govt 498 mullikin paper
TRANSCRIPT
TIP OF THE SPEAR:
PLA Special Operations Forces
Figure 1: A soldier from the "Sharp Sword of Southern China" SOF unit during a training exercise.
Andrew Mullikin
Prepared for: Dr. Philip Karber, Georgetown University
2012.05.10
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The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans…1
—Sun Tsu
I. Introduction
Special operations forces (SOF) are present in the majority of the world’s
finest militaries, from American Special Forces ODAs and Navy SEAL platoons to the
British SAS Regiment and the Korean Special Forces Brigades. Their training
regimes, individual members’ high degree of self-‐motivation, and unconventional
mission set distinguish all of these units. In his thesis on the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) special operations forces for the Naval Postgraduate School, Smith
describes the common threads woven through all SOF, writing:
[T]he visual image and understanding of dedicated SOF remains predictably uniform. Dedicated SOF usually operate in relatively small units that can achieve with a few what conventional forces might not be able or willing with many; dedicated SOF are composed of highly-trained, skilled and motivated operators who underwent grueling ‘rights of passage’ to gain admission into their particular units and often operate without the benefits of external support; dedicated SOF usually get the best most high-‐tech equipment and weapons that their countries can offer, but are fully capable of working the low-‐tech end of the spectrum; dedicated SOF operators are physically, mentally and spiritually tougher than most and are assigned the most difficult and dangerous missions to accomplish, often within enemy-controlled territory, so are usually considered the ‘elite’ of their respective military services.2 [Emphasis added.]
Essentially, all special operations units are constituted and trained to act as both the
vanguard of a conventional fighting force and a reliable, readily deployable force for
1 Sun Tsu, Art of War, (Giles translation; London, UK: British Museum, 1910) at < http://www.textfiles.com/etext/NONFICTION/suntx10.txt > [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 2 Xavier G. Smith, Special Operations Forces in the People’s Liberation Army and the Development of an Integral Unconventional Warfare Mission, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005, p. 1.
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unconventional operations. In keeping with the Sun Tsu quote above, special
operations units are trained to disrupt the enemy’s plans, acting as a force multiplier
on complex battlefields.
Yet, despite their reputation for superior training and battlefield efficacy, SOF
have only recently been incorporated into major strategic military operations
within the US defense establishment; prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks,
special operations units were usually disdained by higher command, the leaders of
which were generally drawn from conventional forces that found “operators”
undisciplined and lacking a sufficient military bearing. All of this changed during
the US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as SOF found their skills highly sought-‐
after in conflicts that required unconventional means to achieve tactical goals in an
asymmetric environment. As American special operations units have become more
frequently utilized, their status within the overall US military has expanded
significantly, to the point that President Obama’s most recent national security
strategy explicitly calls for an increase in the number of SOF units despite cuts in the
Department of Defense’s budget and in the number of conventional troops
employed by the US military. Warfare is rapidly evolving, and Lind and his
coauthors at the Marine Corps Gazette were correct when they wrote: “The fourth
generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society…
[requiring] even the lowest level [of military units] to operate flexibly on the basis of
the commander’s intent.”3 Special operations forces are capable of that autonomy,
and they are rapidly becoming critical tools in modern warfare.
The PLA appears to have taken notice of this shift in the paradigms of war. At
the end of the 1980s, the Chinese leadership in Beijing recognized the waning utility
of a “people’s war” strategy and began to develop a new concept of “local wars
under high-‐tech conditions,” in which smaller, better-‐equipped and more highly-‐
trained forces were believed to have a greater impact on battlefield success than
3 William Lind, et. al. “Fourth Generation Warfare” Marine Corps Gazette 1989.10, p. 23.
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larger, less professional forces. Speaking in the terms of Lind and his coauthors, the
PLA was attempting to leap from a military largely designed to fight first-‐generation
wars that relied upon sheer mass to the fourth-‐generation warfare described above.
The development of a PLA SOF capacity logically followed in their attempts to build
a competitive twenty-‐first century military.
