governance chapter 12 12 - bangsamoro development...
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C H A P T E R 12Governance
111
12Governance
Bangsamoro Development Plan
112
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
commenced as an Autonomous Regional Government (ARG)
in 1989. The establishment and administration of the ARMM
proved too arduous, and the ARMM Government has been
constantly associated with weak governance. The transition
to the Bangsamoro Government will offer an opportunity to
address structural problems and reconfigure the relationship
among the national, regional, and local governments. It
will also open up the chance to strengthen accountability
mechanisms, particularly those that engage communities in
local governance, in line with the Bangsamoro vision for self-
determination based on strong community engagement.
As Chairman Murad said at the launch of the Sajahatra
Bangsamoro Program in February 2013, “further
development can only be effective when it is people-
centered. One that is determined and undertaken by its
ultimate beneficiaries. One that empowers people and its
processes empowering.”
This chapter discusses the governance challenges facing the
region, presents the transition imperatives from the current
ARMM to the Bangsamoro Government in mid-2016, and
proposes interventions and targets to achieve these.
A. Context: Governance Structures and Systems in the Bangsamoro
A.1. Governance Structure and Intergovernmental Relations
Since its creation, the ARMM has been faced with the
challenges of: (a) lack of genuine autonomy; (b) weak
technical capacity; (c) political patronage and political
dynasties; and (d) accountability deficits.
A.1.1. Lack of Genuine Autonomy
The LGUs—the provincial, city, municipal, and
barangay—comprising the ARMM are not formally
subordinate to the regional government. The LGUs are
pre-existing entities with their own elected local officials
and receive automatic appropriations from the Central
Government. As such, they are effectively autonomous
from the ARMM. Given then that the ARMM is “less
autonomous than local governments…and more
subservient and dependent on the National Government
than any other political sub-division in the country,”123
the ARG has struggled to build consensus around
regional priorities and implement regional policies.
A.1.2. Weak Technical Capacity
Given the poor education outcomes in the ARMM, the
regional and local governments have a shallow pool
of technocrats, particularly for such key governance
skills like planning, budgeting, and accounting. Due to
politicization, appointments are often based on affiliation
rather than qualification, discouraging qualified staff from
remaining in government.
A.1.3. Lack of Accountability
Lack of technical skills is compounded by weak or
nonexistent public accountability systems.124 Minimal
community engagement in local development bodies,
weak public oversight of service delivery, and lack
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of a performance-based framework that links access to
public funds to performance have meant that the current
system of governance neither rewards good performance
nor punishes poor performance. The Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), given as an automatic appropriation
to LGUs125 regardless of performance, is often used as a
personal “slush fund” of local chief executives or used to
resolve rido.126
A.2. Revenue and Budget Management
A.2.1. Weak Fiscal Autonomy
Although the ARG has instituted a number of governance
reforms, the region remains highly dependent on Central
Government transfers. Figure 31 shows only 2% of the
total amount of government funds available in the ARMM
(including LGU IRA and Central Government line agency
spending) is raised in the region. As a result, this allows the
budget to be subjected to national control.127
A.2.2. Poor Budget Management
Budget management has generally been weak in the region.
A 2010 study on the ARMM’s education budget control
institutions found “weak internal control systems” and
“no clear guidelines for reporting on budget utilization by
the implementing units, and more importantly, a report
correlating budget spent with achievement of physical
outputs or performance targets is nonexistent.”128
With limited reporting on results and outcomes, the Central
Government’s trust and confidence in the ARMM has
fallen. This, in turn, has created a vicious cycle of mistrust,
reduced funding, and diminished autonomy as the Central
Government increasingly implemented development
programs in the ARMM through neighboring regional
offices of national line agencies rather than through the
regional government.
A.3. Civil Society and Community Engagement in Governance
Direct community engagement in governance has been
very limited in the ARMM outside of major community-
driven development projects run by the BDA and the
ARG.129 Mandatory community participation in local
development councils is usually nonexistent. The
Bangsamoro region has a number of capable civil society
networks and organizations that are active in such
fields as human rights, conflict monitoring, and public
service delivery monitoring. However, transparency and
accountability to the public remains limited.
Strengthening participation in local health boards,
parent-teacher associations, and other community
organizations active in service delivery would help to
improve the relevance of services and accountability
to the public. Increasing access to information on
government performance is also critical to fostering
public accountability.
A.4. Judicial Institutions
Injustice is at the heart of the Bangsamoro struggle
for self-determination. It is also the main driver of
violent conflict and poverty in the BCT. Strengthening
judicial institutions to promote social justice and
correct historical wrongs is central to the BDP. And yet,
impunity and limited access to justice for marginalized
members of the community characterize the delivery of
justice services in the Bangsamoro.
Figure 31: Principal Sources of Government Funds to ARMM (2009–2011)
Source: DFAT-Australia and WB (2013)—Basic Education in ARMM
Bangsamoro Development Plan
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A.4.1. Legal Pluralism in the Bangsamoro
The BBL “recognizes, protects, and guarantees the customs,
beliefs and traditions of the people of the Bangsamoro”
and “shall adopt measures to ensure mutual respect and
protection of these for the Bangsamoro people and the
other inhabitants of the Bangsamoro.” Article X of the BBL
provides the framework for the administration of justice in
the Bangsamoro, including:
a. Strengthening of the Shari’ah justice system and
expanding its jurisdiction to include civil, commercial
and criminal cases;
b. Establishing an Office for Traditional/Tribal Justice
System and enacting legislation that will promote and
support traditional/tribal justice system appropriate to
IPs;
c. Recognizing the powers of other local courts and
improving their capacity; and
d. Establishing an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
system, including provisions for prior recourse to
ADR in recognition of the principles of conciliation
and mediation.
A.4.2. Access to Justice
Access to justice in the Bangsamoro is generally weak.
Only half of the mandated State Shari’ah Courts are fully
operational, because of major resource constraints. Access
to legal aid is similarly minimal in a region that has very
few legal professionals. As a result, most disputes are
resolved through community-based justice mechanisms at
the village level. Elders and community leaders wield local
authority and legitimacy, but in general they run these
village-level institutions with no training in mediation and
limited knowledge of the law. Significant capacity-building
will be needed to strengthen these institutions.
A.4.3. Women and Access to Justice
Women suffer additional challenges in accessing justice.
Community-based justice systems in particular tend to
reflect local power structures that often discriminate
against women, who are under-represented in positions of
leadership. In the State Shari’ah Courts, although women
are the majority of complainants, there are only three
female judges in the entire system, and cases filed by
women are more likely to be dismissed than those filed
by men.
