goldman - rajneeshpuram

Averting Apocalypse at Rajneeshpuram*

Marion S. GoldmanUniversity of Oregon

From 1981 to 1986, most outsiders foretold bloodshed at Rajneeshpuram, the communal city incentral Oregon that was built around an Indian charismatic leader, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (laterknown as Osho). However, violence never escalated to the point of mass murder, suicides, orlarge, collective attacks. The Rajneesh case provides a fruitful context to explore the question: Howis large-scale collective violence in new religions averted? The case of Rajneeshpuram foregroundsthree factors that were most important to relatively peaceful resolution of a situation fraught withdanger: life-embracing doctrine, devotees’ continued contact with networks outside Rajneeshpuram,and law enforcement committed to due process. Each of these influenced outcomes at differentstages of tension between the group and the surrounding community. Close consideration of thiscase provides a framework to examine other alternative religious groups that have exploded in large-scale collective violence or appear to have the potential to do so.

Key words: Rajneesh, violence, cult

In the late-twentieth century, from 1981 to 1986, American media,experts, and a handful of scholars foretold bloodshed at Rajneeshpuram, thecommunal city in central Oregon (Latkin 1992). Discussions of potentialRajneesh1 violence intensified during that time period because of deep hostilitybetween outsiders and sannyasins (devotees) in Oregon. However, violencenever escalated to the point of bloodshed involving the majority of sannyasins.The Rajneesh case provides data to explore the question: How is extremecollective religious violence averted?

*Direct correspondence to Marion S. Goldman, Department of Sociology, 1291 Universityof Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1291, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. The authorgratefully acknowledges Eileen Barker, Christopher Blum, David Frohnmayer, Paul Goldman,Ben Johnson, and Linda Long.

# The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of theAssociation for the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions,please e-mail: [email protected].

1Although Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh officially changed his name to Osho in 1989, thisarticle refers to him as Rajneesh, because it is historically accurate for the period when hewas in Oregon.

Sociology of Religion 2009, 70:3 311-327doi:10.1093/socrel/srp036

Advance Access Publication 25 August 2009

311

LARGE-SCALE COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Large-scale collective cult violence engages the majority of movement members,with lasting physical and emotional effects on both perpetrators and victims. The vio-lence ultimately defines the group to outsiders and frames its historical significance.

While large-scale, collective cult2 violence is uncommon, popular discus-sions of new religions in the United States and stereotypes about them concen-trate on the few most violent groups, such as the Peoples Temple and theBranch Davidians (Bromley and Melton 2002; Barker 2002; Melton 1992,1995). The 1997 group suicides of 39 members of the isolated UFO cult,Heaven’s Gate, also drew popular and academic attention, but not to the sameextent as Jonestown or Waco (Balch 1980; Balch and Taylor 2002).

Media attention to large-scale collective violence in new religions createssensationalist stereotypes that shape popular attitudes and law enforcementresponses. This sensationalism can create self-fulfilling prophecies. Stereotypesalso seep into everyday discourse, taking on a life of their own. For example,university students affirm skepticism with the phrase, “I don’t drink theKool-aid,” without knowing the complicated story about the mass suicide/murders at Jonestown.

Large-scale collective violence represents the end of a continuum of con-flict within new religious movements and between those groups and their hostsocieties. The tragic outcomes at Jonestown and Mt. Carmel and the extremehostility at Rajneeshpuram allow us to better understand less intense conflictsthat plague many alternative religions. Since Rajneeshpuram’s obvious differ-ences from the norm of moderate social tension were so pronounced, this caseof accommodation in a volatile situation can illuminate the hidden dynamicsof more common and taken for granted social relationships (Goffman 1963;Bromley and Melton 2002:3). The case of Rajneeshpuram allows us to betterunderstand the many avenues for accommodation between new religions andtheir host societies.