In the following paper, I submit an in-‐depth overview and analysis of PLA
special operations units, including sections covering the units’ initial development
and force structure, training and equipment, and the way the PLA leadership has
deployed their SOF forces and integrated these units into their overall strategic
plans, especially with regards to their ongoing dispute with Taiwan. Throughout the
paper, I compare PLA SOF units to their most prominent Western counterparts,
including US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), US Navy SEALs, and the British
Special Air Service (SAS). I close with a brief discussion of the degree to which
American “SOF Truths” are compatible with perceived Chinese strategic values, and
thus the degree to which PLA SOF units will be utilized in the overall strategy of the
PRC.
My research results in several major conclusions, namely that, despite the
PLA’s attempts to build a special operations capability on par with that of the United
States, their relatively amateurish level of tactical proficiency, obsession with
developing new hardware rather than investing in human capital, and complicated
command structure has resulted in a special operations community with major
organizational problems. These conclusions are discussed in detail in the final
section of the paper.
II. Early Development and Force Structure
Beijing established its first true special operations forces in the late 1980s,
and the development of these units was prioritized following the First Gulf War in
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1991, during which Coalition forces deployed special operations units with
outstanding success. According to Henderson:
Major transformations in China’s elite special forces began taking place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. [Since then] The People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has concentrated on selecting the highest quality individuals within the military, providing them with the most advanced equipment available, and training them in a wide range of military disciplines.4
Despite the fact that the PRC’s dedicated SOF units are not even a half-‐century old,
China has had extensive historical experience with special operations tactics. Early
ad hoc units were used with notable success during the Japanese occupation of
WWII, when temporary “composite” teams were constituted from conventional PLA
units for a broad variety of special operations taskings, including “long-‐range
penetrations, tactical reconnaissance, raids on vital enemy positions, [and] prisoner
rescue.”5
The “major transformations” of the late 1980s were brought on by three
basic driving factors: (1) A doctrinal shift in the way the Chinese perceived warfare,
from a concept of “people’s war” to a more offensively-‐oriented, technology-‐heavy
concept of “local limited war”; (2) the modernization and professionalization of the
PLA following the disastrous punitive war against Vietnam in 1979; and (3) the
Western military success during the First Gulf War. Smith describes the PLA
reaction to this conflict writing:
The doctrine of Local Limited War was upgraded to Local War Under High Tech Conditions to address the dominance of American technology in every facet of the conflict and to emulate it on a smaller scale within select units of the PLA. The creation and development of
4 Scott J. Henderson, In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-‐Century Fighting Force, Special Warfare, July-‐August 2006, at <fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ChinaSF.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10], p. 30. 5 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 2.
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a dedicated PLA SOF capability got a boost from the First Gulf War. As a result PLA SOF contingents emulate American dedicated SOF units in many regards, particularly in the emphasis on using high-‐technology gear to give itself a qualitative advantage over its adversaries.6
The first PLA special operations unit in Guangzhou was, according to Smith:
“designed and trained to support the contemporary doctrine of Local Limited War
by serving as a limited and relatively inexpensive alternative to modern high-‐tech
force projection tools that the PRC did not have at the time.”7 Thanks largely to the
success of this experimental unit (metrics to measure these successes have not been
disclosed by the PLA), additional SOF groups were stood up around the country in
the early 1990s.
Under the current PLA special operations force structure, each military
region is assigned one special operations group, which according to Henderson have
reportedly ranged from “battalion to division size.”8 The blog “China Arsenal” offers
a second estimate of PLA special operations units, stating that PLA operators are
organized into “brigade equivalents,” each divided into three battalions of about
1,000 soldiers each.9 Given these varied numbers it is difficult to ascertain the exact
size of the PLA special operations units; according to Smith, the PLA has the second-‐
largest SOF element of any Asian country, with somewhere between 25,000 and
30,000 operators on hand. (North Korea reportedly has 100,000 special operations
soldiers.) This overall number includes “as many as 25,000” PLA Special Forces;10
these forces are the primary subject of this paper simply because they are the units
for which the most reliable information is available. However, in addition to these
troops—which are similar to US Army Rangers in terms of both organization and 6 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, pp. 5-‐6. 7 Ibid, p. 28. 8 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 9 China Arsenal, China’s Special Forces and Elite Units, 10 December 2009, at <http://china-‐arsenal.blogspot.com/2009/12/chinas-‐special-‐forces-‐and-‐elite-‐units.html> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 10 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.
