government retaliation against terrorism: a cross‐national study

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political AggressionVol. 3, No. 1, January 2011, 1–19

ISSN 1943-4472 print/ISSN 1943-4480 online© 2011 Society for Terrorism ResearchDOI: 10.1080/19434472.2010.512216http://www.informaworld.com

Government retaliation against terrorism: a cross-national study†

Eros R. DeSouza*, Michael J. Stevens* and Rose M. Metivier

Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4620, Normal, IL 61790-4620, United States

Taylor and FrancisRIRT_A_512216.sgm10.1080/19434472.2010.512216Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression1943-4472 (print)/1943-4480 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & [email protected]

Given an increasingly globalized world connected via instant news sources,terrorism has emerged as a transnational concern. To determine the effect ofterrorism on support for government retaliation, we randomly assigned 288Peruvian and 586 US undergraduates to experimentally manipulated newsflashesof terrorist attacks that varied according to target (civilian, commercial, military),impact (high, low) and frequency of attack (first, latest in a series). A significantTarget × Impact × Frequency × Gender × Country interaction emerged. Separateanalyses by country demonstrated variability in Peruvians’ retaliatory preferencesand sensitivity to the economic costs of terrorism. Unlike pre-9/11 studies, USrespondents did not appear to base their retaliatory preferences on the temporaldimension of terrorist conflict. We explain our findings in terms of the ecologicalcontext of each country and national narratives reflected in the schemas of itscitizens, and identify their applied and research implications.

Keywords: terrorism; government aggression; gender and cross-culturaldifferences

Over the past few decades ever more groups worldwide have adopted terrorism as ameans of social change (Crenshaw, 2000). Terrorism can be construed as premedi-tated violence, whose nature is political and/or symbolic. It may be enacted directly orby proxy, with the intent of producing harm or damage in order to instill fear in thegeneral population and, in some instances, to modify a government’s policies(Stevens, 2005). Targets of terrorism can include civilians, military personnel, andcommercial property.

Purpose of the current study

Terrorism and the responses it evokes are complex phenomena situated in culture,economics, history, politics and religion. Given the threats posed by terrorism in a post-9/11 world (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006), it is important toconduct cross-national research to understand more fully the contextual and individualdifference variables that influence ordinary people’s reactions to terrorism, specificallytheir support for government retaliation. Because political leaders worldwide respondto public opinion concerning the so-called war on terrorism, understanding the public’s

†Preliminary findings were presented at the annual meeting of the Association forPsychological Science, Chicago, in May 2008 and at the XXXII Interamerican Congress ofPsychology, Guatemala City, in June 2009.*Corresponding authors. E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

2 E.R. DeSouza et al.

reactions to terrorism would seem highly relevant to policymakers (Bourne, Healy, &Beer, 2003; Healy, Hoffman, Beer, & Bourne, 2002), particularly in the wake of 9/11.Furthermore, notwithstanding differences in decision-making between the public andpolitical leaders (i.e. choices that follow a rational analysis of available informationwith the goal of maximizing national outcomes), like the public, political leaders areprone to heuristically ‘good enough’ thinking (Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, & Ciarrochi,1997), making it imperative to unravel how common cognitive processes (e.g. schemasbased on experience, gender and nationality) determine reactions to terrorism.

Conceptually, we sought to add to the literature showing that the interpretationsand decisions of ordinary citizens following terrorist attacks are guided by cognitiverepresentations primed by the media (Bourne et al., 2003; Herrmann et al., 1997).Specifically, we wanted to clarify the relationship between specific dimensions of aterrorist attack and support for government retaliation following such an attack bymanipulating information presented to the public via hypothetical newsflashes. Unlikemost studies that have compared military with terrorist attacks (Bourne et al., 2003),we confined our investigation to the target, impact and frequency of a terrorist attackper se, and the interaction of these variables, on the level of support for governmentretaliation. We were particularly interested in whether our study would replicate theexperimental research conducted before 9/11.

In view of documented gender-based interpretations of danger and interpersonalrelationships (Buss, 1994; Gilligan, 1982), we also wanted to examine the influenceof gender on perceptions and decisions made following different scenarios of a post-9/11 terrorist attack. Although this individual difference variable has been studied inexperiments on responses to international conflict, the findings are inconclusive, withsome studies showing no overall gender difference in support for government retalia-tion (Bourne, Sinclair, Healy, & Beer, 1996), whereas others reveal that men prefermore aggressive responses (Healy et al., 2002).

Given an increasingly globalized world in which terrorism has become a transna-tional phenomenon, it is surprising that so little research since 9/11 has focused onreactions to terrorism in different countries. Such research has implications for theidentification of ethnocultural variables that mediate diverse reactions to terrorism, aswell as for assisting political leaders in forging alliances to counter terrorism. Ourcross-national study aimed at understanding responses to terrorism that are situatedin Peru and the United States, countries with diverse ecological systems (e.g.economics, history, politics). The views of Peruvians, who endured years of terror-ism, about government retaliation against terrorists, have yet to be examined andprobably depart from those of US citizens whose culture and national narrative ofterrorism are different.

Terrorism in Peru and the United States

Although ethnic, ideological and state-based forms of terrorism overlap, ideologicalterrorism is especially relevant to Peru and the United States, where citizens haveexperienced terrorism and whose reactions to a hypothetical terrorist attack arecompared in this study. Ideological terrorism encompasses violent struggle againsteconomic, political and social systems based on philosophical principles, religiousdoctrine or national law (Stevens, 2005). It presumes the existence of an unjust author-ity, dissatisfaction with the prevailing order and often the influence of external rolemodels (Stevens, 2005).