Case studies can be foundational to the development of social theoriesinvolving alternative religious movements.3 Lofland’s (1977) research about asmall group of Unification Church members, for example, provided a ground-breaking framework to examine recruitment, conversion, and commitment.The current research considers the single case of Rajneeshpuram in order toidentify and elaborate possibilities for accommodation in terms of the three

2While some sociologists argue that the term “cult” may be pejorative, they use it inthe titles of books and articles because “cult” is known to wider audiences. It is used in thisarticle because “cult” is a synonym for other, more cumbersome terms, and scholars havebegun to reintegrate it into academic usage (Goldman 2006).

3Furthermore, although large-scale collective violence involving new religious move-ments in the USA is rare, the groups in which it occurs merit extensive examination, as dorevolutions and other extraordinary social events that have lasting impact on their societies(Ragin 1981; Skocpol 1979).

312 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

central factors that earlier research has identified as generating violence:apocalyptic doctrine, social isolation, and external emphasis on sustaining theexisting social order. The Rajneeshpuram case underscores the importance ofthose three variables and also indicates how peaceful accommodation maydevelop during each of the four phases of interaction that Bromley (2002)identifies.

METHODS AND SOURCES

This article is based on participant observation at Rajneeshpuram from1983 through 1985, life history interviews with 25 devotees, additional visits toRajneeshpuram/the Big Muddy Ranch in 1986 and 1998, and follow-upinterviews with devotees conducted in 1997. Between 1999 and 2000, I alsointerviewed ten individuals active in local Wasco County resistance toRajneeshpuram.

Every issue of the Rajneesh Times published bi-weekly between 1983 andthe end of 1985 was used to supplement interviews and observation. Inaddition, I had access to legal documents and manuscript collections of letters,private papers, and ephemera of both sannyasins and their opponents in theUniversity of Oregon Special Collections at the Knight Library.

Recent primary sources include a set of 1997 and 2004 interviews withformer Oregon Attorney General, David Frohnmayer. In 2008, I interviewedRajneesh’s personal seamstress, who had lived in his compound atRajneeshpuram. Most important, in 2004, I spent two consecutive days record-ing interviews with Ma Anand Sheela, a central figure in Rajneeshpuram’shistory, who is now known as Sheela Birnstiel. We met at her residence inSwitzerland, where she owns and runs two convalescent homes.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RAJNEESHPURAM

Rajneeshpuram began in the early 1980s, when Bhagwan Shree Rajneeshand about 2,000 of his sannyasins (devotees) created the communal city ofRajneeshpuram on the Big Muddy Ranch about 150 miles east of Portland insparsely populated Wasco County, Oregon. The devotees who settled inOregon were primarily from the United States, although there were small con-tingents of western Europeans and Australians. They hoped to blend spiritual-ity and materialism, while building an intentional community that could alsoserve as a destination resort and pilgrimage center for sannyasins from all overthe world, supplanting the group’s previous ashram in Pune (Poona), India.

Rajneesh kept a vow of public silence for three years, but he appeared for adaily afternoon drive in one of his 96 Rolls Royces, waving to sannyasins thatlined up along the road. With the exception of the drives, the guru retreated

AVERTING APOCALYPSE 313

from public view, delegating organizational leadership to Ma Anand Sheela,his personal secretary.

From the moment sannyasins settled in Oregon, they challenged estab-lished laws and customs, generating a range of opposition throughout the state(FitzGerald 1986; Milne 1987). The most controversial incidents occurred inautumn of 1984, when Sheela and her inner circle bused in hundreds of home-less individuals, mostly men, in a futile effort to control county elections.Massive negative publicity, state monitoring of voter registration, and legalopposition doomed the plan. By the end of 1984, almost all of the estimated1,500 homeless visitors departed.

Less than a year after the “Share a Home” debacle, Sheela and her innercircle fled Rajneeshpuram for Europe. As his community disintegrated,Rajneesh spoke publicly once again, accusing Sheela and her circle of druggingdissident sannyasins, wire-tapping, arson, attempted murder, and embezzlementof Rajneesh movement funds. Most important, Rajneesh publicly revealed thatSheela ordered a few members of her inner circle to sprinkle salmonella bac-teria in almost a dozen restaurant salad bars located in Wasco County, poison-ing at least 750 individuals. It was a test run for a more massive effort thatcould temporarily incapacitate large numbers of anti-Rajneesh voters on elec-tion day (Carter 1990:224–26).

