommended fire hazard management process is shown in a simplified form in Figure 1 and in detail in Figure 2. It requires that all major fire hazards are identified and quantified, and that a strategy is chosen for each hazard.



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Figure 1 - Hazard management process outline

CONCEPTSELECTION

GOALS/ASSESSMENT STANDARDS

HIGH LEVEL FRA OF EACH CONCEPT

APPLY INHERENT SAFE DESIGN PRINCIPLESTO ELIMINATE/MINIMISE

MAJOR HAZARDS AND CONSEQUENCES

CHOOSE MANAGEMENT STRATEGYFOR EACH HAZARD

OPTIMISE DESIGN TO MINIMISESCALE, FREQUENCY AND DURATION

OF EACH HAZARD

SPECIFY PREVENTION AND CONTROL MEASURES

QUANTIFY DESIGN FIRE CASES

SPECIFY MITIGATING MEASURES

VERIFY THAT GOALS/STANDARDS ARE MET

IMPLEMENT AND COMMUNICATESTRATEGY AND PCM MEASURES

(PROJECT HANDOVER)

ONGOING VERIFICATION, PCM MEASURESTESTING AND MAINTENANCE

MODIFICATION, AUDIT AND CONTROL

YES

NO

IMPR

OV

ECH

AN

GE

FIRE(FRA)AND EXPLOSIONRISKANALYSIS

(INCREASINGDETAILASTHE DESIGNDEVELOPS)



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Figure 2 (Sheet 1) - Hazard management process detail

DEVELOP PROCESS AND LAYOUT OF ALLDESIGN CONCEPTS

INDENTIFY ALL MAJOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION (F&E) HAZARDS

COMPARE MAJOR F&E HAZARDS- SCALE, FREQUENCY AND IMPACT

SELECT CONCEPT OPTION

APPLY INHERENT SAFE DESIGN PRINCIPLESTO OPTIMISE LAYOUT & PROCESS OPTIONS

QUANTIFY HAZARDS: FREQUENCY, SCALE, INTENSITY & DURATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INITIAL PREVENTION

& CONTROL PROVISIONS & SELECTED DESIGN CODES

VERIFY CONCEPT SELECTION (CSE)

RECOMMEND ADDITIONALPREVENTION/CONTROL MEASURES

CHANGE DESIGN CHANGE DESIGN

RECLASSIFYEVENTS

RECLASSIFYEVENTS

SELECT DESIGN AND EXTREMEACCIDENTAL EVENTS

SPECIFY ADDITIONALPREVENTIVE MEASURES

IMPROVE PERFORMANCE OFPREVENTIVE MEASURES

ASSESS FREQUENCY OF EVENTS& CONSEQUENCES AGAINST

COMPANY/LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA/ALARP

SPECIFY EXTRACONTROL

MEASURES

IMPROVEPERFORMANCE

OF CONTROLMEASURES

OPTIMISE DESIGN TO MINIMISEF&E DESIGN CASES

SPECIFY PERFORMANCE STANDARDSOF CONTROL MEASURES TO KEEP

F&E EVENTS WITHIN DESIGN CASES

QUANTIFY REMAINING OPTIMISEDDESIGN EVENTS TAKING INTO

ACCOUNT CONTROL MEASURES

ASSESS PRACTICALITY OF MITIGATINGAGAINST THE DESIGN EVENTS

OPTIMISE PREVENTION MEASURES FOR LARGEST/MOST-FREQUENT CASESTO SHEET 2

TO SHEET 2

FROM SHEET 2

IMPRACTICAL

DESIGN ACCIDENTALEVENTS (DAE)

EXTREME ACCIDENTALEVENTS (EAE)

INADEQUATE



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Figure 2 (Sheet 2) - Hazard management process detail

UPDATE AND MODIFY THE PLAN FOR CHANGES IN:PROCESS DESIGNPROCESS OPERATIONMANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

IMPLEMENT THE FIRE AND EXPLOSIONHAZARD MANAGEMENT PLAN

FULLY DOCUMENT FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT PLAN SUPPORT DOCUMENTS INCLUDE:EVENTSCLASSIFICATION (DAE/EAE)PREVENTIVE MEASURESCONTROL MEASURESSTRATEGY FOR DAE: CONTROL/EXTINGUISH/EVACUATEDESCRIPTION/PLOT OF MAJOR DAES/EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANSEXPOSED CRITICAL EQUIPMENTMITIGATING (PROTECTIVE) MEASURESPERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR PREVENTION/CONTROL/MITIGATINGMEASURES, AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS/MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTIONFREQUENCIES AND PROCEDURESOPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES/LIMITATIONSRESPONSIBLE PERSONS

DOES EAE FREQUENCY ANDCONSEQUENCES MEET LEGISLATIVE/

COMPANY CRITERIA AND ALARP

ASSESS, FREQUENCY OF AND TIME TO,ESCALATE TO EAE

(INITIATING EVENT & CONTROL OR MITIGATING MEASURE FAILURE FREQUENCY)