A.5. Managing Conflict and Strengthening Security
The success of the Bangsamoro Government will largely
be determined by progress made on reducing conflict
and increasing security. With respect to the ceasefire and
the success of the Joint Coordinating Committee on the
Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH) and the IMT, the state-
minority contestation has been a relatively minor source
of violent conflict over the last six years. Rather, recent
data indicate that the incidence of inter-communal and
inter-elite conflict is the main driver of violence in the
Bangsamoro.130
Ensuring peace and security in the Bangsamoro will
therefore require the dismantling of the estimated 43
private armed groups operating in the ARMM,131 in
addition to the redeployment of military forces, the
establishment of an effective Bangsamoro police force,
and the disarmament of combatants.
As discussed in Chapter 10, the resolution of competing
land claims has interlocking environmental, economic,
governance, and security implications. Land management
institutions struggle with limited capacity, appear all
too often open to elite capture, and are insufficiently
resourced to withstand the politicization of land conflicts.
Land conflicts are related to historical grievances and
inadequate and/or failed land reform policies, and serve
as a trigger for rido.
B. Transition Period PhaseBesides the above governance issues that will require
significant time, effort, and resources to resolve, there are
immediate tasks that the Bangsamoro Government will
need to address during the transition period. Adequate
responses to these will build the foundations upon which
solutions to these medium- and long-term challenges can
be resolved.
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The transition from the ARMM government to the final
establishment of the Bangsamoro Government can be
split into three phases, each with distinct governance
arrangements:
1. BTC leadership from mid-2014 up to the passage of
the BBL;132
2. BTA leadership from the passage of the BBL up to the
installation of the elected Bangsamoro Government;
and
3. First term of the Bangsamoro Government.
The challenges and sequencing confronting the Bangsamoro
Government in each phase are summarized in Table 28 and
described fully in the following section.
C. Transition Challenges, Features, and TargetsThis section describes in detail the critical challenges,
features, and targets for each phase of the transition (see
Table 28)
C.1. Overall/General Transition Challenges
Overall challenges in the transition period to the Bangsamoro
Government include: (a) constituency-building by the
Bangsamoro Government promoting inclusivity among its
various constituencies; (b) managing intergovernmental
relations; (c) restructuring regional governance; (d) redefining
relationship with local government units; and (e) encouraging
greater civil society participation and civic consciousness
among the Bangsamoro.
C.1.1. Constituency-Building and Inclusivity
Among the most challenging tasks faced by the Bangsamoro
Government is uniting its constituency. There are two sides
in a social contract: the governed (or the constituency) and
the government.
The Bangsamoro identity as articulated in the BBL provides
a strong impetus for unity and engagement in governance.
In the past, there was no sustained effort to harness the
region’s constituency to strengthen governance. The
element of building and uniting that constituency is
therefore imperative, particularly with ethnically diverse
constituents. Moreover, in establishing unity, the role
of women must be recognized and harnessed, as a
sector that comprises half the constituency. Access to
information needs to be fostered as an important element
in building trust in the Bangsamoro Government.
To strengthen the constituents for the Bangsamoro
Government, inclusivity must be fostered at various levels:
among ethnic groups that comprise the region; in the
distribution of the benefits of the dividends of the peace
process; among groups belonging to different political
factions, particularly among LGU officials, MNLF, among
others; and active participation of women in various facets
of the development task.
C.1.2. Intergovernmental Relations
By its nature, the Bangsamoro Government will need
to have robust intergovernmental mechanisms to
facilitate harmony, cooperation, and coordination
between itself and the Central Government. Ensuring
that concurrent powers are appropriately dispensed will
require establishing mechanisms that ensure the exercise
of exclusive powers are coordinated with the Central
Government’s actions.
C.1.3. Regional Governance
The first phase in establishing the regional government
will consist of hurdling problems associated with
transition. While most of Bangsamoro’s procedural
systems will have to adopt a national standard, some
need to be modified to reflect the unique features of the
Bangsamoro parliamentary form of government. These
include administrative relations between the regional
parliament and the regional government as well as
between the regional government and its constituent local
government units. Budgeting procedures in the context
of the block grant and other Central Government funding
mechanisms and development approach will also have
to be adjusted to the unique structural features of the
Bangsamoro Government.
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Table 28: Challenges, Features, and Targets of Transition Phases I, II, and III
Phase I – BTC leadershipApril 2014 until Passage of the BBL
Phase II – BTA leadershipThe Passage of the BBL until May
2016
Phase III – Bangsamoro GovernmentMay 2016 onwards
Overall / General Transition Challenges
• Constituency-building by promoting inclusivity• Managing intergovernmental relationships• Restructuring regional governance• Redefining relationship with LGUs• Encouraging greater civil society participation and civic consciousness among the Bangsamoro
Critical Features of Transition Phase
• CAB, FAB and its Annexes, and the proposed BBL are the primary documents giving formal structure to the Bangsamoro;
• The BTC, a composite entity (GPH-MILF), has a very limited mandate and limited authority or resources to implement projects or programs on its own;
• The BDA and BLMI, the MILF’s current primary implementation organizations, remain non-government entities with no authority over any government program or body;
• The BBL will not be in effect until passed by Congress
• The ARG remains the government entity authorized to govern and represent the GPH in the core territory of the proposed Bangsamoro.
• The Bangsamoro is established by law and the BTA is created; the BTC will be dissolved;
• The BBL is in effect;• Special Development Fund (SDF)
is released to the BTA by the Central Government;
• ARG shall have transferred its authority over devolved agencies to the BTA. ARG has ceased to exist.
• The elections will preoccupy both the GPH and the BTA; and
• Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to be high.
• Devolution of functions to the Bangsamoro is in full swing;
• The Parliament and Cabinet are installed and the Chief Minister elected;
• New sets of LGU officials are in place;
• The first amounts of block grant, special funds and internal revenue shares need to be appropriated and allocated by the Parliament through a regional budget process;
• Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to remain high; and
• Depending upon the results of the plebiscite and elections, indications of private sector interest to invest in the Bangsamoro begin to show.
Specific Transition Targets
• Organize and prepare a Transition Team to support the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) to prepare for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)
• Organize and prepare a Policy Development Team to support the BTC and BTA in addressing key policy issues
• Formulate the BDP containing programs and projects and their respective cost estimates that can be funded by the Special Development Fund
• Establish, define mandates, and operationalize transitional bodies (JNC, IDB, TJRC, JPST/JPSC, etc.)
• Coordinate with COMELEC on management of the plebiscite
• Turnover of reports, documents, functions, properties and other assets of the ARG is completed
• Ensure uninterrupted delivery of basic services
• Help ensure conduct of a successful plebiscite (in coordination with COMELEC)
• Completion of all preparations for the reorganization of the ARG into the new Bangsamoro Government including the transfer of functions and administrative responsibilities and a reorganization plan ready for implementation.