All evidence suggests that only Sheela and her small circle were directlyresponsible for these actions, but Rajneesh’s support of their criminalityremains in dispute. After leaving Oregon, Rajneesh traveled all over the worlduntil his representatives successfully bargained with the Indian government.He resettled in the old Pune ashram, renamed Osho International MeditationResort, and he died in 1990. The movement continues, and current membersdiscuss Rajneeshpuram as a brief, unimportant historical detour. By January of1986, the Big Muddy Ranch was up for sale, the Rajneesh movement wasdeeply in debt, and only a skeleton crew of sannyasins remained.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Research on large-scale collective violence, as well as group suicides ormurders by cults, identifies three important interdependent variables thatproduce violence: sustained external opposition, world-rejecting movementdoctrine, and physical and/or social isolation from their host societies (Hallet al. 2000). These findings carry across cultures, although the shape of exter-nal opposition and the specifics of internal doctrine vary in different socialcontexts.

Dramatic collective violence associated with new religions in the past fiftyyears is by no means limited to the United States. However, Dawson (2006)noted that it is particularly difficult to compare exogenous factors such as stig-matization and law enforcement responses across cultures. I discuss Waco and


Jonestown in some detail because they shared the same broad cultural and legalcontext as Rajneeshpuram.

Theories about large-scale collective cult violence and new religionssuggest that internal group processes and interactions with the external socialenvironment must converge in order to generate extreme outcomes (Robbinsand Anthony 1995:237; Bromley and Melton 2002:42–56). As internal strainsmeet external pressures, potential for disaster accelerates (Galanter 1989:113–21). When violence erupted at Jonestown and Waco, external adversariespressured law enforcement, forcing confrontations that led to large-scale collec-tive violence (Hall et al. 2000).

Because of its American orientation, this article will not deal with otherimportant, relatively recent incidents of large-scale collective violence in newreligions. The Solar Temple in Quebec and Western Europe experienced aseries murders and suicides from 1995 through 1997 (Wessinger 2000). AumShinrikyo in Japan developed a violent, ascetic organization that initiated saringas attacks on outsiders that resulted in a dozen deaths and thousands of inju-ries (Hall et al. 2000; Reader 2000). The Movement for the Restoration of theTen Commandments of God in Uganda generated large-scale collectivebloodshed (Walliss 2004). Despite their many differences from one anotherand from the American groups considered in this article, these new religionsshared experiences of external hostility, world -rejecting doctrines, and socialand physical isolation from the larger culture.

Some research notes charismatic leadership as an important variable in thedevelopment of large-scale collective violence. Wright (2002:106) asserts thata dominating charismatic leader may polarize a movement internally and alsoexacerbate external hostility toward a group. Johnson (1992) and Dawson(1999, 2002) also consider the importance of charismatic leadership in precipi-tating group crises. However, charismatic leadership is necessary to the for-mation of almost all new religious movements and it is inherently unstable(Dawson 2006:28–29). Thus, it is less a central element in the development oflarge-scale collective violence than a necessary part of almost every new reli-gion in its first generation.

When devotees are not entirely dependent on a charismatic relationship,and they have strong connections with other members and with outsiders, theinfluence of the leader may be considerably diminished (Jacobs 1989).Established movement doctrine can also supplement or detract from devotees’willingness to engage in large-scale collective violence. Movement doctrineand external social connections increase or mediate a charismatic leader’sability to generate large-scale collective violence.

Large-scale collective violence is not produced by internal cult attributesalone. It is instead the result of complicated interactions between an alterna-tive religious movement and its host society. Moreover, what may appear tobe a sudden, dramatic descent into large-scale collective violence usuallyreflects long series of interactions culminating in dramatic incidents.


Wallis (1979) developed a cumulative, interactional model to explore thesocial psychology of cult violence, describing a cycle of members’ alienation,increased external pressure, and finally intense religious conflict. Bromley(2002) constructed a more precise framework, positing four stages of inter-actions between movements and their host societies that had led tolarge-scale collective violence and also group suicides in the United Statesand in other cultures as well.