VERIFY ADEQUACY OF DESIGNSTANDARDS TO MATCH HAZARDS

SELECT AND SPECIFYPROTECTION/

REINFORCEMENT MEASURESTO MATCH HAZARDS

DECIDE IF EVENT IS TO BECONTAINED, EXTINGUISHED OR SUPPRESSED

IDENTIFY ALL CRITICALITEMS EXPOSED TOF&E CONDITIONS

WHICH COULD CAUSE FAILURE IMPROVE SYSTEMPERFORMANCE

OR SPECIFYNEW SYSTEMSSELECT AND SET

PERFORMANCE MEASURESFOR ENSURING POST

EXTINGUISHMENT SECURITY

SELECT AND SETPERFORMANCE STANDARDS

OF SUPPRESSION/EXTINGUISHING MEASURES

REDUCE FREQUENCY OFINITIATING EVENTS

(IMPROVE PREVENTIONMEASURES)

FROM SHEET 1TO SHEET 1

INADEQUATE

CONTAIN SUPPRESS/EXTINGUISH

FROM SHEET 1

NO

5.3. Strategy choices a. The choice of a particular strategy should be made at an early stage when it is still possible

to optimise the design, to minimise the hazards, and take credit for these features before



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committing expenditure on extensive protection. This approach achieves full integration of prevention, protection, and mitigation of fire hazards.

b. The possible strategies are: 1. Fire prevention. 2. Fire containment and prevention of escalation (i.e. minimisation). 3. Acceptance of consequential damage.

c. Each of these strategies requires the provision of measures to manage the hazard and at each stage cost effectiveness shall be considered.

These measures are a combination of prevention and control to minimise the frequency, scale, intensity, and duration of the hazard and mitigation to protect personnel and critical equipment.

d. These measures shall be identified and designed to suit the type, scale and frequency of the perceived hazard. They shall be included in the FEHMP as it develops during the project and ultimately handed over to the Operator as part of the operating procedures.

5.4. Strategy goals a. The chosen mitigation strategies shall:

1. aim to reduce the risks to personnel both at the facility and offsite locations 2. address business losses and the need to prevent escalation to a major environmental

incident. 3. meet targets for individual risk and major accident frequency specified by

Client/Operator and/or national legislation (See GP 48-02 on HAZOP which provides a corporate risk matrix and GP 48-50 GP Major Accident Risk Process).

b. Further specific asset protection should only be provided following a request from the Client/Operator and may be subjected to a cost benefit analysis.

c. A formal review of the strategy should be undertaken to ensure that all hazards have been identified and that the quality of the FEHMP is acceptable.

d. The FEHMP should be handed over to and subject to acceptance by the Client/Operator. e. A fire risk analysis shall examine the chosen strategies to independently verify that the

measures are adequate.

5.5. Benefits of the FEHMP process The process and approach provides protection that is matched to the fire

hazards and consequences and identifies the design case. This places obligations on the Operator to ensure that the chosen strategy and associated facilities are maintained in an operative condition.

Implications for capital investment- The FEHMP process ensures that the optimum combinations of prevention control and mitigation measures are chosen, eliminating unnecessary systems and selecting the most cost effective way of managing each hazard.

Implications for active fire protection- The FEHMP process described in this GP has the benefit of determining more accurately the information upon which firewater requirements are based. This occurs at an early design stage and requires assessment of potential fires that are chosen as the design case in individual risk areas, and matching the protection to them. It is more realistic than the traditional Reference Area method and does not require arbitrary correction factors.



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Implications for passive fire protection- Areas requiring passive protection are more easily identified and unnecessary protection can be avoided.

Implications for operators- A clear strategy is put in place for each hazard and all the thinking behind it, the systems required to implement it and performance standards for each prevention control and mitigation measure, are documented and handed over from a project. This allows effective hazard management to be documented.The requirements for procedural controls, maintenance, inspection, and test as developed during design and construction would therefore be transmitted to the Operator.

5.6. Caution on the use of this procedure Since the FEHMP process is based on different assumptions from the Reference Area method, the two techniques should not be used in combination.

The Reference Area method of determining active protection for hydrocarbon areas uses prescriptive water application rates that are pre-defined regardless of the hazard addressed. One result of this type of approach may be the over or under design of water systems. The Hazard Management approach, which matches fire protection closely to the fire risk, leads to more effective protection and a more effective design.

6. Hazard identification and listing

6.1. Identification of Hazards a. Identification of hazards shall be approached on a formalised basis. b. The facility shall be divided into areas and if necessary sub areas. For each area a Fire Risk

Analysis (FRA) report shall be prepared. c. The FRA shall establish hydrocarbon inventories and the valving arrangements in order to

identify the major isolatable inventories, source, fire type, combustible material, pressure, etc. This information shall be presented in tabular form as shown in Table 1.

d. If an identified hazard can impact upon other equipment or areas then it shall also be listed as shown in the example entry for Table 2.

e. Special note shall be made of instances where fires may be preceded by a gas release that may be followed by a confined explosion, an explosion (the initiating event) that may cause larger/multiple releases and fires or structural damage.

f. Releases, fires and explosions in other fire areas that can affect the area in question shall also be considered.