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mission-‐set—the PLA maintains other branch-‐specific special operations units. The
PLA Marine Corps has a SOF detachment numbering roughly 1,500 total operators
organized in four battalions and capable of amphibious operations similar to the
missions of both modern MARSOC operators and the Navy’s disbanded Underwater
Demolition Teams; likewise, the PLAAF has a smaller organic special operations unit
with airborne and air assault capabilities.11 These numbers do not include the
variety of “special mission units”—similar to the US Army’s 10th Mountain
Division—that perform tasks including rapid reaction and amphibious landings. It
is also unclear to what degree the capabilities of these different units overlap, given
the maritime and airborne capabilities of the larger PLA SOF groups.
The following table provides some basic information regarding the locations
and classifications of PLA SOF:
Organization of the PLA Special Forces Groups12
Military Region Group Army Unit Name
Beijing 38th Divine Sword
Shenyang 39th Tigers of the Northeast
Lanzhou Unknown Tigers of the Night
Jinan 54th Eagle
Nanjing Unknown Flying Dragons
Guangzhou 42nd Sharp Sword of Southern
China
Chengdu 13th Falcons of the Southeast
11 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, pp. 38-‐40. 12 Reproduced (with slight modifications) from: Jens Hohmann, “PLA Special Operations Forces – Overview”, GlobalDefence.net, 11 February 2008, at <http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel-‐analysen/sondereinheiten/asien/5909-‐china-‐pla-‐special-‐operations-‐forces-‐english-‐version.html?start=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]
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In addition to this information, Henderson offers some brief background on each
PLA SOF group:13
The Beijing Military Region’s Recon and Strike Force: trained to assault
airfields and eliminate command-‐and-‐control elements using helicopters and
powered parachutes. Known to target key enemy infrastructure including
communications centers, radar systems, and ammunition depots. They are
considered to be endurance swimmers who are proficient at underwater
demolitions and can pilot boats.
The Nanjing Military Region’s Flying Dragons: in 1997, carried out a simulated
attack on a concealed enemy airfield in the Zijin Mountains of Nanjing.
During the exercise, the group used UAVs to relay battlefield intelligence
back to headquarters and assaulted the site using “parawings” and
helicopters.
The Guangzhou Military Region’s Sword of Southern China: capable of carrying
out long-‐range airborne operations, underwater crossings, and capturing
beachheads. Soldiers of the unit cross-‐train in multiple subject areas of the
PLAN and PLAAF. The unit additionally employs several hundred personnel
trained to fly aircraft, perform “stunt driving,” and pilot boats.
The Jinan Military Region’s Black Berets/Heroic Falcons: trained in special
reconnaissance and in amphibious warfare.
The Shenyang Military Region’s Fierce Tigers of the Northeast: a marine
special-‐forces unit trained to perform airborne and commando “SEAL type”
assault operations on airfields, command-‐and-‐control sites, and radar
warning sites using powered parachutes and SCUBA equipment. Members
undergo extensive survival training in jungle, desert, mountain, and urban
conditions.
The Chengdu Military Region’s Falcons of the Southwest: uses high-‐tech
equipment to carry out special combat reconnaissance. Credited with 13 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 33.
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attaining amazing results in: reconnaissance, airborne insertion, surprise
attacks, and emergency evacuations.
The Chengdu Military Region’s Hunting Leopards: carried out an antiterrorism
exercise in 2002 in the Xiling Mountains; may have ties to the People’s Armed
Police force.
The Daggers (military region unknown): amphibious unit, formed in 2001;
described as “one of the ace cards” for dealing with Taiwanese independence.