Bromley’s model deals with dominant patterns, while recognizing that eachphase may involve varied, sometimes inconsistent interactions (Bromley2002:12). There are possibilities for peaceful resolution or conflict within eachstage, including the final denouement, and by extending Bromley’s model it ispossible to consider these more common instances of cult accommodation ordispersal. Although there are other high profile cases of volatile cult situationsthat ended in peaceful resolutions,4 this study of Rajneeshpuram is the firstcase to which this model has been systematically applied to understand non-violent resolutions.

Bromley considers three important stages of interaction between a move-ment and outsiders, leading to a fourth stage of denouement. The three pre-liminary stages are latent tension, nascent conflict, and intensified conflict.Groups often remain in the first stage of latent conflict or move to nascentconflict, without any more escalation. Table 1 summarizes Bromley’s model.

Almost all alternative religions in the United States experience latenttension (Stark 1996). Cults must differentiate themselves from the largersociety and from other religions in order to appeal to potential members.However, doctrines and practices that are extremely deviant from social normsor that are possibly criminal, such as polygamy, may precipitate a second stageof nascent conflict and progressive polarization between the small culture ofthe movement and its host society. During this period of nascent conflict,opponents mobilize public opinion and mount legal challenges.

The third stage involves intensified conflict, as both the movement and itsopponents recruit supporters, trade accusations, and also consider the use offorce. Finally, there may be a denouement, which can take the form oflarge-scale collective violence, attacks on outsiders, group suicides, capitulationand redefinition of the movement, or relatively sudden, mass departures.

Although it is derived from cases of groups that experienced high levels ofconflict and violence, Bromley’s model posits potential resolution or dimin-ution of conflict at all stages, even the final stage of denouement. There aremany possibilities to avoid conflict, and that is why large-scale collective vio-lence is so rare.

4See, e.g., Whitsel (2003) on the Church Universal and Triumphant in Montana,Rosenfeld (1997) on the Justus Freeman in Montana, and Kleiver (1999) on Chen Tao inTexas.


TABLE 1 Bromley’s Model of Stages of Conflict

Stages ofconflict

Response options

Contestation Accommodation Retreat

Latenttension

InternalReligious innovationExternalExternal norms ofJudeo-Christiantraditions

Internal and externalEmphasis on religiousand secularcommonalities

InternalGroup boundariescreate minimalvisibilityExternalOutsiders are notinterested

Nascentconflict

InternalStereotyping ofoutsidersPronouncementsagainst social norms

Internal and externalPositive interactionbetween group andopponentsMediation

InternalGroup reframes itscontested doctrineGroup dispenses withlarge gatherings

ExternalMobilization ofopposition groups,apostates, andcoalitions

InternalOutreach to outsidersExternal Outreach togroup

ExternalOutsiders intentionallyignore group

Intensifiedconflict

InternalGroup radicalizesprophetic claims andpredictionsGroup obtainsdestructive weaponsExternalSocial control agentsand governmentagencies such as INS,IRS, and child welfaremonitor group

InternalConsultation withexternal advisors re-organizationInvitations to outsidersto visit and conferwith the groupExternalDue process moderatesexternal interventionCompromises in localordinances andenforcement

InternalSchisms within groupdiminish its sizeGradual dispersion toother movementcentersExternalCritics disband andcease verbal attacks

Denouement InternalIncreased groupisolationNeed for immediateresolutionSpecific apocalypticpredictions

Internal and externalIncreased positiveinteraction

InternalImmediate dispersionand exodus

Continued


CONFLICT, ACCOMODATION, AND EXODUS ATRAJNEESHPURAM

In the Rajneesh case, each of the three stages of interaction involvedelements of conflict and also elements of accommodation within the group andwith outside opponents. In the final stage of denouement, accommodation andeventual flight trumped conflict.

