god as person;karl barth and karl rahner on divine and human personhod

8/12/2019 God as Person;Karl Barth and Karl Rahner on Divine and Human Personhod

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RS25.2 (2006) 161190 ReligiousStudiesand 1heology (print) ISSN08922922

do:10.1558/rsth.2006.25.2.16l Religious Studies and Theology (online) ISSN 1747-5414

God as Person: Karl Barth and Karl Rahner on Divine and

Human Personhood

MARK S. M. SCOTT

Harvard University

Abstract

Thisarticleexplorestheconceptof divine personhood in modern theology,

particularly in the theology of Karl Barth (1886-1968) and Karl Rah

ner (1904-1984). It systematically explicateswhat it means to call God a

'Person. After contextualizing thecontemporarydebate on divine person

hood byreferenceto the work of John Zizioulas, it interfacesKarl Barth

and Karl Rahner sconceptionof divine subjectivity and itsanthropological

implications. Itarguesthat the dynamics of divine personhoodentaiLrela-

tionality, both internal (the Trinity) and external (creation).Moreover, it

arguesthat divine subjectivity provides the model for human subjectivity.

Christian theology posits the subjectivity of divinity: it conceives of

God as a Ihou not an it, as a person not a metaphysical force or ab

stract principle.1 Christian praxis also presupposes the personhood of

God. When believers cry out to heaven in moments of despair or joy

they believe that someone, not something, hears their prayer.2 But

what exactly does 'personhood' and 'subjectivity' signify when applied

to God? Despite its theological centrality, the precise meaning of di

vine subjectivity has been largely neglected in theological scholarship.

It is often bypassed as a self-evident presupposition that needs no sys

tematic explication. In this article I remedy this oversight by explor

ing the dynamics of divine personhood, focusing particularly on the

theology of Karl Barth (1886-1968) and Karl Rahner (1904-1984).Following the insights of these two seminal theologians, I argue that


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162 GodasPerson

personhood functions as the precondition and model for human sub-

jectivity.

At the outset I contextualize my study within the contemporary de-

bate on divine personhood, which has been dominated by the work

ofJohn Zizioulas. Following this I analyze Karl Barths conception of

divine and human personhood in light of the theme of relationality.

Next, I critically engage Karl Rahners discussion of divine and hu-

man personhood. In the penultimate section I interface their ideas of

divine and human personhood, underscore the salient similarities and

differences, and assess their coherence. Lastly, I forward a theological

anthropology based on the concept of the imagoDei that defines hu-man personhood as being in relation, notasrelation.

Divine Personhood:The Contemporary Debate

Before we proceed to our analysis of Barth and Rahner, itwill be in-

structive to briefly consider the contemporary theological debate on

divine personhood. Greek Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas (Met-

ropolitan of Pergamon) has treated the concept of personhood exten-sively in his writings, especially in his highly influential BeingasCom-

munion (Zizoulas 1985, 2765). He famously argues that relationality,

not substance, constitutes divine ontology: "The being of God is a

relational being: without the concept of communion it would not be

possible to speak of the being of God" (1985, 17). The divine sub-

stance cannot be prioritized over or abstracted from the relationship of

the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus, the intraTrinitarian relations

ground the divine life and entail divine relationality:

TheHoly Trinity isprimordialomo\o%icd\concept and not a notion

which is added to the divine substance or rather whichfollowsit, as is

thecase in the dogmatic manuals oftheWestand,alas, in those ofthe

East in modern times. The substance ofGod,"God," has no ontologi

calcontent,no true being, apart from communion.

(Zizoulas 1985, 17).

Theconcept of personhood originates from the Greek church fathers,

di t Zi i l "Th b th t d li i


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Scott 163

tion that the West begins with the unity of God and then proceeds to

the plurality while the East begins with the plurality and proceeds to

the unity has been problematized in recent scholarship. In Re-thinking

GregoryofNyssa Sarah Coakley and other scholars refer to this model

as the "de Rgnon paradigm" and trace its uncritical infiltration into

modern dogmengeschichte, including Zizioulass work (Coakley 2003,

1-6; Barnes 1995, 51-79).4While it is not our task to adjudicate this

debate, it is important to note that the perceived disjunction between

the West's emphasis on divine unity and substance and the East's em

phasis on divine plurality and personhood is misconceived. Lucian

Turcescu argues that Zizioulass ontology of personhood derives from a

misreading of the Cappadocians, especially Gregory ofNyssa (Turces

cu 2003,2005). While I would not want to elide the substantive dif-

ferences between Eastern and Western theology, I would challenge the

viability of the categories of'East' and 'West' as reified monolithic enti

ties. There are many points of theological continuity that undermine

this false disjunction. Nevertheless, key differences remain.5

Zizioulas explicitly grounds the personal being of God in the Fa

ther: "Thus God as personas hypostasis of the Fathermakes the

one divine substance to be that which it is: the one God" (1985, 41).

But since the Father causes both the generation of the Son and the

procession of the Spirit, the Father s personal being engenders eternal

divine relations. For Zizioulas, the Father, Son, and Spirit are consti

tuted by communion: "The person cannot exist without communion;

but every form of communion which denies or suppresses the person,is inadmissible" (1985, 18). No ontological necessity forces the Father

to exist in communion with the Son and Holy Spirit. Rather, the Fa

ther freely embraces relationality: "For this communion is a product

of freedom as a result not of the substance of God but ofaperson, the

Father ...who is Trinity not because the divine nature is ecstatic but

because the Father as apersonfreely wills this communion" (1985, 44).

The affirmation of the irreducibility of the divine persons within theircommunion will inform our concluding reflections on human per


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164 GodasPerson

(1985, 101). Human personhood, especially vis--vis the church, can

only be realized through freedom and relationality: "Man is free only

within communion" (1985, 122). Thus, there can be no "I" without a

"Thou" (Buber 2000). In the conclusion I will develop these theologi

cal insights.