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 3

Peru endured over a decade of domestic terrorism perpetrated by the SenderoLuminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento Revolutionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA,Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement; Starn, Degregori, & Kirk, 2005). The Shin-ing Path envisioned depopulating cities, indoctrinating the citizenry and creating asocialist utopia reminiscent of Peru’s Inca past (Ellenbogen, 1999). Initially co-optingIndian peasants, its demand for absolute obedience and brutality toward resistersfailed to garner broad support. For 15 years, until the capture of its charismatic leaderin 1992, the Shining Path wreaked widespread carnage and trauma on the Peruvianpeople. MRTA was launched in 1983 and named after the anti-colonial leader, TúpacAmaru (Starn et al., 2005). Like the Shining Path, MRTA was founded by intellectu-als, but centered in cities. MRTA specialized in attacks on US diplomats and corpora-tions as well as financial extortion until 1996, when Peruvian government forceskilled MRTA terrorists who overran the Japanese embassy in Lima. The ideologicalterrorism that Peru suffered was an outgrowth of the country’s history of economicand political inequality and injustice (Alderice, 2009; DeSouza & Stevens, 2009;Wilson, 2009). Overall, 75% of the dead and disappeared spoke Quechua or anotherindigenous language and lived in rural areas, underscoring the racism and classismbehind Peru’s ideological terrorism (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru,2003).

Ideological terrorism in the United States has a long history (Crenshaw, 2000;Hoffman, 1998; Laquer, 1999; Stevens, 2005). The Weather Underground was aMarxist group formed in 1969 by members of Students for a Democratic Society whowanted a more militant program of social justice. The Weather Undergroundconducted bombings and arson attacks for nearly a year, when its leaders were killedin an accidental explosion. The 1980s saw a rise in right-wing movements thatopposed the ‘new world order’ (i.e. globalization) by championing religious and racialpurity and segregation (Crenshaw, 2000; Hoffman, 1998; Laquer, 1999). The Orderwas a White-supremacist organization that sought the overthrow of the US govern-ment, which it claimed was controlled by international Zionists, and the establishmentof an autonomous, White homeland in the northwestern United States. The Orderclaimed responsibility for the assassination of a Jewish celebrity and bombing of asynagogue in Idaho. Eco-terrorists are among the most violent terrorists in the UnitedStates (Stevens, 2005). They aim to discourage exploitation of the environment bycreating financial hardship through property destruction. The Earth Liberation Fronthas engaged in violent anti-globalization protests, torched a Colorado ski resort, andmost recently set aflame multi-million dollar homes in Woodinville, Washington(Harrell, Cohen, & Shukovsky, 2008).

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has increasingly intervened inter-nationally through military incursions, exerted political influence on governmentsseen as friendly to US interests, and forged economic partnerships to access foreignmarkets and cheap labor (Jensen, 2001). As a result, terrorists have targeted US inter-ests in their ideological struggle against US hegemony (Byman, 1998), as illustratedby the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001.

Attitudes toward Terrorism and Government Retaliation against Terrorism

Given the aim of terrorism to sway public opinion, surprisingly little is known aboutattitudes toward terrorism and government retaliation against terrorism, particularlythose held by men and women and by different cultural and national groups. A survey


conducted shortly after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing found that universitystudents and police in New York City held opinions about terrorism and terroristsranging from disdain and disgust to acceptance and approval (Takooshian & Verdi,1993). The diversity of opinion reflected the idiosyncratic ways in which respondentsframed their perceptions of the attack.

Following 9/11, the surveyed residents of a small southeastern city more uniformlyexpressed disbelief and horror, attributing the attacks to hatred and jealousy of theUnited States (Walker & Chestnut, 2003). Although women had more factuallyoriented responses to 9/11 than men, there were no gender differences in explanationsfor the attacks. Whites reacted more angrily than non-Whites, blaming 9/11 on thegeopolitical arrogance and lax immigration laws of the United States; non-Whitesmade religious attributions (e.g. ‘America has abandoned God’). Younger residentsreacted with more fear than older residents, citing religious reasons for the attacks.The explanations above for 9/11 resemble those of US undergraduates, who in 2001attributed the attacks to US foreign policy or to terrorists’ fundamentalist beliefs andpsychological dysfunction. By 2005 student sentiment that the United States waspartly responsible for 9/11 had grown (Sahar, 2008), and paralleled the view of Leba-nese undergraduates who blamed 9/11 on the intrusion of the United States in theMiddle East (Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & Levin, 2004).

In related research on general beliefs about a government’s right to use aggression(e.g. justification for killing civilians when combating terrorism), international studentsand adults were less tolerant of government aggression than were US students andadults (Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Daskalopoulos, Zaveri, & Malley-Morrison,2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos, &You, 2006; Malley-Morrison, Oh, Wu, & Zaveri, 2009). International and US groupsused attributions of blame in supporting government aggression against another coun-try, which was associated with moral and utilitarian justification for such aggression(e.g. ‘will prevent more suffering than it will cause’; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006;Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006; Shamir& Shikaki, 2002). The cross-national variation in beliefs about government rights toaggression supports further inquiry into the beliefs of citizens in different countriesabout how their governments should respond to hypothetical terrorist attacks. Forexample, Russian students adopted a more cautious and contextually sensitive view ofgovernment retaliation against terrorism than did US students (Koch, 2003). Notwith-standing their negative attributions about terrorists (e.g. calculating, cruel), Russianstudents expressed concerns about escalating conflict, perhaps due to their nationalexperience of unparalleled death and destruction in World War II. Conversely, toler-ance in the United States for government aggression may reflect its citizens’ exposureto media reports of the moral correctness of such aggression along with insulation fromlarge-scale violent conflict (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009).