6.2. Information requirements When determining the requirements for fire protection facilities, the following factors shall be considered:

1. The statutory requirements of the country in which the facility will be or is operating. 2. The type and size of the facility. 3. The number of employees on site or planned to be on site. 4. The products stored, processed, or handled. 5. The availability and response time of trained fire crews. 6. The availability and quality of mutual aid schemes. 7. The proximity of adjacent vessels/process plant.



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8. The proximity of third party and public property. 9. The proximity to water courses. 10. Relief and Blow down. 11. Topography including elevation, slope, and drainage. 12. Existence of threatened, endangered species. 13. The proximity of local population/community. 14. The economic importance of the installation. 15. Capital cost of replacement plant. 16. Potential environmental pollution. 17. Business loss.

6.3. Information sources Installation design information may be available from (some of which may be preliminary):

1. Planning application information. 2. Hazardous area drawings. 3. Plot plans, including equipment lists. 4. P&IDs, e.g. main process area, storage area, etc. 5. Process data sheets. 6. Plot plans of escape routes. 7. Process flow diagrams. 8. Key operating procedure details. 9. HVAC philosophy. 10. Fire and Gas detection/cause and Effect diagrams. 11. Area Drainage/containment. 12. Failure rate estimates.

6.4. Fire scenario development A fire scenario shall be development for the plant or facility which identifies the progress of events that could contribute to the fire, what elements affect the nature of the fire, and the situation if the fire is left unabated. For each scenario the following data should be considered:

1. What could cause the release of fuel? 2. Where is the fuel release scenario located? 3. Realistic quantity of release?

a) hydrocarbon hold-up, and b) releasable inventory.

4. Flow rate of release? a) Temperature and pressure of source. b) Size of hole. c) Nature of release.

5. Will the release be contained?



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a) Capacity of drainage system to remove the spill. 6. If ignited, what would be the character and extent of the fire?

a) Volatility. b) Burn rate. c) Heat of combustion. d) Physical properties of released material.

7. Heat release if ignites? 8. Burn-out time if left alone?

6.5. Fire-scenario envelope a. A fire-scenario envelope shall be used when determining fire damage and assigning

protection. b. Preliminary dimensions for fire scenario envelopes that should be used are:

1. Pool fires, 6 to 12 m (20 to 40 ft) horizontal, and 6 to 12 m (20 to 40 ft) vertical from the periphery or spill quantity.

2. LPG vessels, within 15 m (50 ft) horizontally and vertically of the vessel or within the spill containment area.

c. These estimates are sufficient for preliminary analysis, but further consequence modelling should be completed to verify the fire-scenario envelope.

6.6. Needs analysis A needs analysis shall be under taken to determine the level of protection (if any) that is required to protect the plant and facility equipment. The needs analysis should be a qualitative What If exercise. It should include factors relating to duration and severity of the fire scenario. It shall consider which specific equipment might be exposed, the vulnerability, and the resulting impact. These should include social, environmental, and human aspects as well as the business costs. The analysis should consider the effectiveness of intervention and suppression resources together with the probability of the event together with escalation. The needs analysis should be conducted as phased exercises. a. The first phase should include:

1. The location and potential heat release. a) Equipment that can be exposed, and b) The nature and proximity of the exposure.

2. The severity of operating conditions in exposed equipment. a) Process temperature and pressure. b) Process materials above auto ignition points. c) Equipment contains liquids that act as a heat sink.

3. Fire Grade area potential of equipment. 4. Equipment spacing, layout and potential fire exposure to adjacent fire. 5. Estimated duration of unabated fire.

b. The second phase should consider intervention capabilities: 1. Effectiveness of drainage system to remove hydrocarbon spillages.



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2. Capability of isolation and blow down systems. 3. Active fire protection provided by fixed water spray systems or fixed monitors. 4. Unit spacing, equipment layout, and access for emergency response.

c. The third phase should consider Effective Response Times: 1. Automatic fire and gas detection. 2. Investigation/ confirmation of fire. 3. Manual initiation of control actions. 4. Blow-down time of fuel source. 5. Fire team assembly and control time. 6. Additional fire inventory control.

d. The final phase considers the risk: 1. The potential impact on employees, the public or the environment. 2. Scenario event probability (qualitative assessment). 3. The fire grade hazard rating of equipment. 4. The intrinsic value of potentially exposed plant or equipment. 5. The importance of unit equipment to continued plant operations.

6.7. Fire types

6.7.1. General Different types of fire should be considered:

1. Flash from gaseous hydrocarbons. 2. Jet from gaseous or high pressure liquid hydrocarbons. 3. Three dimensional running liquid fires. 4. Pool from low pressure liquid hydrocarbons. 5. Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE). 6. Electrical. 7. Cellulose. 8. Fire resulting from an explosion.

7. Selection of fire hazard management strategy - design fire cases

7.1. General a. A hazard management strategy shall be required for every major fire hazard identified for a

new plant or facility installation. b. The Client shall decide at the beginning of a project if the strategy should only address the

preservation of life and the environment or include investment protection. c. The selection of the hazard management strategy depends on two considerations: the

practicality of implementing the strategy and the scale of the incident. d. The selected hazard management strategy will need to be reviewed at various points in the

design to verify that it remains viable.