In 2004, carried out an exercise involving the capture of a coastal island in
which the unit set up an “electronic interference system,” followed by the
arrival of armed helicopters and airborne troops. The unit destroyed the
island’s airport, oil-‐storage facilities, command center and ammo dumps.
The island was then secured for follow-‐on forces by removing the enemy’s
biological and chemical weapons.
According to Smith, PLA special operations units fall under the direct command and
control of the Central Military Commission (CMC); however, there are no references
to a unified Chinese SOF command—which would be analogous to the United States’
JSOC or US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—that would both coordinate
all SOF activities and advocate on the behalf of the PLA SOF community within the
CMC. Furthermore, the PLA’s special operations units lack organic transportation
units that would be comparable to the American 160th SOAR Regiment or the Navy’s
Special Boat Unit, meaning that all PLA SOF must coordinate their operations
carefully with assets from the PLAN and PLAAF. This situation is very similar to the
status of American special operations units prior to the creation of JSOC in
December 1980, indicating a relatively uncoordinated PLA SOF community.
III. Training and Equipment
Training is a key component of all SOF units. Most selection courses—
including the US Army’s Special Forces Assessment and Selection course, the Navy’s
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Basic Underwater Demolitions/SEAL training, and the British Special Air Service
course simply called “Selection”—test the candidates’ ability to endure grueling
physical hardship and intense mental stress. The PLA special operations training
regimes are no different:
The PLA has placed a high degree of emphasis on the physical and mental abilities of the candidates: The training can be grueling, and those who are found to be unsuited are cut from the program immediately. The dropout rate during initial training is said to average between 50 and 90 percent.14
These training programs can last for as many as three years, and include extensive
physical conditioning and training in airborne and nighttime operations, in addition
to specific environment training (i.e. desert, mountain, jungle, etc.).15 Multiple
online videos display clips
from various PLA SOF training
evolutions; several
screenshots from these videos
are included here to provide
examples of this training. For
example, Figure 2 shows PLA
SOF candidates from an
unknown unit performing “log PT”, a standard training evolution, variations of
which are used heavily by American SOF training programs. Other videos show
Chinese SOF units training in cold weather environments, such as that
demonstrated in Figure 3. Again, these practices have parallels in American SOF
14 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 30. 15 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.
Figure 2
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training, where units are conditioned to operate effectively in cold-‐weather
environments.
The majority of this basic assessment or qualification training is just a
preparation for the advanced operations these units execute in the field. PLA SOF
units spend considerable time in advanced tactical training, not unlike the SEAL
Qualification Training undertaken by
all BUD/S graduates. Again, like their
American counterparts in the SEALs
and Army Ranger battalions, PLA SOF
units focus on close-‐quarters battle
(CQB) drills, which involve clearing
houses or other targets rapidly and
with extreme precision; figure 4 shows
a small Chinese SOF element taking
down a simulated target
using standard CQB
tactics.
However, it is at
this point that a clear
distinction can be made
between the PLA units
and similar American SOF
troops. Despite their
intense training regimes
and high training attrition
rates, PLA SOF units
appear significantly less competent in executing tactical exercises than do American
SOF. Furthermore, their training locations appear to be very basic, especially
compared to the complex, real-‐world training compounds used by American SOF
Figure 3
Figure 4
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units to develop CQB tactics (see figure 5 for
an example of an Army Special Forces
“shooting house”). These shortcomings in
training will almost certainly directly
translate to decreased combat effectiveness.
In terms of equipment, PLA special
operations are again quite similar to their
American counterparts. Smith writes:
PLA SOF is often on the leading edge of technological and tactical innovation within the Chinese military and receives the best most sophisticated equipment that the PRC can produce, buy or steal… [Including] the new Type 95 5.8mm modular weapon system.16
Other PLA SOF equipment includes the “PPC,” a portable parachute capable of
transporting a soldier and his full combat load up to forty-‐five miles using an
internal motor capable of speeds of between 11 and 21 miles per hour, despite
being as light and as quiet as a traditional parachute. Chinese special operations
units have also taken advantage of new “backpack” UAV technologies, which provide
units with real-‐time “over-‐the-‐next-‐hill” combat intelligence.17 (As discussed in the
preceding section, the Nanjing MR’s “Flying Dragons” SOF unit is reported to have
used these devices with stunning success in assaults on a simulated mountainous
terrorist compound.)