Experimental Studies of Government Retaliation against Terrorism

Experimental research on government retaliation against terrorism predates 9/11 andentails presenting hypothetical terrorist-attack scenarios to US university students(Bourne et al., 2003). When asked to choose the best position for the United States totake in response to terrorism, students tempered their initial reactions with forgive-ness, but became less tolerant when attacks persisted (Bourne et al., 1996). Fieldresearch confirms that both Israelis and Palestinians perceived less international


support if previously victimized by terrorism and more international condemnation ifthey supported government retaliation against terrorism (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002).This hostile-world effect may legitimize support for government retaliation followingrepeated terrorist attacks. Bourne et al. (1996) also found that gender moderatedsupport for government retaliation against terrorism, with men recommending harsherretaliation than women for hypothetical attacks. Other researchers also found suchgender differences post 9/11 (e.g. Anthony, Rosselli, & Caparyan, 2003).

Healy et al. (2002) investigated how forcefully university students wanted theirgovernment to retaliate after reading about hypothetical terrorist attacks and militaryincursions whose targets ranged from a civilian tour bus to a military barracks. Onlyafter repeated attacks did students favor government retaliation at a level comparableto that of the attack (Bourne et al., 1996). Unexpectedly, students chose more severegovernment retaliation when the target of a terrorist attack was military than civilian.While counterintuitive, as the loss of innocent (civilian) life is surely the most abhor-rent feature of terrorism, the different scenarios may have failed to portray comparableloss of life. Students may have inferred greater loss of life in an attack on a barracksthan on a bus, and thus reacted to the inferred loss of life rather than to the target perse. In addition, women tended to forgive a variety of terrorist attacks in order topreserve an international relationship, whereas men preferred more aggressive retali-ation due to the perceived betrayal of such a relationship. Other studies confirm asimilar gender difference when a peace treaty exists with another country (Bourne etal., 2003; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006).

Summary

Reactions to terrorism and terrorists prior to 9/11 were more variable (Takooshian &Verdi, 1993) than those measured after 9/11 (Walker & Chestnut, 2003), althoughmodest ethnocultural differences emerged on reactions and explanations for 9/11.These reactions hardened with repeated attacks (Anthony et al., 2003; Bourne et al.,1996; Healy et al., 2002), perhaps reflecting a hostile worldview that intensifiesnegative attributions about terrorists (Koch, 2003; Shamir & Shikaki, 2002) andpromotes moral disengagement from aggressive government retaliation (McAlisteret al., 2006). Different targets of terrorist attacks elicit varying support for govern-ment retaliation (Bourne et al., 1996; Healy et al., 2002). Support for governmentretaliation against terrorism and belief in a government’s right to use aggression aretypically stronger among men than women (Anthony et al., 2003; Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Bourne et al., 1996; Healy et al., 2002; Malley-Morrrison et al.,2006) and stronger among US than non-US respondents (Ashy & Malley-Morrison,2007; Daskalopoulos et al., 2006; Koch, 2003; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira,2008; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006, 2009).

The Current Study

We compared the reactions of Peruvian and US university undergraduates to a seriesof hypothetical terrorist attacks. Although they were samples of convenience, under-graduates were recruited in studies of this kind prior to 9/11 (Borne et al., 2003), andour hypotheses closely follow this line of research. Moreover, undergraduates are ofvoting age and as informed and engaged as the average citizen. We believe, therefore,that the study of undergraduates’ responses to newsflashes of hypothetical terrorist


attacks constitutes a valid examination of how information conveyed by the mediamay affect public opinion, and at the very least can be extrapolated to young adults(Beer, Sinclair, Healy, & Bourne, 1995; Healy et al., 2002).

We manipulated three variables: target of attack (civilian, commercial, military),impact of attack (high, low) and frequency of attack (first, latest in a series). Thedependent variable was level of support for government retaliation. We predictedthat among young adults: (1) terrorist-attack scenarios depicting civilian targetswould elicit support for more aggressive government retaliation than scenariosdepicting either military or commercial targets (cf. Bourne et al., 1996; Healy et al.,2002); (2) terrorist-attack scenarios portraying high impact would elicit support forstronger government retaliation than scenarios depicting low impact; (3) terrorist-attack scenarios presented as the latest in a series of attacks would elicit support forharsher government retaliation than scenarios presented as an initial attack (Anthonyet al., 2003; Bourne et al., 1996; Healy et al., 2002); (4) the scenario depicting ahigh-impact terrorist attack on a civilian target, which was the latest in a series ofattacks, would elicit the most severe retaliatory preferences; (5) men would supportmore aggressive government retaliation for terrorist attacks than would women(Anthony et al., 2003; Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Bourne et al., 1996; Malley-Morrrison et al., 2006); and (6) US respondents would support government retalia-tion for terrorist attacks more than would Peruvians (see Ashy & Malley-Morrison,2007; Koch, 2003; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; Malley-Morrison et al.,2006).

Method

Participants

The combined Peruvian–US sample consisted of 874 university undergraduates. ThePeruvian group was recruited from five universities in metropolitan Lima andconsisted of 288 undergraduates, whose mean age was 21.62 years (SD = 5.89, range= 17–54). Most reported being mestizo/a (72%) or White (20%), with 8% checking‘other’ racial background (e.g. indigenous, African, Asian). Peruvian women wereoverrepresented (62%, n = 179), with 37% (n = 107) being men and 1% (n = 2) notreporting their gender.

The US group was recruited from a medium-sized state university in the Midwest,and consisted of 586 undergraduates, whose mean age was 19.38 years (SD = 2.69,range = 17–54). Most reported being White (85%), with 7.5% checking AfricanAmerican and an additional 7.5% checking ‘other’ racial background (e.g. Latino/a,Asian, mixed). Gender representation was nearly even, with 51.5% (n = 302) beingwomen and 48.5% (n = 284) being men.

The Peruvian group was significantly older than the US group, t(870) = −7.71,p < 0.0001, possibly because most undergraduate degree programs in Peru require 5years to complete as compared with 4 years in the United States. There also was asignificantly larger percentage of women in the Peruvian group than in the US group,χ2(1, N = 872) = 9.49, p < 0.01, because one of the Peruvian universities was all-female. There also was a significantly larger percentage of non-White participants inthe Peruvian group than in the US group, χ2(1, N = 869) = 3.42, p < 0.0001, owing tothe fact that only 15% of the Peruvian population is White (Central IntelligenceAgency, 2009). Thus, we used age and race as covariates in all data analyses in orderto control for these potential confounds.