• Conduct and completion of studies on urgent matters affecting the establishment of the new regional government
• Implementation of a constituency-building campaign
• Reorganize Government and establish new administrative systems
• Develop system support the realization of fiscal autonomy
• Launch campaign to reform LGUs in the Bangsamoro region
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C.1.4. Local Government
The Bangsamoro Government will be inheriting a
convoluted local government system. It will also face
a structure that has thrived on patronage entrenched
through years of misdirection and non-supervision. It
will have to redefine its relationship with the LGUs
to promote greater transparency and accountability
among LGU officials to improve overall welfare of the
Bangsamoro, stabilize the peace and order situation,
and foster prospects of growth and development in the
region under its leadership. The Bangsamoro Parliament
will have to formulate and pass the law that will redefine
this relationship toward a more efficient delivery of basic
services to local communities.
C.1.5. Civil Society
The Bangsamoro Government will need to create
an environment for civil society to adjust to the new
condition of transition and stability. The focus of most
CSOs has been more on peacebuilding and livelihood
development and less on governance and security issues
and improvement of the delivery of basic services by the
regional government. Through partnership with donor
agencies, Bangsamoro CSOs can be strengthened in their
capacity to help effective delivery of the basic services.
The Bangsamoro Government will have to promote
greater civic consciousness among its constituents,
as the development problems confronting the region
will require cooperation and contribution from all
stakeholders to address them successfully.
C.2. Critical Features of Each Transition Phase
The characteristics of each phase limit the types and
nature of activities that can be implemented.
C.2.1. Phase I—BTC Leadership (April 2014 until the Passage of the BBL)
The mandate of the BTC is limited to: (a) drafting the BBL;
(b) identifying possible Constitutional issues that bear on
the authority of the Bangsamoro Government; and (c)
coordinating with GPH agencies and NGOs to assist in
“identifying and coordinating development programs in
the Region, in conjunction with the MILF’s BDA and the
BLMI.”133
The critical features of the first (BTC) phase include the
following:
a. The CAB, FAB and its Annexes, plus the proposed
BBL, are the primary documents giving formal
structure to the Bangsamoro;
b. The BTC, a composite GPH-MILF entity, has a
very limited mandate and limited authority and
resources to implement programs and projects on
its own;
c. The BDA, BLMI, and the MILF’s current
implementation organizations remain to be
nongovernment entities with no authority over any
government program or body;
d. The BBL in draft form is submitted for deliberation
and approval of Congress; and
e. The ARMM remains as the government entity
authorized to govern and represent the GPH in the
BCT.
Given that limitations of the BTC and the MILF during this
context, this phase is best suited to policy development
initiatives, conducting important research studies, and
organizing for the transition process, preparatory to the
establishment of the Bangsamoro Government.
C.2.2. Phase II—BTA Leadership (Passage of BBL until May 2016)
The second phase is marked by the passage of the BBL
calling for the formal establishment of the Bangsamoro
Government and the creation of the BTA as an interim
arrangement.134 The critical features of this phase include
the following:
a. The Bangsamoro Government is established by law
and the BTA is created as an ad-interim body;
b. The BBL is in effect;
c. SDF is released to the BTA by the Central
Government;135
d. ARG shall have transferred its authority over
devolved agencies to the BTA;136
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e. The plebiscite and then the regular election for
Bangsamoro Parliament members will preoccupy
both the GPH and the BTA; and
f. Donor support for the Bangsamoro is expected to
be high.
The BTA will have fewer limitations during this phase,
but the plebiscite and the regular election are expected
to preoccupy everyone, including the MILF. It is a crucial
stage in the transition process for two reasons: First,
it represents the turnover stage from the ARG to the
Bangsamoro Government through the BTA. At this time,
there will be events requiring detailed and meticulous
planning and various nuts-and-bolts issues will likely
arise. A good transition team would have to be formed
for the tasks. Second, it represents the handover stage,
from the BTA to the first Bangsamoro Government-elect.
Between these two milestones, the BTA will have to
ensure that “the continued functioning of government in
the area of autonomy is exercised pursuant to its mandate
under the BBL.”137 That means that while in office the
BTA will need to guarantee uninterrupted delivery of
public services while new institutions are being created
and their capacity is being enhanced.
C.2.3. Phase III—First Term of the Elected Bangsamoro Government (May 2016 onwards)
The third phase is the “take-off” phase for the new
Bangsamoro Government, during which high
expectations will need to be managed carefully. The
critical features of the third phase will include:
a. Devolution of functions to the Bangsamoro
Government is in full swing;
b. The Parliament and the Cabinet are installed and
the Chief Minister is elected;
c. New sets of LGU officials are in place;
d. The Parliament appropriates and allocates the first
amounts of block grant, and special funds through
a regional budget process; and
e. Donor support for the Bangsamoro Government
(according to pronouncements) is high.
Depending on the results of the plebiscite and the
elections, indications of private sector interest to invest in
the Bangsamoro may begin to show.
C.3. Transition Targets: What Need to be Done
Each of the phases during the transition period will
require different sets of targets/activities, as detailed in
the following section.
C.3.1. Phase I—BTC Leadership (April 2014 until the Passage of the BBL)
In Phase I, the targets/activities will be:
a. To organize and prepare a transition coordination
team to support the BTA in performing its mandate;
b. To organize and prepare a policy development team
to support the BTA;
c. To formulate a BDP that identifies programs and
projects and their cost estimates that will be funded
by the SDF;
d. To establish and follow through on implementation
of the transitional bodies (i.e., JNC, IDB, TJRC,
JPSTs, JPSCs) and task forces on camps and
amnesties and pardons;
e. To establish a body to manage the policing
challenges; and
f. To coordinate with the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on overseeing the plebiscite.
C.3.1.1. Organizing the CT4T138
A Coordination Team for the Transition (CT4T) should be
organized to perform the following tasks:
a. Facilitate the transfer of properties, official records,
and books of accounts;
b. Receive and review official reports and documents,
as well as properties to be turned over by the ARG;
c. Help identify and act on other immediate issues
confronting the BTA regarding the transition
process; and
d. Help ensure that all functions mandated to the
Bangsamoro Government are transferred to it by
the ARG.
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As of November 2014, the GPH-MILF negotiating parties
had signed terms of reference for the Coordination Team
for the Transition to the BTA; otherwise known as the
CT4T.
C.3.1.2. Organizing a Policy Development Team139
A Policy Development Team would need to be organized
to conduct research and policy studies urgently needed
to inform the BTA and, eventually, the Bangsamoro
Government on priority issues. It could conduct the
policy researches itself, or contract the services of
outside experts to undertake such studies. Under the
latter arrangement, its role would be to ensure that the
contracted consultants produce high-quality outputs
and that their studies addressed appropriate and critical
policy issues confronting the BTA and/or Bangsamoro
Government. The Team would have to be composed of
highly qualified individuals from various disciplines in
the development field with long experience in policy
research and development.