Karl Barth on Divine Personhood

In Church Dogmatics III \Barth (1957) treats the systematically related

questions of theological epistemology and theological ontology.6 It is

within his treatment of the latter in 28.1 that Barth engages the is

sue of divine personhood.7 Who (we cannot ask "what", as we shall

see), then, is God? For Barth, God reveals the divine being exclusively

through Gods action in salvation history: "God is who He is in His

works"(11/1,260). Furthermore, God's being is "being in person," that

is,God exists astheknowing, willing, and acting "I"(11/1,268). God's

being in person means that God encompasses all reality precisely as a

person. God consists of the "unity of spirit and nature," a unity that

constitutes God as an "I", not an "It" nor a "He", since these pronounssignifycreatedthings and persons(11/1,268). At the core of divine sub

jectivity is the freedom to be an "I" independent of all other persons:

"It is the I who knows about Himself, who Himself wills, Himself

disposes and distinguishes, and in this very act of His omnipotence is

wholly self-sufficient" (11/1, 268). For Barth, the affirmation of God's

personhood follows as a corollary to the affirmation of God's actual-

ism, i.e., Gods being in act and in relation.8

Moreover, since personhood consists of "being in act" and since this

state of being applies exclusively to the Trinitarian being of God, it

follows that personhood can only be ascribed to God "properly and

strictly"(11/1,271). God does not exist on a continuum of personhood

with human beings. On the contrary, God stands alone as the only

person capable of realizing his personhood in his free act, unaffected

by external forces and internal impediments:But this person is the divine person, whom we must see at once to be


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Scott 165

absolutely its own, conscious, willed and executed decision.

(11/1,271)

Humans cannot constitute their own personhood by sheer determination. Our ability to actualize our subjectivity is attenuated byamyr

iad of internal and external constraints. God, by contrast, fully actuates

his being in his act without any impairment or delimiting factors. In

this sense God's personhood is unique:

Now, if the being ofaperson is a being in act, and if, in the strict and

proper sense, being in act can be ascribed only to God, then it follows

that by the concept of the being ofaperson, in the strict and propersense, we can understand only the being of God. Being in its own,

conscious, willed and executed decision, and therefore personal being,

is the being of God in the nature of the Father and the Son and the

Holy Spirit. Originally and properly thereisno other beside or outside

Him. Everything beside and outside Him is only secondary.

(11/1,271).

In 28.2 Barth develops his inquiry further by reflecting on the nature of God's personhood, that is, by asking "what makes God God"

(11/1, 273)? On the basis of God's action in history, Barth avers that

"God is He who, without having to do so, seeks and creates fellow

ship between Himself and us" (11/1, 273). Barth upholds divine free

dom and sovereignty over creation by affirming the possibility of God

without creation, but not vice versa: "God could be alone; the world

cannot" (II1/I, 7). For Barth, creation is the outpouring of the supera

bundance of the divine essence, which reflects God's free decision to

forgo divine solitude in order to love that which God brings into being

(Ill/I, 15;11/1,273). The overflow of God's essence engenders creation

and redemption and reveals God as the one who loves: "That He is

Godthe Godhead of Godconsists in the fact that He loves"(11/1,

275). God's love does not depend on humanity's worthiness or innate

capacity for love, but rather on Gods being: "But God loves because

He loves; because this act is His being, His essence and His nature"

(11/1 279) Hence God's being and loving action are identical: "'God


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166 GodasPerson

and amplify the "basic definition" of God as the one who loves in

freedom (11/1,284).

Godsdesire for fellowship with humanity flows from his being as the

fellowship between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: "In Himself He

does not will to exist forHimself, to exist alone.. .He does not exist in

solitude but in fellowship" (11/1,275).9The inner life of God, then, de

termines the act of God in salvation history. Since God isfellowship, it

follows that God will seek and create fellowship with humanity. God's

desire for fellowship with humanity, then, ensues from Godsbeing as

fellowship: "Therefore what He seeks and creates between Himself and

us is in fact nothing else but what He wills and completes and therefore is inHimself" (11/1,275). It does not follow, however, that God's

triune nature somehow compels him to seek and create fellowship with

humanity. For Barth, God would be truly and fully God without this

relationship, but God does not in factwill to be God without human

ity: "He does not will to be Himself in any other way than He is in this

relationship"(11/1,274). This, for Barth, is the decisive aspect of God's

personhood that shapes all other theological assertions. God's desirefor mutual encounter with humanity issues in the definitive statement

that God is the one who loves in freedom: "He does not will to be

without us, and He does not will that we should be without Him"

(11/1,274). According to Barth, therefore, divine personhood consists

of the being of God in free relation with himself (the Trinity) and with

the world.

Barth rejects the characterization of personal language for God inscripture as "childish or nave or anthropomorphic" (11/1, 286). Rath

er, he argues that it authentically expresses the personal character of the

divine: "God is not something, but someone" (11/1,286). In theology,

then, the correct question is not "What is God?" but "Who is God":

Properly speaking the idea of God can have only this divine Subject

as its content and the divine predicate must be sought only in this

Subject as such, outside of which it can have no existence and cannot

therefore become the content of an idea.

(11/1 300)


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Scott 167

ject lives (God's being as act) and loves (God's being as relational) as

a person. It must be emphasized, however, that God does this freely:

"God's being as He who lives and loves is being in freedom...In this

way, as the free person, He is distinguished from other persons" (11/1,

301). As we will see momentarily, an innumerable set of condition

ing factors restrict the full and free expression of human personhood.

God, by contrast, does not admit of any limitation and is free in the

positive sense of being completely grounded, determined and moved

by himself (II/l, 301).10

The Theological Grounding of Human Personhood

Throughout 28 Barth delineates the anthropological implications of

divine subjectivity. He begins by distinguishing between divine and

human personhood in order to set them in right relation. In contrast

to human persons, God is entirely self-motivated and self-actualized in

the sense of being able to realize his being in his act without any im

pediments: "No other being is absolutely its own, conscious, willed and

executed decision" (II/l, 271). Only God is a person, strictly speaking,because only God is being in act. Conversely, humans are persons only

by analogy: "It is not God who is a person by extension but we" (II/l,

272). We do not run the risk of "personalizing" God when we affirm

Godssubjectivity, but rather of personalizing ourselves when we affirm

our subjectivity, according to Barth: "The real person is not man but

God" (II/l, 272). In the first place, then, Barth attenuates the reality of

human subjectivity vis--vis God: "We are thinking and speaking onlyin feeble images and echoes of the person of God when we describe

man as a person" (II/l, 285). Humans are indeed persons, but since

we are dependent on God and conditioned by other persons and cir

cumstances we are not able to actualize our decision and will in reality.