Devotees’ continued contact with networks outside Rajneeshpuram, theirlife-embracing doctrine, and law enforcement’s commitment to due processmilitated against large-scale collective violence at every stage. The followingsections consider each of those three variables, as they influenced peaceful res-olution at Rajneeshpuram. Table 2 applies Bromley’s model to Rajneeshpuram.

Beyond Social IsolationThe new religions that erupt in large-scale collective violence or collective

suicides, are physically, socially, and symbolically isolated from their hostsocieties (Dawson 2006:162–66). They create strong boundaries, and membersdepend on the leader and other devotees’ to define their identities (Galanter1989). Devotees renounce their emotional ties to their former friends andfamilies outside their group and they have very little contact with them.Communication with the outside world is limited, even when members workin nonmovement contexts (Balch and Taylor 2000). Outsiders may overlookthe group or deliberately avoid it. Law enforcement sometimes relies solelyon groups of disaffected members or the anti-cult movement for information

TABLE 1 Continued

Stages ofconflict

Response options


ExternalDramatic stateinterventionLARGE SCALECOLLECTIVEVIOLENCE

InternalCooperation withexternal oppositionRedefined predictionsand goalsRe-organization

ExternalGroup erased fromlocal discourseGROUP“DISAPPEARS”

ExternalRedefinition of groupas not threatening tosocial orderLOWERED TENSIONANDCO-EXISTENCE


TABLE 2 Accommodation Prevails at Rajneeshpuram

Stages ofconflict

Response options


Latenttension

Internal and externalCultural differencesbetween urban “yuppies”and ranching communityInternalPresence of Indianspiritual teacher incentral OregonExternalJudeo-Christian religioustraditionsConservative politicaland social culture

Internal and externalRajneeshee outreach toorganizations like ACLUPurchasing from localbusinessesInternalSupport of capitalismIndividualism encouragedby Rajneesh’s doctrineSannyasins retain outsideties and financialarrangementsExternalCurious visitors takeguided tours ofRajneeshpuram

ExternalResidents of nearbyAntelope sell propertyand move

Nascentconflict

Internal and ExternalIncidents of harassmenton both sidesInternal

Rapid population growthof RajneeshpuramSannyasins win electionsin Antelope and takeover townLand use violationsSheela becomes publiclyabrasive to outsidersExternalINS investigatessannyasins and RajneeshThousand FriendsorganizesOpponents contactmainstream pressExternalINS investigatessannyasins and RajneeshThousand FriendsorganizesOpponents contactmainstream press

InternalIncreased public relationsefforts in media and ininvitational tours ofRajneeshpuramRajneesh attorneysprivately contact OregonAttorney GeneralRajneesh’s doctrine doesnot advocate violence orinvolve coherentapocalyptic visionsExternalAttorney General’s staffMeets with sannyasinsAG coordinates privateRajneesh meetings withU.S. Department ofJustice Mediation andConciliation Service

InternalAbout 75 sannyasins whooppose Sheela leaveRajneeshpuramExternalLocal activists focus onlegal solutions ratherthan illegalconfrontations

Continued


(Hall 1987). Moreover, media may sensationalize negative accounts of thegroups. Mutual isolation can fuel hostility that creates further social distanceand mistrust.

Although Rajneeshpuram was physically remote, its residents were notsocially isolated. A public relations department staffed by journalists andcommunity hostesses (called Twinkies) lauded their communal city to media

TABLE 2 Continued

Stages ofconflict

Response options


Intensifiedconflict

InternalHomeless bused intoRajneeshpuram and thendispersedSecret salmonella inoutside salad bars triedout to prevent voterturnoutSheela voices threats onnational TVExternalFBI begins investigationsOpponents recruitOregon Secretary of Stateto manage electionsInternational media coverCounty electionsIndividual apostates speakout against Sheela

InternalRajneesh speaks again toa small group ofdissidents opposingSheelaExternalOregon Attorney Generalcoordinates lawenforcement towardpeaceful solutionsAG submits opinion ondis-incorporatingRajneeshpuram because itviolates theEstablishment Clause