C.3.1.3. Special Development Fund (SDF)
The MILF (with support from BDA and other relevant
units) is expected to provide an estimate of the
development assistance it will require during the
transition period. The BTA is expected to implement or
start implementing selected development programs and
projects during its incumbency. However, the ARG will
have a working budget up to 2015 and the BTC will have
to determine whether the proposed priority programs and
projects of the ARG are covered by the ARG submission
for 2015. If not, these priority programs and projects will
have to be funded by the SDF and other funding sources.
C.3.1.4. Establishing and Following Through on Implementation of the Transitional Bodies
The CAB and the BBL provide for the creation of a
number of transitional bodies (JNC, IDB, TJRC, JPSTs,
JPSCs, the Task Forces on the Six Camps and the Task
Force on Amnesties and Pardons) that will address
specific concerns during the transition process. Some of
these bodies have begun working and others are still to
be established or at the initial organizational stage. The
BTC would need to be regularly updated on the progress of
these bodies, as they are critical in determining the outcome
of the concerns assigned to them.
Of particular importance is the establishment of a body
that will manage “policing” operations. The Independent
Commission on Policing (ICP) has made concrete proposals
on reforms that will be needed in policing the Bangsamoro
region within the stipulations of the agreements between
the GPH and the MILF. A unit would need to be created to
ensure implementation of these proposals.
C.3.1.5. Coordinating with COMELEC on the Management of the Plebiscite
While awaiting approval of the BBL in Congress,
representations could be made with the COMELEC on
preparations for the plebiscite on the BBL as electoral
exercises normally take considerable time and manpower.
C.3.2. Phase II—BTA Leadership (Passage of the BBL until May 2016)
Phase II has five major target activities:
a. Turnover of reports, documents, functions, properties,
and other assets of the ARG is completed in an orderly
manner with minimal complications;
b. Uninterrupted delivery of basic services;
c. All preparations for reorganization of the ARG into
the Bangsamoro Government, including the transfer
of functions and administrative responsibilities, are
completed and a reorganization plan is ready for
implementation;
d. Conduct and completion of studies on urgent matters
affecting the establishment of the new regional
government to be approved by the Bangsamoro
Government; and
e. A constituency-building campaign is underway.
C.3.2.1. Completing the Turnover
As the detailed instructions and authority to implement the
turnover are not contained in the BBL, the CT4T will need
to formulate these guidelines for signing and issuance by
the Office of the President. Also, the CT4T will need to
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120
assist in receiving and reviewing the various reports to
be submitted by the ARG. These will include financial
reports, property inventories, personnel inventories, and
others, which would be the basis for the formal turnover.
Milestone events of this activity will include the turnover
of physical properties and financial assets and the proper
disposal of those physical assets according to auditing
rules, if needed.140
In addition to the inventory of financial and nonfinancial
assets and official records, the ARG could prepare a
comprehensive baseline on the “state of the different
sectors in the ARMM” (i.e., the “Open Data” project).
This would be an important document that the CT4T
members could preserve and which the BTA and the
Bangsamoro Government could maintain and continue.
C.3.2.2. Completion of Preparations for Reorganization
Preparations for reorganization will cover the following:
a. Design and Approval of Administrative
Bureaucracy and Organizational Structure. This
document will detail the organizational structure
of each agency defined in the BBL, the mandatory
positions, qualification standards associated
with each mandatory position, and the required
competencies.
b. Drafting and approval of an Organizational
Rationalization Program. This will outline in
detail what line agencies and what positions are
to be retained, the process of personnel transfer/
separation, hiring/rehiring, amount of separation
pay, grievance management system, and others.
This will ensure that the rights of civil servants
are protected. The program will be guided by the
approved BBL.
c. Drafting of a Capacity-Building Plan. Staff of all
line agencies of the Bangsamoro Government
will need to undergo intensive reorientation and
training. This plan will outline the capacity-building
requirements of the line agencies and the manner
of delivery. If none is provided in the BBL, this plan
will detail the establishment of a regional government
agency that will be responsible for implementing
technical assistance programs to line agencies and
capacity-building programs for line agency staff.
d. Completion of an Organizational Performance
Implementation Framework and Performance
Evaluation System (OPIF-PES). Until the current
administration, absence of a performance
monitoring and evaluation framework in the ARMM
disabled attempts to evaluate regional operations
at the outcome level. This inability contributed to
inefficiencies attributed to the ARG and stymied
attempts to establish organizational and individual
accountability. The OPIF is an effective framework
for planning line agency programs and activities
based on strategic objectives. It follows the design
of an administrative bureaucracy and organizational
structure. Given the differences between the ARMM
and the Bangsamoro Government, a new OPIF-PES
will be needed.
e. Organization of a Transition Oversight Committee
and Completion of a Monitoring Framework for
Transition. An oversight committee with defined
mandates and composition will be needed to
shepherd the transition process. It would need to be
composed of high-level officials of the GPH and the
MILF, and could also include some members of the
Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) as the transition
involves implementing provisions of the peace
agreement.141 Based on the ARMM experience, it is
important to have strong oversight of the transition
process, to facilitate resolution of issues as these are
encountered.
C.3.2.3. Completion or Commencement of Policy Studies on Matters Needing Immediate Attention by the BTA/Bangsamoro Government
a. Drafting a new regional administrative code for
consideration by the Bangsamoro Parliament. An
administrative code serves as guide to government
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boundaries. Decisions on whether or not business
transactions are within the region will depend on
this study. The study will contain reference maps,
which will need to be closely coordinated with
the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority (NAMRIA) of the Philippines. It should
provide guidance on what to do with “orphan LGUs”
(municipalities or barangays) that have decided to
join the Bangsamoro and have to be carved out of
their provinces or municipalities.
e. Creating regional special bodies on audit and civil
service. The BBL provides for creation of special
bodies for audit and civil service administration. It
will be important to study how these bodies relate
to the regional government and to their parent
organizations and the range of powers within the
region. The Commission on Audit and the Civil
Service Commission are both constitutional bodies
and their integration into the regional government
will need diligent and careful study.
f. Review and approval of regional local government
code. The LGUs are likely to pose a serious concern
to the new regional government. Ambivalence on the
part of both the Central Government and the regional
government has led to LGUs functioning practically
on their own. The present regional local government
code may need to be reviewed and revised. In the
context of a parliamentary form of government,
the Bangsamoro Government will need to define
new relationships between itself and its constituent
LGUs. It will need the LGUs for revenue generation
purposes (collection of fees and regional taxes), and
the systems and procedures for that purpose need to
be tightened.
g. Conducting a study on promoting the Shari’ah
justice system. A consistent demand of the
Bangsamoro peace negotiators was promotion of
the application of Shari’ah justice system in the
region as part of their adherence to Islamic values
and respect for their distinct cultural identity. It is
operations and decision-making. It can include a
definition of territory and constituency as well as
administrative procedures to guide civil servants in
their day-to-day tasks. It delineates functions among
the different line and staff agencies and other units of
the regional government.
b. Review and enactment of a regional electoral
code. The enactment of a Bangsamoro Electoral Code
is a priority. As proposed in the draft BBL, the first
regular election for the Bangsamoro Government in
May 2016 shall be governed by this electoral code,
although National Omnibus Election Code shall apply
suppletorily, where appropriate.
c. Review and approval of the regional revenue code.