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It is preferable and more cost effective to specify prevention measures rather than mitigating measures.

7.2. Fire prevention Decisions on prevention and mitigation shall be based on risk and considerations should be given for cost benefit analysis (CBA). The aim should be to reduce the frequency and consequences of these events to within acceptable risk tolerability as defined by the business unit and in GP 48-02 and 48-50.

7.3. Fire containment and prevention of escalation a. Fire containment and prevention of escalation should be the most common strategy for all

process, fuel, and non hydrocarbon fires. b. Critical equipment should be protected by location or protective systems that match the

type and duration of the initial hazard. The protective systems depend on the operation of control equipment such as drains and ESD. The Operator will be responsible for maintenance and testing to ensure that these systems work when needed.

c. If the size, location and character of a fire are predictable, proven extinguishing methods shall be employed to put it out or control it before there is critical escalation or loss of life.

d. Extinguishment may be an alternative to passive protection for stored fuel or very low pressure oil processing. Post extinguishment re-ignition hazards, such as residual pockets of flammable gas or pools of liquid, should be considered in selecting an extinguishment measure.

e. Extinguishment of gas releases and flashing liquids should not be considered if there may be a subsequent explosion or gas ingress hazard.

Emergency shutdown provisions and isolation of process units help to determine the type and duration of the fire protection appropriate for a facility. If the fire cannot be isolated and de-inventoried quickly, the duration of a fire can exceed 1 to 4 hours. This time period is that which passive fire proofing can reasonably provide. After this time it is feasible that escalation of the fire can become a major consideration.

7.4. Fire and mitigation planning a. Comprehensive fire and explosion mitigation plans should be developed for each major

incident scenario developed in the fire and explosion assessment. b. Regardless of the type of mitigation strategy selected for each exposure, appropriate

resources shall be made available. In addition, as locations new and established grow in size, possibility of simultaneous incidents occurring increases and this aspect should be taken into account.

c. The possible impact on the community and environment may justify the installation of additional detection and protective systems where they may not otherwise appear necessary.

In some situations, a potential fire location is close to residential or environmentally sensitive sites and additional detection and protective systems are necessary.

7.5. Acceptance of consequential damage a. Fixed protection shall not be needed if the strategy of acceptance of consequential damage

is chosen.



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b. The definition of this category shall be: Applies in circumstances where a fire would not cause a significant risk to life and the consequential damage can be limited to an acceptable level.

c. If containment or control requires the provision of passive protection (e.g. fire walls) or manual fire fighting facilities, the hazard shall be classified under 7.3.

7.6. Controlled burn Rapid extinguishment may not always be possible or prudent. If heat impingement on other vessels or facilities may be controlled and there is no danger to the public, it may be acceptable and sometimes safer to allow the fire to burn itself out under controlled conditions. The decision to select this method of fire control should be made with the advice of qualified fire control personnel and the authority having jurisdiction and should be included as an option in the facility fire response plan.

8. Hazard quantification

8.1. General Hazard quantification is the means of formally identifying the size, duration, release rate, and intensity of all of the major fire hazards are chosen as design cases for either active or passive fire protection. A detailed analysis of the low frequency overwhelming events is not needed but a coarse assessment is required to assist in the selection of the appropriate management strategy. If the fire hazards are well understood and do not vary significantly on different installations, these may be classed as generic hazards. These do not need to be quantified in the rigorous detail described below. If the hazard is variable, but standard methods of protection have proved to be fully effective, the hazard can be classified as standard. Rigorous quantification is not required but a general listing of the variables that would affect the fire, such as the primary flammable inventories or the containment, would be needed. Information is required at the following stages of a project: Concept Selection. Fire Hazard Management Strategy Selection. Concept Safety Evaluation/Assessment. Process Design Optimisation to minimise fire hazards. Detail Design of Protection Systems. Formal Safety Assessment. Operator Handover. Plant Modification. The level of detail depends on the level of process and layout detail available at the time.

Fire hazard quantification is an ongoing process that should simply be updated as more detailed information becomes available or the design is modified. The project safety plan identifies any requirement to carry out an independent check of the fire hazard quantification at either the concept or formal safety assessment stage.

8.2. Method a. The fire hazard quantification should be carried out using methods approved by the

Client/Operator. Different methods may be applied to different fire hazards.



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The BP computer programs HARP and CIRRUS are considered acceptable for release calculation and fire characterisation respectively. Other techniques are needed for compartment or obstructed fires.

b. The fires shall be quantified in a form that can be used as the basis of the fire protection design. It may also provide input data to a quantified risk assessment (QRA).

c. The following cases shall be required for specifying fire protection: 1. The largest design fire case lasting long enough to cause failure. The duration shall be

specified in order to carry out this analysis. Under intense hydrocarbon fires, items may theoretically fail in a few minutes. In practice, the time to failure may be slightly longer than the theoretical minimum. Items that are particularly weak such as plate heat exchangers should be identified.

2. The largest design fire cases at specified times. These may be the times at which proprietary passive protection fails, e.g. 60 minutes.

3. The duration of the smallest significant fires. Normally this would only be needed if investment protection was required and the duration was likely to significantly exceed any of the other cases already analysed.