Denouement NO LARGE-SCALECOLLECTIVEVIOLENCE

InternalSheela expelled andblamed for all crime anddeviance involvingsannyasinsRajneesh invites stateand federal lawenforcement into thecommunal cityRajneesh leaves theUnited States in late fall1985NOACCOMMODATION

InternalRajneeshpuramdis-incorporated in winter1985–86Sannyasins leave forHomes in the UnitedStates and westernEurope to regroup later inIndiaExternalLocal Antelope towngovernment restoredMontana investor buysBig Muddy Ranch anddonates to Christianyouth groupEXODUS


and interested visitors from the outside. Cultivating outsiders’ good will,Rajneesh purchasing agents hosted local suppliers and placed six figure ordersfor everything from farm machinery to new Rolls Royces for Rajneesh’scollection.

Even as tension mounted, Rajneesh representatives continued to meet withsympathetic attorneys and other members from the ACLU in Eugene andPortland and with newspaper and television reporters. Individuals with power-ful positions in the Rajneesh organization initiated covert conversations withthe Oregon State Attorney General’s office. In turn, representatives from thatoffice moderated responses from state police and federal authorities. Sannyasinswho disagreed with Sheela’s confrontational policies recognized that commu-nity survival depended on their neighbors’ good will and on favorableinterpretations of land use and immigration statutes.

Becoming a sannyasin was easy and it did not require devotees to shuntheir families or old friends. After taking sannyas, in the 1970s and 1980s, san-nyasins were supposed to meditate at least once daily, wear sunrise colors(which included a whole spectrum of red-based shades), wear a mala of 108beads with a locket housing Bhagwan’s likeness, and adhere to a vegetariandiet. In terms of Kanter’s (1972) paradigm, devotees did not have to renouncetheir old lives. They could transform themselves, without giving up their oldidentities or sacrificing previous relationships.

In 1984, the mean adult age at Rajneeshpuram was 34 years old, and san-nyasins were predominantly drawn from the upper and middle classes, speakingthe same language as other educated, affluent individuals. Many of them wereexperienced writers and speakers who could talk with the press and presentthemselves well, in order to engender positive responses.

Devotees retained outside sources of interpersonal and material rewards,and they also had close personal bonds outside the group. Sannyasins invitedtheir parents, adult children, old friends and, in a few cases, financial advisorsto visit Rajneeshpuram and attend carefully orchestrated visitors’ weekends.They retained their social and cultural capital, along with much of their finan-cial capital (Bourdieu 2005).

Life-Affirming Doctrine and IndividualismBhagwan Shree Rajneesh embraced the delights of materialism and sup-

ported capitalism. Occasionally, he veered toward dire predictions, but theguru’s emphatic celebration of individualism and independence allowed san-nyasins to reject and even laugh at his occasional apocalyptic musing abouteverything from AIDS to a nuclear bombing of Rajneeshpuram (Gordon 1987:186–87; Goldman 1995). In 2004, Sheela Birnstiel, formerly Ma AnandSheela, explained her role at Rajneeshpuram, disclaiming any malevolentintent. Addressing the issue of whether something like Jonestown could havehappened in central Oregon, she noted: “Bhagwan was life positive. His whole


movement was life positive. Where [a] life negative situation happens you cansee suicide happening” (Interview, August 2004).

In close to 600 books, most of which were transcriptions of his lectures andinitiation talks, Rajneesh discussed almost every major religious andphilosophical tradition. These approaches came together in a spiritualstew dominated by Zen Buddhism and spiced by exhortations to fully enjoyevery aspect of life. Individual choice was the essence of the philosophy,although the ultimate freedom of enlightenment involved disappearance of egothrough surrender to Rajneesh’s teachings. As with almost everything else inthe movement, there was considerable latitude for individuals to constructtheir own meanings of surrender. In the changed movement of the 1990s, med-itation, not surrender, came to be defined as the bridge to enlightenment.

Rajneesh built flexibility into his doctrine, by calling for highly individua-lized interpretations of his lectures and writings. He adopted the role of atherapist, telling sannyasins that they had to discover the true meaning of hiswords in terms of their own personal experience and understandings.