The BBL identifies the revenue sources of the regional
government. These would form the basis for a review
of the present regional revenue code, or its repeal,
as the case may be, based on the study results. Work
on this matter would be urgent, as action on a new
revenue law would be among the first items in the
agenda of the Parliament. It would include drafting
specific guidelines for establishing tax bases, tax rates,
remittance of shares from internal revenue collections,
income from natural resource extraction, incomes of
government corporations from operations in the region,
and other sources. These would help the BTA discuss
procedural matters pertaining to fiscal autonomy with
the Department of Finance. The task would involve
working with an interim Intergovernmental Fiscal
Policy Board (IFPB)and later a permanent IFPB.
This is one of the four priority legislations to be
accomplished by the BTA, including the Bangsamoro
revenue code, the Bangsamoro Electoral Code, and the
Bangsamoro Civil Service Code.
d. Conducting a study defining the land and water
boundaries of the region based on the results of
the plebiscite. The Bangsamoro Government and
the Parliament will need this study because many
decisions will rely on the accuracy of regional
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important that a study on the feasibility of its
expanded application be undertaken, taking into
consideration the pluralistic nature of the justice
system prevailing in the region. The study would
inform discussions in the Bangsamoro Parliament
on promoting wider application of Shari’ah
justice. Further details on Shari’ah justice are in
the next section.
h. Drafting a law to delineate the rights of IPs
in terms of exploitation of natural resources
within their territories. Section 11 of Article XIII
(Economy and Patrimony) of the BBL specifies
that a law will be drafted to define the rights of
the IPs in the exploitation of natural resources
within their territories. This is consistent with the
BBL’s declaration that it recognizes and respects
the rights of IPs residing within the BCT (Section
5, Article IX —Basic Rights of the BBL).
i. Guidelines on receipt of grants and donations
from foreign and local donors. The BBL allows
receipt of grants and other donations from
foreign and domestic entities.The first three
years of the regional government will see many
donors wanting to contribute to the success of
the Bangsamoro experiment. For transparency, it
would be important to have rules on receipt by
the Bangsamoro Government of donations and
foreign assistance.
j. Modifying the regional budgeting and budget
management system. With the block grant
and SDF as predictable sources of funds from
the Central Government, the Bangsamoro
Government may now prepare budgets from
a single regional fund, whereas previously
there were two: allocations in the General
Appropriations Act, and the local fund. The
systems and procedures on budgeting, execution,
and monitoring will need to be reviewed and
modified substantially. A more substantive
performance-based budgeting system could be
expected with the introduction of the Organizational
Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF). The budget
system would need to allow the regional government
to access funding for identified priority projects that are
still covered by national government mandates.
k. Inventory, review, and adaption of relevant
administrative procedures. This task covers two
sets of procedures. The first pertains to procedures
governing relations between the legislature and the
executive (Bangsamoro Parliament and Bangsamoro
Government) in a parliamentary system. The second
pertains to procedures for government operations such
as procurement, government accounts management,
personnel management and other similar systems.
l. Formulating procedures pertaining to relations
between the legislative and executive organs
of the regional government. Rules, regulations,
and procedures governing relations between the
Parliament and the Government (i.e., the Cabinet) in
a parliamentary environment need to be documented.
Such documentation would guide not only officials
and staff of the Parliament, the Chief Minister (and
his/her Deputy) and the Cabinet Ministers, but also
the ministry and Parliament staff who will have to
deal with each other. This is particularly important as
parliamentary procedures are alien to most Filipinos.
m. Formulating procedures on procurement, government
accounts management, personnel management
and others. One of the major issues on regional
administration in the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace
Agreement was the late adoption and documentation
of administrative procedures, which caused confusion
and disorganization. To avoid this mistake, the new
regional government will have to do an inventory
to all relevant manuals pertaining to government
administration, and adapt these to its operations. These
procedures may need to be reviewed in the context of
the ministerial form of governance. Some procedures
C H A P T E R 12Governance
123
may need to be incorporated into the administrative
code.
n. Optional creation of provisional intergovernmental
bodies. The FAB and its Annexes provide for
creation of six intergovernmental special bodies
relevant to governance, and other special bodies for
the normalization process. The BTA may decide to
form provisional intergovernmental bodies during its
mandate. The GPH and the BTA will coordinate and
cooperate on the composition of these bodies and
on the mechanisms that will guide their operations.
Some of these may be created by legislative fiat,
depending on the advice of the study group.142
C.3.2.4. Implementation of a Constituency-Building Campaign
It would be essential for the BTA to show inclusiveness
in its operations and decisions from the start in order to
build a constituency for the Bangsamoro Government.
Demonstrating representativeness and participation
of all stakeholders in each institution and act would
be critical to winning support from Non-Bangsamoro,
settlers, and non-MILF constituencies. In building new
institutions, there may be a need to capitalize on skills
that are spread across all ethnic groups to ensure adequate
capacity to deliver on its mandate immediately and meet
expectations.
C.3.3. Phase III—First Term of the Elected Bangsamoro Government Officials (May 2016 onwards)
This phase covers the period from the inauguration of the
newly elected Parliament members to the end of 2019.
During this period, the BTA will relinquish its mandate
in favor of the convened Parliament. The BBL defines the
functions and operations of the Bangsamoro Parliament,
the Office of the Chief Minister and the Cabinet, and the
relationship between the Parliament and the Government.
An accepted practice in parliamentary democracies is
that the executive sets most of the legislative agenda. At
this point, the BTA’s Policy Development Team could
be formally integrated into the regional government to
support its agenda-setting role.
With the installation of the first Parliament and the
Bangsamoro Government, the activities/targets for this
phase are: (a) the regional government is reorganized
and its administrative systems are in place; (b) systems to
support the realization of fiscal autonomy are installed; and
(c) the campaign to reform LGUs in the Bangsamoro region
begins.
C.3.3.1. The Regional Government is Reorganized and its Administrative Systems are in Place
Among the key activities under this agenda are:
a. Implementation of the organizational rationalization
program.This program would best be placed directly
under the Chief Minister, who shall organize a
rationalization program committee to oversee its
implementation. Committee members may include
representatives of the Civil Service Commission,
members of the Cabinet, the employees of the
abolished ARMM regional government, the
Government Service Insurance System, and the
Pag-IBIG Fund, and a member of the CT4T. This
program will need to be coordinated closely with
the reorganization of the regional administrative
bureaucracy.
b. Reorganization of the line and support agencies and
offices of the regional government. The design of
the regional government’s structure and designation
of mandates and functions to the different line
(Ministries) and staff (Offices) units shall have been
completed under the BTA. Guided by those, former
ARG departments that have been functioning on
an interim basis will be reorganized into the regular
service delivery units of the Bangsamoro Government.