Materials

All materials used in the current study were translated from American English intoPeruvian Spanish using the back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1986). Studentsreceived and completed the materials in the order presented below.

Terrorist-attack scenarios

Based on previously developed stimulus materials (see Bourne et al., 2003), wecreated 12 hypothetical terrorist-attack scenarios that were presented in the form of awritten newsflash. Each participant read only one scenario. Scenarios varied in theirtarget, impact and frequency of attack, the three variables we hypothesized woulddetermine the level of aggression with which participants wanted their government toretaliate against terrorist attackers. Each scenario depicted a different combination ofa target impact, and frequency. There were three different targets of a terrorist attack:civilian, military and commercial. Civilian target scenarios described loss of life at alocal shopping mall. Military target scenarios consisted of loss of life in a militarymess hall. Commercial target scenarios presented only the loss of property and ensu-ing economic damage at an oil refinery. Previous studies have found more aggressiveretaliatory reactions to the loss of military life than to the death of civilians (Bourneet al., 2003). Retaliatory responses to terrorist attacks on commercial targets have notbeen examined previously.

The above scenarios also varied in terms of high or low level of impact. High-impact scenarios portrayed either major loss of life (i.e. ‘Many are injured and 500have been killed in the blast’) or property (i.e. ‘No one was killed or injured in theblast, but 500,000 barrels of oil have been lost from our supply. Production will behalted for months to come’), whereas low-impact scenarios described either minimalloss of life (i.e. ‘Some have been injured and 5 have been killed in the blast’) or prop-erty (i.e. ‘No one was killed or injured in the blast, but 5,000 barrels of oil have beenlost from our supply. Production will be halted for a few weeks’). In previous studies,differences in impact level were not included as variables. Exploring this variableallowed us to extend research on retaliatory responses to terrorist attacks.

Finally, our scenarios differed in the frequency with which the attack hadoccurred. Terrorist scenarios identified an attack as either the first of its kind or thelatest in a series of attacks. Earlier research found increased support for more aggres-sive retaliation against a perpetrator’s country of origin after repeated attacks(Anthony et al., 2003; Bourne et al., 2003).

An example scenario consisting of a high-impact civilian target that is the latest ina series of attacks follows:

*** NEWSFLASH***

A terrorist group, supported by and/or from a foreign country, has just struck a localshopping mall. This is the latest in a series of recent attacks. Several explosive deviceswere placed in restrooms and hidden in the food-court area, and coordinated to explodeat the same time. Many are injured and 500 have been killed in the blast.

As a manipulation check, we used a 10-point Likert scale from 1 (Not At All Real-istic) to 10 (Extremely Realistic) to determine the extent to which participantsperceived the terrorist-attack scenario that they read to be realistic. A one-way


ANOVA showed that the pooled sample rated the scenarios as realistic across allmanipulations, F(11, 837) = 1.47, n.s., with an overall mean of 7.47 (SD = 1.98).

Demographic questionnaire

The demographic questionnaire elicited information about participants’ age, genderand race or ethnicity. The categories of race and ethnicity that we included in the ques-tionnaire reflected the distinctive demography of either Peru or the United States.

Conflict Thermometer

The Conflict Thermometer (Beer, Ringer, Sinclair, Healy, & Bourne, 1992, 1995)has been used in prior research (see Bourne et al., 2003) to measure the preferredlevel of government aggression in response to scenarios describing internationalconflict. Participants have consistently rank-ordered the 12 increasingly aggressivelevels of government retaliation (Beer et al., 1992, 1995). In our study, students wereinstructed to indicate on a scale of 1–12 how aggressively they would like theirgovernment to retaliate to a randomly assigned hypothetical terrorist attack. Eachlevel of the Conflict Thermometer was anchored by a specific retaliatory statement,ranging from least aggressive (i.e. 1 – Peru/US sends a special ambassador to theforeign country) to most aggressive (i.e. 12 – Peru/US engages in an all-out attack onthe foreign country destroying everything and everyone); thus, higher ratings reflectharsher preferences for government retaliation. Each anchor of the Conflict Ther-mometer referenced the country corresponding to the group to which it was adminis-tered (i.e. Peru or the United States). In addition, we modified the most aggressivelevel of the original Conflict Thermometer by deleting any reference to nuclearweapons, as Peru lacks such weapons. Only 10 students (four Peruvian and six US)selected the highest level of government retaliation, indicating that our modificationof the most aggressive level of the Conflict Thermometer was evenly distributedacross both countries.

Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Scale (PAIRTAS)

The PAIRTAS (Malley-Morrison et al., 2006) was originally designed to investi-gate attitudes toward personal and family violence, and was recently modified inorder to measure attitudes toward a government’s right to use aggression, includingactions against its own citizens. We administered only those items pertaining togovernment aggression and peace, as has been done in previous studies (Ashy &Malley-Morrison, 2007; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008). These 12 itemsconsisted of statements, such as ‘Sometimes a country has the right to invadeanother country’ and ‘All human beings have the basic right to peace’. Each itemrequires respondents to rate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scalefrom 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). PAIRTAS scores are based onthe sum of the ratings for items about government aggression and the reverse-scored ratings for items on peace, with higher total scores reflecting greater toler-ance for government aggression. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis withvarimax rotation on the 12-item PAIRTAS. The scree plot revealed one interpret-able factor that accounted for 29% of the variance. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.77 forthe pooled sample (α = .64 and .75 for Peruvian and US groups, respectively).