Nevertheless, we are persons "by extension" insofar as God enables us

to construct our subjectivity through our free activity: "He is the one,

original and authentic person through whose creative power and will

alone all other persons are and are sustained" (II/l, 301). Thus, human

h d di l fl t di i h d i ti l d i ti


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168 GodasPerson

who perfectly exists as the paradigmatic person. In ourselves we do not

know what it meanswe come to recognize it only in God: "What

do we know of our own selfhood," Barth asks, "before God has given

us His name, and named us by our name" (II/l, 285)? Barth defines

a person as "a knowing, willing, and acting I" and immediately limits

the proper ascription of this predicate to God, who is "the One who

loves and as such (loving in His own way) is the person" (II/l, 284).

God creates the possibility for human subjectivity by loving humanity.

When God seeks and creates fellowship with us he confers upon us the

ability to be persons by reciprocating God's love: "Man is not a person,

but he becomes one on the basis that he is loved by God and can loveGod in return" (II/l, 284). We discover the true nature of subjectivity

in God's action in salvation history, not in ourselves: "Man finds what

a person is when he finds it in the person of God and his own being as

a person in the gift of fellowship afforded him by God in person" (II/l,

284).At the heart of human subjectivity, then, is fellowship with God.

Our worth as persons derives from God's willingness to enter into rela

tionship with us, which enables us to be in relation with him.Human subjectivity for Barth, then, is essentially mimetic. We

become persons by mirroring God's love: "Therefore to be a person

means really and fundamentally to be what God is, to be, that is, the

One who loves in God's way" (II/l, 284). We can only be true "Is"

as we reflect God's knowing, willing, and acting within our creaturely

context: "Thus to know, to will, and to act like God as the One who

loves in Himself and in His relationship to His creation means (inconfirmation of His I-ness) to be a person" (II/l, 285). To know, will,

and act like God means to love as God loves, i.e., without ulterior

motives: "For He alone is the One who loves without any other good,

without any other ground, without any other aim" (II/l, 284). God's

knowing, willing, and acting grounds human personhood by revealing

its true meaning and possibility. This grounding of human subjectivity

lies not in an abstract or idealized notion of divine personhood but in

God's actual activity in salvation history: "He is the real person and

t l th id l" (II/ l 285) H d t th hi


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Scott 169

of our derived and dependent personhood. "He is not the personified

but the personifying personthe person on the basis of whose prior

existence alone we can speak (hypothetically) of other persons different

from Him" (II/l, 285).

Karl Rahner on Divine Personhood in theFoundations

Karl Rahner identifies subjectivity as one of the primary features of

the Christian doctrine of God: "The statement that God is a person,

that he is a personal God, is one of the fundamental Christian asser

tions about God" (1978, 73). Though fundamental, the doctrine of

a personal God nevertheless engenders numerous theological difficul

ties.11

How does one distinguish between personhood vis--vis God's

singular subjectivity versus the three persons of the Trinity, for exam

ple? Is there a correspondence between God's generic personhood and

God's Trinitarian personhood? Rahner isolates these two modes of di

vine personhood, beginning his discussion of the "the personal being

of God" by examining divine personhood generically: "When we say

that God is a person, and this in a sense which as yet has nothing to dowith the question about the so-called three persons in God, then the

question about the personal character of God becomes a twofold ques

tion" (1978, 73). Rahner thus helpfully distinguishes between the two

modes of divine personhood without explicating how they interrelate.

Setting aside this problem, Rahner then asks whether personhood

relates to God's transcendence or immanence: "We can ask whether

God in his own self must be called a person; and we can ask whetherhe is person only in relation to us, and whether in his own self he is

hidden from us in his absolute and transcendent distance" (1978, 73).

This question turns on the distinction between God inseand Godpro

nobis, that is, God's internal relationship to Godself and God's external

relation to salvation history. If personhood applies to both God's tran

scendence and immanence, then humans may encounter God rela-

tionally. Conversely, if personhood applied only to God's immanence,then authentic encounter would be precluded, since God would be


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170 GodasPerson

Then we would have to say that he is a person, but that he does not

by any means for this reason enter into that personal relationship to

us which we presuppose in our religious activity, in prayer, and in our

turning to God in faith, hope and love.(Rahner1978, 73)

For Rahner, then, divine personhood also involves the problem of

the relation between God's transcendence and immanence.

Despite these theological complications, Rahner avers that the doc

trine of God as person is "really self-evident" (1978, 73). He argues

that since human personhood self-evidently exists and since God

grounds all human existence, it follows that human personhood must

be grounded in divine personhood. God's personhood, then, establish

es human personhood: "God is a person, is the absolute person who

stands in absolute freedom vis--vis everything which he establishes

as different from himself" (1978, 73). This divine attribute coexists

with the other attributes that follow from the human experience of

transcendence: "This assertion is really self-evident, just as when we

say that God is the absolute being, the absolute ground, the absolutemystery, the absolute good, the absolute and ultimate horizon within

which human existence is lived out in freedom, knowledge, and action"

(1978, 73). As the ground of all reality God possesses the existential

attributes he creates to a superlative degree. Gods personhood exists

prior to human personhood "in absolute fullness and purity," that is,

in an unalloyed manner (1978, 73).

Rahner claims that God's personhood functions as the condition ofthe possibility of human personhood; God, as the archetypal person,

grounds all other persons. But Rahner carefully distinguishes the way

in which God and humans subsist as persons. First, he distinguishes be

tweenfinitehuman subjectivity and God'sinfinite subjectivity. Second,

human persons are individuals who form their personhood in relation

to other persons, who are also "individual and limited" (1978, 73).

But because God exists as the absolutely unique and infinite person,

God cannot be an individual person, since that would imply that there

th l f ti ith G d h d t i di i


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Scott 171

cannot belong to God," Rahner asserts, "who is the absolute ground of

everything in radical originality" (1978, 74).12 Third, while God con

stitutes his own personhood with unfettered and unqualified freedom,

human persons are constrained by "a thousand conditions and neces

sities" (1978, 74). While we are in some sense free, we must recognize

that pre-existing social and personal conditions co-determine our sub

jectivity. Divine personhood, then, must be sharply distinguished from

the finite, individual, and conditioned aspects of human personhood.