With the structures defined and mandates allocated,
position qualification standards are defined and the
regional government embarks on a campaign to
attract the best and the brightest in the region. Staff
members of the abolished ARG who are found to be
highly qualified will be encouraged to apply for new
positions.
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124
The reorganization will also cover the introduction of
the OPIF, against which each agency’s and individual
staff’s performance will be measured. A Performance
Monitoring System would be needed to allow the
Bangsamoro Government to evaluate achievement of
desired outcomes. Among the first major application of
the OPIF would be the preparation of the Bangsamoro
Government’s First Six-Year Plan. Being outcome-
oriented, the OPIF should be able to provide the
regional line and service agencies, guidance in linking
goals and objectives to agency program, project, and
activity (PPA).
Use of the OPIF framework would facilitate its linkage
to the annual budgets as well as the Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Medium-Term
Investment Program (MTIP). The reorganization may
include introduction of agency operations manuals.
All staffs would be oriented not only in its use but
also in relevant procurement, government accounting
management, audit, evaluation and reporting systems.
c. Establishment of a regional budgeting and budget
management system. The regional budgeting and
budget management system, designed under the
BTA, will be established in close coordination with
the Central Government’s Department of Budget and
Management. The IFPB and the Cabinet will review the
system before approval. The Policy Development Team
members responsible for the scheme may provide
inputs for the review and approval process. The new
system will result in the preparation and review MTEF-
MTIP, which will dovetail with regional plans. The
new budget system will include a process to enable
the Bangsamoro Government and its constituent LGUs
to access funding for region-identified priority projects
from national agencies.
d. Enactment of an administrative code. The Parliament
is expected to support this basic and important
piece of regional legislation. The concerned Policy
Development Team member could shepherd the
process of approval. As discussed earlier, the Policy
Development Team would have to work with both the
Parliament and the Cabinet to see the draft law pass.
e. Enactment of a law on Shari’ah justice. Similarly,
the Parliament is expected to support this important
legislation. The Policy Development Team could assist
the Parliament and the Cabinet in drafting the bill.
f. Implementation of capability-building plan. A unit
will be established that will focus on providing human
resource development services to the different line
and support agencies of the regional government. It
will be responsible for implementing a capability-
building plan.
g. Forming and operationalization of intergovernmental
bodies. The six intergovernmental bodies pertaining to
governance, mentioned earlier, will be the following,
in order of priority:
i. Intergovernmental Relations Body (from interim to
permanent)
ii. Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Board (from
interim to permanent)
iii. Congress-Parliament Bangsamoro Forum
iv. Intergovernmental Sustainable Development Body
v. Shari’ah Supervisory Board
vi. Joint Body for the Zones of Joint Cooperation
C.3.3.2. Systems to Support the Realization of Fiscal Autonomy are Installed
The key activities to meet this target will include:
a. Organizing the IFPB or converting its status from an
interim organ under the BTA to a permanent organ of
the Bangsamoro Government;
b. A new regional revenue law is passed;
c. Enforcing specific guidelines on the release of
the annual block grant and other fund transfers from the
Central Government;
d. Establishing a system of collecting regional taxes and
fees;
C H A P T E R 12Governance
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e. Passing a law establishing a Shari’ah Supervisory Board
to promote Islamic banking; and
f. Setting guidelines on access to credit financing and use
of alternative financing modes such as public-private
partnership, bond issuance, and others.
i. Organizing the Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy
Board (IFPB). The IFPB is a strategic body necessary
for sustaining fiscal autonomy. It could be envisaged
as the equivalent of a regional Department of
Finance. The Cabinet, led by the Chief Minister, will
be responsible for its formal creation, although an
interim IFPB may be needed to help guide studies
pertaining to fiscal autonomy and secure the SDF. A
Policy Development Team may assist the Cabinet in
planning out its establishment.
ii. Enacting a new regional revenue law. The Policy
Development Team member assigned to study the
subject may shepherd the process of running the draft
through the IFPB, the Cabinet, and the Parliament.
The law could include guidelines pertaining
to remittance of shares from internal revenue
collections, income from natural resource extraction,
incomes of government corporations from operations
in the region, and other sources. These will cover
operational guidelines to be followed by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in withholding the
Bangsamoro Government’s share of internal revenue
collections within the region. Crafting the law will
need inputs from relevant national government
offices such as the BIR, the Bureau of Customs, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and others.
iii. Setting guidelines on use of block grant and other
fund transfers from the Central Government. The
CT4T and the Policy Development Team could
work with the Intergovernmental Relations Body
in setting specific guidelines on the release of the
block grant and other fund transfers from the Central
Government, as provided for in the BBL and the FAB
Annex on Revenue Sources and Wealth Sharing.
Similar to the revenue law, crafting this piece of
legislation will need intergovernmental intervention.
iv. Establishing systems for collecting regional taxes
and fees. The regional government will continue
to rely mainly on its constituent LGUs to collect
regional impositions. To avoid the confusion
that characterized the past system, better defined
arrangements between LGUs and the Bangsamoro
Government will have to be made.
v. Establishing a Fiduciary Supervisory Board. There
is need for more banks in the region to facilitate
access to credit, promote savings, and keep
financial transactions secure. The third is critical
to the region’s governance system because many
LGUs are forced to stick to manual systems of fund
management in the absence of banks. The Policy
Development Team could help the Cabinet draft
legislation establishing this board. The task will
include undertaking a policy-focused study on the
regional government’s position on the Al-Amanah
Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines and the
Southern Philippines Development Authority.
vi. Formulating and disseminating guidelines on credit
financing and use of other modes of financing.
Such guidelines will be important at an early stage
to assure the financial community that a policy
framework for developing a regional financial sector
is already being studied.
C.3.3.3. The Campaign to Reform Constituent LGUs Begins
The BTA, with assistance from the Policy Development
Team, shall have developed a reform plan for defining
the Bangsamoro Government’s relationship with local
governments. That plan will be subject of review by the
Cabinet and the Parliament. Among the concerns that
will need to be addressed are: (a) that two laws on local
governments are in effect; (b) corruption and patronage;
Bangsamoro Development Plan
126
(c) proliferation of unqualified appointees; (d) monitoring
of performance in the delivery of public services; (e)
action to be taken on municipalities that receive no
allotments from the national budget; (f) greater civil
society engagement in local governance; and (g) the
issue of “orphaned LGUs” arising from their choice to
join the Bangsamoro.