All of this information confirms that the PLA is obsessed with military
hardware, even in its special operations forces. Despite their grueling assessment
and selection training, PLA SOF are relatively poorly trained tactically, and their
leadership seems to value equipment over operational capabilities.
16 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 34. 17 Ibid, p. 35.
Figure 5
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VI. Mission Set and Operational Deployments
In the seminal text The Science of Campaigns, which details a variety of PLA
operational plans, special operations forces are considered “force multipliers,”
affecting battlefield posture and pushing forward campaign progress; in their efforts
to achieve these goals, special operations units are ordered:
[T]o raid the enemy’s vital area targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational systems, reduce the enemy’s operational capability, and interfere, delay and disrupt the enemy’s operational activities in order to create favorable conditions for the main force force-‐units.18
These requirements demonstrate that PLA SOF units are primarily organized for
direct action (DA) raids. While special reconnaissance (SR)—a key role of many
American SOF—is treated as a core competency of PLA SOF units, it is outweighed
by “raid attacks,” “sabotage attacks,” and “raid-‐harassments,” all of which fit with
the traditional responsibilities of US direct action units. However, the PLA also
includes “special technical warfare,” such as cyber-‐warfare, that US special
operations units are not tasked to execute. Another paper, published by two
Chinese military commentators, holds that the PRC classifies special operations as
those adhering to:
[D]etailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as integrated land-‐sea-‐air-‐space-‐electronic combat, all-‐dimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat, no-‐contact long-‐range warfare, asymmetrical combat, large-‐scale night combat and ‘surgical’ strikes.19
This analysis confirms Smith’s assertion that PLA special operations units are
primarily “a reconnaissance and raiding force, one capable of supporting 18 战 役 学 [Science of Campaigns], edited by hang Yuliang, (English translation; Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 202. 19 Henderson 2006 p. 30.
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conventional operations or conducting them, albeit on a smaller scale and higher
intensity than the conventional military.”20 This is in sharp contrast to the
unconventional warfare capabilities of the US Army’s Green Berets, which are
organized specifically to provide training and other support to foreign militaries and
insurgent groups. In other words, the PLA special operations forces are trained to
execute the same missions as only about half of the US special operations forces,
primarily the Army Rangers and Navy SEALs.
In terms of operational deployment, PLA SOF are relatively unproven, in
large part thanks to the PLA’s limited international military footprint; this severely
constrains the degree to which Western analysts are able to compared these units to
their American or British counterparts. Among those that have been deployed, SOF
units from the People’s Liberation Army Navy are among the most prominent of the
Chinese SOF community, serving aboard commercial vessels in an anti-‐piracy
capacity. Their initial deployment was announced in late 2008, when Chinese
officials dispatched a small fleet of three warships to the Gulf of Aden to combat
Somali pirates. The three ships were equipped with “guided missiles and cannon,
[in addition to] two helicopters and a detail of special forces.”21 These units have
seen some (albeit limited) combat action, with one commentator reporting:
On February 6 [2009], seven embarked special operations forces organized crew members of Oriental Oil Explorer 1 [a PRC against an oncoming pirate speedboat, fired three warning shells, and prepared to fight when the speedboat, deterred, sped away.