Personhood, as a "transcendental concept," applies properly to God

and only analogously to humans (1978, 74). It follows, according to

Rahner, that humans can only apprehend the nature of personhood

by allowing their comprehension to "flow into the holy, ineffable and

incomprehensible mystery" (1978, 74). All language about God ulti

mately fails to capture the divine essence. Yet, although humans can

only truly know what personhood means for them and not for God,

this attribute may nevertheless be legitimately predicated of God: "If

anything at all can be predicated of God, then the concept of 'person

hood' has to be predicated of him" (1978, 74). For Rahner, God isa person, but divine personhood can only be partly understood and

in the end recedes from human apprehension into the impenetrable

horizon of mystery: "Obviously, the statement that 'God is a person'

can be asserted of God and is true of God only if, in asserting and

understanding this statement, we open it to the ineffable darkness of

the holy mystery" (1978, 74). But the underlying mystery of the asser

tion does not give the philosopher or theologian license to "arbitrarily"define its meaning or, conversely, to leave it entirely undetermined.

Rather, humanity's "historical experience" of God determines the con

tent of God's personhood for us. Rahner specifically enumerates three

existential areas where God personally encounters humanity: "In our

individual histories, in the depths of our conscience, and in the whole

history of the human race" (1978, 74). The formal concept of divine

personhood receives its content in these three divine-human encounters.


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172 Godas Person

of God's subjectivity Although divine personhood, as a "transcenden

tal concept," resists concrete specification, its "formal emptiness and

empty formality" does not preclude its theological explication, despite

the ontological and epistemological difficulties involved (1978, 75).

Rahner cautions against making the transcendental nature of divine

personhood a "false god" by denying the possibility of personal en

counter with this utterly distant Other (1978, 75). Christian theology

presupposes God's personal encounter with us in prayer, our personal

histories, and the history of God's revelation to humanity. When lay

persons testify to God's personal presence in moments of desperation or

joy they may not comprehend the theological nuances of the doctrineof God they presuppose, but they nonetheless rightly grasp the person

al character of the divine-human encounter. Since theological knowl

edge rests on humanity's existential structure, it follows that anthropo

morphic conceptions of God have some theological merit: "From this

perspective [that is, the experiential basis of theological epistemology]

a certain religious naivete, which understands the personhood of God

almost in a categorical sense, has its justification" (1978, 75). This isnot to say, however, that divine personhood should be conceived of

anthropomorphically. It simply affirms the existential reality of God's

personal encounter with humanity.

Rahner distinguishes his doctrine of God as person from various

impersonal theologies. As the ground of humanity's "spiritual person

hood" God reveals himself to us as a person. An "unconscious and

impersonal cosmic law" cannot ground human subjectivity. The human spirit experiences itself "as being given to itself from another,"

that is, another who also possesses a subjective consciousness. For this

reason Rahner rejects all impersonal doctrines of God. Therefore God

is not "an unconscious and impersonal structure of things, a source

which empties itself out without possessing itself...a blind, primor

dial ground of the world which cannot look at us even if it wants

to" (1978, 75). For Rahner, God is a person, not an abstract force or

impersonal principle. Hence, human subjectivity finds its source in a

l G d G d h "l k t " d h f d b l t


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Scott 173

DivinePersonhood in Rahner's Theological Investigations

In the first volume of the TheologicalInvestigationsRahnerexplores the

meaningof$ (God)in theNewTestament.Within this discussionhedevotes a major subsection to the idea of "God asPerson" (Rahner

1961, 10417). In contrast to the philosophical style of theFounda-

tions of theChristianFaith,Rihner here adopts amoreexegetical tone.

Hebegins bynoting thatfrom thevery inceptionoftheChristian faith

God'spersonal being was considered to be a "living reality," as is evi-

denced by thenumerousprayers in the NewTestament (1961, 104).

In "primitiveChristianity"God's personhood was takenfor granted asan irrefutable datum of experience.The theological epistemology of

the early disciples was grounded not in the "theoretical study of the

world" but in an experientialencounter with "God's living activity"

(1961, 104). On the basis of this encounter they became intimately

aware of God's existence as a TIJOU, not an It:"The God of the New

Testamentis aGodwhomhumanbeings mayaddressasThou,in a way

inwhich only a personal being can be addressed as Thou"(1961, 104

5). This doctrineof God stands in diametrical relation to theGreek

apprehensionof08OS (God)as apredicatewhose subject is thewhole

numinouscosmos (including the gods), not the oneGod: "By0EO

(God) the Greeks did not mean the unity of a definite personality in

the monotheistic sense, but rather the unity of the religious world,

clearly felt as one in spite of its multiplicity" (1961, 90). New Testa-

ment theolog)7does cohere, however, with the Old Testament concep-

tion of God as Yahweh, i.e., "the definite Person with a proper name

who actually intervenes in the history of his people and of all men by

his own free will" (1961, 92). The underlying presupposition of the

earliesc Christian theology, then, is the reality of God's personhood and

its impact on everyday affairs.

According to Rahner, there are four primary aspects of divine person-

hood: "God is he who acts; he who is free; he who acts in a historical

dialogue with human persons; and he who in the true sense tells us

about his 'attributes'which would otherwise remain hiddenonly


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174 GodasPerson

salvific: "The New Testament is strongly conscious of a sharply defined

saving activity of God within the whole of humanhistory"(1961, 106).

Godsreconciling work by which he calls all to come into communion

with himself becomes apprehensible not through "some metaphysical

knowledge of God's necessarygoodness"but from God's historical and

free election of all nations through Jesus Christ (1961, 106-7). Thus,

God is he who acts to save his people. God is the God who sets the

captives free by liberating the oppressed and saving the sinful. God's

salvific act in history is personal. In other words, God does not save

through impersonal processes but through specific events and through

a particular person: Christ.

The second aspect of God's personhood is freedom: "This God who

acts in nature and in human history is one whoacts freely"(1961,107-8). Godsactivity is "voluntary and free," arising not from the sum

total of chaotic contingencies but from "God's spontaneous resolu

tion" (1961, 108). Above time and matter, God is not determined by

any external factors. As the divine person God, who creates all reality,

is not reducible to the natural world but exists distinct from it whilesimultaneously grounding it. Since God creates "out of nothing (exnihilo)"(Rm. 4:17) he exercises complete freedom and autonomy overcreation and thus cannot be susceptible to any constraints (1961, 107).