8.3. Variables The following variables should be taken into account when carrying out the analysis:

1. Each inventory and the proportion that can be released. 2. Type of hydrocarbon fluids. 3. Burn characteristics for these fluids, including transition pressures from spray to pool

for liquid release. 4. Management strategy for each inventory. 5. Maximum hole size or release rate.

It should be recognised that the largest hole does not necessarily give the worst fire from an isolated inventory for a particular duration. Some methods require selection of a number of hole sizes to represent typical incidents.

6. Location of all potential releases. 7. ESD operability and time to operate. 8. Depressurisation operability and time to operate. 9. Release pressure profile taking into account depressurisation and reheat due to the

fire. 10. Pool size and drainage. 11. Ventilation rate.

8.4. Analysis Results The following outputs shall be required from the analysis, and may be presented in tabular form (See Table 3), with a summary in the FEHMP.

1. Fire type: pool, jet, spray or solid combustibles. 2. Fire exposed envelope, location, and flame geometry. (These should be superimposed

on plant layouts and take reasonable account of obstructions and wind effects). The



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size of the fire exposed envelope shall be confirmed using hazard assessment methods approved by BP.

3. Burn time of releases. 4. Heat intensities (fluxes) inside and outside the flame. 5. Lists of critical equipment subjected to radiated heat or direct flame impingement.

9. Prevention

Prevention is the primary defence against fire and applies to all fire hazards. It is implemented through the selection of appropriate design and construction codes and standards and operational controls. These are considered to be adequate if the potential fire can be controlled without the need to evacuate the plant.

a. The potential causes of failure shall be identified and a combination of design features and operational procedures put together to address each one. The causes of failure may, during conceptual design, be identified by a HAZID. This should be verified by a HAZOP study during detailed design. The studies should include the following: 1. Fire (the effects of all other major fire hazards on this particular case). 2. Impact (dropped objects). 3. Corrosion (internal and external). 4. Environmental (severe weather). 5. Breaches of Containment (maintenance and operation). 6. Overpressure (process control failure or overheating). 7. Explosion. 8. Isolation Failure (failure to isolate the hazard from another part of the plant).

b. In each case, the contributing elements to the failure should be identified, e.g. the lockout of a fire and gas detection system may prevent closure of the shutdown valves. The HAZOP and HAZID studies may be augmented by a fault tree and a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). Once identified, the adequacy of the preventive measures embodied in the normal codes and standards and operational procedures should be examined.

This judgement is based on the contribution of the particular hazard to the overall risk to the plant. If the overall risk is acceptable, and the hazard is not a primary contributor to that overall risk, then no further action is required other than to ensure that the design codes and procedures are applied. These should, however, be documented as a critical prevention measure in the FEHMP.

c. If, however, the hazard dominates the overall risk then each cause of failure shall be individually addressed and reasonably practicable design and operational measures shall be put in place.

d. Once these additional specific preventive measures have been identified and design features included, then they shall be documented together with the general prevention measures such as the design codes, in the fire hazard management plan.



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10. Hazard minimisation and control measures

10.1. General The first stage in hazard minimisation is the use of appropriate codes and standards in the design. However, the use of hazard analysis techniques identifies the largest hazards and allows further examination of them to reduce their scale, duration, intensity and consequence. This is normally only required for the hydrocarbon processing events and the main storage inventories. The aim is to reduce the scale of the hazards to that which would not overwhelm the installation and would be of a size that could be controlled by the fire fighting and protection systems. This section concentrates on the techniques to minimise the largest events. The process of design requires the interaction of all engineering disciplines and sufficient time to allow it to take place. The areas that can be optimised are given in the sub-sections that follow. Control measures are those systems that limit the size of fires to that which can be counteracted or extinguished by the passive or active protection systems. These are critical elements in the fire hazard management process as, without them, the fire could spread to areas with inadequate protection.

10.2. Inventory minimisation Major fire hazards are generally dominated by a small number of events, such as fires originating from separators, slug catchers and storage.

a. Fire-tested isolation valves should be located as close to the vessel as possible, with protection or positioning to withstand any anticipated explosions or fires.

b. Valves should close automatically on signals from the Fire & Gas and ESD systems and have local/remote manual initiation.

c. If product separation or bubble tight closure is critical, double block and bleed valves should be used. These valves should also be used when performing pressure tightness tests.

The fire hazard quantification may also show that the degree of isolation provided between some inventories is disproportionate to others, i.e. that there are a number of small inventories which, if combined, do not constitute as severe a hazard as other individual ones. If this is the case, it may be appropriate to rationalise the isolation philosophy by reducing the valve numbers and concentrate the resources on other, more severe hazards. In the case of isolated process inventories the design is restricted by the minimum size of vessel required to carry out the processing. If the fire quantification shows that the inventory is so large that it can still overwhelm the installation, then it is necessary to introduce specific design features and procedures to control the rate of release. It may be appropriate to question the design specification that determined the vessel size and discuss with the Operator. It may also be appropriate to consider the dumping of liquid inventories, although the hazards associated with this should not be overlooked. These measures should only be undertaken where the frequency of the overwhelming event is such that it makes an excessive contribution to the overall risk.