The guru emphasized his ideal of a new man, synthesizing the worldly andthe godly. Zen, Tantra tradition, and prosperity spirituality came together in avision that enticed many privileged Americans:

A new human being is needed on earth, a new human being who accepts both, who is scienti-fic and mystic. Who is all for matter and all for spirit. Only then will we be able to createhumanity, which is rich on both sides. I teach you the richness of body, richness of soul, rich-ness of this world and that world. To me that is true religiousness. (Rajneesh 1983:14)

In contrast to the Rajneesh Movement, the Branch Davidians and the PeoplesTemple had explicit apocalyptic belief systems that contributed to dramaticcollective violence, by both exhorting members’ sacrifice and also alarmingoutside opponents. While Koresh and Jones rejected the contemporary worldand critiqued American’s greed (Hall 1987, 2002; Wright 1995), Rajneesh andhis sannyasins embraced it (Mehta 1985).

Journalist Win McCormick, a persistent public opponent of Rajneeshpuram,was often alarmed at the growing potential for large-scale collective violence incentral Oregon in 1984. However, he reflected on sannyasins’ love of luxury andcame to a prescient conclusion: “Someday, in my opinion, the Rajneesh cultwill break asunder. Since all cults have the inherent potential to end in vio-lence, it may end that way; or, as is perhaps more likely in this case, it may endpeacefully, with Bhagwan and his top assistants departing for a South Sea islandor the Riviera” (McCormack 1985:262).

Due Process and the Rule of LawIn the United States, there is a tension between the emphasis on

maintaining established social order through interventions and the emphasison facilitating the rule of law that protects due process and the rights of


minority groups (Skolnick 1967). Interactions between formal social controlagents and cults develop at many levels, and a full discussion is beyond thescope of this article. This section describes how the rule of law moderatedoutside intervention at Rajneeshpuram. Attention to due process diminishedpossibilities of large-scale collective violence.

When law enforcement agents heed only the pleas of cult opponents, andalso stereotype a group because of its unfamiliar doctrine, the rule of orderprevails (Barker 2002; Wright 2002). If the state’s goals center on supportingthe dominant moral order, there is a focus on immediate resolution rather thanon peaceful compromise. This leads to possibilities for large-scale collectiveviolence. Richardson’s (2004) analysis of legal responses to Rajneeshpuramindicates that lawsuits put pressure on the communal city. However, thatpressure could be mediated and resolved over time, unlike more precipitousresponses by opponents or law enforcement agents.

Oregon Attorney General David Frohnmayer and his staff worked to mini-mize possibilities of violence. Frohnmayer grounded his strategy in the FreeExercise clause of the U.S. Constitution that calls for separation of church andstate. That strategy limited formal intervention based on stereotyping andgeneral fear of the Rajneeshees, and it curtailed informal anticult attacks pro-posed by some opposing groups and by local media. Throughout the escalatingconflict, the State of Oregon actively pressed for legal solutions to all accusa-tions of criminal activities and violation of civil laws at Rajneeshpuram.

In addition to his public positions, the Attorney General and his repre-sentatives privately negotiated with Rajneeshpuram’s opponents and withstate and local law enforcement officials to ensure that they respectedsannyasins’ civil liberties. They also worked with sannyasins attempting tocreate accommodation.

Until 1983, Rajneesh attorneys and their hired outside legal advisors andpublic relations representatives enjoyed cordial informal interactions with theOregon Attorney General and his staff. His office facilitated discussions aboutanti-Rajneesh harassment between Rajneesh attorneys and attorneys from theU.S. Office for Civil Rights. Sannyasin attorneys also talked privately with theOregon Attorney General and the U.S. Department of Justice Mediation andConciliation Service, attempting to resolve conflicts, such as water rights dis-putes, that involved Rajneeshpuram and neighboring communities.