Hence, God is he who acts freely by creating and saving the world

without any internal or external necessity. It follows, Rahner argues,

that God's activity in the world cannot be reduced to its inner structure

( la process theology) or its causal interconnections: "God's activity isnot just another word for the world-process, his will is not just another

word for 'fate'" (1961, 108). Rather, New Testament people experi

enced God's activity as "free irruptions into the historical course of the

world, novel and unexpected and extrinsic to the world's immanent

dynamism" (1961, 108). God does not act as an invisible force animat

ing history and creating the future through natural processes that are

reducible to the inherent structure of the world. Rather, God acts in

unexpected ways that do not necessarily cohere with or even conform

to nat ral la s (e g miracles)


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Scott 175

place God shows himself as person in that he deals with man in an his

torical dialogue, that he allows man, his creature, really to be a person

too" (1961,110). Rahner illustrates this third aspect by contrasting it

with a "purely metaphysical" doctrine of God as the "ultimate cause"

of all reality. A theological epistemology that proceeds from the em

pirical world to a description of God as the highest of a given reality

runs the risk of making the world merely "a pure function of God,"

that is, a "pure expression and objectivization" of the ultimate cause

of reality. Metaphysics on its own, then, fails to apprehend the dia-

logical character of the divine-human encounter. This dialogue does

not entail a loss of transcendence, since God enables it and creation

remains wholly dependent on God even while God gives humanity a

"genuine independence" to respond (1961, 110). God empowers the

human spirit to say "yes" or "no" to God in freedom and this relative

independence constitutes the core of human personhood. Thus, we are

persons insofar as we have the freedom to make authentic choices. We

are not, Rahner avers, automatons or marionettes. On the contrary, we

are persons able to enter into a "two-sided personal relationship" byexercising our free will by responding to God in an authentic personal

encounter (1961, 110).

The fourth aspect of God's personhood is the divine attributes. Be

fore we can understand God's attributes we must know God as a per

son. Only then can we know not "whatGod is, butas whomhe wishes

freely to show himself with regard to the world" (1961, 112). Rahner

argues that attributes apply more to things than to people. In relationto the world God does not have attributes but "freely and personally

adopted attitudes" (1961,112). These attitudes become reflected in the

metaphysical structure of reality, but they are not tantamount to them.

The key question is not the identity of the eternal inner being of God

but the identity of God as revealed in salvation history: "The existen-

tially personal and active character of God's behavior, in contrast to

some fixed metaphysical attribute of his essence, is just as clear whenhe is calledgood,merciful, loving, and so on" (1961, 114). The New


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176 GodasPerson

(1961, 112). But the theological knowledge culled from the natural

world pertains to God's essence rather than God's existence. In salva

tion history, however, the numerous attributes of God "acquire new

harmonics," becoming personal intimations of apersonal God rather

than impersonal denialsofimperfections andaffirmations ofsuperla

tive being (1961,112).

The Theological Groundingof Human Personhood

In hisopening chapter entitled "TheHearerof theMessage" Rahner

(1978) affirms human subjectivity as foundational to the Christian

faith: "With regard to thepresupposition of the revealed messageof

Christianity, the first thing to besaid about man isthat he isperson

and subject" (1978,26).Only asubject can enter into a relationship

with God, pray, accept salvation, and enjoy God's presence. In con

trast to those empirical and regional anthropologies that reduce hu-

man subjectivity to our social, historical, and physiological location,

Rahner's theological anthropology accentsour transcendental senseof

being more than "aproduct ofthe world":"But in themidstofthese

origins into which heseems to dissolve...man experiences himselfas

personandsubject" (1978,28).Rahner argues thatweexperience our

selvesassubjects whenweknowourselvesto be "theproduct of whatis

radically foreign [tous]"(1978, 29).Weknowtheoriginsandcausesof

our identityandrealize that they cannot fully explain us.Wecannotbe

constructed from our background becausewe aremore thanthe sum

of these conditions. Paradoxically,inquestioningtheunderlying causesofoursubjectivitywetranscend theempirical and discreet aspectsof

our identity. This self-reflexivity constitutesus aspersons, in contrast

to finite systems: "A finite system cannot confront itself in its total

ity...It doesnot ask questions about itself. It is not asubject" (1978,

30). Human personhood, then, entails self-awareness and self-posses

sion: "Beinga person, then, means theself-possession of asubject as

suchin aconsciousandfree relationshipto thetotality ofitself"(1978,30).Whereasarock cannot consider itselfasa self,humanscan reflect


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Scott 177

man as "having to do withhimself"as the "subjectivity of the multiple

objectivities" (Rahner 1978, 30). In considering ourselves as the total

ity of antecedent conditions we take responsibility for ourselves. Even

if we wanted to deny all responsibility for ourselves, Rahner avers,we

would be doing this as knowing, willing agents, i.e., as persons. When

we place ourselves in question and confront the present and future

possibilities of our lives we exhibit our self-possession and thus our

responsibility for ourselves:

To say that man is person and subject, therefore, means first of all that

man is someone who cannot be derived, who cannot be producedcompletely from other elements at our disposal. He is that being who

is responsible forhimself.

(Rahner 1978, 31)

Our self-presence, then, reveals our status as transcendent beings.

By "placing everything in question" and being open to "everything

and anything" we experience ourselves as "transcendent being, as

spirit" (Rahner 1978, 31-2). Transcendence in this context does notdenote the metaphysical concept as an object of reflection but the ex

istential background ofall human thought and action:

It is rather the a priori openness of the subject to being as such, which

is present precisely when a person experiences himselfasinvolved in

the multiplicity ofcaresand concerns and fears and hopes ofhiseve

ryday world.

(Rahner 1978, 35)

Rahner observes that people can and often do evade or ignore the

experience of transcendence by retreating to the "familiar and the eve

ryday" of the categorical realm, i.e., by immersing themselves in the

world of the concrete (1978, 32). As we involve ourselves with daily

affairs without reflecting on existence itself these questions recede into

the background. The "broader horizon" of being is lost when our gaze

is fixed on the tasks at hand and the material aspects of human existence.


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178 GodasPerson

(1978, 34). In this transcendental experience we are faced with our

responsibility for ourselves: "Insofar as man is a transcendent being, he

is confronted byhimself,is responsible forhimself,and hence is person

and subject" (1978, 34). This transcendence, then, is the theological

basis of human responsibility and freedom. Rahner distinguishes be

tween transcendental and empirical freedom. Our determination by

the world disallows real freedom in the latter sense. The freedom Rah

ner enunciates is the "I" who experiences him or herself as more or less

free: "It is in this experience that something like real subjectivity and

self-responsibility, and this not only in knowledge but also in action,

is present as an a priori, transcendental experience of my freedom"(1978, 36). Even when we doubt or question the true extent of our

freedom in the categorical realm we remain "Is" that are free and re

sponsible for ourselves amid our doubts and questions. Responsibility

and freedom are coordinate realities of transcendental experience along

with subjectivity. Our freedom concerns our subjectivity considered

"as such and as a whole," not in discreet moments:

We can only say, then, that because and insofar as I experience myself

as a person and as subject, I also experience myselfasfree, as free in

a freedom which does not refer primarily to an individual, isolated

psychic occurrence, but in a freedom which refers to the subjectasone

and as a whole in the unity of its entire actualization of existence.