10.3. Optimisation of release location a. Two benefits may be achieved by optimising the location of potential releases.

1. The number of fire areas into which the inventory can be released is reduced. 2. The thermal loading of critical plant and structure can be minimised.



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b. The first benefit shall require that the major inventories are isolated within the fire area so that they cannot cascade into others via the process piping and systems.

c. The second benefit shall require that the major isolated inventories and well hazards are positioned so that the fires resulting from potential release points have the minimum potential for impact on critical facilities, structure, and evacuation routes.

It may be possible to optimise the location of potential sources of release; pig launcher and receiver doors, instrument taps and flanges so that a pressurised liquid or gas release does not impinge directly onto critical plant or processing equipment with a high escalation potential.

10.4. Control of the rate of release The rate of release can be controlled in two ways: a. Minimisation of the pressure profile with respect to time.

The pressure profile is a function of the initial pressure and the effects on the inventory of the fire and control actions. The fire itself causes the liquid inventory to boil off, increasing the pressure. This can be minimised by fire resistant insulation but this should withstand the effects of the fire if credit is to be taken for it. Depressurisation reduces the pressure and disposes of a proportion of the gas inventory. It also helps to reduce the pressures generated by boiling liquids. If the major inventories dominate the fire cases, particularly those of long duration, there may be scope to optimise the allocation of the flare capacity to minimise their post ESD pressure profiles at the expense of other smaller inventories. Relief valves only keep the pressure to the relief pressure setting if they are realistically sized for the boil off rates that are generated by the particular fire types and size.

b. Minimisation of the maximum hole size on which the design fire cases are based. Minimisation of the hole size through which a release can occur can be achieved by a combination of design specifications and procedures. However, these must be thoroughly documented in the FEHMP and implemented if credit is to be taken for it in any safety assessment. The design considerations are the minimisation of fittings above the critical size, the use of particular jointing systems (e.g. ring type joints) above the critical size, design of the process plant to withstand the maximum anticipated explosion conditions, particularly fittings, and the specific identification and minimisation of any cause of large bore failure (e.g. corrosion or erosion). The operational procedures include the control of any breaches of containment above the critical size and the control of any operations likely to cause these larger failures (e.g. heavy lifts). This may not be practical on all process equipment but it can be applied to individual inventories and well operations.

10.5. Control of liquid releases by bunding If there is a possibility of a pool fire, both the location and size of the fire can be optimised by controlling the spread of the flammable liquids. This may be achieved by either bunding or gulley but in either case there should be provision to dispose of any firewater and to safely dispose of any unburned hydrocarbons. Flammable liquid should be prevented from spreading towards any critical structure or plant if possible. The total pool fire area will determine the burn rate and the overall fire size. This is a particularly powerful tool in the control of fire hazards but it is only effective if the liquid release pressure is low enough to prevent the majority of the liquid burning as a spray.



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10.6. Control of fire spread by fire walls a. The effects of a fire may be controlled by firewalls around the fire area. These may also

limit the ventilation causing reduced combustion and possible extinguishment. b. This should only be considered if there is not a significant gaseous explosion hazard in the

area or the firewalls are arranged so that the explosion overpressures are unlikely to cause escalation.

c. Water curtains may be considered for controlling billowing flames from pool or low pressure spray fires.

11. Protection and mitigation methods

11.1. General The protection of an area may be achieved by active means, passive means, or a combination of both. The choice varies from one area to another. Each area should be treated on its own merits. As part of the review of each area, fire hazards should be examined to determine whether it is practical to extinguish the fire. Extinguishment shall only be chosen as the sole means of fire protection if all consequent explosion or fire hazards can be eliminated until disposal or dispersion of inventory has been achieved, or arrangements made to extinguish re-ignited fires. It may be used in addition to exposure protection as a means of damage limitation. This shall be at the discretion of the Client/Operator.

11.2. Protection measures

11.2.1. Exposure protection without extinguishment The choices of exposure protection are: a. Active:

1. Deluge systems. 2. Monitors. 3. Manual fire fighting. 4. Fire and gas detection and alarms.

b. Passive: 1. Coatings (Intumescent and cementitious). 2. Firewalls. 3. Enclosures. 4. Insulation or panel systems.

Passive protection may also have dual functions such as blast walls, insulation, segregation, and paint systems.

11.2.2. Passive protection to prevent failures a. Passive protection systems should be provided if the anticipated design fire conditions

could lead to any of the following failures: 1. Catastrophic failure. 2. Significant escalation leading to a combined fire size in excess of the protection

possible. 3. Penetration, overheat, or excessive smoke levels within the control room.



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4. Loss of sufficient emergency equipment needed to counteract the initial event. 5. Loss of sufficient emergency equipment needed to preserve life from the initial event. 6. Loss of sufficient emergency equipment needed to control the event before the

equipment has operated (e.g. ESD valves). 7. Progressive structural collapse. 8. Structural failure or the collapse of heavy loads leading to escalation as above.

b. The duration rating of the passive protection shall be based on the expected fire duration or, if the fire is of extended duration, the time required for shutdown. In all cases the protection should prevent the structure/equipment reaching its failure temperature, within the specified time.