While this action is significant in that it is the first operational deployment of a
Chinese special operations unit, and the first time a modern Chinese warship
deployed in a combat operation outside of East Asia, the operational experience
20 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, p. 57. 21 “China ready to use force on Somali pirates,” Channel News Asia, 23 December 2008, at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/398100/1/.html> [Accessed 2012.05.10]
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itself is relatively limited, especially when compared to American SOF deployments,
even those not in support of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Given the very low degree of operational use of the PLA special operations
units, the majority of the open-‐source information regarding these units’
operational readiness focuses on military exercises rather than combat
deployments. In addition to joint readiness exercises with the PRC’s allies
throughout the region—in which special operations units often play a key role in
assaulting headquarters elements and other key strategic targets22—the PLA has
also tasked its special operations units with specific strategic objectives in a
potential conflict with Taiwan. The perceived role of “The Daggers” SOF group has
already been discussed, but in addition to that specialized unit, PLA SOF have spent
considerable time preparing for an invasion of the island. According to an analyst
with The Jamestown Foundation:
In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing China’s growing space-‐based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwan’s major airbases or other government and military facilities. … Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwan’s airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.23
22 The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.06, at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub995.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. 23 Michael S. Chase, “Chinese Special Operations Forces: ‘Lessons Learned’ and Potential Missions,” The Jamestown Foundation, 2007.05.09. At <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4033&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]
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While the overall capabilities of the Chinese special operations forces are unclear at
best, these units could have a major impact on the outcome of a conflict with
Taiwan, if their capabilities are as comprehensive as their military exercises
indicate. According to Henderson, the PLA may “infiltrate, or special-‐forces units
into Taiwan to capture or kill key government leaders” in the days just before the
outbreak of conventional war between the two states.24 Such a strategy has the
potential to decapitate Taiwan’s leadership; given the PLA SOF core competencies in
direct action raids, they appear to have—at least on paper—the ability to execute
such an assault relatively easily.
Regardless of these capabilities and shortcomings, Smith’s analysis of the
current PLA special operations force structure is that, for the time being, it is exactly
what the Central Military Commission wants it to be:
It is an interim and relatively inexpensive (though limited) power projection tool that the PRC can use while it continues to slowly modernize and acquire more conventional, expensive and technologically advanced power projection capabilities (long-‐range fighter-‐bombers, nuclear submarines, aerial refueling, modern C4ISR). PLA SOF’s emphasis on DA, SR and IW make it directly attributable to the contemporary doctrine of Local War Under High Tech Conditions.25
Given that the PLA special operations forces were initially constituted as a low-‐cost
alternative to high-‐tech weapons systems (which the Chinese can now easily afford)
it remains to be seen whether these capabilities will be improved or expanded.
24 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 25 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 41.
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V. Conclusion: The Strategic Implications of PLA Special
Operations Forces
The United States Special Operations Command—the organization that
essentially coordinates the role of American SOF within the overall military
structure—has released five “SOF Truths” that are used to succinctly describe the
fundamental beliefs of special operations personnel. They are: (1) Humans are
more important than Hardware; (2) Quality is better than Quantity; (3) Special
Operations Forces cannot be mass-‐produced; (4) Competent Special Operations
Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur; (5) Most Special Operations
require non-‐SOF assistance. Given what we know about the PLA special operations
forces, how closely does their strategic role fit with these basic principles?
Working backward, we see that the PLA’s organizational structure does not
appear to provide their special operations units with a high degree of non-‐SOF
support. PLA special operations units lack organic transportation elements, and are
controlled directly by the Central Military Commission, likely a decision effected
more by politics than in the best operational interests of the state or the units. This
seems to have created a relatively isolated organizational structure. On the other
hand, the next three major points are closely followed: PLA SOF are subjected to
rigorous training programs—which weeds out all but the top tier candidates,
emphasizing quality over quantity—and their establishment as part of an ongoing
military modernization program was pragmatic, not reactionary. It is the first point,
then, that is most problematic—even in the PLA’s best-‐trained units, human capital
is outweighed by technology, a point that is emphasized by the special operations
units’ focus on technology-‐driven insertion and extraction at the expense of
developing their tactical skills once on-‐target. This framework of analysis thus begs
the question, should we even categorize these troops as “special operations forces”
or simply as better-‐equipped, more rigorously trained units with specialized
missions?