Among the actions expected under this reform agenda
are: (a) decision on Muslim Mindanao Act (MMA) 25,143
with the possibility of enacting a new regional law on
local governments; (b) implementation of an extensive
campaign to emulate the good and shame the bad local
government leaders, and encourage the public to use
current reforms (such as the Full-Disclosure Policy) to
expose malpractices through the media or by networking
with national civil society watchdog organizations;
(c) pressing for greater oversight by the Civil Service
Commission over personnel selection and appointments;
(d) standardization of cash management procedure and
reporting, procurement, asset management, and third
party monitoring of both nationally and locally funded
projects; and (e) broader participation of the citizenry in
monitoring the activities of LGUs.
D. Promoting Shari’ah JusticeShari’ah law has been applied in the Bangsamoro areas
for centuries to bring legal certainty and peace and order
to Muslim communities. Partial recognition of Islamic
law was extended by the Central Government in 1977
through Presidential Decree (PD) 1083, also known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. PD
1083 covers family and personal law issues for Muslims
through a network of Shari’ah District Courts and
Circuit Courts in different parts of Mindanao, under the
supervision of the Supreme Court. Despite being under-
resourced, the formal Shari’ah courts are well regarded,
with surveys indicating relatively high levels of public
satisfaction.144
Parallel to the government Shari’ah courts, Islamic law
is also applied at the community level through non-
state justice mechanisms and through separate judiciaries
run by the MILF, which includes all aspects of the law,
including commercial transactions and criminal justice.
Expansion of the jurisdiction of the government Shari’ah
courts to cover commercial and criminal law was
authorized under the ARMM Organic Act (Republic
Act 9054). However, the relevant enabling legislation
was never adopted by the ARMM Regional Legislative
Assembly.
However, an expanded recognition of Shari’ah has
also been accommodated in the CAB and in the draft
BBL, which stipulates that the Shari’ah courts in the
Bangsamoro shall have jurisdiction over Shari’ah law
enacted by the Bangsamoro Parliament pertaining to
“persons and family relations, and other civil law matters,
commercial law, and criminal law.”
On top of the existing District and Circuit Shari’ah Courts,
the draft BBL proposes to establish a Bangsamoro Shari’ah
High Court that would exercise final and executory
authority over matters of Shari’ah; a Shari’ah Public
Assistance Office; a Shari’ah Special Prosecution Service;
and a Shari’ah Academy.
Furthermore, the draft BBL establishes new standards for
Shari’ah judges, requiring that they have graduated from a
four-year course on Shari’ah or Islamic jurisprudence and
passed the Shari’ah bar examination.145
Making the Shari’ah justice system of the Bangsamoro
fully functional will require actions on multiple fronts:
institutional development, skills development, and
community access to justice.
D.1. Institutional Development
Institutional development will be supported in the
following areas:
a. Support the existing Shari’ah Courts. The
existing Shari’ah Circuit and District Courts in the
C H A P T E R 12Governance
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Bangsamoro lack many basic facilities for handling
current caseloads. Circuit courts in many locations are
non-operational. To ensure that the existing Shari’ah
courts are adequately resourced and to prepare
for the expected expansion of the jurisdiction, an
institutional needs assessment will be launched as
a matter of priority. At the same time, coordination
within the existing courts system in the Bangsamoro
will be necessary and sharing of resources will have
to be discussed, given that caseloads from the civil
and criminal courts will be shifting across the Shari’ah
court system under the Bangsamoro.
b. Create the Shari’ah Academy. Establishing the Shari’ah
Academy is a top priority to ensure that appropriate
training is available to potential judges to fill the
bench of the Circuit Courts, District Courts and the
new High Court and to lawyers to fill the ranks of the
new Prosecution Service and Public Assistance Office.
Given the requirements laid out in the BBL, identifying
appropriate teaching staff, formulating the curriculum,
and establishing procedures for accreditation of
existing courses will be the immediate priorities.
c. Establish the Public Assistance Office (PAO). A PAO
for the Shari’ah courts has been envisaged for more
than a decade under the Expanded ARMM Organic
Act but has yet to be operational. As the jurisdiction
of the Shari’ah system expands into criminal cases, the
availability of affordable legal services becomes even
more important. In delivering these services, the PAO
could also consider cooperation with local legal aid
providers in the Bangsamoro.
d. Establish the Shari’ah Special Prosecution Service.
As noted in the BBL, the prosecution service will
be attached to the National Prosecution Service
of the Central Government. Detailed coordination
will therefore be necessary in the short term to
explore the transition of many functions from the
existing prosecutorial service to the Shari’ah Special
Prosecution Service.
D.2. Skills Development
Establishing the institutions of the Bangsamoro Shari’ah
Justice System will require a significant effort to build
necessary expertise with the qualifications required by
the BBL. Training on Shari’ah law principles and rollout
of the required four-year course on Shari’ah or Islamic
Jurisprudence would be the key priorities for the short-
term period. The BBL provides that all Shari’ah criminal
laws passed by the Bangsamoro Parliament shall be
in accordance with universally accepted principles
and standards of human rights. Accordingly, both the
Bangsamoro Parliament and agencies of the justice
sector will need knowledge not only on Shari’ah and
Islamic jurisprudence but also on international human
rights law.
Accordingly, a targeted skills development plan on
Shari’ah and human rights will be formulated for the
following target groups:
a. Existing judges
b. Members of Parliament and staff
c. Candidate judges
d. Lawyers
In addition to knowledge programs on Shari’ah and
human rights, many Shari’ah judges have had very
little skills training in the past decade or so. Given the
expressed preference for mediation for the resolution
of civil cases through the Shari’ah courts, a program of
mediation skills will be prepared for existing judges.
D.3. Community Access to Justice
The establishment of a PAO would fill an important gap
in terms of access to justice through the Shari’ah court
system. However, legal aid alone would not ensure
access to equitable justice services for the poor. Legal
awareness is a precondition, and yet legal outreach
campaigns have been very limited in the region.
Given the limitless need but finite resources, innovative
ways will be used to inform people of their rights and
obligations and of means of seeking legal redress. This
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128
could include working through NGOs, religious leaders,
and regular community meetings through development
projects.
E. Strengthening Fiscal Autonomy in the BangsamoroThe ARMM generates only 2% of its budget internally.
Its heavy dependence on funding from the Central
Government has seriously weakened the ability of regional
officials to determine priority development projects in
the region and to address the development needs of their
people. It has also fostered a patron-client relationship
between Central Government officials and regional officials
whereby the political fortune of the latter depends greatly
on the amount of resources emanating from the former. The
institutionalization of the “block grant” formula in the BBL
is an attempt to strengthen the Bangsamoro Government’s
fiscal autonomy.
The Bangsamoro Government will have to pass additional
internal revenue measures and improve collection
efficiency. As security and normality are restored and the
economy grows at an accelerated basis, private investments
are expected to come, which will expand the Bangsamoro
Government’s revenue base. Initially, however, the
Bangsamoro Government may have to offer incentives,
including tax holidays, to interested investors. In the
medium and the long term, operations of these investors
will contribute significantly to Bangsamoro Government
revenues in terms not only of their tax payments but also of
tax payments and revenue-generating expenditures of their
employees.