11.2.3. Extinguishment without exposure protection a. If adopting this approach the protection should guarantee the extinguishment of the fire

and any consequential fires (e.g. cable fires, running fires, etc.) before critical failure can take place.

b. In addition the protection should guarantee the prevention of re-ignition or have sufficient residual capacity to extinguish any recurring fire.

11.2.4. Choice of method of exposure protection In jet fires the point of impingement receives high levels of heat input. Water spray alone may not be effective in protecting structures and equipment, although some cooling may be achieved. As a result, passive fire protection or limitation of jet fire duration may be the only effective options. The choice of active and/or passive fire protection and their allocation to equipment, structures, and walls depends on:

1. Suitability of the chosen system to the type of fire. 2. Weight and cost constraints. 3. Overall site water capacity and infrastructure. 4. Corrosion as a result of water deluge. 5. The need to insulate vessels for process reasons where passive protection may have a

dual role. 6. Reliability and availability of active systems. 7. Survivability of passive systems in normal operational conditions. 8. Survivability of active and passive systems following an explosion. 9. The required duration of protection. 10. Preventing failure of instrumentation and electrical equipment. 11. Access for inspection and reinstatement. 12. Disruption to operations during active system testing. 13. Predicted life and maintenance refurbishment requirements of active and passive

systems.

14. The heat intensity of the design event. 15. Corrosion under passive fire protection. 16. Practicality and complexity of application to exposed plant or structures.



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17. Environmental conditions in application and use. 18. Performance verification. 19. Secondary effects, burn rate control. 20. Operator exposure.

11.2.5. Choice of method of extinguishment The choices of extinguishing method should be:

1. Oxygen starvation. 2. Foam.

3. Inert gas. 4. Water systems. 5. Dilution. 6. Dry powder.

Considerations for the choice of method are: Suitability for the fire hazard. Post extinguishment security. Personnel safety. Practicality of application. Consequential damage. Speed of response. Reactive gas systems may be considered if a proven halon replacement becomes available.

12. Implementation and documentation

12.1. Communication plan There shall be adequate communication and documentation from each stage of a project to the next, and to the Operator, so that the hazard management decisions are understood and recorded. This is accomplished by the Fire and Explosion Hazard Management Plan, (FEHMP). It may also be encompassed within an overall plan for the management of hazards on the installation. The plan should contain the following information: a. A specific listing of each major fire hazard (e.g. separator fire). b. A listing of groups of generic hazards.

12.2. Information For each of the major hazards and groups of generic hazards, the following information is required: a. The strategy to manage the hazard. b. The list of engineered prevention, control, and mitigation measures. c. The list of software systems/procedural controls. d. A description and quantification of the design accidental events (the fire hazard

quantification). e. A description of the extreme accidental events and consequences.



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f. Nominated responsible persons for each of the prevention, control, and mitigation measures.

12.3. Documentation The following support documentation should be provided for the prevention, control, and mitigation (PCM) measures (as appropriate):

1. Performance and design standards, e.g.: a) Corrosion thickness (prevention). b) ESD closure time (control). c) Drainage flow rate (control). d) Passive protection rating (mitigation). e) Deluge application rate (mitigation). f) Availability and reliability (all).

2. Criticality. 3. Controls and operating restrictions during maintenance or non-availability of the

PCM measures e.g. deployment of ground monitors during deluge system maintenance.

4. Documentation for procedural PCM measures e.g. corrosion inspection procedures. 5. Maintenance procedures and frequencies. 6. Inspection procedures, test frequencies, and performance acceptability limits e.g. 7. Maximum valve closure time. 8. Minimum wall thickness. 9. Emergency response procedures. 10. Demonstration, using QRA, that the design meets company and legislative criteria for

individual risk.

12.4. FEHMP a. The preparation of the FEHMP should commence at the conceptual design stage when the

major hazards are identified. It should be prepared by a responsible person with input from all disciplines and the Operator.

b. As the project progresses, other hazards may be identified, strategies selected and PCM measures specified. The FEHMP should develop as each item of information becomes available.

c. Fire quantification and engineering sections should be substantially complete before construction.

d. Prior to commissioning, the operational and procedural sections should be completed and handed over to the commissioning/operating team.

e. FEHMP and supporting documentation should form the basis of the checklists and acceptance procedures for the PCM systems during inspection, test and commissioning.

f. The FEHMP should be a living document that conveys information to those who are responsible for safe operation, in a form that is concise and easily read. It should not be an over detailed, cumbersome, mammoth work. This particularly applies to the description of the fire hazards that should be in pictorial form with a short descriptive text.



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12.5. FEHMP for safety case The FEHMP is also a support document to any safety case requirements and shall be completed in time for submission if required. The FEHMP shall be regularly reviewed and updated whenever there is either an engineering modification affecting the hazards or the PCM measures, or a management reorganisation affecting responsible persons.