Mullikin 17
While this last assertion is without doubt an overreaction to the reality facing
these units, it is critical for US strategic planners to examine the way SOF units fit
within the overall PLA strategic posture, and the ways in which they will likely be
used in potential conflicts. To achieve this goal we must first examine exactly what
the PLA hopes to achieve with its military modernization programs. According to
Smith:
Local War Under High Tech Conditions emphasizes a violent, lightning-‐fast regional conflict that is over in a short amount of time; PLA SOF units are tailored to fit within that doctrine, focusing their efforts on DA [direct action] and SR [strategic reconnaissance] mission capabilities and the ability to strike hard and fast in support of the current military doctrine and PRC power projection objectives.26
Given this goal, even a somewhat sub-‐par SOF community should be capable of
executing those missions for which they have been stood up. Provided the Chinese
military establishment maintains its current strategic outlook, effectively preparing
for any conflict with the PRC must involve preparing to counter their special
operations forces.
From this research, we can draw several conclusions from the current force
structure and tactical posture of Chinese SOF units.
C1: PLA special operations units are relatively similar to their
American/NATO counterparts in terms of their selection and equipment.
The PLA has successfully modeled their SOF training after that of their American
counterparts, incorporating extensive physical and psychological assessment in
these training programs, and equipping each unit with the most advanced weapons
and equipment available.
26 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 6.
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C2: Despite these similarities, PLA SOF are shockingly one-dimensional in
terms of mission requirements and are relatively poorly trained
tactically, at least when compared to American SOF.
PLA SOF training styles and facilities are kept highly classified—however, what
information is available indicates that both are sub-‐standard when compared to
other premier special operations units. Their mission set, too, is very one-‐
dimensional; as opposed to American SOF, which are capable of nine primary
mission types, PLA SOF are highly trained in only direct action, special
reconnaissance, counter-‐terrorism, and information warfare. Other key SOF
capabilities—including foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare—
appear to be left out of the PLA SOF doctrine.
C3: Future development of PLA SOF will likely be limited by the lack of a
central organizational group comparable to the US Special Operations
Command; furthermore, this disconnect will likely limit the combat
utility of PLA SOF.
Many of the recent successes of American SOF units are directly attributable to the
establishment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the organization that
coordinates all of the United States’ special operations forces. According to Gen.
Stanley McChrystal, former commander of JSOC and a major driver of organizational
change within the US special operations community, the vast majority of American
SOF successes would not have been possible without JSOC’s strategic role.27 The
lack of a comparable organization to direct PLA SOF units, combined with those
units’ incredibly confusing organization—with each unit having both tactical
specialties and a regional designation—will likely set the stage for future
operational failures not unlike Operation Eagle Claw.
27 Conversation with the author, 2012.02.03.
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C4: The PLA continues to value hardware over human capital, even in their
most highly trained military units.
The earlier discussion of PLA SOF training and equipment encompasses this point in
full; these units’ training exercises appear more focused on leveraging technology to
achieve tactical objectives instead of providing operators with the skills and
experience to achieve these same objectives in austere environments. The
implications of this training philosophy remain to be seen, but given the experience
of other special operations units the Chinese special operations units are unlikely to
achieve a high degree of success in actual combat environments.
C5: Despite their shortcomings, PLA SOF units are especially well prepared
for offensive military action against Taiwan; furthermore, the
organization and training of “The Daggers” indicates that the PLA is
specifically developing forces capable of executing a complex attack on
the island.
PLA SOF are specifically preparing to execute attacks against at least the United
States’ allies, and likely to execute similar attacks against American targets in East
Asia. Given the special relationship between the US and Taiwan, it is critically
important that American strategists appreciate the capabilities of the PLA’s special
operations units and work to mitigate these capabilities in any potential conflict
scenarios between the PRC and the US.
This essay, and others that study Chinese special operations forces, is
significantly limited by the lack of reliable information on a small community, the
actions of which are kept highly compartmentalized. Further research is required to
develop an accurate picture of Chinese SOF capabilities, and the strategic
implications of their presence on the battlefield. However, any information that can
be gleaned on this subject is critical in our attempts to study the units that will most
likely play a major role in any conflict between China and her rivals in Asia or
around the world.
Mullikin 20
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