Note that for both groups, if any PAIRTAS item was removed, it lowered the Cron-bach alpha. PAIRTAS scores served as a covariate in our main data analysis as wesought to control for the potential confound of pre-existing beliefs about a govern-ment’s right to use aggression on support for government retaliation following aterrorist attack.

Procedure

We recruited university undergraduates from lower-level courses in diverse disci-plines (e.g. psychology, education, business) in order to include a broad spectrum ofthe most common academic majors across both countries. During class, students wereinvited to participate in a study on perceptions of aggression and violence, and wereinformed of their rights and obligations as research participants. We emphasized thatparticipation was voluntary and that all responses would remain confidential. Then,students received the materials in their native language (Spanish for the Peruviangroup and English for the US group). By varying the order in which the terrorist-attackscenarios were distributed, students in effect were randomly assigned to one of the 12scenarios.

The above procedures were strictly enforced in both countries. The only departurein protocol for the two groups was that we offered no extra credit to Peruvian studentsin exchange for participation, whereas we gave US students extra credit for participating.The response rate was 100% for both groups. Upon completing the measures, wedebriefed the students.

Results

Age, race (coded 1 for White and 0 for non-White) and tolerance for a government’sgeneral right to use aggression, as measured by the PAIRTAS (Malley-Morrison et al.,2006), were significantly correlated with support for government retaliation inresponse to a hypothetical terrorist attack, as measured by the Conflict Thermometer(Beer et al., 1992, 1995). Age correlated negatively with Conflict Thermometerratings, r(854) = −0.11, p < 0.001; younger students preferred harsher governmentretaliation than did older students. Race correlated positively with Conflict Thermom-eter ratings, r(851) = 0.24, p < 0.0001; White students preferred higher levels ofgovernment retaliation than did non-White students. PAIRTAS scores correlated posi-tively with Conflict Thermometer ratings, r(854) = 0.37, p < 0.0001; greater tolerancefor a government’s right to use aggression was linked to support for harsher govern-ment retaliation following hypothetical terrorist attacks. Thus, we used age, race andPAIRTAS scores as covariates to control for the potential confounds of these pre-existing factors.

We then conducted a 3 (Target) × 2 (Impact) × 2 (Frequency) × 2 (Country) × 2(Gender) ANCOVA on Conflict Thermometer ratings, with age, race and PAIRTASscores as covariates. A significant main effect for Target did not emerge. Hence, ourfirst hypothesis was not supported. There was a significant main effect for Impact,F(1, 845) = 15.08, p < 0.0001, ηp

2 = 0.02, which supported our second hypothesis. Asexpected, high-impact scenarios (M = 5.35, SD = 3.11) elicited more aggressive retal-iatory responses than did low-impact scenarios (M = 4.58, SD = 2.65). There also wasa significant main effect for Frequency, F(1, 845) = 4.87, p < 0.05, ηp

2 = 0.01, whichsupported our third hypothesis. As expected, scenarios depicting the latest in a recent


series of attacks (M = 5.18, SD = 2.85) elicited harsher retaliatory responses than didscenarios portraying a first-time attack (M = 4.75, SD = 2.89). The Target × Impact ×Frequency interaction was not significant. Hence, our fourth hypothesis was notsupported.

There was a significant main effect for Gender, F(1, 845) = 8.95, p < 0.01, ηp2 =

0.01, which supported our fifth hypothesis. As anticipated, men (M = 5.27, SD = 2.97)favored more aggressive retaliatory responses than did women (M = 4.67, SD = 2.67).There also was a significant main effect for Country, F(1, 845) = 5.17, p < 0.05,ηp

2 = 0.01, which supported our sixth hypothesis. As anticipated, US students (M =5.45, SD = 2.84) preferred harsher retaliatory responses than did Peruvian students (M= 4.48, SD = 2.63).

Although two 2-way, one 3-way and two 4-way interactions were statisticallysignificant, they are qualified, as are the main effects, by the significant five-wayinteraction (Target × Impact × Frequency × Gender × Country), F(2, 845) = 7.11, p <0.001, ηp

2 = 0.02. To unravel the meaning of such a complex and unexpected five-wayinteraction, we conducted separate 3 (Target) × 2 (Impact) × 2 (Frequency) × 2(Gender) ANCOVAs on Conflict Thermometer ratings by country, with age, race andPAIRTAS scores as covariates.

The ANCOVA for the Peruvian group yielded a significant main effect forImpact, F(1, 267) = 6.35, p < 0.05, ηp

2 = 0.03, with high-impact scenarios (M =4.36, SD = 2.98) eliciting more aggressive retaliatory responses than low-impactscenarios (M = 3.60, SD = 2.15). In addition, a significant main effect emerged forFrequency, F(1, 267) = 3.90, p < 0.05, ηp

2 = 0.02, with scenarios that depicted thelatest in a recent series of attacks (M = 4.28, SD = 2.79) eliciting harsher retalia-tory responses than did scenarios portraying a first-time attack (M = 3.73, SD =2.42). There also was a significant Target × Impact × Frequency × Gender interac-tion, F(2, 272) = 9.31, p < 0.0001, ηp

2 = 0.07. This interaction uncovered consider-able variability in the retaliatory responses of Peruvian men and women acrossdifferent targets, level of impact and frequencies of attack (see Figures 1–4). Underhigh-impact conditions, Peruvian men expressed more aggressive retaliatoryresponses to scenarios depicting a series of civilian and commercial attacks and toa first-time military attack (Figure 1). Conversely, under high-impact conditions,Peruvian women supported stronger retaliatory responses to a series of militaryattacks and to a first-time commercial attack (Figure 2). The interaction alsorevealed that, under low-impact conditions, Peruvian men favored more retaliatoryforce only in the scenario portraying a first-time commercial attack (Figure 3). Bycontrast, under low-impact conditions, Peruvian women supported stronger retalia-tory responses to a series of attacks than to first-time attacks, regardless of thetarget (Figure 4).Figure 1. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian men for high-impact attack scenarios as a function of target and frequency of attack.Figure 2. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian women for high-impact attack scenarios as a function of target and frequency of attack.Figure 3. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian men for low-impact attack scenarios as a function of target and frequency of attack.Figure 4. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian women for low-impact attack scenarios as a function of target and frequency of attack.There were no significant interactions for the US group. However, a significantmain effect emerged for Target, F(2, 578) = 3.76, p < 0.05, ηp