(Rahner 1978, 38).

We cannot escape our freedom by resigning ourselves to the external

and antecedent forces that determine our existence, since we are still

responsible to say or do something about this determination by either

accepting or cursing it, for instance (1978, 39). Freedom, for Rahner,

consists not of doing particular things but of making ourselves into the

kind of persons we want to be: "When freedom is really understood, it

is not the power to be able to do this or that, but the power to decide

about oneself and to actualizeoneself"(1978, 38). Understood rightly

freedom is not a neutral capacity to make decisions, it is the ability tosay "yes" or "no" to God in the totality of our existence: "Freedom is


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Scott 179

finality of the subject as such" (1974, 183). God enables us to sayuycs"

and "no" to God by being both the horizon and the "whither" of our

transcendence and freedom (1974, 183).

Interfacing Barth and Rahner on the Question of Personhood

Both Barth and Rahner identify the problem of distinguishing be

tween generic divine personhood and Trinitarian personhood. Barth

aptly underscores the ambiguity of person language for God:

Ifweaccept the concept of the personality of God, we must be con

scious ofacertain lack of clarity arising from the fact that right up tomodern times most people have spoken of divine persons' in relation

to the doctrine of the divine Trinity.

(11/1,296)

According to Barth, modern person language fails to capture the re

lationship between the Father, Son, and Spirit. Barth recommends

abandoning person language for Trinitarian relations since, in its cur

rent usage, 'person' implies a distinct center of consciousness, which

runs the risk of tritheism.13 The word 'person, then, properly applies

to God as a unity of three modes of being: "What we can describe as

personality is indeed the whole divine Trinity as such, in the unity of

the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in God Himself and in His worknot

in the individual aspects by themselves in which God is and which

He has" (II/l, 297). For Barth, person language best expresses God's

subjective unity, God's being as one person with one "face" (i.e., one

subjective identity): "There are not three faces of God, but one face"

(II/l, 297). In contrast to Barth, however, Rahner suggests that the ec-

clcsial language of person for the Trinity ought to be retained because

ofitslong theological pedigree and its continued serviceability, so long

as it is carefully nuanced and disentangled from modern individualist

connotations.14

Tliere are three essential aspects of divine subjectivity that Barth and

Rahner mutually affirm. The first is God's activity. Barth emphasizes

that God s personhood consists of his ability to fully execute his deci


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180 GodasPerson

his acthe is as he acts in history. Rahner also affirms that God is he

who acts. God does not act "always and everywhere" but "here and

now", i.e., in a particular way at a particular time in a personal encoun

ter (Rahner 1978, 1, 105). Moreover, divine activity is fundamentally

salvific: God's acts are always liberating and personal. Although Rahner

emphasizes the nature of God's subjective activity while Barth empha

sizes the nature of God's subjective identity in his activity, they both

perceive that God reveals his subjective being in salvation history. Nor

could it be otherwise, since the gospel presupposes the personal work

of God through the incarnation of the Son. True personhood cannot

be dormant because subjectivity requires specific activity in order to

have meaningful content: one must do something in order to be some

one.15 One cannot simply be a person in abstraction. Activity, then,

is a necessary condition for divine subjectivity. We learn what sort of

person God is through salvation history, where God demonstrates his

unfailing love for humanity.

The second aspect of divine personhood is freedom. For Barth, God

is free in both a negative and positive sense. Negatively, God is free inthe sense of being unimpaired by any internal or external forces. Posi

tively, God is free in the sense of being grounded completely in himself

and thus able to be his own decision, in other words to be the kind of

person he wishes to be. Rahner also affirms God's freedom. For Rahner,

God's actions are never compelled and he freely intervenes in history

despite the fact that he creates history to accomplish his ends. God's

freedom does not preclude his ability to suspend or break the naturallaws he created or to enter into history to accomplish his salvific pur

poses. Barth and Rahner agree that God could realize his subjectivity

without creation: God could be God without us; he does not need us

to actualizehimself.Barth emphasizes the centrality of divine freedom

more than Rahner, but both identify freedom as constitutive of divine

personhood. Once again this coheres with the inner structure of sub

jectivity, which presupposes the ability to actualize personhood without

coercion. God's subjectivity would be diminished if it were dependent

h h d f h B f b h B h d R h G d


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Scott 181

pressures and freely chooses to be God with us and for us.

The third aspect of divine personhood is fellowship or relationality.

God does not wish to be God without us, nor does he wish for us to

be without him, according to Barth. The central identity of Godi.e.,

the Godhead of God or what makes God Godis the fact that he

loves. God's love expresses itself through the desire to seek and create

fellowship with humanity. God's relationality stems not from a sup

posed need for companionship with humanity but from the supera

bundance ofhisTrinitarian existence. Rahner avers that God's person

hood is expressed in his historical dialogue with humanity in salvation

history. In Christ God speaks to humanity and allows us to respond.

The dialogue is truly "bi-personal" because God speaks as a person and

makes space for our personhood by enabling us to say "yes" or "no"

to God. Rahner stresses the dialogical character of the divine-human

encounter while Barth stresses divine agency at the expense of human

agency in this encounter. Both, however, agree that God creates the

possibility for a divine-human encounter and fully manifests his sub

jectivity through it.

Lastly, Barth and Rahner both elucidate the theological grounding of

human personhood. For Barth, the only real person is God.16Humans,

however, are persons by extension because they are loved by God and

called into fellowship.17 He argues that human subjectivity is essen

tially mimetic: we become persons by imitating God. But the radical

disjunction between divine and human personhood in Barth under

cuts the possibility of mimesis, in my view. How can humans emulatedivine personhood when they can onlyreceive subjectivity from God?