13. Process areas

13.1. Hazard identification a. Equipment within process areas shall be identified as having high, medium, or low fire

potential according to API 2218. b. Hazards shall be identified using procedures as outlined in Section 6 and shall be listed in

tabular form. c. This list should give the size of hydrocarbon inventories, comprising the total volume of

hydrocarbons between emergency shutdown valves, which may include vessel inventories, pipeline inventories, etc. If the vessel inventory is variable, the relevant amount is that defined by the highest level alarm set point.

d. The list should define hydrocarbon vessel identity, type of hydrocarbon, capacity, maximum anticipated working pressure, means of isolation and anticipated fire types (See Table 1).

e. Other hazards, local to or on adjacent sites that might precipitate or escalate a potential fire incident should be recorded as in Table 2.

Table 1 - Hazard identification (example data) Unit or Area _____________________________

Item I.D. No. Hydrocarbon Type

Capacity (kg (lb))

Pressure (barg (psig))

Fire Type

Enclosure Type

Other Hazards

Vessel 00000 Gas/Oil 20 000 (44 000) 150 (2 180) Jet/Pool Open Smoke 00001 Gas 1 000 (2 200) 80 (1 160) Jet Enclosed Explosion

Table 2 - Associated hazards (example data) Unit or Area _____________________________

Item I.D. No. High Probability Hazards Low Probability Hazards Vessel 0000 Escalation to other vessels causing further

losses Widespread fires if process fire preceded by an explosion

Failure of pipework and vessel supports BLEVE Structural failure resulting in partial or total

collapse under the vessel Complete obstruction of local escape routes by smoke

Reduction in escape route availability

13.2. Hazard quantification a. Fire hazards shall be quantified using an approved technique (see Section 8) that identifies

fire types and quantifies their frequency, size, duration, and associated rate of release. b. The thermal load to which the fire subjects both the area in which the incident occurs and

adjacent areas should also be quantified. c. The degree to which fires are ventilated (if in an enclosed area) or fuel controlled shall be

assessed, since this affects the thermal fire load on equipment and structures (see Table 3).



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Table 3 - Hazard quantification (example data)

Release Number 1 Location/I.D. Number V 301 Pressure (barg (psig)) 5,5 (80) Temperature (C (F)) 80 (176) Release Diameter (mm (in)) 50 (2) Material C5 Release Rate (kg/s (lb/s)) 8,7 (19) Release Frequency (yr1) 4,6 x 104 Fire Type (1) P Release Duration (min) (2) Base

Comparative 60 15

Fire Exposed Envelope Length/Diameter (m (ft)) Overpressure (mbar (psi))

14 (46) ???

Max Heat Flux (kW/m2 (Btu/hr/ft2)) (3) 120 (38 100) Critical Equipment (4) V 201, V 101 Notes: 1. Fire types may be categorised as: J=Jet Fire P=Pool Fire F=Flash Fire E=Explosion S=Solid Combustible 2. Base = inventory with no shut down, depressurisation or isolation Comparative = inventory after shut down, depressurisation or isolation. 3. Calculated from BP CIRRUS program or equivalent. 4. Critical equipment that is subject to radiated heat or direct flame impingement.

13.3. Exposure protection

13.3.1. Thermal stresses

a. Equipment in and around process areas that could be exposed to significant thermal stresses, which could lead to unacceptable consequences, shall be protected. 1. Structures directly or indirectly supporting significant hydrocarbon inventories or

emergency systems. 2. Structures supporting loads that could fall leading to a further significant hydrocarbon

release, catastrophic failure, loss or damage to the control room or emergency systems.

3. Hydrocarbon or other plant that could fail catastrophically or lead to further significant releases.

Emergency systems requiring protection are only those that would be required to control the incident. Even without fire protection, structures, vessels, valves, etc., can (because of their bulk) withstand fire exposure for a period of time before reaching critical failure temperatures. This period of time is influenced by the size, type and direction of the fire together with the duty of the structure, vessel, etc. Software packages are available to calculate heat input, temperature rise and the stress levels of metal surfaces. These should be utilised, as necessary, during the fire risk analysis.



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13.3.2. Extinguishant quantity Protection systems may be active, passive, or a combination of both and shall be rated to ensure that they operate until the fire is extinguished. This occurs either when the fire burns out or the protective system achieves extinguishment.

With the correct type of protection, time to failure is extended; with the incorrect type of protection no benefit is gained. For example, medium velocity water sprays have been shown to be ineffective in jet fire cases. However, they can extend the period of protection when considering an engulfment or radioactive heat fire scenario. Credit can, in certain instances, be taken for the beneficial effect of non-specialist protective devices, e.g. thermal insulation for operational purposes.

Many protection systems require a fire to be extinguished. At the design stage, it shall be determined how much extinguishant is provided or stored on site. In making this decision, account can be taken of the supplies available through mutual aid agreements with adjacent industries or other external bodies. However, on-site supplies shall be sufficient to meet the immediate fire fighting needs until the external supplies have arrived and been deployed.

13.3.3. Additional equipment to be protected Protection may be applied to additional equipment if considered necessary to protect investment and production. In this case either the equipment, or the means by which the criticality of such equipment is assessed, shall be specified. This may include for example: a. Cabling and instrumentation. b. Motors. c. Non hydrocarbon plant.

13.3.4. Application of water Exposure protection may be achieved by the application of water, which should be considered for cooling, intensit

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