2 = 0.01. Post-hocTukey tests revealed that military targets (M = 6.04, SD = 2.95) elicited signifi-cantly more aggressive retaliatory responses than did commercial targets (M = 5.30,SD = 2.63). In addition, significant main effects emerged for Impact, F(1, 578) =11.51, p < 0.001, ηp

2 = 0.02, with high-impact scenarios (M = 6.06, SD = 2.90)generating stronger retaliatory responses than low-impact scenarios (M = 5.32, SD= 2.70), and for Gender, F(1, 851) = 25.62, p < 0.0001, ηp

2 = 0.04, with men (M =6.24, SD = 2.79) supporting harsher retaliatory responses than women (M = 5.13,SD = 2.69).


Figure 1. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian men for high-impact attack scenarios asa function of target and frequency of attack.

Figure 2. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian women for high-impact attack scenariosas a function of target and frequency of attack.


Figure 3. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian men for low-impact attack scenarios as afunction of target and frequency of attack.

Figure 4. Conflict Thermometer means of Peruvian women for low-impact attack scenariosas a function of target and frequency of attack.


Post-hoc analyses

We believed that an exploration of gender and national differences in tolerance for agovernment’s right to use aggression, as measured by the PAIRTAS (Malley-Morri-son et al., 2006), might provide additional insight into our hypotheses and the signif-icant five-way interaction. Our post-hoc findings should be interpreted cautiouslybecause the Cronbach alphas of the PAIRTAS, especially for the Peruvian group,were not particularly high.

First, we conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Country) ANCOVA on PAIRTAS scores,with age and race as covariates. Although gender and the interaction were not statis-tically significant, the main effect for Country was, F(1, 856) = 52.59, p < 0.05, ηp

2 =0.97. US students (M = 36.87, SD = 10.44) reported greater tolerance for governmentrights to aggression than did Peruvian students (M = 26.29, SD = 8.64).

We also examined the partial correlations of PAIRTAS scores (Malley-Morrisonet al., 2006) and Conflict Thermometer ratings (Beer et al., 1992, 1995) by gender andby country, controlling for age and race. This correlation was slightly stronger amongmen, pr(370) = 0.29, p < 0.0001, than among women, pr(467) = 0.22, p < 0.0001, andsubstantially stronger for US students, pr(574) = 0.31, p < 0.0001, than for Peruvianstudents, pr(265) = 0.18, p < 0.01. Furthermore, the partial correlation between PAIR-TAS scores and Conflict Thermometer ratings was highest for US women, pr(298) =0.27, p < 0.0001, closely followed by US men, pr(272) = 0.25, p < 0.0001, and lowestfor Peruvian women, pr(165) = 0.12, n.s., with Peruvian men, pr(94) = 0.23, p < 0.05,more closely resembling US respondents than their female counterparts.

Discussion

We sought to understand more fully the cross-national and individual difference vari-ables that influence ordinary people’s reactions to terrorism post 9/11, specificallytheir support for government retaliation. We compared the effect on young Peruvianand US men and women of three experimental manipulations of a hypothetical terror-ist attack (i.e. target, impact and frequency), presented as newsflashes, in primingsupport for government retaliation following such an attack.

Primary analyses

Owing to the significant five-way interaction of our full model, which accounted for2% of the variance after controlling for respondents’ age, race and general beliefs ina government’s right to use aggression, that qualified all of our original hypotheses,we conducted follow-up analyses by country. For the Peruvian group, significant maineffects emerged for impact and frequency, partially supporting our second and thirdhypotheses, respectively; however, these findings were qualified by a significant four-way interaction. There were no significant interactions for the US group, only signif-icant main effects for target, impact and gender, partially supporting our first, secondand fifth hypotheses, respectively.

With regard to the US group, the target effect demonstrated for the first timethat terrorist attacks on military targets (i.e. casualties at a mess hall), regardless oftheir impact or frequency or the gender of respondents, yielded support for moreaggressive government retaliation than did commercial targets (i.e. propertydestruction at an oil refinery). This effect was above and beyond that due to age,race or pre-existing tolerance for government aggression. This finding suggests that


the cognitive representations of US respondents primed by different targets of aterrorist attack are distinct (Herrmann et al., 1997). For US respondents, news-flashes of death and injury via terrorism, even of legitimate combatants, may haveactivated conflict-related images more quickly than reports of economic loss. More-over, an attack on a military target more closely resembles an act of war and,hence, may justify harsher government retaliation (Healy et al., 2002; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; McAlister et al.,2006).

There was a significant effect for impact for Peruvian and US groups. Theseresults add to the existing US literature (Anthony et al., 2003; Bourne et al., 1996;Healy et al., 2002) by demonstrating that high-impact attacks yielded comparablecross-national preferences for more aggressive government retaliation. Newsflashesof high-impact attacks may have facilitated access to negatively charged attributionsand emotions (Walker & Chestnut, 2003), from which respondents formed their inter-pretations and decisions about how to respond (Bourne et al., 2003; Herrmann et al.,1997). Given their history of ideological terrorism, Peruvian and US respondents mayhave inferred maximally hostile objectives (e.g. radically transforming a country)from high-impact terrorist attacks (Abrams, 2006; Shamir & Shikaki, 2002).