In the end Barth attenuates the reality of human personhood, calling it

a feeble image and echo of the reality of God's personhood. For Barth,

we cannot actualize our personhood because we are not fully free. The

internal and external factors that shape our existence ultimately erode

our freedom. Thus, Barth emphasizes humanity's absolute dependence

on God for authentic subjectivity and downplays the reality of human freedom. Rahner, by contrast, conceives of a closer continuity be


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182 GodasPerson

being the infinite horizon of all our thoughts and actions, by encoun

tering us in our transcendental experience of ourselves as given, and

by inviting us to genuine dialogue in salvation history. Rahner makes

more room for human agency in his anthropology than Barth.

Conclusion: PersonsinRelation, notasRelation

We have surveyed three influential conceptions of divine and human

personhood from three eminent modern theologians: John Zizioulas,

Karl Barth, and Karl Rahner.18 These three represent the Orthodox,

Protestant, and Catholic traditions and although we would not want to

elide their respective differences by forcing a facile harmonization, we

can nonetheless trace salient threads of continuity in their theological

reflections. All three affirm the dual relationality of divine personhood.

First, they affirm that God exists as the holy, mysterious, and ineffable

communion of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Gods eternal self-re

lation creates the possibilitynot the necessityfor outward relation.

Second, they agree that God encounters humanity in salvation history.

Without any ontological constraint God creates the world and enters

into relation with it. While God relates to all creation, Gods deepest

relational encounter occurs with humanity.19 What, then, are the sys

tematic correlations between divine and human personhood?20 What

does the former reveal about the latter?21

The doctrine of the imago Dei systematically links divine and hu

man personhood. Since we are crafted in God's image, our personhood

must also consist of relationality, though in a creaturely way (Genesis1:26).

22 Miroslav Volf rightly notes that our innate affinity with God

enables an ethical agenda based on what he calls the"imitano Trinit-

Us :

There is an affinity between human beings and God and, therefore,

between the way Christiansand by extension all human beings

ought to live and the way Godis.The nature of God, therefore, funda

mentally determines the character of the Christian life.(Volf 2006, 4)


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Scott 183

the Trinity, but we can forgo isolation and strive for greater intercon-

nectedness. Although we are constituted by our relations, we cannot

bereducedto them (nor can the divine persons). Before we participate

in relationships we exist as irreducibly unique persons.23

We are not

simply absorbed into a sea of relations; rather, we fully actualize our

subjectivity through our relations. Human personhood thus consists of

being in relation,notas relation.We must simultaneously affirm both

our irreducibility as persons and our fundamental relationality. Hence,

since God is love (1 John 4:8), and since we are created in God's image,

we reach the summit of our personhood when we refract God's love in

our interpersonal encounters. When we equate the well-being of our

neighbours with our own personal well-being (Matt. 7:12)thereby

centering ourselves in otherswe reflect the divine life, though dimly.

By striving for greater interconnectedness and mutuality we mirror the

Trinitarian life of God, who with "one face" (Barth 1957, 297) "looks

at us" (Rahner 1978, 75) and shows us what it means to be a person.

The metaphysical distance between God and humanity, however, im

pairs our ability to mirror the divine life. Although we bear the imprint

of God, we are not God and can only imitate God in a finite way (Volf

2006, 5). Moreover, while our identity as creatures created in God's

image enables us to reflect the Trinitarian relations, our identity as sin

ners vitiates and partially undermines that ability without erasing it.

Hence, we must be wary of our susceptibility to distortion when ap

plying principles of relationality from divine to human relationships.

Although the divine persons fully interpenetrate one another, humanpersons cannot mutually indwell one another, except poetically. In fact,

our attempts at perichoresis can be destructive ifwe do not allow the

other to remain other or if we divest ourseWes so completely in another

that we lose our distinctive identity. So while we may legitimately ap

propriate models of relation from the Trinity, we must acknowledge

our limitations. Yet even in our brokenness we can look to the life of

God for paradigms to enrich our interrelations and in the process echothe heights of heaven as best as we can.


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184 Godas Person

Notes

1 I wish to thank Francis Schiissler Fiorenza for his helpful comments on an

earlier draft of this article. I wish also to thank my advisor Sarah Coakley for

her assistance on clarifying the problems surrounding Trinitarian personhood.

Lastly, I wish to thank MiroslavVolf,my advisor from Yale Divinity School,

who introduced to me the idea of "interfacing" Karl Barth and Karl Rahner

on various theological questions.

2. Certain versions of process theology reduce God to a function of creation,

thus undermining the doctrine of God as person. For an introduction to proc

ess theology see John B. Cobb and D.R. Griffin (1976). Interestingly, Alfred

North Whitehead (the founder of process thought, along with his pupilCharles Hartshorne) beautifully describes God as "the great companion, the

fellow-sufferer who understands," which seems personalizing, but need not be

([19291 1967, 532).

3. For a recent Jewish perspective on divine personhood. see Muffs (2005).

4. Recent scholarship has questioned whether the paradigm attributed to Tho

dore De Rgnon originates from histudes de thologie positive sur L SainteTrinit(1892-98) or whether it was wrongly ascribed to him based on a misreading of his text. I would argue that the notion of person as relation is found

in both East and West. For a detailed discussion of the so-called De Rgnon

paradigm and the much vexed question of the differences between 'Eastern'

and 'Western' Trinitarian theology, see the forthcoming special edition of the

Harvard TljeobgicalReview(100.2, April 2007), particularly Hennessys article"An Answer to the de Rgnon Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of 'His'

Paradigm".

5. The most significant theological difference between Eastern and Western

Christianity is the mode of the Spirits procession. For a concise but compre

hensive treatment of theFilioquedebate see Daley (2001a, 2001b). There are

also key liturgical and ecclesial differences between the two.

6. Karl Barth (11/1). I will reference ChurchDogmaticsand other key texts fromBarth and Rahner within the text of the article. At the outset of his section

on the reality of God Barth unflinchingly affirms Gods existence: aGod is"

(28.1,257). This theological affirmation does not hinge on any proofs for

Godsexistence but rather on Gods self-disclosure in revelation. The task he

sets for himselfinthis section is to define Gods being, which is the "basis andcontent" ofallother theological assertions (257-8). Gods actual existence is


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Scott 185

presupposition of all theology, he argues that it merits deeper independent

analysis (258-9). The very centrality of"thishardest and most comprehensive

statement that Godis"necessitates its careful explication as a particular truth

rather thanASthe ground of all theological truth (259). Its interconnection tothe entire dogmatic system does not preclude its treatment under the doctrine

of God.