Enhancing fiscal autonomy will require judicious use of
government funds. Expenditures will need to be targeted
on activities that will promote greater economic efficiency
and growth, reduce the incidence of poverty, and improve
the human development indicators of the populace.
Transparency and accountability mechanisms will need to
be built to uphold the accountability of local officials in
the use of public funds. Participation of CSOs and ordinary
citizens would need to be encouraged in the workings of
the government. In the past, much of scarce public funds
were captured by rent-seeking officials, which resulted in
poor or absent basic services and in worsening poverty.
Significant deposits of mineral and non-mineral resources
have been reported in the BCT. If properly developed,
the extractive industry can provide huge revenue sources
that can strengthen the Bangsamoro Government’s fiscal
autonomy. However, there is a need for a scoping study
of mineral and non-mineral resources, and feasibility/
engineering studies for their extraction to determine
whether the available volume can be extracted in a way
that is economically viable and environment-friendly.
The concomitant appropriate fiscal regime vis-a-vis the
operations of mining firms could be formulated as a way of
encouraging their entry while ensuring maximum revenue
gains for the Bangsamoro Government.
An open trading regime in areas declared as export
processing zones (e.g., Polloc Port in Maguindanao and
Bongao Port in Tawi-Tawi) with neighboring countries
would encourage the flow of more goods and services in
the Bangsamoro. Consequently, economic activity and
potential revenue sources would increase. An open trading
regime could also reduce prices of basic commodities
for Bangsamoro consumers, as prime agricultural and
manufactured products in neighboring countries are priced
lower than in the Philippines.
F. Normalization and DevelopmentPeace, security, and development are fundamental
aspirations of everyone in the Bangsamoro. The CAB,
together with the Annex on Normalization, provides
the platform for new institutional arrangements that will
ensure that communities affected by the decades-long
armed conflict in Mindanao can return to a peaceful life
and pursue economic activities and sustainable livelihoods
free from fear of violence and insecurity.
Upon its establishment, the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA) shall assist and support normalization and
development in the Bangsamoro.
C H A P T E R 12Governance
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The Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) shall continue
to coordinate the normalization process with the BTA as
partner until the signing of an exit agreement.
G. Summary of Priority ProgramsA summary of the priority plans and programs for the
transition period can be found in Table 29.
Table 29: Priority Governance and Justice Programs
Objective Priority Programs Components
Support for Transitional Bodies • As provided for in the CAB and BBL
Support for BBL and Plebiscite • IEC campaigns, voter registration, etc.
Capacity-Building, Organizational Development, and Change Management
Requirements from ARMM to BTA
• Training programs on management and leadership, values transformation
• Scholarships in priority technical courses• Drafting of ministry transition plans• Capacity-building for municipalities and barangays
Technical Assistance for Drafting of Key Administrative Laws
• Based on priorities set by the BBL/BTA
Baseline Data Generation • Data generation across all ministries, including a comprehensive assessment of location, number and status of infrastructure and personnel
• Creation of “Open Data” platform for the Bangsamoro
Transparency and Accountability Program • Development of anticorruption strategy• Geotagging and third party monitoring of programs and
projects
Access to Justice, including Shari’ah Justice • Policy and programmatic work on the improving access to justice, including the Shari’ah justice system in the Bangsamoro
Fiscal Autonomy • Reform of government corporations, regional economic policy development, etc.
Bangsamoro Development Plan
130
123 Bacani (2005).124 Despite more than 10 years of significant technical capacity-building support for LGUs across the region through the Canadian-funded Local
Government Support Program for ARMM (LGSPA), ARMM’s own reporting showed little improvement in the quality of governance in terms of both fiduciary standards and service delivery outcomes. This experience suggests that the absence of accountability, rather than technical deficiencies, is at the core of ARMM’s government challenges.
125 Only 6% of LGUs in ARMM received the Seal of Good Housekeeping from the DILG in 2013, compared to the national average of 76.6%.126 Torres (2007), page 109. 127 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and World Bank (2014).128 Tribal Helm (2010), pages 32 to 34.129 The Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Program (see www.bangsamorodevelopment.org) and the ARMM Social Fund
Project. 130 Refer to the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) and International Alert (2014).131 Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2011).132 The debate on the draft law could continue through the first quarter of 2015.133 Executive Order No. 120, “Constituting the Transition Commission and for Other Purpose,” December 2012.134 “The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro,” Section VII, Item 9.135 See “Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing,” Section V, Article B.136 “The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro,” Section VII, Item 9.137 Ibid., item 10.138 The CT4T ideally will be supported by professionals with skills corresponding to those of the heads of line and major support departments of the
ARG: Public Works and Highways, Health, Education, Local Government, Social Welfare and Development, Transportation and Communications, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Fisheries, Environment and Natural Resources, Trade and Industry, Regional Planning, Budgeting, Treasury and Accounting, and others that may be identified later.
139 The Policy Development Team, preferably consisting of professionals with stellar experience in action and policy research, would need expertise or specialization in such fields as economics, including agricultural economics, business management or administration, public administration, law including Shari’ah justice, local government administration, taxation, banking and finance, and others that may be identified by the BTA.
140 It may be necessary to create a joint ARG-BTA Turnover Committee to settle problems encountered in the turnover of reports, physical assets, personnel, documents/records, and financial assets. The committee’s formation could be discussed by the ARG and the BTA early on.
141 The TPMT is mandated to monitor the implementation of the CAB.142 About six intergovernmental bodies are identified in the “Annex on Normalization,” together with mechanisms to facilitate consultative process
between the parties in the appointment, employment and deployment of the existing police force and the Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Those bodies are germane to the issue of security.
143 Two laws on local governments apply in ARMM: the Muslim Mindanao Act No. 25 (approved by the Regional Legislative Assembly in 1994) and the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The latter devolved functions from the Central Government to LGUs, including functions pertaining to delivery of social and economic services such as health, agriculture, social welfare, and environment. Under the LGC, LGUs are entitled to their respective shares in internal revenue allotments (IRA) to fund the performance of those devolved functions. On the other hand, MMA 25 did not devolve functions relating to the delivery of health, agriculture, social welfare, and environmental services. Most ARMM LGUs, notwithstanding receipt of IRA allocations from the national government, refuse to perform those four aforementioned functions because according to them, these have not been devolved.
144 See Guerrero, Barra, Mangahas, and Licudine (2007).145 Presidential Decree 1083 requires judges in the District Courts to have the same qualifications as their counterparts in the regular court system, as
well as passing the Shari’ah bar. Shari’ah Circuit Court judges are required to have high school education and to have passed the Shari’ah bar.
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