With regard to the Peruvian group, the frequency effect is in keeping with theforgiveness-escalation pattern established in pre-9/11 research (Bourne et al., 2003) inwhich reactions to terrorism harden after multiple attacks. This pattern suggests that,once Peruvians overcome their initial hesitancy about forceful retaliation, they areable to justify less measured responses by their government by possibly framingrepeated terrorist attacks as morally indefensible (Robinson, 2008) and governmentreprisal as indispensable to public safety (Malley-Morrison et al., 2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; McAlister et al., 2006; Shamir & Shikaki, 2002). Incontrast to pre-9/11 studies (Bourne et al., 2003) and the frequency effect for Peruvi-ans, US respondents did not display a gradual escalation in support for governmentretaliation following repeated terrorist attacks. US citizens no longer seem to interpretan initial attack as an anomalous or relatively inconsequential act of violence; rather,their reactions to terrorist attacks appear to be set at the beginning and to remainstatic. The unexpected carnage of 9/11 and media presentations legitimizing massivegovernment retaliation (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009) may have contributed to thecurrent disregard of US respondents to the temporal dynamics of ongoing terroristconflict.

Gender had a significant main effect for the US group, with men favoring strongerretaliatory responses than women (Anthony et al., 2003; Bourne et al., 1996; Healyet al., 2002). This finding dovetails with past research showing that women preferredto maintain international relations when peace treaties were broken (Bourne et al.,2003; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006). As suggested by Walker and Chestnut (2003),US women may be more receptive than US men to the factual circumstances surround-ing terrorism, which may temper women’s reactions to a terrorist attack. We alsowonder whether our findings reflect broad gender differences in how US men andwomen interpret and react to wrongdoing in relationships (Buss, 1994; Gilligan,1982). Men generally take greater risks and seek retributive justice when transgres-sions occur in relationships (i.e. moral debts that should be paid in kind to restore equi-librium); women typically are more harm-avoidant and compassionate when relationaltransgressions occur (i.e. eschewing retribution to preserve equilibrium; Robinson,2008). Simply put, US women may be more resistant than their male counterparts to


disengaging morally in support of government retaliation following media reports ofa terrorist attack (Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, & Morrison, 2002).

Overall, US respondents supported harsher government retaliation for terroristattacks than did Peruvian respondents, supporting our sixth hypothesis. Thisoutcome converges with some cross-national studies (e.g. Koch, 2003), but notothers (e.g. Shamir & Shikaki, 2002). Inconsistencies in this sparse literature mayreflect the unexamined influence of ecological variables, such as cultural world-views and national narratives of survival that frame the diverse interpretations andreactions to terrorism worldwide. In related literature on general beliefs about agovernment’s right to use of aggression, respondents from different countries areless tolerant of government aggression than are US respondents (Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Daskalopoulos et al., 2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008;Malley-Morrison et al., 2006, 2009), possibly because the prospect of such violencemay evoke images, based on current and/or past conflict, of a widening toll in deathand suffering.

Unlike the US group, young Peruvians appear more sensitive to the economicconsequences of terrorism and potential threats to their historical class and race priv-ileges than they are to casualties inflicted upon innocent civilians. This is evidencedby the harsher government retaliation favored by Peruvian men to initial low-impactand repeated high-impact commercial attacks and by Peruvian women to a first time,high-impact commercial attack. Peruvians enrolled in prestigious universities in Limaare more affluent and White than the country’s population, and their responses suggestan elitist disregard for their unearned advantage and conferred dominance (Alderice,2009; DeSouza & Stevens, 2009; Wilson, 2009). Peruvian undergraduates’ reactionsto terrorist attacks may also reflect their insulation from the violence experienced bypoor, indigenous Peruvians during the 15-year struggle between the Shining Path andgovernment (DeSouza & Stevens, 2009; Malley-Morrison et al., 2009; Truth andReconciliation Commission of Peru, 2003). It is plausible, therefore, that the supportof elite Peruvian men and women for harsh government measures against terroristattacks that damage the country’s economy, and hence jeopardize the continuity oftheir privileged status, are mediated by images of class and racial identity (Wilson,2009). Additional studies are needed to determine whether the retaliatory reactions ofelite Peruvians, including those of political leaders from their ranks, are guided bypolarizing demographic images and how such images inform counterterrorism poli-cies that serve to stifle protest against their economic and political dominance(Wilson, 2009).

Also unlike the US group, it may be easier for Peru to avoid an escalation in terror-ist-related conflict as demands for forceful government retaliation by the Peruvianelite, and presumably by the elected leaders who represent them, occur after repeatedterrorist attacks. With certain exceptions, Peruvians manifest an incremental intoler-ance toward terrorism when terrorist attacks persist (Bourne et al., 1996), and mayjustify their eventual support for government retaliation by interpreting repeatedattacks as genuinely perilous to their safety and security (Abrams, 2006; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; McAlister et al., 2006;Shamir & Shikaki, 2002). The implications of our findings for Peru’s counterterrorismpolicy sharply contrast with the policy implications for the United States based on theretaliatory preferences of US respondents. If the US public’s reactions to reports of aninitial terrorist attack do not differ from those of later attacks, less justification may berequired for the public and its political leaders, most of whom are men, to advocate a


powerful retaliatory response; this may be especially true if the initial attack targetsthe military. The findings for the US group also suggest that it may prove challengingto de-escalate terrorist-related conflict given demands by the public for harsh govern-ment retaliation early on (Bourne et al., 2003).

Post-hoc analyses

Our post-hoc analyses revealed that US respondents were more accepting of theirgovernment’s right to use aggression than were Peruvian respondents. This finding isparticularly compelling because we controlled for respondents’ age and race. Theseresults add to the literature on the cross-national variability in general beliefs aboutgovernment rights to aggression (Ashy & Malley-Morrison, 2007; Daskalopouloset al., 2006; Malley-Morrison & Castanheira, 2008; Malley-Morrison et al., 2006,2009). The greater acceptance by US respondents for such government rights asinvading other countries and killing civilians when combating terrorism may reflecttheir historical insulation from violent social unrest, with its human and social costs,as well as more recent exposure to media accounts of the righteousness of the so-called war on terror (Koch, 2003; Malley-Morrison et al., 2009). Future researchshould clarify the ecological variables and national narratives that promote or restrainmoral disengagement in citizens of different countries (Malley-Morrison et al., 2009)and how moral disengagement in the general public may impact national policy anddecision-making in regard to counterterrorism (Robinson, 2008).