7. Barth (1914) also discusses divine personhood. Hans urs von Balthasar (1992:

215-216) argues that Barths notion of personhood straddles the line between

two modes of explication: "The concept of personhood hovers on the border

between transcendental philosophy and psychology but continually eludes a

full accounting in terms of either." He notes that for Barth we must "content

ourselves with the ambiguous center" between two unacceptable alternativenotions: "So all that remains to us is to hover between thesicetnonof two

unacceptable alternatives: between the forbidden frontier of pantheism, which

would strip God of all personal attributes, and the forbidden boundary ofde

ism, which would like to subsume Godspersonality within the finitude of the

world".

8. For a discussion of Barths actualisim, see Hunsinger (1991:30-32 andpas

sim).

9. Barths Trinitarian theology is discussed in depthbyTorrance (1996). See especially Chapter4:Triune Person, where he compares Barths Trinitarian concept

of divine personhood with Rahner and Zizioulas.

10. For a concise treatment of Barths doctrine ofdivinefreedom, see Webster

(2000,8S-88). Foi an extensive treatmenr see Molnar (2002), Chapter 8:

Persons in Communion and God as the Mystery of the World: Alan Torrance,

Eberhard Jngel and The Doctrine oftheImmanent Trinity for a treatment of

the problem of the relationship between divine freedom and human per

sonhood. Molnar, following Barrh, posits a "sharp distinction between theimmanent and economic Trinity" in order to preserve Gods freedom vis--vis

"creation, reconciliation and redemption," which do not inexorably arise from

Gods relationality but from God's free decision to be God for us. This does

not implyadisjunction between rhe ecomonic and immanentTrinity,since

the former truly reveals that latter. Rather, it preserves Gods inexhaustibility

and affirms that human personhood "must find its basis and meaning outside

irseliand in Godhimself"(Molber 2002, 235).

11. For a helpful orientation to Rahner s theology, sec O'Donovan ed. (1989). Fora more recent study, see Kilby (2004).


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186 GodasPerson

he does not experience any difference fromhimself" (Rahner 1978, 74).

13. A distinctive feature of Barths doctrine oftheTrinity is his nuancing of Trini

tarian language. He argues that the term "person" is obsolete and misleading

(1/1,366). Gods thrceness is more felicitously conveyed by the term "mode

(or way) of being" (viz,Seins weise,359, 363). Barth exchanges the classical Trinitarian expression of"onebeing, three persons" for the phrase "one

God in the three modes of being" (375). This semantical shift has enormous

significance for Barth. The concept of person cannot be consistently employed

because it implies material distinctions in God and therefore tri theism. Con

versely, the term "mode of being" safeguards the oneness of God. In the end,

however, Barth concedes that God is a mystery and that the honest answer

to Augustines question"quidtresV is Anslems"tres nescioquid? since Godsessence transcends humanity s noetic capacity: "We, too, are unable to sayhow in this case 3 can really be 1 and 1 can really be 3" (367). For Barth, one

ought to affirm the actuality of Gods triunity on the basis of Gods self-revela

tion to humanity as attested in scripture.

14. In concurrence with Barth, Rahner (1999, 110) perceives the infelicitous

tritheistic nuances of the word "person" in Trinitarian language. He remarks

that in modern parlance "person" denotes a distinct "center of consciousness

and activity" (57). When applied to the Trinity, this concept entails three

distinct consciousnesses, which compromises the divine unity: "There are not

three consciousnesses; rather, the one consciousness subsists in a threefold

way" (107). Rahner contends (paceBarth) that the word "person" has been"consecrated by the use of more than 1500 years" and should not therefore be

replaced in ecclesiastical terminology "by another word which produces fewer

misunderstandings" (44). Following Thomas Aquinas' definition of person

(viz, "that which subsists distinctly in a rational nature") Rahner submits that

the expression "distinct manner of subsisting" helps elucidate the meaning

of person in Trinitarian theology. He opts for this expression over Barrhs"manner of being" because it more closely approximates "the traditional

language of the Church" (110). Since the phrase "distinct manner of subsist

ing" underscores the unity of God and guards against tritheistic insinuations,

it is semantically preferable to "person" (113). Nevertheless, Rahner does

not wish to introduce a new Trinitarian vocabulary to replace the Church's

concept of person in the doctrine of the Trinity; rather, he seeks to circumvent

the problematic implications of the modern usage of person by employing a

new concept of Gods threeness that is grounded in "a Thomistic definition of

the 'person'" (115). Rahner affirms the legitimacy oftheecclesiastical idea of

person and seeks to render it intelligible by conveying its implicit Trinitarian


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Scott 187

are not persons. Some people simply cannot "do" anything because of a debili

tating illness or injury. Yet, as creatures created in the image of God, they still

retain their status as persons, despite that fact that they cannot fully actualize

their personhood in their impaired condition. Personhood is not exhausted inrelation or activity, as I argue.

16. Barth denies that human personhood is avestigium Dei or trinitatis(1/1,

334-5;1V/2, 338) in any direct or complete sense, since this would involve a

" second root' of the doctrine of the Trinity alongside that of revelation" and

introduce the notiono analogia entis (Torrance 1996, 125).

17. Barth notes that Christian persons need communion: "Just as a man would

not be a man in and forhimself, in isolation from his fellow man, so a Chris

tian would not be a Christian in and forhimself, separated from the fellow

ship of the saints" {ChurchDog?naticsIV/1, 750-51).

18. For an extensive treatment of the concept of divine personhood in Barth and

Zizioulas, see Collins, Chapter 5: The Concept of Personhood (2001, 107-

161).

19. Ware (1996) draws upon New Testament and patristic sources to construct

an Orthodox view of the meaning of human personhood and the irreducible

value of each person.

20. For recent expositions on the dialogical and dialectical understanding of divine

and human personhood, sec the following: Macmurray (1961), McFadyen

(1990), McFague (1987) and Schwbel and Gunton, eds. (1991).

21. We must avoid mapping our social ideals onto the divine life, as Kilby warns

(2000, 432-45).

22. Gunton(1991 )explores the anthropological implications of theimago Deivis-

-vis the question of personhood.

lo. Moltmann also discusses divine personhood and helpfully notes that we

cannot reduce the concept of person to relationality: "Person and relation

therefore have to be understood in a reciprocal relationship. Here there are no

persons without relations; but there are no relations without persons either"

(1993, 172).

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