Throughout the sannyasins’ sojourn in Oregon, the Attorney General’srepresentatives monitored activities at Rajneeshpuram and tried to calm insur-gent local opponents. A handful of antagonists posted signs about “RajneeshHunting Season,” but this was a symbolic, rather than an actual call to arms.The local gun culture centered on hunting, and from an early age, gun ownerswere taught to raise guns only when they planned to use them. Representativesfrom the Oregon Attorney General’s office persuaded one influential rancherto urge other locals to follow him in locking his firearms in a bank vault, as


conflicts between the communal city and the surrounding communitiesescalated.

In 1984, as sannyasins reeled from their group’s over-extended finances andSheela’s growing irrationality, the Oregon Attorney General issued his legalchallenge to the city of Rajneeshpuram itself, arguing that the incorporatedcity represented the unconstitutional merger of church and state. This opinionwould not apply to other religious communities, unless they had also incorpor-ated city governments and received state and federal funding. The FederalDistrict Court enjoined the City of Rajneeshpuram to cease exerting govern-mental power in December 1985, after the Big Muddy Ranch was already upfor sale. The state pushed for accommodation and peaceful resolution, byemphasizing the rule of law instead of the maintenance of traditional socialorder.

Emphasis on the separation of religion and government also limited lawenforcement agents’ activities against sannyasins and constrained their prep-arations to intervene at Rajneeshpuram. The Attorney General’s activities andlegal opinion on separation constrained state, local, and federal agencies’ com-mitment to mainstream religions. They were informed that sannyasins wereentitled to the same religious freedom as any other Americans. Despite wide-spread law enforcement hostility to sannyasins’ doctrine and practices, agentsat every level adhered to the rule of law and did not act precipitously.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The Rajneeshpuram case is more than a curious incident in the histories ofOregon and the friends of Osho/Rajneesh. Rajneeshpuram is a useful case toexamine because the group exhibited many characteristics associated withlarge-scale collective violence. Sannyasins appeared to be mired in a cycle ofhostility with their neighbors, the press, and state and federal law enforcement.An erratic charismatic leader and his volatile surrogate, Ma Anand Sheela,governed the communal city (Dawson 2006: 154–62). The community wasgeographically isolated, at least a 40-minute drive down a narrow road to theneighboring town of Antelope. And Sheela and her circle had access to manyweapons, prescription drugs, and toxic biological cultures that could have beenused in large-scale collective violence. Nevertheless, accommodation prevailed.

The Sannyasins’ gradual accommodation and final exodus from centralOregon was not a matter of chance. This case study of Rajneeshpuram buildson earlier research about large-scale collective violence at Waco (Mt. Carmel)and at Jonestown (Peoples Temple). I use those cases to develop a frameworkto examine a case of resolution that did not rise to large-scale collective vio-lence. It is important to consider three variables to understand howaccommodation or retreat may overshadow conflict: the nature of a group’sdoctrine, the group’s and its members’ formal and informal connections to


outsiders, and whether or not a rule of law with attention to due processovershadows concern with social order.

Previous case studies of volatile new religious movements have not expli-citly considered the cumulative development of large-scale collective violence.Bromley’s model of conflict, accommodation, and retreat at four different stagesallows systematic examination of sequential levels that occasionally build up tolarge-scale collective violence. This case study of Rajneeshpuram integratesBromley’s sequential model with the three important, interrelated variables:doctrine, connection to outsiders, and external response. Each category andeach stage may contain elements conducive to accommodation or retreat, aswell as elements leading to conflict.

We also do well to remember that, like Rajneeshpuram, the vast majorityof American intentional communities or more informal group living arrange-ments developed by novel religions rise and disappear without large-scale col-lective violence (Bromley and Melton 2002: Kanter 1972). Most, moreover,never approach the potential for violence that characterized Rajneeshpuram.Groups that survive for more than a generation, even when they are controver-sial, tend to move toward the mainstream as the sannyasins did when theyre-opened their Pune ashram as a destination resort and began to market OshoRajneesh’s works in American bookstores like Borders (Goldman 1999:249–68). Over a generation, almost all cults gradually minimize tension withthe surrounding environment and sustain ties with outsiders (Stark 1996;Dawson 2006:144–46).

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