General beliefs about a government’s rights to use aggression were positively tiedto support for government retaliation against terrorist attacks, suggesting that theinterpretations and decisions of ordinary citizens following a terrorist attack may beguided by specific pre-existing cognitive representations (Bourne et al., 2003;Herrmann et al., 1997). The link between tolerance for government rights to aggres-sion and support for government retaliation against terrorism was considerably stron-ger for US respondents than for Peruvians and lowest for Peruvian women. The pre-existing beliefs that influence Peruvian women’s support for government retaliationfollowing terrorist attacks remain unclear. These exploratory cross-national findingsreaffirm the importance of investigating the potential role of general beliefs aboutgovernment rights to aggression, as well as other cognitive and ecological variables,in mediating the preference patterns of men and women in different countries forgovernment retaliation against terrorism.

Limitations and Recommendations

There are three methodological limitations to our study. First, both Peruvian and USgroups were self-selected and consisted entirely of undergraduate students. Peruvianstudents were recruited from elite universities in Lima, and were more affluent, White,and disproportionately female than the population. Hence, our findings should not begeneralized to Peruvians in the rural interior, most of whom are of Indian descent, orto older or younger Peruvians with less education and income. US undergraduates alsowere not especially representative of the general population; in fact, all were enrolledat the same mid-western university. We recognize that regional differences may existin support for government retaliation against terrorism. However, pre-9/11 studies ofthis kind also tested undergraduates and our hypotheses closely followed this line ofresearch (Borne et al., 2003).


Second, the newsflash format of the scenarios may have limited the amount ofinformation conveyed about the target, impact and frequency of a terrorist attack.However, this is unlikely because previous research has shown that abbreviated exper-imental manipulations of this kind consistently elicit differential responses (Healyet al., 2002) and because our participants evaluated the terrorist-attack scenarios asrealistic. However, participants may have responded differently to the Conflict Ther-mometer had the depicted events actually taken place. Using more detailed written orvideo excerpts of authentic terrorist attacks could serve to capture more externallyvalid and generalizable responses.

Third, unlike pre-911 studies (Bourne et al., 2003), all of our comparisons werebetween groups of respondents. Within-participants experimental designs wouldpermit a more credible investigation of the effect of one or more terrorist attackswith constant or varying targets and impact levels on support for government retalia-tion. Although such designs pose a respondent burden (i.e. reactance due to the timeand effort needed to respond to multiple scenarios), they would enable investigatorsto establish critical dosage–response effects on preferences for governmentretaliation.

Additional cross-national research should use qualitative methods to situateresponses to terrorism more fully in a country’s rich and nuanced ecologicalcontext and national narrative. Such research would help to clarify the support andjustification for government retaliation given the particulars of a reported terroristattack (e.g. the power and privilege of Peruvians, the insulation of US respondentsfrom social violence). It also would shed light on the role of citizens’ generalbeliefs about government rights to use aggression in their preferences for retalia-tory engagement. In addition, other dimensions of terrorism need to be identifiedand systematically manipulated in order to bring greater rigor to future studies (e.g.the methods, motives and organization of terrorists described in media presenta-tions). Lastly, a testable conceptual framework is needed to explain the apparenthomogenization of public opinion about terrorism (Walker & Chestnut, 2003),evidence of a forgiveness-escalation pattern in response to terrorism (Bourne et al.,2003), and gender differences in support for government retaliation followingreports of a terrorist attack (Anthony et al., 2003; Bourne et al., 1996; Healy et al.,2002). We specifically encourage researchers to investigate Peruvian–US variationin the retaliatory preferences found in our study, including the nuanced gendereffect as well as differential sensitivity to the target of a terrorist attack (i.e.military vs commercial) and temporal unfolding of terrorist conflict (i.e. immedi-ate vs gradual escalation).

Any extrapolation of our findings to the cognitive mediation of retaliatory prefer-ences following media primes of hypothetical terrorist attacks, the role of moral disen-gagement in legitimizing such retaliatory preferences and the impact of public opinionon counterterrorism policies and political decision-making, although potentially valu-able in understanding and addressing twenty-first-century terrorism, is speculative andawaits empirical validation. Nevertheless, it is clear that gender and nationality areimportant individual and ecological variables, respectively, that must be included inongoing scientific and applied efforts to understand how responses to particular actsof terrorism unfold. Support for government retaliation following a terrorist attack isa psychologically complex and socioculturally situated phenomenon that must beframed holistically if it is to be meaningfully conceptualized, validly studied andeffectively countered.


Notes on contributorsEros R. DeSouza is a professor of psychology at Illinois State University. He earned his PhDin community psychology from the University of Missouri – Kansas City. His research hasfocused on interpersonal aggression and perceptions of war, peace and terrorism, includingqualitative and quantitative approaches to investigating gender and cultural differences.

Michael J. Stevens is a professor at Illinois State University, where he was named Outstand-ing University Researcher. He holds an honorary professorship and doctorate at The LucianBlaga University in Romania. He is an APA Fellow and Past-President of its Division ofInternational Psychology, and has published and presented extensively on the psychology ofterrorism.

Rose M. Metivier received her BA in Psychology and Italian from the University of Coloradoand subsequently earned her MA in Clinical and Counseling Psychology at Illinois StateUniversity. For the past two years, she has worked in community mental health as the coordi-nator of an outreach program for children.

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